University Doctoral (PhD) Dissertation Abstract

EXPERT PREDESTINATION
The Role of Expert Witnesses as a Means of Proof and the Legal Framework for Evaluating Expert Evidence

dr. Cséffai Attila Csaba

Supervisor: Dr. habil. Molnár Judit associate professor

UNIVERSITY OF DEBRECEN
Marton Géza Doctoral School of Legal Studies

Debrecen, 2025

I. Research Topic

The currently known and accepted form of expert evidence developed in the second half of the 19th century. In addition to the free system of evidence, the prerequisites for the emergence of expert trials were the development of scientific and technical progress, along with the development of newer and newer expert methods, as well as the changes in the complexity of social processes; however, its spread is fundamentally connected to its probative value. It was observable that means of proof based on objective scientific principles were preferred, and as a result, expert opinions were more readily and frequently utilized. This approach was broken from the mid-1990s by a new type of litigation (cf. Edmond 2008, 53), in which expert activity culminated in the preparation of client-supporting craft reports (Woolf 1995, 183). All of this negatively influenced the perception of experts in court, as a result of which the justice-seeking public began to cling increasingly less to scientific evidence, thereby awakening suspicion towards the overvaluation of expert evidence, and striving for balance with other means of proof.

Expert Predestination, on the one hand, refers to the topic of the dissertation, which deals with the expert as a means of evidence and their role in the evidentiary process. A comprehensive scientific thesis has not yet been written on this topic. The place of the expert and their status in procedural law is, however, significantly more complex than previously assumed by some, and the expert, if not legally, then in fact, often ends up in the role of either the judge or the witness, that is circumstances which cannot be ignored. The vagueness, theoretical underdevelopment of the expert's role in domestic literature, and not least the necessity of formulating criticism against socialist law were the inspirations that led to the writing of this thesis, which also forms the basis of its legitimacy.

The title of the thesis, on the other hand, refers to the perspective through which we view the expert. According to the teaching of the Reformed Church, the word "predestination" refers to God’s decree by which some are chosen for salvation and others for damnation even before birth (preordination), while in its everyday sense, it denotes a trait, situation, or circumstance that designates or makes someone suitable for a certain role or task from the outset (Bárczi–Országh 1980, 826).

Thus, expert predestination fundamentally deals with the role of the expert in court, in such a way that it considers the expert's role to be predetermined even before they perform any procedural act. In view of all this, the dissertation seeks to answer three questions.

II. Research Theses

The first question to be answered is what the role of the expert in litigation is: a judge of fact, perhaps a witness, or an independent procedural actor. However, the answer to this question is not merely of philosophical nature, but also of very practical significance. Through the expert's procedural role, the expert's function in litigation becomes identifiable, which can vary entirely depending on the specific procedural role.

All this leads us to *the second question*, namely whether the expert's place in litigation is fundamentally determined by their procedural status. Here, the author seeks to answer whether the manner in which the expert enters the procedure has a decisive impact on their function in the case, and whether it preordains their role in the litigation. If this can be substantiated, expert predestination is proven.

The third hypothetical question, already building on the thesis of predestination, scrutinizes the assumption of whether, based on the principle of functionality, it is justified to establish a dichotomy of experts in opposition to the monist theory. According to general opinion, regardless of the mode of application, only one kind of expert exists in procedural legal science – namely the Janus-faced expert. However, serious doubts can be raised against this standpoint, and the distinction between two types of experts seems most advisable: the judicial expert and the private expert. These two types of experts differ so significantly in terms of function that their separation appears reasonable, and such bifurcation is not foreign to procedural law (for the separation of the prosecutorial organization, see: Bódiné–Mezey 2003, 204; for the separation of adjudication and prosecution, see: Cséffai 2014/c). The expert dichotomy contributes to making expert evidence more transparent and offers a solution in cases where the expert would be forced into a role fundamentally alien to their procedural function, thus allowing both branches of expertise to fulfill their procedural tasks more professionally.

