

*Fear not...*¹ A state in search of its nation, the roots of the Turkish nationalism

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Introduction

Korkma, Fear not starts the official Turkish National Anthem which was adopted on 12 March 1921. The anthem refers to the Turkish flag, the white moon, the star of the nation and the crimson colour that symbolizes the blood shed for the nation. The lyrics were penned by Mehmet Akif Ersoy, a very well known poet of his time. And according to Ersoy, a nation can not break as long as it has its own flag and the flag will wave until it has its own nation.²

It is hard to generalize about the nationalist ideology as it comes in many shapes and sizes. Nationalism is a protean ideology and there are very few characteristics that all nationalisms share.

One of these characteristics is the flirtatious nature of all nationalisms. Nationalist ideology, in its earliest appearance in Europe during the French revolution, flirted with liberal ideology. Liberals, were, in fact, rather enthusiastic in embracing nationalism mainly because of the phenomenon of self-determination. Immanuel Kant (1724-1848) proposed that the achievement of freedom on the part of the individuals by resorting to the laws of morality found within rather than the external world constituted the basis of the point of intersection between liberalism and nationalism. Nations, like individuals, could be free through self determination and was a great source of vitality for nationalist ideology. Hence, the idea that the authority of the governments could be derived from the governed became the source of the nationalist ideology in Europe. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, people soon became nations and it was in the aftermath of the French revolution that border controls in Europe, specifically in England, began in order to stop the entry of Jacobin revolutionaries. The first modern practices of immigration controls border patrols and use of certificates of national identity emerged at this historical juncture.

In the first part of this paper the emergence of the notion of citizen and alien in Europe is examined then how the state developed its own concept of nation and nationalism in

¹ *İstiklal Marşı* (Independence March). The first two stanzas in Turkish:

Korkma, sönmez bu şafaklarda yüzen al sancak;

Sönmeden yurdumun üstünde tüten en son ocak.

O benim milletimin yıldızıdır, parlayacak;

O benimdir, o benim milletimindir ancak.

Çatma, kurban olayım çehreni ey nazlı hilâl!

Kahraman ırkıma bir gül! Ne bu şiddet bu celâl?

Sana olmaz dökülen kanlarımız sonra helâl,

Hakkıdır, Hakk'a tapan, milletimin istiklâl!

In English:

Fear not; For the crimson banner that proudly ripples in this glorious dawn, shall not fade,

Before the last fiery hearth that is ablaze within my homeland is extinguished.

For that is the star of my people, and it will forever shine;

It is mine; and solely belongs to my valiant nation.

Frown not, I beseech you, oh thou coy crescent!

Smile upon my heroic nation! Why the anger, why the rage?

Our blood which we shed for you shall not be worthy otherwise;

For freedom is the absolute right of my God-worshipping nation!

<http://www.allaboutturkey.com/anthem.htm> (14/02/16)

² KIRISCI Kemal, *Migration and Turkey: The Dynamics of State, Society and Politics*, In: FLETT, Kate – FAROQHI, Suraiya, *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol.4., 314.

Germany, France and England, the three most significant European countries of that time after the creation of the nation-states, is studied.

The second part focuses on how the sequence of the emergence of the nation entities and the state shaped nationalisms in Europe and how this analysis can be used in studying the nature of Turkish nationalism at the time of its emergence. Two motives of official Turkish nationalism. The preservation of the state and westernism, at the turn of the twentieth century will be shown in the works of Yusuf Akcura and Ahmed Agaoglu which constitutes the root language of all subsequent nationalisms in Turkey.

Finally the manifestation of the Turkish nationalism through the question of citizenship and the Turkish National Program will be examined.

Nous et Eux. The emergence of the citizen and the alien in Europe

The creation of the citizenship as a legal concept is a modern phenomenon that coincides with the formation of the nation-states³, a process that started in Europe after the French Revolution. The occurrence of various definitions of “us” and “them” was reflected in the formation of the concepts of “citizen” and “foreigner” but reached legislative levels in the aftermath the French Revolution.⁴

The citizenship, *nationalité*, was published in the first edition of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française*⁵ and had two meanings: To belong to a certain state; being a member of a particular nation. The former is a status, the latter could be defined as a quality. Citizens belonging to a state was primarily a legal concept based on the person's status determined by an external investigations under the applicable law. Nationals belonging to the nation referred to an ethnographic and sociological concept which sometimes had political implications but rarely had any noticeable legal influence. In England, the law concerning foreigners, *The Aliens Act* (1792), introduced the institution of immigration control in response to the French political refugee movement in England. The uncontrolled influx of foreigners aroused anxiety in the British government circles as they feared that Jacobin spies, agents disguised themselves as political refugees, will be present in the country. According to Joseph Bruges, the Secretary of the Immigration Office, writing to Lord Grenville: “By what I can learn, the majority of these people are of a suspicious description, and very likely either to do mischief of their own accord, or to be fit tools of those who may be desirous of creating confusion.”⁶ Additionally, the newspapers in 1792 emphasized strong public suspicions of “Frenchmen in England” and demanded that high control and security measures be placed onto Britain.⁷ The purpose of the law was not the complete isolation of the country, but it was primarily to strengthen the protection of the country from the inside. According to regulations the immigration was not prohibited, but there was a requirement for the theregistration of immigrants which was carried out at a local magistrate at the arrival of “strangers” into the country. Under this law, those who came to Britain after 01 January 1793, had to register their names, rank, occupation and

³ BOSNIAK, Linda, *The Citizen and the Alien, Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008. 9.

⁴ PLENDER, Richard (ed.), *International Migration Law*, Brill, Leiden, 1988. 10-25.

⁵ *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française*, 1835. 692.

<http://artfl.atilf.fr/dictionnaires/ACADEMIE/SIXIEME/sixieme.fr.html>;

http://www.ebooksgratuits.com/ebooksfrance/dictionnaire_academie_francaise_5eme_edition.pdf

⁶ DINWIDDY, John Robert, *The Use the Crown's Power of Deportation Under the Aliens Act, 1793-1826*, Historical Research 1968.41/104. (1 November 1968.), 199–211.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2281.1968.tb01248.x/abstract> (2016.01.03.)

⁷ DINWIDDY, John Robert, *opt.cit.* 193–199.

address. In addition, the immigrants had to register those who accommodated an immigrant in their own house or shared their room with a stranger. Those who violated the provision had to pay a penalty and were expelled from the country.⁸

America and Switzerland, in fear of the Jacobins' infiltration, also introduced similar provisions to the Aliens Act. The "*peasants to Frenchmen*"⁹ phenomenon spread rapidly and in different ways around the world, penetrating all levels of the modern politics.

