GYULA DÁVID

SPATIALITY UNDERLYING THE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM OF FIGURATIVE ENGLISH

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Abstract

In my dissertation I attempt to analyze and systematize figurative language. The major interest behind the analysis is to see whether a comprehensive approach to various components of figurative language shows a unified picture or not. Though Borne of them have already been analyzed successfully, no one that I know of has attempted to examine several of them with the same tools in one book.

Another aim is to find out whether English and Hungarian figurative expressionsare completely different, or they reveal certain signs of resemblance. Though the database examined is of rather limited size, it may allow insight into tendencies of language development. The analysis is based on cognitive semantics, which has elaborated various theories and tools for efficient language analysis, and was the first linguistic discipline to take on the task of processing figurative language in a promising and comprehensive way.

The analysis comprises various'components of figurative English, searches for links between various domains, and seeks an answer to how spatiality has contributed to the evolvement of figurative language. The various components are, to some extent, paralleled with each other by reason of the fact that spatial schemata are operatiönal in them all, and that part of the conceptual system linking them is detectable.

After the Introduction, Chapter 2 examines different aspects of cognitive semantics which are important for the analysis, and it describes why they can be effective means of a semantic approach. This chapter highlights those elements of cognitive grammar that are vital in analyzing metaphorical extension and thereby the extension of the lexicon.

Non-compositional approach is a precondition of the analysis. Metaphorical extension is motivated by image schemata, which reflect the coarse-grained features of linguistic transformations as opposed to prototype, whose manifestations are instantiations of the schema (Langacker, 1999:129). The roles of schemata and prototype in metaphorization are highlighted, and related senses are shown to have developed from prototypical features.

Chapter 3 focuses on word compounds, a category broken down into the main components of figurative language examined in this paper; Collocations (3.1), Phrasal verbs (3.2), Idioms (3.3), Metaphor (3.4) and Metonymy (35). This comprehensive chapter outlines various semantic, syntactic and other features of each component, and it provides several examples which may clarify how the conceptual system of idiomatic language has emerged. The components are not supposed to be completely different from each other as they overlap to some extent. The conceptual systems they have developed may demonstrate what semantic alternatives figurative language can offer.

Chapter 4 provides a practical approach to the use of adverbial particles. A large number of examples are analyzed to support the theoretical background. The particles chosen are supposed to exhibit cross-domain mapping through schematic analyses, and to reveal a variety of particle senses:

In the final part of the paper (Chapter S), traces of spatiality and of conceptuality are searched for. This part offers a contrastive analysis of English and Hungarian spatial and figurative expressions. The two languages, which do not belong to the same language family are presumed to share an amazingly high number of similarities in figurative language. It is assumed that they are a result of the common cultural, social and other factors that the languages spoken in Europe have shared for a

long time. The aim of the analysis is to prove the relevance of the assumption mentioned above, and to demonstrate it through several examples.

The dissertation is based on extensive reading and contains quotations from authors who have contributed to the completion of my work a lot by supporting or contradicting my assumption

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

The main objective of my dissertation is to give an overview of how spatial relations are extended in English metonymically or metaphorically to various elements of figurative language, and whether this conversion and extension of the lexicon results in systematic meanings. The question of what semantic consequences this process has is of primary concern.

The data are processed with the tools of *cognitive grammar,* an alternative theory to formerly existing linguistic principles, which allows us to observe linguistic changes by means of our imagery. Cognitive semantics is necessary for analyzing language data that lie outside the scope of formal logic (The details of cognitive semantics are discussed in Chapter 2). As Langacker (1987:13-14) points out a description is unnatural to the extent that it deals with data in a way that does violence to the intrinsic structure of language. While analyzing natural language one has to account for all the factors (cultural, social, psychological and so on) that have contributed to its formation.

The importance of cognitive linguistics in describing figurative language can be observed in works by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Kövecses (1990) and (2000) and others. The conceptual network of figurative language comes from spatial roots: the interactions of humans and the surrounding physical world. Langacker (1982:24) outlines the basic principles of *space grammar,* the predecessor of cognitive grammar, explores its descriptive potentials, and sketches the main components of this

novel alternative linguistic approach. Lakoff (1987:12) also points out that conceptual embodiment is closely related to human biological capacities and to the experience of functioning in a physical and social environment.

One of the goals of this dissertation, as mentioned above, is to examine how the lexicon develops by metonymical and metaphorical extension from spatial configurations, and what semantic changes take place in the process. This allows us insight into two different ways of language development: the former requires no domain shift, while the latter does. A large number of figurative expressions come about in the process, which are either idiomatic or non-idiomatic. The analysis of meaning extension is challenging, as, though several features of the source domain are preserved in the process of metaphorization, new abstract meanings develop. The elements occurring in both the SPATIAL DOMAIN, and the TARGET DOMAIN(S), obviously facilitate meaning transfer for some reason. It is primarily the schematic similarity of the source and target entities that the process mentioned above is motivated by (see Section 2.2.).

Semantic changes are also promoted by relation words like prepositions and adverbial particles on account of establishing relations between entities in various domains. As we can see cross-domain mapping preserves various features whereby the source and target expressions are similar. Apart from gaining new, figurative meanings, words tend to form idioms as well (see Section 3.3), which may occur in several components of the figurative language. These idiomatic expressions become consolidated or, in other words, entrenched in English through permanent use. When expressions have become entrenched they are taken for granted by native speakers. I assume that the gap between a native speaker's use of figurative language and that of a non-native speaker's is enormous, but it does not mean that those belonging to the latter group should give up

learning how to use the elements of idiomatic language for good. Rather than that, they should have at least parts of it available in a clear-cut and systematized format.

Another important goal of this analysis is to examine what role relation words lay in the extension of the lexicon. Relation words (like prepositions, adverbial articles), which were earlier believed to only express abstract grammatical relations of some kind, may prove to have developed deeper conceptual senses as well. The role of bodily experience in the extension of the lexicon can be observed in these prepositions and adverbial particles, which occur in both spatial and figurative expressions. It is obvious that they establish links between entities in a spatial or abstract environment, but this phenomenon has only been partly treated so far.

An important theory for understanding the organizing principles of semantic interpretation was developed by Fauconnier (1994), who elaborated a theory of linguistic processing based on mental spaces. Mental spaces are cognitive structures which are necessary for establishing relations between elements of communication. As Fauconnier (1994:xviii) points out:

> In order for thinking and communicating to take place, elaborate constructions must occur that draw on conceptual capacities, highly structured background and conceptual knowledge, schema induction, and mapping capacities. Expressions of language do not in themselves represent or code such constructions - the complexity of the constructions is such that the coding, even if it were at all possible, would take very large amounts of time and be extremely inefficient. Instead, languages are designed, very elegantly it would seem, to prompt us into making the constructions appropriate for a given context with a minimum of grammatical structure. Language does not itself do the cognitive building - it "just" gives us minimal, but sufficient, clues for finding the domains and principles

> appropriate for building in a given situation. Once these clues are combined with already existing configurations, available cognitive principles, and background framing, the appropriate construction can take place, and the result far exceeds any overt explicit infoanation.

Cross-domain mapping is crucial in meaning extension. While *mental spaces* may need space connectors like prepositional phrases, adverbs, connectives and underlying subject-verb combinations, *metaphorical extension* is motivated by image-schematic motivation extending prototypical senses into complex sense-relations without the necessary involvement of connectives. They are similar facets of the same cognitive process based on the underlying principle of cross-domain mapping, thus Fauconnier's theory is of great importance for other aspects of cognitive processing as well.

Indeed, cognitive science linking both procedures of meaning extension offers a new way of accounting for how linguistic expressions are used and how the world around us is perceived and conceptualized. It offers to help us understand the interrelatedness of various domains and the development of language. By venturing beyond popular areas of investigation (like choosing one particular particle promising a high number of statistical data etc.) I shall seek to provide a broader framework including the major elements of figurative language and examine various issues that might shed a light on the nature of basic processes of human thinking. At the same time the analysis carried out in this dissertation can only offer tentative results on account of the size of the databank that would need to be processed. This venture can be justified by the fact that several linguists mentioned above have already elaborated the theoretical and practical aspects of cognitive semantics.

Basic *theoretical and practical questions* to be answered in the dissertation are:

1/ How does cognitive grammar approach language and language processing?

2/ What tools are available in analyzing and classifying figurative language?

3/ Why can spatiality serve as an underlying domain of figurative extension?

4/ Can figurative language be analyzed and systematized?

5/ How do spatial meanings develop into fiwrative ones?

6/ What role do particles play in providing a transition between the physical and abstract domains?

7/ What conceptual meanings of figurative expressions develop from spatial ones?

8/ Are there common or different conceptual frameworks in elements of figurative language?

Organization

The dissertation comprises 6 chapters. Key terms and tools are described in the theoretical part on cognitive grammar. Apart from offering a cognitive approach in the analysis of natural language, it is aimed at describing who the most prominent representatives of this linguistic discipline are, and what they have achieved to promote the cognitive approach. Though the theoretical part of the dissertation is essential as the background of the remaining chapters, it is the latter that are expected to demonstrate to what extent figurative language can be systematized when the process of metaphorization takes place. The practical analyses of the dissertation are aimed at illustrating whether the conceptual development observable in various elements of figurative language offers a unified picture or not.

Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the dissertation and describes the background of research. The principles of current linguistic theories on language clarify what human thinking is like and how they can be related to the linguistic discipline underlying the dissertation.

Chapter 2 explains what cognitive grammar is, what tools it can offer in the analysis of natural language, and why it seems the right approach in the processing of figurative language.

Chapter 3 enlists and describes those components of figurative language which are analyzed in the dissertation. They are defined and classified as well. The chapters and sections are based on relevant literature describing various traits of the notions.

Chapter 4 illustrates how language changes can be viewed schematically at the end of the process of metaphorization.

Chapter 5 highlights the traces of spatiality in English and Hungarian figurative expressions. This comparison demonstrates how language changes are to be viewed in two different languages, and whether their figurative approach is similar or completely different.

Chapter 6 summarizes the results of research, and outlines future objectives.

2. The Theoretical Background: Cognitive Semantics

Cognitive semantics began to take shape towards the end of the 1970s to replace the mainstream linguistic disciplines that could not explain several phenomena of linguistics for lack of proper approach to language analysis and suitable tools necessary for it. Its major contributors are mentioned in Chapter 1. *Cognitive semantics* emphasizes the importance and role of human *cognition* as a vital precondition of language use and communication. Langacker, one of those linguists who have elaborated mainly the theoretical background of the new discipline (1987:12) says when referring to *cognition:*

> Language is an integral part of human cognition. An account of linguistic structure should therefore be articulate with what is known about cognitive processing in general, regardless of whether one posits a special language "module" (Fodor 1983), or innate *facult; de langage.*

Cognitive grammar is based on the use of *imagery* in describing meaning. Lakoff (1987:57) describes imagination as a synthesizing capacity that is crucial for the structuring of our everyday experience. Our cognitive abilities allow us to process our eceryday experience, and in doing so we can either highlight various parts of a scenery (figure or ground) or schematize one, whereby the details are ignored, and only the basic traits are highlighted. Langacker (1999:2) defines cognitive abilities as the inborn capacity for certain basic kinds of experience. Imagery is important for us to view parts

of a process or to see how various entities are related to each other. Imagery is defined by Langacker (1991:549) as:

> The ability to construe a situation in alternate ways for purposes of thought or expression. Meaning is a function of both conceptual content and the "image" imposed on it.

Imagery is vitally important for our cognitive abilities to expand currently available spatial relations into abstract ones based on the same foundations: a conceptual framework pervading figurative language. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:3) describe our conceptual system as a concomitant of human existence:

> But our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of. In most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way is to find out by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like.

Syntax, semantics, phonology and morphology are regarded by cognitive grammarians as inseparable and interrelated areas of linguistics. This is based on the assumption that an integrated description of language structure is necessary and that different fields of linguistics, such as the ones mentioned above, interact with each other. It is necessary to integrate not only them, however, but various disciplines as well, by reason of the fact that linguistic ability cannot be examined separately from other factors of cognitive

processing as is pointed out by Langacker (1987:13) too, who emphasizes the importance of integrating the findings of linguistics and cognitive psychology:

> Instead of grasping at any apparent rationale for asserting the uniqueness and insularity of language, we should try more seriously to integrate the Endings of *linguistics* and *cognitive psychology.*

In examining actions or happenings of varying complexities it is inevitable to view *events* from various cognitive perspectives so as to grasp *schematic similarities* between them. *A Cognitive event* is defined by Langacker (1991:545) as:

> A cognitive occurrence of any degree of complexity, from the firing of a single neuron to the massive train of neurological activity involved in processing a complicated expression.

The recognition of the important role that cognition plays in language awareness and language processing, the new perspectives it provides for language analysis, and how it is related to the social and cultural environment language is used in are of primary importance. But what is *cognition?* Indurkhya (1994:143) defines the concept the following way:

> *Cognition* typically *involves grouping.* Various objects and transformations, in the world that is made available to us by our perceptual and motor apparatus, are further, are further grouped into categories and operations. Thus, the *world*

as *seen from the cognitive layers is* considerably *more simplified and structured* than the one seen from the lower perceptual layers.

Understanding how linguistic expressions are used and the world around us is perceived and conceptualized is an important objective of linguists. The interrelatedness of various domains (such as spatial, figurative etc.) can be understood by examining how the spatial domain is extended metaphorically into other domains. A long time ago metaphor was thought only to contribute to the embellishment of language. Recent research has proved, however, that it is actually a means of creating an intricate but interrelated network of meanings. A research of this kind is essential for revealing not only the interrelatedness of lexical items, but for demonstrating as well that they have their underlying conceptual frameworks. Whether these conceptual frameworks have individual features in the various components of figurative language or not is part of the answer this dissertation is seeking an answer to.

As opposed to the inadequacy of linguistic description regarding figurative language unanalyzable, cognitive semantics offers a promising linguistic approach that can process it. Compositionality, claimed to be applicable universally to all linguistic phenomena intransformational grammar is discarded by cognitive linguists like Sweetser (1990) and language is considered non-compositional.

As figurative language had been ignored in linguistic analyses for a long time the emergence of cognitive grammar meant a new era for the analysis of figurative expressions that had been regarded as unanalyzable. The neglect of figurative language cannot be overlooked as if it was a minor flaw in linguistic processing. As Langacker says (1987:1):

> *Figurative language* is generally ignored in current theories; at best it is handled by special, ad hoc descriptive devices. Yet it would be hard to find anything more *pervasive* and *fundamental* in language, even (I maintain) in the domain of grammatical structure.

Cognitive grammar seems to offer a new approach to processing figurative language as it examines the role of human imagination in exploring meaning. Language is considered to be inseparable from all the factors that have contributed to its emergence, such as psychological, cultural, social, biological and others. The cognitive approach is more promising than other attempts because it analyzes language while accounting for changes in language development such as the metaphorical extension of lexicon, and explains what trends in language development have led to the current stage. 1/ It regards *language as a concomitant of society and culture* and, therefore, one to be examined in terms of whatever conditions have contributed to its formation. The autonomous image of language so long the pillar-stone of linguistic investigation is discarded for the simple reason that the basics of language functioning were ignored by mainstream linguists while processing language data. The neglect of figurative language meant ignoring an essential part of language. Separating language from the factors that are vitally important in its development, and the use of a mathematically based set of rules in the analysis have failed to produce good results.

2/ The conceptual structuring of human thinking has obviously come to the foreground, and has been partly treated by several cognitive grammarians. Various facets of the lexicon have been elaborated and they show signs of being systematic (as proved by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Brugman (1983), Kövecses (1990) etc.). After all, figurative language is not based on randomly created images and thousands of inconsistent expressions. Rather than that, I assume that it may be considered a logically

structured human creation. The stigma that large parts of language can be regarded as unsystematic (that Transformational Grammar says about the lexicon in general) is totally unacceptable. Cognitive grammar does not separate the lexicon from syntax. It regards both conceptual and phonetic structures as symbolic ones. It applies the same tools at all levels of linguistic description.

3/ The assumption that *meaning is a central issue of human thinking* has given rise to a much neglected area of investigation; that of figurative language. Apart from the toothing trouble that has been caused by the partial inadequacy of specific tools of investigation offered by cognitive grammar, several linguists have managed to prove the consistency with which idiomatic or metaphorical expressions are construed.

Cognitive semantics is a linguistic discipline which seeks to integrate various parts of linguistic structure and offers a new approach to the conceptual system of figurative language. It presumes that language is *non-compositional* and regards *motivatedness* a key issue in language use (see Langacker 1991:295). It *does not separate performance* and *competence* and *applies prototype semantics* in linguistic analyses. Langacker (1987:2) points out three central issues of cognitive semantics:

1. Semantic structure is not universal; it is language specific to a considerable degree. Further, semantic structure is based on conventional imagery and is characterized relative to knowledge structures.

2. Grammar (or syntax) does not constitute an autonomous formal level of representation. Instead, grammar is symbolic in nature, consisting in the conventional symbolization of semantic structure.

3. There is no meaningful distinction between grammar and lexicon. Lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of symbolic structures, which

differ along various parameters but can be divided into separate components only arbitrarily.

Components of figurative language analyzed:

Given a novel system with a reservoir of devices to be applied in search for answers as to how language is built up, one is faced with the question of where the raw material should come from. Considering the fact that *collocations, idioms, phrasal verbs* and even *metaphors* occur in large number in dictionaries, I will examine this database so as to have a more homogeneous approach than newspapers, books or other sources can offer.

A basic issue approached by cognitive grammar in a new way is whether figurative expressions are of compositional or non-compositional nature. It is vitally important to see why traditional assumptions about the compositional nature of language are mistaken, and realize what the benefits of non-compositionality are.

2.1 Compositionality vs. non-compositionality

Sweetser (1990:2) points out that formal semantic tradition has neglected the study of individual morphemes' meanings in favor of the compositional-semantic structure of larger phrasal and sentential units. I think that the tools of formal semantics did not allow it to start non-compositional analysis, and it was easier to ignore handling the large variety of idiomatic expressions than attempt to 'decompose' them in a systematic way. Polysemy, and the senses of polysemous words are poorly treated in formal semantics. These notions, however, are integral parts of cognitive semantics, which offers semantic analysis another latitude by highlighting the importance of meaning in communication. Another driving force of this new kind of approach is the general interest in what motivated the creation of figurative expressions. It is, however, impossible to understand their behavior on the basis of compositionality.

Freke's principle of compositionality (quoted by Gleitman and Lieberman, 1995:313) reveals what this meant:

> The meaning of a whole is a function of the meanings of the parts and of the way they are syntactically combined.

Compositionality is a basic principle of logical semantics. Lyons (1995:51), for example, discards the idea of regarding phrasal expressions like idioms non compositional. He suggests:

> Most phrasal expressions, in contrast with word-expressions are lexically composite. Indeed, all natural languages would appear to contain rules for the

> construction of an infinite number of lexically composite phrasal expressions. And, as we shall see, later, it is an important principle of modem formal semantics that the meaning of all such lexically composite expressions should be systematically determinable on the basis of the meaning of the simpler expressions of which they are composed.

Prototypes are often coupled with the notion of *natural kinds* - he says, and argues (ibid:98) that the cognitive view that the grammatical and semantic structure of languages is determined by the categories of cognition, and that the grammatical and semantic structure of languages is determined indirectly, by the structure of the world in terms of such ontological categories as natural kinds can be debated: He says that the reason for it is that someone may take the view that what counts is not the ontological structure of the world as such, but representations of the world (independently of whether they are faithful representations or not).

Langacker (1987:30) disagrees with this view and claims that linguists must strive for naturalness in linguistic theory and description. Cognitive linguistics is at odds withthe assumptions of formal semantics on the whole by reason of another fact as well, as is pointed out by Langacker (ibid:5): it equates meaning with conceptualization.

As opposed to the principle of compositionality, cognitive grammar assumes that figurative expressions are non-compositional, which makes it possible to analyze and understand them. The *non-compositional character* of many phrasal verbs has been proved by authors like Lindner (1983), Britten & Dellar (1989), Goodale (1993) and others who managed to systematize a large number of phrasal verbs. Langacker (1987:449) cautiously accepts *partial compositionality* at a more general level by saying:

> Linguistic phenomena lend themselves more easily to a claim of *partial* rather than full compositionality. Such a claim is perfectly natural in view of the fact that language ís learned and used in context by speakers who bring many shared knowledge systems to the communicative endeavour.

Some linguists are rather skeptical about it as, for example, Fraser (1976:7):

> Actually, the systematic cases amount to only a small part of the total verb-particle combinations in the language. The unsystematic cased are much more frequent.

If we want to see whether *non-compositional analysis* is feasible or not, we need to have a look at a few examples. Quirk et al. (1985:1154) divide phrasal verbs into two basic groups; ones where the constituents preserve their separate meanings (like *put+down/outside/away/aside),* and the group of highly *idiomatic expressions* like *put off,* where the two words are "fused into a unit". It is no wonder that the Hungarian counterpart is elhalaszt as both the preverbal element in Hungarian and the English particle *off* denote the separation of a *trajector* from *landmark.* Similarly, the Hungarian verb *halaszt* and its English counterpart *put* imply moving an entity from one location to another, but while the former is strictly limited to figurative designation, the latter can be used both in spatial and figurative expressions. The particle *off* allows for a metaphorical extension of the spatial designation into the abstract domain, whereby separation from the current moment is highlighted. In the sentence '*The concert is off*'

the particle expresses the same kind of *separation* as in the previous case when it was preceded by a dynamic verb and not by a static one.

Bennett (1975:73) rightly gives the following componential definition of the particle *off:* 'negative locative surface', which is an indication of separation from a location. This particle is predominantly used in directional expressions. Quirk et al. (1985:1162) set up two semantic criteria for the idiomatic status of phrasal verbs. Firstly, the semantic unity of phrasal verbs can be manifested by the fact that they can almost always be replaced with single-word verbs. Secondly, he suggests that the meaning of a phrasal verb is not predictable from the meanings of its parts owing to the fact that the verb or particle in the combination does not remain constant when other parts of the idiom undergo substitution. He divides the second criterion further into (i) free, non-idiomatic constructions like *bring in/out etc, (ii)* semi-idiomatic constructions like *chatter away/work away* expressing *persistent action,* or *drink up, break up* denoting *completion,* while the third group includes 'highly idiomatic' constructions like *turn up* meaning 'rear', *turn up* meaning *'make an appearance'* ete.

I think that none of the examples given by Quirk et al. are hopeless from the aspect of non-compositionally. Even highly idiomatic constructions can be systematized and analyzed in ways that reveal much of their non-compositional character. Let us look at the meanings of *run down,* which is regarded as non-idiomatic by Quirk et al. according to the Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs:

1/ move quickly to a lower level, or away from a place (Hungarian: *le*fut)

2/ criticize someone strongly (see Hungarian : *le*hord, *le*teremt)

3/ if an industry or organization is *run down,* its size, importance, or activity is deliberately reduced (see Hungarian: *le*csökkent)

4/ if someone *runs down* their stock or supply of something, they reduce the amount (Hungarian: *le*csökkent)

S/ if a machine or device *runs down,* it gradually loses power or works more slowly (Hung.: *le*merül)

person *(knock down, run over,* see Hung.: *el-legázol)*

7/ if you *run down* something you have been searching for, you find it after a lot of effort (also *track down, trace down;* Hung.: *le*nyomoz)

8/ if you *run down* a list of items, you read or mention them briefly and quickly (Hung.: *átfut* listán)

9/ if someone is *run down,* they are very tired and unwell after working too hard or not having enough sleep for a while (Hung.: *el*csigázott, *el*gyötört, kimerült)

10/ a building or area that is *run down* is in poor condition, because it has not been looked after (Hung.: *el*hanyagolt)

The following conclusions can be drawn from the examples above:

1/ Except for one case, the English particle got the same Hungarian preverbal element *le-,* or its more neutral, non-deictic alternative *el;* .

2/ The particle *down* could be matched with directional or negative concepts like (downward motion, criticism, reduction 2, loss of energy, worsening conditions etc.)

3/ Contrary to what Quirk et al. (ibid) say about the non-idiomatic nature of *run down,* it does develop idiomatic meanings just like most other phrasal verbs do (from spatial meanings).

Sweetser (1990:15) seems to accept the principles of non-compositional analysis by discarding theories of semantics based on the concept of compositionality and autonomous structures. She points out the following:

> What lexical analysis has been done in this tradition (see Dowty 1979) has (as mentioned above) tended to be on the aspects of lexical meaning most relevant to compositionality. Syntactic and pragmatic analyses which crucially depend on such a semantic framework (e.g. Gazdar 1979; Gazdar *et al.* 1985) do so in the knowledge that their work will stand or fall to the extent that it proves actually possible to do a full lexical- semantic analysis of the kind they presuppose. Their assumption of autonomous levels. and of *purely compositional semantics* seems to me *dubious i*n the light of the recent research.

There appear to be linguists supporting the idea of compositionality even in the 1990-s. Lipka (1992:74) is one of the representatives of this view:

> There are also complex lexemes whose constituents are not morphemes. Examples are *hold up (a* bank), *put up* with (something), *do out of* 'cheat' (in *He did me out of five pounds)* which can be characterized as discontinuous lexical items or *phrasal lexemes*. These verbal lexemes cannot be decomposed into meaningful units, i.e. morphemes.

The first phrasal verb is based on traditional ways of robbing someone (stopping and robbing), which is justified by the fact that the particle UP has developed the meaning of *blocking* (as in *clog up/chock up/choke up* etc.). Robbing has been preserved as an associated meaning as is suggested by the definition of the Longman Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1983):

stop a vehicle by force in order to stop it.

Hungarian has also preserved the original act which substitutes the whole act of robbery: *útonállás,* thus both languages apply a metonymy for describing the same event. *Put up with* seems a harder nut to crack. The prototypical meaning of the phrasal verb is based on the spatial description of staying in the upstairs part of a house where guests were *put up* for the night. This simple spatial feature has evolved into meaning staying *with* someone in the same location and bearing him, as an extended metaphorical sense, where *with* refers to companionship. The third phrasal verb is based on a container metaphor, where the relationship between the container and contained (or LMl and LM2) is one of *control* (like in He is *in power).* The adverb-preposition combination designates parting with i.e. leaving an entity, which metaphorically involves 'losing control or ownership of sth' (Similarly *cheat out off.* Though the analyses may not seem absolutely convincing, I assume that they are based on foundations that may be handy in decoding similar 'motivated' cases. Metonymical and metaphorical extension, and their relation to spatiality are crucial in understanding

meaning structures of the kind examined above.

The conceptual basis of our understanding metaphorically projected images is explained by authors like Rosch (1978), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Radden (1991) and others. It is clear, for example, that particle meaning can be dominant over verbal meaning, and that the former can be systematic in many cases. This feature, however, cannot be extended to all phrasal verbal meanings as, in quite a few other cases verbal meanings may become the dominant part in the global meaning which is modified by adverbial particles. Brugman (1983:46) encourages us to believe in the noncompositional character of phrasal verbs by saying:

> Verb-particle constructions in general have often been relegated the status of 'idioms', which in many cases has exempted them from being studied any further. But we have seen that noncompositionality is not a dead end, and that even constructions we would be comfortable classifying as 'idiomatic' can be analysed to some degree or other.

Interestingly enough, even Britten and Dellar (1989) avoided analyzing phrasal verbs with idiomatic meanings like *take off* denoting the imitation of a person, though it seems to logically overlap with spatial descriptions in the sense that 'taking off a coat' and 'taking off the patterns of behavior characterizing a person' are both based ~n the removal of an entity (which is a physical object in the former case, while it is a behavioral pattern in the latter) (In a way like "lemásol" in Hungarian). Another example of how spatial meaning can be extended metonymically (the actual differences separating the spatial and abstract domains are barely noticeable when one examines the image schemata representing them). Supposing that the case above is not only an isolated example characterizing spatial and idiomatic expressions the example is promising. It is only through a large number of examples that the regularity of cases

The assumption that it is always only the overall meaning of a phrasal verb that

we can rely on is questionable as is suggested by books pioneering in treating these verbal expressions as systematic (and more often than not classifiable by particle meaning) rather than chaotic. Britten and Dellar (1989:1) define the new approach to phrasal verbs as follows:

> The same phrasal verb often has several meanings. For example, you can put down what you are carrying; a shop can put down its prices; you can put down your name on a list; or you can put down someone who is bothering

you. This is because each of the commonest adverbial particles (up, down, on, off etc.) has several different meanings, apart from its basic meaning for position or movement. For each of the meanings of an adverbial particle there is a group of phrasal verbs using that meaning.

The particle may gain figurative meanings through metaphorical extension, while preserving most of the image schematic features of the spatial background. As a result, *spatial metaphors* come about. In Mixtec, a language of Mexico, as Brugman and Macaulay point out (in Langacker, 1991:344) body part terms are used through semantic extension to express locations with respect to non-human objects in that language. In the following two examples the translated expressions of Mixtec are compared with their English counterparts:

a/ cat that be: located face mat = 'The cat is on the mat'

b/ PERF -fly one bird back-tree = 'A bird flew behind the tree'

Though body parts are usually participants, their construal as locations is natural because their position within the body as a whole is a crucial and salient facet of their characterization. A noun like *zata* '(human) back' receives a locational construal to the extent that the notions of position and spatial extension are highlighted at the expense of material substance. This is the first in a regular series of semantic extensions that leads systematically to compounds such as *zata*- zúnu. The next step involves using the bodypart term for the analogous location with respect to a non-human object.

Langacker (ibid) points out that a noun like *zata* '(human) back receives a local construal, then it is used analogously with respect to a non-human object (such as a tree), and finally it comes to designate the spatial region contiguous to that location.

As it is obvious from the examples, Mixtec expresses location by means of noun-noun compounds based on body part terms.

Sweetser (1990:9) also emphasizes the importance of using metaphors and metonymies in language by saying:

> Linguistic categorization depends not just on our naming distinctions that exist in the world, but
>
> also on our metaphorical and metonymic structuring of our perceptions of the world.

It may be assumed that the physical and abstract domains are similar to each other to some extent, as is proved by analyses of metaphorical mappings. Considering the fact that Hungarian spatial and abstract notions have a remarkably similar correlation between the two domains as in felmászik (climb up), *feljön* (come up) vs. felnevel (bring up) etc., it sounds reasonable to say that abstract notions, in a way, derive from the physical world. While the first two examples are relevant through a change in the direction of motion the third one involves physical, emotional and other features. This is corroborated by Lakoff (1987:269):

> The studies of basic-level categorization suggest that our experience is preconceptually structured at that level. We have general capacities for dealing with part-whole structure in real-world objects via gestalt perception,

motor-movement, and the formation of rich mental images. These impose a preconceptual structure on our experience. Our basic-level *concepts* coaespond to that preconceptual structure and are unde5tood directly in terms of it.

