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Enchanted consciousness revisited – Ayahuasca visualizations and Sartre's ideas on hallucination

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the paper is to complement Sartre's concept of enchanted consciousness. The first section of the paper studies the contradictions inherent in Sartre's mescaline experiment and the limits of his phenomenological analysis of hallucination. The second section argues that Benny Shanon's phenomenological cognitive psychology, which is based on the typology of ayahuasca hallucinations, can contribute to the phenomenological analysis of hallucinations and reveal some aspects of the enchanted consciousness that Sartre failed to discover. The third section examines the phenomenon of double bookkeeping, which originated in phenomenological psychiatry, and illustrates the characteristics of the delusional world. The fourth section expands the idea of enchanted consciousness through Shanon's study on ayahuasca hallucinations and provides a comparison between the pathological double bookkeeping and the so-called psychedelic bookkeeping. Finally, the last section actualizes Sartre's views on hallucination and offers a new way to define captivated consciousness through psychedelic double bookkeeping.

KEYWORDS

hallucination, double bookkeeping, phenomenology, enchanted consciousness, ayahuasca

INTRODUCTION

The paper investigates the extent to which Sartre's concept of the *enchanted* or *captivated consciousness* can be actualized with regard to the contemporary psychedelic renaissance. It may be possible to reconsider and update Sartre's theory of hallucination in light of the emerging body of pharmacological, psychiatric, neuroscientific, and philosophical anthropological research surrounding psychedelics. It is important to note that in his two early works on imagination, Sartre is primarily concerned with the relationship between image consciousness and perception. Nevertheless, in *The Imaginary* (1940), both hallucination and dreaming occupy a central theoretical position.

The paper provides a comparison between Sartre's analysis of hallucination and Benny Shanon's phenomenological cognitive psychology. Shanon studied a specific form of psychedelic experience, namely, ayahuasca hallucination or, in other word, ayahuasca visualization. Although more than sixty years passed between the publication of Sartre's *The Imaginary* (1940) and Shanon's *The Antipodes of the Mind* (2002), I believe that a crucial convergence can be shown between the two endeavors. The title of Shanon's book was inspired by Huxley's terms of „heaven" and „hell" and the idea that psychedelic substances can reveal the unknown territories of the mind (Huxley, 2009; Shanon, 2010, p. 272). This paper argues that Shanon's typology of hallucination (i.e., ayahuasca visualizations) and Sartre's concept of the enchanted consciousness can serve as complements to each other: ayahuasca experiences can represent those aspects of the enchanted consciousness which have eluded Sartre's attention due to his presuppositions about the ontology of hallucinations. The analysis of ayahuasca induced experiences can also widen the limited scope of hallucinatory experiences investigated by the French phenomenologists.

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The first section of the paper analyses Sartre's self-experiment with mescaline and his ideas on imagination, dream and hallucination. The idea of enchanted consciousness and O'Shiel's useful term of "hypercaptivation" will also be introduced. The second section studies Shanon's methodological approach to ayahuasca experiences and focuses on a specific ayahuasca experience, i.e., open-eye visualizations. Shanon extended his investigations to such intense and complex hallucinatory experiences which were inaccessible for the French phenomenologists who relied on the psychopathological literature of the early twentieth century, including the studies of French psychiatry and German phenomenological psychiatry. The third section of the paper examines the "otherworldly" feature of ayahuasca experiences and compares it with the phenomenon of double bookkeeping. The analysis of this latter phenomenon – which refers to a kind of double or shared awareness of patients who live in two worlds at the same time – is crucial for contemporary phenomenological psychiatry. On the one hand, they live in the *ordinary* (shared) perceptual world and, on the other hand, in the *delusional* (solipsistic) world. The two realms are inclined to coexist without contiguity or overlap (Fuchs, 2020, p. 136). This phenomenon of double bookkeeping has been described extensively by Sass (2014, 2017) and Parnas, Urfer-Parnas, and Stephensen (2021) and many other scholars. For example, Stephensen, Urfer-Parnas, and Parnas (2024) recently argued that "double bookkeeping seems to be characteristic of most psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia and to manifest itself before the onset of overt psychosis in more subtle changes of the structure of subjectivity." (p. 1406). As I have already mentioned, the third section of the paper argues for the presence of psychedelic double bookkeeping during ayahuasca inebriation and takes into consideration the recent developments in phenomenological psychiatry. The term "psychedelic double bookkeeping" itself has been introduced by Martin Fortier (Fortier, 2018, p. 358). The final section compares Sartre's and Shanon's ideas on hallucinatory experiences and explains how Shanon's study can function as a complement and an expansion to Sartre's idea on the enchanted consciousness. I also intend to show how Shanon's study of ayahuasca visualizations contradicts or even refutes Sartre's ontological view on hallucination, the latter considering it elusive, momentary or even sheer nothingness.

Before diving into philosophical psychological analyses, it is worth considering preliminary approaches to hallucination and psychosis. Shanon prefers the terms of *vision* or *visualization* in contrast to *hallucination* which is tainted by a pathological connotation. For St. Thomas Aquinas, the term "vision" (visio) referred to a supernatural manifestation. The mystics used "visio" more literally and they referred to all kinds of seeing (Sarbin & Juhasz, 1967, p. 341). The term "hallucination" occurred in the English language for the first time in 1572, in the translation of Ludwig Lavater's tract titled *Of Ghostes and Spirites, Walking by Night* where it carried the meaning of "apparition". That is, "hallucination" is an anglicized form of the Latin word *allucinatio* which refers to the wondering of the mind. Lavater used it as a synonym for "illusion" (Sarbin & Juhasz, 1967, p. 345). As Bouso et al. emphasized, neither the Greeks nor the Romans had a term for „hallucination". The Latin word *Alucinactio* means "mental wandering" in general. However, one can also find many Greek words that refer to different kinds of hallucinations (i.e., *phantasmata* as shadowy apparitions; *eideola*, meaning images; or *doxai*, meaning appearances (Bouso et al., 2023, p. 577).

Psychiatry and psychopathology broadened the meaning of hallucination. However, Pienkos et al. argued that the operationalization of mental phenomena resulted in the lack of conceptualization of the subtle and fluctuating forms of the hallucinatory experience (Pienkos et al., 2019). According to Telles-Correia et al., hallucination is the most relevant symptom in psychiatry and the hardest to define. Even the etymology of *hallucination* is controversial. It may have originated from Cicero's *allucinor*, *allucinaris* (the intent to mislead or equivocate) or from the Latin compound *ad lucem* (*ad*-next to; *lucem*-light). In the nineteenth century, Esquirol made a theoretical advance when he introduced the term to psychiatry and extended it to various sensory modalities (Telles-Correia, Moreira, & Gonçalves, 2015, p. 2). He regarded hallucination as a form of/delirium (a symptom of madness) and differentiated it from illusions. As he put it: "In hallucinations everything happens in the brain: visionaries dream awake." (cited by Telles-Correia et al., 2015, p. 2). Telles-Correia and his colleagues also clarifies a misunderstanding: The definition of hallucinations as "perceptions devoid of an object" is erroneously attributed to Esquirol who, in reality, claimed that hallucination was not a perception but a "form of delirium that makes patients believe they have a perception". That is, hallucination does not mean "having a perception", but only the conviction of having one (Telles-Correia et al., 2015, p. 2). It is worth mentioning that another French psychiatrist, Griesinger defined hallucinations, in 1867, as "subjective images that are projected externally and acquire an apparent objectivity and reality" (Telles-Correia et al., 2015, p. 2). Esquirol's disciple, Moreau de Tours defined hallucinations as symptoms of mental illness and used hallucinogenic drugs to induce manageable hallucinations. He was the first to consider the therapeutic effects of hallucinations (Bouso et al., 2023, p. 580). Foucault argued that Moreau de Tours' hashish-based self-experiments allowed only a subjective reproduction of mental illness, and thus, led only to a partial success in understanding and exerting power on madness (Foucault, 2013, pp. 278–279).

Bouso et al. argue for the need of "decolonizing" hallucination. In this case, "colonization" means the dominance of the Western psychiatric conceptualization and Western culture in general in the process of defining hallucination. However, contemporary studies have shown significant phenomenological differences in hallucinations across various cultures (Bouso et al., 2023, p. 577). The authors do not want to dismiss the terms "hallucination" and "hallucinogen"; however, they propose their neutrality. These concepts should be used without pejorative connotations

or pathology-associated views (Bouso et al., 2023, p. 593). The authors argue that hallucinations are more than symptoms of psychopathological diseases, but they have therapeutic effects. By giving access to a symbolic reality, they can also become the sources of creativity, joy, fulfilment, and knowledge (Bouso et al., 2023, p. 592). The authors mention that traditional shamanism lends a "status of reality" to ayahuasca experiences. More precisely, they state the following: "By boosting the intensity of recalled images to the same level of natural image, ayahuasca lends a status of reality to inner experiences." (de Araujo et al., 2012, p. 2559). Shanon used the term "entheogen" to express that, in his view ayahuasca is a sacrament; however, in his scientifically oriented study, he decided to use the terms of "vision" or "visualization" (Shanon, 2002, p. 29). Recent literature on psychedelic experiences also uses the term of "entheogenesis," referring to the awakening of the divine within with the assistance of plants, fungi, and herbs like psilocybin, ayahuasca, and *Salvia divinorum* (cf. St John, 2011, p. 214).

The philosopher Edward S. Casey differentiates between the pathological and non-pathological forms of hallucinations. Non-pathological hallucinations include entopic images, eidetic images, and afterimages. Hallucinations can be induced during hypnosis but Casey also considers *déja vu* and synesthesia to be hallucinatory experiences. According to him, a hallucinatory experience can be compared to perception, but it must be considered as a pathological experience if it begins to replace the perceptual experience (Casey, 2003, pp. 73–74).