The concept of nationalism was based on the idea of Immanuel Kant¹⁰ (1724–1804) whereby every individual needs self-determination in order to be a human being. This argument supported and led to the recognition that nations should also strive to be autonomous and have free will. The national self-determination empowered the people who constituted the nations.¹¹ As the notions of nationalism and popular sovereignty converged, nations became the source of sovereignty and consequently the level of popular political participation increased. Therefore the national identity and hence the nation state was rather a precondition for political participation. This explains the increasing rate of political participation of the population directly after the formation of nation-states.¹²

A nation in search of its state or a state in search of its nation?

1789-1815 is the estimated period of the formation of the French and German nationalism. German nationalism came to life with the Romanticism as a literary trend. The German romantic literature was the medium of the German nationalism long before the foundation of the German nation-state and the most striking feature of German nationalism was the critical attitude towards the French cosmopolitanism. According to the German Romantics, the rationalism of the 18th century was too artificial. They focused on the intuition and emotion rather than rationalism and reason and created the *völkisch* national identity which later determined the concept of the German National Socialist Party's nationalism as well. The German nationalism preceded the formation of the German nation-state, and expressed through folk art and cultural concepts.¹³

According to the officially declared cosmopolitan concept of nation in France (and in the United States), people who live in the same area according to the same laws belong to a nation and anyone can join to the nation who accepts and respects the state laws.¹⁴

Rogers Brubaker sociologist compares the German and French conceptions of nationhood and citizenship as follows:

„It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make all Utopians citizens of Utopia. Crudely puts the former represents the French and the latter is the German model of the nationhood.”¹⁵

⁸ WHITTAKER, Callum, "*La Génèreuse Nation!*" *Britain and the French Emigration 1792-1802*, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/2909048/_La_G%C3%A9n%C3%A9reuse_Nation_Britain_and_the_French_Emigration_1792_1802, 2016.01.22.

⁹ WEBER, Eugen, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*, Stanford University Press, 1976. 124.

¹⁰ KANT, Immanuel, *A gyakorlati ész kritikája*, 1788, fordította Berényi Gábor, Cserépfalvi, Budapest, 1996. 108.

¹¹ REISS, Hans (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, Introduction, 9–19. <http://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Kant-Political.pdf>

¹² LEOUSSI, Athena (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism*, Transaction Publishers, London, 2001. 58.

¹³ PFLANZE, Otto, *Bismarck and German Nationalism*, *The American Historical Review*, 1955/60/3. (April, 1955.), 548–566. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1845577>, 2016.01.22.

¹⁴ HAHNER, Péter, *A nemzeti állam és a nacionalizmus*, Rubicon, 2011/ 03/04. http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/a_nemzeti_allam_es_a_nacionalizmus#top

The French concept of citizenship evolved as an assimilationist, ambitious and state-centered manner while the German conception acquired an organic, differentialist dissimilationist and Volk-centered character. The French nationhood evolved in a predominantly political way while the Germanic model became predominantly ethnocultural. The French concept emerged as a political ideology while the German model as an ethnocultural stereotype whereby German people consider themselves as distinct section within the surrounding population in ethnic and cultural sense.¹⁶

According to Brubaker, the traditions of nationhood have political and cultural components in both countries. The components have been closely integrated in France, where political unity has been understood as constitutive, cultural unity as expressive of nationhood. In the German tradition, in contrast, political and ethnocultural aspects have stood in tension with one another, serving as the basis for competing conceptions of nationhood. This conception is sharply opposed to the French conception and according to this view ethnocultural unity is constitutive, political unity expressive, of nationhood.¹⁷

The French nationalism appeared at about the same time as the French nation state and its political and social unit was the result of the work of statesmen. German nationalism preceded the formation of the German nation state by half a century and the German Romantic tradition was laden with motifs of yearning for a national state.¹⁸

English nationalism asserts that the English are a nation and promotes the cultural unity of English people.¹⁹ In a general sense, it comprises political and social movements and sentiment inspired by a love for English culture, language and history and a sense of pride in England and the English people. English nationalists often see themselves as predominantly English rather than British. A definition of Britishness includes people of English, Scottish, Welsh, Ulster Scots and Irish descent and British nationalism is closely associated with British unionism, which seeks to uphold the political union that is the United Kingdom, or strengthen the links between the countries of the United Kingdom.²⁰

The content of the British identity has never been fully determined since its emergence, but the author agrees with the researchers²¹ who say that ambiguity related to the term of British nationalism does not actually mean the weakness of the British identity. Rather it insured the ability to fulfill the function of a common identity in a multinational state. The English elite played the key role in the creation of nationalism, which could integrate the cultural and political communities living in the British islands and could stand against the temptation not to choose the English nationalism policy.²² The British identity developed a sense of imperial identity that the non-English inhabitants might have felt own and therefore which were a suitable tool for managing a multinational state. For success, it was a necessary precondition that Scotland and Wales can benefit from the fruits of empire-building.

¹⁵ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, 1992. 8.

¹⁶ GREENFELD, Liah, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Harvard University Press, 1993. 89–91, 275–278.

¹⁷ BRUBAKER, Rogers, ... 1992. 10.

¹⁸ KADIOGLU, Ayse, *The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity*, Middle Eastern Studies, 1996/32/2. 177–193. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283799> (2016.01.22.).

¹⁹ MOTYL, Alexander, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999. 23.

²⁰ MILLER, William Lockley, *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond*, OUP, 2005. 12–13.

²¹ MCLEAN, Ian, MCMILLAN, Alistair, *England and the Union since 1707*. In: HAZELL, Robert (ed.) *The English Question*, MUP Manchester 2006. 22.

²² MCLEAN, Ian – MCMILLAN, Alistair, *England and the Union since 1707*. In: HAZELL, Robert (ed.) *The English Question*, MUP Manchester 2006. 24.

Paradoxically, the dominant British identity came with the weakening of the clearly distinguished English identity. To some extent, this was the "price" of the success of the British identity.²³ Roger Scruton striking composition of: the English people neither had any national idea nor just some kind of replacement model.²⁴ Tellingly during the creation of the union (1707-1921) the British elite's primary attention was directed to Scotland, Ireland and the Empire and least focussed upon England.

