

# Reconsidering the Dative Shift

A Construction Grammar Approach

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

My dissertation deals with the properties and behaviour of verbs which appear in the following two constructions:

(1) a. Jack gave Jill a rose. (V NP NP)

b. Jack gave a rose to Jill. (V NP to-NP)

(2) a. Jack bought Jill a teddy bear. (V NP NP)

b. Jack bought a teddy bear for Jill. (V NP for-NP)

This phenomenon is conventionally referred to with the terms 'dative shift/alternation/transformation/rule' in the literature.

Why did I choose this topic? In the first place, I find it important because as a lecturer involved in language teacher training, I can see that it presents an **acquisition problem** for language learners to decide which verb participates in the **double object**, which in the **prepositional construction** and which in both. Thus the dissertation sets out to give an explanation for the non-participation of certain verbs in either of these constructions if semantically they belong to classes the other members of which take part in the alternation. I also find it interesting because the topic has its appeal for both syntax-based and semantics-based theories revealing a rich network of connections especially between lexical semantics and syntax. Further, it involves the theoretical question of what the status of the dative is in the grammatical system of English:

- (i) should it belong to syntax as a case or alternation (also referred to as transformation or shift in the literature),
- (ii) should it be dealt with on the interface of syntax and semantics as a kind of thematic role, or
- (iii) should it be handled within lexical semantics as a kind of lexical rule?

The example of English even raises the question whether it is language universal or not, as in this language it displays features that are unique in comparison with the situation in other Indo-European languages. The dissertation sets out to answer these questions, as well.

The theoretical framework I have chosen to cope with these problems consists of two interrelated parts: in a broader sense the dissertation is based on the theory, findings and methods of **cognitive grammar**. In a narrower sense, especially as regards the investigation of the verb classes involved in the phenomenon, I use the methods of Goldberg's **construction grammar**. The two theoretical frameworks are in many respects interrelated: construction grammar developed out of Fillmore's **case grammar**, which also promoted the birth and development of cognitive grammar.

My reasons for this are the following: as I am dealing with a topic which displays rich connections between semantics and syntax, I find a linguistic theory of greater help which does not regard syntax as independent of semantics, and which gives me the grounding to discover **motivatedness** between meaning and linguistic form. I find that the treatment of the phenomenon in generative theories is less successful in giving an overall and consistent account of the problem despite the fact that it has yielded significant results (especially in matters of details) that are referred to in the relevant sections of the dissertation together with the drawbacks involved (see Chapter 3). I believe that we can get closer to explanatory adequacy if we try to cope with the dative in the spirit of Lakoff's following ideas put forward in *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (1987:465) about the principles of cognitive grammar:

- a) '... just about all other theories assume that there is a clear division between the grammar and the lexicon, with the grammar providing structures and the lexicon providing meaningful words to plug into grammatical structures. We will see that such a clear division is problematic, and that there is more likely a continuum between the grammar and the lexicon.'
- b) '... other theories of grammar assume some form of atomism, namely, that the meaning of a grammatical construction is a computable function of the meanings of its parts. We will argue instead that grammatical constructions in general are *holistic*, that is, that the meaning of the whole construction is motivated by the meanings of the parts, but is not computable from them.' (ibid.)
- c) '... syntactic categories and grammatical relations have radial structure, with a prototypical center that is predictable on semantic grounds; the noncentral members constitute extensions which are not predictable on a semantic basis, but which are typically semantically or pragmatically motivated.' (ibid.)

In the last quotation Lakoff speaks about semantic and pragmatic motivation separately. Another key figure of cognitive grammar, Langacker formulates it more clearly that this theory does not make a distinction between semantic and pragmatic meaning: 'Linguistic meaning does not, however, reside in content alone, for we are able to construe the same content in alternate ways, resulting in substantially different meanings. Though largely ignored in traditional semantics, construal is crucial for both semantic and grammatical structure.' (1999:5) This indicates that cognitive grammar does not deny the existence of objective reality but does not accept the idea of formalist (generative) theories that categories and relationships exist independently from the observer or **conceptualiser** (who we can identify with the speaker or occasionally with the addressee), who would be passive, which means that cognition would merely be a passive process of creating mental representations of objectively existing categories. The standpoint of cognitive grammar is that the same

objectively existing situation can be given a different **construal**, which has crucial consequences for grammatical structure. Langacker defines the basic grammatical relations of subject and object in terms of construal, an important aspect of which is the choice of focal elements. He claims that the subject is prototypically the most **salient** or primary element termed the **trajector** (tr) in the profiled relationship. The object is prototypically a second focal element called **landmark** (lm). For example, the following two sentences describe the same objectively existing situation but with a different construal and consequently, a different subject-object alignment (1999:8):

- (3) a. Jill (**trajector/subject**) sits in front of Jack (**landmark/prepositional object**) in the class.
- b. Jack (**trajector/subject**) sits behind Jill (**landmark/prepositional object**) in the class.

Construal is later referred to as essential in the treatment of the relationship of the two structures at issue, i.e. the double object and prepositional object one (section 4.2).

According to cognitive theory, ‘we organize our knowledge by means of structures called **idealized cognitive models**’ (ICMs) (Lakoff, 1987:68). An ICM can be roughly described as a situation (or mental space), its participants and the relationships that hold between them, as conceived of by the conceptualiser. This term quite closely corresponds to Langacker’s **(abstract) domain**. A typical structured ICM is the **scenario**, a sequence of events, with typical components provided by **kinaesthetic image schemas** (Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987, 1991). ‘Image schemas include such notions as source-path-goal, container-content, center-periphery, linkage, force, and balance. They are highly abstract conceptions, primarily configurational, which are grounded in everyday bodily experience and play an

essential role in structuring our mental world. These schematic conceptions emerge in physical experience (experience with objects moving from source to goal along spatial paths, with actual containers and what they hold, etc.) and provide the basis for projecting it metaphorically to other conceptual realms. '(Langacker 1999:3)

We often categorise objects in terms of a scenario. If we say,

(4) Jill is going shopping.

when we see our neighbour leaving the house in the morning with a typical shopping-bag, we identify one stage of a scenario, incorporating the destination into it, although it may easily be the case that Jill will have to travel several bus stops to get to the shops which are thus not at all in sight for us as speakers-conceptualisers.

In the last quotation mention is made of **metaphor**. Cognitive grammar regards it as fundamental in human understanding and categorisation: 'Of prime importance is the growing recognition that *metaphor* is a pervasive and fundamental aspect of our mental life; far from being merely decorative, it is a vehicle for understanding (even constructing) our experience that generally transcends individual linguistic expressions. ... many (if not most) of the cognitive domains invoked by predication are metaphorically structured; and at the analytical level, metaphor exerts a powerful influence on linguistic theorizing.' (Langacker 1991:8). 'Metaphor is characterised as the conceptual phenomenon whereby a *target domain* is structured and understood with reference to another, more basic *source domain*' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). When we speak about the *foot of a hill* or the *leg of a table*, we carry over concepts from our body as a basic source domain (representing primary experience for us) to the target domain made up of various objects in our natural or cultural environment. This

cognitive theory of **metaphorical extension** is applied in Chapter 5 to give an explanation for the participation of certain semantically delineated verb classes in the dative shift.

It is also claimed by cognitive grammar that language would not be able to exist as a means of communication without metaphor and **polysemy** since the human brain would not be able to describe the infinite world with terms fully independent of and unrelated to one another. In the dissertation the ditransitive construction is presented as a polysemous one.

Cognitive theory does not see categories (including grammatical ones) in the way that category membership is unambiguously delineated by a set of **defining properties**, the presence and absence of all of which would determine whether an entity belongs to a category or is completely out of it. Instead, it claims that categories can have fuzzy edges with some entities in marginal positions and that even among entities that are fully within a category, some members are better examples of the category in question than others – which brings in the term **prototype**. Swallows e.g. are much more central members of the class of birds than penguins as they are able to fly, which property is basic to our experience. The dissertation deals with the dative in this vein as a radial category with a prototype in the centre.

In the cognitive theory lexicon and grammar form a continuum (see quotation a) by Lakoff above) and structures are fully described as **symbolic** in nature. Rules are schematisations of symbolically complex expressions, and can be described as **constructional schemas**. If one construction is conventionalised, i.e. in it speakers learn to effect a dependency between two elements in a particular kind of structural configuration, that constitutes a pattern which might be extended to other constructions (Langacker 1999:121). In the dissertation I claim that this happened to the ditransitive construction, which came into being in connection with verbs like *give* (three-place predicates) and then attracted other classes of verbs on the basis of semantic motivation.

While in generative grammar the emphasis is on general rules and universal principles and partial productivity is a problem, cognitive grammar emphasizes the role of **low level generalisations** (Langacker 1987, 1991). This has the advantage that it fits the ‘sloppiness’ and constantly changing character of a natural language to a much greater extent.

Cognitive grammar is basically equivalent to construction grammar (Goldberg 1995) in that they both postulate that constructions are separate entities in grammar with syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features of their own and with form-meaning correspondences not strictly predictable from knowledge of the rest of the grammar. Once they come into being in the language, they get a certain degree of independence with the capability of attracting lexical items the semantics of which is compatible with their own. It is also common between the two theories that they claim that simple clause constructions are associated directly with semantic structures which reflect scenes basic to human experience and that we can view the construction as imposing a certain semantic construal on the scene described (Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1991, 1999, Goldberg 1992). In the case of the dative this basic scene is the transfer of physical and non-physical objects, without which no human society could exist or survive.

There are, however, significant differences between the two semantics-centred theories. Langacker identifies it in the fact that construction grammar ‘does not attempt the full reduction of grammar to assemblies of symbolic structures’. (1999: 381) This is reflected in the difference that while cognitive grammar does not subscribe to the distinction between language as a system and language as use and does not separate semantics from pragmatics, construction grammar deals with these levels separately. This is revealed in the way Goldberg adopts and elaborates the **Principle of No Synonymy of Grammatical Forms**<sup>1</sup>, which goes back to Bolinger’s *Meaning and Form*: ‘If two constructions are syntactically distinct and

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<sup>1</sup> This is also a basic tenet in cognitive grammar as the principle of **iconicity/symbolicity**.



S(emantically)-synonymous, then they must not be P(ragmatically)-synonymous. If two constructions are syntactically distinct and P-synonymous, then they must not be S-synonymous.’ (Goldberg 1995:67). A consequence of this is that in some of her diagrams describing the features of the different constructions, the semantic and pragmatic levels appear separately. I have adopted this method to be able to differentiate between conceptual content and construal (see above) as I have found that features that distinguish the verb classes involved in the dative shift often lie in the former while differences in construal are a feature of the particular constructions, double object or prepositional.

A further difference is that while cognitive grammar emphasizes the **holistic** character of constructions (see quotation b) by Lakoff above) where motivatedness has greater importance than **compositionality**, construction grammar intends to preserve the latter.

## 1.1 TERMINOLOGY

As regards the terminology of this topic, from among the conventional expressions to denote the phenomenon at issue I am going to stick to the term **Dative Shift** in preference to the also commonly used Dative Movement, Dative Alternation, Dative Transformation and Dative Rule, in line with the terminology of cognitive grammar literature<sup>2</sup>. I am only going to use the term ‘indirect object’ for noun phrases following the verb directly and preceded by no preposition, in contrast to some publications which tend to use this term for *to*- and *for*-phrases, as well, surely bearing a kind of semantic equivalence in mind. However, this approach relies on a restricted, truth-functional view of meaning, which I am not going to adopt here as it contradicts the Principle of No Synonymy of Grammatical Forms (see above),

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<sup>2</sup> The terms Dative Movement and Dative Transformation are preferred in generative theories, which are not the theoretical framework the dissertation relies on.

and takes no account of the semantic import of the prepositions in the constructions. I am not going to use the term 'internal dative' or 'oblique', which also often appear in the literature.

## 2. THE DATIVE SHIFT AND ARGUMENT STRUCTURE

This chapter deals with the **lexical semantic aspects** of the dative shift. The objective of this section is to demonstrate by reviewing the works of authors who dealt (or started to deal) with the phenomenon in an formalist-generative framework but considered the semantic aspects of the problem as built into the theory in the form of the structure of the lexical entry (arguments, subcategorisation, selectional restrictions) that on the one hand they were not able to give a systematic account of the phenomenon and on the other hand paved the way for (Fillmore) or got close to the ideas of cognitive and construction grammars (Pinker).

### ***2.1 Morphophonological criteria for participation in the dative shift***

Green (1974:78-79), Allerton (1978:23) and Gropen et al. (1989:206) identify **morphological and phonological criteria** for participation in the dative shift. As it can be seen, examples have been found to refute them and without much effort others could be mentioned, too:

- i) Only one-syllable words may have internal indirect objects – obvious exceptions are *carry*, *cab*, *promise*.
- ii) Only initial-stressed words containing less than three syllables may appear in the double object construction. Problems are: there are final-stressed bi-syllabic words which permit the double object construction:

(5) I advanced Sam £10.

Similar examples are *assign him a seat*, *allot him a space* or *award him a prize*. In connection with these, Grimshaw and Prince (1986, quoted in Pinker 1989:46) warn, though, that they begin with an unstressed schwa, which is not a complete foot, and they save the claim by saying that when the initial syllable consists of more than a schwa, as in *describe*, *return*, *explain* or *obtain*, the dative shift is often blocked. (Not always, however, as it can be illustrated by the examples of *guarantee* or *reserve*.)

Some verbs with three syllables also permit the double object construction:

(6) The correspondent telephoned them the news.

iii) Only verbs of Anglo-Saxon origin appear in the double object construction. This claim originates in facts about the history of the English language. In Old English the order 'V-NP-dat NP-acc' was more common than the order 'V-NP-acc NP-dat'. In Middle English the case markers eroded, which resulted in a 'V NP<sub>goal</sub> NP<sub>theme</sub>' verb phrase structure similar to the double object construction in present-day English. In early modern English very few verbs appeared in the prepositional form. Then in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries many new verbs entered the language as borrowings from French, which marked the goal phrase with the preposition *à*. As a result, the French argument structure was translated and the preposition *to* was used to mark the goal argument. Verbs of Anglo-Saxon origin were allowed to take this argument structure but the verbs borrowed from French were restricted to the prepositional construction (Visser 1963, quoted in Pinker 1989:45-46). Aronoff (1976) suggests an alternative formulation of the Latinate/Anglo-Saxon distinction saying that Latinate verbs are those which are formed with the combination of a set of stems and prefixes such as *re-*, *de-*, *pre-*, *in-*, *con-*, *trans-*, *sub-*, *ad-*, *ex-* (prefixes) and *-fer*, *-mit*, *-sume*, *-ceive*, *-duce*, *-nounce*, *-pel*, *-plain* (stems).

Well-founded objections to this claim are:

- i) native speakers and even children know the restrictions on occurrence for these verbs regardless of or before they even know that other languages than English exist;
- ii) some verbs of Anglo-Saxon origin do not permit the double object construction:

(7) \*Jack muttered Jill silly compliments.

- iii) some verbs of Latinate/Romance origin do appear in the double object construction: e.g *permit, promise, offer*.

As Pinker points out (1989:45-46), there is a valid possibility to relate the etymological claim to the morphophonological one as usually it is the native verb stems that are monosyllabic or if polysyllabic, they have stress on the first syllable. He in fact mentions the verbs given as counterexamples under point iii) above as such that dativise because they have been assimilated to the native stress pattern while *donate* or *describe*, which do not have stress on the first syllable do not take part in the dative shift.

Further, phonological constraints cannot account for the fact that *give* does not allow the prepositional object construction with certain kinds of direct objects (see *give* as part of a complex predicate in 5.1.1.2).

Among the verbs of instrument of communication and creation there are also exceptions to the morphophonological constraint like:

- (8) a. Jack e-mailed/radioed him the message.
- b. Jack xeroxed him a copy.

In connection with these Goldberg (1992:42) states the generalisation that a verb from any class which is analysed to have a name or noun at its root is exempted from these constraints. In relation to this, Pinker (1989:122-123) remarks that in many areas of morphology the knowledge that a word stem is from another category gives it a special status regarding the rules that apply to it and quotes irregular inflection like the following: *Mary out-Sally-Rided* (instead of *\*out-Sally-Rode*) *Sally*.

In relation to the validity and relevance of the morphophonological constraints, the findings of child language acquisition research are essential. Gropen et al. (1989) report an experiment in which they invented new verbs, half monosyllabic, half polysyllabic, and exemplified their meanings in written stories for their subjects, who were then given sentences with these verbs appearing now in the double object construction and were asked to rate them according to how good they sounded. The result was that participants rated the double object sentences alternating with a *to*-prepositional construction much higher if they contained a monosyllabic word referring to transfer of possession than if they included a polysyllabic one. This clearly shows that morphophonological constraints (together with semantic ones, see later) are active in speakers' minds despite the fact that we are unable to delineate the class of dativizable verbs exclusively relying on them. At the same time the findings related to the morphophonological criteria fit in with the prototype theory of categorisation proposed by cognitive grammar in that there are no hard-and-fast defining properties which all members of the class of dativising verbs would share.

## **2.2 The dative in Fillmore's Case Grammar**

The dative has long been used as a term in linguistics. In traditional, pregenerative grammars it was used to denote one of the morphological cases of nouns. As English is a

morphologically poor language, in it we cannot speak about a separate dative case as even with the personal pronouns, where the case system has been best preserved, it conflated with the objective case. (Historically, in Old English there was, of course, a morphological dative case.) However, the previously mentioned long tradition of use may have been the reason why Charles Fillmore incorporated the dative in his list of **semantic cases** in his publications, *Toward a Modern Theory of Case* (1966), *The Case for Case* (1968a) and *Lexical Entries for Verbs* (1968b). In *The Case for Case* (1968a:24) he defined the dative as 'the case of the animate being affected by the state or action identified by the verb.' He also postulated that the various categorially introduced noun phrase types began with a preposition (1966:11) and rendered *to* for the dative (1968:30). The distinction he made between semantic case and **surface case** can be illustrated with the following much quoted examples where the NP *a hammer* representing the same semantic (deep structure) case (Instrumental) appears in different surface grammatical functions:

(9) John broke the window **with a hammer**. (Instrumental/ Prepositional object)

**The hammer** broke the window. (Instrumental/Subject)

Later Fillmore (1971) gave up the dative as a case label in his case inventory and broke it up into **Experiencer**, **Goal** and **Object**, thus specifying in what ways the animate being in question is affected by the state or action. He obviously did this modification because he turned to the consideration of inherent verb features through which deep structure cases are introduced. He gave the following definitions for them:

'Object (O), the entity that moves or changes or whose position or existence is in consideration.' e.g. *They put the table in front of the window.*

'Goal (G), the place to which something moves.' e.g. *He sent a telegram to New York.*

'Experiencer (E), the entity which receives or accepts or experiences or undergoes the effect of an action (earlier called by me 'Dative') e.g. *He gave a rose to the girl./He showed his newest painting to the visitors.* (1971:49).

On the other hand, this change also reflects the idea that the dative cannot really function as a semantic category as verbs which allow the dative shift have a similar surface structure but the arguments they select are semantically different. (In other words, the dative proved to be too broad a term either to function as the name of an argument/thematic role or even to name participant roles.)

Cook investigates this question very clearly in his **Case Grammar Matrix Model** (1978:299). He calls the cases which are required by the semantic valence of the verb propositional cases and remarks that they are defined in terms of the verb types with which they occur. Thus he introduces five propositional cases: Agent, Experiencer, **Benefactive**, Objective and Locative. If we compare this with Fillmore's treatment of the dative (his breaking it up into the three cases mentioned above), we find two new things: the Benefactive case is introduced as the case required by a benefactive verb denoting 'the possessor of an object or the nonagentive party in transfer of property.' e.g. *He gave the man a handful of banknotes*. By introducing this case Cook makes a clear-cut distinction between verbs and situations referring to concrete, material possession and transfer on the one hand (as typically exemplified by the verb *give*) and mental and spiritual ones on the other (as exemplified by verbs of transfer of a message such as *tell*). In other words, he breaks up Fillmore's Experiencer case, as for him the Experiencer is 'the person experiencing sensation, emotion, cognition and communication.' e.g. *She told her moving story to the man.*

In Cook's coherent system of verb types (1978:301) complex verbs, which require three complements, have the simple verb of their category in their semantic deep structure. Thus



e.g. he renders the following structure to *give*: CAUSE (A, COME ABOUT (HAVE, (B,O))).

In the formula A stands for the semantic case of Agent, B for Benefactive and O for Object:

(10) Jack gave Jill a red rose.

Jack caused Jill to have a red rose.

CAUSE (JACK, COME ABOUT (HAVE, (JILL, A RED ROSE)))

Such a semantic representation in the vein of componential analysis is of great help if we want to account for the various properties of dative shift: e.g. this explains why the referent of the indirect object needs to be prototypically animate, as it must be capable of possession.

### **2.3 Green's lexical semantic approach**

A similar type of approach starts from investigating how the lexical semantic features of the verbs involved in the dative shift are reflected in syntax and representatives of it end up in refuting the idea of a derivational relationship between the double object and prepositional object constructions on account of the fact that it is not fully productive in English. Some researchers taking this view (Allerton (1978), Dowty (1978), Oehrle (1976, 1983)) assign to ditransitive verbs like *give* two lexical entries with identical semantic content but different subcategorisation frames: one that specifies a direct object and a prepositional phrase and another that specifies two NP objects. A work which started from the transformational generative approach but took the first steps in the direction mentioned above was Georgia Green's monograph *Semantics and Syntactic Regularity* (1974). She did not cast away the idea of linking the double object and prepositional object constructions with transformations

but accounted for the syntactic behaviour of the verbs participating in the dative shift by referring to the lexical semantic features and semantic representations of the verbs themselves. In the conclusion of her book she claims that '... the [semantic] constraints on dative-movement are such that some define the  $VNP_iNP_j$  constructions which alternate with  $VNP_jPrepNP_i$  constructions... while others define the  $VNP_iPrepNP_j$  constructions which alternate with  $VNP_jNP_i$  constructions... This implies that there would be at least two dative-movement rules, one of which optionally converted structures that would otherwise be realised as  $VNP_iNP_j$  into  $VNP_j$  to  $NP_i$ , and one or more others which converted structures which would otherwise be realised as  $VNP_iPrepNP_j$  into  $VNP_jNP_i$ ' (Green 1974:149-150). Thus she postulated that the two constructions at issue were linked by syntactic rules but these were restricted with additional semantic constraints. Her reason for assuming two syntactic rules was that in a generative framework she had to take care to set up rules and identify constraints in a way that rules should not generate ungrammatical output at the deep structure level. For example, in this framework setting the animate indirect object referent constraint<sup>3</sup> on the ditransitive construction, which Green does, means that *give* must originate in the double object construction on account of examples like:

- (11) a. She gave him a smile.  
       b. \*She gave a smile to him.

For the same reason she postulates that *bring*, on the other hand, is inserted into a prepositional object construction at the deep structure level to avoid ungrammatical output like:

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<sup>3</sup> See Section 4.1.

- (12) a. He brought a chair to the table.  
b. \*He brought the table a chair.

In spite of the fact that positing two dative movement rules is questionable, her monograph contains a valuable categorisation of the verb classes involved in the dative shift and reveals a lot about the semantic and syntactic behaviour of these classes. Her intention is to give an overall account of the verbs taking part in the dative shift. On a semantic basis she distinguishes 5 TO-classes and 5 FOR-classes. A number of her findings are referred to in Chapter 5.