Unlike voluntary imagination, hallucinations occur completely involuntarily. Collerton and his colleagues define hallucinations as involuntary sensory perceptions, but they immediately add that, in practice, it is difficult to define the limits of the hallucinatory experience (Collerton, Perry, & Bowman, 2020, p. 728). Wilkinson and his colleagues emphasize that the characteristics of hallucinations can vary depending on the context in which they occur. Patients with neurological disorders or neurodegenerative diseases or those who experience full-blown psychosis or schizophreniform disorder may experience different types of hallucinations. The authors note that Merleau-Ponty, for example, addressed schizophreniform hallucinations in *The Phenomenology of Perception* (Wilkinson et al., 2022, pp. 227–228). Pienkos and her colleagues point out that hallucination has a long history, including representational and non-representational conceptions, psychiatric and neurological approaches. The authors underscore that Jaspers' distinction between *real* and *pseudo*-hallucinations is no longer valid. For instance, Meyer-Gross criticized Jaspers because of his view according to which it was impossible to distinguish between real and pseudo-hallucinations in clinical case studies. By definition, the former are akin to "objective" perceptions and the latter are more like imaginations (Pienkos et al., 2019, p. S69). Hallucinations may result from numerous factors: short-term memory deficits, changes in source monitoring, trauma, etc., that is, environmental and neurocognitive dysfunctions can both contribute to their emergence. To summarize: hallucinations occur in several sensory modalities and can function in parallel with non-hallucinatory experiences (Pienkos et al., 2019, p. S69).

The French phenomenologists, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty argued that schizophrenic patients do not necessarily confuse perceived objects with auditory or visual hallucinations. Under certain conditions and circumstances, patients are able to differentiate the two experiential horizons. For instance, Merleau-Ponty argues as follows: „The all-important point is that the patients, most of the time, discriminate between their hallucinations and their perceptions." (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 389) Sartre cites Jenet in *The Imaginary* to demonstrate the differentiating capacity of hallucinating subjects: "First, as Janet remarks, it almost never happens that the patient has hallucinations (at least visual hallucinations) in the presence of the doctor – which we could interpret thus: a systematic activity in the domain of the real seems to exclude hallucinations." (Sartre, 2004, p. 149). In what fallows, I proceed to Satre's philosophical psychological project that discussed the typology of imagination and led to a self-experiment with mescaline.

SARTRE AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HALLUCINATION

Sartre discusses the problem of hallucination in his early writings such as *The Imagination* (Sartre, 2012/1936) and *The Imaginary* (Sartre, 2004/1940). His main interest is the study of the different types and structures of imagination. Sartre follows in the footsteps of Husserl who included in his examination the relation between image consciousness and other intentional states its relation to other intentional states (reproductive remembering, fantasy consciousness and perception). Stawarska argues that Sartre's project of formulating a uniform theory of the imagination, including the introduction of the "image-family" and the idea of image consciousness, was inspired by Husserl's *Ideas I* (Husserl, 1982). Husserl provided the triadic structure of image apprehensions (i.e., the physical image appearance (*das Bild-ding*), the image object (*das Bildobject*) and the image subject (*das Bildsujet*) (Husserl, 2005). Stawarska regards Sartre's theory of imagination as an interdisciplinary study that combines Husserl's descriptive analysis of image consciousness with Pierre Janet's clinical reports and psychological theories. Stawarska underscores that Sartre's thinking ran on two tracks: he adopted Husserl's analysis of image consciousness, but he also developed the idea of spontaneous imagination based on Janet's findings on obsessive behavior. However, Stawarska emphasizes the similarity between Sartre and Janet with regard to the nature of hallucination is limited: "it is Sartre, but not Janet, who argues, firstly that the content of hallucination is by definition poor and schematic, and secondly, that hallucination is never accompanied by positional belief" (Stawarska, 2005, p. 150). In contrast to Sartre's account of imagination, including the analysis of dream and hallucination, Benny

Shanon examined one specific type of hallucinatory experiences, i.e., ayahuasca hallucinations which were labelled by Shanon as "visualizations". As I intend to show, these two descriptive psychological projects share a common goal: both Sartre and Shanon intended to expand our knowledge about consciousness including the nature of imagination and hallucination. However, at the end of my paper, I will also discuss the crucial differences between their results especially regarding the ontology of hallucination.

Sartre is primarily interested in the modifications of consciousness; he investigates the alterations of intentional states. What kind of attitudinal changes occur in consciousness when one, for instance, sees faces in the fire or a human form in rocks? Why do we project faces or other shapes onto the arabesques of the wallpaper? In cognitive psychology, these phenomena are known as *pareidolia*, but Sartre considers these types of "seeing-in" to belong to "the image family" (Sartre, 2004, pp. 35–37). Caricatures and paintings are also classified by Sartre as typical forms of image consciousness. Hallucination is brought into the focus of his analysis during the study of hypnagogic images and dreams. Sartre does not follow the naturalistic attitude of the psychologists of the early twentieth century: he is not interested in the neurophysiological explanations of image consciousness. He theorizes that imagination is an intentional consciousness that intends to its intentional object (i.e., what is represented, for example, in a picture or in the hypnagogic image) through the medium of the *analogon* (i.e., through the colorful oil of the painting or through the entopic lights of hypnagogic states). The problem of the analogon becomes increasingly complex in Sartre's accounts. The wallpaper or the canvas can function as analogons through which we can constitute images when are looking at them and notice perceivable patterns. Even the entopic lights occurring during hypnagogic states can be worked through and transformed into forms and pictures by conscious intentionality. In case of dreams and hallucinations, immanent experiences arise, meaning that consciousness is enclosed on itself and generates imaginary forms from itself (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 53).

Sartre argues that the foundation of the image is actually "nothingness", that is, something distant or fictional and bolsters this ontological idea even with a mescaline-based self-experiment. The second important question that Sartre seeks to answer concerns the passivity of consciousness: why does consciousness become passive in front of images that are created by itself? For example, absorption is increasing when hypnagogic images arise and consciousness cannot regulate or direct the ensuing images, therefore, it finds itself in the state of determinism which is explained by Sartre as follows: "the intention in the hypnagogic consciousness is chained: it has been unhooked, caused by a need to shape the forms of the phosphenes; […] To think that the lines evoke a face is to see a face in the lines. Captive thought is compelled to realize all its intentions" (Sartre, 2004, p. 46). Sartre argues that the entopic matter enriches the empty intentions of consciousness and adheres to them: "For example, I see three beautiful violet lines. In fact, I know that I see the violet, but I do not see it, or rather, I know that I see something that is violet." (Sartre, 2004, p. 46). The enchained or enchanted consciousness is characterized by *fatality*, especially in cases of hypnagogic images and dreams. These states include no freedom or the reality of different possibilities, every occurring intention (thoughts included) is realized without hesitation. Enchanted consciousness is forced to form images: the entopic spots are recognized as teeth of a saw, a violet or an eagle. One sees only phosphenes but has the impression of looking at figures (such as the teeth of a saw) (Sartre, 2004, p. 45). However, captivity is not complete during hypnagogic visions: "I can let myself be fascinated by the field of phosphenes, or not. If there is fascination, hypnagogic images will appear." (Sartre, 2004, p. 46). Sartre argues that, in case of hypnagogic images, consciousness is not only enchanted by the dazzling perceptual illusions but also by itself. Sartre quotes Eugène B. Leroy's *The Visions of Half-Sleep* (*Les visions du demi-sommeil)* to illustrate the role of auto-suggestion. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that the concept of enchanted consciousness owes much to the theory of auto-suggestion that emerged in the late 19th century (Sartre, 2004, p. 41). As for dreams, in them the eclipse of consciousness increases and captivity is complete. Passivity is complete in the case of a dream, which is the point of no return from captivity: the dreamer cannot or does not want to wake up from the dream while it seems obvious that reflective consciousness annihilates the dream process (Sartre, 2004, p. 170).

Sartre takes his study of imagination so seriously that he even participates in a psychedelic experiment in 1935. He is injected with mescaline with the help of Daniel Lagasche at Sainte-Anne Hospital (Beauvoir, 1965; Boothroyd, 2006). A brief description of the experience appears in *The Imaginary* (1940) and Merleau-Ponty quotes Sartre's unpublished notes about the occasion in *The Phenomenology of Perception* (1945). Simone de Beauvoir called Sartre by phone during the experiment and he told her in a blurred voice that the phone call rescued him from a battle with devil-fishes which he would almost certainly have lost (Beauvoir, 1965, p. 209). De Beauvoir interprets Sartre's account in the following way: "He had not exactly had hallucinations, but the objects he looked at changed their appearance in the most horrifying manner: umbrellas had become vultures, shoes turned into skeletons, and faces acquired monstrous characteristics, while behind him, just past the corner of his eye, swarmed crabs and polyps and grimacing Things." (Beauvoir, 1965, p. 209).

However, Sartre's own account in *The Imaginary* (1940) is limited to the occurrence of "three small parallel clouds" which rapidly disappeared as soon as he tried to direct his attention to them. In his own technical vocabulary, he describes the phenomenon as the "freeing of lateral, marginal spontaneities" and comes to the general conclusion that hallucination exists only "furtively" and is incompatible with perception (Sartre, 2004, p. 156). In contrast to dreams, the immediate memory of the hallucination can be retained but it is almost or entirely nothingness. For Sartre, hallucination seems incompatible with visual consciousness:

> …three small parallel clouds appeared before me. This phenomenon disappeared, of course, as soon as I sought to grasp it. It was not compatible with full and clear visual consciousness. It could exist only furtively and for that matter it was given as such; there was, in the way in which these three small mists were delivered to my memory immediately after having disappeared, something at once inconsistent and mysterious, which only, it seems to me, translated the existence of these freed spontaneities on the margins of consciousness (Sartre, 2004, pp. 156–157).