The Paradoxon of the Turkish Nationalism

The distinctions between the French, German and British nationalism and their conceptualizations of citizenship are indispensable in understanding Turkish nationalism as it embraces the characteristics of both types and hence has a paradoxical nature. The early years of the Republic had rather the French characteristics but in the 1930s the German characteristics were dominant in the Turkey.

The concept of German, French or British nationalism are misleading terms as they might create the impression that everyone was affected in the country. As a nation is not a homogenous group, there can be many kinds of nationalism in the context of each nation and it is hard to generalize about the nationalist ideology as it comes in many shapes and sizes. Nationalism is a protean ideology. There are very few characteristics that all nationalisms share.

Turkish nation is a multi-component, multi-national community and in Turkey, according to Tanil Bora politologist²⁵, there are currently four different kind of nationalism. The official nationalism (Atatürk nationalism) was typical of the left-wing politics in the later 1960s; liberal nationalism which favored the Turkish youth and pop culture; the radical Turkish nationalism which was in close contact with the Turkish-speaking people of the post Soviet territories and Islamic nationalism. Researchers said the official, Atatürk nationalism is the root of all other forms of nationalism in Turkey, the new nation concept introduced by the Young Turks will be further examined.

Atatürk nationalism was formulated by a nationalist discourse predominantly by two thinkers Yusuf Akcura (1876-1935) and Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), the two "advocates" of the Turkish nationalism.²⁶ Akcura, the founder of the turanism, promoted nationalism in order to address the problem of the preservation of the Ottoman state while the main reason for embracing nationalism for Agaoglu, the advocate of the pan-turkism, was his ideal of Westernism.²⁷

The first and most important motive of the Turkish nationalism, as a political plan, was to preserve the unity of the Ottoman Empire because this was threatened by the autonomus efforts of the non-Muslim groups during the reign of Sultan Mahmut II. (1808-

²³ AUGHEY, Arthur, *The Challenges to English Identity*. In: HAZELL, Robert (szerk.) *The English Question*, MUP Manchester 2006. 45.

²⁴ SCRUTON, Roger, *Anglia. Egy eltűnő ideál*. Typotex, Budapest, 2004. 9.

²⁵ BORA, Tanil, *Nationalist Discourses in Turkey*, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 2003, 102.2/3, 433–451.

[http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/102/2-3/433.citation\(2016.01.22.\)](http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/102/2-3/433.citation(2016.01.22.)).

²⁶ KAYA, Ibrahim, *Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience*, Liverpool University Press, 2004. 60–66.

²⁷ MEYER, James, *Turks Across the Empires. Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands 1856-1914*, OUP, Oxford, 2014. 151–171.

1837).The first aim of the Turkish nationalism was to preserve the integrity of the state, the nationalism primarily serves the state, not the citizens.²⁸

The Turkish nationalism was shaped by those intellectuals who were interested in preservation the unity of the decaying Ottoman Empire and at the same time the westernization. These intellectuals were linked to the Young Turk movement in period of 1904-1913. The movement takes its name after the Parisian newspaper of the Turkish emigrants, *La Jeune Turquie* (Young Turkey) and the members named themselves as "jöntürkler", the French counterpart of the Young Turk.²⁹

In Europe, for the first time, the Young Turks formed an organization called the Committee of Unity and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)³⁰ which was officially founded in 1889. Until the formation of the second constitutional monarchy (1908), the political scene was determined by the struggle between monarchists and the Committee and later by the quarrel between the Young Turks.

The Movement is basically consisted of two significant groups. The liberal wing was led by Prince Sabaheddine who initiated the market economy, decentralization and establishment of the capitalist structure. The liberal wing consisted of top-class, well-educated, Westernized intellectuals and some religious groups. They hoped that the British force will return and in cooperation with the high-class bureaucrats will govern the constitutional monarchy. In this cooperation, they would have been willing to protect the rights of national minorities.³¹

Within the Committee of Unity and Progress the unifying, nationalist wing was led by Ahmed Riza, the Minister of Education. They also banded together to defend the constitutional monarchy but were opposed to any idea of foreign intervention. Instead, they were filled with national aspirations and wanted to empower and control their own body. Unlike the Liberals, their members were from the middle classes, teachers, officials and military officers. The unifying nationalists almost ferociously propagated the revolution above all idea, which in their opinion should be executed by public officials. The "national" nationalists, who were sympathetic towards the views of the famous writer Ziya Gökalp, did not want to co-operate with any non-Turkish factor.³² After 1908, this wing found enthusiastic followers and strengthen its position in the Committee.³³ Overall, the nationalists' victory over the liberals marked the beginning of the Turkish nationalism, which was largely based on the concept that the state should be protected and the nation must stand in the service of the

²⁸ HEPER, Metin – SAYARI, Sabri (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey*, Routledge, New York, 2012. 15–26.

²⁹ BULAC, Ali, *Turkey's Democracy Saga: The Struggle Against Interventionist Politics*, Blue Dome Press, New York, 2015. 204.

³⁰ At the beginning the Committee of Unity and Progress was named Ottoman Unity Movement (*İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti*). In 1895 they changed their name to Committee of Unity and Progress. The Committee after the first Turkish Youth Conference held in Paris in 1902, splitted into two parts. Between 1902 and 1906 the Young Turks movement began to collapse and break down. In 1906 the team renewed with new members who were fleeing from Ottoman territories. In 1907 at the Second Young Turkish Conference in Paris the nationalist wing gained a leading role. The road leading to the second constitutional monarchy thanks to this wing. The second organization after the establishment of a constitutional monarchy (1908) was appointed Committee of Ottoman Unity and Progress.

³¹ KADIOGLU, Ayse, *An Oxymoron: The Origins of Civic-Republican Liberalism in Turkey*. Critical Middle Eastern Studies 2007/16 /2, 171–191, 172–173.
<http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/5096/1/Critique.pdf>, 2016.01.22.

³² KOROGLU, Erol, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey During World War I*. Tauris, London, 2007. 92.

³³ HANUOGLU, Sükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton, New York, 2010. 197.