## **2.4 LFG, GB and Pinker's account**

The syntactic realizations characteristic of the dative shift are prototypically attached to the so called ditransitive verbs describing states of affairs which involve three participants. The argument structure of these verbs is represented in a variety of ways in the literature. The classic notation is an ordered list of phrasal categories that may simultaneously appear with the verb in the verb phrase: *give*: NP1 – NP2 PP. In **Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG)** the notation is like this (Bresnan, 1982) for the prepositional construction:

- (13) *give* (SUBJ, OBJ, OBL)

agent theme goal

Jack gave a rose to Jill.

and for the double object construction:

(14) *give* (SUBJ, OBJ2, OBJ)

agent recipient theme

Jack gave Jill a rose.

It indicates how many syntactically expressed arguments a verb has and the **thematic role** each argument is an example of. In **Government and Binding Theory** (GB) the notation for the prepositional construction is  $\langle\langle\textit{give to}\rangle\textit{z}\rangle\textit{y}, x$  and for the double object construction  $\textit{give } x\langle\textit{z},\textit{y}\rangle$  (e.g. Zubizarreta, 1987). Then linking rules map open arguments onto grammatical functions with the constraint that every open argument should be linked to a grammatical function (LFG) or underlying argument position (GB) and that no grammatical function or argument position should be linked to more than one argument. This corresponds roughly to **Function-Argument Biuniqueness** in LFG (Bresnan 1982) and to the **Theta Criterion** in GB (Chomsky 1981). For verbs participating in the dative shift the linking rules work in the following way: in their semantic representation these verbs can be broken up into atomic predicates:  $X \text{ causes } Y \text{ to go to } Z \rightarrow X \text{ causes } Z \text{ to have } Y$ . The first argument of *cause* (the agent, denoting the person initiating the transfer) is linked to the SUBJ function (LFG) or to the external argument (GB). The second argument of *cause* (the patient, denoting the thing undergoing physical change of place) is linked to the OBJ function (LFG) or to the direct internal argument (GB). The first argument of *go* (the theme, denoting the thing representing the object of transfer) is linked to the SUBJ function if it is not already linked to the OBJ function otherwise (LFG) or to the direct internal argument (GB). The argument of *to* (the goal, denoting the person to whom the thing changing place goes) is linked to the OBL function (LFG) or to the indirect internal argument (GB). The argument *Z* (denoting the person who benefits from the transfer) is linked to the OBJ2 function (LFG) or to the second internal argument (GB). Internal arguments are differentiated by Marantz (1984) and Levin

and Rappaport (1986) as being either direct, that is, receiving a thematic role directly from the verb, or indirect, that is, receiving a thematic role from an intervening preposition.

The states of affairs denoted by these verbs are characteristically transfers. This constitutes the thematic core associated with their argument structures. Pinker (1989:73) defines the thematic core as 'a schematisation of a type of event or relationship that lies at the core of the meanings of a class of possible verbs.' He illustrates the thematic core associated with the prepositional and double object constructions in the following way (1989:211-212):




Figure 1




Figure 2

The first diagram stands for the prepositional, the second for the double object construction for the sentences *Bob gave a ring to Sue* and *Bob gave Sue a ring*. One difference that is

revealed is that in the prepositional form the transferred object is the patient, in the double object form the recipient is the patient. Pinker underlines that this causes the semantic differences in which argument is construed as 'affected' in the double object form and the entailment differences in terms of the extent to which the recipient is affected in e.g. *He taught Sue German.* and *He taught German to Sue.*

These states of affairs are experientially/cognitively basic in the organisation of human society, social intercourse cannot be imagined without transfers of physical objects in the first place or metaphorically, without transfers of such non-physical objects as ideas. On the other hand, these states of affairs have an elaborate inner conceptual structure reflected by the highly complex syntax representing one of the most complicated structures possible in the English simple sentence. The conceptual complexity is revealed by the treatment of the dative shift by such authors as Green (see above) and Pinker (1989), who break these predicates up into more atomic ones. Green uses this method to explain certain features in the syntactic behaviour of these verbs, while Pinker (also Gropen et al. 1989) postulates that for a verb to participate in the dative shift, it is necessary but not sufficient to fulfil the following **rule of semantic representation**:  $X \text{ causes } Y \text{ to go to } Z \leftrightarrow X \text{ causes } Z \text{ to have } Y$ , which, he claims, causes a change in argument structure. The effect of the rule is indicated by the double-headed arrow in the diagram above. The expression 'necessary but not sufficient' here means that it is a **broad range rule** which needs to be supplemented with narrow range ones in order not to generate ungrammatical output. The example he mentions to illustrate this involves the verbs *hit* and *push*, the former allowing the dative shift, the latter not.

(15) a. Joanna hit the ball to Harold.

b. Joanna hit Harold the ball.

(16) a. Joanna pushed the chair to Harold.

b. \*Joanna pushed Harold the chair.<sup>4</sup>

As Pinker notes, the last sentence is unacceptable despite the fact that it can also be plausibly paraphrased as involving causation of possession. The paraphrases of the two pairs of sentences are:

(17) a. Joanna caused Harold to have the ball (by hitting it to him).

b. Joanna caused Harold to have the chair (by pushing it to him).

Therefore, as he remarks, **narrow range rules** are needed to predict correctly which specific verbs participate in the dative shift. His theory of lexical rules rests on a distinction in semantic features between a set that is 'visible to syntax' and one that is not.

It should be noted here that Pinker attributes the ungrammaticality of the last sentence to the fact that *hit* refers to 'instantaneous imparting of force' while *push* denotes 'continuous imparting of force'. However, I claim that the incorrectness of the example with *push* may rather be put down to the fact that in this context *Harold* may be interpreted solely as a Location and not as a Goal-Recipient. In other types of contexts where the idea of transfer is clearer, *push* allows both constructions.

(18) Harold pushed me a pint of beer.

A similar example given by Pinker himself is:

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<sup>4</sup> This is a doubtful example, however. There are authors who list *push* among the dative verbs (Green 1974, Levin 1993).



(19) a. Maradona pushed the ball to him.

b. Maradona pushed him the ball.

Here again, the idea of transfer is clearer as in the context of a football match the ball is passed to another player, in this case by pushing, in order for him to use it at his discretion with the aim to score a goal.

Pinker also states that the syntactic correspondence is generated with the help of linking rules that assign grammatical relations to particular semantic arguments:  $[-NP_1[\underline{to} NP_2]] \leftrightarrow [-NP_2 NP_1]$ , from which the double object syntax is predictable. In other words, the syntactic complement configuration of a clause is taken to be uniquely predictable from the semantic representation of the matrix verb. The mapping from semantic representations to particular complement configurations is performed by universal or near-universal linking rules (in detail see above, at the beginning of the section). Thus different complement configurations reflect differences in the semantic representations of the main verb. Different semantic representations of a particular verb stem, i.e. different verb senses, are related by generative lexical rules which take as input a verb with a particular semantics and yield as output a verb with a different semantics. Getting quite close to the theoretical standpoint of cognitive grammar, Pinker recognises that differences in semantics are not necessarily truth-functional differences, but may represent a different construal of the situation, a conceptual **gestalt shift**. His formula raises the very important issue of postulating separate cognitive and semantic structures. He opts for this to permit arbitrariness in the semantic structure, which, in turn, has the consequence that it permits individual languages to differ from one another in the semantic representations that they assign to words that are appropriate under identical

cognitive circumstances. This latter idea falls in with the fact that different languages describe reality from different aspects and in different ways.

As for verbs which take the preposition *for*, he assumes that benefactive relations can be subsumed under the abovementioned lexical rule as cases of metaphorical possession, extending the **Thematic Relations Hypothesis** (Jackendoff 1983), according to which thematic relations can apply not only to literal physical motion but also in a quasi-metaphorical way to changes of state or possession, including abstract 'possession' of ideas, as if ideas were moveable things.<sup>5</sup>

A debatable point in Pinker's theory is the connectedness of the two representations, which is indicated by the double-headed arrow in the formula and the diagram. Baker (1992) as well as Goldberg (1995) questioned and refuted this idea and claimed that the double object and the prepositional object constructions did not motivate each other. In this Goldberg (1995:105-106) referred to Bowerman (1982) and Gropen et al. (1989), who showed that in **child language acquisition** semantic restrictions were operative as soon as certain constructions were produced so there was no period of unconstrained overgeneralisation on the basis of a syntactic relation. For example, Gropen et al. (1989) showed that the semantic restriction that the recipient of a ditransitive construction must be animate/human was operative as soon as the ditransitive syntax was produced. Thus no sentence like the following was ever uttered by the children observed:

(20)\*Betty threw the tree the ball.

Gropen et al. noted that this called into question the idea that the dative shift was basically a syntactic operation. At the same time the lexical rule mentioned above also postulates an

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<sup>5</sup> This is similar to the idea of metaphorical extension in cognitive grammar (Lakoff 1987).

asymmetry between the two constructions, presenting the argument structure of the prepositional construction more basic, from which the argument structure of the double object construction is derived.

Another problem is that many of the verb classes do not involve verbs which basically mean: ‘X causes Y to go to Z’, e.g. verbs of creation, verbs denoting acts whose associated satisfaction conditions imply future having, so in order to account for these cases such a theory would need to postulate distinct rules.

On the other hand, there is no reason to think that two senses of *send* are involved in the following examples but this account needs to postulate separate verb senses (Goldberg 1992:45):

- (21) a. Jack sent Jill a package.  
b. Jack sent a package to Jill.

## **2.5 Arguments versus adjuncts**

An appealing attempt to explain the syntactic realisation relied on features of argument structure claiming that it is **three-place predicates** that allow the double object construction while two-place predicates can only appear in the prepositional structure. The argumentation goes that since predicates and obligatory **arguments** are adjacent within a phrase but optional **adjuncts** are outside the phrase, two obligatory arguments can change places in linear order while an optional adjunct cannot intrude between a verb and its obligatory argument. However, e.g. the indirect object for *bake* is not an obligatory argument but an adjunct, still, this verb allows dativization and the same is true, in fact, of the whole class of verbs of creation (FOR-verbs, see section 5.2.1):

(22) a. Bake a cake (for me).

b. Bake (me) a cake.

A related claim is that the *to*-phrases appearing with dativizable verbs can be arguments of those verbs, whereas those appearing with non-dativizable verbs must be adjuncts. (This claim is restricted to *to*-phrases because this group is regarded to be and is indeed more homogeneous.) But in both of the following sentences the *to*-phrase appears to be an adjunct and thus neither of them should dativise but in fact *pass* does (as do all the members of the TO-class named 'verbs of instantaneous causation of ballistic motion', see section 5.1.6).

(23) a. The radio conveyed the message to the shipwrecked.

b. \*The radio conveyed the shipwrecked the message.

(24) a. Jones passed the ball to Smith.

b. Jones passed Smith the ball.

This reveals the fact that we find both three-place and two-place predicates among the dativizable ones.

The independent criteria identified in the linguistic literature for argumenthood (Bresnan, 1982; Dowty, 1982; Gazdar, 1985) also fail when invoked to give help with dativization (Pinker 1989:40-41). They are the following:

i) compositionality: it states that in arguments prepositions can be meaningless markers whereas in adjuncts the interpretation of the meaning of the phrase depends crucially on the meaning of the preposition. However, it cannot be said that the preposition *to* in e.g. *John*

*gave a rose to Mary.* would have no independent meaning. This assumption runs counter to both the Principle of No Synonymy of Grammatical Forms and the basic tenets of cognitive grammar (iconicity/symbolicity), which denies that constructions contain meaningless elements.

ii) existential entailment: it says that the use of the verb entails that the referents of its arguments exist even when they are not expressed overtly. Still, there is no clear sense in which e.g. throwing or kicking would entail a definite goal to which an object must be thrown or kicked.

iii) uniqueness: it means that while adjuncts can be iterated, arguments must appear singly. The problem is that by this criterion the *for*-phrase in the prepositional construction must be an argument as illustrated by the ungrammaticality of the following: *\*I baked cakes for Susan for Mary.*

iv) obligatoriness: while arguments are often obligatory, adjuncts never are. By this requirement the *to*-phrase should be optional for non-dativizable verbs, but for some it is not: *She entrusted her child to the daycare centre./ \*She entrusted her child./ \*She entrusted the daycare centre her child.*

## **2.6 Semantic criteria: selectional restrictions**

**Selectional restrictions** represent the introduction of semantic considerations into the formal system of syntax in generative theories. They are regarded to be objectively given. Therefore, they play a crucial role in determining eligibility for participation in the dative shift. One conspicuous feature is that the argument fulfilling the role of subject must be [+animate]. This really follows from the fact that this argument must be capable of intent [+intentional] and

inanimate entities are incapable of it. Green (1974:105) quotes the following example to prove this:

- (25) a. The sun baked these cookies for John.  
b. \*The sun baked John these cookies.

It can be noted here that there are a few verbs that seem to be exceptions to this. One case is represented by the FOR-verbs *earn*, *gain* and *win* but these are only seemingly exceptions, as their subjects are really action nominalisations, which have a reconstructible animate subject usually co-referential to the referent of the indirect object:

- (26) a. Your active contributions will win you a lot of appreciation among your  
elders.  
b. Your active contributions will win a lot of appreciation for you among your  
elders.

Real exceptions can be found with verbs of future having (for details see 5.1.9):

- (27) a. This theory assigns sincerity the feature [+N].  
b. This theory assigns the feature [+N] to sincerity.

Another constraint relates to the fact that the noun phrase syntactically realised as indirect object or prepositional object (oblique) should be [+animate]. This surely follows from the fact that prototypically the entity (person) named by the indirect object possesses the entity

expressed by the direct object and it is not possible if the previous entity is [-animate]. Occasionally, however, we may come across cases of metonymy like the one quoted by Green (1974:103):

(28) Jill sent Los Angeles letters and telegrams.

Here the noun phrase *Los Angeles* obviously refers to a subsidiary or an outlet of a company where people work or the Los Angeles city council.

It must be mentioned that the participant expressed as indirect or prepositional object is semantically most dependent on the nature of the situation described by the verb. In the case of the sentence

(29) Jack gave Jill a rose.

the indirect object NP *Jill* has the thematic role **Recipient** as the girl denoted by it really comes into possession of the flower. (Recipient is the term generally used in the dissertation to denote the thematic role attached to the indirect or prepositional object. Because of the semantic constraint of animateness it is more appropriate than Goal, which is only used here as an attribute of Recipient for this argument when the situation is about concrete, physical transfer. Recipient is also more appropriate than Possessor because many of the situations described by the dativizing verbs do not speak about transfer of possession but rather transfer as in many cases the referent of the direct object does not go over into the possession of the referent of the indirect object. Further, the term Recipient reflects the dynamic character of the situation better than the term Possessor. (Goldberg 1995:148)). In another sentence

(30) John passed Smith the ball.

the indirect object NP has the thematic role Goal-Recipient, as Smith is at the end-point of the path of the ball and when he gets it, it does not go over into his possession but it is at his disposal e.g. to score a goal. On the other hand, in the sentence

(31) Jack danced me a polka.

the indirect object NP represents the thematic role Experiencer-Recipient, as nothing goes over into my possession, the object of the transfer is nothing tangible but a kind of mental, artistic experience, which indicates that here we are concerned with a metaphorical extension from the prototype.

To sum up, from the point of view of the system of generative grammars, the problem involved in setting these constraints in the form of selectional restrictions is that they should be part of the individual lexical entries themselves. However, in case of the dative shift they clearly seem to be imposed by the construction itself and with the exception of such prototypical lexical items as *give*, do not seem to be an inherent property of the verb itself. This corroborates the idea that another theoretical framework is more promising in developing a consistent treatment of the problem.



## **2.7 The cognitive and construction grammar approach: the dative as a construction**

Although there are also significant differences between the models of grammar of the two theories<sup>6</sup>, in the treatment of the dative shift their viewpoints are remarkably close. That is the reason why the theoretical background they offer are presented together in this section.

### **2.7.1 The cognitive standpoint**

Of the two models, cognitive grammar provides the more general theoretical background for the treatment of the problem. In cognitive grammar a lexical item is not thought of as having a fixed and limited semantic representation (as opposed to generative grammar), but rather as one providing access to indefinitely many conceptions and conceptual systems. Polysemy is regarded to be a pervasive feature of the lexicon as a typical **lexical item** is considered to represent a **complex category**, which does not have just one meaning but a variety of related senses, which comprise a **network**. Senses comprising the network are linked by **categorizing relationships**. They are of two kinds which are illustrated by Langacker (1999:4) with the lexical item *tree* in the following way:

- i) **extension**: when we use the word to refer to a kind of branching diagram as in *family tree*, *constituent structure tree*, this represents a metaphorical extension of the basic sense ‘tall woody plant’
- ii) **instantiation** (or **elaboration**): the metaphorical and prototypical senses of *tree* both instantiate the abstract conception ‘brachiated entity’

Such a view of a lexical item gives the possibility to eliminate the problems presented by formal subcategorisation, logical argument structure and objectively given selectional restrictions. Further, it has the advantage of linking linguistic and cognitive abilities.

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<sup>6</sup> For an outline of the major differences, see Chapter 1.

An expression invokes a **cognitive domain**, which provides its **conceptual content**.<sup>7</sup>

However, as cognitive grammar does not accept the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, it claims that linguistic meaning is not constituted by conceptual content alone as grammatical structure is determined by the construal the conceptualiser imposes on the situation spoken about. For example, the members of the sentence pair

(32) Jack gave Jill a rose.

Jack gave a rose to Jill.

represent two different construals of the same objectively existing situation. The meaning difference it involves is analysed in detail in Section 4.2.

If a lexical item appears in a given construction, e.g. *send* or *bake* in the ditransitive, this information is regarded to belong to the lexical item, together with other possible grammatical environments in which the form occurs.<sup>8</sup> This provides a much more flexible view of the lexical item than positing unlikely senses with their subcategorisation frames. As structures are regarded to be conventionalised units that are stored separately in the mind of the speaker, a frame like [send][NP][NP] or [bake][NP][NP] is also considered to belong to the ditransitive construction.

### 2.7.2 Construction grammar

An approach to the problem presented by the dative shift that this dissertation relies on and strives to carry somewhat further is presented by Goldberg in her monograph *Constructions. A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure* (1995). The author postulates that

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<sup>7</sup> This can be identified with **denotation**.

<sup>8</sup> In this respect cognitive grammar comes close to lexical-functional grammar.

constructions like the ditransitive or double object one are separate entities in grammar with syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features of their own and with form-meaning correspondences not strictly predictable from knowledge of the rest of the grammar, which come into interaction with lexical items and have to be taken into consideration if we want to give an adequate account of linguistic facts. This approach denies the transformational relationship between the two structures at issue and holds that neither of them is derived from the other. Once a construction comes into being in the language, it gets a certain degree of independence with the capability of attracting lexical items the semantic representations of which are compatible with their own. (This involves that if a given verb appears in both, it has a semantic cause). This compatibility, in turn, is determined by the cognitive structure of the lexical items themselves because referring to research on language acquisition by Clark (1978), Slobin (1985) and Bowerman (1994), Goldberg sets the hypothesis that 'simple clause constructions are associated directly with semantic structures which reflect scenes basic to human experience' and 'we can view the construction as imposing a certain semantic construal on the scene described'. As has been indicated at the beginning of this section, in the case of the ditransitive construction this basic scene is that of giving or transfer of both physical and non-physical objects.

Goldberg's theory is based on a solution suggested by Fillmore and elaborated by Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988), Fillmore (1988) and Lakoff (1987). It was Fillmore who proposed that the meaning of an expression is arrived at by the superimposition of the meanings of open class words on the meanings of the grammatical elements.<sup>9</sup>

On a constructional approach to argument structure, systematic differences in meaning between the same verb in different constructions are attributed directly to the particular constructions. This is corroborated by the fact that, as we have seen, the restrictions associated

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<sup>9</sup> This corresponds to Langacker's **elaboration** (1987).

with the dative shift refer to the subject and the indirect object, which undermines attempts to link these semantic constraints directly to the verb itself. According to Construction Grammar, a distinct construction is claimed to exist if one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from knowledge of its constituents or other constructions existing in the grammar: 'C is a construction iff<sub>def</sub> C is a form-meaning pair  $\langle F_i, S_i \rangle$  such that some aspect of  $F_i$  or some aspect of  $S_i$  is not strictly predictable from C's component parts or from other previously established constructions.' (1995:4)

This kind of approach has developed as a result of the fact that there has been growing recognition of subtle truth-conditional semantic differences between related syntactic (subcategorisation) frames and simultaneously, there has been increasing interest in the fact that there appears to be a strong correlation between the meanings of verbs and the syntactic frames they can occur in, which led many researchers to hypothesize that in a given language the syntactic subcategorisation frames of a verb may be exclusively predictable from the lexical semantics of the verb. The reason why Goldberg went further with the approach that Pinker (1989) had initiated was that she criticised it for positing implausible verb senses with his lexical rule approach. As it has been mentioned in Section 2.3, Pinker called his rule a broad range one, which was surely meant to cover such FOR-verbs as:

(33) Jill baked Jack a cake.

But to account for this sentence, his theory would need to claim that there exists a special sense of *bake* that has three arguments: an agent, a theme and an intended recipient. In other words this would mean that *bake* has a sense which goes something like: 'X VERB-s Z intending to cause Y to have Z' or as it is found in Greene (1974:124): '[Subject] INTENDING indirect object to have direct object, subject VERB direct object'. In contrast with this,

Goldberg suggested (1995:10) that we could define the ditransitive construction to be associated directly with agent, patient and recipient roles, and then associate the class of verbs of creation with the ditransitive construction. Thus we would not need to postulate a specific sense of *bake* nowhere else found but in this construction but we could understand the indirect objects found in the example above to be licensed not directly as arguments of the verb but by the particular construction. As Jackendoff (1990:448) puts it: 'There is nothing in the inherent meaning of singing an aria, peeling a grape, or fixing a sandwich that requires an intended Beneficiary – one could just be doing these things for the hell of it.'

Beth Levin (1985:35, quoted in Goldberg 1995:12) suggests that evidence for different verb senses does exist. She argues that 'there is evidence that when the verb *slide* is found in the double object construction ... its sense is not the purely physical transfer sense of *slide* but rather a transfer of possession sense'. She cites the fact that 'the goal argument of a change of possession verb must denote an entity capable of ownership, but the goal argument of a change of location verb need not,' as is illustrated by her examples (renumbered here):

- (34) a. She slid Susan/ \*the door the present.  
b. She slid the present to Susan/to the door.

Thus two distinct senses of *slide* are posited to account for this contrast. One sense of *slide* would constrain its goal to be animate, while the other would have no such restriction. It is only the former that would appear in the ditransitive construction.

Goldberg refutes this argument by referring to the fact that verbs which uncontroversially lexically constrain their goals to be animate, e.g. *give* or *hand* can be used with both syntactic patterns. Further, she suggests that instead of needing to stipulate that *slide* in one of its senses can appear in a ditransitive construction, we should rather posit a

constraint on the construction that would permit it to only occur with verbs which may constrain their goals to be animate. Thus there would be no need to assume the existence of an additional verb sense.

