

Doktori (PhD) értekezés

**The Effects of Gender and Social Distance on the
Expression of Verbal Disagreement Employed by
Hungarian Undergraduate Students**

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Én, Koczogh Helga Vanda teljes felelősségem tudatában kijelentem, hogy a benyújtott értekezés a szerzői jog nemzetközi normáinak tiszteletben tartásával készült. Jelen értekezést korábban más intézményben nem nyújtottam be és azt nem utasították el.

ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ

A társadalmi nem és társadalmi távolság hatásai a magyar egyetemi hallgatók verbális egyet nem értésének kifejezésére

Az értekezés célja az egyet nem értés, szűkebben a mindennapi interakciókban megjelenő verbális egyet nem értés szociopragmatikai vizsgálata a Debreceni Egyetem hallgatóinak körében. Az egyet nem értéssel foglalkozó eddigi tanulmányok túlnyomórészt az angol nyelvre koncentráltak és főként a nyelvi formákat vették górcső alá, figyelmen kívül hagyva a funkcionális aspektust. Az egyet nem értés és társadalmi nem (gender) viszonyát vizsgáló elenyésző számú kutatások pedig elsősorban azonos nemű beszélők szóbeli interakcióját elemezték. Saját munkámban arra keresem a választ, hogy milyen hatást gyakorol a társadalmi nem és a szociális távolság az egyet nem értés verbális kifejezésére és az egyet nem értési stratégiák alkalmazására. Céloom a magyar egyetemi hallgatók körében használt egyet nem értés konkrét nyelvi megvalósulásainak és a mögöttük húzódó stratégiák feltérképezése.

Empirikus kutatásom több lépcsős, mely során a verbális egyet nem értést egyetemi hallgatók szemtől szembeni interakcióiban vizsgáltam. Az adatgyűjtés a vegyes nemű diádok beszélgetésének hangrögzítéssel, valamint háttértesztet alkalmazásával történt. Disszertációmban megállapításra került, hogy bizonyos prozódiai jellemzők (különösen az intonáció) kiemelt jelentőséggel bírnak az egyet nem értés kifejezésében. Ezen megfontolásból az egyet nem értés kifejezésére használt stratégiák azonosítását a megnyilatkozások akusztikai elemzésének segítségével végeztem el. A releváns szakirodalom alapján felállított osztályozási rendszeremet összesen 130 adatközlő vélekedése alapján tökéletesítettem több lépésben. Az elmélet és az adatok közötti folyamatos oda-visszacsatolás eredményeként jött létre a végleges (metaelméleti) modell, mely teljes képet ad az egyet nem értés kifejezésének eszközeiről a magyar nyelvben. Az eredmények statisztikai értékeléséhez leíró és következtetési statisztikai eljárásokat is használtam.

Az egyet nem értés kifejezési módjának feltérképezése során számos direkt és indirekt egyet nem értési stratégiát, illetve pragmatikai erő módosítót

azonosítottam, mellyel a vizsgálati alanyok az egyet nem értés erejét tetszés szerint tompították vagy fokozták. Vizsgálatom rámutatott arra, hogy a kutatásomban résztvevő egyetemi hallgatók egyet nem értésüket egyetlen stratégiával vagy stratégiakombinációk alkalmazásával juttatták kifejezésre. Bizonyos egyet nem értéket előszekvencia vezette be hezitálás, egyetértés, figyelemfelkeltés vagy metakommunikációs funkcióval. Vizsgálatom mindenekeelőtt rávilágított arra, hogy mind a beszélő neme, mind pedig a köztük lévő társadalmi távolság nagymértékben befolyásolja az egyet nem értés kifejezésének gyakoriságát és nyelvi megvalósulási formáját egyaránt (bár nem minden esetben az előre feltételezett módon). Azon feltevésem például, hogy a nők kevesebbszer nyilatkoztatják ki egyet nem értésüket és indirektebben teszik azt, mint a férfiak nem nyert megerősítést. Kutatásomban a beszélők közötti társadalmi távolság és a verbális egyet nem értés gyakorisága egymással fordítottan arányosnak bizonyult, azaz a növekvő társadalmi távolsággal a véleménykülönbség kinyilatkoztatásának gyakorisága csökkent. Bár az esetek többségében a nagy társadalmi távolság és az indirekt stratégiák használata közötti kapcsolat beigazolódott, a nagyobb társadalmi távolság nem minden esetben garantálja az indirekt stratégiák iránti preferenciát. Mindebből egyértelműen következik, hogy kutatásom azon eredményei, melyek a társadalmi távolság és az egyet nem értés viszonyát hivatottak volt feltérképezni nem támasztják alá Wolfson (1988) 'bulge' elméletét, mely szerint a szociális távolságot mérő skála két végén elhelyezkedő csoportok hasonló nyelvi viselkedést produkálnak.

Az empirikus kutatás eredményeinek fényében értekezésem végén a verbális egyet nem értést a következőképpen definiálom: a verbális egyet nem értés olyan szituált társas gyakorlat, melynek funkciója egy olyan vélemény (vagy meggyőződés) kifejezése, melynek propozícionális tartalma vagy illokúciós ereje (a beszélő szándéka szerint) részben vagy teljesen ellentmond egy azt megelőző (nem verbális) megnyilvánulás propozíciós tartalmának vagy illokúciós erejének.

ABSTRACT

The Effects of Gender and Social Distance on the Expression of Verbal Disagreement Employed by Hungarian Undergraduate Students

The primary aim of this dissertation is to investigate disagreement, more precisely, verbal disagreement expressed by undergraduate students at the University of Debrecen from a sociopragmatic point of view. To date, the majority of research carried out on disagreement has focused on the English language and investigated the linguistic manifestation of disagreement while ignoring its functional spectrum. Furthermore, the limited number of studies on the relationship of gender and disagreements tend to focus on one gender exclusively. Hence, to remedy these gaps observed in the literature, the aim of my dissertation is threefold: (1) to examine verbal disagreement as it is accomplished linguistically in the mixed-sex conversations of Hungarian undergraduate students, (2) to map the functional spectrum of disagreements occurring in the data, and (3) to determine the effects of the variables of gender and social distance on the expression of verbal disagreement.

In my research, a multi-step and multi-method strategy was adopted in order to address the research issues. A triangulated approach was employed to collect data by means of audio-recording mixed-sex face-to-face dyadic interchanges of undergraduate students and by completion of background questionnaires. Since certain prosodic features (especially intonation) play an important role in the expression of disagreement, acoustic analysis was also used in the identification of disagreement strategies. The present study proposes a framework of disagreement strategies, which was tested and validated by 130 informants altogether. A constant feedback between linguistic data and theory ensured the development of a final (metatheoretical) categorization scheme that is capable of capturing the complex nature of Hungarian disagreements. The analysis of disagreements was also strengthened by descriptive and inferential statistical analyses.

During the detailed analysis of Hungarian disagreements, I identified a pool of direct and indirect disagreement strategies and various pragmatic force modifiers that are employed to mitigate or aggravate the pragmatic force of the utterance. The

analysis revealed that disagreement in my research was expressed either via a single disagreement strategy or optionally with a combination of two or sometimes even three strategies. Some disagreements were also preceded by a pre-sequence with the functions of hesitation, agreement, alerting, or meta-communication. The main conclusion drawn from my research is that both the gender of the speaker and the social distance between the interlocutors affect the frequency of disagreements as well as the means by which they are expressed (although not always in the anticipated way). For instance, the female undergraduate students participating in the research were not found to express disagreement less frequently than their male counterparts did. Likewise, the research results did not lend support to the hypothesis that, in comparison to male students, female students are more likely to adopt indirect disagreement strategies. A statistically significant inverse relationship was found between the rate of disagreements and social distance. In terms of the impact of social distance on the utilized disagreement strategies, the associations between great social distance and the use of indirect strategies was generally supported, but great social distance did not always warrant a greater preference for indirect disagreement. All in all, my research findings do not seem to support the bulge theory (Wolfson, 1988), which proposes that interlocutors at the two extremes of the social distance continuum exhibit very similar speech behaviour as opposed to the middle section.

In the light of my empirical research, I proposed the following definition of verbal disagreement: verbal disagreement is a situated activity whose function is to express an opinion (or belief) the propositional content or illocutionary force of which is – or is intended to be – partly or fully inconsistent with that of a prior (non-verbal) utterance.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preliminaries

In the past few decades, there has been an increasing interest in conflict talk in several different fields, e.g., psychology, philosophy, sociology, and linguistics. Despite an extensive body of research into conflict in the social sciences, the study of disagreement *per se* within conflict episodes and its features is relatively recent. In linguistics, disagreement has been investigated within the frameworks of speech act theory (Sornig, 1977), politeness theory (Holtgraves, 1997), conversational analysis (Kotthoff, 1993; Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987), discourse analysis (Georgakopoulou, 2001; Kakavá, 1995; Schiffrin, 1985), relevance theory (Locher, 2004), and even social psychological pragmatics (Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998). The growing popularity of disagreement as a research subject among linguists can be attributed to several facts: (a) disagreement is a salient part of our everyday interactions; (b) it has a complex nature; (c) it raises the intriguing issues of im/politeness and in/appropriateness; and (d) in the past, research in pragmatics primarily focused on cooperative linguistic behaviour while insufficient attention was given to issues related to conflict talk.¹

Another area of research which has received increasing attention over the past 40 years is the interface between language and gender. Robin Lakoff's (1975) pioneering book, *Language and Woman's Place*, has inspired innumerable studies seeking to disentangle the complex interaction between gender and communication by examining the linguistic practices of men and women.

While numerous studies have been undertaken separately in the two above-mentioned fields, so far there has been limited research on the relationship of gender and disagreements. Furthermore, most existing studies tend to focus on one gender exclusively and they predominantly investigate the linguistic manifestation of disagreement while ignoring its functional spectrum. In addition, the research to date has mainly surveyed the effects of power and degree of imposition on the expression of disagreement, while there has been little or no discussion about the role of social distance between interlocutors. Moreover, while other speech acts, i.e., apologies (Mászlainé Nagy, 2007, 2008, 2010; Suszczyńska, 1999; Szili, 2003, 2004), requests

¹ I would like to thank one of my opponents, Enikő Németh T., for calling my attention to this reason.

(Szili, 2002, 2004; Vacsi, 2011), compliments (Szili, 2004; Furkó & Dudás, 2012), and refusals (Maróti, 2000; Szili, 2007), have been investigated in the relevant literature, disagreements in Hungarian have been a relatively neglected research area, with the notable exception of Bándli's (2009) (as yet) unpublished dissertation on the pragmatics of disagreement.² Hence, there remains a need to remedy these gaps observed in the literature. The aim of my dissertation is thus threefold: (1) to examine verbal disagreement³ as it is accomplished linguistically in the conversations of Hungarian undergraduate students, (2) to map the functional spectrum of disagreements occurring in the data, and (3) to determine the effects of the variables of gender and social distance on the expression of verbal disagreement. My study is an attempt to fill the gaps in the relevant literature by analysing verbal disagreement in mixed-sex dyadic face-to-face encounters of Hungarian undergraduates⁴ within a task-based framework employing a combined qualitative and quantitative approach to data analysis. The current dissertation endeavours to identify and systemize the various strategies used for the purpose of disagreeing based on empirical research from a sociopragmatic point of view.