Turkish state. In fact, the Turkish nationalism and national identity worked as a necessary public officer.³⁴

The second motive of the Turkish nationalism was the intention of westernization. In the 18th century, the reforms imitating western solutions affected the military organization and in 1839, the main characteristics of the provincial administration, education, judicial system. Turkism and nationalism were latent elements at the beginning of the westernization movement. However, as the movement accepted the Ahmed Agaoglu's pan-turkism ideology, which basic pillar was the westernization, these aims was implemented through these thoughts.³⁵ The increasing number of Turkish nationalists who began to criticize the lifestyle of non-Muslims within the empire indicated ideological effects and was expressed by one of the most prominent nationalist thinkers in Turkey, Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) "There is in our country a class, the so called Levantines or Cosmopolitans, who try to adopt the aesthetic, moral, philosophical tastes, and entire customs, ceremonies and behaviour of the West rather than its scientific methods or industrial techniques. That is they try erroneously to imitate the cultures of other nations under the name civilization."³⁶

According to Ziya Gökalp, the searching for the balance between the Western materialism, based on the principles of the Enlightenment and the Eastern spirituality, civilization and local culture is a returning companion of the Turkish modernity. In his view, the Turkish nationalism rejects western culture and at the same time imitates the results of western civilization and supports local, ancient ancestral identity.³⁷ According to Niyazi Berkes³⁸, in Gökalp's conception of nationalism, the two concepts (culture and civilization) does not represent a conflicting and exclusive entities instead two closely related and complementary features that provides the social reality. Accordingly, the Turkish nationalism has a Janus face. In political terms. It is similar to French nationalism and in an ethnic sense to German nationalism. In the case, of the emergence the state and the nation, it can beconcluded that, in the German case it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state (a state in search of its nation), the historical order of things is reversed in the Turkish case where there is a state preceding a nation (a state in search of its nation).³⁹

The concept of the Turkish nation was composed by the republican elite based on their ideological system and this hypothetical concept was brought to life by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In this sense, the political unity was realized in the Turkish nation-state as a whole.

³⁴ CAGAPTAY, Soner, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* Routledge, New York, 2006. 14–19.

³⁵ ÖZAVCI, Özan, *Intellectual Origins of the Republic. Ahmet Agaoglu and the Genealogy of Liberalism in Turkey*. Brill, Leiden, 2015. 192–194.

³⁶ AKTAR, Ayhan, *Economic Nationalism in Turkey: The Formative Years, 1912-1925*. Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies (Bogazici Jopurnal) 1996/10/1, 263–290.
https://www.academia.edu/5534169/Economic_Nationalism_in_Turkey_The_Formative_Years_1912_-_1925, (2016.01.12.)

³⁷ DAGLYER, Üner, *Ziya Gökalp on Modernity and Islam: The Origins of an Uneasy Union in Contemporary Turkey*, Comparative Civilization Review No.57., Fall 2007, 53–57.
<https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/13052/12913>

³⁸ BERKES, Niyazi, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, Greenwood Press, 1981. 23.

³⁹ KADIOGLU, Ayse, *An Oxymoron: The Origins of Civic-Republican Liberalism in Turkey*, Critical Middle Eastern Studies 2007/16 /2, 171–191, 172–173.

The headstone of national identity was the indivisibility of the Turkish state, the irreversibility of the nation and its borders.⁴⁰

The Turkish nationalism was spectacularly paradox as it was expressed in the phenomenon of hating and at the same time copying the Western civilization.⁴¹ In addition, the Turkish nationalism did not mean awakening its national consciousness. On the contrary, this was an implementation of a plan accomplished by the intellectuals, full of questions about copying or identity dilemmas. The Turkish civilization, a mixture of cosmopolitan and local elements, was the result of the work of intellectuals who raised the necessity of the transformation of the age-old superstitions and irrational results of western folk religion and mixed the western results with the Eastern spirituality.⁴² However with some irony, this synthesis resulted the formation of the laicist westernized national identity finally led to the exclusion of non-Muslims from the society.⁴³

The Manifestation of the Turkish Nationalism The Ottoman Subject

The introduction of the term citizenship in the Ottoman Empire dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. The underlying aim was to save the empire from the collapse by gathering the religiously and ethnically fragmented subjects⁴⁴ of the empire under the specific identity of “*Ottoman Citizen*”.⁴⁵

In achieving this, a set of legal reforms were undertaken, starting with *Tanzimat*, continuing with the Reform Edict, Ottoman Citizenship Law (*Tabiiyet-i Osmaniyye’ye dair Nizamname*) and finally *Kanuni Esasi*, the Constitution.⁴⁶

The *GülhaneHatt-ı Şerif*⁴⁷ (*Supreme Edict of the Rosehouse*), one of the most important document of the Turkish constitutional history, promulgated by the edictum of Sultan Mahmut (1839–1861) in 1839, was the first declaration of fundamental rights-the first charter of liberties. This proclamation assured the Ottoman subjects (*tebaa*), including the non-Muslim population, with protection of life, honor and property. In this context, all of the

⁴⁰ KOHN, Hans, *Prelude to Nation States: The French and the German Experience, 1789-1815*. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1967. 45-47.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249200392_Prelude_to_NationStates_The_French_and_German_Experience_1789-1815\(2016.01.22.\)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249200392_Prelude_to_NationStates_The_French_and_German_Experience_1789-1815(2016.01.22.))

⁴¹ KADIOĞLU, Ayse, *The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity*. Middle Eastern Studies 1996/32/2 (April, 1996.) 177–194. [http://www.jstor.org\(2016.01.22.\)](http://www.jstor.org(2016.01.22.))

⁴² CHATTERJEE, Partha, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 51.

[http://www.jstor.org/stable/20719263?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents\(2016.01.22.\)](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20719263?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents(2016.01.22.))

⁴³ CHATTERJEE, Partha, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, University of Minnesota Press, 1993, 51.

[http://www.jstor.org/stable/20719263?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents\(2016.01.22.\)](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20719263?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents(2016.01.22.))

⁴⁴ Reactions accompanying the introduction of the reforms were not entirely positive. In the Balkans, Christians have refused to support the reforms because they wanted the centralized power to recognize their autonomy. Only strong British support could maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and achieved enforcing the reforms.

⁴⁵ ERGÜL, Asli, *The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Rum?* Middle Eastern Studies, 2012, Volume 48., Issue 4, 629–645. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00263206.2012.683337, 2016. 01. 06.>

⁴⁶ DAVISON, Roderic, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963. <http://psi427.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Davison,%20Reform,%201856-1876-1.pdf>

⁴⁷ Gülhane (Rose House) was a small building of Old Palace. In: MÉSZÁROS, Gyula, *A török alkotmány alaptörvénye, Az Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület Jog- és Társadalomtudományi Szakosztálya*, Kolozsvár, 1912, Introduction.

rights regarding life, property and honor vest equally all the habitants of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims and non-Muslims, regardless of their religion.