Goldberg posits the basic and central (prototypical) sense of the ditransitive construction to be the actual successful transfer of an object to a recipient, with the referent of the subject agentively causing this transfer (and with the object of the transfer being concrete) but in view of the fact that there are many ditransitive expressions that do not imply this: e.g. FOR-verbs of creation, preparation and getting only refer to intended transfer (*Jill baked Jack a cake*), TO-verbs of future having denote acts with which conditions of satisfaction are associated (*Jack promised me a new car.*), she suggests that we are concerned with **constructional polysemy**, where related meanings are linked to the ditransitive construction. The related meanings can be regarded to be **extensions** from the **central sense**. Accounting for the differences between the related verb classes in terms of constructional polysemy has the advantage that it is possible to capture the relationships between the different senses in a natural way, instead of postulating an unstructured collection of rules.

Somewhat modifying Goldberg's standpoint, Panther (1997:115) suggests that the central sense of the construction does not entail that the transfer is successfully achieved, but '(only) very strongly pragmatically implicates the successful receiving and having of the transferred object'. The weakness of this standpoint is that it mixes the meaning of the construction with the meaning of its particular instantiations.

In setting up this theory, Goldberg argues against the so called **abstractionist approach**, which suggests that there is a single uniform meaning associated with the ditransitive, i.e. that there is some kind of special effect on the indirect object and the nature of this effect is inferred pragmatically. Her counterarguments are that the ditransitive construction does not unexceptionally imply any particular special effect on the referent of the indirect object that

the corresponding prepositional construction does not imply. In the following pairs of examples there is no reason to postulate that the referent of the indirect object is any more affected than the referent of the prepositional complement:

- (35) a. Jones kicked Smith the ball.  
b. Jones kicked the ball to Smith.

- (36) a. Chris promised Pat a car.  
b. Chris promised a car to Pat.

- (37) a. Jill baked Jack a cake.  
b. Jill baked a cake for Jack.

For example, in the a) sentence of the last pair there is no guarantee that Jack is necessarily affected by the situation: he may never receive the cake and he may not even ever know about it. Also undermining this claim is the syntactic phenomenon that in the case of FOR-verbs the indirect object is only marginally passivizable or unpassivizable, which contradicts the idea of its affectedness:

- (38) a. \*Jack was bought a new jacket.  
b. \*Jack was boiled an egg.  
c. \*Jill was baked a cake.  
d. \*Jill was nudged a beer.

Another abstractionist analysis put forward by Goldsmith (1980) and refuted by Goldberg (1995:35) claims that the thematic role of the indirect object should be described as prospective possessor for the semantics to be abstract enough to incorporate all the possible interpretations of transfer, whether actual, intended, future or refused. Goldberg criticises this approach by claiming that it makes no difference between the various instantiations of the construction, puts them on an equal level and fails to capture the fact that there are verb classes which are more central and others that are more peripheral in the dative shift. *Give* is shown to be the most prototypical ditransitive verb because its lexical semantics is identical with the postulated semantic representation of the construction. At the other end of the scale there are FOR-verbs, the acceptability of which in the ditransitive construction varies for different speakers and strongly depends on their life experience. Very often they are more acceptable as commands and when the recipient-benefactive is referred to by a pronoun:

- (39) a. Hit me a home run.  
b. Crush me a mountain.

A final problem with the abstractionist approach is that if only an abstract constraint is postulated on the indirect object, this implies that the indirect object is an actual and not a prospective recipient. If, however, constructional polysemy is postulated, it can be said that the metaphorical extensions have the central sense of actual transfer as their source domain. FOR-verbs like the ones in (39) can be regarded as licensed in the ditransitive construction by the metaphor: 'Acts that are Performed for the Benefit of a Person are Objects Given to that Person.' It is also exemplified in the following expressions (Goldberg 1992:65-66): *He owes you many favours./ He graciously offered a ride to the airport.*



In dealing with the different verb classes participating in the dative shift, this dissertation relies on Goldberg's method of illustrating what justifies the participation of the particular verbs in the construction. The diagrams in the corresponding sections in Chapter 5 show which participant roles of the verb are fused with which argument roles of the construction. This is determined by two principles (Goldberg 1995:50-51). The first one is the **Semantic Coherence Principle**.<sup>10</sup> This states that only roles which are semantically compatible can be fused. Two roles  $r_1$  and  $r_2$  are semantically compatible if either  $r_1$  can be construed as an instance of  $r_2$  or  $r_2$  can be construed as an instance of  $r_1$ . For example, the kicker participant of the *kick* frame may be fused with the agent role of the ditransitive construction because the kicker role can be construed as an instance of the agent role. The second principle is what Goldberg calls the **Correspondence Principle**. This means that each participant role that is lexically profiled and expressed must be fused with a profiled argument role of the construction. In the case when a verb has three profiled participant roles, then one of them may be fused with a nonprofiled argument role of a construction.

The semantics associated directly with the ditransitive construction is 'CAUSE-RECEIVE <agt pat rec>'. When a particular verb is integrated into the construction, its roles are fused with the roles of the construction. In the case of two-place predicates (FOR-verbs are mostly and typically such), one role, usually that of the recipient is contributed by the construction. The construction also specifies the way in which a verb is integrated into the construction – this is marked with the letter R referring to relation.

It is worth looking at the different **relation types** that the semantics of a verb may bear to the semantics of the construction. The prototypical case is when the participant roles associated with the verb are in one-to-one correspondence with the argument roles associated with the construction. In this case the meaning of the construction is redundant with the

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<sup>10</sup> This is similar to Langacker's elaboration (1991).

meaning of the verb. For example, the verb *hand* is associated with three profiled participants: hander, handee, handed. These clearly represent instances of the three roles mentioned above, which are associated with the ditransitive construction. Thus the event type designated by the verb is an instance of the more general event type designated by the construction.

Another quite common case is when the verb does not directly denote the meaning associated with the construction but denotes the means by which the action is performed. This is the relation that verbs of ballistic motion, which infallibly participate in the dative shift, bear to the semantics of the ditransitive construction. For example, in the sentence

(40) Jones kicked Smith the ball.

*kick* lexicalises the means (feet) by which the transfer is performed and thus the sentence means: 'Jones caused Smith to receive the ball by kicking it.'

Verbs may also code particular preconditions associated with the semantics of the construction. For example, FOR-verbs of getting designate an act of obtainment which is a precondition for transfer.

(41) Jack chose Jill a new dress at Harrods.

Goldberg (1995: 65-66) summarizes the relations a particular verb which can be integrated into a construction may bear to the semantics of the construction in the following way:

If  $e_c$  is the event type designated by the construction and  $e_v$  is the event type designated by the verb, then

- I.  $e_v$  must be related to  $e_c$  in one of the following ways:

- A.  $e_v$  may be a subtype of  $e_c$
- B.  $e_v$  may designate the means of  $e_c$
- C.  $e_v$  may designate the result of  $e_c$
- D.  $e_v$  may designate a precondition of  $e_c$
- E. To a very limited extent,  $e_v$  may designate the manner of  $e_c$ , the means of identifying  $e_c$ , or the intended result of  $e_c$
- II.  $e_c$  and  $e_v$  must share at least one participant.

This also means that there are classes of verbs (in the present case the class of *give*) which are more central to the construction than other classes. The other classes of verbs are only compatible with the construction in the sense that they are able to accommodate the transfer interpretation but they do not lexically code transfer. This list can be regarded as the specification of the different ways in which the structural configuration of a construction which has already become a conventionalised unit, i.e. the ditransitive/double object one can be extended.

## **2.8 Summary**

This chapter deals with the lexical semantic aspects of the dative shift. The reason is that a simple clause structure cannot be investigated without examining the properties of the verb, which has a central role in the English sentence. It gives an overview of the work of authors who tried to accommodate the dative with the formalist-generative framework but were not able to give a consistent account of it. Green (1978), who did a lot of valuable work in identifying the verb classes involved in the dative shift and in investigating their properties, ended up with postulating two dative movement rules in order to avoid generating ungrammatical output at the deep structure level. On the basis of language acquisition research, Pinker (1984, 1989) gave up the idea of postulating a dative transformational rule,

and argued that it is a lexical rule which works on the semantic representations of verbs ( $X$  causes  $Y$  to go to  $Z \leftrightarrow X$  causes  $Z$  to have  $Y$ ). The weakness of this solution is that it postulates unlikely verb senses. However, by differentiating between broad range and narrow range rules and by acknowledging the role of construal, Pinker gets close to the cognitive approach (cf. low level generalisations).

In generative theories selectional restrictions, regarded to be objectively given, are identified with semantic co-occurrence phenomena. They, however, are considered to be the properties of the individual lexical items whereas here they seem to be imposed by the construction itself.

For these reasons, I argue that cognitive grammar can provide a much more promising theoretical framework for coping with the problem of the dative shift. Key elements of the theory in this respect are:

- seeing a continuum between the lexicon and grammar,
- considering polysemy an essential feature of the lexicon,
- the network view of the related senses of a lexical item,
- regarding the grammatical environments in which a lexical item occurs a part of its lexical entry,
- viewing constructions holistically, as symbolic units, which are characterised by motivatedness rather than by full compositionality
- rejecting the idea that there exist any lexical items which may function as merely meaningless markers.

The morphophonological criteria associated with the dative shift, which are proved to be alive and operative in the minds of the native speakers but which do not delineate the set of verbs participating in it without exceptions, prove the validity of the cognitive assumption of the prototypical nature of grammatical categories. This asserts that as is the case with other

types of categories, membership in grammatical categories is not determined in the way that members should have all the defining properties identified for the category or that there is a single property every member should have.

Closely akin to cognitive grammar is construction grammar, which developed out of Fillmore's case grammar. Key ideas of construction grammar here are:

- constructions are independent entities of grammar
- polysemy is an essential feature of the semantics of a construction
- the two constructions involved in the dative shift do not motivate each other and are not derived from each other
- a verb can be integrated into a construction if its semantics is compatible with that of the construction

### 3. SYNTACTIC FEATURES OF THE DOUBLE OBJECT AND PREPOSITIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS

#### The treatment of the problem in generative theories

The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the findings and solutions concerning the syntax of the two constructions, conceived in generative frameworks. These solutions intend to derive one construction from the other. They mostly regard the prepositional construction as deep structure (with the exception of Dryer, see section 3.3). Larson's solution (1988) (see section 3.4) is presented as an attempt to save the transformational account and solve the binding problems involved. The chapter also deals with problems of syntactic structure such as direct object ellipsis, pronominalisation and the passivisation problem.

#### 3. 1 *Introductory remarks*

The explanations which generative theories gave for this phenomenon and which naturally revealed many important features of the dative were preoccupied with saving the syntactic relationship between the double object and the prepositional constructions partially on account of the fact that the dative shift has much more extended **productivity** in other languages than in English.

The syntax of the dative shift involves the following two constructions:

NP (Subject) – Verb group – NP (Indirect object) – NP (Direct object)

NP (Subject) – Verb group – NP (Direct object) – PP (Oblique object)

Another reason for relating these two structures is the semantic equivalence of the corresponding constituents and the general **truth functional equivalence** of the two constructions. The first, ditransitive double object construction is syntactically unique in

English in allowing two nonpredicative noun phrases to occur directly after the verb, and in that it is not predictable from other constructions in the language that English will allow such a structure. In the prepositional construction two prepositions appear in the prepositional phrase: *to* and *for*. *To* may introduce both obligatory arguments and optional adjuncts whereas *for* always introduces optional adjuncts.<sup>11</sup>

One of the problematic questions for generative theories is which the original deep structure is: the one with the preposition or the one without it. Fillmore's opinion (1968:30), which has been prevailing in this framework since then, was that the prepositional form represents deep structure as he postulated that all the various categorially introduced noun phrase types begin with a preposition. It is important to underline that this only holds for the obligatory arguments because this counteracts Allerton's reasoning (1978:21) that the examples:

(42) a. Uncle Jim sent some chocolates to Margaret.

b. Uncle Jim sent chocolates for Margaret.

might present a problem to Fillmore's idea. In fact, in the second example *for Margaret* represents an intended recipient and thus is not a categorially introduced noun phrase, which is shown by the fact that we can also insert a *to*-phrase into the sentence:

(43) Uncle Jim sent some chocolates to Kate for Margaret.

A further question that should be raised about syntactic structure is whether it is the order of constituents that makes the crucial difference or the presence of the preposition. It clearly

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<sup>11</sup> See also section 2.5.

seems that the latter. Evidence for this lies in the fact that in relative clauses the indirect object may follow the direct object and may even occur sentence-finally:

- (44) a. The book which they gave him was a novel.  
b. The book which they bought him was a novel.

- (45) a. He liked the book which they gave him.  
b. He liked the book which they bought him.

On the other hand, in the prepositional construction if the direct object is expressed by a long, 'heavy NP', it is shifted to the end of the sentence and thus follows the prepositional phrase:

- (46) a. I gave to John [everything that he demanded].  
b. Max sent to me [the longest letter anyone had ever seen].

According to Larson's raising analysis (see in detail in 3.4) these sentences are not created by moving the weighty NP to the right but by the leftward movement of the predicate phrase (1988:347):






Figure 3

Besides the deep structure problem, in this framework there is the question of the partial productivity of the **transformational relationship**, i.e. how to specify conditions which block the dative movement for some verbs appearing in the V+direct object+prepositional object construction. Because of this and the lack of full productivity, the dative shift has not so much been in the centre of investigations in purely syntax-centred, generative theories.

### 3.2 Grammatical relations

In the early 1970s there was a rise of interest in whether transformations changed grammatical relations. Perlmutter and Postal (1984) argued that it was essential to take grammatical relations as primitives and they suggested a small set of universal relations: subject, direct

object and indirect object, which they labelled 1, 2 and 3, respectively. They claimed that in the underlying structure the prepositional phrase was a 3 but its relation (or grammatical function) changed to a 2 in surface structure. This '3 to 2 advancement' meant that the original 2 (the original direct object) was 'demoted' to the relation 'chômeur' (an 'unemployed' 1, 2 or 3). This analysis replaced the traditional distinction between direct and indirect objects by a completely different one between **Primary** and **Secondary Objects**. According to this theory, the Primary Object of a transitive verb is its only object but the Primary Object of a ditransitive verb is the one nearest to it. Chomsky adopted this terminology (1981:94) and claimed that the Primary Object receives Case from the verb in the usual way, on the assumption that this kind of Case is assigned only to adjacent phrases but the Secondary Object receives 'a secondary Case'. (Hudson 1992:256) He also suggested that in order to differentiate between them, the indirect and the direct objects cannot both be considered to be the daughters of VP or V' but the following structure should be postulated (Hudson 1992: 264) :




Figure 4

This means that the indirect object is in fact an 'inner object' forming a constituent with the verb that excludes the surface direct object. Larson (1988:340) supports this kind of analysis with an argument based on the following pair of sentences:

- (47) a. Beethoven gave the Fifth Symphony to the world.  
b. Beethoven gave the Fifth Symphony to his patron.

Here the semantic role assigned to the direct object depends on the nature of the recipient. In the first sentence the transfer of possession is metaphorical and the referent of the phrase *Fifth Symphony* is understood to be a composition so the sentence is roughly synonymous to 'Beethoven created the Fifth Symphony'. In the second sentence the Fifth Symphony is taken to be a physical object, a piece of paper with musical notes on it.

The idea that a verb and its argument can form a single thematic complex is also supported by the existence of 'discontinuous idioms' such as:

- (48) a. Max *carries* such behaviour *to the extremes*.  
b. Mary *took* Felix *into consideration*.

However, this involves serious problems, as well (Hudson 1992: 264-265). Configurationally it blurs the distinction between the direct object of a transitive verb and the indirect object of a ditransitive one as both would be [NP,V']. Then it inverts the **dominance relations** between indirect and direct object. According to it, the direct object c-commands the indirect one and not vice versa, so the indirect object should be in the domain of the direct object for various relations such as e.g. reflexive pronouns. Then it should be possible that the indirect object would be a reflexive pronoun with the direct object as its antecedent, but the truth is just the opposite as can be illustrated with the following example:

- (49) a. \*We showed herself Mary in the mirror.  
b. We showed Mary herself in the mirror.

There are similar problems of **binding** first quoted by Barss and Lasnik (1986) and described in detail in Larson (1988).

The third problem is that this structure breaks the link between **subcategorisation** and **sisterhood**: the direct object, which is in fact a much more integral part of subcategorisation than the indirect object, is no longer a sister of V.

Further, it presents the direct object as a specifier of VP but this conflicts with two claims by Chomsky: that in English specifiers precede their heads and that the specifier of the VP is in fact the finite I (earlier the subject was considered to be that). Because of this, Hudson (1992:266) concludes that so far there is no possibility of distinguishing the indirect and direct object NPs configurationally and suggests that the indirect object (which he labels to be 'indirect') should be treated as a basic analytical category. He proves that it is a coherent category by listing four generalisations that apply to all indirect objects:

- i) they can only occur in the presence of a direct object with the exception of the few cases mentioned above;
- ii) they are confined to the same position, between the verb and the direct object;
- iii) they typically refer to humans;
- iv) no more than one of the types of indirect object is possible in a sentence.

This last claim he proves with the following examples:

- (50) a. I wrote Mary a letter for Bill.
- b. \*I wrote Mary Bill a letter.

In this sentence there are two candidates for the indirect object position: the NP *Mary* represents the thematic role Goal and the NP *Bill* represents the thematic role Benefactive. They cannot both occupy the indirect object position.

### **3.3 Dryer: the double object construction representing deep structure**

A relatively recent advocate of the transformational approach is Dryer (1987) with his antidative analysis. He suggests that double object constructions that can be paraphrased with *to* are more basic than their prepositional paraphrases and the latter can be derived from the former. For example, the second sentence is taken to be derived from the first sentence in the following pair:

- (51) a. Jack gave Jill a rose. (base generated)  
b. Jack gave a rose to Jill. (derived)

With this argumentation Dryer strives to defend the existence of the two grammatical relations, Primary Object (PO) and Secondary Object (SO) suggested by Perlmutter and Postal (1984).<sup>12</sup> The PO corresponds to the direct object of transitive clauses and the first object of ditransitive clauses; the SO corresponds to the second object of ditransitive clauses. At the core the arguments for the existence of these categories are based on an appeal to what Dryer calls the '**Natural Class Principle**', which states that if many languages have rules that apply specifically to a certain form, then this form should be treated as a natural class. Since passive and object marking are sensitive to the PO in many languages, the Natural Class Principle implies that the PO exists as a natural class.

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<sup>12</sup> See section 3.2.

If we compare Fillmore's and Dryer's theory (the former referred to in section 1.2), it reveals another problem with the transformational approach, namely that its representatives postulate an often unjustified asymmetry between the two related constructions. More often, Fillmore's standpoint is accepted, i.e. the prepositional construction is considered to be more basic. A typical reason given is that the verbs which allow ditransitives are a proper subset of those that allow the prepositional construction. This is not actually so, though. There are verbs which merely allow the double object construction only: e.g. *refuse*, *deny* and many expressions in which *give* appears as part of a complex predicate.

Language acquisition data also testify (Gropen et al., 1989) that the double object and the prepositional constructions appear roughly at the same time in children's speech, with neither of them documentedly preceding the other, thus they provide no evidence for the postulated asymmetry.<sup>13</sup>

### **3.4 Larson's account: an attempt to save the transformational explanation**

In line with Chomsky's way of reasoning but striving to do away with the problems mentioned above in section 3.2, Larson (1988) proposes a solution which involves the raising of the verb in order to produce the grammatical surface form:

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<sup>13</sup> See section 2.3.




Figure 5

With this he claims to meet several general requirements, namely that V must head a projection governed by Infl in order to receive tense and agreement information, that Case is assigned under government and that the direction of government is rightward in English. In the following more elaborated version of Chomsky's proposal (Figure 6) V is not the head of a projection governed by I. Further, the NP *a rose* in the lower Spec V' is not governed by the verb and so cannot receive Case. These problems are solved in Larson's abovementioned version:




Figure 6 (Chomsky's version)

Larson also strives to defend the idea of postulating a transformational relationship between the double object and prepositional constructions which was given up by advocates of theories embracing very general operations like Move  $\alpha$ . The well-known restrictions and the lack of full productivity led many to conclude that this relation must be lexical rather than transformational in character (e.g. Allerton (1978), Dowty (1978), Green (1974), Hawkins (1981) and Oehrle (1976), Pinker (1989)). In contrast to this, Larson refers to the status of the relation in other languages, where it is highly productive, indicating that transformational relationships like the 'Dative Shift' must be available in principle. He also quotes the **Uniformity of  $\Theta$ -Assignment Hypothesis** put forward by Baker (1985):



Identical thematic relationships are represented by identical structural relations between the items at the level of D-structure.

with the comment that this hypothesis forces a derivational account of the double object-prepositional construction relation as the thematic roles assigned in these constructions are identical.


Thus he proposes that the dative shift should be construed in a way similar to the passive in the theory of Government and Binding. According to it, the derivation of the passives involves two central effects: withdrawal of Case from an object position, and suppression of thematic role assignment to a subject position. This triggers NP movement to subject position. Larson slightly modifies this account saying that a subject  $\Theta$ -role is not suppressed in passives but assigned in a special way, in accordance with the following rule of **Argument Demotion**:

If  $\alpha$  is a  $\Theta$ -role assigned by  $X^i$ , then  $\alpha$  may be assigned (up to optionality) to an adjunct of  $X^i$ .

This happens in the passive when the subject  $\Theta$ -role is assigned to a *by*-phrase. Larson applies this assumption to the dative shift and says that there the preposition *to* governed by *give* can be regarded as pure **Case marking** and thus *to* is absorbed. Then the  $\Theta$ -role assigned to the subject of the VP (the direct object role) undergoes demotion and this position is reduced to nonthematic status. Since the direct object receives its  $\Theta$ -role from  $V'$ , under the abovementioned principle this  $\Theta$ -role must be assigned to a  $V'$  adjunct. All this gives rise to the following situation: the indirect object becomes Caseless in its deep position, and the VP subject position is nonthematic (and thus empty). Just like in the passive, the indirect object undergoes NP movement to VP subject position. Finally, *send* is raised into V-head position


and is then able to assign Case rightward to the VP subject. The two steps of this movement are illustrated as follows in relation to the sentence *John sent Mary a letter* (Larson 1988:353, trees renumbered here as 1 and 2):

(1)



Step 1

(2)



Step 2

Figure 7

The inner VP in (1) is analogous to a passive in that here, too, an object has been moved to subject position. This gives an account for the binding problems mentioned above (first quoted by Barss and Lasnik (1986)). As a result of NP-movement, the inner object in (1), which is a V' specifier, asymmetrically c-commands the outer object, which is a V' adjunct. Larson then accounts for the difference between the passive and the dative in the following way. One difference is that in passives the verb is marked with overt participial morphology,

-*en*, and the demoted adjunct phrase (the logical subject) may be suppressed whereas in double object constructions the verb appears in its usual active form and the demoted adjunct phrase (the logical direct object) cannot be suppressed. This is accounted for by the fact that whereas passives involve a demoted IP subject, datives involve a demoted VP subject, and the VP subject position is subcategorised for so its theta role cannot be absorbed and assigned to a bound morpheme. A further difference is that in the passive the adjunct phrase gets its case from the preposition *by* while in the double object construction both objects appear as accusatives. In this respect Larson argues that the NP *a letter* is assigned case through the relation [<sub>V</sub> V NP] as the sister of a complex predicate V, whereas the inner NP *Mary* is assigned objective case through Infl on account of the assumption that in transitive structures two objective cases are involved – a structural and an inherent one – and in the double object construction these do not coincide: the structural case is represented by the direct object and the inherent one by the indirect object.