1.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses

At the outset of this section, the research questions of my study are posed in three sets. Next, hypotheses are postulated to address the respective research questions based on the relevant literature.

In light of the problems outlined in the previous section, this dissertation addresses three sets of interrelated research questions. The first set consists of a general and a specific question, listed below. For the second and third sets, first the general question is presented, followed by three specific research questions.

The first general question investigates the linguistic means of expressing disagreement:

RQ1 How do Hungarian undergraduate students express verbal disagreement?

² Mászlainé Nagy's (2010) dissertation, which includes a short section on preference organization in connection with Hungarian disagreements, is also worth a mention here.

³ It must be noted that disagreement can be expressed both verbally and non-verbally and it is not the intent of this dissertation to imply that paralinguistic or non-verbal features are unimportant. However, a detailed investigation of these features is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

⁴ Undergraduate students were chosen as research participants due to their convenient accessibility and relative homogeneity in terms of age and educational background.

RQ1.1 What disagreement strategies do they employ?

The second general research question focuses on the effect of the gender of the speaker on the expression of verbal disagreement:

RQ2 Are there any qualitative and/or quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement in terms of the gender of the speaker? If so, what are these differences?

RQ2 leads to the following three specific questions for the present study:

RQ2.1 Are there any gender differences in the frequency of verbal disagreements expressed by Hungarian undergraduate students participating in the study? If so, what are they?

RQ2.2 Are there any qualitative differences in verbal disagreements (i.e., mitigated or aggravated) in terms of the gender of the speaker? If so, what are the patterns that emerge?

RQ2.3 Does the gender of the speaker influence the pragmatic strategies (s)he employs for expressing disagreement? If yes, in what ways?

The third set of research questions is concerned with the expression of verbal disagreement with respect to the social distance between the interlocutors:

RQ3 Are there any qualitative and/or quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement in terms of the social distance between participants? If so, what are these differences?

RQ3.1 Are there any differences in the frequency of verbal disagreements expressed by Hungarian university students participating in the study in terms of the social distance between participants? If so, what are they?

RQ3.2 Are there any qualitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement (i.e., mitigated or aggravated) in terms of the social distance between participants? If so, what patterns emerge?

RQ3.3 Does the social distance between the participants influence the pragmatic strategies they employ for expressing disagreement? If yes, in what ways?

This dissertation describes and discusses the results of empirical research undertaken to find the answers to these research questions.

In seeking to answer the above-mentioned questions, some hypotheses have been formulated based on the results of relevant research on English and other languages (e.g., Spanish,⁵ Italian,⁶ German,⁷ Japanese,⁸ Chinese,⁹ Korean,¹⁰ Greek,¹¹ etc.). For the first set of research questions, no hypotheses have been postulated, since they address a field of research that has not been thoroughly investigated so far.¹² Thus, I can only tentatively assume that the strategies at the disposal of Hungarian undergraduate students are similar to those utilized by speakers of other languages.¹³ The identification of patterned disagreement strategies in Hungarian remains one of the main aims of this dissertation. In order to address the research questions of the second and third sets, the following hypotheses are postulated,¹⁴ with numbers used to denote correspondence between specific hypotheses and the relevant research questions, e.g., H2.1 addresses RQ2.1.

H2 There will be both qualitative and quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement employed by Hungarian undergraduate students in terms of the gender of the speaker.

H2.1 Female undergraduate students will express verbal disagreement less frequently than male undergraduate students.

⁵ Cordella (1996), Edstrom (2004), Garcia (1989)

⁶ Corsaro & Maynard (1996), Corsaro & Rizzo (1990)

⁷ Kotthoff (1993)

⁸ Jones (1990), LoCastro (1986), Mori (1999), Watanabe (1990, 1993)

⁹ Liang & Han (2005), Liu (2004), Shen (2006)

¹⁰ Song (1993)

¹¹ Georgakopoulou (2001), Kakavá (1993a, 2002), Sifianou (1997), Tannen & Kakavá (1992)

¹² To my best knowledge, apart from Bándli's (2009) study, there has been no (available) research into the linguistic expression of disagreements in Hungarian.

¹³ However, some differences are also anticipated due to cultural differences.

¹⁴ Hypotheses for the second set of research questions were postulated based on previous studies on gender and im/politeness (e.g., Brown, 1980; Coates, 1989; Edelsky, 1981; Guiller & Durndell, 2006; Pilkington, 1992), while hypotheses for the third set were posed in light of research on social distance and im/politeness (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987; García, 2008; Or & Ong, 2008).

- H2.2 Women participating in my study will tend to use more mitigated and fewer aggravated disagreements than men.
- H2.3 Female undergraduate students will favour less face-threatening, indirect strategies¹⁵ when expressing disagreement, while male undergraduates will be apt to employ more direct disagreement strategies.
- H3 There will be both qualitative and quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement employed by Hungarian undergraduate students in terms of the social distance between participants.
 - H3.1 The frequency of disagreements expressed will increase with the decrease of the social distance between participants.
 - H3.2 In comparison to couples and siblings, strangers will be inclined to use more mitigated, fewer neither mitigated nor aggravated, and even fewer aggravated disagreements.
 - H3.3 Strangers will use proportionally fewer direct and more indirect disagreement strategies than couples and siblings.

This presentation of the research questions and hypotheses is followed by a short description of the methodology of the research and the significance of the current study as outlined in the next section.

1.3 Methodology and Significance

In order to address the research questions and find out to what extent the hypotheses are confirmed, research involving 30 Hungarian undergraduate students has been conducted. Data was gathered by recording face-to-face interactions of mixed-sex pairs and by the completion of background questionnaires. The current study employed a metatheoretical¹⁶ approach that combined both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to provide a more holistic and comprehensive view of verbal disagreements in Hungarian. For the purpose of data analysis, a multi-step method was used including coding schemes as well as inferential and descriptive statistical models. In light of new findings and the results of pilot phases, the coding scheme has undergone several changes in order to best suit the nature of the data

¹⁵ For more details on direct and indirect disagreement strategies see Chapter 3.

¹⁶ cf. Kertész & Rákosi (2008, 2012)

and the research questions. Reliability, validity, and comparability were ensured by pilot studies, verification processes and a consistent data collection procedure.

An important contribution of this research will be the study and analysis of solid empirical data on how Hungarian undergraduate students express verbal disagreement in face-to-face encounters. By mapping the patterned disagreement strategies used in Hungarian, the results of the present study will hopefully enhance a deeper understanding of Hungarian interactional styles. Furthermore, the current research will investigate the interface of gender and social distance in the realization of disagreement in natural(istic) language data; thus, the findings will add substantially to the interdisciplinary fields of pragmatics and sociolinguistics.

1.4 Structure of Dissertation

The structure of my dissertation is as follows. It is divided into five chapters. Following this introduction (Chapter 1), the theoretical background for the study is discussed in Chapter 2 (Approaches to Disagreement). It offers a critical review of the definitions of disagreement as well as an initial definition of verbal disagreement. After a concise discussion of the sequential properties of disagreement at the micro and macro level, the chapter provides an overview of the major politeness and impoliteness theories, with specific reference to disagreements. Then, a description of the features of disagreement is presented, and it is argued that disagreements are very complex in nature, and their interpretation is highly context and culture dependent. Disagreements are also discussed from the perspective of preference/dispreference structures. The second part of the chapter explores the findings of previous empirical studies carried out on disagreement and also discusses some relevant terminological issues. First, an attempt is made to clarify the terminological confusion between the concepts of *sex* and *gender*, followed by a brief overview of gender studies. Second, the terminological inconsistency in the use of *social distance* is tackled. Following this, the chapter presents a review of previous related studies, first covering ones dealing with gender and disagreement and then looking at studies of social distance and disagreement conducted on adults. The review identifies several methodological gaps in the relevant literature which are addressed later in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 concludes with an overview of studies on disagreement types, pinpointing some of their limitations.

Chapter 3 (Methodology) depicts the methodological approach adopted in the study by providing an account of data collection procedures, method and treatment. The chapter also presents a comprehensive step-by-step description of the development of both the research instruments used to collect data and of the coding scheme for identifying disagreement strategies and linguistic items that modify the pragmatic force of the given disagreement. A model is proposed that, unlike earlier approaches, is capable of analyzing disagreement from both a functional and a structural point of view. The first set of research questions concerning how Hungarian undergraduate students express verbal disagreement and what strategies they employ for this purpose is addressed in Chapter 3. The disagreement strategies and the linguistic features under discussion are illustrated by a wide range of examples. In addition, ethical issues concerning the research process are clarified. The chapter concludes with a brief description of the statistical procedures applied to the data.

Key findings of the empirical research are presented in Chapter 4 (Findings and Discussion). These include results based on the use of both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. The findings are accounted for through detailed discussion, with reference to each of the research questions and in relation to previous relevant research findings. The second part of the chapter revisits the research hypotheses to see the extent to which they are supported or refuted by the results. Additionally, some miscellaneous findings of the research are presented. Finally, a modified version of the initial definition of verbal disagreement is proposed based on empirical results.

Concluding remarks are made in Chapter 5 (Conclusion). The chapter summarizes the findings of the research, focuses on its implications, indicates some of the limitations, and proposes some directions for future studies.

PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 2 APPROACHES TO DISAGREEMENT

2.1 Defining Disagreement

2.1.1 Disagreement: terminology and definition.

The phenomena of conflict and disagreement have been captivating researchers in linguistics for several decades. The popularity of the latter is due to the fact that it is one of the most commonly occurring speech events in everyday interactions. Disagreements are complex and entail the widely-researched issues of im/politeness and in/appropriateness. Different researchers use various – but closely related – terms for the study of disagreements, such as *opposition* (Kakavá, 2002), *argument* (Emihovich, 1986; Maynard, 1985; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Schiffrin, 1984, 1985), *debate* (Johnson & Johnson, 1985), *conflict* (Honda, 2002), *dispute* (Corsaro & Rizzo, 1990; Goodwin et al., 2002; Kotthoff, 1993; Sprott, 1992), *confrontation* (Brown, 1990; Hutchby, 1992), *oppositional talk* (Bardovi-Harlig & Salsbury, 2004; Corsaro & Maynard, 1996), and *conflict talk* (Grimshaw, 1990; Honda, 2002; Leung, 2005). Although it is not the primary aim of this dissertation to clarify this terminological turmoil, a discussion of the conceptualization issues is pertinent in order to demonstrate how these related notions are used by different scholars, and also to formulate a definition of *disagreement*.