Since a non-compositional approach to figurative expressions is possible, it seems feasible to find out where they derive from and what new meanings develop from spatial ones. Another intriguing question is what *domain shift* is *motivated by*. Given the *image schematic basis* of a spatial configuration, a new, extended meaning becomes possible when it is transposed to the ABSTRACT or FIGURATIVE DOMAIN. This is how spatial containment gains *new conceptual meanings,* as it happens in the following expressions: **Joe is in the house.** vs. **Joe is in trouble.** The former designates a simple spatial configuration while the latter suggests that Joe is limited and constrained in his actions as is suggested by the property of boundedness.

Summary

This section has introduced non-compositionality, an essential component of the approach applied in the dissertation. It has been argued that compositionality, which assumes that the meaning of a composite expression derives from the meanings of its parts is inadequate in the analysis of figurative expressions. Rather than this language is of non-compositional nature, which makes it possible for one to analyze even complex figurative expressions which are created through metaphorical

extensions of spatial configurations. This is promoted by the motivating force of image schemata to be discussed in the following section of this dissertation.

2.2 Image Schemata and Domain Shift

The world around us is made up of all kinds of spatial relations: the position or dynamic motion of the entities in it is perceived by our sense organs. Our perception may show individual traits of these relations. Human cognition can, however, in many cases produce images which, as far as their basic features are concerned, are quite alike. In terms of schematic structuring leaving a point in space and reaching a destination may be quite similar to starting an activity and achieving a result. Both involve a Source, and, after going along a Path, which may be relevant or irrelevant in the process, reach the Goal. The two examples demonstrate it quite clearly that several actions may be alike when devoid of individual traits when described in a more general environment schematically.

Another important point is that it is not only our physically perceived environment that can offer us the opportunity to see things, but, in a broad sense, the abstract world as well. While the former needs a lot more than genetically coded abilities of perception, the latter requires the creation of images in the human mind. The fact that the two are seen as quite alike, however, suggests that the former may have been the basis of the evolvement of the latter, which entails a certain degree of similarity. As Zelinsky-Wibbelt (1993:5) suggests:

> Indeed, understanding and communication only become possible via the *schematic,* relatively
>
> *simple structure* imposed by spatial concepts on the vast amount of information provided by the
>
> physical and non-physical world.

Thus spatial meanings gain new, non-spatial ones in the course of metaphorical

mappings involving a domain-shift.

2.2.1 Definition of image schemata

Abstract thinking may partly be based on the understanding of what the physical world around us is like, and may, to some extent, reflect the way the world is conceived by human cognition. Basic features, phenomena and processes may join the spatial and the abstract domains through a framework incorporating them all. These features are represented by *image schemata,* which are defined by Johnson (1987:19) the following way:

> a cluster of knowledge representing a particular generic procedure, object, percept, event, sequence of events, or social situation. This cluster provides *a skeleton structure* for a concept that can be "instantiated", or filled out with the detailed properties of the particular instance being represented.

These image schemata are present throughout our lives, which makes them a universal constituent of cognition. They are part of a rich array of abstractions that can be paralleled, and at times contrasted with the phenomena of the physical environment. Ulric Neisser (quoted in Johnson, 1987:20) approaches the essence of what schemata are from a physiological point of view:

> A schema is that part of the entire nervous perceptual cycle which is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience, and somewhat specific to what is being perceived. The schema accepts information as it becomes available at sensory surfaces and is changed by that formation; it directs movements and exploratory activities that make more information available, by which it is further modified. From the biological point of view, a schema is part of the nervous system. It is some active array of physiological structures and processes; not a center in the brain, but an entire system that includes receptors and afferents and feed-forward units and efferents.

Image schemata are, actually, specific structures of human perception and thinking and appear in a wide variety of language structures while playing a crucial role in describing the relationship behveen man and his environment. When applying them one can understand vital structural similarities or differences between phenomena and processes. Johnson (1987:41) describes them as follows:

> The internal structure of these experiential schemata: they are coherent, meaningful unified

> wholes within our experience and cognition. They are a principal means by which we achieve
>
> meaning structure. They generate coherence for, establish unity within, and constrain our
>
> they "mushy" forms that have no internal structure".

By applying image schemata in the semantic analysis of words we may get chemata of senses which, while sharing basic components with the prototype (for details see Section 2.7), differ from it as well, as is reflected by this form of structural approach.

2.2.2 Components of image schemata

Image schemata have four essential components: *figure* (defined by Langacker (1987:120) as "within a scene a sub-structure perceived as "standing out" from the remainder (the ground)", *landmark,* an entity located in all kinds of spatial environment, the *trajector,* which in Langacker's words (1991:555) is "the (primary) figure within a profiled relation" expressing the motion of *a mobile object.* As Langacker says (ibid) "the trajector/landmark alignment pertains to the internal structure of relational predications, at any level of organization". In another book Langacker (1999:8) defines *relationship* the following way:

> A relationship generally has one or more *focal elements,* normally describable as *participats,* which stand out with special salience within the

relational profile. The type of prominence they exhibit is hypothesized to be a matter of figure/ground organization.

The trajector and the landmark either get into contact with each other or they do not, and are applied in expressing relational predications. The 'concept of *relation* is described by Langacker (1987:492) as "Defined by interconnections among entities". The term 'general' is justified by the fact that relational predications are devoid of specific features when described with image schemata. A schema is elaborated rather than extended, while an extension is a kind of elaboration in which a new, more general schema is also created. On the other hand, the patterns provided by schemata may be extended into ones describing specific relations. This explains the vital role they play in analyzing semantic relations by providing additional tools to what the formal analysis of the objectivist approach can ensure.

While focussing on schemata I wish to refer to some analyzed by others as well so as to see what role they play in metaphorical extension. After looking at a rather limited segment of linguistic information I wish to extend this approach to each element of figurative language to see if schemata of spatial origin overlap. If there is comprehensive evidence that space is pervasive in construing the abstract world, we may find an explanation to why the relations between entities in the figurative language of English and Hungarian are similar in many cases as well.

2.2.3 Classification of image schemata

The classification of image schemata by Lakoff (1987:282) partly matches that of metaphors owing to the fact that *orientational* and *container schemata* are tightly linked

with the physical structuring of our world. He defines the concept of image schema the following way:

> Kinesthetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our bodily experience: CONTAINER, PATH, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY etc.

By offering a structural framework which is present in various domains the occurrence of schemata is a concomitant trait of both metaphorical and metonymical extension.

Zelinsky-Wibbelt (1993:362) outlines the schema theory *in terms of lexical information:*

> The *schema model* claims that lexical information should be as general as possible in abstracting
>
> from different contextually instantiated sense specializations.

Johnson (1987:126) enlists image schemata which structure our understanding:

CONTAINER	BALANCE	COMPULSION
BLOCKAGE	COUNTERFORCE	RESTRAINT REMOVAL
ENABLEMENT	ATTRACTION	MASS-COUNT

PATH	LINK	CENTER-PERIPHERY
CYCLE	NEAR-FAR	SCALE
PART-WHOLE	MERGING	SPLITTING
FULL-EMPTY	MATCHING	SUPERIMPOSITION
ITERATION	CONTACT	PROCESS
SURFACE	OBJECT	COLLECTION

The occurrence of this variety is a clear proof of the important role that schemata play in not only our physical world but also in the structuring of the human conceptual system. They do not work on their own, however, but they are closely related to prototypes as is pointed out below.

2.2.4 The relationship of schemata and prototypes

Zelinsky-Wibbelt (ibid:363) also draws *a parallel between image schemata* and *prototypes* by saying:

> Both schemata and prototypes are economical mental *strategies for abstracting* from the vast
>
> amount of information offered by reality. The two strategies work in close interrelation. For
>
> example, the extensive use of schemata has often proved to be insufficient, as schemata are too

coarse and not flexible enough for drawing inferences.

When speaking about phonological units, Langacker (1999:129) compares prototype and schemata as follows:

> Since every context induces some phonetic adjustment (if only very minor), the prototype must in some measure be schematic. Its manifestations in particular contexts constitute either instantiations of the schema, which may themselves have unit status, or extensions recognized as secondary allophones owing to their divergent specifications. Higher-level schemas may also be abstracted to represent what is common to the prototype and different sets of extensions.

Apart from proving the contiguity of the spatial foundations of metaphorically extended notions schemata are vitally important in preserving essential linguistic information through omitting minute details of description. This is a key factor in language teaming, processing and storing information. Thus schemata may also be necessary for outlining ways of how figurative language is structured. This assumption is also confirmed by the way Malmkjaer (1991:179) describes schemata:

> Schemata are abstract *generic concepts* constructed by the mind on the basis of patterns of experience. They are stored in long term memory and may be perceived as *a framework* we call up to help store new ideas and information.

If appropriate schemata are already stored in the brain it is an easier matter to activate them than to try to establish new concepts and ideas on a sketchy or non-existent foundation.

The applicability of schemata is demonstrated by Brugman (1983:10-66) through a large number of examples. She suggests, among others, that schemata function in accordance with the following two principles: One is that spatial senses are

More basic than abstract ones, which makes the lexical categories employing these relations more basic in the prototype semantics sense than the lexical categories using abstractions of the spatial uses. Another is that the conventionalization of syntactic position is motivated by the way schemata are combined. Thus image schemata affect language a great deal.

2.2.5 Schematic conversion in metaphorization

Schemata have been used by several scholars such as Radden, (1991), Brugman (1983) etc. to prove the conceptual structuring of language, no matter which domain was targeted at. They are of primary importance in metaphorical extension, as it promotes and facilitates the expansion of vocabulary. In this process spatial configurations become metaphorized, and their meanings are transposed to the ABSTRACT DOMAIN. This conversion might, theoretically, -make the traces of spatiality disappear, since completely new senses have developed, but the fact that it can be traced back to spatiality is partly due to image schematic analysis, which preserves skeletal features of utterances, thus making them comparable on an equal

footing. Zelinsky-Wibbelt (1993:384) emphasizes the importance of schematic conversion in metaphorization. She suggests that the salient features which get from the source domain into the target domain are actually part of the schematization type of the former:

> The metaphorical transfer consists of the transaction of the *properties* which figure out as *salient*
>
> in the vehicle's schematization types of the spatial source domain.

The schematic structuring of the two domains may be alike to some extent, but the process of metaphorization results in a new conceptual framework.

Summary

Experiencing the physical world may trigger a variety of mental representations, which is reflected in their image schematic structuring. While seemingly similar to the derivative structures, however, metaphorical mappings are higher order structures of a large number of concepts. The extension of the lexicon through metonymic transfer and metaphorization is motivated by preconceptual experience (Lakoff 1987:267). A variety of schemata can be observed in language and they are closely related to prototype. Though the latter-is more finely-grained they are both essential in achieving meaning extension.

2.3 Metaphorization and metonymical extension

Before looking at actual examples of how spatial images can be extended to describe idiomatic notions it is necessary to define the two different means that provide ways of doing so. *Metaphor,* a highly productive part of natural language, and that of figurative language (which includes collocations, phrasal verbs, idioms etc.), as well, differs from the rest of the constituents figurative language is composed of by being more spontaneously created and emotionally motivated. One reason might be that it is only partly bound by processes of entrenchment and, another, that the unpredictable variety metaphors provide in language makes them a permanently changing but, at the same time, an extremely valuable part of language. Metaphor needs greater motivation than the simple reproduction of other components like idioms or phrasal verbs available mainly in a ready-made format. Apart from being more motivated than the others, it requires, in a way, a special skill from the recipient, to be able to act as a decoder of the message received. Dead metaphors are not motivated like other metaphors by being more entrenched in language whereby many of them have become idioms.

The fact that two distinctly differing domains are conjoined by metaphorical extension makes their use similar to that of metonymies. As Lakoff (1979:203) puts it:

> The result is that metaphor (that is *cross-domain mapping)* is absolutely *central ro ordinary natural language semantics,* and that the study of literary metaphor is an extension of the study of everyday metaphor. Everyday metaphor is characterized by a huge system of thousands of crossdomain mappings, and this system is made use of in novel metaphor.

This interpretation outlines the general framework metaphors can be applied in.

Metonymy operates in a similar way to metaphors by reason of the fact that it is also based on mapping the Source Domain onto the Target Domain. Unlike metaphor, however, it involves no domain shift. On account of being similar in operation to metaphor, it is an alternative way of meaning extension. The *role of metaphorization and metonymical extension* in extending spatial relations to abstract ones can be observed extensively and is accepted by several authors as is clear from what Zelinsky - Wibbelt says as well (1993:5)

> In this view, *all abstract concepts are metaphorizations and metonymies of semantically concrete spatial predications.* Abstract expressions are indirectly understood in terms of directly
>
> meaningful, preconceptual models which are constrained by the perception of physical relations.

Just as bounded containment, for example, can express that an entity is located within another in space, it can be applied to abstract conditions as well, where boundedness restricts an agent from acting. When saying *"In a towering passion"* one can visualize an imaginary container with passion filling it (up to its brim). Whether filled by steam, water in space or emotions in the abstract domain, containers can constrain both physical and abstract actions/happenings. Once a container has been filled, it can be exploded by the pressure inside. (cf. Lakoff, 1987:377-380). A

description of this kind can be applied in the spatial domain and, after *metaphorical extension,* in the abstract domain as well.

Other examples for the container metaphor can be found in a large number of Expressions. It is suggested by the container idiom *in a nutshell,* for example, that the amount of information is limited to a small size by the external boundaries of the container. When applied to speech acts it is adapted to mean a concisely worded format. A small-size spatial entity stands for small amount of information, which makes it *a conceptual metaphor.* Even a phrase like in *a hurry* can highlight a kind of boundedness. The fact that someone is being constrained by the circumstances and needs to make special efforts to carry out an action within a certain time-span can be likened to other constraints of physical nature.

2.4 Metonymy

The Greek word metonymy derives from meta 'change' and onoma 'name', so it is based on the name change of a notion for that of another (Idegen szavak szótára, 1978). As the Greek word suggests the name of a thing is transferred to take the place of something else with which it is associated. Earlier analyses of metonymies rather concern poetic than colloquial use, as we learn from Potter's (1957:148) interpretation:

> A proper name like John Milton, referring specifically to the author of *Paradise Lost,* has unique reference, but when, using a subtle variety of the figure of speech known as *metonymy,* the poet speaks of 'a Milton' or 'some Milton,' as in Gray's *Elegy - Some mute inglorious Milton here*

> *may rest* - he makes the proper name *generic* and it no longer denotes a unique being.

In a more recent work Bach and Hamish (1979: 68) define metonymy as follows:

> If one thing bears a very close *association* to another, the expression is sometimes classified as
>
> metonymy.

Taylor (1989:122) mentions Nunberg's name (1978), who first called *metonymy a* "a referring function". Taylor says that these referring functions are not fully productive in that not any product can be referred to by the name of the person who created it. *Metonymy* pervades human culture. It is, by its very nature of functioning, closely *related to indexicality.* Sebeok (1994:74), for example, points out that metonymy - especially the indexical method of *pays pro toto* - far outweighs the occurrences of metaphor in film. Langacker (1999:198) defines the notion of metonymy as follows in his recently published book on the relationship between *grammar* and *conceptualization:*

> We can define metonymy as occurring when an expression that normally designates one entity is used instead to designate another, associated entity.

Metonymy may play a kind of simplifying function in language. When we say, for example, that 'The *whole village* is in the streets' a shorter version is used for the lengthy paraphrased interpretation: *'All the people in the village* are in the street.' When we say *'The Crown* disapproves of the prince's behavior' we may actually be referring to the fact that the *Queen* is dissatisfied with his behavior. It may not always be the case that metonymies shorten and simplify, but I think that this is one of the functions of metonymies. Step by step new concepts become favored to the ones they are to be associated with, and as salient and generally accepted notions they are used as alternatives to the notions they stand for. They are described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35-41) as following the cognitive principle where one well-understood aspect of something stands for the thing as a whole or for some aspect of it. Thus metonymies seem to be *more directly motivated* (through intrinsic meaning shift) *than metaphors* and may be regarded as *establishing a more intrinsic relationship than metaphors.*

In *Schwarzkopf defeated Iraq* (see Radden, G. and Z. Kövecses, 1997:17) it is rather the troops that can be regarded as the active zone by being locationally and in terms of military maneuvers in contact with Iraq (or rather the troops of Iraq). It might even be said that *SchwarZkopf defeated Hussein'* thus degrading a battle between military powers to the level of a personal duel by way of applying a double metonymic image, while no mention is made of the actual fighters in the battle. The CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED metonymy, as suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35-45) implies more than the mere replacement of one entity with another. Though a commander-in-chief or a president cannot attack another country on their own they are held responsible for starting, and controlling a war. I disagree with the authors' statement though that when hearing the utterance "Nixon bombed Hanoi", we actually think that he did it. I don't imagine him flying over Vietnam dropping bombs, but visualize him as being in the very center of decision-making, being active and controlling army maneuvers

indirectly etc., while *suggesting more* metonymically: the military maneuvers were controlled and influenced by him more directly than they were in reality. (During the air-campaign, for example, Nixon may have attended several receptions, traveled abroad, attended clubs etc. which cannot have had anything to do with the war.)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35) highlight the use of metonymies as vitally important in the language we use. Their definition also focuses on the term *relation:*

> When we say "Inflation robbed me of my.savings," we are not using the term "inflation" to refer to a person. Cases like this must be distinguished from cases like The ham sandwich is waiting for his check' where the expression "the ham sandwich" is being used to refer to an actual person who ordered the ham sandwich. Such cases are not instances of personification metaphors, since we do not understand "the ham sandwich" by imputing human qualities to it. Instead we are using one entity to refer to another that is related to it.

Kövecses (1990:44) provides a similar definition with a specific example:

> In general, in most cases related concepts are like conceptual metonymies; expressions referring to them (e.g. "I am so *happy* with you'd can be used to mean the concept to which they are related (e.g., love).

Kövecses and Radden (1997:3) define the concept of metonymy the following way:

Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same ICM.

An ICM is an *idealized cognitive model,* or in Lakoff's words "a complex structured whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles:

- image-schematic, as in Langacker's cognitive grammar - propositional structure, as in Fillmore's frames

- metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson - metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson

and Each ICM, as used, structures a mental space, as described by Fauconnier.

Metonymy can be viewed in different ways. As it is proved by the examples in Section 3.5.1, it cannot be simplified to the formula 'a Whole expressed with its components' or the other way round. The most frequent *conceptual relationship among the idioms* examined is the Part for the Whole relationship.

Summary

One way of extending the lexicon is metonymic transfer. It means that a notion is related to another and its name stands for the other owing to a set of features linking them. This process does not involve a domain shift, as opposed to metaphorical

mapping. This referring function of metonymy contributes to meaning extension and means more than the mere replacement of a notion by another. Metonymy shares several features with metaphor, but this stand-for-relationship (Kövecses & Radden, 1997) only functions in one domain.

2.5. Metaphor

The Greek word metaphora is derived from meta meaning 'over', and herein, 'to carry', and it means "meaning transfer" (Idegen szavak szótára, 1978). As the Greek name suggests it refers to an entity as if it was another by reason of the fact that some features of the latter are 'carried over' to the former.

Back in the 1920s Ogden and Richards (1923/89:213) defined metaphor as

follows

> Metaphor, in the most general sense, is the use of one reference to a group of things between which a given relation holds, for the purpose of facilitating the discrimination of an analogous relation in another group. In the understanding of metaphorical language one reference borrows part of the context of another in an abstract form.

It is presupposed by this general description that the context, part of which is borrowed, is valid for the *vehicle.* It will come out later in the analysis in the context of 'Richard is

a gorilla' that even those features of the *vehicle* can be mapped onto the *tenor* which are only valid in the public mind, i.e. they are actually fake features.

In the 1930s Bloomfield (1933:149) pointed out that many linguistic forms are

used for more than one typical situation. Some of the examples enlisted by him include *'head* of an army', *'eye* of a needle', *'teeth* of a saw', *'foot* of a mountain' etc. His observations touch upon another group of figurative expressions as well: metonymies. Bloomfield divides meanings into *normal* (or *central)* and *marginal (metaphoric* or *transferred)* ones. He (ibid) suggests that marginal meaning is only used when the practical situation forces us to do so.

> The central meaning is favored in the sense that we understand a form (that is, respond to it) in the central meaning unless some feature of the practical situation forces us to look to a transferred meaning.

The example with which he wishes to illustrate the option between the two is: *'There goes a fox!'.* Choosing between a real fox and someone whose features are fox-like implies ambiguity. What Bloomfield calls preference is obviously context- or situation-dependent, and is to be applied to utterances which can either be understood literally or figuratively. Not all metaphors can have their literal counterparts to choose from. In 'She is a *red rose',* for example, no literal alternative can be envisaged at all.

The cognitive approach revealed the inadequacy of the views mentioned above. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and Lakoff (1987) pointed out that metaphor was

not simply a tool to embellish the language, but a vital part of human thinking. Lakoff and

Johnson (1980:3) explained it the following way:

> Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish - a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.

Human thoughts are largely metaphorical and they make up a significant part of the conceptual system used in language. Metaphors which were believed to be mainly tools of literature for decorative purposes for long (at the time of Cicero and Aristotle), are, in fact, potential devices of everyday language, an element of conceptualization, as we think in terms of metaphors (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). They are transmitters of human creativity, wit, and are thereby exciting and challenging items in language use. There are hundreds of definitions to choose from, but I shall only quote a few that have been composed by mostly cognitive grammarians as this analysis is based on the principles of semantics.

In the course of language development the lexicon expanded whereby the semantic variability of lexemes increased as well. In an early work Langacker (1967:183) speaks of the extension of lexical items the following way:

> The extension of existing lexical items to new situations involves both the metaphorical side oflanguage and semantic change.

Metaphorization was defined and its basic components were described by Lyons (1977: 103) as follows:

> Here it may be pointed out that a more *complec type of* iconicity may hold between form and meaning, mediated by what, from a historical point of view, may be described as an *extension of meaning* from a basic *to a transferred, or metaphorical sense.*

Several key-words are highlighted in the quotation. Today we say that the relation between basic meaning and its metaphorical sense suggests that metaphorical mapping is a self-evolving process; a given conceptual framework is extended from the Source to the Target Domain while preserving basic image schematic traits. So, while the domain shift produces an apparently new meaning, structural and even conceptual features (like THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE in: He's *a pain in the neck* - Kövecses, 2000:26) provide tight bonds between the SPATIAL and ABSTRACT DOMAINS .

As Dirven observed (1985:88) metaphor is present at every level of the language structure as *sound metaphor* (sw-), *word metaphor* (lose heart = lose courage), *phrase metaphor* (the iron curtain) and *discourse metaphor* (One swallow does not make summer). Apart from these basic structural metaphors there are several other kinds that are vitally important in the use of language like *spatial metaphors* (She asked him *out of* curiosity.), *orientational metaphors* (She is *in high spirits.), ontological metaphors* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 26: "That was a *beautiful catch."), conceptual metaphors*

(Kövecses, 1990:46: LOVE IS FIRE).

Cruse (1986:40) gives a rough description of metaphor by saying:

> a metaphor induces the hearer (or reader) to view a thing, state of affairs, or whatever, as being
>
> like something else, by applying to the former linguistic expressions which are normally employed in references to the latter.

Metaphorical mapping involves a source domain and a target domain. Lakoff (1987:276) says metaphor is *natural* in that it is *motivated by the structure of our experience,* an image-schematic model, but the mapping is typically partial in that it maps the structure of the ICM in the source domain onto a corresponding structure in the target domain.

If you hear someone say 'Jack is a monkey', you may assume that the utterance is not meant literally, but it rather concerns certain facets of his behavior etc. The condensed image of attitudinal aspects might be rendered literally in the following

format 'Jack's gestures and motion look quite like those of a monkey', which might, however, prevent the listener from creating a compact image, like the one offered by a metaphor. One of the advantages of metaphorical language is its *condensity* compared to literal language, whereby a higher level of mental processing becomes necessary, in which both the coder and decoder are engaged in projecting relevant features of an entity/entities onto another/others. The success of this mental process depends very much on whether the source and the target entities share a certain number of features or not.

Before looking at actual examples of how spatial images can be extended to describe abstract ideas, it is necessary to define the two different means that provide possible ways of doing so. *Metaphor,* a highly productive part of natural language, differs from the rest of the constituents idiomatic language is composed of by being more spontaneously created and emotionally motivated than them. One reason might be

unpredictable variety metaphors create in language makes them a permanently changing but, at the same time, an extremely valuable part of language. Apart from being more motivating than the others, they require, in a way, a special skill from the recipient, to be able to act as a decoder of the message received. The fact that two distinctly differing domains are conjoined by metaphorical extension makes them somewhat different from metonymies. As Lakoff (1979:203) puts it:

> The result is that metaphor (that is cross-domain mapping) is absolutely central to ordinary natural language semantics, and that the study of literary metaphor is an extension of the study of everyday metaphor. Everyday metaphor is characterized by a huge system of thousands of crossdomain mappings, and this system is made use of in novel metaphor.

This interpretation outlines the general framework metaphors can be applied in. They exceed the boundaries of literature and can be extended in a wide variety of conditions to describe the conceptual structuring language is based on from an early childhood. Halliday (1935:319) defines metaphor the following way:

> A word is used for something *resembling* that which it usually refers to; for example, *flood..poured in, oozes,stem the tide* in
>
> A flood of protests *poured in* following the announcement [a large quantity...came in] He *oozes* geniality [displays all over)
>
> The government still hopes to *stem the tide* of inflation [resist the force of].

Halliday (ibid) points out that most cases involve transfer *from a concrete to a more abstract* sense, and one large class of these is from material to mental process, as in it *escapes, me, I haven't grasped it, I don't follow.* We need to remember that metaphorical mapping goes with domain shift, so a shift from one domain to another is of metaphorical nature. The relationship between physical reality and the abstract world can clearly be demonstrated through Sweetser's examples quoted in Johnson, 1987:108) linking vision with intellectual activity:

> VISION IS PHYSICAL TOUCHING / MANIPULATION
>
> *behold, catch* sight of
>
> *perceive* (Lat. - *cipio* "seize'
>
> scrutinize (Lat. *scrutari* "pick through trash's examine (Lat. ex + *agmen-* "pull out from a row's discern (Lat. *dis-cerno* "separate'

see ('sek - which also gives Lat. *seqour* "follow'

The examples suggest, Sweetser (ibid) points out, that:

> Each of these vision terms involves physical perceptions or manipulations that come to have
>
> correlates in the domain of intellectual operations.

2.5.1 Metaphor, simile and analogy

Kiparsky (1973:240) suggests that metaphors are frequently linked with a certain type of *semantic deviance* from a compositional point of view. He says that non-deviant sentences like 'He came out smelling like a rose" may have metaphorical interpretations as well, and adds:

> Semantic deviance does not cause metaphorical meaning, but rather brings out what is already
>
> latent by blocking out a literal meaning, just as an eclipse of the sun does not "cause" the moon to shine, but makes its light perceptible by the sun.

Metaphors and similes have to be clearly distinguished. As Glucksberg and Keysar (1979:422-23) point out the difference between metaphors and similes stems from

complex patterned set of properties in shorthand without listing them all exhaustively.

Richards (quoted in Mac Cormac, 1985:25) uses two concepts to describe the process of metaphorization: *tenor* is the underlying idea or principal subject, while the less well known is the *vehicle.* These two components make metaphors very much different from similes which compare two entities directly, without allowing the *vehicle* to transfer some features while leaving out others. And, of course, this is just part of the difference between them. Quite like similes, analogies also differ a great deal from metaphors. Mac Cormac (ibid:24) points out that the *differences between metaphor and analogy* are:

> 1/ the emotional tension generated by the juxtaposition of anomalous referents (the tension
>
> theory) 2/ the falsity or contradiction produced by a literal reading of the identification of the two referents (the controversion theory)
>
> 3/ the ungrammaticality of the juxtaposition of the two referents (the deviance theory)

2.5.2 How are metaphors created and understood?

When talking about the psychological background of metaphorical extension the question of how metaphors are construed and understood is essential. Another question to be answered is what makes them work. Miller (1979:367) writes about the

relationship between images and metaphors. He suggests that *metaphor* presents *an apperceptive problem,* which he describes the following way:

> A metaphor that is literally false of the real world can still be added to our image and used to constrain our model, but it creates a tension between our conception of the real world and our conception of the world that the author had in mind. In order to be able to make as much use as possible of what we know about similar situations in the real world. we trv to svnthesize a textual such a way that its truth conflicts as little as possible with our conception of the real world.

I assume that an expression of the kind 'He is quite boring' used when talking about invitations to a party might also suggest that he should not be invited. Glucksberg and Keysar (1979:401-424) illustrate difficulties arising when "fresh" metaphors are used. They point out that the metaphor *"all marriages are iceboxes"* causes interpretative problems on account of the fact that "there are no readily apparent properties of the vehicle *iceboxes* that are unambiguously relevant to and informative about the metaphor topic, *all marriages.* I assume that certain features may, however, overlap between the Source domain and the Target domain; iceboxes are fully bounded containers (container metaphor) which can constrain free motion, and cold temperature may also become prevalent in marriage just like in an icebox.

Zemach (1994:251) mentions a few examples for *bad, good* and *indifferent*

metaphors. He points out that it is *a bad metaphor* to regard people as crocodiles because we do not find it illuminating. On the other hand, we tend to see people as the realizations of basic figures, so in a sense it is *true* that a man's wife is his mother.

Indifferent metaphors are the ones that reveal a plain truth, and thus he suggests that the metaphor that we daily live is paradoxically called a 'dead metaphor'. I think that Zemach is right in pointing out the inadequacy of the metaphor including crocodiles, for the simple reason that basically none of the external features it has can be matched with that of a human in terms of typicality (behavior, hard skin, slippery body, short lzgs to wobble along on, bulging eyes, razor-sharp teeth, cold body temperature etc.). As far as their habits are concerned; ambushing preys, staying under water for most of the day etc., they only provide information about an extremely bizarre human character. Even if some of them do, there are better examples to rely on, like a vulture for preying on animals etc.

2.5.3 The role of images in metaphorization

Conventional images seem to play a very important role in the conceptualization of metaphors. They facilitate the process of language acquisition by making it easier to learn and remember idioms. They are actually key factors by changing what can be called spatial images into concepts based on them. This cognitive process has led to the stage of development English and probably many other languages have gone through: metaphorization.

One of the seven functions children's language has is the *imaginative* one in Halliday's analysis (quoted in Clark, 1972194:26). Halliday explains that in the imaginative function, a child may use language to create a world of his or her own, to use it as a toy, while making amusing combinations of sounds and words. Images appear in the human brain when one creates or can hear metaphors.