At this point, the author notes that – since the focus of the dissertation is fundamentally on the expert – the research is procedurally neutral in nature, and its conclusions are equally valid in the fields of criminal and civil procedural law. The author, however, does not specifically address administrative litigation, given that a distinct mechanism of expert evidence has not developed in that field, and such proceedings remain most similar, in this respect, to special forms of civil litigation. In contrast, some of the dissertation's findings are of a general nature and consciously avoid the terminology specific to individual legal branches. Nevertheless, its usefulness may be limited if applied outside the areas of law under examination. The subject of the analysis is, in fact, ordinary first-instance proceedings, given that – using the words of Tamás Grósz (Grósz 2011/b, 21) – procedures conducted under general rules are the most suitable for comparison and drawing conclusions. Therefore, the author maintains the possibility that in certain specific or special proceedings, circumstances may arise due to which the findings of the dissertation may not be entirely or necessarily applicable. Furthermore, it is not the aim of the dissertation to analyze the difficulties related to the evaluation of expert opinions, nor is it intended to explore the structural problems of the expert system itself. Where the dissertation does touch upon such issues, it does so only insofar as the topic necessitates it.

III. Research Methods and Sources

The dissertation, like the most works in continental legal scholarship (Szabó–Jakab 2015, 51), is fundamentally a piece of legal dogmatic research – that is, a theoretically systematizing and analytical work dealing with the interpretive structure of the law. This theoretical approach simultaneously implies the function of legal dogmatics in providing strict systematic order, in which the binding force of the dogmatic structure can be recognized (Pokol 2005, 110). According to the German legal scholar Josef Esser, such "principles, which to a great extent are principles of systematization, represent more or less fixed and made mandatory legal opinions" (Esser–Würtenberger–Müller 1972, 15 [quoted in: Pokol 2005, 110]). This kind of control mechanism is not absolute; however, it can only be bypassed by coherently rearranging the relevant interrelations within the legal material and presenting a new, contradiction-free alternative order embodied in a legal dogmatic model (Pokol 2005, 110). Thus, the legal dogmatic perspective encourages the researcher aiming to alter the existing order to engage in broad theoretical reflection by thoroughly rethinking the connections.

The tools of the research *methodology* assist in all this, determined by the nature and characteristics of the legal field examined. Although the research primarily relied on two dimensions of comparative law – legal history and the theories of comparative law – the application of these together with the legal research method of the qualitative case study enabled the dogmatic analysis to explore the subject in its full depth, including its historical roots.

The research was preceded by thorough and wide-ranging *data collection*. The dissertation processed dozens of journal articles related to expert evidence, numerous collected studies, as well as textbooks and monographs, not only from the Hungarian but also from English- and German-speaking legal areas. In this framework, the author also participated in two study trips. The first took place in 2013, leading to Lausanne, Switzerland, to visit the internationally renowned forensic medical expert, Professor Tamás Krompecher. During the interview, the professor presented the formation and current functioning of the Swiss state system, as well as its regulation of forensic experts – especially medical ones – which may appear considerably underregulated to a legal scholar accustomed to the detail-oriented domestic rules. Given that Professor Krompecher's main field of activity involved the identification of victims of mass disasters, he provided insight into numerous internationally significant cases full of expert challenges, which contributed to broadening the researcher’s perspective and deepening his knowledge. The second study trip took place in 2016 in The Hague, where the goal was explicitly library research – specifically at one of the world’s most famous international law libraries, the Peace Palace Library, housed in the prestigious building of the International Court of Justice. As a result of more than a week of research, a quantity and quality of literature – primarily from the Anglo-Saxon legal domain – was gathered that could not have been acquired domestically, or only with significant effort.

In the dissertation, alongside constitutional court decisions, resolutions published in the Collection of Court Decisions, and anonymized court judgments, various judicial opinions, positions, and guidelines also appear. However, the case analysis is not limited solely to Hungarian adjudication. Decisions related to expert evidence in the practice of the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, or the Court of Justice of the European Union have also been examined – due to the high authority of these institutions and their significant impact on legal practice – just like the case law of the higher courts of the foreign country analyzed.

Naturally, the author was influenced during the research by his own experience as a forensic expert and attorney, but he also considered the informal opinions and impressions of other colleagues. Overall, it can be said that the researcher devoted great care to laying a deep professional foundation for the study, which, he hopes, will be positively reflected in the value of the dissertation.

IV. Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation follows the structure commonly applied in legal scholarly works dealing with experts, which can be divided into four main structural units. *The first major structural unit* (Chapters II–IV) deals with the fundamental conceptual definitions relating to the expert and seeks to clarify the expert's procedural place and status, while also highlighting the expert's function within the administration of justice and, consequently, the issue of constitutional expert testimony. This part is considered of fundamental importance, as it provides the necessary foundation for subsequent analyses and arguments.