The term *opposition* refers to a verbal or non-verbal “oppositional stance” in response to an “antecedent verbal (or non-verbal) action” (Kakavá, 2002, p. 1539). Kakavá (2002) points out that opposition can be delivered in various verbal (e.g., disagreement) and non-verbal (e.g., gestures) ways and she also notes that silence can serve as a means of opposition (i.e., withholding approval). Honda (2002, p. 574) considers *conflict* to be a speech activity “in which two parties attempt to maintain their own positions by means of opposition, that is, the manifestation of negativity against the other party’s position that is opposed to one’s own”. Negative attitude towards the other party’s stance is also reflected in *confrontations*, which are conceived as “aggravated opposition” highlighting the oppositional character of the interaction (Hutchby, 1996, p. 25). Along similar lines, *dispute* is also conceptualized as talk consisting of extended opposition turns characterized by hostility and

antagonism (Goodwin et al, 2002). Johnson and Johnson (1985) state that disagreements and argumentation are central elements of debates. Studying the effects of debates in learning groups, they claim that “debate exists when two or more students argue positions that are incompatible and a winner is declared on the basis of who presented their position best” [emphasis added] (ibid. pp. 238-239). They suggest that debates promote open-minded cooperation and facilitate learning, since participants do not consider them personal attacks but interesting opportunities to learn new things. The concept *oppositional talk* is generally used in a broader sense as it includes “disagreements, challenges, denials, accusations, threats, and insults” (Bardovi-Harlig & Salsbury, 2004, p. 200). Similarly to oppositional talk, in *conflict talk* the parties occupy alternative positions *vis-à-vis* the same issue(s), but the latter is used in an even wider sense. Conflict talk is viewed as “a process of opposition which includes not only the manifestation of opposition, but the whole process of inducement, initiation, development, and management of opposition” (Honda, 2002, p. 574).

Argument, one of the most commonly used terms, can be used in the traditional rhetorical sense and as an interactive process. The classical interpretation of argument is based on logical reasoning and conceptualized as unidimensional since it generally focuses on a single speaker who “presents an intact monologue supporting a disputable position” (Schiffrin, 1985, p. 37). In contrast, argument as a type of interaction involves two or more participants who “openly support disputed positions” (ibid.). Jacobs and Jackson (1981) make an analogous distinction between argument as a type of speech act and as a type of interaction. They regard arguments as “disagreement-relevant speech events” which are “characterized by the projection, production, suppression, or resolution of disagreements, so that they function not only to manage cases of explicit disagreement, but also to regulate the occurrence of disagreeable speech acts” (Jacobs & Jackson, 1982, pp. 22-23). Thus, argument is defined formally as an expansion of the speech act of disagreement, and functionally as a means of managing disagreement in interaction. Arguing is conceptualized by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) as an illocutionary act with the perlocutionary outcome of convincing. In their interpretation, arguments can extend through multiple utterances, so-called illocutionary act complexes. However, other researchers share the view that argument is broader than a single act of disagreement. Kakavá (2002), for instance, sees argument as “the activity in which

the participants engage when they exchange oppositional moves to challenge and/or support for [*sic*] a position” (p. 1539). Schiffrin (1984) emphasizes that argument is characterized by sustained disagreement and competition for interactionally negotiable goods. Finally, Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) propose that arguments consist of “the conversational interactivity of making claims, disagreeing with claims, countering disagreements, and the process by which such disagreements arise, are dealt with, and resolved” (p. 225). Hence, participants oppose one another in successive turns at talk, so opposition is detectable throughout longer stretches of talk.

Thus, it can be seen that the terms discussed above are closely related with varying scope and fuzzy boundaries. The distinctions are made along the lines of positive/negative attitude and the local/interactional dimensions. It is also clear from the above that disagreement does not equate with argument, but can evolve into it.

At this point, it seems important to define what is actually meant by the term *disagreement*. There has been a great deal of variation in the literature in the way in which the term has been used. According to Edstrom (2004), for instance, disagreement is the “communication of an opinion or belief contrary to the view expressed by the previous speaker” (p. 1505). Similarly, Sifianou (in press, p. 1) considers the act of disagreement an “expression of a view”; however, it is not opposite to, but rather simply different from “that expressed by another speaker”. Although these definitions allow for both verbal and non-verbal ways of expressing disagreement, they only deal with conflict on a content level. Rees-Miller (2000) gives a more detailed and more scientific account of what is meant by the term by stating that “[a] speaker S disagrees when s/he considers untrue some Proposition *P* uttered or presumed to be espoused by an Addressee A and reacts with an utterance the propositional content or implicature of which is *Not P* [original emphasis]” (p. 1088). This definition points out that disagreement can be achieved indirectly, by implying opposition. Moreover, it allows S to disagree without A actually having said *P*. However, as Reese-Miller (ibid., p. 1089) observes, the definition excludes teasing, nonserious verbal dueling and irony. Sornig, in his article titled “Disagreement and contradiction as communicative acts”, gives the most detailed definition of the term disagreement in saying tentatively that “any *utterance* that comments upon a pre-text by questioning part of its semantic or pragmatic information (sometimes its formal structure as well), correcting or negating it (semantically or formally) will be called an

act of disagreement or contradiction” [emphasis added] (1977, p. 363). I share Sornig’s categorization of the act of disagreement as an utterance, since this dissertation examines the expression of verbal disagreements. Although I am aware of the fact that there are also nonverbal ways of expressing disagreement, such as posture, facial expressions, and paralinguistic features, these are beyond the scope of my research.¹⁷ Sornig’s definition, however, seems to neglect the fact that disagreement can be a reactive act to a non-verbal expression of opinion as well (and vice versa).

2.1.2 Disagreement in speech act theory.

Following Sornig (1977), this dissertation also defines disagreement drawing upon Speech Act Theory as one of its major theoretical frameworks. Speech Act Theory, the theory claiming that in conversation speakers perform various speech acts (e.g., promising, warning, commanding, etc.) that can be interpreted on three different levels,¹⁸ was first developed by John Austin (1962) in his widely acknowledged book titled *How to Do Things with Words*. He set up the following classes of verbs based on their illocutionary force and presented a list of verbs which typically mark each of these categories (ibid., pp. 150-163):

- verdictives: “the giving of a verdict or judgement” (e.g., *acquit, convict, value*)
- exercitives: “the exercising of powers, rights, or influence” (e.g., *appoint, dismiss, nominate*)
- commissives: making promises or giving undertakings (e.g., *promise, agree, oppose*)
- behabitives: representatives of “attitudes and social behaviour” (e.g., *apologize, thank, congratulate*)
- expositives: clarify “how utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation” (e.g., *state, agree, argue*) [emphasis added]

As is clear from the above, the classification of speech acts is not always clear-cut, a flaw that the author himself acknowledges stating that “there are still wide

¹⁷ However, some prosodic features (e.g., intonation) will be taken into consideration.

¹⁸ locution, illocution and perlocution

possibilities of marginal and awkward cases, or of overlaps” (ibid., p. 151). The verb *agree*, for instance, is both categorised as a commissive and an expositive. As Bándli (2009, p. 20) notes, semantically, it is the opposite of *disagree*, while they both fulfil the function of expressing one’s opinion. Furthermore, other verbs closely related to the meaning of *disagree* (e.g., *oppose*, *argue*) are also drawn into different groups in the taxonomy of illocutions. Although Austin does not list the verb *disagree* among the words exemplifying each category, he refers to its ambiguous group membership claiming that “supporting, agreeing, disagreeing, maintaining, and defending” form a “group of illocutions which seem to be both expositive and commissive” (ibid., p. 158).

Austin’s theory of speech acts was deepened, extended, refined and incorporated into a linguistic theory by John Searle (1969). Searle refuses to accept the claim that conversation is rule-governed (ibid., p. 21) and proposes that the illocutionary speech act is the basic unit of communication. Searle (1975) points out several weaknesses of Austin’s framework, the most crucial one being that it is a classification of English illocutionary verbs rather than acts (ibid., p. 351). As an alternative, he proposes a taxonomy of illocutionary acts comprising the following five categories (ibid., pp. 354-361):

- representatives (or assertives): speech acts that commit the speaker to the truth or falsity of the expressed proposition (e.g., *suggest*, *conclude*, *deduce*)
- directives: speech acts that attempt to get the hearer to take a particular action (e.g., *ask*, *order*, *beg*)
- commissives: speech acts that “commit the speaker [...] to some future course of action” (e.g., *promise*, *oath*, *wow*)
- expressives: speech acts that express the speaker’s attitudes and emotions towards the proposition (e.g., *thank*, *congratulate*, *apologize*)
- declarations: speech acts that are to “bring about a correspondence between the propositional content of the speech act and reality” (e.g., *resign*, *declare*, *name*)

In Searle’s taxonomy, the act of disagreement is not a commissive and it differs from promises since it is a reaction act to an act that precedes it; in other

words, it requires a prior utterance from an interlocutor (Sornig, 1977, p. 364). This has implications for the study of disagreements. Since the act of disagreement depends on a pre-text, it must be analysed within the particular context in which it occurs (on the importance of context see section 2.6.2). Disagreements can be related to representatives, since in some cases a disagreement can be expressed by stating that a previous proposition is untrue; that is, *Not P* (cf. Rees-Miller's definition on p. 10).

Applying Searle's framework, the following conditions and criteria should be met for a proposition to be realized as an act of disagreement (1975, pp. 361-362):

(1) Preparatory condition:

- (a) S1 has asserted or implied or is believed to have asserted or implied *P*.
- (b) S2 understands the propositional content of *P* and there's no need for further information.

(2) Propositional condition: S2 asserts or implies *different from P* or *Not P*.

(3) Sincerity condition:

- (a) S2 believes that S1 has asserted *P*.
- (b) S2 believes that S1 considers *P* to be true.
- (c) S2 wants to inform S1 that S2 is of a different opinion and, therefore, agreement is not possible.

(4) Essential condition: Either or both S1 and S2 count the act as an act of disagreement.

2.1.3 Towards a working definition of verbal disagreement.

At this point, it is essential to define what I mean by the term *verbal disagreement*. As already mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, disagreements are complex in nature. In my definition verbal disagreement is a speech act¹⁹ expressing S's opinion or belief²⁰ whose propositional content or illocutionary force is partly²¹ or fully²² inconsistent with that of the previous S's utterance. It is important to note four things here:

¹⁹ see note (1)

²⁰ see note (2)

²¹ see note (3)

²² see note (4)

(1) Disagreement is interpreted here as a speech act, so the truth value of S1's utterance and that of S2's do not have to be in contrast with each other. Example 1²³ illustrates this point (disagreement is indicated by an arrow):

Example 1

Two tourists are talking about S2's itinerary:

S1 So, are you going to visit The Big Apple tomorrow?

→ S2 No, I'm going to New York City.

S2's utterance is defined as an act of disagreement, even though the propositional content of the two utterances are not opposite to each other, since S2 lacks the world knowledge that The Big Apple is a nickname for New York City and believes that they are talking about two different entities.

(2) Analysing speaker's belief is always problematic, as it is hard or in some cases even impossible to access. S2's utterance, however, does not always have to mirror speaker's belief, as it can be a joke or teasing the other and still count as an act of disagreement. For instance in Example 2, the illocutionary force of S2's utterance is a disagreement with S1's boasting about his looks expressed by a joke. Naturally, S2 does not think that S1 has a star-like head.