> Lakoff examines the idiom *spill the beans* in terms of image creation. Though the metaphorical process results in the concept of 'giving away information, deliberately or unintentionally' (definition from the Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English), Lakoff (1987:449) concludes that most speakers have a conscious vivid image associated with the idiom. The creation of images is based on perception and the experience of bodily sensation. In determining relations between entities relation words are crucial, even more so because they have their adjoining conceptual system malting up part of idiomatic language. The importancx of cognitive relations is corroborated by Indurirhya (1994:132), who says the following about the relationship of imagery and the conceptual world created in poetry:
>
> When reading Boland's poem, one imagines the experience being described in the poem, and the description of the poem (the concept network) forms a cognitive relation with this imagined experience.

The author adds that while some of the concepts are interpreted conventionally in the context of the imagined experience other concepts cannot be interpreted so.

Carroll (1994:190) compares *visual metaphors* with *verbal metaphors.* She suggests that *visual metaphors* are a subclass of visual images i.e. symbols whose elements are recognized perceptually. There is a striking *structural analogy* between them:

> where verbal metaphors are frequently advanced via grammatical structures that appear to portend identity - such as the "is" of identity or apposition - visual metaphors use pictorial or otherwise visual devices that suggest identity in order to encourage metaphorical insight in viewers.

2.5.4 Varieties of metaphor

Apart from the fact that metaphor is present in almost all layers of language, it shows an incredible variety in composing the conceptual system of figurative language. Below are given some of the main types of metaphors which are vitally important in constructing idiomatic concepts.

2.5.4.1 Orientational metaphors

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) give a thorough analysis of orientational metaphors, or *structural metaphors* as they call them. These metaphors are based on *spatial orientation* (see Section 3.4) like *up-down, in-out* (therefore they partly include *container metaphors), front-back, on-off, deep-shallow* and *central peripheral.*

'He is *lagging behind',* for example, can, to some extent, be contrasted with 'He's *ahead of* the others. Both are based on the metaphor PROGRESS IS MOTION. Other phrases

seem to corroborate this notion as well: 'He is *leading'* 'He is *behind* times'. 'She is in *high spirits'* can also be compared with 'She *is in low spirits'.* The former is based on the metaphor HAPPY is UP, while the latter on SAD is DOWN.

2.5.4.2 Ontological metaphors

As was pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the experience of humans with physical objects gave rise to quite a variety of ontological metaphors. They point out that ontological metaphors are necessary for attempting to deal rationally with human experiences as well. Some of the examples analyzed by them include: *referring, quantifying, identifying aspects, identifying causes, setting goals and motivating actions,* THE MIND IS A MACHINE, THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT etc.

Ontological metaphors (ibid:25-33) include *container metaphors,* which are again based on our bodily experiences. We conceive of ourselves as containers with in-out orientation as the following examples illustrate: 'Put it *into* your mouth', 'Spit it *out'* 'The arrow went deep *into* his body' etc. In our surroundings we apply the same orientation for moving *into* buildings and coming *out of* them etc. Even *the visual field, events, actions, activities, and states* (ibid: 30-32) are based on the notion of *containment.*

2.5.4.3 The conduit metaphor

Based on orientational metaphors our communication contains a variety of

expressions related to either containment or other ways of orientation as is suggested by Reddy (1979:164-201). He says that the overwhelming majority of expressions connected with communication apply the notion of containment, and that words have " insides" and "outsides" as his examples illustrate it:

1/ That *thought is* in practically every other *word*

2/ The *sentence wns filled with emotion*

3/ The *lines* may rhyme, but *they are empty* of both *meaning* and *feeling*

4/ Your *words are hollow* - you don't mean them.

2.5.4.4 Conceptual metaphors

Conduit metaphors reflect, as Radden (1991:14) suggests *a naive conceptual model.* The experiential basis of human thinking provides a coherent system of concepts. Several parts of the conceptual framework that have been elaborated demonstrate that spatial metaphors may serve as underlying structures of concepts. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:56) point out:

> The prime candidates for concepts that are understood directly are the simple spatial concepts, such as UP. Our spatial concept UP arises out of our spatial experience. We have bodies and we stand erect. Almost every movement we make involves a motor program that either changes our UP-DOWN orientation, maintains it, presupposes it, or takes it into account some way.

Our constant physical activity in the world, even when we sleep, makes up-down orientation not merely relevant to our physical activity but centrally relevant.

How our conceptual system is groúnded is illustrated by Kövecses (1990) through analyzing *emotion concepts.* He (ibid:33-41) suggests that conceptual metaphors take us from the domain. of concrete notions to the target domain of abstract concepts. Though not many of his examples contain spatial elements they can also facilitate building up a conceptual framework. An example may be the Anger is Heat metaphor (ibid:53):

You make *my blood boil.*

Simmer down!

I had reached the *boiling point.*

Let him *stew!*

As is shown by the examples, emotional concepts may have both underlying *container metaphors* and *orientational metaphors.* This is explained by the fact that emotions which are based on bodily sensation are conceived of as if they filled a container. Once emotions have filled an imagery container they tend to produce pressure on it one way or another. Thus the interrelatedness of spatiality and its metaphorical projection is clearly proved.

2.5.5. Social and cultural aspects of metaphors

The use of metaphors is based on the cultural values which are regarded as standard by members of a society. The two extremes; good and bad, for example, represent two opposite values. While both *more* and *better* are UP, Lakoff and Johnson (1980:23) note that among the values generally accepted by the society certain values have priority over the others; just as it is the case with MORE IS UP over GOOD IS UP. This is demonstrated by the examples "Inflation is rising" and "I'he crime rate is gong up».

As culture is tightly connected with society and the environment humans live in, it is preconditioned by social coexistence and the permanent refinement of language carried out by the members of a smaller or bigger community. The reasons for *semantic change* are explained by McMahon (1994:185):

> Semantic change is frequently *socially conditioned,* and crucially involves language use; thus, the meaning of a word alters because one sense is favoured and another disfavoured in a particular context.

I assume that the fact that varieties are used by people of various social statuses and cultural and educational levels does not hinder language from developing, but, much rather it promotes language development. In this process new lexical items are accepted or discarded, so language changes in a dynamic and permanent way.

The interrelatedness of the conceptual world and culture seems obvious. Human cognition utilizes schemata of the physical world to structure the conceptual world

While being exposed to a variety of cultural interactions. Turner (1991:21) finds that cognition and culture go hand-in-hand in facilitating the understanding of the conceptual world:

> There is an underlying tradition in cognitive linguistics of analyzing conceptual schemas and their role in language. Much of this analysis concerns how we understand linguistic expressions, fixed or otherwise, by reference to conceptual schemas and conceptual cultural models. In such analysis, the cognitive and cultural go hand-in-hand. Cognitive linguists have produced detailed analyses of basic instruments of understanding - such as our knowledge of force dynamics - and the ways those instruments underlie various patterns in fixed and novel expression.

Summary

In sum, metaphor is the most pervasive device of meaning extension. It is deemed.essential to cognitive development (Langacker 1999:3). Similarly to metonymy metaphor emerges owing to the relationship of one entity to another. The human conceptual system is metaphorical in nature, and metaphors are based on social and cultural factors as a result of the interactions of language users. It has been suggested that language is refined through these interactions where language users keep creating new lexical items while discarding some of the others used before.

2.6 Literal vs. figurative language

Literal language used to be regarded different from figurative language in the 1970s and before. Rumelhart (1979:71-82) e.g. makes a distinction between *literal meaning* and *figurative meaning.* He separates *figurative language use* from *traditional* language use while admitting that the distinction between literal and conveyed meanings is not as strong as it was generally assumed to be by other scholars. Following Grice's (1975) assumptions about language that it is comprehended through the literal meaning, and that figurative meaning comes through only when some rules of conversation are violated, he says (ibid:82) that a statement is literally true when we find an existing schema that accounts fully for the data in question. Searle (1979:85) suggests that before trying to explain how metaphorical utterances work we need to analyze the way literal ones work. Sadock (1979:42-58) presumes (in keeping with Grice's theory of *maxim of relation* (quoted in Malmkjaer, 1991:355) that some additional processing is needed when literal meaning is nonsensical or violates some rule of conversation. Sadock (ibid:42) suggests that the underlying principles governing

metaphor are of a general psychological nature and aré thus not specifically linguistic. He says:

> When the literal sense of an uttered monologue , sentence, phrase, or word is in apparent conflict
>
> with the cooperative principle - by seeming to be irrelevant, false or lacking in justification - the
>
> hearer is forced to seek a figurative, but cooperative, intent behind the utterance.

Contrary to what Grice (197) and his followers believed, *cognitive linguistics rejects the distinction between literal and figurative language* (Langacker, 1987:5) when saying that imagery and metaphor are not peripheral aspects of our mental life, but one of its important constituents. Linguistic investigation is focussed on analyzing the nature of meaning on a linguistic basis. What would language be without figurative utterances, if the human mind only had to understand language in the ready-made format offered by literal ones? As Langacker (1987:1) says:

> if figurative language were systematically eliminated from our database, little if any data would
>
> remain.

As was pointed out at the beginning of this section, literal language has been

thoroughly analyzed by mainstream linguists on account of its predictability and neglect of other equally essential components of language like that of figurative language. The reason for this maltreatment seemed that the latter was presumed to be unsystematic and unpredictable, which was justified through the devices of traditional linguistic processing.

Autonomous syntax is at odds with processing figurative language, an important constituent of language. It is truth-value semantics that is accepted and applied in autonomous syntax. Langacker (1987:40) suggests that the truth-value account of meaning makes it plausible to derive sentence pairs like *He sent a letter to Susan* and *He sent Susan a letter* from the same source, ignoring the semantic contribution of grammatical morphemes and syntactic constructions. He suggests that the two approaches cannot be regarded as alternate accounts of the same data. The failure of truth-value semantics makes it unacceptable in cognitive semantics. Truth value semantics was developed by Montague (1974) in his Formal Philosophy. He believed that there was a one-to-one correspondence between syntactic rules and semantic rules (Malmkjaer, 1991:312), an idea he elaborated in what is referred to now as his Montague Semantics. Malmkjaer (1991:136) defines the truth conditional theory as the idea that the meanings of sentences are linked to their truth conditions, which means that we understand a sentence when we know what would have to be the case for it to be true.

Before the semantic principles of cognitive grammar were accepted there had been a number of Objectivist theories applied in linguistics. One of them was Frege's theory (1892/1977: 21-41- see Malinkjaer, ibid:72)), who, in quest of purely objectivist meaning, distinguished "sense (Sinn) and "reference" (Bedeutung). Johnson

(1987:•cX.yxxxi) says that in Frege's terminology, *a sign* (such as a word) has a public meaning, its *sense, by* means of which it picks out *a reference.* Lakoff concludes:

> One centrally important consequence of Frege's rigid separation of the sense and reference of a
>
> sign from any "associated ideas" is that the reference relation of a sign to things in the world is
>
> completely objective.

Frege's treatment of meaning as if it was separable from bodily experience, imagination and the interaction between a human being and its envirorirnent is totally unacceptable just like truth-value semantics.

Another important element of the cognitive approach is the use of image schematic structures (see Section 2.2). Johnson (1987:134) refers to the role of these structures when quoting several examples containing the verb "open" from Searle They are the following ones:

(1) Tom opened the door.

(2) Sally opened her eyes.

(3) The carpenters opened the wall.

(4) Sam opened his book to page 37.

(5) The surgeon opened the wound.

(6) The chairman opened the meeting.

(7) The artillery opened fire.

(8) Bill opened a restaurant.

(9) Bill opened the mountain.

(10) Sally opened the grass. (The mowed, not the smoked, type.)

(1l) Sam opened the sun.

Searle suggests that the first five sentences have the same literal sense of "open", but the same semantic content is understood differently due to the different Background called up for each. Sentences (6)-(8) are said to have *three different literal senses*. Sentences (9)-(11) are grammatically correct but do not make sense because they call up no relevant Background. Johnson rejects Searle's semantic analysis, and says that he would analyze his cases of "open" as parallel in kind to other cases of image-schematic structures tied to spatial orientation and manipulation of objects (cases such as that of *in-out* orientation). He adds that he would analyze Searle's examples (1)-(8) as

instances of an OPEN schema that is extended and metaphorically elaborated to constitute *a web of related senses* of "open".

His explanation is justified by the fact that image schemata offer us insight into how various domains are related to each other. They can do so by virtue of the fact that they preserve the structural features of spatial configurations even when utterances have been extended from the SPATIAL into the ABSTRACT DOMAIN.

Schematicity is closely related to categorization. It is important in grammatical *composition* (cf. Pelyvás, 199:38), (viewed by Langacker as identical with *categorization,* cf. Langacker 198 7:466ff) where one component structure elaborates a schematically given salient substructure *(e.g. trajector* or *landmark)* of another through the relationship of correspondence.

Conceptualization, an important factor for the description of,figurative language, is closely linked to sanctioning. Pelyvás (ibid:37) points out that *full sanction* is established by the relation of *identity. Partial sanction* occurs when there is no identity between the properties of the sanctioning structure and those of the target structure. Partial sanction is, for example, when a person is referred to as *a pig,* or when the *estuary* of a river is referred to as its *mouth.* Polysemy and metaphor derive from partial sanction and interrelated meanings are brought about without which the isolated lexical elements of a language would be unleamable- he adds.

Now we understand that the use of directly meaningful image schemata, based

on bodily experience, is extended in the process of metaphorization to result in partial

sanction. This process leads to preserving structures (or relationships) which are described in the Invariance Hypothesis developed by Lakoff (1990) and Turner (1990),

an Important theory in the investigation of metaphorical mappings. It is interpreted by Newman (1996:134) the following way:

> This hypothesis holds that metaphorical mappings preserve all (in a "strong" version) or some (in a "weak" version) of the cognitive topology of the source domain. This hypothesis, at least in its

strongest version, makes interesting claims about how the metaphorical mapping takes place.

Looking at some examples of meaning extension, we may examine an utterance of idiomatic nature like 'Peter has *fallen head over heels in love with* Mary'. Though it seems difficult to decode, it is clear that the metaphorical extension of a simple spatial image suggests the loss of control over thinking *(head),* which schematically elaborates the preposition *over.* It is interesting to observe how the same idea is expressed in Hungarian *through the container metaphor:* beleszeret, *beleesik,* belebolondul; each suggesting loss of your own control by reason of the fact that you are restricted in acting on your own by boundedness. At the same time, both languages evoke what can in another context be regarded as spatial description: *Falling in love* = Hung.: *Szerelembe esni,* which confirms the idea of lack of control (when you are falling, you are helpless).

We are already on the borderline between the spatial and figurative domains,

and are only pushed through to the latter once a metaphorical transfer has come about. The question is what semantic changes occur when the lexicon is metaphorically extended, as a result of cultural, social, historical or other forms of language development.

Part of the complexity of reasons is shown by what Quirk et al (1985:8) say:

When an Australian speaks of *fossicking* something out ['searching for something'], the metaphor looks back to the desperate activity of reworking the diggings of someone else in the hope of finding gold that had been

overlooked. When an American speaks of *not getting to first base* [not achieving even initial success'], the metaphor concerns an equally culture specific activity - the game of baseball. And when an Englishman says that something is *not cricket,* ['unfair'], the allusion is also to a game that is by no means universal in the English-speaking countries.

Figurative utterances, therefore, may be based on earlier exemplars of cultural and other phenomena carrying certain meanings, ones that are apt to be extended to abstract notions which can be associated with them. The analysis of figurative language reveals the foundations serving as pivotal building blocks in their formation (i.e. spatial elements), though later on they are unnoticed or not regarded as ones anything to do with one utterance or another. It is natural that not all elements constitutive in the formation of figurative utterances can be collected, but they are still relevant in the composition of vocabulary.

The systematicity of language changes is a fact that can be proved through a historical review showing that alterations occurring in language are not of sporadic nature but they appear to massively penetrate one or another item in an effective way. The primarily primitive expression of emotion shown in an early part of human development must have gone through a long period of development until it was no longer only tangible things that language could denote, but, eventually spatial configurations based on bodily experience became the foundations of figurative ones. These changes are certainly not only typical of the early stages of human development, but they have been going on ever since language was first used and are motivated by social, cultural and other changes. Language and abstract thinking must have developed simultaneously to lead to the current stage of language development.

In the process of the enlargement of the lexicon through metonymic transfer or metaphorical extension *entrenchment* was of great importance in consolidating the use of lexical items in a language. Every novel expression is compositional first, and obtains non-compositional elements in the process of entrenchment. Langacker (1987:59) defines the concept of *entrenchment* as follows:

> It is also important to recognize that automatization is a matter of degree. In distinguishing notationally between units and nonunits, I imply neither a sharp dichotomy nor homogeneity among the structures in either group. Linguistic structures are more realistically conceived as falling along a continuous scale of entrenchment in cognitive organization. Every use of a structure has a positive impact on its degree of entrenchment, whereas extended periods of disuse have a negative impact. With repeated use, a novel structure becomes progressively entrenched, to of occurrence *(driven,* for example, is more entrenched than *thriven).*

Summary

Literal language considered to be distinct from figurative language has been analyzed by mainstream linguists on account of its being systematic and predictable. Analyses were only partly extended to figurative language while the conceptual structure of idiomatic language was ignored. It was, obviously, not only the unsystematic nature of figurative language that was supposed by grammarians to hinder a thorough linguistic treatment, but also the insufficiency of the devices applicable which blocked proper analysis. The relative novelty of cognitive grammar and its flexible principles make it possible for an observer to examine linguistic data as components of the development of

natural language. Representatives of cognitive grammar question the clear separation of literal language from figurative. They argue that there are virtually no expressions which can be considered strictly literal in meaning.

2.7 Prototype theory

It is generally accepted that entities supposed to belong to one category are not equally typical representations. Some of them may exhibit features that are more typical and generally describe what can be associated with membership. Brugman (1983:4) explains what the relationship between the members of a category located closer or farther from a prototype is like as follows:

> Since noncentral members of a category possess membership relative to how many of how important the characteristics possessed, some objects belong to the category to some degree but
>
> bear little resemblance to other noncentral members.

This definition concerns mainly the relationship between the members of a prototypical classification. It should be noted that, depending on how many or how important features they share with the prototype, they are closer or farther from it, but, they are, on the whole, related not only to the prototype but to each other as well. Category membership, as it can be seen from Brugman's definition is not always a matter of yes and no distinction. Rather than that, it depends on degrees of typicality which can be extended not only to tangible examples like the ones given in Ungerer & Schmidt, (1996:13) based on Rosch (1981) ranking birds from *robin* to *bat* to find a prototype of

BIRD), but to ahstract ones as well (even to the prototypical meanings of adverbial particles). Rosch's examples show that some categories of lexical items are open-ended. In the category weapon, for example, "gun" is the most typical example, whereas shoes are the least typical. .

Adverbial particles do not offer such a big variety, of course, but they can also

be classified in terms of more vs. less typical senses. This assumption is based on what Lakoff (1987:5) says about meaning being frequently prototype-based rather than composed of checklists of features as is suggested by the classical approach.

Langacker (1987:492) describes prototype from another perspective. In the glossary of his book he points out its crucial features in the following way:

> That unit in a schematic network which is naturally *most salient,* most often *thought of, most likely to be chosen as representative* of the category. In a generalized sense, the term is also adopted for the standard in a categorizing relationship based on extension rather than schematicity.

If we take a whale, for example, which is a mammal, we shall probably not

classify it as the most typical mammal on the earth. Most animals belonging to this group have legs, (not fins), are hairy, and live on land. They have teeth, they are viviparous and breast-feed their cubs. There must be other necessary traits animals would also define the membership of this category in a similar way. One may argue, of course, that it is impossible to find the most prototypical animal in the group of mammals, and that there may be different opinions concerning the most typical member. On the one hand, I suppose that biologists have classifications of this kind

and, on the other hand, a comparison of mammals, in general, would place one member closer while others farther from the traits characterizing the prototype.

Lyons (1995:96-7) suggests that speakers of a language operate with *prototypes,* which means that some lexical items "fall within the *nuclear extension* or *focal extension"* of the category, while others do not.

The cognitive work of selecting more typical entities by comparing the features they have is a natural process of argumentation that we experience in specific situations in our everyday lives. We may disagree as to which animal can be considered a prototype in the group of mammals, but surely, almost all people would agree that the whale is one of the most atypical ones. In fact, it might mislead many people who do not even have basic knowledge of biology, and they might classify it as a fish (not without any reason) on the basis of its habitat, shape, limbs, food etc. In describing prototypes we need to define the concept of categorization, which can be applied to determine the items linked up to the prototype on the basis of their partly shared properties.

Smith (1995:16) outlines some of the results of *categorization* in his paper

entitled: *Concepts and Categorization:*

1. The *representations of* the *target category* and test item are permanently stored in long term memory, but once activated they *also become part of working memory,* where all subsequent processing ensues.

2. An item will be *categorized* as an instance of a category if and only if its representation exceeds some *criteria! level of similarity* to the concept associated with that category.

3. The *time needed* to determine that an item exceeds this criteria! level of similarity is *less themore the item is similar to the concept.*

Entities resembling the most typical one can be found farther from it on an imagery network linking nodes representing all the items which are parts of the semantic network. This fact, however, is not a result of a merely arbitrary decision, but that of the number of features they share with other members of the category and the prototype. In other words, membership depends on the features shared within prototype-hierarchy and on the ones missing that might 'upgrade' a member to a higher level of typicality. In analyzing semantic networks *neural network modelling,* or alternatively called *parallel distributed processing* (PDP), or *connectionism* (described in Langacker, 1991:525), a conception that draws its metaphorical inspiration from the brain is of primary importance. PDP can be used in a variety of ways (see Langacker, ibid:536) like *handling structured conceptualizations, analyzability, metaphorical structuring,* elaborate correspondences between elements of different *mental spaces,* and it must accommodate to dimensions of *conventional imagery* (or *construal*). It is aimed at examining the nature of mental representations, and is called by Langacker (ibid:526) "neurally inspired". It may prove useful by handling categorization effectively and (as Langacker points out, ibid:528) by being capable of giving rise to prototype effects.

Prototype semantics, as its name suggests, is based on semantic analysis that incorporates entities closely or loosely linked to each other. Typicality, as we could see above, is a matter of how many features a member shares with the prototype (and thereby how close it is to that) and how important they are. The members of the category make up a network connecting every single entity to the prototype by virtue of

the fact that they share certain features with it either to a greater or a lesser extent. Radden (1991:10) calls the *prototype a* certain *reference point:*

> The prototype stands out as the *best, clearest* and *most salient examplar* among the members of
>
> a category and serves as a kind of *cognitive reference point* with respect to which the
>
> surrounding, poorer' instances of the category are defined and processed. In this category it is obviously the most typical example, the prototype that is regarded as a reference point while
>
> atypicality does not serve as a basis of any kind of classification at all.

Prototype theory is a unidirectional approach in the sense that the reference point of the measure of membership is solely limited to the prototype itself. Other members do not serve as the most salient example of the category and, therefore, they are not indicative of the grade of membership.

One might ask the question why I have expounded all this about prototypes and whales as this paper is not part of a biological experiment that could lead to conclusions of any kind on species or any other questions concerning biology. I think, however, that prototype semantics can provide access to not only tangible entities which are part of our habitat and ones whose traits can be. identified visually but also to the abstract domain, where the features of entities are somewhat less tangible and need firm argumentation for demonstrating a hierarchy of the kind outlined above. That it can be

extended to figurative language and relation words as well will hopefully become clear in Section 5.3 of this paper as an example for the statement above may concern the use and system of relation words like particles. Most particles are deeply rooted in spatial use on which abstract applications are based.

It is also exciting and challenging to discover where figurative language comes from. If we assume that the meanings of figurative expressions are related to each other one way or another, especially in terms of particle meaning to be treated in Sections 3.2.7-3.2.8, and accepting that there is a coherent system of particle meaning, it is not at all a far-fetched idea that prototypical instances serve as foundations of abstract notions as well. Linguistic automatism, a result of the process of entrenchment most figurative expressions have gone through, makes us forget what the original motivation of their creation was but it needs to be clarified as part of the need natural-language analysis has created. Thus prototypicality has become a vital component of processing the data available, one that has managed to offer us a clear view of how language functions and human thinking works.

Summary

Prototype theory, an important component of cognitive semantics, offers a comprehensive view of how items of natural language sharing features can be classified in terms of overlapping with the most salient member of the category. An exclusionary condition of membership might be the absence of any features shared with the prototype and other members of the category.

Another phenomenon that natural-language processing can rely on is the *frequent occurence of polysemous relations* (see Section 2.9) exhibited by lexical items to a greater or smaller extent. Polysemy and prototype theory are closely related to each other. Prototypicality is essential in the structuring of sense relations between lexical items. Polysemous relations largely pervade language and exclude allegations concerning the "incoherence" of idiomatic expressions which are part of figurative language. I presume that though polysemy is less palpable in the ABSTRACT DOMAIN it can be examined successfully with the tools of cognitive semantics. It is important to remember what Hudson (1984:39-40) suggests concerning prototype:

> For one thing, those who discuss prototypes include some people who believe that some concepts are prototypes, and others are not, the difference being flected in the internal structures of the concepts concerned. In contrast, for me entities all have the same status in this respect, and the Yuzziness' of a prototype-based concept lies not in its internal structure but rather in the deviations which the world allows between it and its instances.

2.8 Meaning, Sense and Sense Relations

Traditional approaches to grammar distinguish *denotation, sense* and *reference* from each other. This dissertation is rather aimed at clarifying how *sense* and *meaning* differ.

Before cognitive linguistics had taken root the idea of related senses linking up the members of a category to the prototype was not known. Ziff (1960:180) gives a brief description of what *sense* is:

> To talk of the sense of a word is, as it were, to talk of the word *branching off* in a certain
>
> direction.

Lyons (1977:317) suggests that the term *sense* is used by many philosophers for what others would describe as their meaning, but, perhaps in a more narrow sense, "as their *cognitive* or *descriptive* meaning." In Lyons' words (ibid):

> In so far as componential analysis is associated with conceptualism, the sense-components (for
>
> which there is no generally accepted term) may be thought of as atomic, and the senses of
>
> particular lexemes as molecular concepts.

Amold (1986) differentiates a variety of meanings such as: *contextual, denotative, connotative, literal, figurative, grammatical, lexical* and *lexico-grammatical.*

She (ibid:l6) describes *lexico-grammatical meaning* by saying:

> Words seldom occur in isolation. They are arranged in certain patterns conveying the *relations*

> *between the things* for which they stand, therefore alongside with their lexical meaning they
>
> possess some grammatical meaning.

She (ibid) describes *lexical meaning* as follows:

> The lexical meaning of the word can be defined as the realization or naming of a notion, emotion
>
> or object by means of a definite language system subject to the influence of grammar and vocabulary peculiarities of that language.

Literal meaning refers to an entity without paralleling it with another one, while the *meaning* is *figurative* when the object is named and at the same time characterized through its similarity with another object. The distinction between the two meanings mentioned above are distinct from each other only in *denotative/lexical* meaning.

She calls (1986:54) *contextual meaning* as "the lexical meaning of a word in speech"; while *denotative meaning* "conceptualizes and classifies our experience and names for the listener concerning some objects spoken about". *Connotative meaning* reveals "the pragmatic, communicative value the word receives by virtue of where, when, how, by whom, for what purpose and in what contexts it is or may be used".

When examining how entities are related to each other at a deeper level we need to analyze how *senses* of an entity are interrelated with each other, what prototypical features are present in all the related senses, and how the basic sense is extended to other domains *metaphorically.*

Hurford and Heasley (1983:28-33) call a sense of an expression its place in a system of semantic relationships with other expressions in the language. They also define the sense of an expression as "its indispensable hard core of meaning" or "the sum of its sense properties and sense relations with other expressions." Cann (1993:217) defines the role of senses in a similar way, by saying that the notion of sense is to be defined in terms of the different sense relations that hold between lexemes in a language.

As opposed to the view above Brugman's research (1983:3) is based on the assumption that polysemes have primary senses' which are extended to non-primary ones. She says that there is one higher level category *over* which is comprised of all senses named by the word *over,* and each sense is a lower level category, some of which are central members of the higher category BUT ALL OF WHICH ARE NEVERTHELESS FULL MEMBERS.

She (ibid:71) suggests that *sense relations* are vital for the examination of *polysemy:*

> And given a sentence containing *over,* we can to a certain extent identify that occurrence of *over* as an instance of some category of sense, just as we can identify crimson as a kind of red.

The senses of adverb particles also reveal an amazing variety, even if they are used iin different domains. This can be demonstrated through image schemata which may offer an explanation to whether entities in different kinds of domains are structurally similar or not.

We need to distinguish from each other therefore *the lexical meaning* of a word and the sense-relations that facilitate the systematic formation of vocabulary, to see how senses and polysemy are related to each other, and what role they play in extending the lexicon. It is also important to note that if the systematization of particle senses becomes possible through establishing sense relations between them it might be easier to classify phrasal verbs so that they can be more easily learnt by language learners. Langacker (1999:4) also refers to polysemy by pointing out that related senses have varying degrees of *entrenchment,* and they are of great importance in the *metaphorical extension* from *a prototypical value:*

> Returning now to lexicon, we can first observe that a typical lexical item represents *a compler category:* it does not have just one meaning, but a variety of related senses with varying degrees of entrenchment. These senses comprise *a network,* being linked by *categorizing relationships,* which are of two basic sorts. First, some senses arise *by extension* from other, more central values. The term *tree,* for example, is extended metaphorically from its *prototypical* value (tall woody plants to indicate various kinds of branching diagrams. Second, some senses *instantiate* (or *elaborate)* other, more schematic values. For instance, the prototypical and metaphorical senses of *tree* both instantiate the abstract conception of a branchiated entity' (this is the image-schematic commonality which motivates the metaphorical extension in the first place).

Related senses, as we can see, are vitally important in the process of conceptualization, categorization and in the construal of the lexicon. They break down a lexical category into a complexity of relations, and are essential for polysemy. The role of image schemata in the process of metaphorization is not simply to provide coarse-grained variants of specific entities but also to motivate metaphorical extension, i.e. a shift from the SPATIAL to the ABSTRACT DOMAIN as was pointed out in Section 2.2.

2.9 The Role of Polysemy in Linking Senses of Lexical Items

When analyzing the senses of a word one is faced by the question of how they are related to each other along a polysemous string. Allerton (1979:51) describes polysemy (and homonymy) from the aspect of contextual conditioning:

> A further problem in the identification of morphemes is that of contextual conditioning, homonymy and polysemy. It is clear that many morphemes have a meaning that varies somewhat from context to context: it is only by overlooking these minor differences and abstracting the common core that we can make generalization possible in language.

