

Theses of the Doctoral (PhD) Dissertation

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION CRISES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ANGLO–RUSSIAN RELATIONS: CONCEPTS, MECHANISMS AND THEIR STAGES, 1821–1838

Katalin Schrek

Tutor: Dr. Erzsébet Bodnár



UNIVERSITY OF DEBRECEN

Doctoral School of History and Ethnography

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I. OBJECTIVE OF THE DOCTORAL THESIS, DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT

There are various perspectives to the examination of the Eastern Question associated with the decay of the Ottoman Empire. Several studies and monographs in the fields of social history, economic history, political and diplomatic history have been published on the set of related problems and sub-issues persisting through the 18th and 19th centuries. Within the subject of the Eastern Question, however, still there are orientations for further research, as well as a set of topics the examination of which continues to be relevant and valid even today. One of these fields is the crisis management of Great Britain and Russia in questions related to the Ottoman Empire. In the beginning of the 19th century the two Great Powers were active participants or rather “shapers” of the crises emerging at the Balkans and the Middle East. As to their foreign policy strategy they had profound disagreements, and yet they shared a common need to exercise their political influence over the Porte, to which the crisis situations of the 1820s and 1830s had offered plenty of opportunities.

After 1815, London and St Petersburg, as the two leading states of the European Great Power system, had become main representatives of preserving the Vienna system and of the continental peace. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire starting from 1821 – although not without previous background events – had turned into a source of constant conflicts. The Porte sought to maintain the integrity of the Empire as well as to restrain the independence aspirations of nations at the Balkan region, while Great Britain and Russia mainly followed their geopolitical interests, which greatly defined the extent and the character of their measures taken in the given issues. Besides, in their participation in the affairs of the Eastern Question a duality of cooperation and competition had emerged during the 1820s and 1830s. The reason for that is the fact that after the end of the Napoleonic Wars the relationship of Great Britain and Russia could be mainly characterized by a certain rivalry. As opposed to the Tsarist policy, that besides maintaining the European equilibrium system urged greater influence on the continental issues, stood the British approach of compensating St Petersburg’s ambitions and protecting their own economic interests. Nevertheless, during the years of Anglo–Russian rivalry, persisting through decades, there were certain situations – all related to the Eastern Question –, which called forth and ended in the cooperation of the two states.

In my thesis, I focussed on and wanted to present the crisis management methods of Great Britain and Russia used in the Eastern Question and the main factors influencing those methods. What were the basic tendencies in the attitude of the Foreign Office and of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministerstvo Inostrannyh Del (henceforward: MID)? What were the geo-

strategic aspects of the concepts and principles applied during the international conflicts? In which cases can we observe a greater degree of engagement on the part of London and St Petersburg, and what were the policy instruments used during their actions? Furthermore, what was the Ottoman Empire's position in the interrelations of the two cooperating and competing Great Powers?

The timeframe of this paper is the period between 1821 and 1838. The starting point is the beginning of the Greek Cause – the decisive conflict of the 1820s at the Balkans –, while the close date is the second Egyptian Crisis and the period of escalation of the Persian conflict with Herat in 1838. Both can be regarded as milestones as to their impact on Great Britain's and Russia's political attitude and interrelations concerning the Eastern Question. The importance of the Greek Cause was defined by the fact that it highlighted the Porte's internal problems and turned the European Great Powers' attention to those, becoming the first precedent (besides the Napoleonic Wars) when the English diplomacy intentionally intervened with the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. For Russia, the changes taking place in the Balkan region were matter of basic priorities in their foreign policy, therefore the scenes of political actions of the two states had coincided. As a result, a strong alliance was formed on the background of this conflict, the success of which led to weakening of the Porte and escalation of the Anglo-Russian conflict during the 1830s. The second Egyptian Crisis and its closure (Convention of London – Straits Convention) was a temporary resting point in the rivalry between Britain and Russia in issues related to the Middle East.