Beauvoir's account suggests that Sartre was disappointed by the results of the self-experiment because he missed the anticipated heavenly visions and he was informed that he gave an atypical reaction to mescaline. However, he had radical hallucinatory experiences when he left the hospital and suffered from terrible flashbacks, or, more precisely, from Hallucinogen Persisting Perception Disorder (HPPD). Beauvoir describes them as follows:

> His visual faculties became distorted: houses had leering faces, all eyes and jaws, and he couldn't help looking at every clockface he passed, expecting it to display the features of an owl – which it always did. He knew perfectly well that such objects were in fact houses and clocks, and no one could say that he believed in their eyes and gaping maws – but a time might well come when he would believe in them; one day he could really be convinced that there was a lobster trotting along behind him (Beauvoir, 1965, p. 210).

In the midst of his suffering, Sartre had the conviction that he is "on the edge of a chronic hallucinatory psychosis" but Beauvoir reassured him that he was not mad; he only believed that he has gone mad (Beauvoir, 1965, p. 210). Sartre spent more time with his friends than he used to in order to shelter himself from the hallucinated lobsters and other distortions of shared reality.

Interestingly, both Sartre and Beauvoir denied the explanatory role of the unconscious. As Barnes suggested, Sartre was not suffering from resurfacing unconscious fears; rather, the crabs and other "symbolic projections" represented his fear of being submerged into "the ocean of bourgeois society" (cf. Barnes, 1978; Riedlinger, 1982, p. 106). Curtis-Haynes (1995) speculated that if Sartre's experiment had been a "Good Trip" instead of the "Bad Trip", then his ontological description of being would have been very different (pp. 105–106). Thomas Smith disputed the direct causal link between Sartre's mescaline experiment and early philosophical insights. Based on Guntrip's and others' analysis, he argues that "French philosopher's writings (*Nausea*, in particular) reflect the 'objective neurosis' of contemporary society" which includes depression, depersonalization and the feeling of unreality and existential dread (Smith, 1995, p. 593).

Sartre tries to determine the status of hallucination among the web of intentional states and places it between perception and dream. He argues that during perceiving we possess pre-reflective and reflective awareness about the empirical reality of the perceived object. For instance, when we ride a bike, we can give a conscious account of what we are doing in that very moment, even if our consciousness is (partially) absorbed in a bodily activity. However, consciousness is totally absorbed, i.e., enchained and enchanted during dream states. This does not mean that we do not have pre-reflective consciousness during a dream, however, it does mean that reflective awareness annihilates the dream, and therefore it is difficult to reconstruct and recount the dream content. When Sartre underscores that reflective awareness eliminates dreams and hallucinatory experiences, he is committed to the ontological claim that hallucination is basically "nothingness". This ontological thesis is supplemented by the example of the three clouds which rapidly disappear under closer scrutiny. However, it is important to note that those experiences were not full-blown hallucinatory experiences, but rather, cognitive or perceptual illusions. It seems that Sartre, at least on the pages of *The Imaginary*, did not want to face the consequences of his vivid hallucinations which were labelled as atypical reactions. It is hard to regard hallucinations as a form of absence or nothingness when Sartre himself admits that hallucinatory lobsters and other creatures tormented him. The affective impact of his hallucinations, including the panic and anxiety, is undeniable.

Sartre argues that hallucination does not disappear without traces. In *The Imaginary* he speculates that hallucination is like a dream that is retained in the immediate memory. His arguments become more complicated when he differentiates between the "pure event of hallucination" and "the pure experience of hallucination" (Sartre, 2004, p. 158). He seeks to define the structure and the temporal unfolding of the hallucinatory experience. If we study the consequences of Sartre's self-experiment in detail, it seems reasonable to say that both the fleeting cognitive-perceptual illusion experienced during the mescaline-experiment and the dread of "hallucinatory psychosis" are woven into his theory of hallucination. As Boothroyd underscores, the pure event of hallucination is momentary and basically ungraspable by conscious awareness. According to Sartre's rumination, a hallucinating person can grasp the echo of the pure event of hallucination only in his or her immediate memory. As Boothroyd points out, Sartre did not realize that he had reached the limits of phenomenological investigation when he introduced the pure event of hallucination into his descriptive analysis. In other words, he discovered a limit experience in which the transparency of consciousness – which, according to him, applies to all experience – is suspended or even falsified. Sartre speculates that the pure event of hallucination is accompanied by the pre-reflective awareness of the unreality of its object. According to Boothroyd, this thesis of Sartre is an after-the-fact intellectual construct, a reaction to an experience that undermines his fundamental theses on the transparency of consciousness and the mutual exclusivity between perception and hallucination (Boothroyd, 2006, p. 146). Boothroyd points out that the example of the three clouds demonstrates the mutual exclusivity between perception and imagination. However, Sartre's tormenting experiences, such as the lobster and the fear of going mad were not mentioned in *The Imaginary* (Boothroyd, 2006, p. 147). Sartre also forgot to mention his

hallucination of the frightening orangutan that appeared to him when he was traveling by train with Beauvoir (Beauvoir, 1965, p. 209).

Sartre takes into account the following question: how do hallucinations acquire their character of reality? This question reflects the problem of the temporal structure of hallucinations. Sartre explains the process through which hallucinations progressively become real. According to him, the hallucinated object is "neutral" in memory (i.e., the subject is undecided about its ontological status) but it can have a belated impact: the patient begins to interpret the hallucination retrospectively, locates it into its surroundings and, eventually, might even act upon it. The hallucinatory experience is unpredictable and involuntary; it cannot be integrated into the actual conscious synthesis of experiences. However, it can be localized among the existing objects due to its apparent externality and independence. This is the emergence of hallucinatory deceptions – at least according to Sartre (Sartre, 2004, pp. 158–159). Sartre's theory of imagination reflect the influence of Janet's psychology. He refers to hallucinations as the "spasms" of conscious spontaneity, he also discusses the role of lateral subsystems and the pathological fragmentation of personality. Daniel O'Shiel, based on Sartre's considerations, introduces the notion of "magical hypercaptivity". The phenomena of dream, paranoia and auditory hallucination threaten the subject by blurring the line between perception and imagination, whereas it is precisely this demarcation that Sartre intends to defend. Sartre had to recognize that – in certain cases – (i.e., in various forms of psychosis) perception and hallucination can no longer be separated. Although Sartre himself never experienced full-blown psychosis, according to Beauvoir's account quoted above, he was frightened by the possibility of madness. During a dream, the subject experiences the immanence of consciousness, and – consequently – the loss of the reference points for the distinction of the real and the irreal. The free and transcendent consciousness, according to Sartre, detaches itself from being-in-the-world and becomes totally immersed in the imaginary realm (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 162). As O'Shiel argues, the extreme form of enchanted consciousness is a kind of "magical hypercaptivation": "…spontaneous acts of pre- or irreflective consciousness can often leave the reflecting subject confused and scared. In these cases, imaging consciousness liberates itself from consciousness's own reflective will to the extent that what I have termed hypercaptivation occurs, this often being very hard to extricate oneself from." (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 170) That is, dream is the natural, and psychosis is the pathological form of hypercaptivation.

When we consider the problem of imagination in relation to *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936) and *Being and Nothingness* (1943), it is important to note that even though Sartre's goal is to refute the doctrine of immanence, he does not fully achieve it. In order to distance himself from the idea of immanence, he claims that imagination is not based on the internal images of the conscious subject that could be perceived with an inner eye just like the objects of perceiving. As Casey accentuates, Sartre considered images not as contents of consciousness, but rather, spontaneously emerging *conscious acts*: "In imagining, the spontaneity is wholly unmotivated: it is an instantaneous, self-generated upsurge. Nothing external initiates it, and it does not cease because of external factors. This is why there is a 'magical' quality in imagining, which produces its objects spontaneously and, as it were, *ex nihilo*." (Casey, 1981 p. 145). This kind of spontaneity also reflects the endless freedom of consciousness. The conscious subject is not an internal sphere containing images plus a self- or ego-image. As Marosán puts it, the "I" is not the "inhabitant" of consciousness, but rather, a specific image of ourselves that we can form intersubjectively. In Sartre's view, the self or the ego is not a static entity but a "relative existence" that is capable of subverting the order of being by transcending it (Marosán, 2016, pp. 150–151). Consciousness that constitutes a comprehensible object in an image is an active spontaneity. Marosán argues that the fundamental principle of *Being and Nothingness* can be found in *The Imaginary*: freedom is basically a nullifying force that annihilates the pregiven (Marosán, 2016, p. 151).

In case of dreams and hallucinations, however, active spontaneity is paired with passive self-forgetfulness. As we have seen, Sartre claims that, even though we have a pre-reflective consciousness about the neutrality or the irreality of imaginary objects, we nevertheless allow ourselves to be enchanted or even frightened by them. It seems that the mode of being of the enchanted consciousness is a kind of self-forgetfulness where the "hypercaptivation" of the imaginary dominates the ego. The freedom of the ego is restricted by the captivating images (i.e., dreams and hallucinations) and consciousness is absorbed by its self-generated contents.