The second part of the dissertation (Chapter V) undertakes to present the figure of the expert as it has appeared in Hungarian procedural law from the mid-19th century to the current procedural system. The various periods are examined regarding one another, so the emphasis falls on changes and the emergence of new institutions, while the reintroduction of rules that have remained unchanged or have become insignificant over time receives less attention. This structural unit helps to observe and understand the development of the expert's role through the exploration of the characteristics of the various expert formations, while it does not aim to provide a detailed presentation of each procedural code.

The third part (Chapter VI) addresses the current Hungarian civil procedural law, in the course of which the author provides insight into the new concept of expert evidence. In this context, the dissertation presents in detail the current regulation of expert evidence, the principles applied and their practical implementation, and also aims to highlight the shortcomings experienced by legal practitioners. Compared to earlier sections, the aim of this chapter is no longer to construct theory, but rather to contrast existing theories – that is, to compare and critique the theories of the legislator and the author. Therefore, the dissertation, as a discipline of civil procedure, omits the discussion of the current criminal procedural law. This part includes numerous critical remarks, pointing out areas the legislator has still not managed to address satisfactorily, as well as issues that present challenges for the future.

In *the fourth and final part* (Chapter VII), the researcher summarizes and presents the results of the research and takes a position regarding the hypotheses of the study. To facilitate the use of the research findings, this section also undertakes to formulate *de lege ferenda* recommendations.

V. Summary of the Research Result

The dissertation first and foremost creates its own definition of an expert, simultaneously delineating its scope of interpretation. Accordingly, the author calls an expert a person whose proficiency in some science, art, or craft enables them to assist in clarifying or understanding a certain issue, provided that the court takes such person's opinion into account.

The first part of the concept thus requires expertise itself, which also means that expertise is always a subjective criterion, to be examined case by case in the light of the specific case. The second part of the concept is formal in nature, although it no longer matters how the expert entered the procedure – by appointment, commission, or possibly tacit acceptance. The decisive question is the court's evaluative/discretionary activity, not who called upon the expert. If the court evaluates the statement of a certain specialist, then the person shall be considered an expert, and the statement shall be regarded as an expert opinion.

The two conditions (expertise, judicial recognition) are thus in a conjunctive relationship; the absence of either excludes the possibility of speaking of an expert in the legal sense. Following this anticipation, the dissertation answers the three posed questions as follows.

The research answers *the first question* by stating that the expert's procedural role varies depending on whether their opinion serves as evidence in the procedure or not. If their opinion qualifies as evidence, then the expert is the scientific witness of the facts; if their opinion does not qualify as evidence, then the expert is the scientific judge of the facts. Therefore, which role the expert fulfills is fundamentally important from the perspective of conducting the procedure. At the same time, these roles mutually exclude each other, since one cannot simultaneously be both the source of evidence and not. From this, it also follows that because of the contradictory and exclusive nature of the two roles, uniting the expert in one person, that is, treating the expert as an independent procedural actor, is conceptually excluded.

While *the expert's place* in the proceedings – through the lens of legal scholarship and theory – reflects their procedural legal position, *the expert's status* in the proceedings refers to their position in public law. These two approaches cannot be treated independently, since the configuration of the expert's specific procedural rights and obligations, as well as their relationship with other actors in the procedure, may determine the expert's procedural legal position.

Based on this, in answering *the second question*, the dissertation concludes that the expert's status fundamentally determines their place in the proceedings: how the expert enters the proceeding decisively impacts their function, preordaining their role in the case (*expert predestination*). An expert opinion provided upon appointment by the court is always a forensic expert opinion, in which case the expert becomes so closely tied to the judge's adjudicative activity that the opinion loses its evidentiary character, and the expert assumes the role of the judge's assistant. In contrast, a privately retained expert, who acts as a party's own expert, is so heavily biased in favor of that party that their role resembles that of a witness, effectively becoming the party's witness.

The dissertation then explores the expert's procedural position through different procedural laws and historical periods, examining the civil and criminal procedural codes all the way back to the mid-19th century. This historical analysis outlines the trajectory of the legal development of the expert institution and highlights that both roles of the expert were important enough to remain present throughout the balancing of competing interests within legal proceedings.