In parallel with the Egyptian crisis a new course of events had begun, the war of the Persian Empire with the Principality of Herat. The conflict became a turning point for two reasons: firstly, the Anglo-Russian rivalry had expanded to a new scene, the Central Asian region (more precisely the Afghan region), and secondly, after this point Great Britain's and Russia's conflicts of interest overstepped the borders of the Ottoman Empire, and the struggle for political and economic influence took a new shape.

II. OUTLINE OF THE METHODS APPLIED

When processing the subject, I focused on parallel investigation and resource management methods. Investigation of the above described problem from the aspect of diplomatic history required an approach that goes beyond the traditional political history demonstration. For that reason, when revealing the British and Russian concepts and mechanisms of foreign policy, I applied the methodology of parallel conflict analysis. The simultaneous presentation of problem

management concepts used by Great Britain and Russia in the same situations, on the one hand allowed me to investigate the British and the Russian foreign policy behaviour based on the same set of criteria, and on the other hand to learn the attitudes of the two political rivals, as well as the methods used by them with all the underlying motivations.

Beside the bilateral investigation another important aspect of this study was the systematization of the conflict management mechanisms observed from British and Russian side. Based on the resources available and the character of the problem solving, I introduced the investigation of the regional character of the given issues as a new assessment criterion. I classified the conflicts emerging during the observed period based on geopolitical scenes, analysing the conflicts in question according to geographical regions. Based on the structure of the thesis, the description of different topics classified by geopolitical scenes was made in accordance with the thematic and chronological order of the related conflicts. Besides, my methodology included the determination of the crisis managements used both from British and from Russian side, as well as the description of the theoretical background of these methods.

In my thesis special emphasis was put on the presentation of the practical background of diplomatic relations, in many cases with a focus on informal negotiation processes. The background negotiations of the leaders and delegates of Foreign Office and MID occasionally had greater significance than the official consultations, summarizing the consequences of pre-negotiations. Revealing the content of these informal discussions in certain cases gave us an insight to the processes of foreign affairs decision making.

During my research I used primary sources from archives as well as published documents. Beside documents of The National Archives/Public Record Office (London) Foreign Office related to Russia I also used source documents related to the 1820s and 1830s of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire published within the volumes of the *Vneshnaja Politika Rossii 19 i nachala 20 veka Dokumenti Rossiyskava Ministerstva Inostrannyh Dyel*. In addition to the mentioned sources, I also used documents of *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Großbritannien – Diplomatischen Korrespondenz* fond, along with the source documents of the University of Oxford Balliol Archives related to David Urquhart and of the British Library collection on the Lieven family.

III. NEW SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OF THE DISSERTATION

1. Regionally differing conflict management mechanisms: different methods – at different geopolitical scenes

The main consequence of the source documents is the fact that the mechanisms of Great Britain's and Russia's conflict management and the used methods differed in each geopolitical region. The regional classification of issues of the Eastern Question turned out to be entirely valid, since the methods and measures of enforcement of British and Russian diplomatic interests depended on their individual position in the given region, as well as on the existing relations within the region. In total, the Foreign Office and the MID were not able to apply the same methods during the Greek Cause and the Middle Eastern crisis, since the conditions of the intervention and interference differed in the two regions, and the British and the Russian foreign policy adapted to these conditions. The conflicts investigated in this paper were classified in three major geopolitical units:

- The Balkan region: the Greek Cause, the Russo–Turkish war of 1828–1829
- The region of the Black Sea (Eastern Balkan and Caucasus region): the cause of the Danubian Principalities, the Vixen affair
- Middle Eastern region: first and second Egyptian crisis
- Central Asia (as an outlook): the Persian–Herat war

The thesis followed this structure while describing the crisis management mechanisms of Great Britain and Russia, which were presented through the examples linked to the regional units.

2. Mechanisms of the British crisis management

Determination of the mechanisms of the British and Russian crisis management methods was a significant part of this thesis. On the part of Great Britain we can highlight two different methods of problem solving: peaceful crisis management, when the participating parties seek to restore the balance through bilateral – or depending of the character of the conflict – through multilateral negotiations; and as opposed to that, armed intervention. English diplomacy predominantly used the first kind of crisis management. In the 1820s and 1830s two main tendencies could be defined in the field of peaceful resolution.