Cognitive Semantics elaborates the question from a somewhat different perspective. It emphasizes the importance of coherence, and, by doing so, it discards the idea that linguistic units be analyzed without considering the conditions that have

promoted their emergence. Polysemy is ciosely linked with the metaphorical extension of spatial meanings and image schemata that provide a general framework produced by imagery.

Lyons (1995:59) talks about the relationship between polysemy and metaphorical analysis:

> One of the principal factors operative in semantic change is metaphorical extension, as when 'foot' meaning "terminal part of a leg" also came to mean 'lowest part of a hill or a mountain.

Johnson (1987:107) highlights the following features of polysemy:

> Some of the strongest evidence for the existence of image schemata and their metaphorical elaborations is the phenomenon of polysemy, by which I mean not just multiple related meanings, *e.g. out,* must etc. have several meanings, just because there exists an *underlying image schema* that is *metaphorically extended,* typically from the physical domain to a non-physical of more abstract domain.

Lakoff (1987:12) seems to agree with Johnson by and large when saying about polysemy:

> Polysemy as categorization: The idea that *related meanings of words form categories* and that the meanings bear family resemblance.

Brugman (1983:1) points out that *polysemy* and *functional shift* are *related* to each other. Polysemy means that a lexical item and its meanings are linked to each other. Functional shift, however, means that a lexical item may belong to different lexical categories, and the meanings are still related to each other:

> It will be demonstrated that all nonprepositional uses of *over* are derived from one or another sense of the prepositon. This is an interesting process, of which I have largely ignored the internal structure, but the importance of functional shift must be recognized, since semantic shift can result from the new syntactic environment precipitated by a functional shift.

Goldberg (1995:31) also highlights the importance of related senses in semantic analysis:

> Constructions are typically associated with a family of closely related sense rather than a single, fixed abstract sense. Given the fact that no strict division between syntax and the lexicon is assumed, this polysemy is expected, since morphological polysemy has been shown to be the norm in study after study.

The meanings of prepositions (discussed in Section 3.2), are closely related to those of adverbials. It must be noted, at the same time, however, that apart from a few syntactic incongruities between certain prepositions and adverbial particles they are hard to tell apart unless the latter develop a variety of conceptual frameworks. Schematically, though, they can still be quite closely related to prepositions by virtue of

the fact that they preserve many of the structural features extended from the SPATIAL into the ABSTRACT DOMAIN.

That prepositions and adverbial particles are related to each other semantically was proved by Brugman (1983) as well. It is obvious that polysemy makes up a coherent system of interrelated meanings rather than a diversity of meanings. It is metaphorical extension that is to be examined when one refers to the related meanings of polysemous lexemes linking DOMAINS. Metaphorical creativity (in the broadest sense of 'metaphorical') is part of everyone's linguistic competence. So polysemy is a crucial factor in elaborating figurative language and providing cohesion in it. Polysemous relations can be observed not only in the case of nouns, verbs but with *particles* too, which confirms the assumption that language is logically structured rather than built up out of a variety of interrelated and uninterrelated items.

The polysemy of particles like prepositions is described by Zelinsky-Wibbelt (1993:10) too, for its role in the process of metaphorization:

> Prepositions constitute a lexical category the elements of which are highly polysemous. Not only
>
> dimensionality and shape - determine the respective differences between the same relational expression, but these different *polysemes* are also *exploited by metaphorical and metonymic* ecrensions into abstract target domains so that an increasingly high number of polysemes and increasingly abstract ones are created for the same relational expression.

Indeed, the use of relation words in both spatial and idiomatic expressions

providing structurally similar or even identical image schemata cannot be disregarded. Practical details of polysemous relations will be expounded in Chapter 3 of this paper concerning *elements of figurative language* viewed in different domains such as SPATIAL, ABSTRACT etc., as a result of the metaphorical extension of meaning structures.

Summary

Polysemy, observable in natural language, reveals patterns of related meanings for a given word. As a result of the iconic character of polysemy the meaning structures of a language are construed economically whereby existing semantic designations are extended to other areas of the conceptual system. Polysemous relations can come about in the case of most lexical units whose sense can be extended semantically. Polysemy is a consequence of metaphorization, and thereby of the extension of lexicon. Once abstract relations are broken down into schematic features, however, they exhibit similarity with ones in the SPATIAL DOMAIN. Metaphors and metonymies are equally important in the extension of lexicon. Both tools are constitutive in figurative . language on the common grounds that they apply formerly created schemata of human thinking in the processing of imagery.

Conclusion

Cognitive semantics does not offer an updated system of mainstream linguistics, but a completely new approach to language. The analysis of natural

language accounts for all the factors that have promoted its formation, and it does not ignore areas of language analysis on account of having inadequate tools.

The analysis of figurative language carried out by cognitive grammarians is based on the observation that spatial meanings are metonymically and metaphorically extended to gain a variety of meanings. Some factors that play a crucial role in the process are prototype semantics, polysemy and schematic conversion of spatial images.

This new approach is justified by the results of research which seem to prove that metaphorical thinking is a concomitant factor in the lives of humans since their early childhood. Cognitive semantics does not discard expressions as unanalyzable, but it offers a non-compositional approach. The lexicon is now thought to contain more interrelated lexical items than before on account of the related senses that seem to exist between figurative expressions which used to be ignored. Understanding language functioning in a different way opens up new ways of analysis.

3. FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE

Habitual co-occurrence of lexical items can be observed with a variety of expressions. Firth (1957:197) refers to the *collocational level* of analysis, which, he says, is between the situational and the grammatical. He mentions, for example, that "one of the meanings of 'night' is its collocability with 'dark' and 'dark', of course, collocates with 'night' ". Though his explanation of what collocability is, is not crystal-clear he, at least, highlights the importance of defining and analyzing collocability. It is to be noted at the same time that syntagmatic relations can often be *replaced with a single lexeme* as the example given by Lyons (1977:262) shows. The English verb 'kick' is translated as 'dormer un coup de pied' into French, i.e. 'stiilce with the foot'.

This unit is primarily focussed on idiomatic *word compounds* which, in many cases, owe their existence to spatial expressions. The term *word compound* is considered by the majority of linguists a kind of cover term for the simple reason that it includes a variety of expressions whose components are bonded together. *Phrasal verbs, collocations, idioms* and *metaphors* can all be classified under this heading.

The diversity of word combinations in English do not simply make up strings of lexical items, but they are functioning units complying with rules of selectional restriction etc. Even the names of word-combinations differ from writer to writer. Zgusta (1971) uses 'combinations of words' Becker (1975) calls it a 'lexical phrase', Alexander (1978, 1979), Carter (1997) and Moon (1998) use the term 'fixed expression'. Glaser (1988) favours 'phraseological unit', used in a broad sense to allow sentence-length units, such as proverbs, to become part of the category. Howarth (1996) disagrees with the rather general term 'fixed expression' and chooses 'word combinations' to also

refer to their property of constituting combinations. He (ibid:25) points out that the term collocation has been used since 1751 to mean 'co-occurrence'.

Howarth {1996) uses the term 'word combinations' for the follo:ving range of expressions: *clichés, composite units, idioms* and *collocations.* He makes a distinction between word combinations by dividing them into *functional expressions* and *composite units.* Both groups include *idiomatic* and *non-idiomatic* expressions.

Moon (1998:2-3) says that *'fixed expressions'* (the term she uses for word combinations) subsume idioms as well. She adds that *phrasal verbs* also show a range of idiomaticity types. It is necessary to define what is meant by *idiomaticity,* since phrasal verbs and collocations can be either non-idiomatic or idiomatic.

Chafe (1968:111-112) criticizes the Bloomfieldian view by saying that transformational-generative grammar cannot handle idioms the right way. Fraser, another representative of the transformational-generative view, (1970:39-42) divides idioms into seven groups based on *transformational frozenness.* He suggests that idioms can be examined on these seven levels. Makkai (1972:Preface) claims that his approach to what idiomaticity is more neo-Bloomfieldian than stratificational. He divides idioms into two goups; *lexemic idioms,* and *sememic idioms.* He defines (ibid:122) the former as follows:

> Lexemic idioms differ from other lexemes (especially monolexonic lexemes, such as *no, yes, who?, hot, dog,* etc.) in that THEY ARE SUBJECT TO A POSSIBLE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING DESPITE FAMILIARIT'Y WITH THE MEANINGS OF THE COMPONENTS, OR TO ERRONEOUS

DECODING; THEY CAN POTENTIALLY MISLEAD THE UNINFORMED LISTENER, OR THEY CAN DISINFORM HIM.

Makkai (ibids:170) points out that *sememic idioms* are what students of literature would call *clichés*. He adds that *every idiorn is a cliché, but not all clichés are idioms.*

Cognitive semantics regards an idiom (Langacker,1987:25) as a complex of conventionalized semantic and symbolic relationships that have formed a configuration. The author says:

> We can plausibly suppose that this con£guration of relationships might be recognizable even when anaphora disrupts the normal shape of an idiom, or when its component words are split up
>
> an idiom may be recognized as a unit that is to some degree independent of a specific overt arrangement, even if one such arrangement is far more familiar and hence more "usual" than the
>
> others.

As was pointed out above, word compounds include *collocations, idioms, phrasal verbs* and even *metaphors.* These elements of figurative language are highly productive in the lexicon. The categories mentioned above demonstrate signs of overlap with each other as it has been suggested above (e.g. phrasal verbs can demonstrate idiomatic sense, not only non-idiomatic; dead metaphors can turn out to have obtained idiomatic meaning through constant use), but the major comprehensive feature is that

they all seem to be collocated one way or another i.e. they constitute complexes, some of which remain unchanged, while others do not.

Certain facets of categorization seem to exclude some elements of the category of collocations based on idiomaticity vs, lack of idiomaticity. Contrary to idioms and metaphors, not all *phrasal verbs* and *collocations* have gone through the process of metaphorization i. e. the extension of spatial senses into figurative ones. In this respect the two groups of word combinations mentioned above differ from each other. The reason why all four elements are discussed in this paper is that collocations and phrasal verbs may contain idiomatically bounded expressions as well, and thus are vital constituents of figurative language.

3.1 Collocations

The components of these syntagmatic relations are attached to each other to a greater or lesser extent. *Collocations* are generally considered *loose or fazed combinations of words* that endure no alterations beyond their scope of variation. Palmer (1933:7) points out the non-compositional characteristics of collocations when he defines them the following way:

> A collocation is a succession of two or more words that must be Ieamt as an integral whole and not pieced together from its component parts.

The *definition* seems to focus on the *educational* rather than syntactic or semantic aspects of word combinations. So there is more to it than the approach outlined above. Noam Chomsky points out (quoted in Benson (ed.) 1986.: Introduction) that *decide on a boat,* -meaning 'choose (to buy) a boat' contains the collocation *decide* on (in his terminology 'a close construction), whereas *decide on a boat,* meaning 'make a decision while on a boat' is a free combination' (in his terminology 'loose association'). The first structure refers to the metaphorically projected location of the decision while the latter implies the location. of the act of deciding (therefore it features the unity of the preposition (having the same semantic meaning as the particle had location) and noun.

Lipka (1992:166) defines collocations *from the viewpoint of lexicology,* rather than semantics, the following way:

> The term designates the co-occurrence or syntagmatic combination of lexical items (or lexemes),
>
> independently of word class and syntactic structure.

Later (ibid) he adds:

> Precisely because of this vagueness and neutrality, the concept of collocation has, in my opinion, certain advantages for capturing syntagmatic relations between lexical elements. This holds for syntagmas both on the syntactic level and on the level of word formation, i.e. compounds and nominalizations.

Apart from the advantage mentioned by Lipka, however, collocations cause great difficulty for language learners by being immensely varied, numerous, and by forcing a non-native speaker to choose between lexical items carrying very subtle differences. The efforts necessary for mastering collocations, however, are later up for by the ease of handling them when they are already part of one's vocabulary.

Though it is rather difficult to decode and classify word combinations there several attempts by linguists to do so. Langacker (1991:3), for example, outlines possibilities of treating parts of the lexicon that seem to be semantically frozen unanalyzable as follows:

> And if *lexicon* comprises the fixed expressions of a language, it subsumes not only morphemes and polymorphemic stems and words, but also thousands of multiword *conventional erpressions* (clichés, idioms, standard collocations etc.) representing usual ways of expressing oneself in a language. The units generally thought of as "grammatical" are more schematic semantically and often phonologically. Schemata interrelating various domains by offering certain simplified ways of semantic approach in cases where human thinking produces a multitude of apparently differing notions prove the systematicity of human cognition whereby we are faced not by a huge set of uninterrelated linguistic expressions, but, rather by ones interrelated and mutually supporting each other at all levels.

3.1.1 Classification of collocations

Opinions differ as to what to consider collocations. Cruse (1986:41) uses the term *collocation* in *a narrow sense,* and says that *it only borders on idiom.* He points out that the example, *foot the bill* is semantically transparent, and *bill* is fairly freely modifiable as in:

I'm expecting to foot the bill.

the electricity bill.

All the bloody bills!

At the same time it is idiom-like in that *foot* (in the relevant sense) demands the presence of a definite lexical partner, and resists interruption as is obvious from:

? I'm expected not only to foot, but also add up, all the bills.

Collocations as was pointed out are closely related to *idioms, phrasal verbs* and even *metaphors.* These elements of figurative language result from the metaphorical extension of spatiality. Certain facets of categorization seem to exclude some elements of the category of collocations: on the basis of idiomaticity vs. non-idiomaticity.

Collocations can be broken down into two major groups; that of *grammatical* and *lerical collocations* as described by Benson in the BBI Combinatory Dictionary of English (1986). The former are phrases consisting of a dominant word (noun, adjective, verb) and a preposition or grammatical structure such as an infinitive or clause. Lexical collocations do not usually contain prepositions, infinitives, or clauses. The analysis I am going to carry out will focus on grammatical collocations, especially the ones containing PARTICLES.

3.1.2 Syntactic features

Some groups of collocations to be analyzed.are as follows (Benson led.), 1986:x-xii):

1/ Noun + particle + noun; *apathy towards*

2/ Preposition +noun; *by accident, in advance*

3/ Adjective + preposition; *angry at* someone,

4/ Verbs allowing the dative movement; He sent the book *to* his brother - He sent his brother the book.

5/ Transitive verbs allowing the dative movement transformatión; They returned the book *to* her.

6/ Transitive verbs + preposition *for* allowing the dative movement transformation. Mary bought a book *for* Tom.

These groups do not include other important groups that are integral parts of my

analysis as well.

Howarth (1996:66) points out that

preposition and noun (e.g. in *advance)*

verb and preposition (e.g. *consist of)*

verb and particle *((e.g. take off)*

may form part of major collocational complexes. For example, the grammatical collocation *due to circumstances* may be most familiar and most frequently observed with an embedded lexical collocation in *due to unforseen circumstances.* The verb + particle combination *take up* could be regarded as either a grammatical collocation or as a unitary verb; *take up a position* could then be viewed either as a complex combination of a grammatical and a lexical collocation:

take up a position

or a simple lexical collocation:

take up a position

Russian phraseologists conceive of free collocations and pure idioms as each other's opposites by reason of the fact that the former are free and transparent while the latter are restricted and opaque. (see Howarth, 1996:33). Restricted collocations are between these two extremes. The framework encompassing collocational expressions, however, is more varied and needs more groups than the ones allowed by the approach above.

It is my aim to examine the behavior of particles in collocations to see what

similarities (or differences) the senses of particles reveal when compared to the ones emerging in phrasal verbs, idioms or metaphors, and how they develop conceptual meanings after a domain shift. I assume that, one way or another, they must be justified by a number of examples proving that spatial expressions serving as sources of extended metaphorical senses reveal signs of schematic similarities to be observed in domain changes.

3.1.3 Semantic features

The question of whether a collocation is figurative in meaning may very often depend on context. Seemingly non-idiomatic utterances can turn out to be idiomatic in meaning when made part of a different scenario. An utterance like *'He would not get off his horse',* for example, can either be part of a spatial configuration or a figurative scenario. The application of an utterance that can so flexibly become part of the *spatial* or *abstract domain* must be based on common grounds. When stripped to the schematic core both reveal a large extent of similarity, if not identity of structural build-up (In the SPATIAL DOMAIN: getting off a horse presupposes high spatial location, while in the ABSTRACT DOMAIN: the UP schema is associated with *high social rank* to be given up to treat people of *lower rank* differently, but it is a conceptual meaning that emerges out of the schematic similarities.

It must be noted, however, that idiomatic expressions, firmly established in the vocabulary do not always need context. The expression *'This* is *a nail in the coffin of the system'* is certainly meant to be a form of evaluation about a political/social etc. system, rather than an undertaker's report about the state of business going on, by virtue of the

fact that a/ the idiom is almost exclusively applied to describe figuratively targeted scenarios, and b/ the possessor is an abstract notion. The formation of an idiom like this is strictly related to the findings of Estill and Kemper (1982) (quoted in Howarth, 1996:54), which show that it takes less time for one to process idioms than non-idiomatic interpretations. This is clearly a result of entrenchment, which makes the processing of the former expressions quicker through constant use.

Collocations can have varying degrees of cohesion. Free collocations can, undoubtedly be exposed to a set of alterations that offer a certain extent of freedom for the speaker to produce a variety of expressions applicable in a wide range of situations.

Cruse (1986:40) says:

> The semantic integrity or cohesion of a collocation is the more marked if the meaning carried by
>
> one (or more) of its constituent elements is highly restricted contextually, and different from its
>
> meaning in more neutral contexts.

He adds that collocations like a *heavy smoker, a* heavy *drug-user,* or the mention

of a car that is *heavy on petrol* share a common concept characterizing the sense of the adjective: "consumption", a pre-requisite of its application in a particular context. Collocations and idioms seem to share some features that make them look alike, as was pointed out earlier. Parts of collocations may require specific words to be included in the phrase, just like idioms. Fraser (1976:29) suggests:

Although they (collocations) display some of the characteristic properties of idioms, bound

collocations are nevertheless, as far as we are concerned, lexically complex.

Semantic restrictions

The semantic restrictions of prepositional phrases are examined by Quirk et al

(1985:1068), who say:

A friend in need as a noun phrase, for example, would mean 'a friend who is in need', whereas *[1= A friend in need* is *a friend indeed]* means '(to be) a friend

when another is in need' *(i.e.* Friendship in a time of need is indeed friendship)

Elsewhere, (ibid 1985:1198) they remark that certain verbal collocations can drop the nouns from them like in *brinJ* (a child) *up healthy, 6ecy* (sth) *cheap* etc. This behaviour of collocations also makes them similar to idioms in that they become more compact than non-idiomatic interpretations tend to be.

Just as *orientational metaphors* offer a conceptual framework of human thinking so do *collocations. 'Down* at heel', for example, refers to poor (i.e. *low* level) circumstances. *'Down* on luck' is associated with ill-luck. 'It's *up* to you' describes the end of an imaginary path leading up to the person to make his decision. 'The house is *up* for an action' gives salience to an entity as the central point of a transaction.

Prepositions play a similar role to that of adverbial particles, but they do not

always create a conceptual background. The simple description *'over* age', is an example for the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN, or we can get into the ABSTRACT DOMAIN in

'The lecturer was *over* their heads' (mentally *superior* and so too difficult to understand), or in 'He went *over* his boss's head' (without permission from someone *superior),* where spatiality is associated with higher rank in a professional hierarchy.

Several other prepositional collocations are connected with abstract notions denoting CONTROL, PRESSURE and AUTHORITY. Higher position of one entity than that of another is presupposed here, and the notions associated with it are enlisted below:

Under /the circumstances/ the law/ lock/ pressure/ repair/ spell/ suspicion/ one's thumb/ the weather, each imply inactivity/ or the inability of the agent to act. Short of metaphorical extension those nouns collocate with the preposition that can be associated with the idea of *control, pressure* and *authority.*

3.1.4 Conclusion

Collocations are a group of complex expressions which may have idiomatic meaning too. The shift from the spatial to the abstract domain implies a shift from the source structure to the target stntcture. In this process more central, prototypical senses are the background from which other senses develop. This change from one domain to another is promoted by "highly abstract conceptions" (in Langacker's words, 1999:3) that are rooted in and emerge from the spatial world. This change in the lexicon occurs as part of natural language development, and the development of notions in one domain into those of another preserves image schematic structures. The particles examined

above reveal similarity with the conceptual framework other elements of the figurative language have and so they offer insight into language structuring. They have a remarkable feature of conveying ideas through different domains when extending physical traits into abstract ones.

The common characteristics linking idiomatic collocations with idioms, idiomatic phrasal verbs or even metaphors is that they all come about in the course of the domain shift and meaning extension described above. The cohesion created by the collocationally associated language items is present in them all, which makes them (except for some metaphors) a kind of readily available set to be used.

3.2 PHRASAL VERBS

Phrasal verbs are generally regarded as opaque, unleamable and unsystematic elements of language by many language learners. Thus they avoid using them and replace them with their single-word synonyms. A new framework for semantic analysis was introduced in cognitive semantics recently by Johnson and Lakoff (1980), Brugman (1983), Langacker (1987), etc. This new approach has encouraged me to examine some aspects of phrasal verbs in this chapter. At the beginning of the analysis I am going to define phrasal verbs (Section 3.2.1). Next, certain semantic and syntactic aspects of phrasal- and prepositional verbs will be discussed (Section 3.2.2). A historical review of the development of phrasal verbs will lead up to the present-day (Section 3.2.3). Particles are vital constituents of phrasal verbs, so they are defined and classified in the next section with some non-adverbial particles included. (Section 3.2.4) In the next part of the analysis, it is going to be examined whether either part of ű phrasal verb is

semantically dominant ovér the other (Section 3.2.5). One-word synonyms of phrasal verbs have a different stylistic effect (Section 3.2.6) than phrasal to be analyzed (Sections 3.2.7.-8) to see whether they show signs of systematicity or not. Conclusions are drawn at the end of the unit (Section 3.2.9).

3.2.1 Definition of phrasal verbs

Adverb particles often make up two-word combinations with verbs which are called phrasal verbs. These particles complement verbs and can semantically influence them in different ways. Other alternatives of verb complementation include prepositional verbs, which will be paralleled with phrasal verbs at a later stage of this chapter. The term phrasal verb is favored by the majority of linguists but not all. Zandvoort (1962) calls phrasal verbs 'verb-adverb combinations', Live (1965) 'discontinuous verbs', Lipka (1992) labels them 'verb-particle constructions'. Rot (1988: 183) remarks that the term *phrasal verb* is the most appropriate for verb- particle combinations:

> However, the term "phrasal verb" seems to be the most appropriate because it pertinently expresses the linguistic essence of this lexico-grammatical collocation, and it has its terminological parallels in the locution "phrase prepositions" which are applied to such expressions as *along with, by means of, on account of, with regard to.*

Crystal (1985:232) defines phrasal verbs the following way:

> A type of *verb* consisting of *a sequence* of a *lexical* element plus one or more *particles,* e.g. *come* in, *get up, look out for.* Subtypes may be distinguished on *syntactic* grounds (for instance, the particles may be classified into *prepositional* or *adverbial* types), and the definition of 'phrasal' varies

somewhat with?n different descriptions. But the overall syntactic and *semantic* unity of these sequences is readily demonstrable, using *transformational* and *substitution criteria* (cf. *He got up ar six/He rose* at six/ li7tat *time did he get up?* etc.

Phrasal verbs are defined in the Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1989) as combinations of verbs and adverbial particles or prepositional particles. Adverbs seem to modify clauses while adverbial particles are conjoined with verbs not only syntactically but semantically as well. As Grattan and Gurrey (1925:79-85) suggest adverbs only add to the meaning of verbs whereas *verbal particles fuse with them* and express one unit of thought. It is to be noted here that although the latter do so indeed, the components of these verbal collocations may contribute to the meanings of phrasal verbs to varying extents as the examples will illustrate it in this unit.

There appear to be two definitions of phrasal verbs. The *narrow sense* excludes prepositional verbs, but includes both spatial and figurative, transitive and intransitive combinations. *A broader sense* includes prepositional verbs as well as is pointed out by Kovács (1998). The current paper focuses on the narrow sense while touching upon prepositional verbs only marginally. A crucial task of this section is to examine to what extent phrasal verbs can be systematized semantically on the basis of a non-compositional analysis. One way of developing a well justified approach to phrasal verbs might be to compare them with their Hungarian counterparts to see if any constituents of the latter can semantically be paralleled with phrasal verbs.

This approach is based on the assumption that both languages have been formed on the foundations of common spatial imagery affecting language development in largely similar ways. Human beings undoubtedly model many of their figurative

images on the spatial envirotunent they are part of. The very same tools that are used to describe spatial configurations are applied in the creation of figurative language as well (prepositions adverbial particles etc.) Jackendoff (1994:195-6), a representative of modular cognitive theory (which shares a remarkable number of features with the Government and Binding theory) accepts the use of the same lexical items in both literal and figurative language as evident.

> Because the same abstract system appears in many (and possibly all) semantic fields, we are likely to find the same words used as we switch from one field to another, as seen in (5)-(8).

The fields mentioned are as follows: *5. spatial location and possession, 6. possession, 7. ascription of properties and 8. scheduling activities.* The efforts made by Jackendoff are really remarkable as is shown by the mingling of cognitive discoveries and the syntactic analyses still based on mainstream linguistics elsewhere in the same book.

The adoption of spatial configurations for describing non-spatial images are characteristic of both English and Hungarian (and probably all other languages as weIl), which accounts for their partially similar conceptual systems. Specific examples of this will be analyzed later.

Questions arising during the analysis are as follows:

1/ Are the meanings of phrasal verbs interrelated? If they are, how?

2/ How does spatiality evolve into figurativeness?

3/ How can prototypical meaning be detected in phrasal verbs and what role does it play?

4/ What proportion of phrasal verbs can be regarded as non-compositional?

5/ Why is it that certain phrasal verbs do not yield to non-compositional analysis?

3.2.2 Adverbial particles vs. prepositions

Swan (1980/95) points out that words like *down, in* and *up* often fulfil düferent functions:

> Words like *down, in,up* are not always prepositions. Compare:
>
> *-1 ran down the road.*
>
> *Please sit down .*
>
> *He's* in his *office.*
>
> *You can go in..*
>
> *Something is climbing up my leg.*
>
> She's *not up yet.*
>
> In the expressions *down the road, in his ofJ-rce* and up my *leg,* the words *down, in* and up are prepositions: they have objects *(the road, his office* and *my leg).* In *sir down, go in* and *She's nor up,* the words *down, in* and *up* have no objects, so they are adverbs, not prepositions.

The author gives us a list of the following adverbial particles: *above, about, across, ahead, along, (a)round, aside, away, back, before, behind, below, by, down, forward, in, home, near, off, on, out, over, past, through, under, up.* Many of these words can be used either as adverbs or prepósitions except for *back* and *away* (they are

only adverb particles), while other words *(from* and *during)* can only be used as prepositions.

Potter (1965:258-90) claims that there are 24 kernel verbs and 16 adverbial particles which make up the most loaded phrasal verbs of today. The verbs he considers vital in making up verbal collocations (phrasal verbs) are as follows: *back, blow, break, bring, call, come, fall, get, give, go, hold, keep, lay, let, look, make, put, run, send, set, stand, take, turn* and *work.*

Apart from the semantic similarity between adverbial particles and prepositions certain syntactic features separate them from each other. Their positions and the sentence constituents they are linked to (a preposition precedes a noun, pronoun or other words while an adverbial particle follows a verb), and function (adverbial particles can function as adverbs and modify the preceding verb) differ a great deal, as is confirmed by Heaton as well (1965:10).

Quirk et al (1985:1167) point out the following differences between phrasal verbs and prepositional verbs:

(a) The particle of a phrasal verb can stand either before or after the noun phrase following the verb, but that of the prepositional verb must (unless deferred) precede the noun phrase.

(b) When the noun phrase following the verb is a personal pronoun, the pronoun precedes the particle in the case of a phrasal verb, but follows the particle in the case of a prepositional verb.

prepositional verbs, but not in phrasal verbs.

(d) The particle of the phrasal verb cannot precede a relative pronoun at the beginning of a relative clause.

(e) Similarly, the particle of a phrasal verb cannot precede the interrogative word at the beginning of a wh-question.

(f) The particle of a phrasal verb is normally stressed, and in final position normally bears the nuclear tone, whereas the particle of a prepositional verb is normally unstressed and has the 'sail' of the nuclear tone which falls on the lexical verb.

The *syntactic* and *phonological differences* between them are clear, but nothing is said about the conceptual system of phrasal verbs, which differs largely from the semantic potentials of prepositional verbs.

3.2.3 The diachronic development of phrasal verbs

Syntactic aspects:

The current state of phrasal verbs was preceded by a long process of historical change; a structural shift from the Old English- to the Modern English period verbal prefixes to Early Modem English post-verbal particles.

Brinton (1988:95) suggests that a variety of *verbs* and particles were

grammaticalized from Old English to Modern English as markers of aspect. He mentions the following verbs: *begin, commence, start, continue, keep (on), go on, stop, cease* and *leave off*. Grammaticalization meant the development of function words, clities, or inflections from lexical items. This process had both *syntactic* and *semantic* aspects. Langacker (1967:186) notes the following concerning the changes that take place in language:

> Of much greater importance are changes in the rule of a language. Since rules apply to whole
>
> Classes of lexical items and to infinite sets of sentence structures, the surrounding effect of modifying a rule may be extensive. Changes occur in the rules of both the *syntactic* and *phonological* systems of languages.

Baugh and Cable (1951/93) note the following concerning *verb-adverb combinations:*

> An important characteristic of the modem vocabulary is the large number of expressions like set *out, gather up, put off, bring in,* made up of a common verb, often of one syllable, combined with an adverb. They suggest comparison with verbs having separable prefixes in German. and to a smaller extent with English verbs like *withstand* and *overcome.* The latter were much more common in Old English than they are today, and we have seen that their gradual disuse was one of the consequences of the Norman Conquest. Old English made but slight use of the modem type, and during the Middle English period the large number of new verbs from French seems to have

> retarded for a time what would probably have been a normal and rapid development. Such combinations that we do find before the modern period are generally expressions in which the meaning is the fairly literal sense of the verb and the adverb in the combination *(climb up, fall down),* often a mere intensification of the idea is expressed by the simple verb. One of the most interesting features of such combinations in modem times, however, is the large number of figurative and idiomatic senses in which they have come to be used.

The figurative use of phrasal verbs therefore is a product of comparatively recent language development, which was preceded by a long-term spatial use. Though idiomatic meanings could have come about on their own as well, they seem to have developed from the literal meanings of phrasal verbs, where particles only intensified the meanings of the preceding verbs long ago. (The authors use the term adverb for adverbial particle, which is rather a great mistake from both a syntactic and a semantic point of view: Adverbs can be used in various positions in a sentence, whereas adverbials cannot and adverbs can modify the semantic content of various parts of an utterance, while adverbial particles do so only within the collocation they are part of].