It was established that in the long 20th-century Hungarian civil procedure law, the expert's procedural position was continuously characterized by a duality. The legislator and legal theory regarded the expert throughout as an assistant to the judge, which, however, the legislator himself did not take so seriously as to consistently enforce it across the individual laws, thus leaving those gaps through which the expert could take on the role of a party's witness. Without exception, it can be stated that in all past procedural codes there was uncertainty around the role of the expert, which emphasizes that in the field of expert evidence no unified and clear regulatory concept developed, but rather a *sui generis* institution burdened with tensions and difficult to interpret was created by the arbitrary borrowing and recombination of individual dogmatic elements. By the end of the century, however, the unified image of the expert seemed to break down and, adapting to the expert's procedural status, the procedural place doubled, opening the way for the doctrinal regulation of expert evidence.

It was also established that in the long 20th-century Hungarian criminal procedure law, the assessment of the expert's procedural position was broken by socialist legal thinking. Only expert activity organized along the principles of authority corresponded to the rigid, etatist conception of socialist law, so during this period the expert filled the role of assistant, and the evidentiary nature was highly doubtful. In contrast, the procedural codes preceding and following this period treated experts as independent means of evidence, which was more attributable to legal science's uncertainty than to a concrete professional stance. However, the appearance of the review expert and the private expert highlighted that the polarization of the role assumed by experts of opposing parties is able to distinguish between the prosecution's and defense's expert and the court-appointed expert, thereby doubling the expert's procedural place.

Based on all these, the research resolves the third question by stating that, according to the principle of functionality, the establishment of the expert dichotomy is justified; consequently, in the trial, two types of experts exist: the judicial expert and the private expert. Historical experiences indeed show that most problems were caused by the procedural codes uniting functionally incompatible expert roles in one body. However, this unification meant a violence against the expert's position and situation, disregarding the effect of expert predestination, and expected such restraint from the participants of the procedure that already contradicts the nature of litigation. The usual consequence of this was that by the time the expert opinion was completed, the expert usually became a witness or judge of facts. Therefore, nothing is more natural than to separate these incompatible functions from each other and entrust them to different persons, with different rights and obligations.

VI. De lege ferenda

In order to utilize the results of the research, the dissertation puts forward numerous *de lege ferenda* proposals concerning all three expert evidence methods appearing in the current regulation of the civil procedure code.

Regarding *the officially appointed expert*, the author proposes abolishing the current functionally neutral expert evidence system and simultaneously introducing a system based on the expert dichotomy. The current evidentiary system lacks a developed and coherent theoretical foundation, and its short-term effects do not justify its maintenance, as in numerous cases it leads to contradictions and uncertainties during proceedings, raising legitimate questions about its efficiency and reliability. In contrast, the dual expert system offers a more structured and theoretically grounded approach, capable of addressing the existing contradictions and problems, thereby promoting the transparency of the procedure. In summary, it can be stated that the introduction of the expert dichotomy would represent a significant step forward in the development of the expert evidence system and would have a positive long-term impact on the legal system as a whole.

It is also proposed to introduce the classic overruling function of the officially appointed expert, according to which the officially appointed expert would be used in the substantive trial phase only if it is necessary to determine the reasons for the differences between the party-appointed expert opinions, whether any of them require supplementation, or whether a new expert opinion should be obtained in the case. Furthermore, as a general rule, the evidentiary nature of the officially appointed expert would cease to exist, thereby the role of the officially appointed expert assisting the judge in defining the framework of the legal dispute would also be harmonized.

When using the opinion of *an expert officially appointed in other proceedings*, the author sets as an interpretive maxim that the court must pay particular attention to treating it the same way as the opinion of the officially appointed expert in the trial. This requirement includes that both parties should be free to refer to it, which simultaneously enhances the court's participatory role in cases where the formulation of leading questions or questions irrelevant to the case disturb the possibility of fair and equal adjudication. The dissertation also considers that the opposing party of the party presenting evidence should be entitled to use the opinion prepared by an expert officially appointed in other proceedings on the subject matter and to motion for the exclusion of the expert opinion officially appointed in other proceedings, if the party presenting evidence moves for the submission of such an opinion. This also promotes the enforcement of the principle of concentration in proceedings, as the use of expert opinions prepared in other proceedings is only justified to the extent that it does not contradict the purpose of the legal institution.