The latest studies on hallucinations and psychedelic experiences were not available for the French phenomenologists. In the following section, I will focus specifically on ayahuasca visualizations which will allow the criticism and the expansion of Sartre's idea of enchanted consciousness.

AYAHUASCA VISUALIZATIONS AND THE FEELING OF OTHERWORLDLINESS

In this section, I would like to focus on ayahuasca hallucinations or visualizations which can be categorized as altered or non-ordinary states of consciousness eventuated by the ayahuasca compound.

The ayahuasca admixture is best known in South American shamanic traditions. This botanical decoction is obtained from the leaves of the *chacruna Psychotria viridis* and the vine of *Banisteriopsis caapi*. The unique concoction enables the psychedelic compound DMT (*N,Ndimethyltryptamine*), present in *Psychotria* in a natural way, to reach the brain. As a result, intense changes in perception and sensory integration occur, generating altered states. Placebo-controlled trials have recently confirmed that the combination of the pharmacological and non-pharmacological effects

of ayahuasca rituals can produce positive therapeutic outcomes (Uthaug et al., 2021, p. 1899). For a review of the complexities of the ayahuasca rituals see, for example: Luna, 2011; Sherwin, Friso, Fachner, & Politi, 2025.

The cognitive psychologist Benny Shanon has done more than 140 self-experiments and has examined more than 300 accounts of ayahuasca experiences. Ayahuasca consumption can induce a range of perceptual and non-perceptual changes including personal psychological insights, metaphysical beliefs and religious-spiritual experiences (Shanon, 2003, p. 129). Shanon's work titled *The Antipodes of the Mind* can be regarded as a landmark in the psychological study of ayahuasca. His aim has been to complement the natural scientific and anthropological approaches to ayahuasca and to conduct psychological research on the general nature of the mind (Shanon, 2003, p. 128). In terms of methodology, Shanon called his own approach "phenomenological cognitive psychology". He intended not only to classify the visionary experiences but also to explore the structure of consciousness. Shanon argued that ayahuasca visions cannot be identified with pathological hallucinations, ordinary perceptions or even dreams, although consumers often perceive their experiences as being awake during a dream or participating in someone else's dream. Despite these accounts, there is only a minimal overlap between the contents of dreams and ayahuasca experiences. The latter are indistinguishably unique and often lead to impersonal themes (Shanon, 2002, p. 269).

When used in its traditional form with the original ingredients, ayahuasca has a remarkable effect. Self-awareness, control, and the ability to differentiate hallucinations from perceptions remain stable. Shanon also mentions that certain concoctions are so dangerous that they can cause hallucinations for days, an irreversible psychological defect, or even death (Shanon, 2002, p. 47). Retaining the ability to differentiate between perception and hallucination is an ideal state, since the form and intensity of ayahuasca hallucinations can vary greatly in relation to the *set* and *setting*; not to mention the individual predispositions. Simply put, the *set* is the subjective and the *setting* is the external, environmental factor of psychedelic use. It is important to formulate meaningful goals and hopes prior to the experience (Campo & Yali, 2024). The set refers to the individual's intentions, moods and expectations, whereas the setting refers to the environmental factors such as the location and the atmosphere of the ceremony, the group dynamic and so on (Uthaug et al., 2021, p. 1900). Fortier underscores the cultural specificity of hallucinogen consumption. In the case of ayahuasca, novice and expert users can be distinguished. This inference was verified by Fortier's field work among South American shamans. It seems that expert users, such as traditional shamans, have a high-level metacognitive skill and a decreased (apodictic) sense of reality regarding the altered states (Fortier, 2018, p. 369). Dupuis' recent analyses and fieldwork conducted in South America demonstrate that the cultural environment and ritual can influence the content of hallucinations (Dupuis, 2021a, 2021b, 2022). The sense of "otherworldliness" which is one of the main characteristics of the ayahuasca experience can be found in contemporary ethnographic research as well: "Many participants report the perception of animals, anthropomorphic beings or hybrid beings combining human, plant, and animal elements. These beings can be elements of bigger pictures in which they evolve including natural or urban spaces and places presented as 'unknown worlds.'" (Dupuis, 2022, p. 204).

When Shanon typifies ayahuascainduced open-eye visualizations, he introduces the paradoxical term of "veridical hallucination". In order to illustrate the meaning of this notion, he recounts two of his own experiences. Both cases are connected to obscure circumstances. He met suspicious figures on both occasions and only belatedly (the following day) had realized that those had been hallucinated figures. On these occasions another ingredient (*datura*) was added to the traditional concoction and, as Shanon says, this kind of confused state is not a typical consequence of ayahuasca (Shanon, 2002, p. 81).

There is no room here to reconstruct Shanon's detailed classification of open-eye and closed-eye visualizations. The structural typology of ayahuasca visualization ranges from elementary nonfigurative patterns through grand scenes to undifferentiated vision of light. I only intend to show that the main point of convergence between Sartre and Shanon is the investigation of open-eye visualizations. Shanon argues that the exacerbation of spontaneous meaning bestowing occurring in open-eye visualizations is palpable. As he puts it, "under the Ayahuasca intoxication there is a general tendency to confer great meaningfulness on whatever one perceives or encounters." (Shanon, 2002, p. 70)

This kind of increased meaning-bestowing is in pair with the intuition that an otherworld is revealed for the subject. The "feeling of otherworldliness" seems to be the main characteristic of ayahuasca visualizations. However, Shanon accentuates that Huxley's mescaline trip also included a radical change in the perception of the surroundings (Shanon, 2002, pp. 37–38). Besides, as it has already been shown, Sartre's mescaline experience also eventuated a radical change in the perceived world.

The relationship between the perceived world and hallucinations has been extensively investigated by Merleau-Ponty who argued that both hallucination and perception are grounded in the body. In contrast to Sartre, when he explicitly discussed the temporal unfolding of experiences, he argued that both the body and world have their own rhythm. The body has the capacity to adapt itself to the rhythm of the perceived world and there is also a kind of mutual relationship between the body and the hallucination. In *The Structure of Behavior*, Merleau-Ponty writes the following: „It is nevertheless clear that an instinctive movement, tied to a syncretic situation, is adapted to the spatial characteristics of the instinctual object and involves a temporal rhythm." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p. 104). In *The phenomenology of perception,* he discusses the bodily capacity of summoning and the secretion of time: „In every focusing movement my body unites present, past and future, it secretes time, or rather, it becomes that location in nature

where, for the first time, events, instead of pushing each other into the realm of being, project round the present a double horizon of past and future and acquire a historical orientation." (Merlau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 278–279) Embodied existence is the primordial way of being, it opens up spatial horizons and unites subjectively lived time ("secretes time"). Merleau-Ponty suggests that the perceived and the hallucinated realms are both sustained by the rhythms of embodied existence. This means that the subjectively lived space could be radically altered during hallucinations. Merleau-Ponty quotes Sartre's unpublished notes on the mescaline-experience in *The Phenomenology of Perception*: "my whole perception was transformed and, for an instant, I perceived a rubber bulb. […] Everything seemed at once clammy and scaly, like some of the large serpents I have seen uncoiling themselves at the Berlin Zoo. Then I was seized with the fear of being on a small island surrounded by serpents." (Sartre quoted by Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 397). Merleau-Ponty does not consider Sartre's hallucinations to be full-blown visual experiences, he regards them rather as fleeting impressions that reproduce the way in which perceptual reality used to strike him. Hallucinations are disjointed phenomena without causal connection between them. The victim of hallucination builds up an "artificial world" out of the fragments of the real world. He says that hallucination has no place in the "geographical world". The world of hallucination is an individual, fictional and subjective landscape that has its own value of reality for the embodied subject (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 398–399).

There is also a stark contrast between Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's ontological commitments. Sartre painstakingly tries to preserve the fissure between perceiving and imagining. According to Boothroyd, – by the reports of psychotic patients –, Sartre intends to prove that hallucination occurs when perception collapses and that the patients know that their hallucinations are not real. He says that it is difficult to see what Sartre learnt from his self-experiment: "One is left wondering here what it is that Sartre has learnt from his experimental trip into a hallucinatory mode of consciousness. Everything he says could, in fact, have been said on the basis of the psychological literature on hallucination…" (Boothroyd, 2006, p. 146). Instead of the rigorous attempt to divide perception and hallucination, Merleau-Ponty finds a common ground between these modes of consciousness in his investigation of embodied subjectivity. He is skeptical about the *nothingness* (the *absence*) of imagined objects as well. As Dufourcq has put it, "Merleau-Ponty criticizes Sartre for having overemphasized the dimension of absence in the imaginary and for failing to account for its dimension of presence." (Dufourcq, 2024, p. 201). This ontological contrast is also conspicuous in Merleau-Ponty's analysis of dreaming consciousness. Dufourcq argues that Merleau-Ponty prefers Freud's ideas on dream instead those of Sartre. If dreams were completely nothing, we would not even be able to remember them. Sartre devalues their symbolic aspects as well: „The dream is reduced to total absence of sense or a complete incongruity." (Dufourcq, 2024, p. 202). It seems that Sartre, due to his exclusivity principle, does not want or unable to integrate vivid perceivable hallucinations into his theory of imagination despite the fact that he himself lived through experiences where hallucinations superimposed onto the perceived world.