Example 2

S1 No wonder that every girl in class is into me: I have a baby face and star-like eyes.

→ S2 Star-like is your head!

(3) In the definition, partial inconsistency refers to the fact that the disagreeing utterance does not have to oppose the whole of an antecedent utterance, it can be inconsistent with a part of it. For instance, in Example 3, S2's utterance challenges only a part of S1's proposition:

Example 3

S1 Tom is a handsome and intelligent guy.

→ S2 Handsome? / I don't think he is intelligent at all.

²³ The majority of the examples used in this chapter are non-authentic and were created for illustrative purposes.

(4) Accordingly, full inconsistency exists when the disagreeing utterance contradicts the whole of a preceding utterance, illustrated by Example 4:

Example 4

S1 Tom is a handsome and intelligent guy.

→ S2 I don't think so.

From now on disagreement is going to be identified and analysed based on the definition above, bearing in mind the four aforementioned points.

2.2 Sequential Properties of Disagreement

The act of disagreement, as already noted, is reactive, hence it relies on a prior utterance. Consequently, its realization is in sequential relationship with the previous utterance. Disagreements have a unique nature, as they are linked not only to the pre-text²⁴ but they also call for a next-position of the other interlocutor requiring some kind of reaction (acceptance or refusal). Because of this expectation, as Locher (2004, p. 95) points out, disagreements restrict the action-environment of the addressee. Since a disagreement can be followed by another disagreement as a reaction from the party disagreed with, disagreements can potentially create conflict. Kakavá (1993b, p. 36) summarizes this as follows: “Since disagreement can lead to a form of confrontation that may develop into an argument or dispute, disagreement can be seen as a potential generator of conflict.”

In terms of their sequential position, disagreements generally constitute the second pair part of an adjacency pair. Schiffrin (1994, p. 236) describes an adjacency pair as “a sequence of two utterances, which are adjacent, produced by different speakers, ordered as a first part and a second part, and typed, so that the first part requires a particular second part or range of second parts” (e.g., greeting – greeting, compliment – thanking). However, disagreements are not second pair parts in the sense that they are not required and their absence is not noted as in the case of greetings. Moreover, as will be discussed later, they can be “provoked” by almost any kind of preceding acts, not only by particular types. Liu’s (2004, pp. 28-29) argumentation, however, claims that in the case of disagreements the first part of the adjacency pair has to be an utterance expressing an opinion or a point-of-view.

²⁴ The term *pre-text* is used in this dissertation to refer to previous text in a discourse (cf. Sornig, 1977).

Consequently, it cannot be a commissive (e.g., a promise), a directive (e.g., a request) or an acknowledgement (e.g., an apology), since these do not express a belief *P*. He claims that the prior utterance should be a constative which, according to Bach and Harnish's (1979, p. 41) definition, "express[es] the speaker's belief and his intention or desire that the hearer have or form a like belief". Although it holds true that a commissive, for example, is generally not an expression of a belief, there are exceptions. For instance, when one makes a promise that one wants to keep, the promise is not only the expression of that intention, but the speaker's belief as well. Moreover, a promise can be followed by a disagreement. Consider the following situation:

Example 5

S1: Thanks for the loan. I'll give it back to you next month. I promise.

→ S2: No, you won't! I mean I don't want you to. You need that money much more than I do.

or

→ S2: No, you won't. And we both know that.

These examples illustrate that, although it is not typical, it is possible to disagree with a promise as well. Hence, examples of this type will be treated as disagreements in this dissertation. Maynard (1985) challenges the view that the prompt of disagreement is a specific type by stating that any preceding excerpt of talk could be interpreted as an initiation of dispute and disagreement. This claim is confirmed by the empirical research of the current dissertation detailed in Chapters 3 (Methodology) and 4 (Findings and Discussion).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

Section 2.1.2 has already described how disagreement can be interpreted within speech act theory. This section provides a concise overview of the relationship between disagreement and the theories of politeness and impoliteness.

2.3.1 Politeness theories.

As pointed out at the outset of this chapter, the study of disagreements is a popular field of research partly because it involves the concepts of politeness and

impoliteness, which have been studied extensively in the last few decades and manifest themselves frequently in our everyday interactions. However, what is meant by the term *politeness* lacks consensus.

Grice (1975) states that people cooperate with each other when communicating and formulates the four maxims (quantity, quality, relation, manner) of the Cooperative Principle (hereafter CP) to describe how communication works efficiently between interactants. He proposes that people communicate with each other in an informative, truthful, relevant, and clear way for successful communication. Theories of linguistic politeness stem from his politeness maxim (“Be polite”), which regrettably remains at the level of a side remark without further elaboration (ibid., p. 47).

Robin Lakoff (1973) was among the first who adopted Grice’s CP in an effort to account for politeness. She suggests that pragmatic competence is based upon two rules: (1) Be clear and (2) Be polite, where the former is a condensed version of the Gricean maxims, while the latter²⁵ serves to avoid conflict between participants. Recognizing the importance of politeness in everyday interaction, Lakoff posited three sub-maxims that guide polite behaviour: (1) Don’t impose, (2) Give options, (3) Be friendly. However, these three rules do not define explicitly what politeness is either.

Leech (1983) starts from the assumption that Grice’s maxims are basically correct and adds his Politeness Principle (hereafter PP) to the CP to explain the motivations for people to violate the Gricean maxims. In his proposal of an *interpersonal rhetoric*, the PP “Minimize the expression of impolite beliefs” (ibid., p. 79) is also elaborated by a set of maxims (ibid., p. 132):

- Tact Maxim: minimise cost to other; [maximise benefit to other].
- Generosity Maxim: minimise benefit to self; [maximise cost to self].
- Approbation Maxim: minimise dispraise of other; [maximise praise of other].
- Modesty Maxim: minimise praise of self; [maximise dispraise of self].
- Agreement Maxim: minimise disagreement between self and other; [maximise agreement between self and other].²⁶
- Sympathy Maxim: minimise antipathy between self and other; [maximise sympathy between self and other].

²⁵ a literal repetition of Grice’s (1975) politeness maxim

²⁶ For further information on the Agreement Maxim see p. 25.

Pikor-Niedziątek (2005, p. 107) gives the following summary of Leech's PP: "other things being equal, minimize the expression of beliefs which are unfavourable to the hearer and at the same time (but less important) maximize the expression of beliefs which are favourable to the hearer". In this approach, politeness aims at achieving maximum benefit for both H and S at a minimum cost. However, Leech himself admits that in his politeness theory, just as in other early politeness theories, the speaker's face may be neglected. Apart from the lack of explicit definition of politeness, Leech's approach has been criticized for the claim that politeness is categorized as a principle (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Jucker, 1988).

The face-saving view of politeness by Brown and Levinson's (1987) *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*, one of the most influential and definitely the most fully elaborated work on linguistic politeness, is based on Goffman's notion of face, "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (1955, p. 213). Brown and Levinson claim that certain communicative acts (termed *face-threatening acts*, hereafter FTAs) pose a threat to the positive or negative face of the hearer or the speaker, as they "run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speakers" (ibid., p. 65). Thus, Brown and Levinson postulate politeness strategies designated to mitigate the degree of FTAs in interaction. When the speaker has to perform an FTA, s/he chooses the best politeness strategy based on the estimated risk of loss of face calculated by considering the following variables: (1) the social distance of H and S, (2) the relative power of H and S, and (3) the absolute ranking of the imposition in the particular culture.

Brown and Levinson list numerous politeness (sub)strategies and note that the list is not exhaustive, which has been considered one of the main weaknesses of the model (cf. e.g., Culpeper, 1996). Their claim that interlocutors balance between the face needs of self and other seems questionable, considering that the framework is highly speaker-oriented and often neglects the face wants of the hearer. The universality of the theory, the dubious distinction between positive and negative politeness, the vague definition of such key concepts as face and context, and the equation of politeness with indirectness are just a few flaws of Brown and Levinson's model that have been widely criticized (Blum-Kulka 1987, 1990, 1992; Eelen, 2001; Ide, 1989, 1992; Kasper, 1990; Mao, 1994; Matsumoto, 1988; Meier, 1995; Tracy, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1985). Yet, their seminal work on politeness remains one of the

most influential and widely cited works on the subject,²⁷ one which has furnished new ideas for linguistic investigation and thus inspired innumerable studies.

One of the most generalized, global and dynamic approaches to politeness is the so-called conversational contract (henceforth CC) view, proposed by Fraser and Nolen (1981) and later elaborated by Fraser (1990). Politeness is conceptualized in terms of rights and obligations of interactants constituting a CC, which determines the expectations of discourse participants in the given conversation. This view considers politeness an integral part of interaction and equates politeness with appropriate language use. The CC perspective is a discursive view of politeness, since according to this theory the terms of the CC are open to renegotiation as a result of the dynamics of interaction (Fraser, 1990, p. 232). Although this approach to politeness draws attention to the interactive nature of conversation, it is not without caveats, either. One of the criticisms levelled against the theory is that it puts great emphasis on the role of the individual while diminishing the impact of culture and demographic variables on a conversation (Stadler, 2006). According to Fraser, being polite “simply involves getting on the task at hand in light of the terms and conditions of the CC” (1990, p. 233). This task-based view of interaction can be a target of criticism as well, since it is possible to enter into a conversation without having an interactional goal in mind (e.g., small talk).

Postmodern views of politeness (Locher, 2004; Locher & Watts, 2005; Watts, 1989, 1992, 2003) represent a major shift in politeness theories, since (1) they treat im/politeness as a first order concept (politeness₁ meaning lay/folk interpretation), not as a theoretical construct (second order politeness or politeness₂), (2) they analyse interactions at a discourse level instead of investigating isolated speech acts, and (3) they are theoretically grounded in social theory (especially Bourdieu, 1990), rejecting the Gricean approach to conversational cooperation. Watt’s (1989, 1992, 2003) relational work theory, the major representative of postmodern approaches to im/politeness, is an elaborated form of Fraser’s (1990) conversational contract view. Relational work is defined as “the ‘work’ individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others” (Locher & Watts, 2005, p. 10). Relational theory holds that, based on their relational histories, interactants enter an interaction with certain expectations about the conversation, the terms of which could change in the course of the

²⁷ The popularity of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory is due to the facts that it is the most comprehensive approach to politeness, one which uses cross-cultural data extensively and provides both a social and psychological explanation for politeness (Geyer, 2008, pp. 17-18).

interchange. Locher and Watts (2005) return to Goffman's (1967) notion of face and propose a broader view of facework that "comprises that entire continuum of verbal behaviour from direct, impolite, rude or aggressive interaction through to polite interaction, encompassing both appropriate and inappropriate forms of social behaviour" (Locher & Watts, 2005, p. 11). They propose that whether certain behaviour is considered to be im/polite or in/appropriate depends on the judgements of the interactants based on their norms and expectations. Depending on social, situational, and contextual variables, im/politeness is relative to different speakers and cultures. Watts's notion of politic behaviour – "linguistic and non-linguistic [behaviour], which the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction" (2003, p. 20) - is central to his framework and it roughly corresponds to Brown and Levinson's (1987) concept of politeness. For Watts (2003), however, polite behaviour is marked and goes beyond appropriate and politic behaviour (p. 21).