### **3.5 The abstract clitic hypothesis**

A more recent attempt at saving the transformational account and the abovementioned idea of asymmetry is the **abstract clitic hypothesis** put forward in Keyser and Roeper (1992). It starts from the following distribution of facts:

- (52) a. We gave money (again).  
       b. I envied his shoes (again).  
       c. He left a note (again).  
       d. I threw the ball (again).

These sentences cannot occur with *re-*:

- (53) a. \*We regave the money to Bill.  
b. \*I re-envied his shoes.  
c. \*He releft a note.  
d. \*I rethrew the ball.

To capture this distribution, it is assumed that in every double object construction that occurs without an indirect object, there is an abstract position in which an invisible indirect object is present. Thus the sentences in (52) above have the following S-structure form:

- (54) we [<sub>VP</sub> [<sub>V</sub> [<sub>V</sub> give] clitic] money ]

Further, it is supposed that in the case of indirect object constructions the position labelled Clitic in the formula above is occupied by a marker that is called dative. In order to achieve the goal, i.e. to account for the incompatibility of *re-* and indirect object constructions, another hypothesis is postulated, namely, that *re-* occupies the Clitic position in verbs. It follows from this that as the indirect object and *re-* both must occupy the same underlying position, they are in complementary distribution with one another.

- (55) a. He rediscovered an island.  
b. \*He refound an island.

- (56) a. He repurchased a car.  
b. \*He rebought a car.

In the two pairs of sentences the second member is ungrammatical. As the sentences indicate, whether a sentence in (55-56) is ungrammatical or not correlates with whether or not its verb may take the double object construction:

- (57) a. \*He discovered me an island.  
b. He found me an island.

Keyser and Roeper argue that although it is tempting to say that the a) sentence above is unacceptable for semantic reasons, it is to be noticed that it is always possible to have a benefactive dative prepositional phrase in sentences containing verbs like *discover*:

- (58) a. He discovered an island for me.  
b. He purchased a car for me.  
c. He exhibited his paintings for me.

Therefore they conclude that it is possible to express with *for* datives what cannot be expressed with double object constructions in verbs like *discover*, *purchase* and *exhibit* and, furthermore, such constructions can co-occur with *re-*. The problem about this approach, however, is that cliticisation is otherwise typically treated as a surface phenomenon in syntax, together with word order variations and interactions between case marking and word order and morphological markings.

### **3.6 Direct object ellipsis, pronominalisation**

A syntactic difference between the TO- and FOR-verbs is that when the direct object of TO-verbs is deleted as understood, as in

(59) I did it because they paid me.

the indirect object never has a preposition:

(60) \*They paid to me.

When the direct object of FOR-verbs is deleted, the indirect object must have a preposition:

(61) Mary cooks for us.

As Green remarks (1974: 124-125), in American English *write*, which belongs to the TO-verbs, may have either a preposition or no preposition:

(62) a. As soon as he heard the news, he wrote to us.

b. As soon as he heard the news, he wrote us.

In the earliest days of generative grammar it was observed that there was an interaction between dative movement and pronominalisation which produced the following paradigms:

(63) a. They gave the boy the book.

b. They gave the book to the boy.

(64) a. They gave him the book.

b. They gave the book to him.

- (65) a. \*They gave the boy it.  
b. They gave it to the boy.

- (66) a. \*They gave him it.  
b. They gave it to him.

Even such verb groups which normally only appear in the double object construction (e.g. complex predicates with *give*, verbs of refusal – in detail see below) allow the prepositional construction in such a case (Green 1974:174):

- (67) a. Walt gave Dick the answer, and he gave it to Ted, too.  
b. \*Walt gave Dick the answer, and he gave Ted it, too.

- (68) a. Ted gave Joey the permission to march but he denied it to Kim.  
b. \*Ted gave Joey the permission to march but denied Kim it.

A similar phenomenon is experienced in relation to particle movement and inversion:

- (69) a. I put out the cat.  
b. \*I put out it.  
c. I put it out.

- (70) a. Out went the cat.  
b. It went out.  
c. \*Out went it.



This syntactic difference falls in with the pragmatic feature of focus. **End-focus** does not tolerate very short elements which are not expressed by notional nouns but by personal pronouns as can be seen in (69-70). They also represent old information by definition. Mallinson and Blake (1981:163 quoted by Thompson 1991:156) include English among those languages in which the order of the patient and recipient is hierarchically determined, a participant higher on the animacy hierarchy appearing first and a definite participant preceding an indefinite one.

### ***3.7 The passivisation problem***

The TO-datives have three passive forms:

- (71) a. A book was given to John.  
b. John was given a book.  
c. A book was given him.

The third one only applies when the indirect object is expressed by a personal pronoun. On the other hand, FOR-datives have only one passive form (although some native speakers accept the second sentence of the set, too):

- (72) a. A book was bought for John.  
b. \*John was bought a book.  
c. \*A book was bought him.

This phenomenon presented a problem for the **Standard Theory** (Fillmore 1965) because it had to be postulated that if the double object and the prepositional object constructions were transformationally related, then in the case of the TO-datives the dative rule would have to apply before the passive rule, while in the case of the FOR-datives it would be just the other way round. As Fillmore claimed that the various categorially introduced noun phrases started with a preposition, the treatment he presented involved an optional *to*-deletion rule, an obligatory *to* NP movement rule, and an optional rule which simultaneously deleted *for* and moved its object NP. Thus the resulting structure contained two NPs as sisters of V, without distinguishing their functions or making it explicit whether either of them had the same function as the object of a transitive verb. However, it linked the indirect object to the underlying prepositional phrase and the direct (or second) object to the underlying direct object. Because of the abovementioned asymmetry in the passive, Fillmore's treatment required different deep structures for indirect object constructions corresponding to *to*-phrases and *for*-phrases (Green 1974:72).

In Government and Binding theory the passive *John was given a book.* raises the question of case assignment in the sense how both VP-internal NPs are assigned case. Compared to other Indo-European languages like German and French, English presents a special case as in these two languages it is impossible to move the active indirect object to passive subject position (for examples see Haegeman 1993:176).

Based on the postulated connection between the passive and the dative shift (see section 3.4), Larson (1988: 362-369) offers a different account. He postulates that the passive rule is applied to the prepositional construction (*Someone gave a book to John.*) in the way that the case assigned by the preposition is withdrawn from the indirect object and it is directly moved to the subject position in order to receive case:




Figure 8

In this way the indirect object is promoted directly to subject position, with no intermediate double object structure involved but the direct object will essentially have the same status, that of V' adjunct. Larson postulates that the application of passive both suppresses the case

of the moved NP and blocks the assignment of structural objective case to the NP *a book*. Thus the direct object NP is assigned only inherent objective case. The ungrammaticality of

(73) \*A book was given John.

is accounted for by reference to the fact that although here case assignment to the indirect object has been suppressed (the preposition *to* is absent), it is the direct object that appears in subject position. Thus the indirect object is left caseless and the sentence is ruled out.

### **3.8 Summary**

This chapter has dealt with the accounts of the dative shift proposed in formalist-generative frameworks. These solutions insist on a derivational account of the two constructions as they rely on a truth-functional theory of meaning. (Doubtlessly, in a prototypical case like *Jack gave Jill a rose./ Jack gave a rose to Jill*, the two constructions can be used to describe the same objectively existing situation but they differ in other significant aspects of semantics such as the affectedness of the referent of the indirect object NP and presuppositions.) Their other reason for intending to preserve the transformational account is that the dative shift is much more highly productive in other languages. Partial productivity in English is a considerable problem in this framework and the semantic conditions identified cannot really be integrated into the system either as selectional restrictions (because in many cases they do not seem to be an inherent property of the lexical item in question) or as semantic constraints on the transformation (as they do not apply unexceptionally). Despite their semantic relatedness, the TO- and FOR-verbs involved necessarily get a different treatment in this framework (argument-adjunct distinction). For these reasons I claim that semantics-based

theories like cognitive and construction grammars offer a better framework to form a consistent view of the problem. As these regard the lexicon and grammar as forming a continuum, the syntactic consequences of semantic properties will be dealt with together in Chapter 5.

## 4. SEMANTIC AND PRAGMATIC FEATURES OF THE DOUBLE OBJECT AND PREPOSITIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the semantic and pragmatic features of the two constructions involved in the dative shift. First, I refer back to the **semantic constraints** on the referents of the NPs identified in generative solutions and intend to show that they are better accounted for with the help of Langacker's **action chain** model (1999), which does not set rigid requirements but treats these features as prototypical. The semantic differences between the double object and prepositional object forms are investigated in light of Bolinger's principle stating that there is no semantic identity in difference in syntax, which is a basic tenet in both cognitive and construction grammars. The chapter finally deals with the distribution of the two constructions.

### ***4.1 Semantic constraints on the referents of subject, direct and indirect objects***

In Section 2.6 it has been mentioned that the solutions proposed in basically generative frameworks operated with selectional restrictions or semantically constrained transformations (movements). In this section my objective is to show that the solution offered by cognitive and construction grammars to the semantics of the two constructions involved in the dative shift ensures a more consistent approach. The following constraints have been identified on the NPs for the verb to participate in the dative shift as illustrated by examples:

a) The referent of the subject NP must be [+ animate] as can be proved by the ungrammaticality of sentences like:

(74) a. The sun baked these cookies for John.

b. \*The sun baked John these cookies.

(75) a. \*Eating liver gives lots of iron to you.

b. Eating liver gives you lots of iron.

The referent of the subject must be [+intentional], too, i.e. an agent who consciously and intentionally engages in performing the action expressed by the verb. Goldberg here remarks (1995: 143) that the description used to pick out the argument referents may be understood to be the speaker's description and not that of the referent of the subject. So the sentence

(76) Oedipus gave his mother a kiss.

is felicitous despite the fact that Oedipus did not intend to kiss his mother. Similarly:

(77) Joe gave Mary a sweater with a hole in it.

is acceptable even if Joe did not intend to give Mary a defective sweater.

b) The referent of the indirect object NP is prototypically [+animate], too, as is shown by the ungrammaticality of the second example:

(78) a. Jack brought two chairs to the table.

b. \*Jack brought the table two chairs.

This constraint applies because *to*-phrases with inanimate NPs, like the one above, cannot represent the thematic role Recipient but only Goal.

An additional semantic constraint referring to the indirect object is that it should be a willing recipient. This constraint accounts for the ungrammaticality of the following example from Green (1974):

(79) \*Sally burned Joe some rice.

This example is unacceptable even if we attribute malicious intentions to Sally; it is acceptable, however, if Joe is thought to like burnt rice.

Goldberg's following example (1995:147) proves that the fact that the recipient is willing should not be confused with the idea that he/she is expected to benefit from the transfer.

(80) Jack poured Jane an arsenic-laced martini.<sup>14</sup>

c) A third constraint concerning the member NPs is that 'the speaker or referent of the subject of the world-creating verb ... must assume that the referents of the direct and indirect object noun phrases exist contemporaneously (i.e. in the same relevant world) with each other and with the subject, at the time referred to by the dative movement verb.' (Green 1974: 105-106)

An illustrative example is:

(81) a. Kill a Commie for Christ.

b. Kill Christ a Commie.

---

<sup>14</sup> Complex predicates with *give* do not require the referent of the indirect object NP to be a willing recipient: e.g. *Bill gave Chris a headache*, or *Bill gave Chris a kick*. It is true, however, that these are unacceptable in the prepositional construction.



Both sentences are felicitous if the speaker believes that Christ exists in the sense of being able to appreciate such actions performed in his honour, but if the speaker does not believe in his existence, he can only say a) but not b).

This is obviously true for verbs of concrete physical transfer, for those denoting creative acts and also for communication and performance verbs (see Chapter 5). (For the exceptional cases of *earn*, *gain* and *win* see section 5.2.3) It can be noted here, though, that it is not necessarily required for the referents of the subject, indirect object and direct object to co-exist with the conceptualiser, but only with each other, as is demonstrated by the grammaticality of the following for present-day speakers:

(82) a. Brutus killed a Celt for Caesar in 49 B.C.

b. Brutus killed Caesar a Celt in 49 B.C.

The problem with identifying such constraints is that they do not imply unexceptionally. I claim that these semantic features rather represent the prototype as is revealed by Langacker's prototypical action chain model (1999:30-34). It says that we can conceptualise an event as being instigated or executed by some kind of force or energy input and then it is given an **energy construal**. The notion of agency implies at least a minimal action chain, where the agent exerts some force on the theme. An example is: *He threw the ball*. Langacker's notation for this is: (AG  $\Rightarrow$  TH), where a double arrow indicates an interaction involving the transmission of energy. It is a very common human experience that we use an instrument to perform an action. It is so frequent in our everyday experience that it is called a **conceptual archetype**. In the flow of energy the instrument is intermediary (AG  $\Rightarrow$  INSTR  $\Rightarrow$  TH): *He broke the window with a hammer*. In an energetic construal, we can distinguish between the **source domain** of an interaction, which comprises those elements

which lie upstream in the flow of energy with respect to others and the **target domain**, which lies exclusively downstream. Within each domain, a further distinction can be drawn between an active participant and a passive one, depending on whether its role is in some sense **initiative** or not.

The constructions involved in the dative shift also describe a very common (physical) human experience, i. e. transfer of objects, which are prototypically physical objects moving from source to goal along spatial paths, therefore it can be called a conceptual archetype.

An action chain model of a prepositional construction like *Jack gave a rose to Jill* is: (AG  $\Rightarrow$  TH  $\rightarrow$  ZERO), that of a double object construction like *Jack gave Jill a rose* is (AG  $\Rightarrow$  REC  $\rightarrow$  ZERO), where REC stands for Recipient. The dashed arrow stands for a non-energetic relationship. As in these models the referent of the subject NP is defined as an agent, this involves that it is prototypically an active, human instigator of the action. As regards such examples as

- (83) a. The missed ball handed him the victory on a silver platter.  
b. Stunts like that won him the appreciation of his peers.

where the referent of the subject NP is not a volitional human agent, they are all instances of a particular conventional systematic metaphor, 'Causal events as transfers'. This metaphor involves understanding causing an effect in an entity as transferring the effect, construed as an object, to that entity. In the source domain of the metaphor the subject is agentive but it is not mapped to the target domain due to the fact that the target domain is concerned with abstract causes. Evidence for the existence of this metaphor, independent from the ditransitive construction, can be found e.g. in the following expressions:

- (84) a. The unforeseen circumstances laid a new opportunity at our feet.  
b. The report furnished them with the information they needed.

The action chain model of the ditransitive, double object construction (see above) shows that the agentive subject initiates an event which terminates in a possessive relationship between *Jill* and *a rose*. That is the reason why the referent of the indirect object is prototypically animate as it should be capable of possession. It is again the expressions mentioned above, licensed by the 'Causal events as transfers'-metaphor that may provide examples which are non-prototypical in this respect (Goldberg 1995:146):

- (85) a. The tabasco sauce gave the baked beans some flavour.  
b. The paint job gave the car a higher sale price.

The reasoning again goes saying that the constraint is satisfied in the source but not in the target domain.

As Langacker remarks (1999:40), verbs which participate in the dative shift describe scenes which have two downstream participants which compete for focal prominence. In the example

- (86) a. Jack gave a rose to Jill.  
b. Jack gave Jill a rose.

the direct object is a natural action chain tail in the physical sense, and the recipient may also be conceived as the endpoint of an action chain in the more abstract sense of being affected by

the transfer. In this way both choices are motivated. Languages differ as to which motivation they make use of in choosing the direct object – English allows both options.

## **4.2 Semantic and pragmatic differences between the double object and prepositional constructions**

As regards the semantic difference between the two constructions, I find it revealing what Bolinger writes in *Meaning and Form*, namely that probably there is no such thing as identity of meaning in difference in syntax and warns that the linguist should be very cautious in declaring two constructions to be identical in meaning. This hypothesis has caught on in linguistic literature since then. It was mentioned as the **one-to-one or Uniqueness postulate**, referring to the hypothesis that meanings and strings in language pair up in one-to-one fashion, by Wexler and Culicover (1980), Pinker (1984, 1991) and Clark (1987) and is a basic tenet in Lakoff and Langacker's cognitive grammar, where it is a central idea that language consists of symbolic structures. It was likewise adopted as a working hypothesis by Goldberg in her monograph *Constructions. A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure* (1995) as the Principle of No Synonymy of Grammatical Forms, where it is elaborated in the following way: 'If two constructions are syntactically distinct, they must be semantically or pragmatically distinct... Pragmatic aspects of constructions involve particulars of information structure, including topic and focus, and additionally stylistic aspects of the construction such as register.' Two corollaries follow from this principle: 'If two constructions are syntactically distinct and S(emantically)-synonymous, then they must not be P(ragmatically)-synonymous. If two constructions are syntactically distinct and P-synonymous, then they must not be S-synonymous.' (Goldberg 1995:67) Here the remark must be made that this is a dividing point between cognitive and construction grammars. Cognitive grammar accepts no distinction between semantics and pragmatics or language as a system and language as use.

As Langacker puts it, the difference between the double object and the prepositional object constructions lies in the fact that the sentence pairs represent different cognitive construals of the profiled event (1986:14-16, 1999:40, see also section 4.1 about the action chain).

(87) a. John gave Sally a bunch of flowers.


b. John gave a bunch of flowers to Sally.

In the case of the first sentence the focus is on the object which is given to Sally (a bunch of flowers) and the state arising from the transfer is highlighted when Sally as good as came into the possession of the flowers. On the other hand, in the second sentence the focus is on the recipient expressed by the phrase *to Sally*, which puts into the foreground the path which the bunch of flowers moves on in the course of the transfer and thus its route is highlighted. This is reinforced by the original spatial-directional meaning of the preposition *to* (Panther 1997:111). The gestalt shift between the two constructions can be illustrated with the following diagrams, the first belonging to the double object construction, the second to the prepositional one<sup>15</sup>:


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<sup>15</sup> Langacker's idea about the double object construction referring to transfer of possession at its end-point may be supported by contrastive examples from the Hungarian language, where the same suffix (-*nak, -nek*) marks the dative and possessive cases of nouns: (1) *John adott Sallynek egy csokor virágot.* (*John give+past ind sg3 Sally+dat a bunch flower+acc* – 'John gave Sally a bunch of flowers')/(2) *John odaadta neki Sallynek a csokor virágját.* (*John give+past ind sg3 he+dat Sally+poss the bunch flower+sg3+acc* – 'John gave him Sally's bunch of flowers.') According to *A magyar nyelv történeti nyelvtana I.* ('The historical grammar of the Hungarian language') (1991: 300-301) the Hungarian genitivus-possessivus developed from the dative in contextual environments where the dative representing the complement of the verb was followed by a noun naming a possessed object with a suffix referring to a 3rd person singular possessor, of which it could be regarded as the possessor.

(1)



(2)



tr= trajector, lm=landmark, > = volition, J = John, S = Sally

Figure 9

The semantic difference between the prepositional and the double object constructions is a clear demonstration of the iconicity principle (Lakoff 1987) in that there is a correlation between the position of the recipient in the clause and the degree of its relationship with material in the previous discourse. Thompson and Koide (1987) quote the following example to illustrate this:

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(88) a. ?Using an electric bull-horn, the Dean read the hiding students the injunction.

b. Using an electric bull-horn, the Dean read the injunction to the hiding students.

and argue that in the situation described in these sentences the dean is most likely to be not very close to the students, therefore the prepositional construction is a more felicitous syntacticisation because in it the recipient argument expressed by the prepositional phrase is more removed from the subject and the verb, which is iconic for a less immediate impact of the action by the agent. On the other hand, the juxtaposition of the recipient argument with the verb in the ditransitive construction rather implies a more immediate, stronger effect. This is confirmed by Lakoff and Johnson's statement (1980:130), who claim that the positional relationship between verb and recipient illustrates the metaphor 'Closeness is Strength of Effect'. (See also the action chain model in section 4.1). To prove this, they use the example:

(89) a. I taught Greek to Harry.

b. I taught Harry Greek.

saying that in the second sentence where *Harry* and *Greek* are next to each other, there is a much stronger implication that Harry actually learned the classic language so the teaching had an effect on him, whereas in the first sentence it is rather the conscious effort on the part of the referent of the subject that is focussed on without any reference to the efficiency of the teaching.

The systematic meaning distinction outlined above can be used to account for a difference of **presuppositions** between prepositional and double object constructions as illustrated by this example quoted from Green (1974:107-108):

- (90) a. Did you really write a thank-you note to Santa Claus?  
b. Did you really write Santa Claus a thank-you note?

The second sentence presupposes that the speaker believes that Santa Claus really exists, so e.g. a parent who does not really believe in his existence might say the first sentence but not the second because the latter focuses on the state resulting from the transfer, which makes no sense if there is no recipient at the end-point of the route of the thank-you note.

Goldberg mentions the following example in her book (1995:146-147), where a stylistic difference is caused by a semantic feature involved in the ditransitive constructions.

- (91) a. She fed lasagna to the guests.  
b. She fed the guests lasagna.

She argues that the second sentence is slightly more polite than the first one because the recipient expressed by the indirect object of the ditransitive construction is a willing recipient or beneficiary. Therefore the second sentence implies that the guests were willing to take in the Italian dish.

In the framework of the dative shift individual linguistic units may change their meanings, too, as a result of the interaction within the construction. This is so in the case of a metonymical meaning change when occasionally inanimate nouns appear as indirect objects and their meaning is transferred metonymically to the people's community related to them:

- (92) a. James Bond sent a message to London.  
b. James Bond sent London a message.



In the case of the first sentence the prepositional object may have a pure locational meaning, it may name the Goal on the path where the message was moving. On the other hand, if it is moved after the verb, it definitely adopts another meaning referring to an organisation based in London. In this special case it may have a political overtone.

A systematic meaning difference concerning the *for*-verbs is illustrated by the following pair of sentences:

- (93) a. Eve baked cakes for Mr Smith.  
b. Eve baked Mr Smith cakes.

The prepositional construction here can have a variety of meanings: the cakes may have been meant to be presents for Mr Smith, or baking the cakes may have been an act in honour of Mr Smith, or Eve may have substituted for Mr Smith to do the baking or Eve may have been Mr Smith's employee. In the case of the ditransitive construction the last two options are ruled out (Green 1974:97-98).

### **4.3 Differences in distribution**

The two constructions can also be compared on the basis of frequency or distribution. Thompson's statistical investigations, based on the examination of three narrative texts, (1991) yielded the result that the double object construction was more frequent than the prepositional one, proving the author's hypothesis that recipient arguments generally more often function as topics in the discourse than patient or theme arguments and as such they much more often occur in postverbal position than as a prepositional complement (71% of the

cases where there was a choice). The factors identified which qualified recipient arguments for topicality were the following:

- a) animateness
- b) pronominality: patient arguments occurred much more often than recipients in the form of a full noun phrase, whereas one of the typical devices of reference to previous discourse knowledge is the use of pronouns
- c) specificity: recipients proved to strongly tend to be specific while patients were about evenly divided between specific and nonspecific just like in the example:

(94) Might I offer you a little glass of cherry brandy?