The radical changes that occurred in the development of English involved three kinds of reanalyses as is suggested by Brinton (1988:97):

(a) of a full verb as an auxiliary

(b) of a participle or infinitive as an 'auxiliate', and

(c) of a loose *concatenation of main verb plus verbal complement* as a

unified or 'frozen' form

It is pointed out by Rot (1988) that Old Scandinavian played an important role in the formation of *verb + adverb collocations* in the Late Old English and Early Modem English period. He says the following (ibid:190):

> Thus the Old Scandinavian lexico-grammatical cóllocation 'herb + Adverb" acted as a catalyst
>
> strengthening and stimulating a certain primordial English word-formational tendency.

Though in the Old-English period verbal prefixes were predominant in English there was a significant change noticeable towards the early Middle English period as is pointed out by de la Cruz (1972) and Hiltunen (1983), which involved the build-up of a large segment of the vocabulary; verbs followed by adverbials.

Both Kennedy (1920) and Rot (1988:204) describe how the disappearance of verbal prefixes led to the development of present-day English, where adverbial particles have fully integrated into the lexicon. They say that *paradigmatic word formation* has its roots i» *late Middle-English.* They call phrasal verbs, their converted nouns and adjectives are "an honest protest" against "hard words" (i.e. lexical units of non-Germanic origin).

Semantic aspects:

Syntactic aspects are underlying factors of semantic considerations. When a

semantic message is created it is not the major aim to produce an utterance of a certain complexity, but, even if the word order is changed, it is done so to give semantic priority to a part of the message. Semantic changes in the development of phrasal verbs occurred with the loss of concrete particle meanings by way of a metaphorical extension as was pointed out by de la Cruz (1972:115-116). Phrasal verb particles do not always refer to space, and their meanings cannot often be taken literally. It is often a metonymical change that adds to the literal, spatial meaning rather than full metaphorization of the phrasal verb. In many cases a systematic metaphorical conversion can be observed in place of former spatial meanings and structurally derive from them.

In *make up,* for example, the particle does not describe motion upwards, but it has developed a conceptual sense (up ='creation') as it can be observed with other phrasal verbs as well: *think up, dream up* and *draw up.* One might argue against this by saying that the verbs themselves express some sort of creativity on their own as well, but no trace of creative work is detectable in the phrasal verb *put up,* meaning 'construct', so it seems to bear out the former hypothesis. (It should be remembered at the same time that the conceptual sense of the particle is based on its spatial derivative; when something is created, built or constructed its size usually increases, becomes visible etc.

This semantic shift occurred as a result of an aspectual change in the meaning of the particle. What is *aspect?* -we may ask. Bloomfield (1933) says that aspect distinguishes between 'punctual' i.e. 'perfective' and 'durative' i.e. imperfective actions. Quirk and Greenbaum (1973:40) call aspect *the manner in which the verbal action is experienced or regarded,* while Crystal (1985:24) defines aspect as follows:

A category used in the grontmatical description of verbs (along with tense and mood) referring to the way the grammar marks the duration or type of temporal activity denoted by the verb.

Another category which is indispensable for describing phrasal verbs is *Aktionsart*, a German term. Although the difference between aspect and Aktionsart is rather vague, its definition by Brinton (1988:3) roughly describes what the latter means:

an indication of the intrinsic temporal qualities of a situation

Brinton (ibid) suggests that the categories aspect and Aktionsart are rather difficult to distinguish. While 'aspect' is a grammaticized, obligatory and systematic category of languages, 'Aktionsart' is lexicalized, optional and unsystematic. Aktionsart or 'kind of action' concerns the static or dynamic, punctual or durative, bounded or unbounded, continuous or iterative nature of actions. Aspect expresses the speaker's point of view, whereas Aktionsart depicts the intrinsic nature of actions. He concludes (ibid:235) that English aspectual markers express aspect distinctions, whereas the second set (consisting of post-verbal particles) aktionsart distinctions.

Combinations of verb + particle can be classified as belonging to three basic groups in terms of meaning, as is pointed out by Courtney in the Longman Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1983): 1. Ordinary meanings 2. Idiomatic meanings and 3. Fixed idioms with phrasal verbs used in them. While *ordinary meanings (run around 1, jump up 1-2* and others) are predictable, several difficulties may arise when it comes to

analyzing *idiomatic meanings.* (The number given after the phrasal verb indicates the number of dictionary item in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English by Homby, 1948/74). *Run around 2,* for example, refers to one's using a vehicle for a short journey involving a similar spatial framework but a different mode of transportation; a metaphorical extension of the original sense, while *run around 3* implies one's having company (going out together) as an extended version of the first, and also one's changing lovers frequently [where the spatial aspects seem to have been lost by reason of the fact that there ís actually no running involved (see Hungarian 'nők után futkos')]. The third, idiomatic meaning is produced by metaphorical extension as well (indefinite motion is suggested by each sense, which shows that this prototypical meaning can be detected even in a figurative sense).

The change from spatial to abstract involves a metaphorical change whereby spatial description gains a new metaphorical meaning at the end of a domain shift. 'The team *went down',* for example, highlights a situation where the loss of position is signified (went *down* = was defeated, or rather DOWN for *defeat).* Losing one's position may be linked to one's moving down an imagery scale of hierarchy. At the same time it is not denoted who the team was defeated by, though the event presupposes at least two agents. In many cases it can be anticipated what concepts particles can be associated with. *Down,* for example, can be linked with *decrease (cut down, go down), failure* or *defeat (bring down* and *go down)* each of which ontologically denotes *'negative happenings,'.* Lakoff and Johnson (1980:22) link UP-DOWN spatialization metaphors with cultural values in a society. They say that "more is better" is coherent with MORE IS UP and GOOD IS UP, "bigger is better" is also coherent with the same metaphors. They add that what may be an acceptable cultural value for the mainstream culture may be different with subcultures. LESS= IS BETTER and SMALLER IS BETTER with

respect to material possessions are acceptable cultural values for monastic orders like the Trappists, who think that material possessions hinder serving God.

It is interesting to note here that, while some authors regard phrasal verbs as completely compositional, our native language may help us in understanding these verbal expressions by means of providing semantically similar non-compositional counterparts of English phrasal verbs. Unfortunately, English linguists may not have had a chance to compare the common spatial background of English and Hungarian idiomatic expressions. Quirk and Greenbaum (1973:348), for example, say:

> Phrasal verbs vary in the extent to which the combination preserves the individual meanings of verb and particle. In instances like *give in* ('surrender'), *catch on* ('understand'), and turn up ('appear'), it is clear that the meaning of the combination cannot be predicted from the meanings of the verb and the particle in isolation.

I think it is not only by chance that there is a near synonym in Hungarian which we use for ‘give in’ (= beadja a derekát), while *turn up* can be translated as 'felbukkan '. Hungarian slang can be paralleled with the second phrasal verb *catch on* (which is similar to sl. fogom' = I understand). I think these examples are not forced, as they reflect the common spatial background both languages are based on. (In a rather simplified way we may draw some conclusions: UP stands for *appearance,* ON for *contact* i.e. with the content of the message, and IN for *control* in a bounded container. It is important to see that while the meanings of the verbs constituting the expressions differ, the semantic content of particles and preverbal elements is virtually the same in the two languages.

3.2.4 Definition and classification of particles:

Quirk et. al. (1985:444) define the adverbial nature of particles the following way:

> However, the adverbial nature of the particle in such phrasal verbs is generally shown by its mobility, its ability to follow the noun phrase: He took the dog in.

Langacker (1987:243) compares particles and prepositions to each other as follows:

> Though most panicles are identical in form and related in meaning to prepositions, they are generally treated either as adverbs or else assigned to a special class because of their distinct behaviour, in particular their variable position with respect to a direct object and the lack of an object of their own (e.g. She *turned the lights on/She turned* on *the lights).* There is again no harm in recognizing particles as a separate class by virtue of their grammatical behaviour, but we should avoid the spurious conceptual difficulties entailed by regarding this class as comparable to but disjoint from the others. Considered as predicates, these particles are not distinct from the class of prepositions: they are simply prepositions employed in grammatical constructions where the landmark happens not to be elaborated, as it otherwise normally is.

Brinton (1988:226) points out that idiomatic senses of phrasal verbs begin to appear in the Middle English period. Particles *form more or less cohesive units with . verbs,* which is a characteristic feature of the language dating back to OE. Particles, obviously, play an important role in *complementation* (i.e. they are parts of prepositional or adverbial phrases), by a/ *completing* the meaning of the head-phrase, or as later we shall see *b/ creating a dominant conceptual meaning* for the phrasal verb.

The category of particles is regarded by Lyons (1995:313) *semi-grammatical* or *semi-lexical.* They are not independent lexical or grammatical categories that, by standing alone, could denote meanings '(unless understood so in an ellipted form). Their dependence on words they are linked to make them fulfil a role similar to that of

modal or auxiliary verbs (see Lyons 1995 again).

Quirk and Greenbaum (1973:347) point out some *syntactic features* of particles the following way:

> Most of the particles are place adjuncts or can function as such. Normally, the particle cannot be
>
> separated from its verb *('Drink quickly up),* though, particles used as intensifiers or perfectives or
>
> referring to direction can be modified by intensifiers *(Go right on).*

Heaton (1965: 45) points out what the *functional role* of adverbial particles is:

> Although most adverbial particles have the same form as their corresponding prepositions, they do not denote a relationship between a noun or pronoun

> and another word. They function as adverbs and modify the verbs with which they are associated.

Brinton (1988:4) labels phrasal verbs unsystematic and suggests that the addition of particles to verbs produces the following three meanings

> The addition of a particle to a simple verb is thought to lend perfective meaning *(drink up, calm down, wait out, die off, pass away, carry through, bring about,put over*), ingressive meaning (*hurry up, lie down, doze off, set out, pitch in, go* away), or continuative/iterative meaning
>
> *(hammer away, drive on).*

Finally, Britten and Dellar (1989:4) suggest, quite encouragingly, that the majority of phrasal verbs can be systematized:

> The essential thing is that the student should begin to perceive the regularities of meaning that
>
> underlie the vast majority of phrasal verbs (unlike the prepositional verbs).

This assumption is corroborated by Sinclair (1991:68), who suggests that phrasal verbs be grouped and analyzed by the particle:

> Some recent works (Sinclair, Moon *et al.* 1939) show that the semantics of phrasal verbs is not as arbitrary as it is often held to be. We usually cite phrasal verbs based on the verb element *(give up, give out, give over etc.).* If, instead, we group them by the particle *(give over, get over, tide over),* it is possible to make sense groupings.

Thus phrasal verbs are not random products of the human brain, but, rather, they are based on some sort of systematicity. The examples above clearly demonstrate at the same time that these meanings are produced from a variety of particles and verbs.

3.2.5 Altering semantic dominance of phrasal verb constituents

Whatever the proportions of phrasal verbs analyzable by their meanings are, what matters is that such an approach is justifiable and relevant. It may be debated what particles exactly mean, but even the possibility of systematizing them is of great importance. It cannot be assumed that a metaphorical- or metonymical extension produces a meaning or meanings which have got absolutely nothing to do with source-meaning. As language formation is based on *motivation* (cf. Langacker 1991:6) it is often a spatial meaning that facilitates the creation of a figurative meaning which is thus loosely linked to it.

Mc Arthur and Atkins (1974:6) find that 6 types of verb can be phrasalized:

a. verbs of movement (usually monosyllabic and of Anglo-Saxon origin): *go, come, run, walk, hop,skip* etc.

b. verbs of invitation and ordering etc.: *invite, order, summon, let* etc.

c. the so-called 'empty verbs' o; verbs of indefinite meaning: *get, put,* rake, *make, do* etc. d. verbs formed with or without the suffix -en, from simple monosyllabic

adjectives: *brighten, slacken, jlarten, dry, cool* etc.

e. verbs formed unchanged from simple, usually monosyllabic nouns with such paraphrase patterns as: *chalk up* = mark up with chalk

brick up = seal up with brick

f. a random scattering of two-syllable verbs of Latin origin, with which some kind of direction or emphasis is required: *contract* (out), *measure* (up), *level* (off) etc.

It is suggested by Live (1965:430) that it is verbs of the old, common monosyllabic or trochaic 'basic English" variety that are most active in making up phrasal verbs like *bring, send, take, set, go, come, look* and others, whereas polysyllabicor "more learned" verbs of classic or French borrowing are not.

Bolinger (1977:75) remarks that the idiomaticity of the verb *bring* is flexible as it allows any directional adverb that can be applied to a conversation -*up, out, into the open* etc. Some verbs are more likely to be linked up with particles than others. The verb *set,* for example, is, as characterized by Sinclair (1991:67-79) a fairly common, rather dull little word, but one which has become part of several combinations with particles like *about, in, up, out, on, off* and others. He adds (ibid:68) that the semantics of phrasal verbs is not as arbitrary as it is supposed to be.

Fraser (1976:5) divides verb-particle combinations into two groups in terms of the (like in *drink down, hang up* and *give over)* are the ones where a consistent change in meaning results from the presence of particle, and *fgurative combinations figure out, look up* and *auction ofd,* where the particle changes the meaning completely.

Again, a small sign of the semantic content; OUT OF for emergence (of information) - *container metaphor* (Hung.: kitalál), UP for *appearance,* while OFF for separation of goods from seller.

There are basically four options as regards the force of the particle is concerned:

a/ The meaning of the phrasal verb cannot be iziferred from its constituents: *fix up* meaning 'to find a place to stay' or *sign off ,* i.e. cease broadcasting for the day.

b/ It modifies the meaning of the verb through its adverbial force as in *go ahead* or *rush in* for example.

c/ The particle modifies the meaning of the verb with a completive sense as in *die out, read through* etc.

d/ The particle controls phrasal verb meaning by forcing its own conceptual framework onto the verb. *Send invitations out* meaning 'to the public', *phone someone back,* where the particle stands for 'in reply' and other examples.

Lipka (1972:188) also corroborates that particles may develop their own meanings as *out* stands for 'aloud' as in 'read out', while *up* means 'again, a second time'. These collocations seem to prove, he suggests, that particle meaning differs from the meaning of the adverb. It is as though there is a hidden semantic expaision of lexemes, i.e. particles.

As opposed to what Fraser says about grouping particles on the basis of their meanings into two groups Lindner (1983:32) claims that it is necessary to recognize more than just one literal and figurative meaning of the particle. She concludes as follows:

> Rather, in the spirit of Kennedy and Bolinger, we must find a way to include in our analysis of
>
> these particles a whole host of other meanings - meanings which are specialized (containing more information than the “standard” meaning) or

extended (coding relations among abstract objects, for example) or schematic (containing less information than the standard meaning).

Lindner (ibid:33) proposes meanings for particles in combinations which are unanalyzable and suggests that she can prove in explicit terms how the various meanings of each particle might be interrelated.

Contrary to what has been said by several linguists, like Fraser (1976) and others mentioned in this section, I actually found it rather difficult to find opaque phrasal verbs for the first group. Not even they are fully opaque as *fix up* is quite like *put up* in having the same particle meaning 'stay somewhere for the night', and *sign off* contains the particle *off* meaning *termination* and *separation* as in *cut off*. I suspect that in many cases it is the rather opaque meaning of the verb that provides no guidelines for learners. It is quite common that the figurative senses derive from the original spatial senses, which becomes clear after their image schematic structures are compared. Besides, the figurative uses are deeply rooted in cultural traditions which are also tightly linked with what is believed about the physical world itself.

3.2.6. Phrasal verbs and their synonyms

Language learners tend to avoid using phrasal verbs as they find them rather unsystematic and difficult to learn. Phrasal verbs are 'colloquial' and 'informal' expressions typically used in spoken English, so a kind of artificial English is created when they are replaced by single-word equivalents. A mixture of informal and formal English is brought about which is intelligible, but only used by those speaking English

is a second language. A peculiarity of phrasal verbs is that they cannot always be replaced with single-word synonyms as is pointed out by Rot (1988:194):

> A phrasal verb may often be substituted by a simple verb, *e.g., bring forward* = produce. This test cannot always be applied, however, either because some phrasal verbs express ideas which can be expressed in no other way or because no single word of the same meaning can be substituted for them. Moreover, many lexical units which at first sight seem to be synonymous are not interchangeable.

Both Jowett (1950/51:154) and Live (1965:429) point out that using phrasal verbs is more natural than using their one-word synonyms. Most non-native speakers of English tend to ignore that phrasal verbs are preferred to their lengthy synonyms by native speakers as is pointed out in the Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English (1975:ví):

> Expressions such as *step* up (supplies), *lay on* (transport) and *take up* (the story) are part of the common coin of everyday colloquial exchange, and the tendency, especially in casual or informal contexts, to prefer the Anglo-Saxon combination to its single Romance equivalent - *increase, provide, continue* - helps to explain the widely-held view that idioms such as these are among the most characteristically 'English' elements in the general vocabulary.

Baugh and Cable (1951/93): point out the *formal character* of one word synonyms:

> It will be noticed that many of these expressions are substitutes for single verbs such as *comprebend, continue, surrender* etc., of more learned or formal character, and the interesting observation has been made that the vocabulary has thus been pursuing a development similar to that which took place in English grammar at an earlier period and which changed the language from a synthetic to an analytic one. It is also apparent that many of the expressions among the examples given are more or less colloquial and betray clearly their popular origin.

Why is it then that not every single verb can be conjoined with an adverbial particle? Part of the answer is what we learnt about the types of verbs that can be phrasalized. On the other hand, verbs and particles usually need to be semantically coordinated as it is illustrated by the examples below. It is quite likely that verbs are

Limited in their choice of adverbial particles because of their semantic content. In the phrasal verb *pull down* (Hungarian lebont), for example, which is a combination of a verb and an adverbial particle with the former denoting motion modifying the state of

repairs a building has, the verbal element can be replaced with *knock* (in *knock down* - Hungarian lebont, szétszerel) but not by *put, keep* or others. It would be difficult to explain why only these two verbs are paired with the particle *down* standing for *demolition* and not the others mentioned above. It is the particle *down* that is associated

with demolition in this metaphorical extension of meaning. It may be assumed that the verb *pull* is suitable to express gradual demolition, while *(mock* describes a sudden action. The component-verb matches the meaning of the particle and does not signify

motion opposite to that of the particle like **erect down* might do. That the particle *down* refers to *demolition* is corroborated by Britten and Dellar (1989:19), who point out that *pull down, knock down, cut down* equally refer to *demolition* with one more phrase having the same particle to add in 'a condemned building has *come down'.*

So it seems that the particle has semantic dominance over the whole phrase linking up various verbs even if the verbal meanings do not necessarily imply destruction. It is worth recalling what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) find concerning the metaphorical use of the particle *down.* When a car *'breaks down',* someone mentally *'breaks down'* we are faced with a variety of *malfunctioning,* which can occur with both humans and machines. In these examples the verbs simply provide the state (be) or the performance (break) background of malfunctioning. The question of how *crack up* comes into the picture might be asked, but it could be answered quite easily. The particle in the latter phrasal verb does not carry the semantic content opposite to *down* in *break down,* but its denotation ís synonymous with that of *break down* as is proved by another ph:asal verb with the same meaning: *pack up.* The difference between the two might be that the phrasal verbs containing the particle *up* suggest more emphatic, *complete* and perhaps *unchangeable malfunctioning,* while the ones with *down* reflect the ordinary event of reaching the state of malfunctioning.

This sense of the particle can be observed in the utterance *'Eat* it *(up)!',* where

the idea of *completion* with phrasal verbs including the particle *up,* without noticing that aspectuality is derived from the particle and not the verb by reason of the fact that the

very same particle denotes *completion* with various verbs collocating with it. (See the examples above!) The Hungarian counterparts can also be paralleled with the English ones as in lerobban, where the *preverbal element* denotes the same aspectuality as the English particle *(break down).* Another example might be: *Take off (*= imitate) is a metaphor which stands for copying the behavior of other people The idea of *separation* (of a person' s patterns of behavior) is extended metaphorically to the *abstract domain.*

When looking at the semantic diversity of a phrasal verb one can see three important aspects: a/ a shift from physical meanings towards figurative meanings (see the example above); b/ the potential classification of phrasal verbal meanings based on particle meaning *[knock off* (--write, compose rapidly) = *throw off, toss off* ; c/ the occurrence of the same adverbial particle suggests identical semantic content; and the occurrence of non-identical counterparts denotes overlap between the semantic content of particles *[make out* (progress, prosper) = *get on* (though they are only near synonyms highlighting different aspects of the action; the former focuses on emergence out of a container (which may have restricted one in achieving progress) (something like Hung.: kitör a környezetéből, whereas the latter highlights progress as a continued journey on a surface)]. As it is clear from the examples above, phrasal verbs offer visual images which make these verbal expressions very valuable for cognitive thinking.

Baugh and Cable (1951/93) note the following concerning the significance and values of phrasal verbs:

> Usually the verb-adverb combination conveys a force or a shade of meaning that could not be
>
> otherwisese expressed, and there can be no question about the fact that the flexibility of the

language, to say nothing of its *picturesqueness,* has been enormously inaeased

Below are semantic analyses of two particles, and an attempt at following the course of expanding the basic meaning into conceptually differring but structurally similar patterns.

3.2.7. The particle DOWN

The classification of phrasal verbs is based on the Longman Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1933). The numbers after the phrasal verbs are the same as the ones in the dictionary.

The Hungarian counterparts given in brackets after the phrasal verbs are needed to highlight the potentially identical semantic content designated in English by the particles and in Hungarian by the preverbal elements.

break down

1/ a/ destroy something; b/ reduce something

a/ The idea of demolishing a whole entity can be associated with either element of the verbal structure. (symbolically expressed it can be denoted as follows: a/

from l to 0, where 1 is the Source while 0 is the Goal; b/ from 1 towards 0 - Source -Goal, as it could be represented in the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN).

Langacker (1987:152) mentions two distinct domains: one projecting spatial features and another highlighting values on a scale:

> A predicate specifies a location or a configuration in some domain (or in each domain of a complex matrix). Accordingly we can speak of a domain as being either *locational* or *configurarional.* The spatial domain supports the conception of both two- and three-dimensional con£gurations and can be taken as prototypical for configurational domains. Locational domains are exemplified by temperature and colour.

Thus the first meaning concerns a spatial configuration visualized by the human mind. The second meaning can be linked to the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN, where values can be represented on a value-scale. The ones rising on the scale can be linked to the particle *up*, while the ones falling down can be expressed with *down.* In spite of the seeming distinction between the two domains, they are closely interrelated, owing to the fact that whatever is created in space can be designated in the form of an increase on a scale, and whatever is demolished may be linked with decrease on a scale in terms of status of completion, for example.

2/ be defeated

the basic meaning of physical destruction is assumed by a figurative one following metaphorization, whereby some of the features of the spatial environment are passed on and supplemented by other non-physical features:

At the end of the transition from basic meaning to the metaphorical ones most of what has been included in the spatial configuration is preserved but it is also substantially modified by its idiomatic extension(s).

The prisoner's opposition broke down under repeated questioning (quoted from Courtney,1983:47) demonstrates that the prototypical meaning *(failure)* can be extended to the ABSTRACT DOMAIN as well etc. The second meaning seems to be a derivative of the first, but, while the latter requires the application of outer force, the former only implies it as a potential component. Thus a new meaning is produced at the end of metaphorization.

3/ (of machinery) to fail to work; stop working

The car broke down on the motorway. As the opposite of the particle *up* which usually involves creation and a high level of functioning (though not with *break up,* where the particle highlights *division* or *crack up,* where the particle designates *complete malfunctioning* (see above), or *smash up, beat up, mess up* and *blow up* for *destruction* - (the last 4 from Britten & Dellar,1989: *47), down* can be associated with reduced functioning, or even stoppage. This can be well demonstrated by the example of machinery which, due to mechanical or system errors, stops functioning, its parts finish moving when the engine fails to work. The basic meaning of there being no functioning health, machinery, or proper state of entities, after what was normal, can be observed in each of the meanings.

After designating a purely configurational meaning the adverbial particle is associated through metaphorical extension with a variety of other meanings derivable from it.

4/ fail - the idea of physical disruption is metaphorically extended to the ABSTRACT DOMAIN, to health, a peace process or other complex phenomena. DOWN stands for *failure.*

5l to suffer poor health; suffer a nervous illness for some time

DOWN transfers features of ill-health metaphorically. Poorer functioning of the physiological processes ensuring human thinking, emotions and health. The malfunctioning of a machine can be likened to this process.

6l to lose control of one's feelings

Peter broke down and started crying when he realized what a fatal error he had made - illustrates clearly that it is just a temporary failure in one's emotions that is highlighted. Quite similarly to what happens in the case of a car where malfunctioning is regarded as irregular, this abnormal state of mind can return to normal with a human as well. This kind of event can also be illustrated on a value scale (so it is linked to the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN), where normal functioning is shown by values at the top, while its stoppage by the one at the Bottom.

l/ to (cause) to have a chemical change

closely related to the meaning above denoting destruction are the last two meanings of this phrasal verb, but while it formerly meant unchannelled and uncontrolled activity, purposeful and intentional separation into components

nay as well be designated by the new meaning depending on whether the phrasal verb is used transitively or not. The final outcome, the status of the original entity changes from WHOLE to PARTIAL.

8/ to (cause to) separate into different kinds

unlike the chemical process of changing a substance into its ingredients through acomplicated process, this meaning concerns the separation of a whole into parts through a complex logical process. Thus a new meaning is gained after the metaphorical transfer of meaning 1. Splitting a WHOLE is well directed here and causes no damage to its parts. It is clear from the meaning structure of phrasal verbs that UP stands for *construction* or *creation* (from building blocks etc.), whereas DOWN expresses the opposite; *destruction, demolition* or *disintegration* into parts.

Three prototypical senses of *break down* seem to have been metaphorically extended to several other senses. *Division, destruction* and *failure* seem to be somewhat linked up by reason of the fact that device or human being can function properly as long as they constitute a unit. Once this unit is taken apart or some of its parts are missing, it cannot function properly any longer. Destruction and failure in functioning can also be associated for the same reason (see Hungarian: lebont, lerombol and lerobban). In tune with what has been said above Levin (1993: 241-2) classifies verbs on the basis of their semantic content. He points out that 'break verbs":

refer to actions that bring about a change in the "material integrity" of some entity.

This might suggest that the particle meaning in *break down* simply highlights completion of the process of disintegration, but another phrasal verb; *run down* also involves the deterioration of a state. As the verb *run* (whose semantic content can be regarded as neutral in terms of expressing destruction) does not denote a change for the worse in the material integrity of an entity it is the particle *down* that implies it metaphorically.

Quite like the particle *down* in English, its Hungarian counterpart can express *failure* and *completion* as is pointed out in Benczédy et.al. (1968/91:66), which corroborates the assumption that similar conceptual systems have been construed on spatial foundations in the two languages.

One wayof treating phrasal verbs is to examine the gradual extension of their semantic content achieved at the end of metaphorical extension. What this means in practice is that prototypical meaning is latently present in all the other meanings and then it is extended into a/ other domains or b/ to (other) conceptual frameworks. It is not of vital importance that they be very closely related to each other, but it is essential for them to have basic semantic links, which is contrary to what most linguists maintain except the cognitive school.

The analysis above provides just one way of analyzing phrasal verbs. Another way of doing so links up possible orientational denotations of particles, ones that can be followed and classified in dozens of phrasal verbs. The semantic analysis of particles provides insight into how many different kinds of orientational or conceptual applications particles can be exposed to.

THE SPATIAL DOMAIN:

Combinations with the particle *down* suggest downward motion in space (in other words 'goal locative lower' as was defined by Bennett (1975:130) as is proved by she large number of phrasal verbs consisting of verbs of motion and the particle. There are dozens of them exhibiting similar changes to what could be observed in the case of *break down* analyzed above, but now the main issue is how meanings can be grouped on the basis of the semantic content of particles. This kind of classification can be found in Goodale (1993).

Most of the phrasal verbs below have a number/numbers after them which are the same as the ones in the Longman Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs. The Hungarian counterparts are given in brackets with the preverbal element corresponding to the English particle in italics.

Obtaining lower position in space:

Be down 1 (*le*jön), *bow* down1 (*le/meg*hajol), *lie down1* (*le*fekszik), *fall down1 (*le*esik),* grow down 1-2 (1.*le*nő, *össze*sugorodik), *let down 1-2 (1. le*enged pl. kötelet, 2. *le*enged ruhát), *press down* (lenyom), *touch downl-2* (leszáll repülőgép, 2. letesz rögbit), *knock down* (lever pl. akadályt), *run down* 1-4 (l lefut, 2 lefolyik 3. levisz járművel, 4. *le%lgázol,* where the latter denotes more neutral orientation) and many other examples involve motion directed from a higher Source position towards a lower Goal position.

THE LOCATIONAL DOMAIN

Achieving lower intensity of an activity, which can be demonstrated on a value-scale.

Work down l (lecsökken), *turn down3* (lecsökkent), *tone downl* and 2 (1. lehalkít/tompít [pl.élességet], 2. letompít [pl. hangnemet], *fade down* (lehalkít), *narrow down* (leszűkít), *ease down* (lelassít), *quieten down* (lehalkít), *calm down* (lecsendesít/csillapít), *come downl* (lejön) and other phrasal verbs designate some indefinite point on a scale where much of the earlier stage has become eliminated, though not completely. *Slow down* (lelassít) and *slow up* (to stop) (lelassít megálláshoz) both denote the act of attaining slowness, though they are supposed to express contrary semantic content. The former one illustrates one's reaching lower speed on a scale, while the latter rather demonstrates it as *completion* of the process of slowing.

Cornpletion of an action:

Burn down, close down, shut down and *settle down* can equally be associated with the *completion* of an action, which can clearly be paralleled with Hungarian *(burn down=leég, close down* and shut *down=be /lezár,* while *settle down=letelepedik).* It is to be noted here that the Hungarian preverbal element expresses *completion* too, in Benczédy et. al. (1968/91:66).

Reaching bottom point on a scale:

Die down (a/*le*csendesedik [pl. tűz] b/ *le*szárad/kókad [pl. növény] seems one of the few that can be associated with a fully decreased level of intensity. It demonstrates the fact that the action has reached its lowest point of intensity and ceased to go on.

While investigating the diversity of the *abstract domain* we may rely on metaphor. Kövecses (1990:110) mentions this in his book on emotion concepts: BETTER IS UP; WORSE IS DOWN. This metaphor is a basic building-block of human culture, and its relevance can be observed at various levels of language.