- Direct involvement: in which case the Foreign Office sought to find a consensus through negotiations, while representing their individual interests and standpoint. This situation has a significant stake, since the Cabinet of London took part in the political crisis as well.

- Mediation: it was the case when Great Britain was not directly involved in a conflict but still took an official part by mediating between the conflicting parties as an outsider, aiming at creating consensus and peace.

These were the tools the Foreign Office used in the Greek Cause, during the Russo–Turkish war of 1828–1829 and the Egyptian crises. The application of a third option took place due to the failure of those diplomatic tools:

- Armed intervention: military intervention, an example to which was the battle of Navarino and the Persian–Herat conflict.

The Foreign Office in the majority of the cases decisively refused the crises resolution through armed forces. It was due to the fact that London feared to act out a military engagement in the Eastern Question, since whatever was the mechanism used – without Russia or in alliance with her – it would in each case involve the mobilization of the Tsarist military forces, which would cause a threat to one of the basic units of British diplomacy: to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire’s integrity. The methods used in the Central Asian region were completely different. In the case of the Persian Empire or the Afghan Khanates to the East, the Foreign Office found armed intervention acceptable, moreover, directly applicable, while in the context of European, Balkan and Middle East crises it was regarded virtually impossible.

3. Tools of the Russian crisis management

As regards Russia’s political tools, we can find similar classification as in Great Britain’s case. The possibility of diplomatic discussions and consultations is present here as well, followed by the alternatives of peaceful or armed intervention. In the case of the St Petersburg Cabinet, the character of intervention to conflicts must be discussed in a more nuanced way, since during the observed decades it showed significant differences. In the 1820s, especially during the last years of reign of Alexander I, the Great Power intervention was regarded as a viable possibility of management of the Balkan Crisis. In this respect Russia had two alternatives, with regard to the European balance of power:

- Collective engagement: which was based on the traditions of the congress system functioning between 1818–1822 and included the cooperation of the leading states of the Concert of Europe. These were the basic characteristics of Emperor Alexander I’s endeavours related to the Greek Cause in the period between 1822 and 1825.
- Limited partnership: it is the case when the coalition of intervening allies did not include each of the European Great Powers, instead it became a direct and exclusive partnership

of two states. The example to that was the formation of the Anglo–Russian coalition on the turn of 1825 and 1826. This method projected the exclusive actions and cooperation of the contracting parties without the involvement of the other states within the pentarchy.

4. Impact of domestic factors on the foreign policy of Foreign Office and MID

Along with the evolution of international events and the balance of power of the Great Powers, Great Britain's and Russia's policy and problem solving methods applied in respect of the Eastern Question had also been influenced by the domestic affairs of the two states, which may have defined the degree of their activity in their foreign affairs policy. Although domestic policy on the whole did not have a continuous impact on the activities of the Foreign Office and MID during the observed decades, there were certain events that had clear effect on the evolution of foreign affairs. In the context of the Russian Empire, the death of Alexander I and the subsequent Decembrist Uprising were such events. The revolt against the Tsarist rule, besides laying down the conservative direction of the domestic policy of Nicolas I, encouraged the new emperor as regards the Eastern Question to continue the processes initiated by his predecessor. One of the main reasons of the continuity emerging in the management of foreign affairs was an aspiration to consolidate the domestic situation, since the domestic crisis itself, as well as its management, presented the St Petersburg Cabinet in a negative light in the perception of the Western European states. In a situation like that, with the decline of international prestige and a possible threat to lose the English support, it seemed impossible for Russia to initiate the war on the agenda against Turkey.