A chief merit of this model is that it accounts not only for politeness but also for impoliteness and emphasises individual variability both in the production and perception of im/politeness. Relational theory represents a crucial contribution to politeness theory because it focuses on the dynamic realization of politeness and takes into account the heterogeneous nature of culture. However, a major flaw of the theory pointed out by Sako (2008, p. 28) is that "the conflation of two terms (politic and polite) within the same framework leads to confusion and reduces its parsimony".

Spencer-Oatey's (2005, 2008) rapport management framework examines politeness from a broad perspective and aims at analysing how individuals manage face in interaction. It accounts for the way interactants use language to "construct, maintain, and/or threaten social relationships" (2008, p. 12) and thus it attempts to explain the motivations behind some areas neglected by Brown and Levinson (1987) such as face-enhancement and impoliteness. In Spencer-Oatey's conceptualization, politeness is context-dependent "subjective judgements that people make about the social appropriateness of verbal and non-verbal behavior" (ibid., p. 97). She proposes that the success or failure of human interaction depends on three elements, namely the interactants' behavioral expectations, face sensitivities, and their interactional wants. Behavioural expectations are based on people's assessments about what is appropriate in the given situation on the basis of social norms and conventions. These conventions exist across a variety of domains (illocutionary domain, discourse

domain, participation domain, stylistic domain, nonverbal domain)²⁸ and rapport can be managed through different domains simultaneously (Garcia, 2012, p. 226). In defining face, Spencer-Oatey (2008) also follows Goffman (1967) and excludes Brown and Levinson's (1987) concept of negative face. She states that face is "associated with personal/social value, and is concerned with people's sense of worth, dignity, honour, reputation, competence and so on" (Spencer-Oatey, 2008, p. 14). Face in Spencer-Oatey's framework has two interrelated aspects: (1) quality face, which is closely related to self-esteem and thus corresponds to Brown and Levinson's positive face; and (2) identity face, which is associated with people's sense of public worth and derives from Goffman's (1967) concept of face (ibid.). The third factor determining the choice of strategies people use in rapport management is interactional wants, which could be either task-oriented transactional or relationship oriented relational (Spencer-Oatey, 2005, p. 107). These interactional wants are also proposed to significantly affect interactants' perceptions of the nature and outcomes of an interaction (Spencer-Oatey, 2008, p. 17).

Although Spencer-Oatey's (2005, 2008) framework can serve as an adequate approach to analyze im/politeness, similarly to the conversational contract view of Fraser (1990), it attributes too great a role to the individual him/herself in comparison to cultural and societal influences. Furthermore, as Spencer-Oatey (2005) admits:

[f]urther case study research is now needed to determine the extent to which the rapport management issues that occur in authentic interactions can be explained with reference to these elements [interactional wants, behavioral expectations, face sensitivities], and whether they are adequate for analysing the similarities and differences that occur across cultures, contexts and individuals. (p. 117)

2.3.2 Impoliteness theories.

Just as in the case of politeness, defining impoliteness is a real challenge. Several researchers have come up with various views on what impoliteness is. While Brown and Levinson (1987) suggest that impoliteness is an absence of politeness, other scholars (e.g., Bousfield, 2008; Culpeper, 2003, 2011) argue that impoliteness should be considered the other side of the politeness coin. The issues of intentionality, judgement, face, aggression, and communicative goal play a central

²⁸ cf. Spencer-Oatey 2008, pp. 19-20

role in defining impoliteness. Whilst there are a number of definitions of impoliteness, none of them seems to be commonly accepted. As Bousfield and Locher (2008, p. 3) point it out, “[t]he lowest common denominator, however, can be summarized like this: *Impoliteness is behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context*” [original emphasis]. Bousfield (2008, p. 72) takes impoliteness to be “the broad opposite of politeness, in that, rather than seeking to mitigate face-threatening acts (FTAs), impoliteness constitutes the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts (FTAs) which are purposefully delivered”. It must be noted, however, that impoliteness can be used to achieve different communicative purposes such as gaining or exercising power over the hearer, entertaining, causing offence, creating rapport, etc.²⁹

There is still limited research on impoliteness compared to politeness. While all the major early politeness theories mention impoliteness, it is not described adequately and is treated as something exceptional, a deviation from politeness. Also, it is generally assumed that the exact concepts used for describing and explaining politeness can be applied to impoliteness as well. There are three major existing models of impoliteness, that of Lachenicht (1980), Austin (1990) and Culpeper (1996).³⁰ In the remaining paragraphs of this section, a brief summary of these approaches will be given along with their limitations.

Lachenicht (1980) postulated his impoliteness framework based on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model of politeness. In his paper titled “Aggravating language: a study of abusive and insulting language”, he proposes a model as an extension to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) framework for the description of impolite and aggravating behaviour. He postulates four superstrategies that can aggravate face: (1) bald on record, (2) off record, (3) positive aggravation, and (4) negative aggravation. He adopts Brown and Levinson’s formula for calculating the seriousness of the act and choosing the right strategy for performing the FTA. Unlike Brown and Levinson, Lachenicht believes that “it is possible to combine more than one sub-strategy into an utterance” (1980, p. 635) in order to aggravate face. One of the chief merits of his work is the exhaustive list of the linguistic strategies that can be

²⁹ I would like to thank Olga Bársony for calling my attention to the importance of elaborating on the notion of impoliteness.

³⁰ It is important to note here that relational work (Locher, 2004; Locher & Watts, 2005; Watts, 1989, 1992, 2003, 2005) and rapport management (Spencer-Oatey, 2005, 2008) frameworks introduced in the previous section also deal with both politeness and impoliteness phenomena, but not to the degree as the impoliteness theories do described in this section.

employed to aggravate face. Lachenicht's model is a significant and innovative approach to impoliteness. However, since it is based on anecdotal and constructed examples without the claims having ever been tested on authentic real life data, the model is purely hypothetical and speculative in nature. Thus, its validity may be questioned.

Similarly to Lachenicht, Austin (1990) also derives a framework from Brown and Levinson (1987), one which is a hearer-based approach to the interpretation of seemingly polite utterances as impolite and offensive. In this model of "face-attack", she develops the notion of "Face Attack Acts", defined as follows: "those communicative acts which are injurious to the hearer's positive or negative face, and are introduced in a situation which could have been avoided, but where their inclusion is perceived by the hearer to be intentional" (1990, p. 279). She posits that the rational speaker can choose from the following strategies to carry out the face attack the most effectively in the given situation: (1) bald on-record, (2) bald on-record threats to positive face, (3) on record without redress to negative face, (4) on-record with inappropriate redress to positive face, (5) on-record with inappropriate redress to negative face, and (6) off record (ibid., pp. 281-289).

Austin gives great importance to the roles of context and implicatures in interpretation, however, her approach is more of an account of how impoliteness is perceived than how it is communicated. Another pitfall of Austin's paper is that it overlooks the role of the speaker and focuses exclusively on the hearer. As a result, her approach may include utterances that are simply misinterpreted by the hearer and thus count as unintentional face threats. In addition, as noted by Culpeper et al. (2003, p. 1554), the interpretations of offense remain untested.

A third, more recent model of impoliteness, proposed by Culpeper (1996, 2005, 2011), is yet another theory inspired by Brown and Levinson's (1987) framework. Culpeper's theory of impoliteness is "parallel but opposite" (1996, p. 349) to Brown and Levinson's model in terms of orientation of face, i.e., the five superstrategies are designed to attack face. These are the following: (1) bald on record impoliteness, (2) positive impoliteness, (3) negative impoliteness, (4) sarcasm or mock impoliteness, and (5) withhold politeness. While Lachenicht (1980) neglects to consider silence when politeness is expected as a potential strategy to aggravate face, Culpeper (1996) explores this possibility and proposes that withholding politeness is a means to damage hearer's face. To illustrate his point, Culpeper gives

the example of failing to thank someone for a present, which may be interpreted as deliberate impoliteness (ibid., p. 357). As already mentioned, Lachenicht (1980) assumes that individual aggravating strategies can be mixed within an utterance. By the same token, Culpeper (1996) also states that impoliteness strategies can co-occur within a turn and thus be used for boosting the face damage inflicted. The chief merit of Culpeper's model (1996) undoubtedly lies in the fact that it has been tested with real-life data across various discourses. Unlike Brown and Levinson (1987), he goes beyond the utterance level and examines how impoliteness is manifested in extended discourse. Culpeper (1996, 2005; and Culpeper et al., 2003) assumes that impoliteness is constructed within interaction and notes that paralinguistic and non-verbal aspects can also contribute to creating a face-threatening atmosphere. In the modified version of his initial 1996 model of impoliteness, Culpeper (2005) argues for the need of a more contextually and culturally sensitive approach to face and impoliteness (Bousfield & Locher, 2008, p. 134).

The fundamental criticism of the aforementioned impoliteness models is that since they are inspired by the Brown and Levinson's (1987) framework of politeness, they tend to inherit some of its flaws (Bousfield, 2008; Bousfield & Locher, 2008; Culpeper et al., 2003). For instance, the provided list of strategies to damage the hearer's face is open-ended and as Culpeper (1996) points out, Brown and Levinson's model is "primarily geared to handling matters relating to linguistic form" and thus "impolite implicatures can slip through their framework" (p. 358).

Obviously, the theories of politeness and impoliteness briefly outlined above constitute only a small part of the vast field of im/politeness research. Nevertheless, these theories seem to be the core representatives of these areas of research and they provide the basis for a multitude of amendments, modifications, extensions, reconstructions as well as criticism that have been proposed since then.

2.4 Im/Politeness, Face, and Disagreements

In section 2.3, the most influential theories of politeness and impoliteness have been briefly presented along with their major merits and weaknesses. The present section is aimed at exploring the relationship between disagreements and im/politeness.

In early politeness theories (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Lakoff, 1973; Leech, 1983) disagreement is mostly seen as an impolite, face-threatening act that poses a

threat to the addressee's positive aspect of face. Similarly, Heritage (1984, p. 269) states that acceptance and agreement "are uniformly affiliative actions which are supportive of social solidarity" while refusals and disagreements "are largely destructive of social solidarity". Goffman (1967) assumes that in face-to-face interaction people strive for harmony and pay deference to the hearer's face. Hence disagreements are supposed to be avoided or at least mitigated.

Leech (1983, p.132) includes an Agreement Maxim in his PP consisting of two sub-maxims, repeated here for convenience:

AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives)

- (a) Minimize disagreement between *self* and *other*
- [(b) Maximize agreement between *self* and *other*]

Leech proposes that sub-maxim (b) is of less importance than sub-maxim (a) as he considers "avoidance of discord" (negative politeness) more important than "seeking concord" (positive politeness) in conversational interaction. As Locher (2004, p. 65) points out, however, a comprehensive theory of politeness should equally accommodate both aspects. Leech also proposes that the Principles of Politeness are more or less universal, though he admits that intercultural differences may be present and the weighting of principles may vary in different social and cultural context.