THE ABSTRACT DOMAIN:

1l al Completion of a process usually resulting in negative meanings (failing):

break downl-6 (1. lerombol, lebont) 2. (letör vmit), 3. (1eá11), 4. (lerobban), 5. (legyengül), 6. (zokogásban tör ki), *laugh down* (nevetségessé tesz), *batter down* (lebont/robbant), *chain downl-2* (1.lerögzít lánccal, 2leköt), *knock down 3-4,* (3lebont, 4. szétszed), etc. Not all the verbs above suggest negative senses (see *laugh),* but their inclusion of the particle automatically lends them a negative meaning.

bl Completion of other kinds of processes:

wet down (átnedvesít), *stick down* (leragaszt), *melt down* (leolvaszt). The signs of both physical change and the termination of the action can be observed with each of the verbs above. Interestingly enough DOWN can also denote, in some specific cases *completion* as is suggested by the examples: *wet down/damp down* meaning all over, *water down (felvizez).* Another phrasal verb; *run down* is a synonym of *come across. Live down* (one reduces one's former bad reputation), *bear down* 2 (defeat/opposition or someone, i.e. bring sth/sb into a subordinate position [legyőz ellenállást)), *let down*

(where *failure* to keep one's loyalty can be observed [cserben hagy), quite like with *an engine* or *negotiations* as expressed by *break down 3-4), vote down* (with complex implications of helping one to get into *power* at the cost of others [leszavaz)) etc. share

acommon metaphorical feature extended from a spatial denotation. These examples, however, seem to differ a great deal on account of the conceptual diversity involved. What this means in practice is that certain phrasal verbs can be grouped together by their conceptual content.

2/Defeating and suppressing.

Pull down 4 [legyengít], *bear down 2* [legyőz), *bring down 3* [legyőz], *clamp down* on [leszámol vmivel) and *put down* 12 [legyőz/leszámol vmivel) seem to share the same sense through the complex semantic content of the verb and particle. The interrelatedness of the ABSTRACT and the LOCATIONAL DOMAINS can be observed in several examples. It is a clear proof of the fact that the various domains overlap with each other to some extent. Concepts are rooted in culture, which suggests the ontological judgement: UP is *success,* whereas DOWN is *failure.*

Whenever an activity has ceased to be going on it reaches its end-point, which may either be connoted with a fully-achieved negative state or simply its cessation. *Break down 3-4* [3.lerobban (iármű), 4. 1eá11 (tárgyalás)) for example, feature a state in which an engine has stopped functioning or negotiations/talks have failed to achieve good results. Both actions are quite similar in describing the termination of the activity, either temporary or permanent, which means the lowest possible level in the case of both. Quite similarly *turn down4* [elutasít) shows the end-

point of a procedure where the lowest status result has been achieved. These examples prove it clearly that not even the LOCATIONAL and ABSTRACT DOMAINS can be separated from each other completely, and that something happening in one may have far-reaching consequences in the other. In changing domains metaphorical extension plays a crucial role.

THE EMOTIONAL DOMAIN

The emotional domain is also tightly connected with the *up* and *down* schemata by reason of the fact that, unless it is well-balanced, one's emotional life is either characterized by *happiness* or *sadness.* As a result of our physical and cultural experience the former concept is associated with UP, while the latter with DOWN. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:15) illustrate what orientational, or in other words "spatialization metaphors" look like through several examples:

> HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN
>
> I'm feeling up. That *boosted* my spirits. My spirits *rose.* You're in *high* spirits.
>
> Thinking about her always gives me *a lift.* I'm feeling *down.* I'm *depressed.* He's really *low* these days. *I jell* into *a depression.* My spirits sank.
>
> Physical basis: Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state.

As is corroborated by the two authors emotional concepts are firmly based on spatiality, which serves as an experiential factor in their construction. This is reflected by two meanings of the phrasal verb *get down.* (9,10) [lehangol], the first of which concerns one's becoming nervous, ill or sad as in *This bad weather is getting me down,* while the very same phrasal verb can be integrated into idioms like *get down in the dumps/mouth.* Preserving the element implying lower emotional level than the one earlier suggests that the metaphorical process has produced a meaning related to the former while it is extended to a distinctly different domain.

At least two sets of semantic chains seem to be vital to follow: the semantic development observable through metaphorical processing from item to item within the scope of a phrasal verb and particle meaning. The latter has been extended into a limited number of closely related senses controlling the scope of the particle and providing a narrow or wide semantic field for it to be applied in. Whatever meanings of the particle occur they can somehow be linked to getting into or being in a lower emotional state for one reason or another, the opposite of which is illustrated by *cheer up.*

3.2.8. U P

As is suggested by the semantic contenE of the particle, verbal combinations of the particle mostly denote the opposite of *down,* except for the idea of completion. The latter seems a consequence of the fact that whenever an action reaches its end-point it is terminated. In this sense UP describes *a telic* situation, which is defined by Britton (1988:26):

> Garey's definition of telic is somewhat misleading. Rather than being 'an action tending towards a goal' (1957:106), a telic situation is one which necessarily includes a goal, aim, or conclusion. The goal is an inherent part of the situation, without which the situation could not be what it is. Thus, a relic situation, such as fruit ripening, necessarily implies a final state of ripeness; if that end state is not attained, then the fruit cannot be said to have been ripened.

Apart from this feature, however, the rest are connected with rising levels, or higher end-points in a spatial configuration, where the element/s get/s higher than a certain landmark.

Though it might aot be important to enlist the meanings in different domains, I do so because there are clearly spatial meanings, others that belong to the locational domain and ones that have gained metaphorical meanings and are part of the abstract domain etc. By separating sets of meanings we can gain insight into what armory basic meanings have obtained so as be suitable for app ation in other related areas.

The particle *up* can be classified into the following conceptual groups on the basis of its semantic content. Various domains are featured by the variety of particles incorporated into phrasal verbs. Here is a list of the conceptual variety of phrasal verbs with up:

Rising in space can involve either reaching a top height or following a trajector moving upward.

Rising or raised in space; in the form of a rising level in a container *(be upl-2 [l.fent* van, 2. felemelkedik], *back up* [alátámaszt], *bear upl [felemel], blaze upl* [felízzikJ, *bob upl* [felbukkan/ felszínre kerül], *bring up1,4* [l.felvisz, 4. kihány], *bristle upl* [felborzolj, *bubble up* [felbugyog) *bunk up3* [feltolJ, *buoy upl [fenntart], burn upl [felszít* tüzet], *cast* upl-2 [l.feldob, 2. felsodor partraJ *, chuck upl (feldobJ, clew up [felhüz* vitorlát], *close up [közeledik], cock upl* (felkunkorodik/ kutya fülét hegyezi], *come upl-2* (1. felkel, 2. feljönJ, *come up for 1* (felmegy vmiért], *cough upl* [felköhög], *drag upl* [felhúzJ, *dredge upl [felhúz], fetch upl [felhoz], fish upl,2 [1. felhúz, 2. felszed], fizz up* [felpezseg], *flame upl* [fellángol], *flare upl* [fellángol], *flash up* (felvillan), *fling* upl *(feldob], fly upl-2* [l.felrepül, felemelkedik], *foam up* [felpezseg], *froth up (felpezseg], fuel up* [feltankol], *top up* 2 [feltölt), *soak up* [felszívJ, *shake up [felráz]),* an object rising in space *(toss up* [feldobJ, *take up* 1 [felemel], *show up [felmutat], straighten up* [felegyenesedikJ, *tip up [felhajt]* etc.). Undoubtedly, there is no clear-cut demarcation line between *completion* and *rising.*

Completion can also be expressed with verbs or verb preposition combination as is pointed out by Schlesinger (1995:195):

> For some verbs there is a difference in meaning behveen the direct object construction and one with an object of a preposition. Thus, the verbs *swim*

and *climb* may take either direct objects, as in (29), or objects of prepositions, as in (30).

(29) a. swim the channel

b. climb Mount Everest

(30) a. swim in the channel

b. climb up Mount Everest

The direct object construction in (29) implies that the activity has been successfully *brought to its completion* (Quirk *et al.,* 1985, Section 9.31), which is also corroborated by Moravcsik (1977:256):

> Swim the *Channel* means that the Channel has been successfully crossed, and *climb Mount Everest* implies that the top of the mountain has been reached. The prepositional object constructions in (30) do not have this implication: *swim in the Channel* can also be said of a leisurely swim close to the shore, and *climb up Mount Everest* of an abortive attempt to scale it.

In the open space actions are more vague in this respect, i. e. it is often difficult to define whether rising is only partial or complete. But rising levels in a container might suggest that they may reach the top, where completion is achieved. .This may contribute to the extension of simply spatial configurations to idiomatic denotations, which is an indication of the metaphorical extension of physical features to non-physical ones.

THE LOCATIONAL DOMAIN

Though seemingly separate from the spatial domain, the locational domain is still closely related to it by reason of the fact that whatever is rising in space can be illustrated on a value scale demonstrating stages of completion or rising.

1/ Value points rising on a scale:, add up [összead], be up 6-7 [6. növekszik, 7. nő] *bear ups [fel* a fejjel/ ne csüggedj!], *bid up* [felsrófol árat], *blaze up2* [felfortyan], *boil upl-2* [l.felforr/al/, 2. felforrósodik helyzetJ *, brace up2* [megerősödik], *, brighten upl-2* [l.felélénkül, 2. felvidul), *buck up* [felvidul], *cash ttpl [összead], cheer up* (felvidul], *cltirk up* [felvidul/vidít], *come up to 4 [elér* összeget], *dim up* (felvilágosít], *fade up* [felhangosítJ, *fair up* [kivilágosodik], *fcgure up [összead,* valamilyen összegre rúg], *frame up 2 (felforr az* indulata], *flare up2* (felfortyanJ, *force up (felver* pl. árat] *, freshen* upl-3 [felfrissül/frissít], *fiy up2* [felmelegítJ, *keep* one's chin *up10 [fel a* fejjel] *, perk up2* [felvidítJ, *run up 3 [felhúz* zászlót árbócraJ, *soup up* [felturbósít), *speed up* (felgyorsítJ, *spunk up* (felvidít), *staff up [feltölt* személyzettel], *tot up [összeadJ, tune up [felhangol]* etc.

2l The state of one's having reached high values on a scale: wrought up, worked up, whipped up etc., where the past participle shows that a certain stage has been reached, and it has been instigated by someone or something.

THE ABSTRACT DOMAIN:

As a result of the metaphorical extension of spatial configurations into figurative meanings various meanings have evolved. They seem to have preserved some

of the features applied in space through metaphorization and thus represent a link between two seemingly different domains.

I. Appear: blow up 2 [túloz] *, come up7* (feltűnik/megjelenik], *conjure upl* [elkészítJ, (metaph.) *2, crop upl* (felbukkan], 2, [adódik i.e. crops up in a figurative sense), *come up 4* (feltámad (szél)/ adódik (lehetőség)]. When an entity reaches a higher level than it had earlier it rises above its surroundings and this feature provides basis for both spatial and figurative interpretations with the latter producing an image of an entity, be it information whatsoever, appearing in one's mind as a kind of novelty, a new feature, salient both in a spatial and a figurative configuration. Thus, by preserving the feature 'become salient' metaphorically a transfer of meaning from spatial to abstract can be achieved.

II. *Arrive or reach (nearly) ertd point: be up10* [fent van - referring to an important

place], *boil up2* [forrpontra jut], *bring up8* [idehoz - where the particle implies completing a route leading to an entity], *call up 6* [felidéz], *come up13* [felbukkan/megjelenikJ, *14, drive up* [rnegérkezik - the particle in Hungarian and English equally denote attainment of goal], *AmE. drop *up* (felbukkanJ, *end up 3* [valahol végzi), *fetch up G* [kilyukad = felbukkan valahol], *finish up* 4 [see fetch *up],*

land up 5 [see fetch *up*], *wind up 8* [see fetch *up*] , land *up 5* [see *fetch up*], *cozy up to* [*össze*barátkozik], *cotton up to* [see cozy up to], *be up 9* [véget ér], *break up 3-5* [3.feloszlat- police), 4, feltámad (storm), véget ér (party), *black* up[elsötétít], *button up3* [befejez], *check up* [kivizsgál], *drink up(felhajt* (drink), *soften up* [megpuhul], *stuff up* (betömJ, *suck upl [felszív], turn up* 2 [felfordít), *use up* [felhasznál], *eat up2* [felhasznál], *feed up* [felhízlal), *clean up 6* [felszámol - enemy), *clear up3* [befejez], *eat upl* [megeszik *felfal], dry up2* [kifogy), *end upl-2* [valahogy végez], *fetch up 4,5 [4., finish up2,3* [see *end up*], *land up3* [see *ertd up], wind up6* [see *end up], cock upl* [elront

valamitJ, *colour up* [elvörösödik], *crack upl* [kiszárad), *crease upl* [megnevettetJ, *crisp up* [kiszárít], *cook upl [kifőz* tervet], *daub up* (kimázol], dress *up* [felöltözik], *dry* up1,3 [l. kiszárad 3. megszárítJ], *dull up* [letompít valamit], *ease up* [megenyhül), *event up* [kiegyenlít számlát], *fatten up* [felhízlal], *fit upl* [felszerel], *form up* [felsorakozik], *freeze up* 1-2 [lbefagy, leblokkol], *bring up against* 1-2 [szernbekerülJ, *catch up 4 [utólér], close up3* [közeledik], *come up [elér], come up to* 1-2 [elér valahová], *creep upl* [közelébe férkőzik], *creep up on 1* [rátör érzés], *end up 4* [bevégzi valahogy], *fetch up 7* [odahoz), *finish up 5* [see end up 4], *land up 6* [see *end up 4), wind up 9* [see *end up* 4].

One might argue that the preverbal elements in Hungarian cannot be assigned any kind of guiding principle that can be associated with one's reaching a goal, but *Mai magyar nyelv* edited by Benczédy et al. (1968/91:66) classifies *el, ki, be, fel, le* and *meg* as preverbal elements expressing *completion* i. e. *the two languages show similar conceptual extensions* of the spatial domain.

The multitude of phrasal verbs suggests-that it is not only the act of getting from one point to another that is highlighted but anything that goes with it. Travelling from one place to one's destination can be quite similar to one's starting an activity and reaching its end-point in both having a starting point and an end-point, lasting for some time and achieving some kind of a result. The idea of one closely linked to the other, therefore, does not seem a mere coincidence, but it rather serves the evidence to prove that they are interrelated to each other as a result of metaphorisation.

*III. Close, block or fasten:bank up 1 [*fel*torlaszol],* block up *1-2* [elzár], *board up* [bedeszkáz], AmE *box up2* [bedeszkáz], *box up 4* [beprésel], *brick up [fel/befalaz], bung upl-2 [elzár), clog up* [eldugul], *chock upl* [telezsúfol), *choke upl* [teletölt], *close up1,2,4,* [lbetöm, 2,4 bezár/ul], *dam up* [el/zár/torlaszol], *do up* (begombol), *earth*

up1,2, [feltöltj *fasten up* [bekapcsol], *look up* [bekapcsol ruhátj, *belt up* 4 felvesz övet], *bind upl-3* [lbeköt/öz, *2. feltűz* hajat 3. beköt könyvet], *buckle upl, 3,* [lbekapcsol) *button* upl [begombolkozik], *catch up6* [összeölt], *chain up* [megláncol], *cork up l* [bedugaszol].

Several phrasal verbs in this group might be enlisted under the heading 'complete' but they seem to be linked to a different notion and action whereby the particle reflects the termination of the action as an act of closing entrance to an object, filling or fastening it.

IV. *Contain and control (metaphorical: bottle up2* [elfojt dühöt stb.], *box upl* [Austr.E. összezavar], *cage in/up* [bebörtönöz], *cork up2* [elfojt érzést].

Containment can often be viewed as an integral part of not only physical but also figurative notions. When an entity is physically contained, it is surrounded by boundaries, possibly on all sides, which may cause constraints when spatiality is extended to the abstract. By preserving the idea of containment though, it suggests that there is a direct *link between containment and control,* whereby the former is faded away by the latter as a result of there being a transition from spatial to abstract-figurative.

V. Damage, rutin, wound or destroy:

Bash upl [összetör], crack up2 [/'elrepeszt; összetör], *cut up2,4,7* [2.összevág, 4szétrombol, 7. felaprít, összevagdal]), *carve up4* [felaprít], *slit up2* [felaprít], *dent up* [összetör], *doctor up* [elront], *balls up* (taboo) [elszúr valamit], *break up2* [szétszed/esik), *burn up2 [leég], bust upl* [tönkretesz], *chew up2 [összerág], cock up2* [elszúr), *mess up2* [elront], *smash up* [csúnyán megrongál], *fry upl* (feléget], *bash up2* [összetör], *beat up2* [összever],

Again, the semantic scope incorporated by the semantic content of the verb is 'supplemented' by the particle adding to it a sense of completion.

VL Complete division:

break up1,4,6 [iszétesik, 4szétszór, 6 felbomlik, *9.*]*, chew upl* [összerág), *chop upl-2*

[felvág/szeletel], *crush up* [kiprésel], *cut upl* [felvág/szeletel], *split up [a/ feloszt, b/*szakít].

The idea of dividing entities is supported by the semantic content of the Hungarian preverbal elements as well. It is pointed out in A *mai magyar nyelv* (1968/91:67) that preverbal elements like *szét,- fel; ki;* and others designate *direction.* In this case, however, it is not directionality that is involved but *completion.* Let us remember that preverbal elements rather modify verbal meanings than bring about an intricate conceptual system. This concept is crucial in the act of dividing even if it is to denote an action which is metaphorically extended. Though the division of an orange or a marriage seem very much different from each other by reason of the fact that emotional, financial and other factors are involved in the latter, whereas the former is triggered by simple pragmatic considerations (the fact that it is easier to eat one in segments), but schematically they are pretty much the same.

Verbs designating the process of dividing may be accompanied by the particle to suggest that the action has reached its final stage. An utterance 'He is chopping/cutting bread' also describes the process but without being completed. This group of phrasal verbs and that of the ones above reveal an important semantic feature of the particle that might unite several of the groups enlisted on the basis of latent prototypical sense: *completion* .

VII. *Closeness, reaching level:*

be up toll [elér], couple togetherlup [összeáll], be up against [szembenéz vmivel), *bring up against* [felhoz vmivel *szentben].* Though the word szembe/n is not classified as a preverbal element, it functions like one in the word *szembenéz.* The designation of closeness is based on the meaning of the word, i.e. szem= eye. Once a journey is terminated, the goal of an action and the mobile object get close to each other, be it either a spatial configuration or an abstract relationship that can be illustrated similarly in tzerms of schematic renderings. The particle still seems to be carrying the basic semantic marker that can be applied in a relationship with several other groups of verbs. Just like in ' Go up/down this road' the particle refers to an activity that is engaged in attaining its goal (the end-point) in a great number of figurative relations as well. At the same time, some of the basic semantic traits are preserved in the course of metaphorization. The idea of reaching an end-point can best be proved with the following examples.

DIRECTION LOCATION

(end-point)

He is going *down/up.* He is *down in the mouth/ (up) in high spirits.*

VIII. *Complete or finish action:*

load up [felpakol], *build up 5* [felépül], *choke upl* [eldugít], *clog up* [eldugít], *fill up* 1 (feltölt], *bone up on* [bemagolj, *mug up* [bemagol], *swot up* [bebifláz], *end ups* [bevégez vhol/vhogy], *fetch up* [kilyukad vhol=land *up], finish upl /land up7* [see *fetch up], wind up* 6 [see *fetch up], bandage up* [bekötöz], *bundle up* [összekötöz], *fold up* [összehajt], *belt upl* [befejez beszédet, see also *shut up], belt up* 2 [bekapcsol biztonsági övet], *chuck up* [befejez], *bring up* 1-2 [l.felnevel, *2.felhoz* témát], *draw up4* [kihúzza magát], *wind up 5* [lehúzza a rolót= befejez üzleti tevékenységet], *clean upl[* kitakarít], *clear upl*

[rendet rak], *mop upl* [feltöröl]. Quite like the English particles, the Hungarian preverbal elements also derive from denoting spatiality, but each can denote *conrpletion*..

As is illustrated through the examples, and is corroborated by Benczédy et al (1968/91), the preverbal elements above have developed the conceptual sense of *completion.* It is, however, common knowledge that they cannot function on their own so the idea of *completion* supplements verbal meaning.

Though apparently several other phrasal verbs might be enlisted here, this group seems to be the one which implies the act of completing an action. Various domains seem to be interrelated in the course of metaphorical extension, despite the fact that they are seemingly different. In terms of the particle UP the SPATIAL DOMAIN suggests that a higher level is reached in space, the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN implies the attainment of higher values on a scale, the ABSTRACT DOMAIN features concepts based on but different from spatiality, while the EMOTIONAL DOMAIN illustrates how a high level of positive or negative emotional state has become dominant. All this happens in the presence of an accompanying integral factor (the prototypical spatial sense) that is metonymically and metaphorically passed on to several meanings of various phrasal verbs.

IX. *Form, produce and create:*

balls up [sokat hibázik], *build up4* [reklámot esinál vkinek], *bunch up* [csomóba rak], *coil up* [felteker] *, draw up* [összeállít), *cook up2 [kifőz], dream up* [megálmod], *make up* [kitalál], *mess up* [sokat hibázik], *think up* [kieszel], *dredge up/dig up [feli*déz]. We must recall here what was said about the relationship of the particle UP and *creation, construction* and their physical signs earlier. It is to be noted here that some of the

Hungarian examples reflect a different way of approaching *creation: ki-* suggests that creation in Hungarian is regarded as emergence from the constraints of a container.

Lakoff (1987:272) illustrates how our bodily experiences are paralleled with

figurative notions as follows:

> Sample metaphors: The visual field is understood as a container, e.g.., things *come into* and go *out*
>
> *Of sight.* Personal relationships are also understood in terms of containers: one can be *trapped in a*
>
> *marriage* and get *out of it.*

Though the semantic content of the verbs which are constituents of the phrasal verbs above have got nothing to do with creation in many cases (come, fling etc.), they are all related to *formation, creation* or *production.* Short of practical semantic approaches to the study of particle meaning, I need to rely on what Pinker (1991:370) says about the *contiguity of the spatial and abstract world:*

> The use of a physical "metaphor" to express abstract relations (the Thematic Relations Hypothesis) is ubiquitous in language. The choice of prepositions, verbs, idioms, and argument structures, and the patterns of broad-range generalizations among them in a variety of abstract fields, are based on a mapping of those fields onto a small number of schemas based on space, force and time.

The particle is associated with creation by reason of the fact that whatever is

produced or created appears physically as a salient entity in a spatial configuration. This image is extended to the abstract domain and can only be related to spatiality when visually represented in the human mind. When a house is reaching its stage of completion, for example, it is gradually rising in space until construction is terminated.

Figurative configurations utilize this experiential basis for construing abstract notions like in *make up, think up, conjure up* and others. As configurational features have been metaphorically extended to another domain their spatial basis has become opaque to most people using the language. Their importance, however, is relevant in identifying the foundations of idiomaticity, and in alleviating language learning by establishing semantic relations and groups in figurative language.

X. Increase in size, speed, quality:

blow up 4, 5, 6 *[felfúj,* felnagyít, *felerősödik], build* 1-3 [l.felhalmozódik, 3. megerősít (= növel) bizalmat], *come up14* (wind), [felerősödik], *, buck upl* [felvidít], *clean up 4* [bezsebel pénzt], *deck up/doll up/dress up* [kicsípi magát], *frg up/ fix up 3* [gyorsan összeüt]. Though there is quite a variety of Hungarian preverbal elements, the presence of *fel-* is predominant. The preverbal element *ki-* has come up again to obviously denote the act of one's getting rid of constraints, demonstrated as a way of emerging out of a container:

An increase in the level of categories like size, speed

or quality can be

associated with the particle *up,* its major semantic marker. It is again human experiential basis, which allows figurative applications of both *configurationul* (increase in size), and *locational* (increase in speed and improve in quality) semantic structures. Either structure is closely linked to hierarchical scanning. Hierarchical schemata are based on

PART-WHOLE schemata and UP-DOWN schemata as is pointed out by Lakoff (1987:283).

All schemata are based on human bodily experience and are extended to all

relevant areas of cognition and thinking. Whatever increases in size can be described with the particle UP, which is extended to metaphorically denote abstract events as is shown by *grow up* vs. *bring up.*

XI. Mention:

bring up 2 [felhoz témát], *cast up [felvet], fling up [felvet], sling up [feldob* témát], *throw up [feldob]*. The physical action of throwing/casting/bringing/flinging/slinging *up* raises an object possibly unseen before into the visual field of people. This bodily experience is reflected in the figurative use of the particle *up* applied for communication.

It is not only English that preserves the schematic buildup of spatial

configurations for expressing figurative utterances. The Hungarian preverbal element fel; also appears in both spatial and figurative context as in *felvet, feldob* (témát). The semantic content of verbs is also important in the formation of the phrasal °rerbs above, but throwing, casting and the other actions can also be carried out along the horizontal plane. This aspect of communication (verticality) seems to supplement what Reddy (1979:189-201) describes as the role of 'the conduit metaphor/' in communication as hierarchical structuring is also part of communication.

XII. *Obtainment*

beat up [bezsebel], buy *up* [felvásárol], *clean up4* [be/seper/zsebel pénzt] etc.

Both the particle up and the preverbal element *fel-* suggest an increase in the number of entities obtained. This complies with the experiential basis of buying: the larger the number of entities obtained is the bigger their physical dimensions are. The idea of *completion* is latently present in all the three phrasal verbs. Nothing but the particle can denote this sense (or rather this is a new sense of the particle), owing to the fact that it is only one of the verbs (buy), which actually refers to obtainment through purchase, while the others do not do so.

THE EMOTIONAL DOMAIN:

charge up [felvillanyozódik/feltöltödik], *be/get chewed up* [elemészti magát], *crack up* [testileg/lelkileg összeroppan], *crock up* [megbetegszik], *crumple up* (felmorzsolódik], *cut up* [elkeseredik), *eat up* [felemészti magát], *be fed up with* [torkig van vmivel], *fold up* [összeomlik].

Interestingly enough, the examples enlisted suggest either positive emotions or the opposite; falling into the deepest depression. All this may have to do with the negative semantic content of the verbal components which suggest disintegration, where the particle implies *completion.* On the other hand, it has been proved (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 and others) that ontologically UP means happiness, while DOWN sadness.

Emotional expressions are related to orientational metaphors as well. Kövecses (1990:52) illustrates with several examples when describing the metaphorical background of *anger;* a group of metonymies express anger such as:

Agitation: He's all *worked up.*

She's all *wrought up.* You look *upset.*

When the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises. His pent up anger *welled up* inside him. My anger kept *building up* inside me. Intense anger produces steam:

She *got all steamed up.*

Anger involves keeping the pressure back:

He managed to keep his anger *óotrled up* inside him. When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes:

She *blew up* at me. Anger is fire:

Boy, am *I burned up!* etc.

3.2.9 Conclusion

The limited but definite variety of meanings suggests that the metaphorical mappings based on spatial configurations form a system rather than make up such a multitude of expressions that cannot be handled in any way. It often occurs that the meanings of different phrasal verbs develop step by step *from spatial to figurative* meanings.

Particle meaning seems to modify and supplement verbal meaning or even develop its own conceptual system, while preserving basic structural features of spatiality. Based on the physical act of *throwing up* an object, the expression *'throw up* an idea' has become entrenched as well. Other verbs of motion like *bring, cast, fling* and sling seem to have coupled up with the particle *up* too through metaphorical extension. Basic traits of the spatial configuration are preserved but a clearly figurative meaning is gained. (Also see Hungarian: felvet/dob egy témát, which literally means: *cast/throw up a topic).* It is interesting to observe what different deictic perspectives phrasal verbs can

offer. In *'throw up* an idea', the act is viewed by all participants as departing motion directed upwards. It does not suggest well-preparedness, but much rather a hasty action which may not achieve much. In *'bring up* an idea' the speaker seems to be in a higher position which the idea reaches from below, which suggests that it has been forgotten but brought up again. This might mean that he has *control over it* and, say, has thought it over.

Dozens of verbs have combined with the particle *up,* which suggests the end point of a journey, figuratively applied for the completion of an activity. This is, however, only one sense of the particle UP, and various other senses have emerged from the prototypical meaning. The fact that the particle describes rising in space leads to the evolvement of metaphorical meanings preserving spatial features while excluding tangibility, clearly visible boundaries, anything that is somehow related to perception. In return, an imaginary setting is applied for actions or events that are not featured in literal context any longer. They are shifted into one where only schematic similarity to physical reality can be detected, and one where new conceptual senses have developed.

A certain degree of similarity between the physical and the figurative domains can be assumed, as we have well justified evidence on the basis of our analyses for the latter to emerge from the former.

It is not without any reason that figurative language is structured the way it is. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) agree that spatialization metaphors are deeply rooted in physical and cultural experience so they are not randomly assigned. Metaphor can serve as a vehicle for understanding a concept only by virtue of its experiential basis and so can metonymy. These two devices of idiomatic extension fulfil a twofold task; one of furthering features indispensable for extending spatiality, and the other: linking two seemingly different domains; SPATIAL and ABSTRACT.

Considering the fact that Hungarian spatial and abstract notions seem to have a remarkably similar correlation between the two domains as in felmászik, feTjön vs. felnevel, feTjelent etc., it sounds reasonable to say that abstract notions are, in a way, derivatives of the physical world and of the social and cultural environment they are used in.

3.3 Idioms

Idioms belong to the group of *multiword conventional expressions* (just like collocations and phrasal verbs) used predominantly by native speakers, and neglected by non-natives by reason of their being considered both structurally and semantically complex. Owing to the fact that they are regarded as opaque not only by EFL students but also by a large group of linguists they are often simply ignored. Nilsen and Nilsen (1979:94) make a vague reference to what an *idiom* is when comparing it to blending:

> Blending is also different from an idiom because an idiom may have a meaning not even distantly
>
> related to the meanings of its parts. For example, there is no direct relationship between the words
>
> *bucket* and *kick* in the idiom *kick the bucket,* meaning *to die.*

Interestingly enough dying is described in Hungarian in quite a similar way: *felrúgta a bocskort* (roughly: He kicked up his mocassins) dating back to old times. We

might speculate over why the two languages approach the same phenomena quite alike, but the conclusions might be a bit far-fetched. Though one reason may be that Hungarian describes one's falling down in the fatal moment so that the moccasins are higher.

Sinclair (1991:109-115) postulates two basic principles underlying language concerning lexical co-occurrences: *the open choice principle* and *the idiom principle.* The former concerns language text seen through a large number of complex choices applicable at word, phrase, and clause level. The latter suggests that there is a large number of semi-pre-constructed phrases to be regarded as units available to language users though they might appear to be non-compositional.

As it was pointed out earlier, idioms are just as productive in the lexicon as collocations and phrasal verbs (the latter is considered by the Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English a sub-group of idiomatic language), and metaphors can become idioms as well through constant use (dead metaphors).