Regarding *the party-appointed expert*, the author argues that it should be considered – taking into account our legal-historical traditions – that the use of ad hoc experts possessing appropriate expertise for performing private expert activities become the general rule. The expert dichotomy system does not regard private expertise as judicial expert activity; therefore, the guaranteed safeguards that exist for officially appointed experts are either limited or entirely inapplicable in the case of party-appointed experts, which makes their strict application unjustified.

In order to promote equality of the parties, it would also be worth reconsidering the rules on cost allocation and cost reductions, shaping them so that the litigants can effectively exercise their rights. It is inherently unacceptable for the course of expert evidence to depend on whether the parties are poor or wealthy; therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the disadvantaged party can access important expert evidence without financial difficulties posing an obstacle. The advance payment and bearing of party-appointed expert fees by the state is thus a matter that should be assessed based on the fairness and justice of the procedure.

According to the dissertation's position, simplifying and making the rules on party-appointed expert evidence more transparent is a fundamental requirement from the perspective of law enforcement. Under the current rules, the parties and experts find it difficult to follow the individual steps of private expert evidence, and they are often unaware of their procedural rights and obligations, which creates an opportunity for the court to ignore the opinion of the party-appointed expert. It would be more consistent if the party-appointed expert, who explicitly acts as the party's professional representative, and the opposing party only come into contact for the first time after the submission of the party-appointed expert opinion, typically at the hearing, from which point the party-appointed expert could exercise full rights to question and comment. In this context, it would be worth reconsidering whether it is truly justified to exclude the party-appointed expert from contributors, as serious doubts can be identified concerning both the party-appointed expert to be present at the hearing by the party and in the field of evidence-taking.

Finally, the author proposes excluding the scope of the principle of substantive conditionality in cases involving the presumption of an inconclusive party-appointed expert opinion, as it violates the system of free evaluation of evidence by creating a hierarchy among the pieces of evidence and excluding the opinion of a party-appointed expert from consideration even before the evidentiary procedure has been completed. The lawful way to resolve conflicting professional opinions is not the exclusion of evidence, but rather the determination of the necessity for further evidence and the conduct of such proceedings. By discarding evidence, however, the very discovery of truth is put at risk, which fundamentally contradicts human nature's constant desire to uncover the truth.

References

1. Bárczi Géza – Országh László: *A magyar nyelv értelmező szótára V*. Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest 1980.
2. Bódiné Beliznai Kinga – Mezey Barna: A törvénykezés szervei. In: *Magyar alkotmánytörténet* (szerk. Mezey Barna). Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2003.
3. Esser, Josef – Würtenberger, Thomas – Müller, Friedrich: *Methoden der Rechtswissenschaft (Teil 1)*. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München 1972.
4. Cséffai Attila Csaba: Justitia elveszett szemkendője. *Magyar Jog* 2014/c. 3. sz.
5. Grósz Tamás: Szakértői bizonyítás az egyes eljárásokban. *THEMIS* 2011/b. december sz.
6. Pokol Béla: *Jogelmélet – Társadalomtudományi trilógia II.* Századvég Kiadó, Budapest 2005.
7. Szabó Miklós – Jakab András: A jogdogmatikai kutatás. In: *A jog tudománya. Tudománytörténeti és tudományelméleti írások, gyakorlati tanácsokkal* (szerk: Jakab András – Menyhárd Attila). HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó, Budapest 2015.
8. Woolf, Harry Lord: *Access to Justice, Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales*. HMSO, London 1995.

UNIVERSITY AND NATIONAL LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF DEBRECEN
H-4002 Egyetem tér 1, Debrecen
Phone: +3652/410-443, email: publikaciok@lib.unideb.hu

Registry number: DEENK/576/2024.PL
Subject: PhD Publication List

Candidate: Attila Csaba Cséffai
Doctoral School: Géza Marton Doctoral School of Legal Studies
MTMT ID: 10025080

List of publications related to the dissertation

Articles, studies (8)