Within Brown and Levinson's (1987) framework, disagreement by its nature is a face-threatening act which jeopardizes the solidarity between the interlocutors as it indicates that the speaker does not share the addressee's wants or beliefs (p. 66). Thus, disagreements might lead to conflict, create an antagonistic atmosphere and result in a communication breakdown. Moreover, as Liu (2004) notes, disagreement could pose a threat to the speaker's positive face as well if the speaker fails to support or defend his position and thus appears to be ignorant (pp. 32-33). If the speaker wishes to disagree with the other interlocutor and still maintain social harmony, the FTA has to be performed either indirectly – so that it has more than one possible interpretations – or with redress to the hearer's face (Brown & Levinson, 1987, pp. 68-74). As discussed in section 2.3.1, the relative power of S and H, the degree of social distance between S and H, and the rank of imposition will influence the choice of strategy. In analogy to Leech's (1983) sub-maxims of the agreement

maxim, Brown and Levinson (1987) include “Seek Agreement” and “Avoid Disagreement” as politeness strategies to redress the hearer’s positive face wants. This can be achieved by selecting safe topics (e.g., weather) that will not raise disagreement or using token agreement or white lies (ibid., pp. 112-117). However, this is not true in all contexts. Contrary to what one might think, talking about the weather, for instance, does not always help build solidarity between the interlocutors. Although it is evident that it allows speakers to agree with each other, it might express distance as well, since this is not a topic that will allow them to build and sustain a close relationship with each other. Along similar lines, one can use token agreements and white lies to avoid conflict and disagreement, but they at the same time express insincerity and thus may jeopardize social harmony.

There are contexts where honesty and telling the truth are more valued than the avoidance of face-threat (Sifianou, in press, p. 8). To illustrate this point, if the bride-to-be asks her best friend’s opinion on the wedding gown she is about to choose and utters something like *“Oh, this one looks wonderful on me, doesn’t it?”*, she definitely wants to hear the truth, not a white lie, because she does not want to look ridiculous on her wedding day.

Shen (2006, pp. 57-72), examining Chinese disagreement strategies in business settings, also reports that business interest outweighs face considerations. Thus, when participants feel that their business interest is in jeopardy, they express disagreement overtly even towards a more powerful opponent (e.g., a superior).

Another limitation of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) framework is that it regards positive and negative politeness as mutually exclusive and fails to consider the possibility that a single utterance can be oriented to both positive and negative aspects of face. It has already been shown how an act of disagreement can be a threat to both the hearer’s and the speaker’s positive face. However, Sifianou (in press, p. 6) notes that disagreements can also pose a threat to the addressee’s negative face “if they are seen as pressuring him/her to accept a different line of thought”. Moreover, disagreements might threaten both aspects of the speaker’s face simultaneously. Consider the following example:

Example 6

Husband and wife are talking while dressing for a party.

Wife: Oh, I look so fat in this dress, right?

→ Husband: No, honey. You look *beautiful*.

This typical exchange between a couple illustrates that, given that the husband does think that his wife looks overweight in the dress, the act of disagreement uttered by him can threaten both his positive and negative face. That is, because he does not want to hurt his wife's feelings or because he simply wants to avoid a quarrel, the husband feels obliged to disagree to save his own face and to protect his wife's face.³¹

An observation made by Kotthoff (1993, p. 209) relating to Brown and Levinson's model, is that disagreements can be not only face-threatening but also face-saving acts as well. She argues that by falsely agreeing with someone, the speaker is unable to protect his/her own face, which is self-face threatening. In addition, agreements can also pose a threat to face "if they are interpreted as insincere, manipulative or ingratiating" (Sifianou, in press, p. 6).

In contrast to early politeness theories, postmodern approaches to politeness suggest that disagreements are not necessarily face-threatening and they resist the automatic labelling as being impolite. These frameworks emphasize the importance of context and culture in the interpretation of disagreements. In a similar vein, Spencer-Oatey (2008) challenges the view that agreements are polite and disagreements are impolite and argues that different cultures and different contexts may favour different points along the continuum of total consensus and total opposition (p. 40).³²

As for the way impoliteness theories see disagreement, Culpeper's (1996, 2005, 2011) model, which is a "parallel but opposite" (1996, p. 349) version of the Brown and Levinson framework, considers "seek disagreement" by choosing sensitive topics or disagreeing outright as a positive impoliteness strategy, which attacks the hearer's positive face wants by informing him/her that s/he is not liked and will not be co-operated with. However, in Lachenicht's (1980, p. 619) model "Disagree/Contradict" is regarded as a negative aggravation strategy since it

³¹ For an alternative interpretation of Example 6 see section 2.5.1 (p. 28).

³² Consult sections 2.6.1 (pp. 31-35) and 2.6.2 (pp. 35-38) for a detailed discussion of the role of culture and context in the interpretation of disagreements.

impinges upon the hearer and impedes with his/her freedom of action. Austin (1990) makes no mention of disagreements at all.

It can be concluded that disagreements are seen as face-threatening acts in early politeness theories, however, there is a lack of consensus on whose face and which aspect(s) of face they pose a threat to. In contrast, postmodern views of im/politeness argue for the importance of culture and context in the interpretation of disagreement. Based on the foregoing discussion, it seems that disagreements are multidirectional in nature. Other characteristic features of disagreement will be discussed in the following section.

2.5 The Nature of Disagreements

2.5.1 Disagreements as metalinguistic, metacommunicative, and analogical acts.

It has already been shown that disagreements are face-threatening, reactive and multifunctional in nature, and it is to a further exploration of their complexity that I now turn. Sornig argues (1977, pp. 361-362) that disagreeing is a metalinguistic, metacommunicative and analogical act, “because it relates and opposes itself to what the partner has meant when saying what he said”. In other words, it is not usually the propositional content of the utterance that is the object of contradiction, but the illocutionary one. Instead of saying exactly what they mean, people often use indirect expressions to deliver the illocutionary intention and thus the hearer must interpret the message first. This involves an analogical problem-solving mental process on the part of the hearer based, among other things, on the locution (the actual words) uttered by the speaker, the context, and the hearer’s knowledge of the speaker and the world. Thus, for instance, in Example 6 the wife’s utterance is a request for disagreement and/or compliment; it is a desire of reassurance about her appearance cloaked in the form of a simple statement followed by a question tag. First, the husband has to infer what is meant by the utterance based on all the above-mentioned factors before answering accordingly, which might also be an indirect answer (e.g., simply replying ‘You look great!’).

2.5.2 Disagreements as spontaneous and multifunctional acts.

Another intrinsic feature of disagreements is that they are spontaneous acts, as a result, they can hardly be planned beforehand. This is due to their reactive

nature and, since they arise spontaneously, it is very difficult to examine them in naturally occurring settings.

The assumption that a single function can be assigned exclusively to a single form has been questioned by a number of researchers (cf. e.g., Coates, 1989; Holmes, 1984). In fact, multi-functionality is suggested to be the norm and this calls attention to the need of interpreting speech acts such as disagreements in context, and thus the importance of doing qualitative analysis. An exploration of the functional spectrum of disagreements is presented in Chapter 3.

2.5.3 Disagreements as preferred vs. dispreferred acts.

As shown in section 2.4, disagreement is mainly conceptualized as harmful to the relationship of interlocutors: it threatens the social harmony between them. Therefore, disagreement is regarded as a dispreferred³³ act. Along with the notions of preference and dispreference, the concepts of inherent politeness and impoliteness have to be dealt with here.

Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 60) claim that “certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face,” in other words, some acts (e.g., orders, criticism) run contrary to the face wants of the self or the other. They call these acts face-threatening acts (FTAs) and disagreement, as already mentioned, is considered to be one of “those acts that threaten the positive-face want, by indicating (potentially) that the speaker does not care about the addressee’s feelings, wants, etc. – that in some important respect he doesn’t want H’s wants” (ibid., p. 66). Similarly, Leech (1983, p. 83) argues that “[s]ome illocutions (e.g., orders) are inherently impolite, and others (e.g., offers) are inherently polite”. Thus, both Leech and Brown and Levinson have a preference of agreement over disagreement in social interaction because of face considerations. The notion of inherent im/politeness was first questioned by Fraser and Nolen (1981, p. 96) who called attention to the importance of context by saying that “no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. We often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determine the judgement of politeness” (cited in Culpeper, 1996, p. 351). Similarly, in his later work Fraser (1990) notes that “[s]entences are not *ipso facto* polite. It is only speakers who are polite, and then only if their utterances reflect an adherence to the obligations they carry in that particular conversation” [original emphasis] (p. 233).

³³ in the psychological sense of the term

Postmodern theorists of politeness (e.g., Locher, 2004; Locher & Watts, 2005, 2007; Watts, 2003) also reject the idea of inherent politeness and impoliteness and they also emphasize that it is necessary to take context into account when interpreting utterances such as disagreements. For a more detailed discussion on the role of context in interpretation see the following section.

The notion of preference originates from Sacks (1973/1987). Preference in this sense is seen from a conversation analytic perspective so it is a structural concept, similar to the linguistic notion of *markedness* (Levinson, 1983). The term as used here also reflects cultural norms and it refers to the ranked ordering of possible answers to a first turn in terms of their normative projection. Sacks (1987) claims that people “may not like to disagree because they are supposed to not like to disagree” (p. 69), and therefore disagreement is governed by expectations of society rather than individual choice. To support his claim, he points out that when a question requires an agreement, the preferred agreement response will “occur contiguously”, whereas the dispreferred disagreement will be hidden away later in the turn (ibid., p. 58). Naturally, the preference notion for agreement does not imply that people will never disagree but that agreement is the unmarked form and disagreement will be marked somehow.

Building on Sack’s notion of preference, Pomerantz (1984) postulates that disagreement is the dispreferred second pair part of an assessment statement. She argues that preferred actions are linguistically unmarked, while “dispreferred seconds” are structurally marked by “dispreference” features such as delays, silences, fillers, requests for clarification, and partial agreements/partial disagreements (p. 75). She distinguishes between strong and weak disagreements and proposes that strong disagreements are usually not accompanied by the listed devices.

As discussed above, these prior studies generally view disagreements as destructive, impolite, disaffiliative and dispreferred based on face considerations and societal expectations. However, others (e.g., Georgakopolou, 2001; Kakavá, 2002; Locher, 2004; Tannen, 2002) argue that disagreement resists this straightforward labelling and is not an *a priori* negatively marked act as cultural and contextual factors need to be taken into account.

2.6 Other Factors

The negative evaluation of disagreement has been discussed in the previous section(s), however, disagreement *per se* is not necessarily dispreferred, as hinted above. The interpretation of disagreements renders context significant and what follows is the discussion of these contextual and cultural constraints.

2.6.1 Culture.

The first thing that undermines the claim that disagreements are always impolite and dispreferred is that different cultures have different notions on politeness and impoliteness. Although politeness as a phenomenon is considered to be universal, the means by which it is realized vary cross-culturally. Scollon and Scollon (1983) make the generalization that deference cultures such as Britain's and Japan's emphasize negative politeness while solidarity cultures such as American culture place greater value on positive politeness. However, this seems to be an overgeneralization which ignores cross-cultural variation (Matsumoto, 1988, p. 408) and builds upon the concept of face, which is not universal either.