Cruse (1986:42) sums up the main points of what 'dead metaphors' are as follows:

l

> If, however, *a metaphor* is *used* sufficiently *frequently* with a particular meaning, it loses its
>
> characteristic flavour, of piquancy, its capacity to surprise, and hearers encode the metaphorical
>
> meaning as one of the standard senses of the expression.

Its comprehension no longer requires the same decoding strategy most metaphors need to go through, but they are much rather treated as idioms. On account of their conventional use, 'dead metaphors' no longer cause differences between what the speaker says and hearer understands as it is the case with metaphors. The process of decoding is simplified and faster, since 'dead metaphors' are now readily available parts of the vocabulary.

3.3.1 Definition

It is undoubtedly true that both *idioms* and *collocations* are both a kind of fixed Seidl and McMordie (1909/88:12) define idioms as follows while emphasizing the importance of their non-compositionality: expressions, but, while the latter often allow a greater variety of optional elements, idioms are more 'rigid', and rarely offer alternatives. Langacker (ibid) says:

> An idiom can be defined as a number of words which, when taken together, have a different
>
> meaning from the individual meanings of each word

Arnold (1986:19) classifies idioms as *set expressions:*

> Set expressions are word groups consisting of two or more words whose combination is integrated so that they are *introduced* in *speech,* so to say, *ready-made* as units with a specialized meaning of the whole that is not understood as a mere sum total of the meanings of the elements.

This categorization of idioms seems to include other components of figurative language like phrasal verbs as well. Many idiomatic utterances have undergone the process of simplification and they are today condensed images contradicting at times even basic rules of proper grammatical behavior, or at least ellipted like in *no small tribute* (It is/was considerable tribute), or *no go* (It isn't possible), which cannot be said of phrasal verbs for example.

The traits of idioms might as well be applied for idiomatic *collocations* too. Crystal (1985:152) confirms that while some linguists call idioms 'ready-made UTTERANCES' an alternative terminology refers to them as 'ready-made COLLOCATIONS'.

Langacker (1991:460) applies the terms *idioms* and *collocations* too, which only shows that the boundaries between parts of the idiomatic language are not clear-cut.:

> Also relevant is a general observation concerning idioms that is readily extended to other fixed collocations, including such as *there be* and *it rain.*

It is undoubtedly true that both *idioms* and *collocations* are both a kind of fixed expressions, but, while the latter often allow a greater variety of optional elements, idioms are more ‘rigid’, and rarely offer alternatives. Langacker (ibid) says:

The symbolic units of language are heterogenous and differ even qualitatively owing to the

> position along certain parameters, notably specificity and symbolic complexity. However, their
>
> distribution along these parameters is essential.

Chitra Femando (1997:1) calls idioms *conventionalized multiword expressions*

which are often but *not always non-literal:*

> The distinctive feature of idioms is that though they are multiword expressions, they are also lexicalized: they have the *semantic unity* of single words *but* the *grammatical flexibility,* though in varying degrees, of phrases, semi-clauses, and clauses, which indeed the majority are.

This is also corroborated by Lyons (1995:51), when he says that the meaning of the lexically simple, idiomatic phrase is not systematically determinable (by rule) from the meaning of its constituent lexemes.

Lipka (1992:74) characterizes idioms from the point of view of *lexicology:*

> Other *formally complex lexemes* which cannot be broken down into morphemes are normally labelled *idioms.* with some idioms the formal constituents never occur independently or in other combinations, e.g. *eke* in *eke out, peter* in *peter out.* With other idioms, the constituents are homonymous with independently occurring free lexical mo:phemes, e.g. in

understand, pull someone's leg, AmE shoot the *breeze* 'talk idly', *blow a raspberry* 'make a vulgar noise with lips to express contempt, dislike, disapproval.

Apart from analyzing the constituency of idioms grammarians do not seem to have grasped much of their conceptual background. They often fail to notice the basic conceptual framework offered by spatial metaphors or spatial metonymies. The idiom *she* is *over the moon* is mentioned by Carter below. Similarly to *she* is in *high spirits* it is based on the conceptual framework UP is HAPPY (contrasted with *in low spirits, down in the mouth* etc. closely-related to the metaphor LOW is UNHAPPY). As was mentioned above, Carter's (1997:320) definition also contains this idiom, but it does not account for the conceptual framework it can be fitted in:

(Idiom is): A sequence of words which functions as a single unit of meaning and which cannot

normally be interpreted literally. For example, 'She is over the moon' contains the idiom 'over

the moon' meaning 'happy'

The definition is rather vague by reason of the fact that it can be applied to virtually all the other components of figurative language, since they may make up a sequence of words as well and constitute one meaning when used in an idiomatic sense. This definition seems to reaffirm that common features conjoin the elements of figurative

language and prove that they may overlap with each other through a/ idiomaticity and b/ collocated constituents.

I may be in a more fortunate situation than many linguists, since I can see a large number of semantic similarities between English and Hungarian shared as a result of the fact that a/ figurative language may have underlying spatial metaphors b/ similar social, cultural and other factors may determine the conceptual background of languages.

I believe that most idioms can be subjected to productive semantic analysis, which is confirmed by most cognitive grammarians as well. (without an abundance of practical guidelines though). The motivating force of the schema is undoubtedly strong in that it evokes the image of structural similarities extended into a conceptual framework. In *let the cat out of the bag* the bag is a bounded container from which the information emerges. The idea is similar to the one suggested by another idiom, namely, *buy a pig in a poke,* where *poke* is the bounded container. The latter may have emerged from the tradition of buying animals in the market, so that the idea is applied to another scenario.

There is a high incidence of similarities between English and Hungarian idiomatic expressions, which does not seem to be justified by the fact though that they belong to completely different language families so little related to each other and do not resemble each other in terms of lexicology or syntax much either.

Langacker (ibid) says:

> The symbolic units of language are heterogenous and diúer even qualitatively owing to the
>
> position along certain parameters, notably specificity and symbolic complexity. However, their
>
> distribution along these parameters is essential.,

Fernando (1997:3) regards habitual collocations and idioms as related, but two different lexical types, which is justified by the degree of variability. It is true that the multiplicity of options often characterizing collocations cannot be observed with idioms, where there is either no choice, or it is rather restricted.

3.3.2 Semantic features

As far as the possibility of componential analysis is concerned, I assume that semantic features can be traced back to either a certain degree of similarity as in the case of *pins and needles* where the "tingling sensation following numbness" (definition from Hornby, 1948/74:643) is based on similarity to one's feeling tiny pricks by needles in various parts of the body. Labeling an idiom like the one as opaque simply seems a mechanical approach disregarding human bodily experience. When one hears the idiom above one associates the sign with the experiential basis of bodily functioning. Why is the idiom a sequence of two closely-related entities and not the mere repetition of the first one like *?pins and pins?*. The answer can be at least twofold. One is that the idea of the feeling produced is reinforced by the addition of another entity causing the same

sensation. Another can be traced back to some kind of phonological reason, i.e. the two different-sounding entities produce a harmonious and easily pronounceable pair when conjoined. Though theorizing like this may be regarded as unjustified and far-fetched, I assume that the workings of the human mind may have construed them in a way similar to the one described above.

It is interesting to observe that another idiom containing the same elements is again based on similar bodily experience: *be on pins and needles* (which roughly means 'one can hardly wait'), and it is rendered into Hungarian almost the same way: *'tűkön ül'* (i.e. he/she is sitting on needles). This similarity clearly proves that concepts like *impatience* and the experiential bases triggering them *(lack of comfort* i.e. being.,/ sitting on pins and needles) are not only closely related to each other, but that the human experience underlying a conceptual framework offers a causative status to their use. (i.e. One is *impatient* because one is (sitting) *on pins and needles).*

That idioms are really based on global acceptance by both speakers and listeners on account of their shared cultural, linguistic and other features can be proved by the fact that a "set phrase" construed on the spot by someone is not adopted and passed on by the listener unless it is compact, (perhaps witty) and is based on human experience that is readily shared by both parties (like Churchill's *Iron curtain,* a dead metaphor).

Many literal expressions are also regarded as idioms only on the criteria of *compositeness* and *fixity*. *Arm in arm* and *try, try and try again* belong here (see Fernando, 1997:61). Another interesting aspect of using idiomatic strings in communication is that they are processed faster than literal expressions, and can thus speed up communication (Gibbs, 1980, 1986)

3.3.3 Analyzability

On account of their diversity and alleged opacity,idioms are regarded as unanalyzable units of language by many. Treating them in the form of idiom chunks in transformational grammar has significantly put off answering the question. New and promising perspectives have been opened up by cognitive linguistics, which declares that most ways of earlier investigations have been inadequate and that idiomatic language can be analyzed, since a large number of idioms are semantically transparent and yield to componential analysis. Chafe (1970:9) a representative of formal semantics says about the origin of idiomaticity that what is treated today as readily available lexemes used to be rooted in literalness:

> Presumably at an earlier stage of English *to drag one 's jeer* had only the literal meaning. At some point in the history of English a change occurred which amounted to the creation of a new semantic unit with the meaning alluded to above:

Chafe speaks of a change, but he does not name the underlying factor of this change: metaphorical extension, which led to an increase in the number of vocabulary items.

Lindner (1983:45) claims that analyzability is a matter of degree:

> In sum, I assume that analyzability is a matter of degree; a compler structure is analyzable to the
>
> extent that some facet (for our purposes, the meanings) of its components are salient in the meaning of the whole.

The author is very close to what cognitive grammarians think of the alleged dichotomy of literal and figurative meanings. She denies that a clear line can be drawn between the two and even discards the assumption that a broad division between them is useful at all.

With the appearance of cognitive grammar linguists begin to view idioms from another perspective, that of conceptualization. Lakoff (1987:38), for example, gives us a more straightforward answer as to the emergence of idioms than Chafe (see above) when talking about 'The Conceptualization of Feeling:

> Is it just that each idiom has a literal meaning and the inferences are based on the literal meanings? Or there is something more going on? What we will uy to show is that there is a coherent conceptual organization underlying all these expressions and that much of it is metaphorical and metonvmical in nature.

I believe with all the variety they exhibit idioms can be productively systematized, which is suggested by the excamples analyzed in this section as well (even though only a certain number of idioms are included). Langacker (1987:24), for example, suggests that the vast majority are analyzable to some degree, with particular facets of the overall

meaning attributed to particular words or morphemes, though he admits that some idioms may be fully opaque. It is him (ibid:93), who offers an analysis of the idiom *let the cat aut of the bag.* The motivating force of the schema descrbing the idiom is, undoubtedly, strong in that it evokes the image of structural similarities extended into aconceptualframework. The bag is a bounded container from which the information emerges. The idea is similar to the one suggested by another idiom, namely, *buy a pig in a poke,* where *poke* is the bounded container (see pp. 124-125 above).

3.3.4 Conclusion

Idiomaticity so long regarded as an obstacle to thorough semantic analysis seems to have gained new grounds. Though the componential diversity and compactness of idiomatic expressions makes them look difficult to handle, this is not always the case.

Metaphorically extended images are largely based on bodily experiences derived from the world around us. Though spatial imagery seems of secondary importance in the course of metaphorical and metonymical extension, it is not, since it is a prerequisite directly facilitating metaphorical mapping. This shift from spatiality to figurative language was undoubtedly crucial in promoting language development in general and expanding the limits of human thinking.

In elaborating the answers to these issues, which have largely been neglected through the inadequacy of the tools of mainstream linguistics we might understand a lot better how abstract entities can be fitted into our conceptual world.

That idiomatic expressions are not produced as self-contained, autonomous

utterances of language, but they are related to various other facets of human thinking as well, can be detected when drawing parallels between the derivative spatial expressions and idiomatic language. An additional factor might be found when proving the relevance of the fact that bodily experiences serve as foundations of abstract notions.

The idiomatic tools in languages like English and Hungarian, which seem to share both spatial metaphorical and spatial metonymical processes are similar and, supposedly, quite a bit of the conceptual framework of figurative language is based on spatiality in both.

As a result, the "anomalies" of idiomatic language blamed for hindering normal processing of language seem, in many cases, unacceptable. Metaphorical exctension of basic notions has made language a completely complex system of communication. Its elements, however, have not come *out of* thin air (in Hungarian *légből* kapott), but they follow the course of a logical string of linguistic structuring that expands communication by means of applying new notions developed on old foundations.

3.4 Metaphor

3.4.1 Examples for metaphorization

Our conceptual system is based on the interactions of people and their environment. 'He is well *ahead of* us', 'He's *at a standstill',* 'It's going to be difficult to

catch up with them and 'He's *lagging behind'* highlight the PROGRESS IS MOTION metaphor based on a variant of *orientational metaphor:* the back-front schema.

Quite a variety of orientational metaphors, some of the UP and DOWN schemata are tightly linked to the *conceptual framework* of figurative language. The following examples are quoted from the Metaphors Dictionary compiled by Sommer & Weiss (1996) to illustrate and prove how various concepts emerge from spatial images. MEMORY/MEMORIES/FORGETTING (1996:281-283)

Container metaphors

1/ In the summer of 1963...[Martin Luther King) forever *etched into public memory* the eloquent words of his Washington "I have a dream " oration - Michael Eric Dyson, "King's Light, Malcolm's Shadow, *The Nesv York Times,* January 13,1993

2/ My brother, / I've saved you in *the icehouse* of my mind - Robert Lowell, "Her Dead Brother" 3/ Old age begins when you *open the trapdoors of your memory* - Artur Lundkvist, *Journeys in Dream and Imagination*

4/ Behind the eyes was a card-index brain that *contained* the vital statistics of Los Angeles - Ross Mac Donald, *The ufoving Target*

5/ His memory opened its gallery of wax-works, and he knew that there, at its far end somewhere

a chamber of horrors awaited him - Vladimir Nabokov, *King, Queen, Knave*

6/ Pictures pass me *in long review* - / Marching columrv~ of dead events - Dorothy Parker, "Ballade at Thirty Five," *Enough Rope*

7/ She rarely took the recollection *out of its pushed-back corner* in her mind - Norah Hoult. "Mrs. Johnson." *Poor Women*

The quotations contain or presuppose particles describing spatial relations of containment. Your memories are *put into a container,* are stored *in a container,* and when you start to be forgetful they *get out of it* through a door as Lundkvist says (see above). The whole scenery matches the description of physical entities, with the exception that it creates figurative images in the human brain.

Orientational metaphors UP-DOWN schema

1/ Duke: Far, far away where sleeps the heron of forgetfulness, *with head beneath his wings*

August Strindberg, *Swanwhite*

2/ Now, *buried under tons of years,* / my eye of sense still sees / that mound coiled full of bright shining new years - Richmond L.attimore, "The Korean Mound at Peitaiho"

3/ His memory *lifted its skirt over this bad patch* and hurried convulsively - Noel Cotvard, "Traveller's Joy"

As the examples show this schema may entail relations of entities to each other as well. When an entity is higher than another it implies *covering* and *hiding,* not only hierarchical structuring.

SUCCESS/FAILURE (Sommer & Weiss, 1996: X11-412) *Achieving success is reaching a goal*

Standing on the burning deck, President Clinton *sailed his ship to victory* in the House of Representatives tonight – R.W. Apple, Jr.*The New York Times,* May 28, 1993

When I was *far away from the larger* that my arrows never hit... Lewis Mumford

Achieving success involves overtaking others (in an imaginary journey)

Right now Masson is *ahead on poinu.* But it is the eighth inning - Richard N. Wingfield, quoted

The New York Times, June 4, 1993

Success is rising, whereas failure is sinking

1/ It's very well for you... you *caught the tide* - Sean O'Faolain, "A Born Genius"

2/ Brutus: There is *a tide* in the affairs of men, / Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. / Omitted, all the voyage of their life / Is bound in *shallows* and in miseries - William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar, Act* 4, scene 3, line 217.

3/...I had the pleasure of using all my strength to pull a long bow, and even the misses did not *lower my self-esteem* - Lewis Mumford

4/ Though only 34 years old, he [Playwright Paul RudnickJ might be a household name by now...had *I hate Hamlet,* his Broadway debut, not been *capsized* by the onstage misbehaviour of its star, Nicol Williamson - Frank Rich, "Review / Theater," *The New York Times,* February 3, 1993

5/ In the midst of this chopping sea of civilized life, such are the clouds and storms and quicksands and thousand-and-one items to be allowed for, that a man has to live, if he would not *founder* and *go to the bottom* and not make his port at all, by dead reckoning, and he must be a great calculator indeed who succeeds - Henry David Thorough, '~Vhere I Lived, and What I Lived For"

JOY (ibid: 238-9)

Feeling joy is rising and flying; the overflowing emotions may f low out of a container or

cover you

1/ I left the presence on the wings *of elation* - Louis Auchincloss, "Portrait of the Artist by Another, “Skinny Island”

2/ Come, on *wings of joy we'll fly* / To where my Bower hands on high - William Blake,'7he Birds"

3/ Anna was intoxicated with the wine of admiration she had *aroused* - Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina

4/ Anna was *floating* in the mid-current of felicity, on *a tide* so bright and *buoyant* that she seemed to be one with its warm waves - Edith Wharton, *The Reef*

5/ Evidently she was always going to understand... the discovery made his cup of bliss *overflow* Edith Wharton, *The Age of Innocence*

6/ A wave of clean joy *swept over* Taylor - Richard Wtight, "Fire and Cloud,"

As the examples above demonstrate it clearly, spatiality only appears as the underlying structure of a comprehensive conceptual framework. Culturally and socially established standards regulate human thinking, and the patterns available may complete each other (entering a container, being bounded in a container, and getting out of a container, which often implies leaving behind constraints). Apart from offering a variety of ways to express all these relations categories may overlap. *Success* and *failure,* for example, can be described in terms of the UP-DOWN SCHEMA (as rising or falling), or the BACK-FRONT SCHEMA (reaching or not reaching a goal). These phenomena reveal a certain degree of flexibility in the structuring of the conceptual system, a latitude available for language users.

3.4.2 Conclusion

Metaphor is part of figurative language. It is partly based on spatiality together with other idiomatic expressions. Spatiality can still be detected in many metaphors and traced back to the SPATIAL DOMAIN through image schemata, which link domains during the metaphorical extension of spatial configurations. Metaphors differ from other components of figurative lanQUaee by being more snontaneouslv

created,and offering quite unexpected associations between entities. This makes them more challenging than the others are, but they form a ubiquitous conceptual system partly overlapping with that of the others. Metaphors and the other constituents of figurative language make it possible for the lexicon to expand, by applying existing patterns of the language for new semantic purposes. .

3.5. **Metonymy**

3.5.1 Some examples of metonymies:

PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING

Go under describes an event where direction relative to an entity stands for the concept of *failure.* It is based on the metonymical extension of a commonly used spatial action, and is firmly grounded on the belief that DOWN means *failure* (also in *fall down* etc.), and UP stands for *success* (As in 'He got to the *top', work up* ete.)

High and low (everywhere)

Here segments of the vertical space stand for the whole.

'I cannot *'take my eyes off* her'

Rather than describe an action with specific verb forms we have the choice of highlighting the body part and applying a verb of general meaning: usually one implying possession or motion. Barcelona (1996:10 suggests that the metonymical expression *I couldn't take my eyes off her* exhibits non-compositional features (see Section 2.1):

In fact, for instance, both *could not take off* and *eyes* (and not only *eyes)* jointly and inseparably yield the general metonymic reading 'unavoidable, insistent behaviour by means of the eyes'. lfiis reading is arrived at in a holistic, gestalt-like manner, but *eyes* highlights the body part aspect of the inference, and *could not take off* highlights its behavioural aspect.

'Take one's mind off sth' is quite similar to the one above in the sense that it focuses on the same process of *diversion* with a different body part highlighted. Just like in *'eye* sb *up and down'* or *'eye sb* with *suspicion'* the body part stands for the action associated with it.

'keep one's ears close to the ground `

is a metonymy where a body part stands for the action carried out. The implicational force of the metonymy makes it unnecessary to mention the action associated with the means.

'one's blood boils' and *'in cold blood'*

both imply that the physiological features of the human body like temperature are linked to varieties of temperament. High body temperature is generally thought to be related to high emotional state (the UP schema), which entails that the lack of it can be associated with the lack of emotions (see Lakoff, 1987). When one's blood boils, the contents of an imaginary container may run over. There is an ontological correspondence between the limited capacity of a container and the tolerance level of one's nervous system.

'run one's eyes over sth' and *'make eyes at* sb'

illustrate that parts of the human body take part in imaginary journeys. Much of the difference between the two phrases lies in the fact that the former describes a process in which the body part follows a path designated by the semantic content of the preposition, while it is conceived of as one iteratively targeted at an entity in the latter case as is suggested by the preposition.

Spatial metonymies occur both with *phrasal verbs* and *idioms.* Apart from being apparently similar to spatial metaphors, metonymical spatial configurations are different from them in featuring not the relevant entity but only a salient trait suitable to be mentally associated with the entity represented by it. (In the case of '*making eyes at sth'* it is only the *eyes* that are highlighted and they stand for seeing). It means that there is a certain degree of reciprocity between the metonymical Source domain and the Target Domain. In other words eyes presuppose seeing and vica versa.

In The whole *village* is outside' (metonymy) standing for 'All the people in the village are outside' (literal utterance') the target domain and the source domain of the same ICM are so tightly linked to each other that one may not even notice that a metonymy has come about. With metaphorical relations this matter-of-factness does not always work. On the other hand, it might be absurd to change the relationship between the target domain and the source domain of the metaphor and say 'A red rose is Mary' i.e. reverse the order of the Target and Source domains. A metaphor does not seem to be successful here owing to the fact that the new target domain has no substantial symbolically applicable feature that could be matched with that of the source domain, and humans seem to get priority over non-humans.

Undoubtedly, both speakers and listeners of English need to be aware of certain

cultural, social and other aspects of the language to be able to understand why an entity can stand for another within a metonymical relationship. The contiguity of relations

between the source and target domains defines a smooth transition within one domain. As Gibbs (1979:261) remarks:

> The evidence therefore suggests that understanding contextual expressions involving metonymy
>
> requires *quick access to common ground information* to create novel interpretations for these
>
> nonliteral utterances.

3.5.2 Metaphor vs. metonymy

Though the two categories have akeady been partly compared, a more detailed analysis of their features is given below. *A metaphor cannot* be created *within its own conceptual framework,* but it needs a domain shift to be related to the *vehicle,* while a *metonymy is created within its own conceptual domain* by designating *a feature as salient,* rather than feature the whole entity. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:39) say:

> Thus, like metaphors, metonymic concepts structure not just our language but our thoughts, attitudes, and actions. And, like metaphoric concepts, metonymic concepts are grounded in our experience. In fact, the grounding of *metonymic concepts* is ingeneral more obvious than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves *direct physical or causal associations.* Metonymy is, therefore, part of a process of raising one relation out of a complexity of intrinsic relations as salient, and suitable to stand for

> the rest. This feature can be regarded as purely referential by many linguists, but the nature of metonymies actually exceeds this kind of oversimplification. Metonymies can, in reality, be derived from various sources within one and the same domain.

Overlapping categories

Hintikka and Sandu (1994:18-1~9) point out that it is sometimes possible to call the same notion a metaphor or a metonymy *depending on the content of our statement:*

> A neat little example of the metaphor-metonymy distinction is offered by the locution *The Golden State* commonly used for California. This is in any case an instance of nonliteral meaning; California is not made of gold. But what kind of nonliteral meaning do we have here? Is this locution a metaphor or not ? It depends on how it is intended. Many people seem to believe that the great state of California is called "golden" because of this precious metal was plentiful there, leading to the Gold Rush and eventually to statehood. If so, the locution is not a metaphor. As a matter of fact, however, the epithet *golden* is not intended to refer to the history of California but to its looks.

The authors find an interesting aspect of the difference between *metaphor* and metonymy. In a metaphor, drawing meaning *relies more on similarity,* whereas

when there is *a greater reliance on continuity* we are dealing with *metonymy*. It is a pity, and actually a bit surprising that they cannot find any other differences between the two nonliteral expressions except for a vague mention of "a change of realm" in the case of a metaphor quoted from Goodman.

Kövecses (1990:44) suggests that the metaphorical system draws on two major sources; conceptual metaphors (like 'Love is war") and conceptual metonymies (like 'physical agitation stands for anger"). Thus metaphorical language has alternative sources to rely on to build up its conceptual system, one (metaphor), where deeper insight is necessary to establish associations between two entities, and another (metonymy), where inclusion is understood to be a more natural sign of the contiguity between the two entities.

At the same time, metonymies seem to offer an alternative to the metaphorical extension of non-figurative notions. Though metonymies and metaphors share a number of features that make them look alike, they differ to some extent. *Firstly,* metaphors require a domain shift, whereas metonymies don't. *Secondly,* only some aspects of the Source Domain are carried over with metaphor, while metomymy restricts the transfer to a more intrinsic relationship. *Thirdly,* metonymies are more direct associations than metaphors are. *Fourthly,* a metonymy is rather *a stand jor-relationship.* Structurally, a metaphor and metonymy are similar in both having a vehicle and a target, but while the vehicle joins two conceptually related ICM-s with the former, the latter is restricted to one.

Taken-for-grantedness is a crucially different feature of metonymy from metaphor where the tenor can theoretically be associated with quite a few vehicles (and what is understood by the speaker and the listener do not always coincide). (Even less prominent features may serve as a justifiable basis for linking one ICM to another). If

this reciprocity is really true, it entails another significant difference between metüphors and metonymies: the Source Domain and the Target Domain are the same with metonymies (so reversible), while between those of metaphors it is not. Thus it may be easier to associate the target domain of a metonymy with the source domain (and vica versa), whereas with a metaphor it may not. This is confirmed by Gluksberg and Keysar (1979:415), who point out that metaphorical comparisons are irreversible:

> Because metaphors are class-inclusion statements,they behave in exactly the same way. Like literal class inclusion statements, assertions like “sermons are sleeping pills” are anomalous when reversed "sleeping pills are sermons'.

Though metaphors and metonymies are distinctly different from each other they offer similar approaches to phenomena, and can be conjoined as well.

Metonymy and meicrphor conjoined

Mac Cormac (1985:36) suggests that when giving the name "speedy" to a fast runner, the metonymy does not cross categories and does not produce semantic anomaly. If he is called "flash", however, the *metonymy is also a metaphor* because we are taking the category of light (the "flash" of lightening or the "flash" of a "flashgun" on a camera) and applying it to a human being, a category with the semantic marker Animate.

It seems, therefore, that the correspondence between metonymies and metaphors is not a one way street. Both metonymies and metaphors are vitally important in extending the lexicon, and make language nicer not only for aesthetic reasons, but also because they demand more creativity, and a higher emotional state than non-figurative language.

3.5.3 Conclusion

Metonymy, unlike metaphor, does not come about in the course of a domain shift, but through intrinsic associations. Apart from the differences between metaphor and metonymy, the latter has also developed a conceptual system of its own. Generally speaking, metonymy is regarded as a stand-for relationship whereby an entity is used as if it was another. It has pervaded language easily by being a product of intrinsic meaning association, and has largely contributed to language development.

4.1.1 UP

4. Image schemata

4.1 Image schematic analysis of particles

Several idioms include the particles UP or DOWN which make up a complex conceptual network. *Down with the rich/poverty* can be fitted into the conceptual categories: UP is *success* and *ambition;* DOWN is *failure* and *lack of ambition.*

UP for *success* and *ambition:*

He has *got to the top.* They are *high-rank* officers. We have *had a flying start.* Joe is a *high flier.* Mary has passed her exams *with flying colors.* She was *flying* too *high.*

DOWN for *failure* and *lack of ambition:*

He has *come down.* He is *in low water* (=short of money). Joe *is in deep water. He wasn't up to the mark* (Hung.: 'nem ütötte meg a szintet', which means 'He didn't meet standards'). They proved to be *below our expectations.*

Looking at idioms there is a remarkable correspondence between the spatial ses of the particle *up* and its conceptual framework in idiomatic expressions. It refers to an *increase* in a level in *up to a point,* to *completion* and *readiness* in *all dressed up and / with nowhere to go,* it suggests a sense *over* has in phrases like *up and down the country /land/stairs* while implying the idea of motion. This is quite similar to what can be observed in the case of *orientational metaphors* like HAPPY is UP. It is also noticeable that the particle up signifies *increase* and *completion* with both *phrasal* verbs and *idioms.*

To illustrate the similarity between the basic schematic structuring of spatial ressions and their corresponding figurative derivatives I am going to divide my examples into these two relevant groups.

4.1.1 UP

THE LOCATIONAL DOMAIN

The particle UP presents a relatively small number of options by being limited in its spatial use to either 'location higher' or 'to a place higher', which is a directional variant. In tune with the spatial designation the metaphorical extensions can be broken down into these two schemata when stripped of the conceptual framework they are embedded in.

'spatial locative' , 'spatial directional'



Fig.l. Gwyneth lives *up* the hill Fig.2. Trevor walks *up* the hill every day

(Bennett,1975:88)

Though no real motion is involved in the first of the following examples from Taylor (quoted in Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1993:156), they may both be suggesting a directional sense:

a! There's a row of trees going up the hill.

b/ Follow that row of trees up the hill.

THE ABSTRACT DOMAIN

'locative' ‘directional’

Fig.3. a. He is in *high* spirits. Fig.4.a. His spirits *rose.*

b. He wasn’t *up* to much. b. Cheer up!

The examples above demonstrate a schematic overlap between the LOCATIONAL and SPATIAL DOMAINS and the ABSTRACT DOMAIN.

Owing to the variety of particle meanings in phrasal verbs, the idea of *increasing* or *completion* can only be detected in just a few phrasal verbs. In the rest of the cases, the latter can be detected mostly in the prototypical meanings (since the idea of completion and reaching high level is present in many cases, even if not overtly). *'Keep up with* the Joneses' may be an example for this, since the prototypical meaning refers to higher standards to be attained, but the actual meaning implies 'possession of properties', 'luxury holidays' etc.

4.1.2 DOWN

THE SPATIAL DOMAIN

The notion presented by DOWN clearly suggests either a 'location lower than' or 'direction towards a lower location'. These are associated with quite a variety of abstract notions.

Examples for the SPATIAL DOMAIN:

'in a location lower than' 'to a location lower than'

Fig. 5. Mary is already *down.* Fig. 6. Jack went *down* the road.

In both cases the particle is part of a configurational setup, but it can be applied to describe a figurative message as well, as in *Joe is down and out.*

Hungarian is also based on similar metaphotlcal extensions of spatial notions as is suggested by 'maga *alatt* van' (literally: He is *under* himself/ or He is *under* his seat). *Die down* and *calm down* seem to corroborate the assumption that DOWN suggests decreasing level of noise or emotional level.