In the case of Great Britain, it was not specific events but rather long-term domestic processes influencing the tendencies in Britain's foreign policy. One of these was the period between the Congress of Vienna and the Congress of Verona (1815–1822). After the closure of Napoleonic Wars the political elite supported the policy of non-involvement with the European affairs as opposed to Castlereagh's Eurocentric policy, which was noticeable in the first reactions related to the Greek Cause as well. The period of Whig reforms at the beginning of 1830s and the recognition of Catholic Emancipation before that in 1828 both resulted in a similar situation. Besides generating a debate and political split in the leading elite, these issues – along with other European issues – took attention away from the set of problems connected with the Eastern Question. On the other hand, the emergence of the Russophobe tendency in England in the mid-1830s (public lectures, essays, monographies, newspaper articles – mostly

works of David Urquhart, John McNiell and Alison Archibald), also enhanced the evolvement of the Russophobe attitude, already present in the official English foreign policy.

Among the factors shaping politics we can mention the question of economic orientation as well. To guarantee Levantine trade and connections with their Indian Crown Colony in the formation of Foreign affairs required for Great Britain the enforcement of a basically economy-oriented approach, therefore the Foreign Office elaborated their foreign policy applied in the Eastern Question and in the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the British economic interests. The economic priorities of the St Petersburg cabinet were defined by the needs to integrate Russia's southern provinces into the Mediterranean trade along with the enhancement of the Russian economic activity within the Ottoman Empire.

The third element of the internal factors was the attitude of the opinion leaders shaping politics, in which marked differences could be observed on the English and Russian sides. On the British side the methods of Britain's political actions and of crisis management in issues of the Eastern Question were defined by governors of the Foreign Office, the Foreign Ministers (George Canning, Lord Palmerston), and in exceptional cases by the Prime Ministers (George Canning, Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington), in accordance with the above described political principles. Based on the structure of the domestic policy, substantive decisions were always made by the current Government, while the monarch had no control over foreign affairs. As opposed to that, the Russian leadership in foreign affairs was completely different. One of the most important characteristics of the era was the fact that the monarch played major role in the determination of the foreign affairs directive, as well as in shaping other political alternatives and tendencies. Although the current foreign minister did have its significance within the St Petersburg Government under the control and coordination of MID, the decisive factor of the crisis management strategy and control of the foreign policy was the Tsar itself. This was the case under the reign of both emperors, Alexander I and Nicholas I, but Alexander's foreign policy was more predominant.

In the context of Russia, it is worth highlighting the role of the well-trained Foreign apparatus, which besides the practical implementation of diplomatic processes also functioned as the Tsar's consultancy in foreign affairs. As to implementation of background negotiations and maintaining informal communication we must point out the activity of two important personalities, of count K. A. Lieven, Russian ambassador in London, and of K. R. Nesselrode, leader of the MID.

5. Theoretical and practical background of English and Russian mechanisms of crisis management

In the functioning of English and Russian mechanisms of crisis management certain differences, as well as matches and/or similarities can be observed. As to differences, the first important feature was the set of principles defining the tendencies in foreign policy. In this respect, the Foreign Office shaped his diplomacy guideline in accordance with a firm concept, which had been unchanged for decades. The corner stones of interests and main pursuits of the London cabinet were to maintain and ensure the smooth functioning of the British trade volume, in the Eastern Question to guarantee the Porte's power, while within the Ottoman Empire to enforce the British trade interests, by ensuring the trade routes leading to India and the prosperity of the Crown colony. As opposed to that, the St Petersburg Government applied a less consistent foreign policy strategy. Although the Russian foreign policy had their certain constant features as well, such as the endeavour to achieve access to the Mediterranean or to systematically and gradually weaken the Ottoman Empire's power, I still think that the foreign policy of Russia applied in the Eastern Question during the investigated period was not built around a constant predetermined concept but kept being adjusted to Russia's changing needs and the changing international circumstances.

Another important difference was that the Russian foreign policy, beside the strict rational considerations, also included an approach based on ideological principles. It was characterized by the period between 1821–1825, when the Tsarist court as regards crisis management wanted to stick to the principles of dynasties and legitimism of the post 1815 continental system, as well as to the conservative ideas formulated by the Holy Alliance and their attitude opposed to the national-revolutionary movements. Moreover, on top of this was the unique feature of the Tsarist foreign policy, a sense of mission in protection of the Christian believers of the Ottoman Empire. This sort of foreign policy attitude based on ideological principles was not characteristic of the Russian diplomacy in general, it was exclusively the influence of Alexander I's political views on the Russian foreign policy, not typical in the period between 1825 and 1838. Again, in the case of the Foreign Office no precedents to such ideological impacts can be found.