In 1844, the first official ottoman identification document, officially the *Mecidiye* identity document, unofficially the *Kafa kağıdı* the head paper, was introduced.⁴⁸

Provision *Islahat*⁴⁹ *Hatt-I Hümayunu*⁵⁰ (*Islahat Fermani*) even more firmly carried on the results of the reform era in respect of equal treatment of non-Muslim and Muslim population. The *Islahat Hatt-I Hümayunu* confirmed the 1839 edict and promised *full legal equality* for citizens of all religions before the law.

The famous Nationality Law of 1869 (*Tabiiyet - Osmaniyye'ye Dair Nizamname-i*)⁵¹, a milestone in the reform era, created the term of the unified and common Ottoman citizenship irrespective of religious and ethnic divisions in the population.⁵² The law was based on the principle of *ius sanguinis* (Article 1). Accordingly, a child from foreign parents was born in Ottoman land can apply for Ottoman nationality after the age of 3 (Article 2). At least five years ongoing imperial residence was necessary for the acquisition of citizenship (Article 3) or it could be obtained on the basis of individual merit (Article 4). According to the final provisions, inhabitants of the Ottoman dominion were automatically Ottoman citizens until their other nationality were established (Article 9).

Conversion to Islam was not included among the conditions of the acquisition of citizenship. This provision was a radical break with the former traditions and meant the creation of a secular citizen. However, through the implementation of the law, the State Council and the Council of Ministers considered conversion to Islam sufficient reason to exceptionally awarded citizenship (Article 4). The major step forward was that although for the acquisition of citizenship was advisable to convert to Islam but was not mandatory.

In theory, under the provisions of 1869 Act, the Ottoman Muslims and the Ottoman non-Muslims belong to the same political community created equal legal footing (even if the *millet* system was still in place) and ignored the nation based on the Islamic principles (*ummah*). In practice, however, in respect of the Persians living in the Ottoman dominions, the Persian and the Ottoman authorities agreed that the Persian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire could count ottoman citizens only if they converted to the Islamic religion.⁵³

Thus, the results of the reform era were that the government ignored the religious intolerance; violence conversion to Islam; and did not tolerated the execution of the apostates. In practice, however, the rights of non-Muslim citizens had been significantly slashed. The non-Muslim citizens were given the opportunity to recourse *dhimmi* status meaning that they could follow their original religion, could acquire property in the Ottoman Empire but all for extra poll tax (*jizya*). We This Turkish reform period was the first era of Turkish history that declared that everyone is free to exercise their religion without harassment. However, for the Ottoman ruling elite, the religious freedom was not yet freedom of religion, but freedom of “protection of their own religion”.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ AVEDIAN, Vahagn, *State Identity, Continuity, and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey*. The European Journal of International Law, 2012, Volume 23. Issue 3. 797–820. <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/23/3/2306.pdf>, 2016. 01.05.

⁴⁹ Meaning reform, renewal.

⁵⁰ Hungarian translation In: MÉSZÁROS, Gyula, *opt.cit.* 24–43.

⁵¹ 19 January 1869.

⁵² PAROLIN, Gianluca Paolo, *Citizenship in the Arab World. Kin, Religion and Nation-State*. Amsterdam University Press, 2007. 73–76.

⁵³ Ottoman- Persian Treaty, 14 December 1873, Article 6.

⁵⁴ DAVISON, Roderic, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*. Princeton, New Jersey, 1963. 25.

The first Constitution (1876) following the reform era (*Kanuni Esasi*) in the Article 8 was practically confirmed the concept of the citizenship of the Nationality Act: "The Ottoman Empire's people, regardless of religious or racial affiliation are Ottoman Tebaa⁵⁵ (subjects).⁵⁶

The concept of citizenship in the Constitution of 1921 (Teskilat-i Esasiye Kanunu)

Two forms of citizenship appeared at the turn of the 20th century, in the Arab areas, particularly among Persians, where the main condition of the Turkish citizenship was the conversion to the Islamic religion: the Ottoman citizens and local indigenous citizens. Lawmakers had introduced the concept of the secular citizen but in relation to people living in the Ottoman dominions, religion was the most important criterion of the Ottoman nationality.⁵⁷ Before the World War I, the patriots persuaded a more forcefully approach for the establishment of their own national state.

The armistice agreement was signed on 30th October 1918, towards the end of the First World War, in Mondorose port aboard the "Agamemnon" cruiser. , This enabled the Entente to occupy the strategic points in any part of the Ottoman Empire in case of their security-threatening situation. The conditions are clearly aimed at the elimination of the Turkish state and whilst enforcing the British interests unconditionally.⁵⁸

The government of the last Sultan Vahdettin (Mehmet VI., 1861-1926)⁵⁹ reluctantly accepted the treaty of Sévres on 10 August 1920⁶⁰, which divided the Ottoman's country between the imperial power further strengthened the opposition. This national resistance movement and the process of the Turkish National Independence War were started organizing by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) after his arrival in Samsun city in the Black Sea on 19 May 1919.⁶¹

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's declaration (21-22 June 1919) in the Amasya circular (Turkish *Amasya Gemelgesi* or *Amasya Tamimi*), issued in Amasya city located in the Black Sea Region, stressed the necessity for a national will and determination of the Turkish nation to save the independence of the nation.⁶²

This was followed by the National Congress of Erzurum consisted of the delegates from the eastern provinces and held in Erzurum city, East Turkey. According to the declaration of the Erzurum Congress (23 July to 17 August 1919), the entire country within its (undefined) national frontiers is an undivided whole and any foreign act of forcefully taking possession of a Turkish area would be opposed forcefully.⁶³

<http://psi427.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Davison,%20Reform,%201856-1876-1.pdf>

⁵⁵ According to Nihal Uluocak the concepts of Turkish *vatandaslik* (citizen) and *tabiiyet* (nationality) comes from *tebaa* (subject).

⁵⁶ INCE, Basak, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*. I.B. Tauris, New York, 2012. 223.

⁵⁷ PAROLIN, Gianluca Paolo, *Citizenship in the Arab World. Kin, Religion and Nation-state...*, 2007. 75.

⁵⁸ DZSIHANGIR Fehmi, *A Török Köztársaság Fél Évszázada*, Kossuth, Budapest, 1974. 13.

⁵⁹ KINROSS Lord, *The Ottoman Centuries. The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, Perennial, New York, 2002. 609.

⁶⁰ DZSIHANGIR Fehmi, *A Török Köztársaság Fél Évszázada...*14.