Irrespective of their ontological ideas, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty provided a limited analysis of hallucinatory experiences. Sartre, following Husserl, offered the detailed analysis of the "image-family" and dealt with pathological forms of imagination (i.e., hallucination) but he did not go further to differentiate the pathological and, for example, the psychedelic types of hallucination. The unfolding visualizations of grand scenes, which often form the central part of the ayahuasca experience, do not represent the inarticulate and fragmentary hallucinations, investigated by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (Sartre, 2012/1936, p. 157; Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 395). The idea of hallucination, as proposed by the French phenomenologists, can be criticized and expanded by taking into account the psychedelic and – especially – the ayahuasca experiences. However, Sartre's idea of enchanted or enchained consciousness could hold a heuristic value for today's investigations on psychedelic experiences. I intend to show that consciousness is enchanted by the remarkable or unpleasant scenes of ayahuasca experiences. However, the enchantment does not result from the diminishment of reflective consciousness but, as Shanon has concluded from the reports, rather from the revelation of a "secret world" (Shanon, 2002, p. 85). One can find another contrast between the Sartrean and the ayahuasca related enchantment. According to Sartre, the captivity of consciousness increases in dreams and hallucinations. However, at the same time, the subject still has a pre-reflective consciousness about the *irreality* of imaginary objects, i.e., one is dimly aware of the fact that the imaginings are self-generated mental states. This thesis of Sartre does not apply to ayahuasca experiences, because the nature of those cannot be totally identified with dreams or pathological hallucinations. The unique ayahuasca visualizations are often alien to the self and, instead of giving the impression of irreality, they may seem more real than real. This characteristic will be discussed in a latter part of my paper.

For Sartre, the forms of heightened imagination, such as nocturnal dreams, become precursors to the concept of the bad faith. In the state of bad faith, consciousness deceives itself, becomes passive in relation to its own activity and fails to take responsibility for the radical change in its attitude. The idea of bad faith is elaborated in *Being and Nothingness* (1945) and functions as an alternative to Freud's repressed unconscious. The fatality of the dream and the enchanted consciousness in *The Imaginary* (1940) can be considered as precursors of bad faith. Sometimes consciousness sinks into deeper states of enchantment. Sartre recounts a dream sequence where, first, he sees a slave running, then suddenly he finds himself being the slave who is pursued – this change in the perspective means that the captivity of consciousness is now complete. Or, to use O'Shiel's term, we arrived at the state of hypercaptivation.

Sartre argues that the world can be duplicated in dreams: in his example, a shift occurs in the dreamer's perspective ashe no longe observes but takes on the first-person perspective of the running slave through an "irreal affective quality." For Sartre, even the bilocality of the dreaming subject is imaginable: "He [the running slave] is therefore, in a sense, transcendent and external since I still see him running and, in another sense, transcendent without distance since I am irreally present in him." (Sartre, 2004, p. 171) The world can also be duplicated in imagination: "It remains therefore, in a sense, a purely represented world and, in another sense, a world immediately lived. […] am taken as I am in a game. But there are games in which one is strongly taken and, on the other hand, I cannot break the enchantment." (Sartre, 2004, p. 172) Sartre argues that in the imaginary "worlds" of consciousness, the category of the real does not exists. In another instance, Sartre has a dream in which he is reading a book and, suddenly, finds himself identifying with one of the characters. In dreams, one is participating in a game that can be so enchanting that it makes the escape impossible (Sartre, 2004, p. 166). Sartre is quite skeptical about the cogency of imaginary worlds such as dream-worlds. On the one hand, he believes that every dream and even phases of a dream involve a context akin to an environment. On the other hand, imaginary worlds are merely subjective beliefs because consciousness deceives itself and believes that the emerging scenes take place in the world. However, Sartre says that the images, scenes and stories in dreams are surrounded by an "undifferentiated mass that is posited as an imaginary world" and concludes that there is no imaginary "world" in the literal sense, because, as he explains, "the 'worldliness' of the dreamed image does not consist in an infinity of relations that it sustains with other images." (Sartre, 2004, p. 167). Here Sartre claims that even if dreams transport us into an imaginary world, it must be admitted that these imaginary realms always lack the complexity of the shared, practical world and they only function as obscure horizons for the suddenly emerging dream-objects and dream-scenarios. However, the limits of the imaginary realms or horizons remain unnoticed by the captivity of consciousness. In Sartre's understanding, the enchanted consciousness is unable to realize that it sank into a fictional dream world. The fact of *believing* in the imaginary world means that consciousness can be enchanted without attributing real existence to imaginary objects. Consciousness inattentively slips into the imaginary realm but is not completely lost: "a consciousness that dreams is always nonthetic consciousness of itself as being fascinated by the dream, but it has lost its being-in-the-world and recovers it only on awakening." (Sartre, 2004, p. 170)

What makes ayahuasca experiences extraordinary for the Sartrean idea of enchantment is that they can generate "hypercaptivation" without the radical diminishment of self-awareness. Shanon accentuates that, during ayahuasca experiences, the sense of being-in-the-world remains stable while hallucinations are superimposed on it. In addition, consciousness is not enchanted by the diminishment of reflective capacities, the sense of reality of the visions and self-awareness are both intensified. Shanon argues that the sense of reality decreases in imaginations and dreams but often increases in case of ayahuasca visions: "In general, the higher the degree that the Ayahuasca drinker takes the visions to be real, the higher the likelihood that the visions will indeed appear as such. In the limit, the most realistic visions are those in which the drinker fully immerses himself in the other reality that Ayahuasca seems to be presenting." (Shanon, 2002, p. 315). According to Shanon, the sense of reality is a "parameter" embedded into the mechanisms of perception and can be changed situationally (Shanon, 2002, p. 265). The sense of reality can increase or decrease in the different stages of the ayahuasca intoxication as well:

Many drinkers report that what they see during the course of the intoxication seems to be 'more real than real'. Phenomenologically, this is related to the intensification of sensory qualities of both perceptions and visions, as well as to ideations entertained along with them. The feeling is so strong and compelling that it may be coupled by the assessment, very common with Ayahuasca, that what is seen and thought during the course of the intoxication defines the real, whereas the world that is normally perceived is actually an illusion (Shanon, 2002, p. 205).

The drinkers of ayahuasca immediately immerse themselves into the grand scenes. Shanon argues that the level of immersion can be compared to our unreflective participation in the perceptual world. Both states involve perceptual faith in which the sense of reality is generated not by intellectual judgment, but by the level of immersion. Besides the pre-reflective "perceptual faith" referring back to Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's analysis of perception, Shanon invented another second significant explanatory term, namely, is "virtual reality". In a full-blown scene, the subject is immediately thrown into a virtual reality (Shanon, 2002, pp. 93, 197). As Sartre's analysis of dreams and hallucinations indicated, he underestimated the richness of the imaginary realms and insisted on the dualism between the perceived and the imagined. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty's ontology is more in line with Shanon's observations. This line of argument has already been discussed by Szummer et al. (2017). However, Sartre's idea of enchanted consciousness can also be refined and updated.

O'Shiel demonstrates that the real and the irreal are not always disparate and conflictual in Sartre's thinking. O'Shiel argues that the main concluding argument in *The Imaginary* is that the real and the irreal presuppose one another. Consciousness posits the irreality of the imagined thing when it is an absent, an inexistent or a reality-neutral object. However, this process of negation can only be relevant with regard to reality only (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 63). Sartre writes the following: "To posit an image is to constitute an object in the margin of the totality of the real" (Sartre, 2004, p. 183). O'Shiel extends Sartre's example: when we leave the café and imagine that Pierre is on the bus then the imaginary irrealizes the real; it has nothing to do with the act of walking really happening. Daydreaming can also be a typical example of this kind of separation (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 52).

However, there are forms of imagination where the real and the irreal seem to merge. According to O'Shiel, in psychopathological cases, images or voices "have become sedimented and automatized with powers of their own. Voices speak and torment; paranoia sets in; one comes to live in a disparate imaginary world almost entirely…" (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 61). Such phenomena can become "more real" for the subject for whom it is "incredibly hard to control such possessions". The result is that "the monstrous and spasmodic spontaneity of consciousness has surrendered its power to its own creations", a kind of "reverse intentionality" takes place (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 61). This kind of "magical hyperactivation" demonstrates that the irreal is able to condition, infiltrate or even corrupt the real. According to O'Shiel, this type of the "magic of the imaginary" contradicts the thesis that the imaginary can only arise through spontaneous irrealizing acts (i.e., evoking something absent or non-existent) and cannot be part of the perceptual realm (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 48). O'Shiel mentions an everyday situation as well. He had a St Christopher's medal that symbolized his father's care and affection for him. The "sentimental value" of the object and the affective memories which were mediated by it cannot be described as irrealization. Rather, he argues that the affections and memories emanated from this object (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 64). Significance and affection have embedded in it so deeply that he was unable to look at it in a neutral way. Even though Sartre emphasizes the magical qualities of certain objects, he maintains the thesis of exclusivity and denies that the lines between perception and imagination can be blurred (O'Shiel, 2019, p. 162). It seems that Sartre could not precisely say how much the irreal can condition or superimpose on the real. Ayahuasca visualizations can be regarded as another type of magical enchantment where the irreal unmistakenly manifests itself on the perceptual plane.

In one of his own experiences, Shanon finds himself in a palace and meets an intriguing and suspicious man who offers him "a radical change" in his state of consciousness. The palace and the encounter seemed totally real to him but, at the same time, he was also aware that they were not real. Shanon argues that the vision was "on a par with any other interpersonal interaction" taking place in the course of everyday life. What is even more striking is that the scene offered him the hypothetical case of another vision. While he was still experiencing the first vision, he had a second one in which he was surrounded by pumas and he himself turned into a puma. The "vision within the vision" also depicted that he would be devoured by the pumas, therefore he refused to participate in the altered state offered by the strange (hallucinated) person (Shanon, 2002, p. 103). The presence of possibilities and the freedom characterizing this visionary experience are remarkable. According to Sartre, these attributes are missing in dream imaginary. As we have seen, he argues that dream implies *fatality*, i.e., there is no room for possibilities and, despite the presence of the pre-reflective consciousness, the sequence of the dream cannot be altered (Sartre, 2004, pp. 169–170). In Shanon's view, what we see with our open eyes can be regarded as real and this can be an explanation for the sense of reality in open-eye visualizations. However, it can occur, even though rarely, that the open-eye visualization seems to be stronger than the closed-eye scene. The latter type of vision is even more immersive than the former (Shanon, 2002, p. 112).