- d) identifiability: this feature relied on the ability of the discourse addressee to identify the referent of noun phrases and it was related to specificity as only specific noun phrases could be identified; one of Thompson's examples for a non-identifiable noun phrase (1991 :162) is the following:

(95) ... she described her success in teaching American Sign Language to an infant gorilla named Koko.

- e) expressed by proper nouns or not: the far greater number of recipient arguments expressed by proper nouns is related to their animateness
- f) status or activation state in the discourse addressee's mind: this referred to the degree to which the referent of the noun phrase in question was presumed to be in the addressee's consciousness at the time of the utterance, which in turn depended on its being or not being mentioned in previous discourse

- g) length: recipient noun phrases proved to be shorter than patient NPs and in English there is a tendency for heavy NPs to come at the end of the sentence.

## **4.4 Summary**

This chapter has dealt with the semantic and pragmatic features of the double object and prepositional object constructions. The semantic constraints on the referents of NPs identified by generative theories are reinterpreted as prototypical features with the use of Langacker's action chain model (1999). The advantage of this solution is that it gives an opportunity for a more natural explanation of exceptions. The investigation of the semantic differences between the two constructions relies on Bolinger's idea stating that there is no semantic identity in difference in syntax, which is accepted as a basic tenet in both cognitive grammar (principle of iconicity/symbolicity) and construction grammar (Principle of No Synonymy of Grammatical Forms). Both constructions describe a very common human experience without which human society could not exist, a conceptual archetype, i.e. transfer. The basic semantic difference between the double object and prepositional constructions is presented as a conceptual gestalt shift following Langacker (1986, 1999). The prepositional construction profiles the path on which the object named by the direct object moves from the referent of the subject to that of the prepositional object. The double object construction, on the other hand, highlights the end state arising as a result of the transfer, when the referent of the indirect object NP comes into possession of the transferred thing denoted by the direct object NP. The difference in conceptualisation results in the difference in grammatical configuration. Verbs which participate in the dative shift describe scenes which have two downstream participants in the energetic construal, the recipient and theme, which compete for focal prominence (see the action chain model in section 4.1). Thomson's statistical investigation

(1991) gives the result that in 71% of the cases when there is a choice, the double object construction is used so the recipient is presented as topic.

## 5. VERB CLASSES PARTICIPATING IN THE DATIVE SHIFT

This chapter of the dissertation gives a detailed analysis of the verb classes participating in the dative shift. The order in which they are presented is intended not to be accidental but to reflect the degree of **motivation** licensing their use in the two constructions at issue. I intend to move from the **central** to the more **peripheral, fuzzy** members here. I have developed this classification on the basis of those of Green (1974), Levin (1993) and Goldberg (1995). The following verb classes are going to be dealt with:

TO-verbs:

1. verbs that inherently signify acts of giving: *Jack gave Jill a rose.*
2. verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion in a deictically specified direction: *Jack brought Jill a bunch of roses.*
3. verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion: *Jack carried Jill a chair.*
4. verbs of accompanied/unaccompanied physical transfer: *Jack slid Jill a banknote under the table.*
5. verbs of unaccompanied physical transfer: *Jack sent Jill a Valentine card.*
6. verbs of instantaneous causation of ballistic motion: *Jack headed Jill the ball.*
7. verbs of transfer of a message: *Jack told Jill the good news.*
8. verbs of instrument of communication: *Jack faxed Jill the documents.*
9. verbs of future having: *Jack promised Jill a new fur coat.*
10. verbs of refusal: *Jack refused Jill a new diamond ring.*

FOR-verbs:

11. verbs of creation: *Jack built Jill a new house.*
12. verbs of artistic creation and performance: *Jack sang Jill a love song.*
13. verbs of getting: *Jack ordered Jill a glass of champagne.*

#### 14. verbs of preparation: *Jill poured Jack a drink.*

This list offers the possibility of forming subgroups among the classes. The prototype is represented by Class 1. The members here are three-place predicates, i.e. verbs which profile actions with three participants. They exemplify metaphorical extension from **caused motion** (transfer of object) to **transfer of possession**. In the ditransitive construction they denote successful transfer. Classes 2-6 form a subgroup on the basis of the fact that the verbs listed in these groups all denote some kind of physical transfer and they do not necessarily denote transfer of possession. Classes 7 and 8 share the semantic property that they are communication verbs. The participation of the members of these classes in the dative shift are licensed through the **conduit metaphor**. Verbs of future having are either verbs of giving with associated **satisfaction conditions** (e.g. *guarantee, promise, owe*) or they express giving permission (*permit*). Verbs of refusal bear the relation of **negation** to the ditransitive construction ('cause not to have').

FOR-verbs refer to the **intention of transfer**. Here classes 11, 12 and 14 are related semantically through denoting creative acts. Their participation in the dative shift is licensed by the metaphor: 'Acts that are performed for the benefit of a person are objects which are given to that person.' Classes 11 and 12 are more closely related in the respect that their members denote actions which result in the creation of an entity that has not existed before. Class 14 consists of verbs that denote actions which change the state of an already existing entity.

## **5.1 Verbs taking TO in the prepositional construction**

### **5.1.1 The prototypical case: the class of GIVE (TO-verbs)**

#### **5.1.1.1 General characterisation**

This class consists of verbs which inherently signify acts of giving (Levin 1993:45). They can be defined as ones denoting the direct transfer of an object to an individual denoted by the indirect object phrase, where neither the transfer nor the transferred object is necessarily physical. The individual denoted by the subject is the initiator of the transfer, the entity denoted by the direct object is the thing transferred and the individual denoted by either the indirect or the prepositional object is the recipient. Verbs belonging to this class are *allow, feed, give, lease, lend, loan, pass, pay, peddle, refund, render, rent, repay, sell, serve, trade*. The central member of the class is *give*, which is a three-place predicate so the three participants of the situation appear at the level of subcategorisation as arguments of the verb. This indicates that its lexical semantics is identical with the semantics of the double object construction. If the adverb *away* or *out* is added to *give*, however, we get a complex two-place predicate, which indicates a general giving activity and does not permit the double object construction:

- (96) a. John gave out/away lots of books (to his pupils).  
b. \*John gave his pupils out/away a lot of books.

Among the verbs belonging here there are such that imply presuppositions on the nature of the transferred object: e.g. in the case of *serve* and *feed* it is some kind of consumable object, most commonly food or drink that is given over to the recipient for the purpose of eating or consuming it, or in the case of *feed* it is data in the context of electronic information storage,

in the case of *rent* it is a flat or a car, for *pay* it is typically money. On the other hand, there are verbs here which have presuppositions concerning the limitations or conditions on the transfer: e.g. *lease*, *lend* or *loan*, which refer to different kinds of financial transactions where after a defined period of time the object of the transfer reverts to the lender, who retains ownership throughout, or *pay*, which implies that something has previously been transferred in the other direction. *Sell* and *trade* presuppose a countertransfer event which obligates the recipient to transfer money or in the case of *trade*, another object in return. *Rent* belongs here, too, as it refers to a legal relationship between the participant expressed by the subject and that expressed by the indirect object. Evidence that these conditions must be explicit in the semantics of these verbs (see below) is provided by the fact that when these conditions are made explicit, the resulting sentence will become ungrammatically redundant or at least doubtful (Green 1974:114):

(97) ? They rented him the house in exchange for periodic payments.

If the stated conditions are special cases of the general conditions, however, the sentences are grammatical:

(98) They rented him the house for \$195 a month.

The verb *allow* implies that the agent enables the transfer to occur by not preventing it:

(99) Joe allowed Billy a popsicle.



There are verbs which semantically belong to this class, still, they do not take part in both constructions: *contribute*, *distribute*, *donate*, *remit*, *submit*, *surrender*, *transfer*. They have the common property which is often quoted to account for non-participation in the double object construction: they are not elements of Germanic but of Romance origin in the English language. This has the morphological consequence that they consist of two or more syllables. Furthermore, at least five of them, *contribute*, *distribute*, *donate*, *submit* and *surrender* involve a presupposition on the nature of the participant expressed by the prepositional object phrase. In the case of *donate* e.g. it is that it should be a sanctioned and reliable organisation of charity which the donor need not know personally, while in the case of *submit* and *surrender* the referent of the prepositional object has authority over that of the subject:

(100) a. I donated an old coat to the Salvation Army.

b. \* I donated the Salvation Army an old coat.

(101) a. He submitted an application to the board.

b. \*He submitted the board an application.

The definition at the beginning of the section states that the verbs in this group refer to transfers that are not necessarily physical but their conceptual structure does not exclude physical transfer, either, what is more, it must have been primary in it historically. As human relationships in society have become and are constantly becoming more and more abstract and sophisticated, we are now able to give over physical and non-physical objects to each other without the transfer necessarily being physical or both human participants being physically present, but this was increasingly less so as we go back to ancient times. Therefore it is

justified to postulate that it was in connection with these verbs that the idea of causing some object to move to another person was metaphorically extended to causing that person to have that object. This intuitively fits in with the experience that if we see an object in the proximity of a person, we are inclined to think that that object belongs to that particular person. In her *Constructions. A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure*, Goldberg (1995:89, also Langacker 1999:191) proves the existence of such a metaphor that involves understanding possession as the ‘possessed’ entity located next to the ‘possessor’, transferring an entity to a recipient as causing the entity to move to that recipient, and transferring ownership away from a possessor as taking that entity away from the possessor with the following examples (renumbered here):

- (102) a. They took his house away from him.  
       b. He lost his house.  
       c. Suddenly several thousand dollars came into his possession.

Goldberg uses the following diagram to illustrate the process of metaphorical extension (1995:93). It presents the prepositional construction as a subset of a more general one which can be termed **Caused Motion construction**. The first line shows the semantics associated with the construction indicated. PRED marks a variable that is filled by the verb when a particular verb is integrated into the construction. Solid lines indicate which roles specified by the construction are obligatorily fused with roles of the verb. Dashed lines indicate roles which are not obligatorily fused with roles of the verb, that is, roles which can be contributed by the construction. This is how the diagram provides for the case when two-place predicates appear in a construction involving three participants.




Figure 10

The abbreviation OBL refers to a prepositional object. I<sub>M</sub> indicates the metaphor active in the instantiation.

Panther (1997:114) summarizes the scenario represented by the caused motion construction, that is, the source domain in the following way:

1. A (concrete) object, the trajector moves along a path towards a goal. There may be a causer (human agent) of the movement.
2. The trajector has to cover a certain distance before reaching the goal (endpoint).
3. It takes a certain amount of time to cover the distance from the starting-point to the goal.
4. There is an expectation that the object will reach the goal.
5. It is possible that the object will not reach the goal because there may be 'obstacles' on the path.

The scenario represented by the target domain, the transfer-caused-motion construction can be specified as follows:

1. An animate (human) agent volitionally transfers a concrete object (landmark) to an animate recipient on a path.
2. The purpose of the transfer is that the recipient will possess or utilise the object.
3. It takes a certain amount of time for the agent to transfer the object to the recipient.
4. There is an expectation that the object will get to the recipient.
5. It is possible that the object will not be transferred to the recipient because there may be 'obstacles' on the path.

This scenario gives an explanation why it is possible to utter without contradiction e.g.

(103) She gave the hat to him, but he didn't take it.

as there may be obstacles on the path leading towards the goal.

The second box in Figure 10 shows the prepositional object construction, which prototypically has the same conceptual content as the double object construction (Figure 11) but the focus representing a different construal is moved to the second object denoting the object of the transfer.

## Ditransitive Construction




Figure 11

The scenario for the ditransitive construction may be elaborated as follows:

1. A volitional human agent transfers a concrete or abstract entity to a human recipient.
2. The transfer is successful as it is iconically implied by the juxtaposition of the verb and the NP denoting the human recipient.
3. The recipient has the object in his possession or at his disposal.

This scenario accounts for the infelicitousness of examples like the following:

(104) ?She gave him the hat but he didn't take it.

Here the remark must be made that Figures 9 and 10 reveal a significant difference between the standpoints of cognitive grammar and construction grammar: cognitivists do not agree with taking focus or prominence out of meaning and distinguishing a separate level of pragmatics as they claim this represents a crucial semantic difference, a gestalt shift, which has its effect on grammatical (syntactic) structure. (See also Chapter 1) The gestalt shift

between the two constructions means that in the case of the double object construction it is the end-point of the transfer that is profiled and is most salient, i.e. the phase when the object of transfer is already in the ownership or at the disposal of the recipient, whereas in the case of the prepositional object construction it is the path along which the object of transfer is moving that is profiled and most salient. (See Figure 9 in section 4.2) However, in the diagrams I have kept these two separate and have thus accepted the construction grammar notation because it is capable of a differentiation that fits in with the cognitive framework, as well: the ‘semantic’ level is capable of representing conceptual content, while the ‘pragmatic’ level gives information about construal.

Many of the verbs belonging to this class require that the referents of the subject, indirect object and direct object should co-exist: e.g. *feed, give, lend, loan, sell, serve*. (Green 1974:108-109) Others such as *lease* and *rent* permit indirect objects ‘from another world’, but only in the prepositional construction:

- (105) a. I promise to lease my land to future generations at \$1 an acre.  
 b. \*I promise to lease future generations my land at \$1 an acre.

Still others, such as *pay* have no co-existence requirement:

- (106) a. I promise to pay future generations of Sioux \$1 a year for the use of this  
 land.  
 b. I promise to pay \$1 a year to future generations of Sioux for the use of this  
 land.

The reason for this difference may be that *lease* and *rent* refer to a legal relationship which cannot be valid if one of the parties does not yet or no longer exists. On the other hand, *pay* does not lexicalise such a relationship and with the sophisticated payment techniques of the modern world, it is possible to pay even decades ahead.

The semantic representation of these verbs, which is: Subject causes indirect object to have direct object [in accordance with a condition i], where the part in brackets is optional, raises the question of the scope of possible adverbials added to the sentence as adjuncts (Green 1974:143-144). Duration adverbials e.g. an expression with *until* describes the time when the having will cease and says nothing about the time or duration of the causing or transfer:

(107) John lent Jill his hoe until Monday.

Place adverbs such as *in London* only have a reading in which the causation, movement and the consequent having all occur as described by that adverb.

(108) Jack sold Jill a house in London.

With this class of verbs the adverb *almost* may refer either to the initiation of the transfer or to the fact that the transfer has been attempted and has almost succeeded. The first sentence illustrates the former case, the second one the latter:

(109) a. John almost gave Jill a kiss, but he lost heart.

b. John almost sold his ward to some whiteslavers, but the  
notary was out of town.

### 5.1.1.2 Complex predicates with *give*

The central role of *give* is shown by the fact that it appears in a lot of expressions in combination with nouns denoting abstract notions, activities or events. These complex predicates follow three patterns (Cattell 1984:66):

1. Either the double object or a *to*-prepositional construction can occur:

(110) a. Henry gave the students a demonstration of the new technique.

b. Henry gave a demonstration of the new technique to the students.

2. Neither of these can occur:

(111) a. Bob gave a sneeze.

b. \*Bob gave Cathy a sneeze.

c. \*Bob gave a sneeze to Cathy.

The reason for this probably is that it is quite inconceivable that any person would be involved in anybody else's sneezing in any way.

3. Only an indirect object construction can occur:

(112) a. Jack gave Jill a kiss.

b. \*Jack gave a kiss to Jill.

Our present concern here is the expressions where the double object construction can occur. They are licensed by the everyday metaphors 'Ideas are Objects' and 'Actions are objects', i.e. objects that can be transferred and can be owned. Another motivation for the existence in



the language of these expressions lies in the fact that forms such as *give a kick* focus on the action nominalisation *a kick* presenting it as a result, whereas the verbal form *kick* can be freely used when the focus is not on the action performed. In accordance with the properties of the double object construction, there is the distinction between the nominal and the verbal expression that e.g. *He gave her a bump*. rather refers to a purposeful action (which may be the effect of the construction where the subject prototypically refers to an intentional agent), whereas *He bumped into her*. may describe either an accidental or a deliberate bump. Another characteristic property of the double object construction is revealed by the difference between *have a look* and *give a look*. While *have a look* describes a situation in which Mary indulges in looking at John and it is irrelevant whether John realises that he is being observed, *give a look* speaks about a way of communication – Mary gives John a look and he notices it. This is why it is possible to use *give sy a smile* as *smile* has the sense 'using the gesture to communicate with sy' but only *have a laugh* and not *\*give sy a laugh* because *laugh* only means 'show amusement at sg'. Conversely, it is appropriate to use *give sy a wink* but not *\*have a wink at sg*, as *wink* implies a way of communication. This falls in with the feature that in the double object construction the referent of the indirect object is affected by the situation. Similarly, it is possible to say *I gave the child a carry*., as the child is favourably affected by this action, being spared the effort of walking on its own. On the other hand, it would be infelicitous to say *\*I gave the suitcase a carry*. This, however, does not mean that the referent of the indirect object cannot be inanimate but there should be the implication that it is affected in some way: e.g. *give the table a wipe* (it was dirty before and is now clean) or *give the rope a pull* (to try to dislodge the end from where it is trapped) (Dixon 1991:349).

Green (1974:82-85) classifies these expressions into five semantic subgroups:

- 1) There are expressions which describe the source of some physical or psychic condition:  
*give sy the measles, give sy an inferiority complex, give sy a cold*

2) There are active expressions typically referring to physical contact: *give sy a bash, biff, clout, crack, cuddle, hit, hug, kick, kiss, pat, pinch, a punch in the nose, push, smack, squeeze, thump, whack* etc. Here the nouns appearing as direct objects are action nominalisations. Cattell (1984:5) points out that there are cases where the nominal cannot take an object but the corresponding verb can:

- (113) a. Bill kicked the dog.  
b. Bill gave the dog a kick.  
c. \*Bill gave a kick of the dog.

He further remarks that those expressions that contain formally transitive nominals allow the prepositional expression:

- (114) a. Henry gave the class a demonstration of the new technique.  
b. Henry gave a demonstration of the new technique to the class.

Cattell (1984:81) accounts for this claiming that in these expressions the indirect object position can be assigned two types of thematic roles. One possibility is that the thematic role Goal is assigned, which is in accordance with the lexical entry of *give* but this only happens if this role is in the set of  $\Theta$ -roles provided in the lexical entry of the predicational noun. This is the case with the abovementioned expression *give a demonstration of*, as the thematic role Goal is present in the lexical entry of *demonstrate*, too. Otherwise the thematic role Theme is assigned if the lexical entry of the predicational noun does not contain the role Goal but does contain Theme: e.g. *give a kiss*. Thus after all, it is the predicational noun whose  $\Theta$ -role

assignment determines the  $\Theta$ -role assignment of the complex predicate. This also accounts for the fact why *give a demonstration of* can occur in the prepositional construction whereas *give a kiss* cannot. At the same time the fact that this complex predicate can be used in the double object construction whereas *demonstrate* itself cannot is a feature the composite predicate has inherited from *give*.

3) There are expressions referring to non-physical interpersonal behaviour, often of a communicative nature:

(115) a. Mary gave John a piece of her mind.

b. Mary gave John a dirty look.

c. Mary gave John a nod.

4) There are expressions where *give* means 'provide with' as opposed to 'present as a gift' and the subject NP is often abstract and non-volitional:

(116) Mary's behaviour gave John an idea.

5) The expressions belonging here indicate that the person denoted by the subject (either by granting permission or by enabling) lets the person denoted by the indirect object engage in having, getting, taking or suffering whatever action, behaviour etc. is denoted by the direct object NP:

(117) a. John gave Mary a ride on his motorcycle.

b. John gave Mary a look at his etchings.

Occasionally a nominal derived from a ditransitive verb may also appear in this type (Dixon's example 1991:346):

(118) Will you give me a lend of your ruler?

This sentence is related to:

(119) Will you lend me your ruler?

The original indirect object remains indirect object, the nominal derived from the verb becomes direct object and the original direct object becomes the complement of the preposition *of*.

These complex predicates can be given the following representation as a metaphorical extension of the central sense:




Figure 12

The letter R introduces the specification of the way the particular verb is integrated into the construction (see section 2.7). The abbreviations *aff* and *eff* stand for the terms 'affected' and 'effected', the former one referring to the person who receives the effect and the latter one to the event performed which brings about the effect.

In text form they can be given the following representation (Goldberg 1992:64):

Name of Metaphor: Actions which are directed at a person are Entities which are transferred to the Person

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subj performs an action (Obj2) which is directed at Obj

Subject: actor

Object: recipient (affected)

Object2: action (effected)

(The parts in brackets are added by me.)

The scenario for the target domain can be elaborated as follows:

1. The referent of the subject (which may be a human agent or a causing event or entity) causes the event or action denoted by Obj2 to happen.
2. This has a (strong) effect on the human denoted by Obj as is iconically indicated by the juxtaposition of Obj and Obj2.

### ***5.1.2 Verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion in a deictically specified direction: BRING, TAKE (TO-verbs)***

The two verbs in this small class denote the direct and accompanied physical transfer of an object from and by an agent to the individual denoted by the indirect or prepositional object expression. The semantic representation of their conceptual content is: Subject causes indirect object to receive direct object by causing direct object to come/go with subject to indirect


object. The referent of the subject is the initiator of the movement, the referent of the direct object is the entity transferred and the referent of the indirect or prepositional object is the goal and recipient of the transfer. Thus they describe a situation where an agent comes or goes to the individual referred to by the indirect object, with some object which he wants that individual to have, receive or use. Semantically, this class is closely related to that of the CARRY-verbs with the difference that the two members here prototypically lexicalise the viewpoint of the speaker (or subject/trajector), *bring* referring to motion in the direction of and *take* referring to motion away from him. Denoting caused motion in the concrete, physical sense, these two verbs belong to the central instantiations of dative shift. The reason why they do not constitute the prototypical case is that their meaning does not necessarily encode a transfer of possession so they frequently occur in prepositional constructions which do not alternate with a double object construction because the referent of the prepositional object denotes a physical location, so purely a Goal and not a Recipient Goal:

(120) a. Jack took some chairs to the table.


b. \*Jack took the table some chairs.

An example for the ditransitive use is the following:

Jack brought Jill a bunch of roses.



Jack took Jill a bunch of roses.



Ja=Jack, Ji=Jill, tr=trajector, lm=landmark, C=conceptualiser (speaker), > = volitional

Figure 13

The semantic and syntactic features of these two verbs can be illustrated with the following diagram:

Ditransitive Construction




Figure 14



As regards the scope of adverbials with this class, both the place and time adverbials have only a reading in which the causation, movement and having all occur as described by the adverb, which follows from the features of continuity and accompaniment:

- (121) a. Jack brought Jill a bunch of roses in London.  
b. Jack brought Jill a bunch of roses on Monday.

For example, the second sentence asserts that the bunch of roses got to Jill on Monday and that Jack initiated the action on Monday.

Adverbs denoting origin such as *from London* only refer to the motion with verbs of this class and not to the having:

- (122) Jack brought Jill the bunch of roses from London.