⁶¹ ZÜRCHER Erik Jan, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2010. 221–222.

⁶² KEDOURIE, Sylvia (ed.), *Seventy-five Years of the Turkish Republic*, Middle Eastern Studies, Routledge, New York, 1999. 152–186.

⁶³ STARR, June, *Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace of Justice*. State University of New York Press, New York, 1992. 190.

After the Erzurum Congress, the delegates of the whole country were called to Sivas, Central Anatolia for another congress (4-13 September 1919) where the terms of the Erzurum Congress were redefined on the national scale.⁶⁴

In the face of this resistance, the Istanbul Government had to be allowed parliamentary elections to proceed. Those advocating for a national liberation war have won elections by a large majority.

The principles and resolutions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congress, known as *Misak-i Milli* (*National Pact*), which form the basis of the Turkish national liberation movement, were adopted on January 28 1920 by Parliament (Turkish *Meclis-i Mebusan*) in Istanbul and is actually considered the statement of the national nationalist program.

According to this six articles pact⁶⁵, the territories not occupied at that time and inhabited by the Ottoman Muslim majority (united in religion, aim and race) are the homeland of the indivisible nation; the status of the territories inhabited by Arab majority will be determined by a referendum. The rights of minorities will be issued on the condition that the rights of the Muslim minorities in neighboring countries are protected. The country should be independent and free; all restrictions on political, judicial and financial development would be removed. The status of Kars, Ardahan, Batum and Western Thrace will be determined by referendum. Transport and free-trade on the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will be determined by Turkey. This was the fundamental statement of the nationalist programme and significant as it advocated all Muslim Ottomans, not just Turkish national sovereignty. In practise this meant Turks and Kurds as well as smaller groups like the Laz and Cerkez.⁶⁶

There was no map appended to the *Misak-i Milli*; the names of the towns, mountains, and hills over which the border would pass were not set forth by being cited. The geography of the fatherland was defined in principle: The geography of the people both “within and without” the line where the army was when the Armistice of Mondros (Mudros) was signed on 30 October 1918, and who had a shared purpose and were respectful of each other’s rights...⁶⁷

Parliament was dissolved by the Ottoman Government when Istanbul was occupied by the British (16 March 1920), headed Damat Ferit Pasha in collaboration with the British. In response to this, the Mustafa Kemal Pasha, possessing extraordinary powers, ordered new elections through a circular sent to provinces and convened a parliament in Ankara. On 23 April 1920, the new Parliament came together as the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey” (Turkish *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) in Ankara, which consisted of representatives who were new elected or escaped from Istanbul. The Government of Grand National Assembly announced the republic form of state on 23 April 1920 and adopted the Constitution of 1921 (Turkish 1921 *Teskilat-i Esasiye Kanunu*)⁶⁸, roughly nine months after its establishment on January 20, 1921.

The Constitution of 1921, which did not repealed the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, was made up of 23 articles. It incorporated no provision for changing itself. Therefore its

⁶⁴ HEKIMOGLU, Mehmet Merdan, *Constitutional Developments Of Turkey Since Ottoman Times To The Present Sate Of The Modern Turkish Republic*, Grin, Munich, 2010. 21.

⁶⁵ ZÜRCHER, Erik Jan, *Turkey, a Modern History*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2004. 139.

⁶⁶ JUNG, Dietrich – PICCOLI, Wolfango, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*. Zed Books, London, 2001. 68.

⁶⁷ AKYOL, Taha, “Greater Turkey”

http://www.biyokulule.com/view_content.php?articleid=5823, 2015.12.01.

⁶⁸ Some parts of the Constitution of 1921 in English <http://genckaya.bilkent.edu.tr/1921C.html>, 2015.12.01.

regulations could be amended with simple majority of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and became the only flexible constitution in Turkish constitutional history. This study does not examine the content of the Constitution of 1921 in detail but only focuses upon Article 1, in which the principle of national sovereignty was firstly adopted in the constitutional history of Turkey: "Sovereignty unconditionally entitled to the nation. The governmental system is based on self-determination and national governance." Thus the fundamental principles of the republic have been constitutionally recorded.⁶⁹

The Turkish National Program

The Ottoman Empire began to lose its territories to Russia, Austria and the Greeks and this, started the migration of Muslims, living in these areas, to the center of the empire. The deportation and slaughter of Armenians in Anatolia happened at the same time as the immigration. The Turkish War of Independence resulted in further population exchanges---executed under the Treaty of Lausanne which affected the Anatolian Greek Orthodox Christians⁷⁰ and Muslims in Rumelia.⁷¹ The main motive of these acts was to create a nation-state with a homogenized population.⁷² The caliphate was abolished in 1924 and the unifying power of the Islam between different ethnic groups came to an end and started the exclusion of the non-Muslim population, for example Kurds from the Turkish society.⁷³

This perception was manifested by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk - the founder of the Turkish Republic: "*In today's Turkish national, political and social community we have patriots and citizens who have been subjected to propaganda about Kurdish, Caucasian and even Laz and Bosnian nations. But there are misnomers, which are a result of the despotic ages of long ago, they have no influence on the individuals of this nation, except for a new enemy agents and brainless reactionaries, and have left our people in grief and sorrow. Because individuals of this nation, as members of the integrated unified Turkish community, have a common past, history, morality and law.*"⁷⁴ According to the CHP's (Republican People's Party/Turkish: *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) program, the nation is a political and social community of citizens based on the principle "one language, one culture and one idea" (*tek dil, tek kültür, tek ülkü*).⁷⁶ This concept later became the nation's motto of the Republic and played very significant role in the construction of Turkish citizenship. Kemalist secularism (*laiklik*) also played an important role in establishing the political and cultural basis of Turkish citizenship.⁷⁷

⁶⁹ ISIN, F. Engin, *Citizenship after orientalism: Ottoman Citizenship*, In: KEYMAN, Fuat – ICDUYGU, Ahmet (szerk.), *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. Routledge, New York, 2005. 31–52.

⁷⁰ 1922-24 it meant 1.200.000 orthodox Greek Christians and 400.000 Muslims.

⁷¹ The European territories of the Ottoman Empire.

⁷² In 1913 every fifth inhabitant on the territory of the „Modern Turkey” were non Muslim regarding their religion. After the reforms five changed into fourty.

⁷³ YEGEN, Mesut, *The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity*, Middle Eastern Studies 1996/32/72, 216–229.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263209608701112>(2016.01.12.)