The English and Russian mechanisms of crisis management at different geopolitical regions must be taken into consideration as the third aspect of observation. The first scene is the Balkan and in connection to that the Greek Cause, in which the problem escalated the most among all the conflicts investigated in this paper, both in space and time. The actions during the first stage of the conflict cannot be considered as Great Power intervention at all, however,

from 1821, the issue came to the forefront of the Russian diplomacy and from 1824, it became of international importance. Starting from that year St Petersburg launched extremely intense negotiation processes aiming to find a solution to the Greek–Turkish conflict; and between 1824 and 1825, Russia undertook the organization of a collective Great Power action, but without success. The lack of interest from the side of the European Great Powers gave way to the possibility of a new intervention and cooperation: the possibility of the Anglo–Russian cooperation in 1826.

The Balkan scene was a neuralgic point both from English and Russian side, since the states concerned entered into alliance and took action in favour of the Greek independence, and yet, they were driven by entirely different motives in their pursuit to achieve this goal. By promoting the autonomy of Greece, Great Britain wanted to restore the inner peace and the strength of power of the Porte; while Russia's aim with the Greek independence was to give another strike to their neighbour to weaken them, since due to their geopolitical position they were one of the main hindrances to the Russian ambitions. The clashes of interest perceived within the cooperation on the long run turned out to be a divisive force and the Anglo–Russian coalition existing during the Greek–Turkish crisis functioned temporarily only, and after the 1828–1829 Russo–Turkish war permanently split off.

The beginning of the 1830s was the period when the issues of the Black Sea and Middle East region came primarily to the forefront. After the Russo–Turkish war of 1828–1829, the Russian Empire managed to arrange conditions that created the proper prerequisites to the enhancement of the political influence at the Danubian Principalities, as well as to the expansion of Russia's role as a protector over the given provinces. The Russian diplomacy did not fully exploit the advantage given by the victory of 1829, but due to the restrained attitude to problem solving Russia gained new possibilities and territories of influence. Examples to that were Moldavia and Wallachia in the western region of the Black Sea, while in the first Turco–Egyptian conflict it was the Government of Constantinople, which left room to the implementation of the Russian foreign policy endeavours. On the other hand, the Russian Foreign policy kept taking into account the basic economic needs of the Empire that required the maintenance of good relations with Great Britain. This was the reason why Russia – beside the achievements in the Eastern Question – found it important to maintain their political and thereby economic connections with Britain, not wanting to threaten those by a major international crisis and intentionally exercising a moderate attitude related to the Eastern Question in the 1830s.

The English crisis management with regard to the Greek Cause proceeded according to a well-built concept, the objectives of which were the solution of the Balkan crisis along with Russia's holding in check. From the point where the latter seemed unrealistic (Russo–Turkish war of 1828–1829), the Foreign Office started to consistently eliminate all the elements of the cooperation with the MID.

The London Government participated with different intensity in each geopolitical scene of the 1830s. In the Black Sea region they wanted to counterbalance the growing Russian influence using economic expansion, while in the Middle East both of the Great Powers tried to avoid direct political confrontation. At the end of the 1830s however, a new scene and a new crisis emerged within the Anglo–Russian interrelations: the Afghan region in Central Asia, which changed the course of Great Britain's and Russia's rivalry and brought changes in the use of crisis management tools. At this time, St Petersburg still tried to avoid the strengthening of the British–Russian conflict, although in the region – far from the European territories – Great Britain took firmer decisions without less hesitation to apply armed forces to protect the Principality of Herat. In turn, the indicative British military actions of 1838–1839 undoubtedly projected the new direction of the British and Russian expansion and a new chapter of the two great power's rivalry.



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List of publications related to the dissertation

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
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
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