### **5.1.3 Verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion in some manner: the class of CARRY (TO-verbs)**

As has been indicated in the previous section, these two classes are closely related. The verbs belonging here also denote the continuous causation of accompanied motion. In comparison to *bring* and *take* what they lack is the deictic element (with the exception of *pull* and *push*) but on the other hand they lexicalise the means (two kinds: hands and feet, as the two parts of the body human beings primarily use to move physical objects from one place to another, at least in western cultures; probably African languages have a lexical item for carrying things on the head) and the manner of transfer. The proposed semantic representation of the

conceptual content for these verbs is: Subject causes indirect object to receive direct object by causing direct object to come/go with subject to indirect object [in a lexicalised manner]. The referent of the subject is the initiator of the movement, the referent of the direct object is the entity transferred and the referent of the indirect and the prepositional object is the goal and recipient of the transfer. On account of the latter fact, this class represents an interesting contrast with the verbs of manner of speaking like *groan*, *mumble* or *whisper*, which are excluded from the dative shift. The crucial difference between these two classes may be caused by two factors: one is that the verbs of the CARRY-class refer to visible, physical motion, and the other is that in the case of the verbs of manner of speaking the initiator (the speaker) concentrates on the exact formulating of the message rather than on its content that the addressee could receive and cognitively possess.

Members of this class include *carry*, *drag*, *haul*, *heave*, *heft*, *hoist*, *kick* (in the repetitive sense of the verb), *lug*, *pull*, *push*, *schlep*, *shove*, *tote*, *tow*, *tug*. It should be noted here, however, that the intuitions of native speakers here differ in connection with *pull* and *push*, the two members of the class containing a deictic element in their semantics. Green and Levin list them among the dativizing verbs but Pinker does not.

The semantic and syntactic properties of the verbs in this class can be illustrated in a diagram equivalent to that of the previous class (see Figure 14).

#### **5.1.4 Verbs of accompanied/unaccompanied physical transfer: the class of SLIDE (TO-verbs)**

This class is again a small one including such verbs as *bounce*, *drive*, *float*, *lift*, *lower*, *raise*, *roll* and *slide*, which may describe both situations in which a physical object is transferred to

the individual denoted by the indirect object by the agent-subject in an unaccompanied or accompanied way. The proposed semantic representation of the conceptual content here is: Subject causes indirect object to receive direct object by causing direct object to go with/without subject to indirect object [in a lexicalised manner]. The referent of the subject is the initiator of the movement, that of the direct object is the entity transferred and the referent of the indirect or prepositional object is the goal and recipient of the transfer.

The semantic and syntactic properties of this class can be illustrated in diagram form in a way that is identical with Figure 14.

### **5.1.5 Verbs of unaccompanied physical transfer: the class of SEND (TO-verbs)**

This class incorporates the verbs denoting the unaccompanied physical transfer of a physical object from an agent to an individual denoted by the indirect object phrase. Members in this class include *barge, bus, cart, ferry, fly, forward, hand, mail, post, row, send, ship, shuttle, slip, smuggle, sneak, truck, wheel, wire (money)*.<sup>16</sup> The proposed semantic representation for this class is: Subject causes indirect object to receive direct object by causing direct object to go without subject to indirect object [often with lexicalised means]. The referent of the subject is the initiator of the transfer, that of the direct object is the entity transferred and the referent of the indirect or prepositional object is the goal and recipient of the transfer. As the verbs

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<sup>16</sup> Levin (1993) lists the following verbs among the dativizing ones with a question mark: *barge, bus, cart, drive, ferry, fly, row, shuttle, truck, wheel, wire (money)*. This shows the fuzzy boundaries of the category. A revealing remark by P. Pelyvás (personal communication) is that here two elements of the complex scenario compete for the profiled status: caused motion and motion to target/transfer of possession. The more specific the meaning of the verb is, the more likely it is to attract the profile. This has the consequence that the ditransitive construction is less felicitous. This way the group makes an interesting contrast with verbs of ballistic motion (5.1.6) and verbs of instrument of communication (5.1.8) as the members of these two classes, which also lexicalise the means of transfer, invariably participate in the dative shift.

here refer to unaccompanied transfer, the scope of time adverbials only encompasses the causation and the initiation of the transfer only but not the end-point:

(123) Mary sent her father the letter on Monday (so he won't have it yet).

This sentence simply implies that the letter must have gone from Mary on Monday.

With this class of verbs duration adverbials describe the time when the having will cease and say nothing about the duration of the causing or the transfer.

(124) Jack sent his laptop to Jill until Monday.

The semantic and syntactic properties of this class can be illustrated in diagram form in a way that is identical with Figure 14.

### ***5.1.6 Verbs of instantaneous causation of ballistic motion: the class of THROW (TO-verbs)***

One of the facts that make the dative shift a problematic issue in English linguistics is its partial productivity, i.e. the phenomenon that there is a complex interaction of factors allowing or disallowing verbs to take part in it. This group of verbs is unproblematic in this respect: any conceivable member of it automatically appears in both constructions. Thus it provides very significant counterexamples to the much favoured and very neat, perhaps too neat explanation that only three place predicates can participate in the alternation and underlines the necessity of refining the account offered. Goldberg points out (1995:60-61) that it had been implicit in much of the generative semantics literature and has been more

recently recognised by Talmy (1985), Rappaport and Levin (1988) and Jackendoff (1990) that verbs which do not directly denote the meaning associated with the construction often denote the means by which the action is performed. This is the relation that these verbs bear to the meaning of the ditransitive construction and that is why they unexceptionally take part in it. The following diagram shows the semantic and syntactic features of the verbs belonging to this group when they appear in the double object construction:

#### Ditransitive Construction




Figure 15

Verbs belonging here lexicalise the means by which the motion is performed: e.g. feet in the case of *kick*.

In accounting for the unexceptional participation in the dative shift of these verbs Larson (1988:372) refers to the argument structure of the particular verbs and the preposition *to*, claiming that the latter assigns the thematic role Goal, which is subsumed by the role assigned to the third argument of the verb itself. A weak point of this account is that it is doubtful whether in connection with these verbs we can speak about a third argument. They

may be two-place predicates in themselves and it is the cognitive structure of the situation described by them which contains a path with an end-point to which an object moves.

A list of members includes *bash, bat, bunt, cast?, catapult, chuck, fire* ('projectile'), *flick, fling, flip, hit, hurl, kick, lob, loft?, nudge, pass, pitch, punt, shin, shoot, shove, slam, slap, sling, tap, throw, tip, toss* (Green 1974:85, Levin 1993:46). But if in a given context we come up with the name of another part of the body with which e.g. a ball can be passed converted into a verb, we can add it to this list without fail:

(125) Smith headed Jones the ball.

The semantic representation of the conceptual content of these verbs is proposed to be: Subject causes indirect object to receive direct object by causing direct object to move to indirect object partially in the air [with lexicalised means]. The referent of the subject is the initiator of the movement, that of the direct object is the entity passed in the air and the referent of the indirect or prepositional object is the goal and recipient.

### **5.1.7 Verbs of transfer of a message: the class of TELL (TO-verbs)**

These verbs refer to the transfer of communicated message. Members in the class include *cite, pose?, preach, quote, read, relay, show, teach, tell, write*. This class is distinguished by the nature of the entity which is the object of transfer because it may not always be physically tangible (e.g. it is in the case of *write* but not in the case of *tell*) but even if it is not, it has a physically discernible part, i.e. a sound string but the transfer is performed because of the abstract content of the physical entity. The participation of these verbs in the double object construction is licensed by the **conduit metaphor**, described by Michael Reddy (1979),

which involves communication travelling across from the stimulus to the listener, who understands communication upon reception. The conduit metaphor involves another everyday metaphor, namely ‘Ideas are Objects’, according to which ideas are transferred in the communication channel, can be packed, sent, received, unpacked and owned. Evidence for the metaphor can be found in the following examples (Goldberg 1995:148):

- (126) a. He got the ideas across to Jo.  
b. Jo received the information from Sam.

This metaphor works in the following sentences:

- (127) a. Jack told Jill the news.  
b. Jill read Jack a passage.

A related metaphor involves understanding perceptions as entities which move toward the perceiver. This metaphor is active in the following examples:

- (128) Jill showed Jack the photos.

The proposed semantic representation of the conceptual content of the members of this class is: subject causes indirect object to have knowledge constituted by direct object by means of (oral) communication. The referent of the subject is the initiator of the communication, that of the direct object is the written or sounding message and the referent of the indirect or prepositional object is the addressee/experiencer. The semantic and syntactic properties of these verbs as used in the ditransitive construction can be illustrated with the following

diagram. The notation *cog* is an abbreviation of 'cognitive' and indicates the special character of the object transferred.




Figure 16

In a textual form this class can be represented in the following way (Goldberg 1992:63):



Name of metaphor: Conduit

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subj communicates Obj2 to Obj

Subject: speaker

Object: listener/addressee

Object2: information

The scenario related to the target domain can be summarized as follows:

1. A volitional human agent sends a message to a human addressee in the communication channel.
2. The transmission of the message is successful and it goes over to the cognitive possession of the addressee as is iconically indicated by the juxtaposition of the NP referring to the recipient (Obj) and the one referring to the message (Obj2).

As regards such members of this class as *show*, which is a lexical causative of *see/notice/observe*, and partly *teach*, which is a lexical causative related to *know*, the following representation is more valid (Goldberg 1992:64):

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subj acts to cause Obj to see Obj2

Subject: actor

Object: perceiver

Object2: perception

The scenario related to this target domain can be summarized as follows:

1. A volitional human agent performs an action to send a human recipient-perceiver-experiencer some cognitive information and make him aware of it.
2. The transmission of the cognitive information is successful and goes over to the cognitive possession of the perceiver as is indicated by the juxtaposition of the NP referring to the perceiver (Obj) and the one referring to the piece of information (Obj2).

*Show* and *teach* stand out from the group because with them there is a difference in propositional, truth-functional meaning between the double object and the prepositional constructions and these are also two which allow either the first (indirect) or the second (direct) object to appear as the sole object of the sentence:

(129) a. Peter taught Jack grammar/good manners.

b. Peter taught grammar to Jack.

c. Peter taught Jack/grammar.

(130) a. Peter showed Jack a photo.

b. Peter showed a photo to Jack.

c. Peter showed Jack/ a photo.

This meaning difference involves aspect because the a) sentences refer to telic situations while the b) sentences refer to atelic ones. In the case of the a) sentences emphasis falls on the fact that Jack actually benefited from the situation, he was affected by it (he now knows grammar or is aware of what good manners are or he perceived the photo). In the case of the b) sentences the situations are viewed in another way: the conscious intentional effort on the part of the subject is focussed on but its effect on the entity denoted by the prepositional object is uncertain. This significant difference accounts for the fact that in the case of the a)

sentences it is possible to have inanimate or abstract subjects, which is an option ruled out in the case of the b) ones (Green 1974:158):

(131) a. Several mistakes taught Jack grammar.

b. \*Several mistakes taught grammar to Jack.

(132) a. Experience showed him the truth of his father's words.

b. \*Experience showed the truth of his father's words to him.

In the double object construction these two verbs may have a wide range of abstract nouns as direct object but in the prepositional construction this choice is much more limited as can be illustrated by the following ungrammatical sentence:

(133) \*Jill taught responsibility to Jack.

Similarly, in the double object construction which does not alternate with a prepositional construction *teach* and *show* may have abstract subjects:

(134) a. Several mistakes taught John the secrets of Chinese cooking.

b. \*Several mistakes taught the secrets of Chinese cooking to John.

The c) sentences in (129-130) illustrate the cases when the sentence is reduced to just one of the two objects. The appearance of the former indirect object as the sole object of the sentence reveals a high degree of affectedness.

On account of this propositional, truth-functional meaning difference Green speaks about two verbs of *teach* and *show*, one with which the prepositional object construction alternates with the double object one, and one which is restricted to the double object construction as the latter one does not fulfil the semantic requirements of the prepositional construction referring to transfer.

In the case of *write* there is a difference of presuppositions between the prepositional and double object constructions as is illustrated by the example quoted from Green (1974: 107-108) under (90) in section 4.2.

The list at the beginning of this section does not contain those verbs which would semantically belong here but do not take part in the alternation. Here belongs the class of *say*, which Beth Levin (1993:47) defines as verbs of communication of propositions and propositional attitude and lists the following members in it: *admit, allege, announce, articulate, assert, communicate, confess, convey, declare, mention, propose, recount, repeat, report, reveal, say, state*. The exceptionality of these verbs can be accounted for by the fact that they lexicalise the manner and attitude of speaking, which is a relationship a verb only marginally bears to the construction in which it appears. As regards the difference between *say* and *tell*, they are both basic verbs referring to oral communication. There is the economical distribution in the language between them that with *say* it is the message that is most salient and reference to the addressee is optional, which reflects the human experience that oral communication is possible without any conceivable addressee at the other end of the channel. Wierzbicka (1996:121) quotes a line from the Bible:

(135) And God said: let there be light! (Genesis 1:3)

with the comment that it is definitely not elliptical for ‘God said to someone: let there be light!’ *Tell*, on the other hand, is a three-place predicate with which besides the message the addressee can be made salient and focussed upon, too.

Another significant group of exceptions is constituted by verbs of manner of speaking: e.g. *babble, chant, grumble, lisp, moan, mutter* etc. (for a comprehensive list see Chapter 6). Their exceptionality can be put down to the fact that in their cognitive structure the manner of speaking is profiled and made salient and not the successful transfer. On the other hand, as they do not describe the prototypical way of communication, i.e. at a normal pitch with a normal tone, they imply that there are disturbances in the communication channel and successful transmission cannot be guaranteed.

Time adverbs modifying the verbs belonging to this class refer simultaneously to both the causation and the beginning of the effect, the cognitive ‘having’. As Green (1974:134) remarks in a sense the actions described by these verbs are conceived of as instantaneous, so it would be wrong to assert e.g.

(136) Jack told Jill a joke on Monday.

if the action was initiated on Monday but was not complete until Tuesday, or if it began on Sunday but was not complete until Monday. In the extreme case when we are concerned with an extremely long joke, the choice of the time adverbial must be such that incorporates both the time of the beginning of the causation and the time when the effect is complete:

(137) Jack told Jill a joke last week.

As regards place adverbials, due to the direct and instantaneous character of the situations described by these verbs these only have a reading in which the initiation and the consequent effect all occur at the location described by the adverbial. So one cannot say

(138) Jack told Jill a story in London.

if Jack was not in the capital of England when the transfer was started and completed.

### **5.1.8 Verbs of instrument of communication: the class of RADIO (TO-verbs)**

The verbs belonging here are related to members of the previous class in that they refer to transfers where the transferred object is a kind of message in a written or sound form. They lexicalise the means of the transfer of message or communication and unexceptionally take part in the dative shift. Should a new telecommunications device be invented tomorrow, we can be sure that its name converted into a verb form will participate in both constructions. A list of members include *cable, e-mail, fax, gesture, modem, netmail, phone, radio, relay, satellite, semaphore, sign, signal, telephone, telecast, telegraph, telex, wire, wireless*. The direct objects of these verbs are typically nouns like *news, information* or *response*. The semantic representation for the conceptual content of this class can be: subject causes indirect object to have the knowledge constituted by direct object by the means of using the device lexicalised. The referent of the subject is the sender of the message, that of the direct object is the message sent and the referent of the indirect or prepositional object is the addressee. The semantic and syntactic features of these verbs as used in the ditransitive construction are

illustrated in the following diagram. Their participation in the ditransitive construction is licensed by the conduit metaphor, similarly to the class of TELL.

#### Ditransitive Construction




Figure 17

In a textual form this class can be represented in the following way:

Name of metaphor: Conduit

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subj communicates Obj2 to Obj

Subject: speaker

Object: listener/addressee

Object2: information

Time adverbials have a different scope with these verbs than with the ones in the previous section. Because of the devices and duration of transmission involved (as the transmission is

not direct and instantaneous), there is a difference in this respect between the double object and prepositional object constructions. A sentence

(139) John wired the news to his mother on Monday

may imply that John sent the wire but his mother may not yet have received it on Monday. On the other hand,

(140) John wired his mother the news on Monday.

prototypically implies that the news was both sent and received at the time indicated.

Duration adverbials here may modify the causing and the going but not the having in sentences describing habitual or repeated actions (Green 1974:143):

(141) Bob wired the news to Mary until yesterday, so she probably doesn't know  
of the events of this morning.

This sentence is inappropriate if Bob engaged in only one causative act whose effect was that the mail or news should be sent on every occasion.

Place adverbials may have two readings with verbs of this class (Green 1974:139). A sentence like

(142) Jack wired his mother the news in California.



may refer either to a situation when both Jack and his mother were in California, one of them in Los Angeles, the other one in San Francisco, or to one when Jack was in Los Angeles but his mother in New York.

### **5.1.9 Verbs of future having (TO-verbs)**

As Beth Levin (1993:45) defines the members of this group, they refer to commitments or arrangements to the effect that a person will have something at some later point. The group includes the following verbs: *advance, allocate, allot, assign, award, bequeath, cede, concede, extend, forward, grant, guarantee, issue, leave* 'bequeath', *offer, owe, permit, promise, vote, vouchsafe, will, yield*. These verbs imply that the agent acts to cause the referent of the indirect object to receive the referent of the direct object at some future point in time. On the other hand, they do not imply any intention or obligation of future action on the part of the referent of the subject; the agent's role in the transfer is accomplished by the action referred to by the predicate but the crucial act, if uninterrupted, will naturally result as part of a causal chain in the referent of the indirect object having the referent of the direct object (Goldberg 1992:58, 1995:32). It follows from this that the co-existence constraint stating that the referents of the subject, the indirect object and the direct object should exist at the same time in the same world holds for this class, too, in the ditransitive construction, as is illustrated by the following pair of examples quoted from Green (1974: 107-108):

- (143) a. If I am elected, I promise a college education at the school of their  
choice to any children born in this ward after I take office.

- b. \*If I am elected, I promise any children born in this ward after I  
take office a college education at the school of their choice.

Verbs of future having represent notable exceptions to the morphophonological criterion verified with experimental evidence by Gropen et al (1989) stating that verbs with particular morphemes such as *per-*, *con-*, *-mit*, *-sume* and polysyllabic verbs with non-initial stress are excluded from the double object construction. These constraints broadly coincide with the abovementioned distinctions between Romance/Latinate and native vocabulary as well as between specialised and more basic vocabulary (Goldberg 1992:41):

(144) Chris assigned/ allotted/guaranteed/ bequeathed him the tickets.

The constraint applies in the case of the verb *delegate*, which semantically belongs to this group, though.

This class is also seemingly exceptional in the sense that members allow inanimate entities to appear as subjects. This can be illustrated with an example similar to (27) in section 2.6:

(145) a. Your theory assigns the feature [+N] to sincerity.

b. Your theory assigns sincerity the feature [+N].

On the one hand, however, the possessive *your* implies the presence of an animate participant in the background of the situation. On the other hand, even if we replace *your* e.g. with an element like *this/that*, which do not refer to an animate participant in themselves, *theory* as a lexical item invokes a cognitive domain which, on the basis of our experience, contains the idea that theories are conceived by human beings.

Within this group four subgroups can be identified:

- 1) The subject arranges for the indirect object to have the direct object in the future:  
*advance, allocate, assign, allot, bequeath, cede, concede, extend, forward, leave, will.*  
*Bequeath, leave* and *will* lexicalise the time when the referent of the indirect object starts having the referent of the direct object so the semantic representation of their conceptual content can be elaborated like this: the subject arranges for the indirect object to have the direct object when the subject dies.
- 2) The subject commits himself that the indirect object will have the direct object in the future: *guarantee, issue, promise, vote, vouchsafe*
- 3) The subject communicates to the indirect object that the indirect object may have the direct object in the future: *allow, award, grant, offer, permit, yield*
- 4) The subject is obligated to cause the indirect object to have the direct object: *owe*

In connection with two subgroups, 2 and 4, transfer is implied by the ‘conditions of satisfaction’ associated with the act denoted by the predicate (Searle 1983). This means that the sentences these verbs appear in do not imply transfer in themselves but if the action denoted by the verb is performed, the transfer will come about, e.g.:

(146) Jack promised Jill a pearl necklace.

If Jack keeps his promise, Jill will be given the precious necklace.

## Ditransitive Construction




Figure 18

The link between the central sense of the ditransitive construction and the sense represented by these verbs is based on pragmatic satisfaction conditions. An analogous relationship can be found with such complex transitive structures as on the one hand (Goldberg 1992:57):

(147) a. He pushed the napkin off the table.

b. He kicked the ball into the end-zone.

which imply that the subject causes the object to move, and on the other hand

(148) a. She ordered him out of the house.

b. She asked him into the room.

where no actual movement is implied but if the order or request is satisfied, then the person denoted by the object moves out of the house or into the room.

As for subgroup 3) Goldberg (1992:58) claims that the link with which its members are related to the central sense of the construction is based on the relation between causation and enablement.

As regards the scope of adverbials with these verbs, place adverbials may have two readings. They may define either the place where the action expressed by the higher verb takes place or the location of the having:

(149) Jack promised Jill a kiss in Chicago.

This sentence has the readings 'Jack told Jill in Chicago that she would get a kiss' and 'Jack told Jill that she would get a kiss in Chicago'.

On the other hand, the sentence

(150) FDR offered them a chicken in every pot.

can only have the reading that the American president said that citizens would have, in every pot, a chicken.

Time adverbials behave differently with the semantic subclasses to be found in this group. With the arrangement verbs e.g. *assign*, *allot*, *bequeath*, *leave* punctative time adverbials refer only to the time of arrangement (Green 1974:135-137):

(151) They assigned Bob a new office on Thursday.

This sentence cannot mean that they arranged on Monday that on Thursday Bob could have a new office. On the other hand, duration adverbials refer to the having:

(152) They will assign Bob a new office for the next six months.

It does not mean that they will spend the next six months assigning an office to Bob but that Bob's new office will be his for the next six months.

With the promise and permission verbs, however, the scope of time adverbials is ambiguous:

(153) Tricky Dick promised Judy a new car on Thursday.

This sentence may mean either that Tricky Dick told Judy on Thursday that she would or could have a new car, or that he said to her that on Thursday she could have a new car. If, however, the adverb is preposed, the sentence only allows the first reading.

Duration adverbials here may refer to the cessation of the causation in sentences describing repeated or continuing activity (Green 1974:143):

(154) Tom promised his girlfriends money until they caught on.

With most of the verbs participating in the dative shift *almost* refers to the initiation of transfer or to the activity almost being effected. Thus it would be wrong to use the sentence

(155) Jack almost promised Jill \$1,000.

if Jack said that Jill would/could almost have \$1,000 or that she would/could have almost \$1,000. However, the latter reading is marginally found with *owe*:

(156) Jack almost owed Peter \$1,000.

### 5.1.10 Verbs of refusal

This small group of verbs comprises just three members: *deny*, *refuse*, *spare*. They imply that the referent of the subject causes the referent of the indirect object not to have the referent of the direct object. Verbs belonging here are exceptional in the sense that they only occur in the double object construction:

- (157) a. His mother denied John a birthday cake.  
b. Mr Smith refused Bob a raise in salary.  
c. He spared me the effort of answering all those letters.

At this point the question may arise why this group is listed among the dativizable verb classes. The reason is that this group bears a specific relation, that of negation to the ditransitive construction.

In the case of *deny* and *refuse* the idea of transfer is relevant in that the possibility for successful transfer has arisen, but the agent is understood to refuse to act as the causer of it (Goldberg 1995:33). The lack of a prepositional object construction in the case of *deny* and *refuse* is due to the fact that they cannot be readily understood in the terms of caused motion and another factor may be that the juxtaposition of the referents of the indirect and direct objects gives greater emphasis to the personal loss of opportunity suffered by the person referred to by the indirect object (cf. iconicity principle).