What can the contemporary neurocognitive studies tell us about the "more real than real" character of ayahuasca visions? Aqil and Roseman argue that psychedelics do not open the gate of a supernatural realm, rather, give us insight into the functioning of our perceptual system. As a result, we recognize that our everyday world is less objective than we thought. Owing to the psychedelic experience, the subject reconsiders the relationship between the self and the world (Aqil & Roseman, 2023, p. 5.). Both Shanon and above-mentioned authors emphasize that certain psychedelic experiences are less real than others (i.e., one can find movie-like or even cartoonish experiences). Aqil and Roseman emphasize that in contrast to hallucinations induced by deliriant hallucinogens, psychedelic experiences cannot be confused with the ordinary reality of perception (Aqil & Roseman, 2023, p. 5). Preller and Vollenweider underscore the correlation between the ego dissolution experience and the discovery of an ultimate reality, often accompanied by a feeling of awe and encounter with the divine (Preller & Vollenweider, 2016, p. 230). According to Martin Fortier, the sense of reality is the result of metacognitive processes. Fortier distinguishes between the *sense of reality* and the *judgment of reality*. The former is a non-reflective and non-propositional state. An example of that can be the following case: we jump out of the way of a speeding car because we have a pre-reflective sense of reality about the approaching car. There is no room for intellectual deliberations in this dangerous situation (Fortier, 2018, p. 344). As Sartre would say, the subject is in a state of pre-reflective consciousness and is fused with practical activities (i.e., being-in-the-world).

Shanon and the above-mentioned authors do not consider the impression of "more real than real" to be a sign of psychosis. Nelson and Sass draw a sharp contrast between a psychotic break and a psychedelic experience. They provide a comparison of Renee's autobiography and Huxley's mescaline trip: they argue that an anxiety laden derealization takes place during the prodromal phase of schizophrenia which is labelled by Sass as the stage of "unreality". For Renee, the world seems hollow and empty as if it was a meaningless scaffolding of phantoms. Huxley, in *The Doors of Perception*, also describes a stage where the conventional meanings are peeled off from the perceptual world. However, his experience was not unreality; rather, a heightened emotional resonance and glow around the world (Huxley, 2009; Nelson & Sass, 2008, p. 351). In both cases, the world unravels itself in a fundamentally new way but, in Huxley's case, the experience of "mere being" is accompanied by mystical or spiritual elements (Nelson & Sass, 2008, pp. 351–352). The authors argue that there is no strict causal connection between hallucinogen-induced experiences and those resulting from psychotic break. They claim that both experiential realms might be reducible to the so-called

psychotic-like experiences. Though they do not mention Sartre's self-experiment, they accentuate that an individual with psychotic vulnerability can get a taste of psychotic-like experiences under the influence of a hallucinogen (Nelson & Sass, 2008, p. 353). The word *psychotic-like experience* was not used as a clinical term originally but, recently, it has been applied as the indicator of psychosis. The overarching application of this term can be called into question for several reasons. Firstly, there is currently no standardized questionnaire for operationalizing the concept. Secondly, there are many additional *subtypes* of psychotic-like experiences (Hinterbuchinger & Mossaheb, 2021, pp. 3–4). Even Shanon avoided to use this term in relation to ayahuasca hallucinations because he believed that the visions should not be interpreted from the perspective of mental illness. According to him, psychosis does not offer the kind of structured and meaningful experience that ayahuasca can provide for a mentally stable person (Shanon, 2002, p. 264).

In addition to the concept of psychotic-like experience, we can find other ideas in phenomenological psychiatry that could have heuristic value for the descriptive analysis of ayahuasca experiences. Sartre emphasized the dualism between the perceived and the imaginary, Merleau-Ponty traced them back to the "summoning" capacity of embodied subjectivity. The phenomenon of double bookkeeping, already mentioned in the introduction, provides another way to characterize their relation. While double bookkeeping was originally introduced to explain the estrangement of schizophrenic patients from the shared world, it has recently been expanded to describe the preserved lucidity during psychedelic experiences (Fortier, 2018).

DOUBLE BOOKKEEPING AND PSYCHEDELIC BOOKKEEPING

The aim of this section is not to identify the otherworldly realms of ayahuasca experience with the delusional or psychotic worlds. Instead, the section argues that there are non-pathological forms of double bookkeeping, i.e., psychedelic bookkeeping occurring in ayahuasca visualizations. I also intend to argue that this latter form of bookkeeping makes possible a new kind of captivity and enchantment which Sartre avoided to discuss due to his ontological presupposition about the nature of hallucination. The concept of double bookkeeping was introduced in 1911 by Eugen Bleuler who used it to describe the paradoxical phenomenon "where psychotic reality can exist side by side with shared reality even when these realities seem mutually exclusive" (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1405). Bleuler also experimented with the terms of "double registration" and "double orientation". He wanted to capture the attitude in which the subject believes with absolute certainty in the reality of the delusions while acting as if they were false or, at least, irrelevant (Sass, 2014, p. 128). The phenomenon of double bookkeeping was discussed by Louis Sass in his influential book *Madness and Modernism.* He accentuates that the presence of double bookkeeping does not mean that schizophrenic patients give up their delusions. The patient can laugh about the delusions of being persecuted and, yet, firmly hold this belief. It seems that their delusions exist "in some special domain, sealed off from real-world action or any sort of normal emotional response." (Sass, 2017, p. 227). According to Parnas and his colleagues, double bookkeeping suggests that the patient is living on two different levels of reality simultaneously. On the one hand, he lives in the external, social reality that obeys the laws of nature and contains the implicit order of pre-thematic understanding. On the other hand, he lives in a private world that violates the spatio-temporal and logical conditions of the shared intersubjective world. The authors add that the patient's private world should not be regarded as a mere figment of imagination, fiction or fantasy. The subjective sphere could take on such significance and depth that it seems more real to the patient than the socially constructed reality (Parnas et al., 2021, p. 1514).

According to the authors, double bookkeeping is most clearly observable in the initial, prodromal phase of schizophrenia. The paradox of double bookkeeping "appears across manifold phenomena of schizophrenia such as delusions, hallucinations, behaviors, existential orientation, and the nature of the insight into illness." (Parnas et al., 2021, p. 1514). One of the patients (Case 5) ascribed the hallucinatory experiences (thoughts and voices) to some kind of "universal extra-sensorial space". Another patient (Case 6) claimed that he or she lives in two realities: in the shared world and in his own private world in which hallucinatory voices occur. For another patient (Case 7), the hallucinations are "absolutely undoubtable" but the paradoxical nature of hallucination, its incompatibility with shared reality, engenders severe distress. The authors agree with Merleau-Ponty who argued that hallucinations are located on a level which is different from the perceived world (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 398; Parnas et al., 2021, p. 1517). This means that the perception of the subject, who lives in two parallel worlds, is only divided but not fragmented or multiplied. From the first-person perspective, there is one singular but *divided* subject. Or, to put it another way, there are two worlds belonging to the same subject. Of course, the authors emphasize that they do not deny that severe psychosis can result in the complete disintegration of the experiential field (Parnas et al., 2021, p. 1519).

Elyn Saks, in his frequently quoted autobiography, illustrates this situation in the following way:

> [M]y life truly began to operate as though it were being lived on two trains, their tracks side by side. On one track, the train held the things of the "real world" – my academic schedule and responsibilities, my books, my connection to my family […]. On the other track: the increasingly confusing and even frightening inner workings of my mind. The struggle was to keep the trains parallel on their tracks, and not have them suddenly and violently collide with each other (Saks, 2007, pp. 64–65; Cf. Stephensen et al., 2024. p. 1405).

Based on a longitudinal study, Stephensen and her colleagues argue that double bookkeeping is not necessarily

restricted to delusions, the phenomenon rather involves the overall change in reality which is associated with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1406). The outbreak and proceeding of psychosis may lead to the intuitive discovery of an "other reality". Of course, this "reality" unravels itself only in the subject and does so progressively (one can think of the *prodromal* phase of schizophrenia that precedes and substantiates the more profound psychotic states). In short, the process is akin to the discovery of an alien presence inside the most intimate center of the subject:

> This [sense of another presence] is accompanied by a sense of breakthrough to some kind of "other" layer of reality varying from an inner life of quasi-solipsistic character (i.e., a sense to be the only existing consciousness) to contact with other-worldly dimensions. Patients often describe their psychotic reality as more true and profound than the socially accepted reality (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1406).

The authors describe the recognition of the second world as a form of ontological breakthrough, meaning that the unfolding solipsistic otherworld has its own spatiotemporal structure and language. Amid the everyday, or "ontic" world, the otherworld is unnoticeable (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1406). The reports of 25 patients illustrate that the psychotic world is located beyond the physical world and can be characterized as "mystical", "supernatural", and "quasi-religious". The authors also differentiate between the otherworld as another dimension and as a private, quasi-solipsistic realm (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1407–1408). In addition, the patients recounted that a balance can be established between the two realities when those are separated. However, the two realities confused with one another "typically in acute psychotic exacerbations", and "the psychotic or inner world typically became increasingly invasive and out of control" in the phases of hospitalization (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1409).