⁷⁴ İNAN, Afet, *Atatürk and the History Thesis*, Belleten 3, issue 10, 1939. 244.

⁷⁵ HANIOĞLU, Sükrü, *Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography*, Princeton, New York, 2011. 160–199.

⁷⁶ The 1931 programme of the Republican People's Party CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), defined nation as a political and social community formed by citizens bound by an unity of language, culture and ideal". This definition of nation „one language, one culture, one ideal", then became the motto of the Republic. In: CAGAPTAY, Soner, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey. Who is a Turk?* Routledge, New York, 2006. 44.

⁷⁷ BABAN, Feyzi, *Community, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*, In: KEYMAN, Fuat – ICDUYGU, Ahmet (ed.), *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. Routledge, New York, 2005. 52–70.

During the single-party period, the CHP distinguished between citizenship (being a Turkish citizen) and nationality (Turkishness) and tied citizenship rights to nationality. The single party period did not only differentiate between Turkish citizenship and Turkishness but also, as the political scientist Mesut Yegen clearly states, what the Turkish state understood by Turkish citizenship, which was said to be less than Turkishness.⁷⁸

The founders of the new republic aspired to create a homogeneous nation state whose citizens were Muslim, speaking Turkish, and possessing Turkish culture, however. Turkey was multiethnic and to some extent, multi-religious. The Muslim majority of the country was hardly homogeneous as there were Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians and Arabs, who spoke languages other than Turkish. Thus the central question during the single party period was how to unify the ethnically, culturally and linguistically diversified citizens of the Republic and create a homogeneous nation state.

The main issue of the CHP in this period was to “*turkificate*” the citizens with various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Within this program, the knowledge of the Turkish language was considered one of the most important criteria of the real Turkish citizenship. Those people who do not speak Turkish became second-class citizens.⁷⁹ Hence, through accepting the Turkish national identity, the state, at the same time, accepted the exclusion of the non-Muslims and non-Turks and assimilationist politics.

According to Eric Hobsbawm, nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. He argues that nations are a modern construction and that they are not unchanging social entities. Hobsbawm views the development of nations as “situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation” and must be seen as such. He claims that nations have traditionally been understood as top-down constructions and argues that they must also be looked at from the bottom-up. Building on this idea, he highlights the importance of language. He places particular importance on the development of class consciousness which, in turn, led to the development of the mass politics which made nations possible.⁸⁰

One of the most significant national assimilation campaigns were the Turkish linguistic campaign series, the Citizens speak Turkish! (*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konus!*) which was supported by the Turkish government and created in January 1928 in Istanbul by a student organization of University of Istanbul Faculty of Law. This campaign was very effective and exploded into the public consciousness. The turkification movement started at the same time with series of political reforms which ordered the mandatory use of the Turkish language in minority schools, in offices and economic institutions.⁸¹

In February 1932, city community centers (*Turkish Halkevleri*) were founded in 14 Turkish cities to promote the republic and the main principles of Turkish nationalism. Their aims were to create the ideal Turkish citizens, the ideal Turkish voter of the CHP which followed the six principles: nationalism, laicism, populism, republicanism, etatism, revolutionism. Hence the republican elite realized the citizenship in Turkey.⁸²

⁷⁸KARDAM, Filiz–CENGİZ, Kurtulus, *Republican Citizenship in Turkey: Historical Development, Perceptions and Practices*. Middle Eastern Studies, 2011/ 47/1.151–165.

⁷⁹ KADIOĞLU, Ayşe, *The Pathologies of Turkish Republican Laicism*, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 2010/36/3–4.. 489–504.

<http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/ayse/files/2008/11/Pathologies-of-Laicism.pdf> (2016.01.12.).

⁸⁰HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press, 1990. 46-80.

⁸¹ COLAK, Yilmaz, *Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey*, Middle Eastern Studies, 2004/40/6., 67–94., http://www.jstor.org/stable/4289953?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

⁸² SOYARIK, Nalan, *The Citizen and the State and the State of the Citizen: An Analysis of the Citizenization Process in Turkey*, PhD Dissertation, Bilken University, Department of Political Science and Public

The main target of the *Ülkü* (Great Ideals), the journal of the community centers, was to educate people within the theoretical framework of these concepts.⁸³ Their work was supported by two other institutions: Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*), founded in 1931, and the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*), founded in 1932. The former searched the pre-Islamic Turkish history with the aim to prove that all civilizations of the world is rooted in the Turkish civilization and has Central Asian origin. The latter sought to present the richness and beauty of the Turkish language as the mother of every language.

The concept of Turkish national identity was apparently shaped by state officials and was associated with the exclusion of non-Muslims and assimilation of Muslims who do not speak Turkish. The Turks were transformed from the subjects of the Empire into the citizens of a nation state. This transformation in Turkey did not appear as a revolutionary social struggle by the masses, who asked for their rights from those who did not grant it to them, but as a number of choices made by the ruling elite who tried to grant rights to the masses in order to increase social integration and to empower the state. However, when the state constituted Turkishness and Turk identity and forced its implementation in practice dominated the relationship between the state and the citizens, especially among the non-Muslim and non-Turkish citizens.

The method of achieving and executing the national programme meant that citizens were dutiful servants of the state rather than full right member of the state. With the foundation of the republic in 1923, the republican elite granted all rights related to citizenship. The creation of a national unity provided the main reason for the creation of citizenship and national unity was formed by creating the obligations associated with the citizenship. To determine these obligations, the elite highlighted the concept of Turkishness as criteria. Instead of individualism, they sought to create the Turkish citizen and emphasized the duties rather than rights. Therefore the Turkish nationalism became the language of obligations rather than rights which further aim was to preserve the unity of the state

Conclusions

Citizenship is a strategic concept that is central in the analysis of identity, participation, empowerment, human rights and public interest.⁸⁴ In his speech to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk⁸⁵ (the founder of modern Turkey) congratulated the nation on the amount of progress and results it had made in such a short period of time, closing with the famous words "*How happy is the*

Administration. In: KADIOGLU, Ayse – KEYMAN, Fuat (ed.) *Symbiotic Antagonism. Competing Nationalism in Turkey...*43.

⁸³ INCE, Basak, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk's Republic to the Present Day*, I.B.Tauris, London, 2012. 65.

⁸⁴ NYERS, Péter, Introduction: Why Citizenship Studies, *Citizenship Studies*, Vol 11, no. 1 (February 2007), 1–4.

http://www.academia.edu/514268/Introduction_Why_citizenship_studies, 2015.12.01.