*Spare* represents a different case. It appears in contexts where no transfer is performed but this is beneficial for the referent of the indirect object:

- (158) The judge spared John the ordeal.

Larson (1988:375) here explains the lack of the prepositional construction with the fact that the notional indirect object argument of *spare* is assigned the thematic role of Beneficiary but it cannot be interpreted to be a Goal. As *to* assigns the role of Goal, this rules out a sentence like:

(159) \*The judge spared the ordeal to John.

The semantic and syntactic features of *deny* and *refuse* as used in the ditransitive construction can be illustrated with the following diagram:

#### Ditransitive Construction




Figure 19

The scenario related to these two verbs can be summarized as follows:

1. A volitional human agent performs an act of communication to a human recipient with the content that he/she will not transfer a concrete or abstract entity to him/her.
2. This act is successful.



3. As a result, the recipient does not have the object in his possession or at his disposal.

*Spare* presents a higher degree of abstraction. Here the entity not transferred – beneficially for the referent of the indirect object – is often an action or event. Therefore the participation of *spare* in the ditransitive construction is licensed by the ‘Causal Events as Transfers’ metaphor as can be seen in the following diagram representation:

## Ditransitive Construction




Figure 20

In text form this verb can be given the following representation:

Metaphor: Causal Events as Transfers

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj not to receive Obj<sub>2</sub>

Target Domain: Subject is the cause of Obj (beneficially) not being affected by Obj2 or not having to perform Obj2

Subject: agent

Object: affected party

Object2: effect (event or action)

As has been mentioned, all the three members of this class are related to the central sense of the construction by the link of negation. Goldberg (1992:57) presents for this as an analogous case one of the interpretations of anaphoric *it*:

(160) The 76'ers didn't win this year, but it will happen next time.

The *it* in the second clause refers to the negation of the first clause, not the first clause itself.

## **5.2 General features of *FOR*-verbs**

In the following classes of verbs participating in the dative shift we find the preposition *for* in the prepositional construction instead of *to*. This makes a significant semantic difference as the preposition *to* assigns the thematic role Goal whereas the preposition *for* assigns the thematic role Benefactive. This makes the well-known difference that in these structures we are not concerned with actual but intended recipients so these verbs do not refer to causation but to the intention of it. As Green remarks (1974:94-95), assumptions about the subject's intention in performing the action are crucial in determining whether a double object construction is permitted or not. A sentence like

(161) Jill baked Jack cakes.

is appropriate if the cakes are intended for Jack to eat or if the baking is intended as a performance or ritual act for Jack but not if in baking the cakes Jill acted as a substitute for Jack or was an employee of Jack's. There are three verbs which represent exceptions in this respect: *earn*, *gain* and *win*.

The verbs listed in the *for*-classes are typically two-place predicates thus providing evidence against one of the traditional explanations why certain verbs participate in the dative shift, why others do not, namely that only three-place predicates would take part in it.

I claim that unlike TO-verbs in the case of these verbs there is no need for separate semantic representations of conceptual content for the sake of the present problem, as their participation in the dative shift is only indirectly licensed by their semantic structure insofar as they generally refer to actions which in human society are often performed for the benefit of others. For example, in the family every member has to perform tasks for the others: the mother cooks meals for the father and the children, the father does the repairs, the older child cleans everybody's shoes etc. In our work we also perform creative or reproductive actions for others in order to get paid to be able to support ourselves: engineers plan and build houses, bakers bake bread, cakes and cookies, actors perform plays and so on. It is this common human experience which licenses the use of the following classes of verbs in both constructions.

As regards the scope of adverbials with FOR-verbs, generalisations can be made so statements about it are going to be included here instead of being placed with the particular verb classes. As regards time adverbials, with the exception of *earn*, *gain* and *win*, they refer only to the time of the making, getting, performing etc. and not to the having or the intended time of having (Green 1974:138):

- (162) a. Jill baked Jack a cake on Monday.  
b. Jill sang Jack a song on Monday.  
c. Jack bought Jill a bunch of flowers on Monday.  
d. Jack killed Jill a Tory on Monday.

Place adverbials and adverbials of origin behave in a similar way, and all the three types of adverbials may be preposed freely.

With FOR-verbs duration adverbials describe repeated or continuing activity:

- (163) a. Jill baked Jack cakes until she ran out of flour.  
b. Jill sang songs for Jack until she was hoarse.  
c. Jack bought Jill flowers until he ran out of money.  
d. Jill boiled eggs for Jack for breakfast until he developed an allergy.

### **5.2.1 Verbs of creation: the class of BUILD (FOR-verbs)**

It is fundamental in human society that we cooperate with each other in the sense that we produce things and perform actions for the benefit of our fellow humans and in many cases for our own subsistence, too, as that is how we may support ourselves and our families. As here any kind of constructive or destructive action may come up from which somebody else can benefit, the *for*-classes are semantically much more varied than the *to*-classes are. In this first class those verbs are listed which refer to actions producing something new and thus take an effected object. Here the following items can be mentioned (often with their prototypical objects): *arrange*, *assemble*, *bake (cake)*, *blend (drink)*, *boil (tea)*, *blow (bubbles, glass)*, *brew*

*(coffee), build, carve, cast, chisel, churn, compile, construct, cook (meal), create, crochet, design, develop, dig, embroider, fabricate, fashion, fix (meal), fold, forge (metal), grind, grow, hack, hammer, hatch, knit, light (fire), make, manufacture, mint, mold, pound, prepare (meal), produce, roll, sculpt, sew, shape, spin (wool), stitch, weave, whittle.* The list is based on that of Beth Levin (1993:49).


It is in connection with the *for*-verbs that the question of semantic representation and subcategorisation frame becomes crucial. It would be far-fetched to postulate that intended transfer is encoded in the meaning of these verbs, e.g. that *bake* not only has the sense 'make cakes or biscuits' but also the sense 'make cakes or biscuits intending somebody to have/eat them'. In this class we are concerned with two-place predicates, which is shown by the fact that with these verbs the prepositional object can be preposed:

(164) a. I baked a cake for my brother.

b. For my brother, I baked a cake.

The participation in the dative shift of the verbs belonging here is licensed by our cognitive experience about the mechanism of human society. Goldberg (1995:77) gives the following diagram to illustrate the metaphorical extension by means of which these verbs take part in both constructions:

### Transfer-Caused-Motion Construction/Ditransitive Construction



I<sub>p</sub>: intended causation

### Benefactive-Ditransitive Construction




Figure 21

The I<sub>p</sub>-link between the central sense and the benefactive extension is one that relates causation to intended causation. An analogous example for a link between actualisation and causation given by Goldberg (1992:57) involves two uses of the present progressive:

- (165) a. Not right now, I'm working. (actual performance)  
b. Tomorrow, I'm working all day. (intended performance)

In textual form this can be represented as follows:

Name of Metaphor: Acts that are Performed for the Benefit of a Person are Objects which are Given to that Person

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subject Performs an Action for the Benefit of Object which results in the creation of Obj2

Subject: actor

Object: person whom action is performed for the benefit of

Object2: object created by Subject

The scenario related to the target domain can be summarized as follows:

1. A volitional human agent performs a specific action with the intention to benefit the animate being denoted by Obj.
2. The action denoted by the verb is a creative act which results in the production of a concrete physical object denoted by Obj2.
3. The agent intends the beneficiary to receive the object.
4. It does not necessarily happen that Obj receives Obj2.



### **5.2.2 Verbs of artistic creation and performance: the class of DANCE (FOR-verbs)**

Prototypically, when a person engages in an act of artistic creation or performance, he/she does it for the enjoyment of not just him/herself but for that of other people, which is reflected by the fact that these activities also constitute professions in human society. But even when they are done by amateurs, these people usually have an audience in mind even if it is just a party of friends. The list of member verbs here includes *dance*, *do* (*somersault*), *draw* (*picture*), *hum* (*tune*), *paint* (*picture*), *play* (*music, game*), *recite* (*poem*), *sing* (*song*), *spin* (*story*), *whistle* (*tune*), *write* (*book*). It might be said that membership here overlaps with the previously mentioned class of FOR-verbs as some of the verbs mentioned here describe a situation when something new, e.g. a picture or a poem is created which has material existence, too, but the purpose of its creation, at least partly, lies in the psychological and mental effect it has on its intended audience. The verbs listed here are two-place predicates, still, all the transitive verbs that can be conceived of invariably participate in the dative shift.

It should be noted, however, that verbs denoting particular kinds of dancing, playing etc., which depend on the properties of the object performed upon or the work performed cannot occur or are doubtful in the double object construction (Green 1974:94):

(166) ? She blew us her trombone.

On the other hand, verbs denoting different kinds of vocal productions which depend on the nature of the work performed, rather than on properties or actions of the performer occur in both constructions:

(167) She hummed us the new song.

The semantic and syntactic properties of these verbs as used in the ditransitive construction can be illustrated in a diagram form as follows. The notation *cog* indicates the special character of the object of the intended transfer (some kind of artistic experience).

Benefactive-Ditransitive Construction




Figure 22

This can be formulated in textual form as follows:

Name of Metaphor: Acts that are Performed for the Benefit of a Person are Objects which are Given to that Person

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subject Performs an Action of artistic creation or performance for the Benefit of Object which results in the creation of Obj2

Subject: actor

Object: person whom action is performed for the benefit of

Object2: object created by Subject causing artistic enjoyment or experience

The scenario related to the target domain can be summarized as follows:

1. A volitional human agent performs a specific action of artistic creation or performance with the intention to benefit the animate being denoted by Obj.
2. The action denoted by the verb is an artistic act which results in the production of a concrete physical object or perception denoted by Obj2.
3. The agent intends the beneficiary to receive the object.
4. It does not necessarily happen that Obj receives Obj2.

### **5.2.3 Verbs of getting: the class of GET (FOR-verbs)**

This class consists of verbs which denote situations in which the referent of the subject obtains the referent of the direct object with the intention to pass it on to the referent of the indirect object for possession or utilisation. This act often involves selection, as well. Members here include *book, buy, call, catch, cash, charter, choose, earn, fetch, find, gain, gather, get, hire, keep, lease, leave, order, phone (doctor), pick (fruit, flower), pluck (flower), procure, pull (a beer), reach, rent, reserve, save, secure, shoot (game), slaughter (animal), steal, vote, win*.

*Earn, gain* and *win* are different from other members of the class in that they do not refer to intended but to actual transfer. The semantic representation that can be rendered to them is: Subject causes indirect object to have direct object by merit/effort. Here the question arises why they are among the FOR-verbs if they do not refer to intended but to actual transfer. A possible explanation is that in the sentences in which they appear the subjects are typically action nominalisations and the realisation of these actions is the condition for the

success of the transfer. This means that atypically they allow inanimate subjects (Green 1974:94-95):

- (168) a. Tolerance for your enemies will gain/win you no friends.
- b. Selling that cupboard will earn you enough to pay those bills.

However, as has been mentioned, these subjects are action nominalisations which have a reconstructible animate subject which is usually co-referential to the indirect object. Goldberg adds (1995:144) that these examples are all instances of the conventional systematic metaphor 'Causal Events are Transfers' together with such sentences as the following, which involve the use of the verbs *bring*, *buy*, *get*, *give*, *hand* and *lend*, which have already been mentioned as belonging to other verb classes:

- (169) a. The rain brought us relief.
- b. Taking the detour bought us some time.
- c. She got me a ticket by distracting me while I was driving.
- d. Going out without a coat gave me a cold.
- e. The music lent the party a festive air.
- f. The missed ball handed him the victory on a silver platter.

In such cases the co-existence requirement holds but if the reconstructible animate subject is non-co-referential, it does not (Green 1974:109):

- (170) a. Your going to jail will earn only abuse for whatever children you may beget.  
 b. Your going to jail will earn whatever children you may beget nothing but abuse.

They also allow concrete nouns as subject which are again understandable as action nominalisations:

- (171) Stunts like that will earn John a bad reputation.

The syntactic and semantic features of the verbs included in this class with the exception of *earn*, *gain* and *win* can be illustrated in diagram form as follows:

#### Benefactive-Ditransitive Construction




Figure 23


The scenario related to this group can be described in the following way:

1. A volitional human agent obtains the entity denoted by Obj2 with the intention that the animate being denoted by Obj will receive it for possession or utilisation.
2. It does not necessarily happen that Obj receives Obj2.

On the other hand, the semantic and syntactic features of the three verbs *earn*, *gain* and *win* together with those of the examples mentioned above, involving the use of verbs like *bring*, *buy*, *get*, *give*, *hand* and *lend*, can be illustrated with the following diagram, which shows this class as a metaphorical extension from the central sense.

Ditransitive construction

Source domain



*I<sub>M</sub>*: Causal Events  
as Transfers

Target domain




Figure 24

In text form these verbs can be given the following representation:

Metaphor: Causal Events as Transfers

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj<sub>2</sub>

Target Domain: Subject is the cause of Obj being affected by Obj<sub>2</sub>

Subject: cause

Object: affected party

Object2: effect (event or action)

Here the following scenario can be suggested:

1. An action or event denoted by Subj causes the animate being (human) denoted by Obj to be affected by Obj2.
2. Obj2 may denote a concrete entity, event or action.
3. If Obj2 denotes a concrete entity, Obj comes into its possession.
4. If Subj denotes an action performed by a human agent, the effect it brings about is put down to the agent's merit/effort in a positive or negative sense.

Recognizing this metaphor makes it possible to do away with the claim that such examples are simply idiosyncratic. It is evident that the intentionality constraint is present and satisfied in the source domain though it is not mapped to the target domain. This follows from the fact that the target domain is concerned with abstract causes, which cannot be [+intentional] because they are necessarily not human.

In this class the exceptional character of the verbs *earn*, *gain* and *win* among the FOR-verbs is revealed in the different way adverbials have their scope in sentences containing them. Whereas with the rest of the class time adverbials refer only to the time of getting or obtainment, with these three verbs they refer simultaneously to both the causation and the beginning of the having (Green 1974:134). Compare:

(172) a. Jack chose Jill a new dress on Monday.

b. That trick earned Jack \$6,000 on Monday.

The same holds for place adverbials:



(173) a. Jack ordered Jill a new car in London.

b. That trick earned Jack \$6,000 in Las Vegas.

With the rest of the class source adverbials have only a reading in which the adverb modifies the origin of the selection or obtainment whereas these three verbs are only compatible with them if they atypically have animate agentive subjects. Compare:

(174) a. Jack ordered Jill a new dress from his office.

b. Jack earned himself \$6,000 from his office.

Duration adverbials refer to the time when the having will cease with *earn*, *gain* and *win* (Green's example 1974:142):

(175) The Democratic Convention won the Republicans political control until  
1972.

With the adverbial *almost* these three verbs have the reading 'almost succeed in the transfer' or 'cause that indirect object almost has' (Green 1974:144-145):

(176) John's book almost won him a prize.

Marginally, *almost* may have the reading with these verbs that it refers to the direct object:

(177) John almost earned his company \$6,000 in royalties.

#### **5.2.4 Verbs of preparation: the class of PREPARE (FOR-verbs)**

As has been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the difference between this class and the first one lies in the fact that here we are concerned with verbs which describe actions that do not create anything new but in some sense make an already existing object ready for use. When humans engage in such actions, they do not always do it for themselves but for the benefit of others as human society is based on the cooperation of its members being divided into smaller collaborating units. This is a really amorphous group where membership and acceptability strongly depend on the real life experience of the speaker. Again, it is worth indicating some typical objects after the verbs when listing the members of this class. The following list is based on that of Beth Levin (1993:48): *boil (egg, tea), clean, clear (path), cut, fill, fry (egg), grill, hardboil (egg), iron, mix (drinks), peel, poach (egg), prepare, pour (drink), roast (chicken), run (bath), set (table), slice, softboil (egg), toast, toss (salad), wash*. When these verbs participate in the dative shift, they imply that the referent of the subject intends the referent of the indirect or prepositional object to have and use the referent of the direct object in the form modified through the process of preparation. This class can be considered to include 'destructive' verbs which describe a negative action if in the given context the situation can be interpreted to benefit the referent of the indirect or prepositional object. A revealing example is quoted by Green (1974:92):

(178) Mary burned John a steak because she realised he liked it that way.

The semantic and syntactic features of these verbs as used in the ditransitive construction can be illustrated with the following diagram:

## Benefactive-Ditransitive Construction




Figure 25

Similarly to the classes of BUILD and DANCE, the participation of the members of this class in the ditransitive construction is also licensed by the metaphor: Acts that are Performed for the Benefit of a Person are Objects which are given to that Person.

Source Domain: Subject causes Obj to receive Obj2

Target Domain: Subject Performs an Action on Obj2 for the Benefit of Object which results in a change of state of Obj2

Subject: actor

Object: person whom action is performed for the benefit of

Object2: object the state of which is changed by Subject

The scenario related to the target domain can be summarized as follows:

1. A volitional human agent performs a specific action to change the state of Obj2 with the intention to benefit the animate being denoted by Obj.

2. The action denoted by the verb results in a change of state of a concrete physical object denoted by Obj2.
3. The agent intends the beneficiary to receive the object in the transformed state.
4. It does not necessarily happen that Obj receives Obj2.

## 6. ACCOUNTING FOR THE EXCEPTIONS

In the sections dealing with the verb classes hints were made at cases when verbs semantically akin to those belonging to a particular dativizing class do not participate in usually the double object, occasionally in the prepositional object construction.

On the basis of Pinker (1989) and Levin (1993) the following nondativizing verb classes can be listed, the members of which only appear in the prepositional construction:

TO-verbs:

1. Verbs of Romance origin consisting of more than one syllable which belong to one of the semantic classes listed above:

*address* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*administer* (verbs of giving)

*broadcast* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*convey* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*contribute* (verbs of giving)

*delegate* (verbs of future having)

*deliver* (verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion)

*denounce*

*demonstrate* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*describe* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*dictate* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*dispatch* (verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion)

*display*(verbs of transfer of a message)

*distribute* (verbs of giving)

*donate* (verbs of giving)

*elucidate* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*exhibit* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*express* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*explain* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*explicate* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*forfeit*

*illustrate* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*introduce* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*narrate* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*portray* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*proffer*

*recite* (verbs of transfer of a message)

*recommend* (verbs of future having)

*refer* (verbs of unaccompanied physical transfer)

*reimburse* (verbs of giving)

*remit* (verbs of giving)

*restore*

*return* (verbs of giving)

*sacrifice* (verbs of giving)

*submit* (verbs of giving)

*surrender* (verbs of giving)

*transfer* (verbs of accompanied/unaccompanied physical

transfer)

*transport* (verbs of accompanied physical transfer)

These verbs were not formed from nouns so the Romance constraint applies as they are made from stems of Latinate origin and many of them contain prefixes like *con-*, *re-*, *sub-*, *sur-*.

2. Verbs of fulfilling (X gives something to Y that Y deserves, needs, or is worthy of): \**He donated the charity 1,000,000 dollars. \*I presented him the award.* Membership here includes the following verbs: *credit, entrust, furnish, leave, present, provide, serve, supply, trust*. The obstacle here seems to be the specific presuppositions on the recipient participant.

3. Verbs of manner of speaking: \**John shouted/ screamed/ murmured/ whispered/ yodeled Bill the news.* As has been mentioned in section 5.1.7., the non-participation of these verbs in the dative shift can be put down to the fact that they lexicalise the manner of transfer of a message and express non-default ways of oral communication which imply the existence of some kind of obstacle in the communication channel or inability on the part of the speaker (e.g. when someone is only capable of whispering because due to some illness he/she has a hoarse voice), which puts the success of the transfer of message and the affectedness of the recipient at risk. Membership here include *babble, bark, bawl, bellow, bleat, boom, bray, burble, cackle, call, carol, chant, chatter, chirp, cluck, coo, croak, croon, crow, cry, drawl, drone, gabble, gibber, groan, growl, grumble, grunt, hiss, holler, hoot, howl, jabber, lilt, lisp, moan, mumble, murmur, mutter, purr, rage, rasp, roar, rumble, scream, screech, shout, shriek, snap, snarl, snuffle, splutter, squall, squawk, squeak, squeal, stammer, stutter, thunder, tisk, trill, trumpet, twitter, wail, warble, wheeze, whimper, whine, whisper, whistle, whoop, yammer, yap, yell, yelp, yodel*.

4. Verbs of proposition and propositional attitude: \**I said/ asserted/ questioned/ claimed/ doubted her something.* The following verbs can be listed here: *admit, allege, announce, articulate, assert, communicate, confess, convey, declare, mention, propose, recount, repeat,*

*report, reveal, say, state*. Their non-participation in the dative shift can be put down to the fact that their most salient argument is the message and not the recipient. Besides, some of these verbs contain Latinate prefixes such as *de-*, *re* and Latinate stems like *-mit*, *-nounce* (See also 5.1.7.)

Among the non-dativizing verbs Pinker (1989) also lists the following under the label 'verbs of continuous causation of accompanied motion in some manner': *carry, haul, lift, lower, schlep, push* but taking side with Green (1974), I have listed them among the dativizing ones with the remark that they are more common in contexts referring to Goal than to Goal-Recipient but the latter is not infelicitous, either.

The same is the case with Levin's group labelled 'Verbs of putting with a specified direction', which contains the following members: *drop, hoist, lift, lower, raise*.

FOR-verbs:

1. Verbs of obtainment: *accept, accumulate, acquire, appropriate, borrow, cadge, collect, exact, grab, inherit, obtain, purchase, receive, recover, regain, retrieve, seize, snatch*. Their non-dativizing character can partly be put down to the fact that their most salient argument is the patient/theme and not the recipient. Another factor that comes into play is the Romance/Latinate origin in many cases (e.g. *ex-*, *in-*, *re-* as prefixes, *-ceive* as stem).
2. Verbs of choosing/selection: *\*I favored/ indicated her a dress*. Members are *designate, favor, indicate, prefer*. [Pinker also lists the verbs *choose, select* and *pick* here but following Green I have listed them among the dativizing verbs.] Their exclusion from the dative shift can be put down to the fact that their most salient argument is the patient/theme instead of the recipient. They are also ruled out by the morphophonological criteria: two of them have more than two syllables (*designate, indicate*), these two contain Latinate prefixes just like *prefer*, which also displays a Latinate stem.



On the other hand, there are verbs which are restricted to the ditransitive construction. Exceptions are more individual here than in the previous group but at least one class can be identified. It consists of verbs which describe situations when the referent of the subject charges the referent of the indirect object a certain amount of money expressed as direct object. This means that the direct object is semantically restricted. Thus these verbs imply transfer but not in the direction of the referent of the indirect object (so in this case it is not a recipient) rather in the direction of the referent of the subject. The situation described is aspectually punctual and conclusive so the referent of the indirect object suffers the loss all of a sudden. This is further confirmed by the experience in modern societies in the age of plastic money that sums are remitted to or withdrawn from accounts at the touch of a button. This group includes *bet, bill, charge, fine, mulct, overcharge, save, spare, tax, tip, undercharge, wager*.

(179) He charged me £5 in fare.

*Save* and *spare* are exceptions in the sense that with them the referent of the indirect object really benefits from the situation in the way that he/she does not have to part with his/her money. The lack of the prepositional construction may most probably be due to the lack of any kind of transfer.