The phenomenon of "more real than real" also occurs in these psychotic experiences. According to Stephensen and her colleagues,

> patients often described psychotic experience in terms of being more "real" than the "real reality" and as something involving a deeper level of truth, transcending common sense knowledge. It was not possible to doubt the certainty of these experiences. Typically, patients reported that the meaning involved in psychosis came from the outside with a revelatory character, arising suddenly in the middle of the intimate or affective sphere of their subjectivity (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1409).

The patients did not regard their experiences as symptoms of an illness in the clinical sense. Moreover, eighteen patients in the study referred to the psychotic symptoms as "signs from another dimension, parallel, or supernatural world, or insight into a more true level of reality." (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1410). The reports of the patients also suggested that the psychotic world and the ordinary world differ from one another and cannot be measured in the same way (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1410). Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's account, Stephensen emphasizes that psychotic patients do not enter a parallel world, but rather experience another ontological dimension within consensual reality. In other words, there is a "rupture within reality itself, as if reality turns itself inside out", or a "sense of split or the experience of 'two realities'" (Stephensen, 2025, p. 11).

The phenomenon of double bookkeeping occurs in a wide range of experiences, especially in cases of delusions and hallucinations. Based on Renee's autobiography, Sass argues that it is extremely rare for patients to relate to their hallucinations as objective perceptions. For instance, Renee writes that she does not hear the hallucinatory voices with her ears, but "in her mind". Sass argues that hallucinations with vivid sensory qualities are rare and even when they occur, subjects do not confuse the perceived world with their hallucinations. The schizophrenic hallucinations often indicate a kind of "unreality" (Sass, 2017, p. 227). Bleuler called into question the hallucinations of catatonic patients. His subjects described their hallucinations as "as if" experiences. He believed that visual hallucinations are pseudo hallucinations or illusions consisting of images. He also took into consideration the ambiguities of his patients' reports. For instance, one of his catatonic patients claimed that everything was filled with green snakes but had not seen them, rather, experienced them "as if they were there" (Sass, 2017, p. 227). As the hallucinations are located on a "different plane" of existence, they can be seen only through the "eyes of the mind". According to Sass, many seemingly "objective" hallucinations turn out to have only "as if" characteristics or they reflect a virtual, metaphorical quality (Sass, 2017, p. 228).

In his paper "Delusion and double book-keeping", Sass employs phenomenological ideas to illuminate the nature and complexity of schizophrenic experiences. He compares psychotic symptoms to dreams and to the phenomenological *epoche*. Wolfgang Blankenburg seeked to illuminate the estrangement of schizophrenics with an involuntary or pathological *epoche* which means that the life-world is not intentionally put into brackets but is, rather, unwillingly destabilized (cf., Stephensen, 2025, p. 5). Sass critically argues that the structural analogies between dream, *epoche* and psychoses can lead only to a partial success due to the major differences in the structure of experiences (Sass, 2014). This kind of limited structural analysis is represented by the current paper's approach as well. I intend to examine the structure of the psychotic "worlds" and the "otherworldliness" of ayahuasca experiences by taking into consideration the differences in their origin. Sophie's reports can be intriguing in the context of structural similarities. Sophie, who is one of the patients of Sass, has a delusion about the presence of a figure. She describes his emergence as an "aberrant perception" that superimposes itself onto a real object or person. It is remarkable that this "quasi-real" presence can be touched and it seems that it acts on its own. Sophie writes to Sass that, in her experiential reality, the delusion and the delusional perception cannot be divided; rather, they are fused together. Sass quotes Sophie with minor additions:

> "In delusions," she writes, "there is this external perceptual reality (albeit in a very strange sense) that needs to be included. Closer, I still feel to a dream [than to imagination or the phenomenological epoche] – a dream in which one moves, and feels, and explores" – that is (as she later clarified), in which "one does have some sense that one is discovering (and not merely projecting or imagining) the texture and quality of things." (Sass, 2014, p. 140)

Sass underscores the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of Sophie's experiences. The "aberrant perceptions" do not belong to the facts of the natural world, nor can they be compared to mere projections of imaginary objects. Sophie describes the perceptual anomalies of schizophrenia as "quasi-perceptual" phenomena, located in the grey zone between the vivid imagination and ordinary perception. The relationship between the everyday, "normal" and the "non-ordinary" world can also be multifarious, ranging from a strict differentiation to a fusion. Sophie says that the delusional world is also populated by people, however, those have undergone radical ontological changes. For instance, in contrast to real people, they can turn into leaf, or, as Sophie says, they have the capacity to intrude each other's minds from far afar (from the other end of the country) (Sass, 2014, p. 139). The dynamics between the real and the delusional world are complex. It might be that the latter displaces the former, or, in other situations, the ordinary being-in-the-world preserves its primacy and remains separated from the delusional world (Gallagher, 2009, pp. 258–259).

The studies on double bookkeeping, including the nature of the delusional or psychotic realms, raised again the central question which was of crucial importance for Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. How is it possible that, in certain circumstances, certain patients are able to differentiate between the shared world and their psychotic world populated by delusions and hallucinations? In order to avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasized again that double bookkeeping is not the general feature of psychosis. Sass and many others underscore that double bookkeeping is relevant mainly in the initial stages of schizophrenia (the above-mentioned prodromal phase). In severe psychosis, this kind of discrimination is obliterated and, in mainstream psychiatry psychosis, it is characterized as "the loss of touch with reality" or "the lack of ability to distinguish the real from the imaginary" (Stephensen, 2025, p. 2). According to Gallagher, double bookkeeping suggests that, in some cases, there is a transition between the consensual and the „virtual", i.e., the delusional world (at least in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia). However, certain delusions reach such level that the subject is unable to keep a distance from them and becomes a prisoner of his own "quasi-solipsistic" and private world (Gallagher, 2009, pp. 255–256). As Stephensen and her colleagues argue, the schizophrenic subject lives in two worlds at the same time and the aim of therapeutic intervention is to formulate a delicate equilibrium between those two and to defend the patients from the inflation of the psychotic world (Stephensen et al., 2024, p. 1414). Sass also found double-bookkeeping and reality duplication among the symptoms of Renee who was has been analyzed by the psychoanalyst Marguerite Sechehaye. Furthermore, he mentions the same phenomena in D. P. Schreber's classical case study and in Adolf Wölfli's accounts (Sass, 2014, 2017).

Sass agrees with Sartre who describes the delusional world of the schizophrenic as an empty imaginary world burdened with immutable desires and imaginations. Sartre argues that the perceived world can easily undermine our expectations. For example, he writes that Anne is only the *correlate* of his fixed desire, his intention, when he longs for her arrival. When she finally arrives, she immediately transcends his prior desires and expectations. This means that there is a fissure between imagination and reality (Sartre, 2004, p. 147). In this context, Sarte considers the world of the schizophrenic (i.e., the "morbid dreamer") to be empty and mechanical:

> It is therefore wrong to take the world of the schizophrenic for a torrent of images with a richness and a sparkle that compensates for the monotony of the real: it is a poor and meticulous world where the same, scenes keep on being repeated, to the last detail, accompanied by the same ceremonial where everything is ruled in advance, foreseen; where, above all, nothing can escape, resist, or surprise (Sartre, 2004, p. 148).

Sass confirms Satre's insight and, by analyzing Adolf Wölfli's delusional memories, shows that certain delusional worlds involve an agonizing solipsism. According to him, Sartre rightfully claims that, in certain cases, the subject escapes into imaginary worlds and leaves behind the shared world. This phenomenon is labelled by Sass as "subjectivisation" (Sass, 2004, p. 12; cf. Sass, 2014, pp. 141–142, footnote 10).

The crucial question to consider is the following: what connection can we establish between pathological hallucinations (characteristics of schizophrenia spectrum disorder) and ayahuasca visions? Shanon concluded that the ayahuasca visualizations can be identified neither with perceptions nor with pathological hallucinations (Shanon, 2002, p. 268). That is, the ayahuasca experience seems to be an unusual intentional state which is difficult to place either into the realm of the imaginary or into the world of perception. Shanon's reports suggest that the visions are not accompanied by pathological "subjectivisation". They do not reflect the repetitive and impoverished scenes of Sartre's morbid dreamer. Shanon even introduces a new form of consciousness (i.e., *Consciousness 4*) which includes contents perceived by the subject as totally independent and alien (Shanon, 2002, p. 270). However, it is worth mentioning that ayahuasca visions may contain and process personal content, such us traumatic memories (Sheth, Parikh, Olayeye, Pfeifer, & Khanna, 2024). Shanon has no intention to say that the otherworldly realms of ayahuasca would rule out the personal and therapeutic impact of the experience. On the contrary, ayahuasca eventuates a mental time travel: "Ayahuasca may act as a kind of time machine whereby we may observe past and perhaps future events perceptually, as if they were taking place in the present." (Shanon, 2002, p. 203).

The otherworldly realms generate a new form of enchanted consciousness that contradicts Sartre's thesis according to which the captivated consciousness pre-reflectively knows that the imaginary objects are the results of the spontaneity of consciousness. The important difference resides in the fact that the visions of the ayahuasca consumer are far stronger and more vivid than the fleeting perceptual illusions referred by Sartre as "hallucinations" in *The Imaginary*. It seems ayahuasca intoxication provides a new form of enchantment: the subjects have the impression that the unfolding scenes and entire worlds are not created by them. Consciousness ceases to function and becomes passive in front of the imaginary scenery. Even though the subjects do not confuse visions with real perceptions, they have the impression that an otherworld is unfolding: "Ayahuasca drinkers do confer reality on their visions, but they conceive of them as presenting separate realities which cannot be apprehended without Ayahuasca." (Shanon, 2002, p. 268). According to Shanon, the drinkers are aware of the fact that their visions are not perceptions because the "magnificence" usually presented in the visions cannot occur in ordinary perceptual contexts (Shanon, 2002, p. 268). However, this kind of pre-reflective knowledge does not rule out the otherness of their experiences.