⁸⁵ At that time, when Atatürk was born the concept of surname from the West was still unknown. Atatürk's birth name Mustafa, which is of Arabic origin, meaning "the chosen", one indicator of the Prophet Muhammad. Mustafa as he completed military school in Thessaloniki, the "perfect" meaning Kemal was given by his math teacher. From that time he was known as Mustafa Kemal. In 1916, he was promoted to brigadier general, for which the address and salutation Pasha was attended and he was called Kemal Pasha. On 19 September 1921 the Turkish National Parliament for his achievements in the war of independence in Gazi, "Hero" award bestowed to him and he was called Gazi Mustafa Kemal. In 1934, as part of the reforms, the parliament introduced the public registration of a surname. On November 24, the parliament named Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which means "father of all Turks." The law states that this last name can not be beared by another person. In: KINROSS, Patrick, *Atatürk. The Rebirth of a Nation*, 2012, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 12.

one who says I am a Turk.” (*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*).⁸⁶ These words came to embody the concept of citizenship (*vatandaşlık*) in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic.⁸⁷ Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic and creation of the legal definition of citizenship, the national identity issues played a pivotal role in the Turkish society.

On the 1 January 1995, former Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller reformulated Atatürk’s famous words by declaring “How happy is the one who says I am citizen of Turkey.” (*Ne mutlu Türkiye’nin vatandasıyım diyene*).⁸⁸

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-2014) and Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current Turkish prime minister have taken the concept of citizenship one step further by declaring Turkish identity to be a sub-identity. They argue that being Turkish means belonging to a sub-identity encompassed by the larger supra-identity of Turkish citizenship. These declarations have sparked a new debate on supra-sub identity (*üst kimlik/alt kimlik*). Some citizens – politicians in particular – have begun to refer to themselves as being from Turkey (*Türkiyeli*), rather than being Turkish (*Türk*). In relation with the Kurdish issue, there were published new proposals (*anayasal vatandaşlık*) for the constitutional concept of a new “super citizen identity”, which would be used for the members of society who, with this self-definition, wanted to contribute to the peace in Turkey.⁸⁹

The motivation behind all these statements on citizenship stems from the challenge that powerful ethnic, religious, and secretarian movements pose for the official view of Turkish citizenship, which based on the kemalist “one language one culture and one ideal” principle.⁹⁰

According to Ahmet Yildiz, historian and researcher of the early years of the republic there was a big difference between being Turk and being hold (by himself or by someone) as a Turk. For the latter, some ethnic and other qualities were necessary that was formulated by the great ideologists in the Turkish War of Independence. In his work, he periodized the Turkish Republic defines that the early republican years, the basic features of Turkish nationalism vallásiból (1919-23) pushed from religious towards laicism (1924-29), then the next period (1929-38) filled with ethnocultural motifs. The citizenship practices developed in accordance with these main periods.

This is Gellner's classic modernization argument explaining the origin of nations. Gellner states that nations are primarily a political principle that holds that the political and national unit. Nations were the result of pressures created by the demands of the industrial revolution. As soon as people from widely different backgrounds began to converge on cities, it was necessary to create some form of common identity. Perhaps more importantly, the demands of capitalism, specifically the need for constant retraining, demanded that there be a common language among workers. These demands were met by creating a common past, common culture (created by turning "low" folk cultures into "high" state cultures) and requiring a common language. With these common experiences as a motive, workers were more willing to work hard, not only for their own good, but for the good of their country.⁹¹

⁸⁶ For the full text of the Atatürk’s speech to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic see <http://www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/ata/onuncuyil.html>

⁸⁷ 29 October 1923.

⁸⁸ KORHAN, Dorgu, *Entertaining the Citizen*, Tansu Ciller – A Case Study, 2008.

http://www.academia.edu/3426161/ENTERTAINING_THE_CITIZEN_TANSU_CILLER_A_CASE_STUDY, <http://www.duygukorhan.com> (2015.12.01.).

⁸⁹ INCE, Basak, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2012. 2–7.

⁹⁰ CASTLES, Stephen – DAVIDSON, Alastair, *Citizenship and Migration. Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. Routledge, New York, 2000. 81–84.

⁹¹ GELLNER, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983. 3-5-

Similarly to the proto-nationalism according to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Republic of Turkey the nation is a community based on common political life, language, territory, ancestors, historical affiliation and common moral. Religion is not the cohesive component of the nation. Instead of the common religion the common moral should be focused on and the common wish to form a nation. According to Mustafa Kemal those nations who do not awaken to national consciousness become to prey of other nations. The Turkish nation, which is governed as republic, is a state.

This tradition is still alive; Article 3 in the 1982 Constitution states "The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish". The indivisibility of the Turkish nation is part of the valid Constitution. Today the Turkish government still intends to preserve the fundamental characteristic of Turkish national identity. The political debates of the recent decades, the political and social rights of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish speaking minority as well as the Muslim women's obligation to wear the Islamic veil, in Turkey are closely related to citizenship.

However, the creation of homogeneous nationality, the unified nation and citizenship is a political mask that covers the lack of the minority rights in Turkey. The citizenship issues⁹² include minority rights issues that apply to citizens who participate in local, regional and national elections. Therefore, the claim that you can be proud of being Turkish citizen without being recognized that this kind of homogenization masks the differences is discriminatory.

The Turkish national anthem begins: *Fear not!* It seems that the non-Turkish identity (or the visibility of the Muslim women) makes the state officials concerned about the homogeneity of the nation and indivisibility of the state. Thus the basic fear which manifests in nationalism and citizenship issues is the fear of the disintegration of the state.

Abstract

Korkma–Fear not..., starts the Turkish national anthem, which was officially adopted on 12 March 1921 and is about the Turkish flag. The white moon, the nation's stars and red-scene symbolizes the blood spilled for the nation. Mehmet Akif Ersoy wrote the National Anthem, who said "that a nation can not break until the flag is. And the flag will not break down until there is a nation". The first part of this paper examines how the governments developed the concept of nationalism and their own nation after the French Revolution in three dominant countries of Europe, in Germany, in France and in England then later focuses on the special characteristics of Turkish nationalism and its manifestation at the time of its emergence.

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https://www.academia.edu/5534169/Economic_Nationalism_in_Turkey_The_Formative_Years_1912_-_1925

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⁹² KYMLICKA, Will – WAYNE, Norman, *Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory*. In: BEINER, Ronald (szerk.), *Theorizing Citizenship*, New York State University Press, 1995, 307.

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