The juxtaposition of the indirect object NP referring to a human and the direct object NP specifying an amount of money may reveal a lot about the intimate connection between man and his purse and about the importance of finances in money-orientated western societies. *Cost* is also related to this group but with it the subject refers to the physical object or act which deprives the referent of the indirect object of his money:

(180) This trick cost me an immense lot of money.

Another verb that is restricted to the ditransitive construction is *ask*. The expression *ask sy a question* can be regarded to be licensed by the conduit metaphor as it can be understood to mean 'cause sy to receive a question'.

On the other hand, such sentences as

(181) She asked Sam his name/ his birthday/ his marital status.

can be seen as examples motivated by factors independent from the ditransitive construction. Grimshaw (1979, quoted by Goldberg 1992:67) argues that noun phrases such as these, which are semantically questions, can appear as arguments of any verb which subcategorises for an NP in that position and which selects a question complement.

In the case of *forgive* and *envy* there is no reception involved. Their participation in the dative shift is motivated by historical factors. Both had senses that were closely related to *give*. *Forgive* used to mean 'to give or grant' and *envy* 'to give grudgingly, to refuse to give to'. Although these historical facts are not compelling evidence synchronically, they suggest that these verbs were once associated with the ditransitive construction. Goldberg predicts (1992:67) that due to the meaning change these verbs will drop out of the dativizing ones and makes the personal remark that she finds archaic sounding direct objects more acceptable with them than modern sounding ones. Her examples (renumbered here) are:

(182) a. She forgave him his sins.

b. ?\*She forgave him his goof.

(183) a. She envied him his vast fortune.

b. ?\*She envied him his extensive stock portfolio.

Expressions such as *bear sy emotions* and *not begrudge sy sg* refer to emotional states, not real actions of transfer, and with them the indirect object names the Experiencer who is exposed to the sentiments of the subject.

*Flash sy a glance* and *strike sy a blow* are analogous to complex predicates with *give*: cf. *give sy a look/whack*. (See section 5.1.1.2.)

*Wish* probably occurs only in the double object construction to underline the goodwill of the subject referent, who wants no delay in the referent of the indirect object getting the object of the wish.

## 7. CONCLUSION

The objective of the dissertation has been to give a comprehensive account of the phenomenon conventionally called 'dative shift' in the English language, which affects a great number of verbs with diverse semantics. (For a list see Appendix.) The dissertation compares the solution to the phenomenon in formalist (syntax-based) generative and semantics-based (cognitive and construction grammar) theories.

The investigation shows that the dative cannot plausibly be regarded as a semantic/abstract case or thematic role because of the semantic diversity of the arguments involved in it. This was recognised by the early advocate of the idea himself, Fillmore, who first incorporated the dative in his inventory of semantic cases but later broke it up into cases such as the Goal and Experiencer, which are widely used even now as labels for theta roles. The construction grammar approach that my dissertation elaborates on was based on Fillmore's ideas.

Generative frameworks have not been really successful to deal with the dative in the module of syntax as a transformation, or in a Government and Binding-framework as a 'Move  $\alpha$ ' transformation, striving to derive one of the constructions from the other, because of the problems of identifying the D-structure (deep structure) form, the considerable differences between the syntactic behaviour of the TO- and FOR-verbs involved (despite their semantic relatedness), the great number of semantic conditions at play and because these accounts rely exclusively on a truth functional theory of meaning. Doubtlessly, in a prototypical case like *Jack gave Jill a rose.* / *Jack gave a rose to Jill.* the two constructions can be used to describe the same objectively existing situation but they differ in other significant aspects of semantics

such as the affectedness of the referent of the indirect object NP and presuppositions. The other reason for intending to preserve the transformational account is that the dative shift is much more highly productive in other languages than in English. Partial productivity in English is a considerable problem in this framework and the semantic conditions identified cannot really be integrated into the system either as selectional restrictions (because in many cases they do not seem to be an inherent property of the lexical item in question) or as semantic constraints on the transformation (as they do not apply unexceptionally).

I claim that the dative cannot be regarded as a lexical rule, either, as has been proposed by Pinker (1989). In this respect I have agreed with Goldberg's criticism that by postulating changes in the semantic representation of verbs, this approach assumes the existence of implausible verb senses for the sake of being able to draw a sharp dividing line between the lexicon and syntax.

These are the reasons why the dissertation looks for a solution in two, related semantics-based theories: cognitive grammar and construction grammar. The basic principles of these theories that are introduced as relevant to the topic are:

- the principle of iconicity/symbolicity (called the Principle of No Synonymy of Grammatical Forms in construction grammar), according to which there is no semantic identity in difference in syntax, just as there are no meaningless elements in a structure
- construal: it means that the same objectively existing situation can be given a different construal by the conceptualiser, which has crucial consequences for grammatical structure because the choice of primary (trajector/subject) and secondary (landmark/object) focal elements depends on it. The double object and the prepositional constructions are analysed as two different cognitive construals of the same real life state of affairs. The double object construction focuses on the end-point of the process of transferring, when the recipient has come into possession of the physical or non-physical object transferred, and the prepositional

construction focuses on the path the transferred entity is moving along. The difference in construal causes a difference in the choice of the secondary focal element standing after the verb.

- idealised cognitive models (ICM), which can roughly be described as a situation, its participants and the relationships that hold between them – its structured form is the scenario.

- constructions or constructional schemas: they are viewed as separate entities in grammar with semantic and syntactic features of their own, which are motivated by but not compositionally deducible from the semantic and syntactic features of the lexical items that appear in them. When a lexical item is integrated into the construction, participant roles (arguments) may be provided by the construction. This is the case e.g. with verbs of creative acts (sections 5.2.1., 5.2.2., 5.2.4), where the benefactive-recipient role is supplied by the construction, their most salient argument being the patient.

- prototype view of grammatical categories: instead of working with grammatical categories sharply delineated by defining properties so that membership is determined by possessing or not possessing them all, cognitive grammar claims that categories have fuzzy edges with central and marginal members. In case of the dative shift the prototype is represented by the class of GIVE (5.1.1), while typical fuzzy classes are e.g. those denoting creative acts (classes of BUILD, DANCE and PREPARE, sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.4). The much quoted morphophonological criteria (see section 2.1), where exceptions were problematic, can be accommodated to a prototype view of the phenomenon.

- metaphorical extension, a basic conceptual phenomenon, fundamental in categorisation, whereby a target domain is structured with reference to another, more basic source domain.

The dissertation proves the ditransitive double object construction to be a radial category with the members of the class of GIVE as the prototypical case, where the semantics of the individual verbs is in one-to-one correspondence with the semantics of the double object

construction. The basic and central sense of the ditransitive construction is considered to be the actual successful transfer of an object to a recipient, with the referent of the subject agentively causing this transfer and with the object of the transfer being concrete. This construction itself is a metaphorical extension of the caused motion construction licensed by the metaphor: 'transfer of possession as physical transfer'. Other, semantically delineated verb classes appearing in both constructions are viewed as metaphorical extensions of the prototypical case, thus exemplifying constructional polysemy. Their relation to the prototype is specified in each case. Metaphors identified in the extensions of the prototype include: 'Actions which are directed at a person are entities which are transferred to the person.' (licensing e.g. composite predicates with *give*, section 5.1.1.2); the conduit metaphor involving the metaphor 'Ideas are objects.' (verbs of transfer of a message, 5.1.7, verbs of instrument of communication, 5.1.8); 'Acts that are performed for the benefit of a person are objects which are given to that person.' (verbs of creation, 5.2.1, verbs of artistic creation and performance, 5.2.2, verbs of preparation, 5.2.4); 'Causal events as transfers.' (*earn, gain, win* in section 5.2.3). The appearance of the verbs of refusal (5.1.9) in the double object construction is licensed through the relation of negation. Those verbs which lexicalise the means by which the action resulting in the transfer is performed prototypically appear in the ditransitive construction (verbs of instantaneous causation of ballistic motion, 5.1.6, verbs of instrument of communication, 5.1.8). In this way the participation of the particular verbs in the ditransitive construction is licensed by the compatibility of their cognitive construal encoded in their semantic representation with the semantic construal the construction imposes on the scene basic to human experience (transfer of possession) described by it.

- action chain model: according to it, we can conceptualise an event as being instigated or executed by some kind of force or energy input and as constituting energy transmission from participant to participant. The dissertation invokes this model to give an account of the

prototypical semantic properties (often called constraints) of the NPs appearing in the double object construction (see section 4.1).

Although various aspects of the dative shift have been investigated in cognitive and construction grammar publications, the dissertation is novel in applying the abovementioned principles to all the verb classes involved in the dative shift. It develops a hierarchical classification of the verb classes. It gives an account of the semantic and syntactic features of the members of the verb classes identified. It shows how, by virtue of what kind of motivation they are integrated into the two constructions, it specifies what kind of extension/instantiation they represent. It describes the scenarios represented by the particular classes.

The dissertation accounts for the non-participation of verbs in one of the constructions. In the explanation of the exceptions, in many cases there is a complex interaction of factors, from cognitive construal and saliency of arguments to morphophonological criteria often coming into play as well, probably due to facts about the history of the English language, i.e. that as it used to be an inflected language with a morphological dative case, the sensitivity of the ditransitive construction to such criteria may have been preserved as a remnant.



# APPENDIX

## *List of verbs*

V n n = double object construction: Jack gave Jill a flower.

V n pr = prepositional construction: Jack gave a flower to Jill.

See the preposition used in brackets.

In the case of verbs participating in the dative shift, you can see the name of the class next to the entry. '?' indicates that usage fluctuates in the case of the verb.

abandon: V n pr (*to*)

abduct: V n pr (*for*)

accept: V n pr (*for*)

accord: V n n, V n pr (*to*)?

accumulate: V n pr (*for*)

acquire: V n pr (*for*)

address: V n pr (*to*)

administer: V n pr (*to*)

admit: V n pr (*to*)

advance: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

affirm: V n pr (*to*)

afford: V n n

allege: V n pr (*to*)

allocate: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

allot: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

allow: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class/ FUTURE HAVING

announce: V n pr (*to*)

answer: V n n

apportion: V n n

appropriate: V n pr (*for*)

arrange: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

articulate: V n pr (*to*)

ask: V n n

assemble: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

assign: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

assert: V n pr (*to*)

award: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

babble: V n pr (*to*)

barge: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?

bake: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

bark: V n pr (*to*)

bash: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

bat: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

bawl: V n pr (*to*)

bear: V n n

begrudge: V n n

bellow: V n pr (*to*)

belt: V n n

bequeath: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

bet: V n n

bill: V n n

bleat: V n pr (*to*)

blend (drink): V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

blow (bubbles, glass): V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

bode: V n n

boil: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class/ PREPARE-class

book: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

boom: V n pr (*to*)

borrow: V n pr (*for*)

bounce: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class

bray: V n pr (*to*)

brew (coffee): V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

bring: V n n, V n pr (*to*), BRING/TAKE-class

broadcast: V n pr (*to*)

build: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

bunt: V n n, V n pr (*for*), THROW-class

burble: V n pr (*to*)

bus: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?

buy: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

cable: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

cackle: V n pr (*to*)

cadge: V n pr (*for*)

call<sub>1</sub>: V n pr (*to*)

call<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

capture: V n pr (*for*)

carol: V n pr (*to*)

carry: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

cart: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?

carve: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

cash: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

cast<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class?

cast<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

catapult: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

catch: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

cede: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

chant: V n pr (*to*)

charter: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

chatter: V n pr (*to*)

chirp: V n pr (*to*)

chisel: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

choose: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

chuck: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

churn: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

cite: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class

clean: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

clear (path): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

cluck: V n pr (*to*)

coin: V n pr (*for*)

collect: V n pr (*for*)

communicate: V n pr (*to*)

compile: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
compose: V n pr (*for*)  
compute: V n pr (*for*)  
concede: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING  
confess: V n pr (*to*)  
confiscate: V n pr (*for*)  
construct: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
contribute: V n pr (*to*)  
convey: V n pr (*to*)  
coo: V n pr (*to*)  
cook: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
cop: V n pr (*for*)  
cost: V n n  
create: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
credit: V n pr (*to*)  
croak: V n pr (*to*)  
croon: V n pr (*to*)  
crotchet: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
crow: V n pr (*to*)  
cry: V n pr (*to*)  
cut: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
dance: V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class  
declare: V n pr (*to*)  
delegate: V n pr (*to*)  
deliver: V n pr (*to*)

demonstrate: V n pr (*to*)

denounce: V n pr (*to*)

deny: V n n

derive: V n pr (*for*)

describe: V n pr (*to*)

design: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

designate: V n pr (*for*)

develop: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

dictate: V n pr (*to*)

dig: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

dispatch: V n pr (*to*)

display: V n pr (*to*)

distribute: V n pr (*to*)

do (somersault): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class

dock: V n n

dot: V n n

donate: V n pr (*to*)

drag: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

draw (picture): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class

drawl: V n pr (*to*)

drive: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class?

drone: V n pr (*to*)

drop: V n pr (*to*)

earn: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

elucidate: V n pr (*to*)

e-mail: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

emancipate: V n pr (*for*)

embezzle: V n pr (*for*)

embroider: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

entrust: V n pr (*to*)

envy: V n n

exact: V n pr (*for*)

exhibit: V n pr (*to*)

exliberate: V n pr (*for*)

exorcise: V n pr (*for*)

explain: V n pr (*to*)

explicate: V n pr (*to*)

express: V n pr (*to*)

extend: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

extort: V n pr (*for*)

extract: V n pr (*for*)

fabricate: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

fashion: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

favor: V n pr (*for*)

fax: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

feed: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

ferry: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?

fetch: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

filch: V n pr (*for*)

fill: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

find: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 fine: V n n  
 fire (projectile): V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 fix: V n n, V n pr (*for*) (US), BUILD-class  
 flash (a glance): V n n  
 flick: V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 fling: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 flip: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 float: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class  
 flog: V n pr (*for*)  
 fly: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?  
 fold: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 forbid: V n n  
 forfeit: V n pr (*to*)  
 forge (metal): V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 forgive: V n n  
 form: V n pr (*for*)  
 forward: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class/ FUTURE HAVING  
 fry (egg): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
 furnish: V n pr (*to*)  
 gabble: V n pr (*to*)  
 gain: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 gather: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 gesture: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
 get: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class



gibber: V n pr (*to*)

give: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

grab: V n pr (*for*)

grant: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

grill: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

grind: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

groan: V n pr (*to*)

grow: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

growl: V n pr (*to*)

grumble: V n pr (*to*)

grunt: V n pr (*to*)

guarantee: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

hack: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

hammer: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

hand: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-verbs

hardboil (egg): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

hatch: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

haul: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

heave: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

heft: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

hint: V n pr (*to*)

hire: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

hiss: V n pr (*to*)

hit: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

hoist: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

holler: V n pr (*to*)  
 hoot: V n pr (*to*)  
 howl: V n pr (*to*)  
 hum (tune): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class  
 hurl: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 illustrate: V n pr (*to*)  
 impound: V n pr (*for*)  
 impart: V n pr (*to*)  
 indicate<sub>1</sub>: V n pr (*to*)  
 indicate<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*for*)  
 inherit: V n pr (*for*)  
 insinuate: V n pr (*to*)  
 intimate: V n pr (*to*)  
 introduce: V n pr (*to*)  
 invent: V n pr (*for*)  
 iron: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
 issue<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING  
 issue<sub>2</sub>: ( a ticket, a passport): V n n  
 jabber: V n pr (*to*)  
 keep: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 kick: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class/ THROW-class  
 kidnap: V n pr (*for*)  
 knit: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 lease: V n n, V n pr (*for/to*), GIVE-class/ GET-class  
 leave<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

leave<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*to*)

leave<sub>3</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

lend: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

liberate: V n pr (*for*)

lift<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class

lift<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*for*)

light (fire): V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

lilt: V n pr (*to*)

lisp: V n pr (*to*)

loan: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

lob: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

loft: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class?

lower: V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class

lug: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

mail: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class

make: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

manufacture: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

market: V n pr (*to*)

mention: V n pr (*to*)

mint: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

mix: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

moan: V n pr (*to*)

modem: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

mold: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

mortgage: V n pr (*to*)

mult: V n n

mumble: V n pr (*to*)

murmur: V n pr (*to*)

mutter: V n pr (*to*)

nab: V n pr (*for*)

narrate: V n pr (*to*)

net: V n n, V n pr (*for*)

netmail: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

notify: V n pr (*to*)

nudge: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

obtain: V n pr (*for*)

occasion: V n pr (*to*)

offer: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

order: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

organise: V n pr (*for*)

overcharge: V n n

owe: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

paint (picture): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class

pass: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class/ THROW-class

pay: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

peddle: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

peel: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

permit: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

phone<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

phone<sub>2</sub> (doctor): V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

pick<sub>1</sub> (fruit, flower): V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 pick<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*for*)  
 pilfer: V n pr (*for*)  
 pinch: V n pr (*for*)  
 pirate: V n pr (*for*)  
 pitch: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 plagiarise: V n pr (*for*)  
 play: V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class  
 pluck (flower): V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 poach (egg): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
 portray: express: V n pr (*to*)  
 pose: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class?  
 post: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class  
 pound: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 pour: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
 preach: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class  
 prefer: V n pr (*for*)  
 prepare: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 prepare (meal): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
 present: V n pr (*to*)  
 procure: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 produce: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 proffer: V n pr (*to*)  
 promise: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING  
 propose: V n pr (*to*)

prove: V n pr (to)

provide: V n pr (*to/for*)

pull<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class?

pull<sub>2</sub> (beer): V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

punt: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

purchase: V n pr (*for*)

purloin: V n pr (*for*)

purr: V n pr (*to*)

purvey: V n pr (*to*)

push: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class?

quote: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class

radio: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class

rage: V n pr (*to*)

raise: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class

rasp: V n pr (*to*)

reach: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

read: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class

receive: V n pr (*for*)

recite<sub>1</sub>: V n pr (*to*)

recite<sub>2</sub> (poem): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class

reclaim: V n pr (*for*)

recommend: V n pr (*to*)

recount: V n pr (*to*)

recover: V n pr (*for*)

recreate: V n pr (*for*)

redeem: V n pr (*for*)

refer: V n pr (*to*)

refund: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

refuse: V n n

regain: V n pr (*for*)

reimburse: V n pr (*to*)

relate: V n pr (*to*)

relay: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class/ RADIO-class

remit: V n pr (*to*)

render: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

rent<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

rent<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

repay: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

repeat: V n pr (*to*)

report: V n pr (*to*)

repossess: V n pr (*for*)

rescue: V n pr (*for*)

reserve: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

restore: V n pr (*to*)

retrieve: V n pr (*for*)

return: V n pr (*to*)

reveal: V n pr (*to*)

roar: V n pr (*to*)

roast (chicken): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

roll<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class

roll<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
row: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?  
rumble: V n pr (*to*)  
run: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
rustle: V n pr (*for*)  
sacrifice: V n pr (*to*)  
satellite: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
save<sub>1</sub>: V n n  
save<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
say: V n pr (*to*)  
schlep: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class  
score: V n n  
scramble (egg): V n n, V n pr (*for*)  
scream: V n pr (*to*)  
screech: V n pr (*to*)  
sculpt: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
secure: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
seize: V n pr (*for*)  
select: V n pr (*for*)  
sell: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class  
semaphore: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
send: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class  
serve<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class  
serve<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*to*)  
set: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class



sew: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 shape: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
 shin: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 ship: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class  
 shoot<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 shoot<sub>2</sub> (game): V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 shout: V n pr (*to*)  
 shove: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class/ THROW-class  
 show<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class  
 show<sub>2</sub>: V n n  
 shriek: V n pr (*to*)  
 shuttle: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?  
 sign: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
 signal: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
 sing<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class  
 sing<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*to*)  
 slam: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 slap: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 slaughter (animal): V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
 slice: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
 slide: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SLIDE-class  
 sling: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 slip: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class  
 smash: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
 smuggle<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class

smuggle<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*for*)

snap: V n pr (*to*)

snarl: V n pr (*to*)

snatch: V n pr (*for*)

sneak<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class

sneak<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*for*)

snuffle: V n pr (*to*)

softboil: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

spare: V n n

spin<sub>1</sub> (sy a tale): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class

spin<sub>2</sub> (wool): V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

splutter: V n pr (*to*)

sponge: V n pr (*for*)

squall: V n pr (*to*)

squawk: V n pr (*to*)

squeak: V n pr (*to*)

squeal: V n pr (*to*)

stammer: V n pr (*to*)

stand (sy a drink): V n n

state: V n pr (*to*)

steal: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

stitch: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

strike (a blow): V n n

stutter: V n pr (*to*)

style: V n pr (*for*)

submit: V n pr (*to*)  
supply: V n pr (*to*)  
surrender: V n pr (*to*)  
swap: V n n  
swipe: V n pr (*for*)  
take<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), BRING/TAKE-class  
take<sub>2</sub>: V n pr (*for*)  
tap: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
tax: V n n  
teach<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class  
teach<sub>2</sub>: V n n  
telecast: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
telegraph: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
telephone: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
telex: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
tell: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class  
tender: V n pr (*to*)  
thieve: V n pr (*for*)  
throw: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
thunder: V n pr (*to*)  
tip<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class  
tip<sub>2</sub>: V n n  
tisk: V n pr (*to*)  
toast: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class  
toss<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), THROW-class

toss<sub>2</sub> (salad): V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

tote: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

tow: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class

trade: V n n, V n pr (*to*), GIVE-class

transfer: V n pr (*to*)

transport: V n pr (*to*)

trill: V n pr (*to*)

truck: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?

trumpet: V n pr (*to*)

trust: V n pr (*to*)

tug: V n n, V n pr (*to*), CARRY-class?

twitter: V n pr (*to*)

undercharge: V n n

unfold: V n pr (*to*)

vote<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

vote<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class

vouchsafe: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

wager: V n n

wail: V n pr (*to*)

wangle: V n n, V n pr (*for*)

warble: V n pr (*to*)

wash: V n n, V n pr (*for*), PREPARE-class

wave: V n n, V n pr (*to*)

weasel: V n pr (*for*)

weave: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class

wheel: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?  
wheeze: V n pr (*to*)  
whimper: V n pr (*to*)  
whine: V n pr (*to*)  
whisper: V n pr (*to*)  
whistle<sub>1</sub>: V n pr (*to*)  
whistle<sub>2</sub> (tune): V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class  
whittle: V n n, V n pr (*for*), BUILD-class  
whoop: V n pr (*to*)  
will: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING  
win: V n n, V n pr (*for*), GET-class  
winkle: V n pr (*for*)  
wire: V n n, V n pr (*to*), SEND-class?/ RADIO-class  
wireless: V n n, V n pr (*to*), RADIO-class  
wish: V n n  
withdraw: V n pr (*for*)  
wrest: V n pr (*for*)  
write<sub>1</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*to*), TELL-class  
write<sub>2</sub>: V n n, V n pr (*for*), DANCE-class  
write<sub>3</sub> (check): V n n  
yammer: V n pr (*to*)  
yap: V n pr (*to*)  
yell: V n pr (*to*)  
yelp: V n pr (*to*)  
yield: V n n, V n pr (*to*), FUTURE HAVING

yodel: V n pr (*to*)

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