Shanon claims that the examination of ayahuasca can even contribute to studies on the cognitive psychology of hallucination. Furthermore, we can gain more insight into the phenomenology of Sartre's enchanted consciousness, especially if we investigate the phenomenon of double bookkeeping occurring during ayahuasca visions. For instance, the subject can achieve different levels of absorption in the cases of emerging scenes or grand scenes. In order to illustrate the division in awareness, Shanon frequently applies the metaphors of virtual reality, the theatre, and the cinema. That is, complex ayahuasca visualizations and scenarios are compared to theatrical or cinematic experiences where both the alteration of consciousness and meaning bestowing occurs. He illustrates how the subject can enter or leave the state of absorption and how it is possible to navigate between the visionary and perceptual layers of the experience. As he puts it,

> *The world of visions may be so captivating that the Ayahuasca drinker may wish to be totally absorbed in it.* In particular, the drinker may keep his or her eyes closed and avoid contact with ordinary reality. *He or she may even succumb to a kind of seduction and the idea that the eyes can be opened might not occur to him or her at all (even if what is happening in the vision is most unpleasant).* However, were the drinker to open his or her eyes, awareness of the real, external world will be there in some form or another. I shall again make use of a cinematographic analogy. In the cinema, one may be totally absorbed in the film one is watching and not think about or pay any attention to what there is around one (e.g. the cinema hall and the people in it). Yet, the viewer can always, if she so wishes, turn her head, let her eyes accommodate to the darkness, and inspect things in the hall. Usually, this is also the case with Ayahuasca (Shanon, 2002, p. 266., *author's italics).*

As Shanon demonstrates, there is some degree of control and awareness in ayahuasca inebriation. As a result, we can say that ayahuasca illustrates what Fortier called psychedelic bookkeeping (Fortier, 2018). It is important to note that these visions are incompatible with the world of Sartre's morbid dreamer. The latter is pathological and solipsistic, enduring and filled with estrangement; whereas the former is temporary, filled with awe and reinvigorates the subject.

According to Fortier, drug-induced hallucinations not only can be compared to the double bookkeeping that occurs in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, but can provide insight into the neurobiology of the bookkeeping. Fortier argues that, while the psychedelic hallucinations are perfect illustrations of double bookkeeping, the deliriant-induced hallucinations involve a single-bookkeeping where the real and the hallucinated worlds are conflated (Fortier, 2018, p. 359). This opposition was verified by Shanon's accounts as well, for example by the following case: on one occasion, Shanon regarded the hallucinated person as real due to the *datura* previously mixed into the traditional ayahuasca concoction (Shanon, 2002, p. 81). While awareness remains stable in cases of psychedelics, the psychonaut completely loses awareness and reflection during deliriant-induced hallucinations and the self is dissolved in the state of delirium. In the latter case, the subject can even forget that he has taken a deliriant drug and perceives everything "at face value" and behaves as if he was surrounded by real (i.e., not hallucinated) objects. Fortier cites Shanon when he argues that the above-mentioned situation occurs nor in the case of ayahuasca, nor in the cases of other serotonergic hallucinogens (Fortier, 2018, p. 359). Fortier distinguishes three levels of reality discrimination. We can find the single bookkeeping of deliriants on one end of the continuum of reality registration, and the double bookkeeping of psychedelic-induced hallucinations on the other. Schizophrenic double bookkeeping can be inserted between the two ends of the spectrum precarious (Fortier, 2018, p. 360). That is, not every symptom of schizophrenia involves the possibility of double bookkeeping (Bortolotti & Broome, 2012). Shanon's observations are supplementing Fortier's idea of psychedelic double bookkeeping. The study of schizophrenic and psychedelic double bookkeeping leads Fortier to the conclusion that "two things can be considered real, but real in two very distinct ways" (Fortier, 2018, p. 360). This means that the sense of reality is not a homogeneous or single characteristic of consciousness but a changeable parameter, as Shanon has also suggested in the study of the "more real than real" character of ayahuasca experiences (Shanon, 2002, p. 265).

The ayahuasca visions also provide an opportunity to further develop Sartre's concept of enchanted consciousness. According to Shanon, the content and the intensity of ayahuasca visualizations engender enchantment and awe in the subject. The interactive grand scenes literally enchant the psychonaut. Shanon describes the impact of enchantment in the following lines:

> The forest was full of animals – both natural and phantasmagoric: notably there were dragons, felines, and big birds. The dominant colours were green and blue. I was sitting viewing the forest as if it were a stage. It was as if a screen were raised and another world made its appearance.

> At moments, however, it seemed to me that even though I was sitting here on the bench, my own self was over there in the forest and I was dancing with the various creatures in it. It was all blissful, and very real. And I saw it all with open eyes (Shanon, 2002, pp. 6–7).

In the case described above, in contrast to Sartre's theory on dreams, the state of enchantment is not identical with the suspension of reflective consciousness, the emergence of the otherworldly realm indicates psychedelic double bookkeeping. It seems that this kind of enchantment does not rule out self-awareness, on the contrary, increases it. These complex visions also shed light on the limitations of Sartre's theory of hallucination. As it was discussed above, Sartre argued that perception and hallucination are mutually exclusive attitudes or modes of consciousness. Despite the exclusivity principle, Sartre was inclined to accept that the irreal (in forms of pathological hallucinations) might condition the real (i.e., shared perceptual reality). In addition, ayahuasca visualizations demonstrate the possibility of a transient, non-pathological psychedelic double bookkeeping in which perceptual and hallucinatory (i.e., visionary) elements are superimposed on one another and experienced in this new form by the subject. As we have seen, Sartre claims that, when the pure event of hallucination enters into the immediate memory, its irreality is retained in consciousness; that is, the subject pre-reflectively recognizes the irreality of hallucinated object as well as its "capricious", "furtive" and "mysterious" characteristics (Sartre, 2004, p. 159). Sartre seeked to underpin his ontological idea of nothingness and the exclusivity between perception and hallucination by characterizing hallucinations as elusive and transient. This limited notion of hallucination can be refined by Shanon's observations demonstrating that the "sense of reality" of visions can be enhanced or reduced due to the intensity of the sensory elements of hallucinations (Shanon, 2002, pp. 202, 265). The intensification of visions does not necessarily mean that the subject confuses the visualized scenes with the environment perceived in reality. The ongoing psychedelic double bookkeeping can be seen as a kind of reflective awareness that differentiates between the "reality" of the perceived environment and the hallucinations which are superimposed on it when open-eye visualizations occur.

Sartre defined enchantment as a state of enchained consciousness in which reflective self-consciousness diminishes and the subject submerges into a dream world or a pathological hallucinations. The extreme form of enchained consciousness is what O'Shiel labelled as the "magical hypercaptivity of consciousness" which is a near-psychotic state. We can observe a nearly complete enchainment of the consciousness in ordinary dreams as well. The subject can escape the dream world by regaining reflective consciousness. These kinds of captivations are not present in the ayahuasca experiences. The affectively charged visions of the ayahuasca experience do not necessarily enchain consciousness, reflection remains possible. In his book, Shanon likens the skilled ayahuasca drinker to a pianist: "the pianist may be said to be able to maintain a concurrent dual existence in which he can, at will, be both immersed in and reflective about his playing I propose that this is exactly the talent the master ayahuasquero develops." (Shanon, 2002, p. 352) He also argues that the psychonaut is not a mentally ill but a stable person, a "competent navigator" who can "dance along" with the visions. There is no such control and awareness in psychotic episodes (Shanon, 2002, p. 29). According to Shanon's observations on psychedelic double bookkeeping, in certain mental states, consciousness is enchanted without the enchainment or hypercaptivation typical to delusional and psychotic realms.

CONCLUSION

Sartre's theory of hallucination can be supplemented by the conclusions drawn by Shanon's study on ayahuasca. The ayahuasca visualizations can be characterized as a new form of enchantment which generates a sense of otherworldliness. This is the exact opposite of Sartre's contention, according to which hallucinations are fleeting temporary illusions. Ayahuasca experiences can provide a new framework for investigating the phenomenon of double bookkeeping. Fortier's distinction between delusional and psychedelic double bookkeeping demarcates the pathological and the psychedelic hallucinations. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty restricted their attention to pathological hallucinations. As we have seen, Sartre regarded his own atypical reaction to mescaline as a pathological condition. Following the psychological studies of the first half of the twentieth century, he regarded hallucinations in general as pathological forms of imagination. The analysis of double bookkeeping demonstrated the significance of the phenomenological method. In contemporary psychedelic studies, the phenomenological stance could play a similar role, more precisely, it could enrich the qualitative (first personal) analysis of the non-pathological forms of hallucinatory experiences. In addition, phenomenological inquiries could also widen the scope of experiences worthy of investigation. Shanon mentions a certain feature of ayahuasca which constituted a crucial aspect of imagination for Sartre as well: it can induce a poetic stance in the subjects, a dynamic and creative mode of cognition takes place, one which is usually attributed to poets and artists (Shanon, 2002, p. 342; Shanon, 2010, p. 276). Shanon even points out that the meanings of visions cannot be deciphered merely by natural scientific or positivist means; consequently, it would be fruitful to employ the method of hermeneutics of art (Shanon, 2010, p. 278).

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