In some cultures, disagreement is viewed as a preferred action which indicates solidarity and reinforces sociability. Schiffrin's (1984) highly influential study on disagreement among East European Jews living in Philadelphia, for instance, shows that disagreement does not threaten social interaction, but it is a form of solidarity and co-operation. She found that although participants were constantly opposing each other, they managed to maintain an intimate relationship. She lists four features to show that these arguments are sociable: (1) sustained disagreement even in the case of indisputable topics, (2) fluid argumentative frames, (3) use of threats for cooperation, and (4) positive evaluation of disagreements (p. 316). Studies conducted by Tannen (1981) of New York Jewish people and by Blum-Kulka et al. (2002) of Israelis also support the notion of preferred disagreement. Explicit disagreement is seen as a way of showing solidarity and intimacy in the Jewish culture. Therefore, numerous instances of sustained disagreement were found in the conversations of these people, accompanied by rapid tempo, increasing sound volume, exaggerated intonation, intensifiers, and a great number of overlaps.

In a similar vein, Tannen and Kakavá (1992) point out that aggravated disagreements can strengthen the bond between family members and close friends in modern Greek discourse as they are means of displaying and creating intimacy

and cooperation. In her later work, Kakavá (2002) shows that disagreement in Greek discourse is “allowed” and “preferred” (p. 1537) and does not jeopardize social solidarity and harmony in interpersonal relationships (ibid., p. 1562). Moreover, contrary to Pomerantz (1984), she found that disagreements were structurally unmarked, unprefaced by dispreference markers and were foregrounded (ibid., p. 1563). She claims that argumentative skills are valued in Greek culture and suggests that disagreement is an “interactional ritual” for Greeks and is preferred. Sifianou (1997) shares the same view with Kakavá in her study of Greek family members and friends. Georgakopoulou (2001) also provides counter-evidence to the view of disagreement as a dispreferred action and claims that “the occurrence of disagreements does not seem to pose a threat to the participants’ relation” (p. 1897).

Cordella’s (1996) study of disagreements conducted with Spanish university students also seems to support the notion of preferred disagreements. Her findings show that Spanish speakers attribute a high value to directness so they express their disagreement openly and that they “enjoy contradicting each other as a means of showing involvement in the dispute” (p. 159). With respect to Venezuelan Spanish, García (1989) studying the acts of disagreement and request among American and Venezuelan women in English, found that Venezuelans employed a confrontational style and direct disagreements, while Americans preferred non-confrontational styles. Edstrom (2004) carried out a similar study on disagreements between American and Venezuelan women and her findings seem to confirm García’s claim that Venezuelans are confrontational when disagreeing, whereas Americans are more indirect. However, it must be noted here that the Venezuelans’ expression of disagreement in Edstrom’s study were “not as concentrated around the confrontational end of direct/indirect continuum as previous research [...] might have predicted” (p. 1508). This might be due to the different kind of data the researchers used: while García’s study is based on elicited data, Edstrom analysed naturally occurring disagreements in casual conversations.

Kotthoff (1993) examines disagreement in German and Anglo-American disputes and her findings contradict Pomerantz’s (1984) claims. She reported a preference for disagreement but more importantly, her results suggest that preference structure can change in the course of conversation: “When the context of argumentation is established, it is no longer preferred to agree. On the contrary, it seems very important to contradict quickly and in a coherent manner” (p. 203). She

noticed that first disagreements were prefaced by dispreference markers but as the argument became more heated, they were not accompanied by these markers any more. Once disagreement became preferred, they were marked by intensifiers, instant contradiction of the other interlocutor's assertion and verbal shadowing (that is, the repetition of the "previous speaker's utterance with altered words or intonation to indicate disagreement", Rees-Miller, 2000, p. 1094) as support for the speaker's view. Kotthoff argues that "giving up a position that has already been argued for can also be face-threatening because it could be interpreted as submissiveness" (ibid., p. 213). As Kotthoff shows, disagreements are likely to initiate attempts to achieve agreement. This study implies that preference for agreement or disagreement may be context dependent, an issue that is discussed in more detail in the following section.

In addition, in Asian cultures like China's, Japan's and Korea's a dispreference for disagreeing has been observed (Cheng & Warren, 2004; Liu, 2004; LoCastro, 1986; Mori, 1999; Watanabe, 1993). Naturally, they do disagree, but these cultures generally place a high value on social harmony and non-confrontational interaction in delivering disagreement. They try to avoid overt conflict, and thus employ indirect disagreement strategies often prefaced by pauses or hesitation markers. Korean culture particularly puts great emphasis on harmonious interpersonal relationships; as a result, Koreans make every effort to avoid conflicts or to end them quickly (Song, 1993). Similarly, the Japanese have a strong sense of unity and community so the importance of belonging to a group overrides considerations of positive and negative face wants. Japanese culture values harmony and cooperation, and thus the Japanese try to avoid conflict and maintain social harmony (Watanabe, 1990). On the other hand, Jones (1990) argues that the Japanese do discuss controversial topics and that by doing so, they express their disagreement explicitly. The conflict is thus sustained and the Japanese hardly ever resort to compromise. However, seldom do they express anger and when the debate becomes too intense, they either reframe it as play or change the topic (Kakavá, 2002, p. 1541).

Similarly, Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 114) observed a preference for agreement over disagreement in their data from British English. Strategies employed to avoid disagreement included safe topics, white lies, giving an agreement before disagreeing, or hedging (ibid., pp. 113-117).

As discussed above, preference or dispreference for disagreement as well as choice of disagreement type could vary from culture to culture. While in some cultures (e.g., Greek, Spanish, Jewish, Venezuelan) disagreement is viewed as a form of sociability that reflects solidarity, in other cultures (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Korean, British, American) it is considered an action that threatens solidarity and jeopardizes social harmony.

Some remarks are in order here on the relationship between disagreement and the transactional and interpersonal functions of language. Watzlawick et al. (1967) propose that language has a content component and a relationship component. Accordingly, a disagreement will express a contrast of some kind (e.g., on the accuracy of a piece of information) with a previous utterance but will also reflect the relationship between the speakers (e.g., convey lack of respect). By the same token, Brown and Yule (1983) distinguish the transactional (information-transferring) and the interactional (maintenance of social relationships) functions of language and advocate that discourse is either primarily transactional (e.g., news report) or interactional (e.g., small talk) in focus (Spencer-Oatey, 2008, pp. 1-2). However, other scholars (e.g., Johnson, 2006; Spencer-Oatey, 2008) claim that the two functions of language are closely interconnected and emphasize the central importance of the relational aspect in communication. Thus, disagreeing is not just a linguistic action but a social action as well expressing interpersonal contrast.

Similarly, the varying degree of impact of rationality and interpersonality principles³⁴ on disagreement in the given culture or context plays a vital role in the dis/preference of disagreements. We have already seen that interpersonality principles such as politeness strategies (Brown & Levinson, 1987) and the politeness principle (Leech, 1983) argue for a preference of agreement and dispreference of disagreement due to mutual protection of face / face considerations. These principles have their roots in social norms. On the other hand, rationality principles are concerned with economy and effective information transmission. Grice's (1975) maxim of quality,³⁵ for instance, contributes to explaining the preferred status of

³⁴ In a nutshell, rationality principles (e.g., Grice's (1975) cooperative principle, Kasher's (1976) rationality principle) focus on effective information transmission and processing with reference to the object, while interpersonality principles (e.g., Leech's (1983) politeness principle, Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness strategies) guide interpersonal relations in communication and the self-projection of interlocutors. For a discussion of rationality and interpersonality principles, see Németh T. (2003, 2004).

³⁵ "Try to make your contribution one that is true." ("Do not say what you believe to be false." and "Do not say what you lack adequate evidence for.") (Grice, 1975, p. 27)

disagreements in an adjacency pair involving a statement in the first part which the hearer does not think to be true. I share the view of Lerch (2005) that both rationality and interpersonality principles seem to “be at work simultaneously in the course of communication” (p. 67).

2.6.2 Context.

Over the past two decades conflict episodes have been investigated in different contexts such as family talk (Kakavá, 2002; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Schiffrin, 1990; Tannen, 1981), workplace interaction (Angouri, in press; Holmes, 2001; Holmes & Stubbe, 2003) radio talk shows and phone-in broadcasts (Bilmes, 1999; Hutchby, 1999), TV shows (Culpeper, 2005, 2011), army training discourse (Culpeper, 1996), courtroom discourse (Garcia, 1991; Lakoff, 1989), therapeutic discourse (Lakoff, 1989), parliamentary discourse (Harris, 2001; Lakoff, 1989), academic discourse (Rees-Miller, 1995, 2000; Rohmah, 2012; Tannen, 2002), fictional texts (Culpeper, 1998), and computer mediated communication (Angouri & Tseliga, 2010; Baym, 1996; Bolander, in press; Graham, 2007; Langlotz & Locher, in press) analysing e-mails, blogs and different forums. These studies have examined the expression of conflict, and thus disagreements, and many of them have reported findings contrary to Pomerantz’s results.

We have already seen that in the context of argument disagreement is appropriate and comprises an intrinsic feature of conflict and argumentation. Structurally, argument is generally seen (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Schiffrin, 1984) as an expansion of the speech act of disagreement, so it is broader than a single speech act. Functionally, it is a means of managing disagreement. Disagreements are vital in the process of constructing the interlocutors’ stances about the topic. Usually the outcome of an argument is the result of the participants’ joint views, and therefore disagreement does not pose a threat to the speakers’ relationship during this cooperative endeavour. In the process of argumentation speakers generally employ indirect or mitigated disagreements, since these allow for teamwork, and make argument a joint scrutiny of different perspectives as opposed to a hostile, heated debate (Georgakopoulou, 2001, pp. 1886-1887).

Disagreements are also valued in academic discourse because, as Tannen (2002) puts it, “[o]nly through the open expression of disagreement can ideas be

honed and mistakes corrected” (p. 1667). Scholars must feel free to disagree at conferences or in their scholarly writings when they meet opinions or findings that they believe to be wrong. Both creative and critical thinking generate new ideas and challenge current thinking. Thus, they involve disagreement.

Similarly, disagreement is invited in discussion boards of online newspapers as readers are encouraged to critically discuss news items and express their opinion honestly. Therefore, in this context explicit disagreements are accepted and appropriate (Bousfield, 2008; Locher, 2004).