Schematic presence of the CONFIGURATIONAL and the LOCATIONAL DOMAINS in the ABSTRACT DOMAIN. They are not to be separated as they seem to have obtained meanings based on SAD, SICKNESS, FAILURE ARE DOWN in the ABSTRACT DOMAIN:

'locational lower'	'to locational lower'
Fig. 7. Joe was *down* in the mouth	Fig. 8. Joe *fell down* the job
Joe was low-spirited	Joe's spirits *sank*
Joe was *down* with flu	Joe *fell* into *depression*

4.1.3 OVER

The particle over has been analyzed by several linguists like Brugman (1983), Lakoff (1987), Radden (1991) and others. The reason why it has attracted so much attention might be that it reveals a complexity of schematic meanings which are missing in the case of other particles (like the ones above). Brugman (1983) analyzes a large number of the senses of *over* and concludes that lexical items are natural categories of senses. Her analysis is based on two distinct parts; a/ the determination of relations between spatial senses and b/ focussing on the metaphorical extensions of the Spatial senses. Apart from classifying the senses of *over* she had to cope with the

problem of how to explain that the variety of senses chained up actually derive from various grammatical categories like *preposition, adverbial particle, adverb, prefrx* and others. The significance of her work is that she managed to prove the interrelatedness of senses even through the boundaries of grammatical categories.

Looking at the relationship between *landmark* and *trajector* we can observe quite a variety of options. Compared to its occasional synonym, *above,* which is limited to expressing differences in level between the two constituents of spatial configuration mentioned above, *over* has a lot more to offer.

As Hungarian uses case endings and preverbal elements to express what English does with particles it is important to see what Hungarian linguists think of this issue. Kenesei (1976:373) quotes Keresztes (1975:203), who compares the English *above* and *over,* and suggests that a variety of case endings can be rendered to them such as -n, on,- ön, -val kapcsolatban, -n keresztül, át etc. This shows the complex problem of comparative linguistics, and also the fact that a particle can have quite a variety of meanings available, which might lead to overlap between the semantic content of various particles.

4.1.3.1 Above vs. over

I. The lack of contact between trajector and landmark, which is typical with *above,* is not always true with *over:*

1/ She spread the tablecloth *over* the table.

2/ There was a big mess all *over* the place.

II. *Above* is usually limited to denoting static relations, and cannot be used to describe the trajector of a flying or moving entity, while *over* often does so:

3/ The hot-air balloon flew *over* the desert. (lack of contact) 4/ The cat climbed *over* the fence. (contact)

III. Being a more flexible alternative in denoting spatial relations, *over* has a wide range of combinations with verbs.

5/ knock over, fall over, run over, be over, look over, get over etc., each reveals a schematic specificity of meaning.

IV. Short of the potential of variability, *above* cannot be preposed in a verbal, pronominal or adjectival compound, unless embedded in a hyphenated compound, whereas *over* can (above-mentioned).

6/ override, overshoot, oversleep, overspill, overstrung, overweight, overlook, overjoyed etc.

V. Apart from being constrained in several different ways, *above* is less likely to produce idiomatic meaning, i.e. it is rarely subject to the metaphorical extension of spatial meanings. *Over* has a variety of metaphorical meanings, and has developed a large number of conceptual meanings as well as is proved by the analysis of phrasal verbs.

7/ Over and over again, Over my dead body, Over sb's head, Over to you.

4.2 Schematic denotation in different parts of speech containing over

4.2.1 Preverbal element

The preverbal element including *over* refers to many concepts, some of which can be divided into distinct semantic groups.

1/ authority and *control*

Override suggests *authority* and *control.* Orientational metaphors implying higher position suggest that those who are in lower or inferior position, are exposed to the decision-making of those higher, which is in accordance with human experiential basis. The physical basis of fiwrative notions can clearly be observed in a variety of compounds including *over* or its antonym: *under*. Other examples for the same concepts include: overrule, overlord, oversee, overmaster, overpower etc.

Fig. 9.

2/ Excess

Overburden, overblown, overdress, overleap, overpay, overrate etc. suggest excessive level, on account of the spatial meaning of *over* denoting motion along a path and beyond a point located on it.

Fig. 10.

3/ Surpassing

Overstep, overspill, oversexed, *overkill* etc. are quite closely related to the previous group in the sense that their meanings suggest a kind of excess, but they are not necessarily identified with negative meaning. At the same time their spatial background can perhaps even more strongly be felt than in the other groups as the Hungarian counterpart suggests as well (overstep= *túllép* vmin).

Fig. 11.

4/ Past a boundary

*Over*board can either be used to refer to a spatial configuration, or figuratively, and thus it presents a kind of borderline case between two domains: SPATIAL and ABSTRACT. Similarly: overcloud, overlap etc.

Fig.12.

4.2.2 Preposition

Brugman (1983:10) describes the schematic behavior of the preposition *over,* and compares it with *across* and *above.* Her analysis suggests that *bver* incorporates the other two, which is corroborated by what Lakoff (1987:416-461) says as well:

The plane flew *over* the field

In the above example, the trajector ("the plane") is a single point relative to the landmark The landmark itself can have any topological characteristics - - its shape is not important in this particular sense. The trajector is in a position vertical to, and not in contact with the landmark. So one of the dements of *over* in this sense is that it excpresses the same relation as *above.* Similarly, the trajectory traced by the trajector corresponds to one dimension of the landmark: that is, the line segment traced by the trajectory defines one dimension of the landmark and canonically crosses one or more boundaries of the landmark These elements are exacctly those which characterize the category *across.* Notice that either *above or across* can be substituted for

over in (1), with grammatical results; but either *above* or *across* provide less information about the event than *over* does, since it incorporates both the other concepts.

The preposition *over* seems to incorporate the other two from another point of view as well. While *above* presupposes no contact between landmark (LM) and trajector (TR), *across* usually does so, which are features combined by *over*. At the same time, neither of the other two prepositions can describe the trajector *over can* in sentences like 'The cat climbed *over* the fence', 'Jack walked *over* the mountain', and not even the sense demonstrated in 'The church is *over* the hillock'.

Dirven (1993:83) draws a parallel between the use of *over* and *about* exhibited in their semantic extension to Place, Time, Area and Cause:

(a) Place: *over the mountain*

(b) Time: *over the whole year*

(c) Area: *debate over*

(d) Cause: *argue / fight over*

Quite naturally, the schematic representations of these examples differ a great deal from each other:

Fig 13. (a) Fig.14. (b) Fig.l5. (c) Fig.16. (d) Dirven remarks (ibid:95) the following concerning the use of *over* and *about:*

Since the movement associated with *over* is less hectic and implies a two-way or a repeated

movement, causal *over* is limited to reciprocal verbs such as *fight, argue,* etc. or to predicates

implying repeated thought movements such as *hesitant over*.

Lakoff (1987: 416-461) finds four distinct senses of *over* schemata; *covering, excess,*

sense of *over* is the Above-Across sense. Both authors, however, seem to ignore

examples involving a combination of path and indefinite goal, like in the following

examples:

a/ Geoffrey lives *over* the mountain. b/ the marksman shot *over* the target.

The first example could be interpreted the following way: G. lives at the end of the path leading to the other side of the mountain from the speaker. The second example cannot be paralleled with the meaning of *above* or *across,* but its meaning is close to that of *beyond.*

Fig.17. (a) Fig.13. (b)

Finally, Taylor (1993:16) suggests that *up, down, through* and *over* (and

marginally *past)* can denote the multiplex place of an extended 1-D TR if the TR can define a potential path.

a/ There's (a tunnel/*a vein of ore) *througk* the mountain.

b/ There's (a way/*a row of houses) *down* the hill.

c/ There's (a footpath/*a fence) *over* the hill.

d/ There's (? a main road/* a row of trees) *past* our house.

4.2.3 Adverbial particle

In the schematic structure of adverbial particles the trajector and landmark coincide while with prepositions they don't, as was pointed out by Brugrnan (1933:43). The two examples she illustrates it with are:

a/ The drunk teetered and *fell over.* b/ He *fell over himself* to be nice to her.

Fig. 19. (a) Fig. 20. (b)

The curved trajectory that is applicable with the particle *over* cannot be found with any other particle, which makes it a unique schematic tool. In a metaphorical extension, which many particles are exposed to, much of the spatial denotation may be modified, but the basic schematic structure may remain roughly the same.

Observe the two-directionality of TR relative to LM in the following examples:

Fig. 21. (a) take *over* sb swhere Fig.22. (b) take *over* a country

The idea of *repetition* can also be expressed with this particle. This involves a number of imaginary journeys from Source to Goal which are metaphorically extended to express abstract notions as well. And again, Hungarian may help us understand what really happens here. 'Count it *over!'* can be rendered as 'Számold *át!'* in Hungarian. Here the preverbal element has become postponed, and it denotes the same idea of describing a journey from A to B as its English counterpart.

Johnson (1987:112-138) suggests that the internal structure of the PATH schema provides a basis for many metaphorical mappings from concrete, spatial domains onto more abstract domains. Johnson mentions the PURPOSES ARE

PHYSICAL GOALS METAPHOR, and draws a further parallel between the physical and the abstract worlds:

> In our culture, for example, we have a metaphorical understanding of the passage of time based on movement along a physical path. We understand mental activities or operations that result in some determinate outcome according to the PATH schema. And we understand the course of processes in general metaphoticallv as movement along a path toward some end point.

Iteration is an important feature of *óver* as well, as the examples below show:

Fig.23. a/ do *over* ('repaint') Fig.24 b/ do *over (* 'repeat') Fig.25.c/ puzzle *over*

Image schematic structures may denote causal relations as well. Schema c was taken from Radden (1991:196), who introduces the notion *mobile object* (MO=TR) to refer to the agentive role. Though the last example reveals the prepositional role of *over,* it expresses *iteration.*

4.3 Conclusion

The analysis of *over* is more complex than that of UP and DOWN, but the obvious reason for this is that it can orTer more potential approaches than the other two. Several conclusions can be drawn after looking at the samples of English. *Firstly, over* offers a variety of schemata, which proves its flexibility and variability. *Secondly,* the Source of metaphorical structuring which demonstrates basic structural similarities

between spatial and figurative meanings. *Thirdly, over* can sometimes denote two different directions in the SPATIAL and ABSTRACT DOMAINS even when they are conjoined with the same verb (see the schemata with *take over). Fourthly, over* can denote both *vertical* and *horizontal* motion, or conceptual structuring. And *finally, over* can combine the meanings of other particles as well (like *above, across* and *beyond,* but it is more complex in terns of schematic potentials.

Though the other particles *(up* and *down)* reveal a simpler schematic structuring, they do play a very important role in not only spatial, but the conceptual structuring of language as well. The differences between English and Hungarian are significant, but they show a surprising number of coincidences only to prove the common grounds of metaphorical language in both: the SPATIAL DOMAIN. One final remark can be that the intermediary role of particles makes it possible for language to reapply its tools in new domains as well to denote new concepts based on old structural patterns.

Though the examples analyzed above are of more tentative nature than the results of processing a huge databank, I do believe that they reflect tendencies which are operational in the English language. The understanding of these mechanisms may allow insight into the structuring of human thinking, and may inspire us to further explore how the conceptual world and the spatial world are interrelated through schemata as well.

5.Traces of Spatiality in English and Hungarian Idiomatic Expressions

5.1. Introduction

Now that we are aware of what cognitive semantics can offer us in the semantic analysis of the lexicon, it is time we carried out the final test comparing traces of spatiality in English and Hungarian. This may prove useful by bearing out the results achieved so far. We have found that cognitive grammar has offered a new way of approaching and understanding language, thus ,making it possible for many linguists to start thinking of language phenomena in terms of diversity but interrelatedness, complexity but analyzability, unpredictability but motivatedness.

The roots are more or less clear: language has gone through a large number of changes in accordance with the mental capacity of its speakers, the influence of its environment etc. As second language speakers often use utterances whose underpinnings are rather vague, it is necessary to find out more about them. There may have been changes in language itself but they are only quantitative since language has always been idiomatic. There has been an essential change, however, in the approach to idiomaticity: non-compositionality as a guiding principle has appeared in the study of language.

Literal language, regarded as the sole source of lin~istic raw material for a long time, has never really baffled linguists in as many ways as idiomatic language by reason of its being a kind of matter-of-fact and relatively clear p~ of language. Towards the end of the 1980s cognitive linguists argued that language is not be divided into these allegedly existing parts (see Section 2.6). When elements of fiwrative language like *idioms, phrasal ver3s* and even *metaphors* are carefully examined they seem to reveal

An amazing abundance of conceptual or structural diversity linking themup into a

complex language system. The shift from the spatial to the figurative domain is possible through metaphorical extension, which does not separate them but provides continuity linking them. Direct bodily experience and interactions between entities have gained new metaphorical senses and thus language is extended by means of *metonymies* and *metaphors.*

The primary aim of this chapter is to compare the spatial environments underlying figurative thinking in English and Hungarian. The semantic content of adverbial particles in English will be consistently compared with those of *preverbal elements* in Hungarian, which can be justified by the fact that the latter are closely related to adverbials (Benczédy et.al., 1968/91:66) Other Hungarian counterparts can be nominal *case endings* (-ból,ből etc.) and the *postposition:* kívül (an adverbial relation-word), each implying *separation,* the prototypical meaning of *off* (as in *off the record* - jegyzőkönyvön *kívül* and *off the cuff* - kapásból] . The adverbial particle examined below is *off;* since other particles have been thoroughly treated.

As far as the relationship between spatiality and idiomaticity is concerned, Langacker points out (1987:149):

> By definition, basic *domains* occupy the *lowest level in hierarchies of conceptual complexity:*
>
> they furnish the *primitive representational space necessary for the emergence of any specific conception.*. Basic domains constitute a range of conceptual potential, and particular concepts can be taken as exploiting that potential in various ways.

Thus spatiality is important in the construal of higher level conceptual categories. In fact, gradual, prototypical structuring can be observed in complex verbal expressions like phrasal verbs (see Section 3.2). When examining meanings of phrasal verbs one can assume that the starting point is often purely spatial meaning developing through metaphorical extension into figurative ones. This spatial aspect as was pointed out) can still be traced back in the majority of the cases. It might be assumed that basic, spatial meanings were applied earlier than idiomatic ones and not the other way round. *Go under* (from Cowie & Mackin, 1975:143), for example, seems to have developed the spatial meaning:

1/ one's 'sinking below the surface of the sea' (lesüllyed)

2/ 'one's failing or becoming bankrupt' i.e. one sinks töwards the negative pole of a scale with two extremes; *UP=success* (the + pole) and DOWN= *failzrre* (the - pole) on it, or (elmulasztlszalaszt pl. lehetőséget; korrumpálódik= lesüllyed erkölcsileg).

3/ signifies 'disguising' one's identity' (leplez=elrejt).

There is a noticeable change even in the source meaning, which is a spatial metonymy, as the medium is not mentioned. The number of expressions involved in the analysis is growing, thus it cannot be regarded complete. The examples given below are of analytic nature, and their semantic denotations only serve as parts of their underlying meaning-structures. The meanings they have today are clearly based on the schematic structuring demonstrated in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. of the dissertation.

5.2 Meaning and domain shift

Major tendencies operating language can be as follows:

A/ Gradual semantic extension from more literal towards more figurative meaning.

B/ Development of a variety of particle meanings in the case of the majority of particles.

C/ The same particle meaning can be observed in various phrasal verbs.

D/ Particle meanings can often be paralleled with ones in other. elements of idiomatic language.

E/ There is a palpable correlation between particle meanings in various domains of language.

F/ Each particle meaning can be understood by means of image schemata.

The following examples might corroborate the assumption that most phrasal verbs make up a system of interrelated items. Hungarian translation is provided in brackets to demonstrate semantic correlation between the two languages. The semantic categorization of phrasal verbs is based on a practice book on phrasal verbs by D. Britten and G. Dellar (1989).

A/ Gradual extension from more literal towards more figurative meaning:

The basic meaning of the particle OFF is *departure,* which appears in several phrasal verbs like *dash off* (elintéz, elvégez etc.), *rush off* (elszáguld) etc. The latter example refers to *horizontal motion* but *vertical motion* can also be designated by the very same particle: *get off* (leszáll), *take off (felszáll).*

B/ Development of a variety of particle meanings in the case of the majority of particles: Other meanings of the very same particle include *interruption:* like in *break off* one's engagement (megszakít, where the preverbal element refers to completeness, while the verb to separation), *leave off* doing sth (lemond vmiről) etc.; *arrangement: finish sth off* (elintéz emit; elbánik vmivel), *rub sth off* (ledörzsöl/kapar/vakar) etc.);

success: come off (jól sül *el), be well-off* (jómódú = jó1 van elerésztve); *separation:* get off (leszáll), *fall off* (leesik). Even idiomatic meanings like *rip off* reveal fairly good correspondence with their Hungarian counterparts (elemel), *rattle sth off* (elhadar, eldarál).

C/ The same particle meaning can be observed in various phrasal verbs.

A proof of this statement can be observed in the following phrasal verbs with OFF: *kick off* (elkezd), *see off* (elkísér), *ser off* (eTindul) etc., where action is started or a imaginary location is left behind.

D/ Particle meanings can often be paralleled with ones in other elements of the idiomatic language.

The idiom 'You *are off colour'* signifies *separation* in the course of a physiological process where one leaves behind one's color, and becomes pale (elhagyta a színe - a metonymy). 'I could have *bitten off my tongue'* - figuratively signifies *regret* expressed in terms of the *separation* of the organ of speech blamed for causing trouble *(le* tudtam

volna harapni a nyelvem). 'He *is off his head'* again signifies *separation* of someone from his normal mental activity, as if it was him who was separated from his normal mental activity (signified by *head* - a metonymy) (elment az esze - projecting the metaphorical image of the journey mentioned above- symbolizing the process of one's becoming mad). It is quite clear from the examples that once the particle is used in metonymical context the agent (and direction of event) changes. (It is the agent who leaves his normal physiological and mental condition behind.)

E/ There is a palpable correlation betlveen particle meanings in various domains of language:

Particle meaning can be shared by several domains such as the CONFIGURATIONAL, LOCATIONAL, TEMPORAL, COLOUR, ABSTRACT etc. The particle appears in the CONFIGUR.ATIONAL DOMAIN: He *took* his hat *off* (levette kalapját). The spatial domain featuring two or three-dimensional space is an ideal prototypical domain for configurational descriptions. When an event can no longer be described in terms of two or three dimensions but only as a point on a scale, it can be represented in the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN. 'The food has *gone off* (megromlott; a verb which signifies that good and bad qualities are on the two extremes of the scale; as Lakoff and Johnson, (1980) pointed out *good* is UP, whereas *bad* is DOWN.

The TEMPORAL DOMAIN: George *took a week off* work (kivett egy hét szabadságot -emergence out of a container). The temporal domain in Givon's (1979:ch.8) and Langacker's (1987:148-9) analysis might be considered more fundamental than the spatial one by being a prerequisite of actions occurring in space:

> the conception of spatial relations linvolves scanning, which requires processing time, and our notions of spatial e.~tension are intimately bound up with time-extended physical actions.

The same can be observed in connection with some cases of the locational domain, as in the case of food *going off* (since a prerequisite of the event is *time,* running parallel with the chemical process, and even after its end-point).

The same particle can refer to the COLOUR DOMAIN as in 'He *is ojf color',* which looks like an imaginary journey during which somebody is left behind by his

color (as is justified by the Hungarian counterpart: elhagyta a színe). Part / whole relations include normally inalienable possession of the former by the latter, since your color cannot exist without you.

F/ The operation of utterances belonging to this or that domain can be understood in terms of image schemata that highlight the skeletons of utterances involving basic spatial or even locational features. As a result utterances referring to the configurational domain can be compared with ones describing other domains. *Cooling off* (lehűl) after running or *easing off* (lanyhul =lecsökken) both involve actions that can be described as

being on the lower end of a scale; a prerequisite of cooling off is *high* body temperature, while the easing off of a situation presupposes former *tension,* which is associated with *growing.* SimilarÍy, *'kicking off a* journey' (elkezd) highlights the physical features of one's beginning a journey (spatial description) in contrast with *'sparking off* arguments' (kirobbant=elindít), where the starting point of an imaginary journey (symbolizing argumentation) is designated by the phrasal verb. *'Drop off* dead' (elhalálozik) describes the event as the termination of a journey, whereby the deceased person is separated from life.

5.3 Prototypical meaning present in sense relations

The following examples will hopefully testify how basic prototypical meaning can be detected in a variety of meaning structures in phrasal verbs. The phrasal verb to be examined is *put off:* The following ordering of phrasal verb meanings is in accordance with the one to be found in the Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic Enelish.

1/ *Put off a* decision (elhalaszt) - *separation* of the time of decision-making to another point on the time scale is described.

2/ *Put off* a person – (*el*ijeszt*)* – one's *separation* from a person.

3/ His behaviour *put ofj* many customers (elriaszt) (i.e. put them off shopping) - (un)intentional *separation* of customers from a shop through the bad manners of an agent.

4/ He wanted to work but the noise *put* him *off* (elvonja a figyelmét)- *separation* of full concentration from work

5/ She was *put off* studying by constant nudging by her mother (elmegy a kedve vmitől) - *separation* of agent and the act of studying.

6/ I asked him to *put* me *off* at the station *(ki/letesz)- separation* of vehicle and hiker. 7/ Why not *put off* your worries? (elfelejt)- *separation* of listener and worries.

8/ The smell of gas soon *put* him *off* (elkábít)- *separation* of consciousness and person affected.

The English word in italics *separation* only demonstrates *a prototypical sense* present in all meanings, but it does not coincide with dictionary meaning. The examples above seem to bear out the assumption that prototypical meaning can be detected in other related meanings which only include it as a partial feature. Whether one Hungarian preverbal element or the other is incorporated in verbs *(le-* or *el-),* they imply a certain degree of *separation* as well. The first implies detachment from a higher point while the latter refers to separation on a horizontal plane.

5.4 Phrasal verbs

Phrasal verbs are multi-word verbs consisting of a lexical verb plus an adverbial particle (see -Section 3.2). As is pointed out in the chapter in brackets recent analyses have demonstrated (M. Goodale, 1993 and D. Britten-G.Dellar, 1989) that the semantic content of a phrasal verb is not often a new meaning gained when the verb and particle are combined but particle meaning can be dominant and essential in enforcing the semantic content engrained in it and it either suppresses the semantic content of 'weaker' verbs like *get* by developing its own conceptual structure, or supplements that of 'stronger' verbs like *run.* This can best be proved by two facts: 1/ a large number of phrasal verbs share the same conceptual framework underlying them regardless of what ,, I automatism in many speakers of English.

5.5 Idioms

The statement: 'Peter, unfortunately, *let the cat out of the bag',* for instance, would no t be interpreted literally by many people literally unless it is required so by the situation (*ki*kottyant –both English and Hungarian use the container metaphor for revealing secret).

Particles that are constituents of some idioms exhibit similar semantic traits to the ones that could be observed in phra sal verbs. It is, therefore, not surprising at all that analyses of this kind allow us to understand how constituents of idioms can sematically contribute to their global semantic content.

Let off steam -, for example, signifies an act where one gets rid of the tension bottled up inside. In other words, as the prototypical meaning of the particle suggests that one is *separated from it (ki*ereszti a gőzt –Hungarian seems to prefer the container metaphor to express the same notion).

Come off it! – the agent is warning someone to stop pretending (Hagyd *el*!). The particle applied suggests that the person warned should leave the course of action behind (as a result should become separated from it).

Have an off-day – (*rossz* napja van) evokes an image depicting one day in the life of someone as being unusually unlucky or bad and thereby different (i.e. in a way separate) fromordinary, normal ones. We need to recall the metaphor *good* is *UP, bad* is *DOWN* from Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

*Be able to charm the bird off the tree – (Hung.: kb. Ki*énekli a sajtot a holló szájából) el(highlights the result of an extremely difficult action. The particle, representing relational predication, establishes relationship between the schematically designated entity (tree) and an open category for an agent/agents. The idiom used can be associated with a potential situation that allows the listener to decode the utterance. Only then can it become specific in its denotation.

Finally, *carry off the palm-,* (elviszi a pálmát), a metonymy (see *come off* for *success*), describes one's achieving success as the starting point of an imaginary journey (and the end-point of another potential journey understood to have preceded it), but *palm* is associated with *victory.* Here the agent and the schematic object of the action move along a trajector,which is,asis described by the relation-word,gradually separated from the location of departure.

5.6 Conclusion

The similarities (though partial ones) between English and Hungarian idiomatic languages based on the very same principle suggest that these languages, for the most part, are not composed of arbitrarily applied, unrelated elements but they are built from ones which are or may be interrelated with each other. Regardless óf the syntactic behavior of a language, its structuring and the interrelatedness of its constituents can clearly be demonstrated by means of a semantic analysis.

6. Conclusion of research

We have now completed the task of giving an overview of four components of figurative language. We presumed at the outset of this work that they could be analyzed with the same linguistic means. Our goal defined in the Introduction (Chapter 1) was to prove the following assumptions:

• It is *cognirive grammar* that can offer suitable tools for a comprehensive analysis of figurative language. Several books and studies quoted in the dissertation focussed on different components; Lakoff and Johnson (1980] wrote on metaphor and metonymy, Moon (1998) on idiom, Lindner (1983) on phrasal verbs, but no one has attempted to analyze and classify them with the same means of cognitive grammar in one study.

• *Spatiality* serves as the *underlying domain of* various *constituents* of figurative language. This spatial source can still be detected in them all**.**

• The *four constituents* of figurative language *can be analyzed* and *classified***,** and they are not unsystematic.

• Adverbial particles, just like prepositions,'play an important role in establishing links between constituents of both spatial configurations and abstract ones too. Metaphorical extension, however, results in *a conceptual system* that has only *preserved traces of* the *spatial origin.*

• There is *an abundance of* the *conceptual meanings* revealed by the components of figurative lanwage.

• Though these *conceptual meanings* observable in one component may differ from each other a great deal they are *linked to each other by* orientational metaphors like *up-down, in-out, front-back* etc. *Common frameworks* like these have been *preserved in* the process of *metaphorization.*

Chapter 2 of the dissertation is dedicated to the theoretical background, Cognitive Grammar. It is suggested by cognitive grammarians that the *noncompositional* character of figurative language makes it possible to analyze and systematize them. They suggest that the process of metaphorization (and thereby meaning extension is triggered by image schemata (I,angacker 1987). Schemata are closely *related to prototypes* and they abstract from linguistic information. Cognitive linguists use prototypes to describe sense relations which are crucial in *metonymical* and *metaphorical extension* and thereby in analyzing and systematizing figurative language. I argue that the new approach by cognitive semantics is suitable for the overall work presented in the dissertation.

Chapter 3 includes the components of figurative language concerned. Figurative language is broken down into two major components: *idiomatic* and *nonidiomatic expressions.* This division can be observed among *collocations* and *phrasal verbs* as well. It is proved that the constituents of figurative languáge overlap with each other and that one can even become part of another. This can be observed with *dead metaphors,* which become idioms by being entrenched in language use (Gibbs,

1979:271). This transfer from one component of figurative language into another demonstrates that there are no clear-cut impassable boundaries between them.

We can see in Section 3.1 that *collocations* are very similar to orientational metaphors in that they have developed their distinct conceptual meanings, such as CONTROL, PRESSURE and AUTHORITY depending on prepositional or particle meanings. Concepts have gained spatial orientation, which is obviously based on our bodily experience. Collocations contain a large number of examples for this phenomenon. These findings are based on cultural and social factors which affect language development as well and are in tune with those in the other sections on account of the presence of orientational metaphors in them.

The analysis of *phrasal verbs* (Section 3.2) is supported by the assumption that the majority can be systematized on the basis of particle meaning (ef. Lindner, 1983). The particles chosen (LTP, DOWN and OVER) reflect consistency of meaning and systematicity. It becomes clear from the examples that conceptual meanings largely draw on the SPATIAL DOMA íIV either through metonymical or metaphorical extension. An important result of the analyses is the evidence that prototypical meaning can be extended to domains such as ABSTRACT and EMOTIONAL as well. There is quite an abundance of related senses as it can be obsen:ed in phrasal verbs like break down.

It is demonstrated in Section 3.3 on *Idioms* that the metaphorical mappings of their prototypical meanings resemble those of the phrasal verbs to a large extent. These mappings are reflective of cultural and social trends as well. For example, social ranking can be viewed in the LOCATIONAL DOMAIN, where individuals are ranked on a vertical scale.

Having looked at the other constituents, I suggest (Section 3.4) that *metaphors* share several features with the ones discussed so far. This can be accounted for the fact that meaning extension is *of* either *metorrymical* or *metaphorical nature.* Thus it is no wonder that figurative language is pervaded by orientational metaphors, which may highlight an event from different perspectives. This section suggests that a concept like *success* can be perceived of as *rising on a vertical scale* or *reaching a goal along a horizontal plane.*

It is not only concepts concerning one's status that can be highlighted through metaphors but *emotions* as well. *Positive* emotions generally involve *rising* or *flying* while *negative ones* are associated with *sinking* or *law position.*

I argue in Chapter 4 that *image schemata,* these "highly abstract conceptions" (Langacker, 1999:3) preserve schematic spatial structuring in the TARGET DOMAINS. Thus the SOURCE DOMAIV (SPATIAL or LOCATIONAL) the constituents of figurative language derive from is reflected in the image schematic analysis of each to some extent. It is demonstrated in this chapter of the dissertation how these coarse-grained source structures can motivate the emergence of target structures schematically. It becomes clear from the analysis though that the latter lose a lot of their resemblance to the SOURCE DOMAIN when examined in terms of their conceptual features.

I suggest (Chapter 5) that there is evidence that two different languages like English and Hungarian share a lame number of cultural background features, and even their semantic buildups resemble to some extent. I point out that though their linguistic tools differ, the approaches to various phenomena reveal similarities in their vocabularies.

The conceptual meanings of English particles are incorporated into *preverbal elements, case endings* and *postpositions* in Hungarian. Even the prototypical meaning

present in English phrasal verbs can be paralleled with the Hungarian counterparts: the idea of *separation* is present there too ('the noise *put* him *off* - a zaj elvonta a figyelmét). Container metaphors occur similarly in both languages as in 'let the cat *out of* the bag' vs. *ki*kottyant. It is obvious in both languages that conceptuality is based on the more concrete spatial meanings.

With all the shortcomings that the dissertation may have, I think it has contributed, to some extent, to working out the principles for an analysis of figurative and idiomatic language. The partial results revealed in the various chapters, however, encourage me to go on analyzing English so as to understand the structuring and semantic content of figurative language better. There is still a lot more to do. It is a challenging task to examine how constituents of figurative language are conceptually structured. On the other hand, other languages unrelated to English might be compared with it so as to gain insight into how they are psychologically, socially and culturally conditioned.

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