1. Molnár, J., **Cséffai, A. C.**: A más eljárásban kirendelt szakértő véleménye és felhasználása a polgári perben.
   Magyar jog. 71 (6), 341-349, 2024. ISSN: 0025-0147.
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A
2. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Szakértők a bűnvádi perrendtartásban.
   Jog, állam, politika. 16 (2), 151-166, 2024. ISSN: 2060-4580.
   DOI: uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.58528/JAP.2024.16-2.151
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A
3. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A más eljárásban kirendelt szakértő véleményének felhasználása a polgári perben.
   Forum. Acta juridica et politica. 13 (2), 27-34, 2023. ISSN: 2063-2525.
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A
4. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A szakértőhöz való alkotmányos jog.
   Jogtudományi közlöny. 75 (10), 460-470, 2020. ISSN: 0021-7166.
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A
5. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Alkotmányos igazságügyi szakértés.
   Közjogi szemle. 12 (1), 80-87, 2019. ISSN: 1789-6991.
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A
6. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Szakértők és szakvélemények a Be.-ben.
   Magyar jog. 64 (12), 765-776, 2017. ISSN: 0025-0147.
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A
7. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A szakvélemény evolúciója a Pp.-ben.
   Jogtudományi Közlöny. 69 (3), 591-600, 2014. ISSN: 0021-7166.
   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

8. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Az igazságügyi szakértő függetlensége a kirendelés során.
Magyar jog. 59 (11), 653-669, 2012. ISSN: 0025-0147.

Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

List of other publications

Articles, studies (7)

9. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A közvetlenség elve és a hallgató vádlott.
Belügyi szemle. 3, 73-82, 2014. ISSN: 2062-9494.

Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

10. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Justitia elveszett szemkendője.
Magyar jog. 61 (3), 173-182, 2014. ISSN: 0025-0147.

Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

11. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A Gyulai Törvényszék ítélete a várakozási díjból és pótdíjból eredő igényérvényesítésről.
Jogesetek magyarázata. 3, 13-17, 2013. ISSN: 2061-4837.

Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

12. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A líbiai válság a nemzetközi béke és biztonság nézőpontjából: egy humanitárius intervenció.
Közjogi szemle. 6 (1), 58-64, 2013. ISSN: 1789-6991.

Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

13. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A Római Statútum, avagy egy ki nem hirdetett nemzetközi szerződés Magyarországon.
Magyar jog. 60 (5), 281-288, 2013. ISSN: 0025-0147.

Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

14. **Cséffai, A. C.**: A hallgatás joga a változó világban.
In: Az állam és jog alapvető értékei a változó világban : Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola konferenciája. Szerk.: Verebélyi Imre, Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola, Győr, 125-135, 2012. ISBN: 9789637175732

DEBRECENI EGYETEM Egyetemi és Nemzeti Könyvtár

15. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Legalizált alkotmányellenesség, avagy anomáliák a magyar alkotmánybíráskodásban.
In: A XXIX. Országos Tudományos Diákköri Konferencia Állam- és Jogtudományi Szekciójának díjnyertes dolgozatai I-II. Szerk.: Király Miklós, Varga István, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 73-106, 2011. ISBN: 9789633120408

UNIVERSITY AND NATIONAL LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF DEBRECEN
H-4002 Egyetem tér 1, Debrecen
Phone: +3652/410-443, email: publikaciok@lib.unideb.hu

Conference presentations (3)

16. **Cséffai, A. C.**: The right to silence.
In: Rossijskoe zakonodatel'stvo: sovremennoe sostojanie i perspektivy razvitija : sbornik nauchnyh trudov IV Vserossijskoj studencheskoj nauchnoj konferencii (Vologda, 25 apr. 2016 g.), posvjashh. 85-letiju Universiteta imeni O.E. Kutafin, Sad-ogorod, Vologda, 653-656, 2017. ISBN: 9785906850652

17. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Kötelező ügyészi részvétel bökkenője (különvélemény).
Optimi Nostri. 2012, 62-111, 2012. ISSN: 1789-7203.

18. **Cséffai, A. C.**: Legalizált alkotmányellenesség, avagy anomáliák a magyar alkotmánybíráskodásban.
Optimi Nostri. 2009, 42-76, 2009. ISSN: 1789-7203.

By the directives of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences:

Publications in periodicals level „A": 13, related to the dissertation: 8.

The Candidate's publication data submitted to the iDEa Tudóstér have been validated by DEENK on the basis of the Journal Citation Report (Impact Factor) database.

25 November, 2024

DEBRECENI EGYETEM Egyetemi és Nemzeti Könyvtár