In “exploitative” TV shows such as the tabloid talk shows *The Jerry Springer Show* and *The Steve Wilkos Show*, troubled families come to discuss their problems before a studio audience, which obviously leads to conflict and heated confrontational interaction. Open disagreements, challenges, verbal and often physical assaults are intrinsic features of these shows, whose aim is to entertain the audience by ridiculing and often humiliating the guests of the show. *The Weakest Link* is another show designed to humiliate contestants. It makes use of institutional impoliteness in the form of open criticism, challenges, insulting rhetorical questions, sarcasm, etc. (Culpeper, 2005, 2011). *Egyenes Beszéd (Straight Talk)*, a political talk show broadcast in Hungary, also entails conflict and disagreeing utterances. As a result of the critical and combative communicative style of the show’s female interviewer, Olga Kálmán, a lot of direct questions, disagreements, challenges and irony manifest themselves in the interviews. These are obvious elements of the process of eliciting actual information and revealing the “truth” (Lakoff, 1989).

Krainer (1988) argues that the expression of conflict is welcome in psychotherapy groups as disagreements and complaints should be discussed openly. In her data, she found strong disagreements intensified by intonation, overt negation and evaluative vocabulary, as well as mitigated disagreements, which were accompanied by pauses and requests for clarification. Along similar lines, Lakoff (1989) reports that confrontation is the base of psychoanalytic discourse implying that open conflict and disagreements have a curative power in therapeutic interviews.

Courtroom discourse is an institutionalized form of dealing with conflict, where disagreement is an intrinsic feature of trials due to the confrontational nature of the discourse. Atkinson and Drew (1979) found that “after accusations, the preferred response is an unmitigated disagreement” (Kakavá, 2002, p. 1541). They argue that a prompt denial is necessary in that scenario, since the absence or delay of a denial

could be interpreted as an admission of guilt (Atkinson & Drew, 1979, p. 821). Similarly, Lakoff (1989) claims that conflict is crucial to the process of revealing the truth in court. Informativeness takes priority over politeness; thus, adversarial dialogues laden with overt expressions of a desire to confront, along with systematic and intentional rudeness including blunt disagreements and accusations, are intrinsic features of courtroom discourse.

Another institutionalized form of disagreement is parliamentary debate where disagreements, challenges, and the direct expression of different points of view of parties are considered essential for effective government. In any other institutions or organizations, as well as in our everyday lives, disagreements are fundamental in the problem-solving and decision making process (Lakoff, 1989).

Along a similar vein, Angouri (in press) argues that disagreements are an inherent characteristic of problem solving meeting talk, since “interactants introduce, negotiate, and challenge diverse views and opinions” (p. 1). Dissonant views are accepted, unmarked and they construct a meeting as a problem solving interaction (ibid., p. 4). Drawing on meeting data from two different workplaces, Angouri reports that deviating opinions and disagreements are “more the norm than the exception” in these contexts (ibid., p. 9).

As noted earlier, Pomerantz (1984) argues that in some action environments agreement is the preferred action. However, she also specifies some situations, such as compliments, self-deprecations, complaints, etc., whereby disagreement is preferred. A study carried out by Baym (1996), focusing on computer-mediated discourse in a newsgroup, replicated most of Pomerantz’s findings; however, she noted some differences as well. For instance, disagreements were linked to previous discourse, used quotation with reference and were followed by long elaboration. Furthermore, not only disagreements but also agreements contained justifications. Some of these differences, however, might be the consequence of the different medium.

It is worth mentioning here that early politeness theories also acknowledge the significance of context, but capture it by incorporating broad social variables into the models. For instance, Brown and Levinson (1987) examine politeness in relation to social distance, relative power and weight of imposition, while Leech (1983) does the same along the dimensions of social distance, authority and cost-benefit. However,

these variables have been treated as static entities and have been criticized as being inadequate to account for the complexity of context.

As for the linguistic context of disagreement, it has been discussed (see sections 2.1.2, 2.2) that an act of disagreement is a response to a preceding prompt. However, as Corsaro and Maynard (1996) point out, disagreement may be related not just to the turn that precedes but to a series of prior turns through format tying. In addition, opposition may question a claim made in previous interactions as well and also might provide a source for future dispute. Graham (2007) summarizes this issue as follows: “all interactions are contextualized and interpreted within the frame of previous interaction and the expectations that grow out of them” (p. 758).

Thus, context proves to be another key factor determining the positive or negative evaluation of disagreement. While some contexts invite disagreements, others consider them dispreferred actions. However, disagreements are only fully comprehensible when all linguistic and extralinguistic factors are taken into account. The discussion of further parameters will therefore be the topic of the following subsections.

2.6.3 Participants.

It has been claimed that apart from the above mentioned constraints, other variables such as age, gender, power, communicative style, interactional goals, relational history and sympathy also have an impact on one’s attitude towards disagreement and its means of expression.

Different participants have different personality traits and communicative styles (Mills, 2003) which predispose them to employ particular strategies. Some individuals are more argumentative and verbally aggressive than others, which may escalate conflict and disagreement. However, very little is known of how the discourse of argumentative and non-argumentative people differs, as research on this topic has primarily been done from a psychological perspective. This might be a fruitful area for further research.

Furthermore, the relationship between interlocutors is a critical determinant of what is considered to be polite or impolite (Locher & Watts, 2005). The speaker-hearer relationship in terms of relative power/status and liking of the other can have a significant impact on disagreement likelihood and appropriateness. Depending on these factors, disagreements will be constructed and evaluated differently. For

instance, Rees-Miller (2000) posits that the Brown and Levinsonian factor of power (along with severity and contextual constraints) influences the choice of disagreement strategies and claims that in a university setting, professors disagree with students more frequently than vice versa and they use proportionally more positive politeness strategies than students do. Further scrutiny of the ways power dynamics influence the perception of disagreements and the choice of disagreement strategies would help understand the negotiation of disagreement and politeness in extended discourse.

Participants' relational history, and thus sympathy and liking of the other, also have a bearing on the use of disagreement. People in antagonistic relationship will disagree more frequently and differently than speakers in solidarity relationships. Therefore, the relationship between participants should be taken into account when analysing and evaluating disagreements.

Another closely related factor, namely the social distance between participants also has a major impact on the expression of disagreement. This is supported by Boxer (1993), who states that social distance is one of the most significant factors that determine the way interlocutors interact with each other because it affects the level of politeness and deference in the conversation (p. 103). In a similar vein, the formula³⁶ to calculate the weightiness of an FTA put forward in Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory implies that more direct disagreement strategies are employed when the social distance between participants is less. Consequently, strangers tend to use more indirect disagreement strategies, while intimates a higher proportion of direct disagreement strategies. This view, however, is challenged by the bulge theory (Wolfson, 1988), which claims that interlocutors at the two extremes of the social distance continuum exhibit very similar speech behaviour as opposed to the middle section. From this it follows that strangers and intimates employ analogous disagreement strategies, which seems implausible. According to Wolfson, the explanation lies in the certainty of the relationships. While the social distance of strangers and intimates is certain (they know what to expect from one another), that of interlocutors in the middle of the continuum (e.g., acquaintances, colleagues, friends) is relatively unstable and requires negotiation.³⁷

³⁶ W_x (weightiness of an FTA) = D (social distance between S and H) + P (relative power of S and H) + R_x (rating of imposition)

³⁷ For a more detailed discussion of social distance see section 2.7.3.1 on pp. 48-50.

The role of the audience also has to be noted here as the presence of a third party may influence to some extent the speakers' choice of disagreement strategies. For example, the patterns of disagreement in the dispute of two students will be different among their peers than in the presence of parents or teachers. Similarly, during a phone-in radio program or a televised talk show, where there is a listening audience present, speakers might also monitor their speech and consider language strategies before employing them. The awareness of the presence of audience may lead interlocutors to be more reluctant to utilize direct and confrontational disagreement strategies.

There is a range of strategies which may be used by speakers to accomplish a particular communicative goal. For example, a speaker who intends to dominate a conversation will use whatever interactional resources are available and appropriate (e.g., interruption, disagreement). Rees-Miller (2000) discusses achievement of power as a possible interactional goal in disagreement. Along similar lines, Maynard (1985) demonstrates how elementary school children use disagreement to gain power and control in reading groups. The resources for achieving a particular interactional goal will vary from context to context and also according to differences in individual or group norms.

Another variable to consider is the age of participants. There is linguistic evidence that children express disagreements as early as three, although presently little is known about how disagreement strategies are acquired. Studies on dispute episodes in children's interaction (Boggs, 1978; Corsaro & Rizzo, 1990; Emihovich, 1986; Goodwin, 1983, 1990, 2000; Maynard, 1985) indicate that serious disputes are more frequent among children aged 4-6 than older ones and children express disagreement more often than adults do. Furthermore, it has also been reported that, compared to adults, children tend to use proportionally more direct and aggravated disagreements. Mixed-Hawaiian ancestry children for example, use *No!* as a direct and undelayed disagreement strategy very frequently (Boggs, 1978). Similarly, Goodwin (1990) reported that contrary to Pomerantz's claims, the children in her study emphasized opposition via turn-initial direct disagreement (e.g., *No!* or *Yes!*) and partial repetition of prior talk in order to challenge it. Corsaro and Rizzo's (1990) study on Italian and American children aged 3 to 6 support the claim that children's interactions are very competitive and oppositional, and the findings replicate earlier results on the frequent use of assertion-denial exchanges, escalation of insult and

partial repetition of prior talk. In children's conversation, justification is often missing from turns of disagreement and aggravated disagreements are "activities that participants work to achieve in their own right" (Goodwin, 1983, p. 675). Findings suggest that the perception of disagreement and the use of particular disagreement strategies may vary over the course of development and according to age.

Gender has long been recognized as a social factor that has an influence on the way people talk. Gender has been examined in some depths in the conflict literature and there are various positions on the differences between the trouble talk of men and women. Those who believe in gender differences in language use (e.g., Aries, 1996; Holmes, 1995) suggest that gender affects the perception of verbal disagreement and linguistic choice in displaying disagreement. Coates (2004) proposes that women tend to avoid conflict, whereas men value it and consider it a means by which power is negotiated and involvement is expressed. The relationship of gender and disagreement is discussed in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 3).

2.6.4 Norms of the group/culture.

The evaluation of disagreement and particular disagreement strategies is also suggested to be affected by cultural, situational and individual norms. Decisions about whether or not one should express his/her disagreement and which linguistic strategy should be employed in its expression are influenced by both social expectations and the norms of the individual. Everyone has his or her own ideas about what is appropriate in a given speech event and this perception varies considerably from individual to individual. Furthermore, norms are dynamic rather than static rules, which are continuously altered and shaped by the members of the group or society.

2.6.5 Topic.

It has been suggested that conversational topic may contribute strongly to the emergence of disagreements (Locher, 1984; Schiffrin, 1984). One would assume that topics that are more controversial would arouse strong emotions (Langlotz & Locher, in press) and generate more (open) disagreements. However, this seems to be an overgeneralization, as cultural and contextual factors may play a role. For instance, Kakavá (1993a) discusses an example where the colour of a belt escalated into a

dispute, while Georgakopolou (2010) mentions a similar debate over the colour of a coat. In addition to the adversativeness of the topic, speakers' belief, the degree of involvement in and the background knowledge of the topic discussed are also significant factors (Sifianou, in press).

Along with the influence of culture, all these factors need to be taken into account in order to gain a better understanding of disagreement in interaction. These variables allow us to decide when disagreement is likely or unlikely, when it is considered to be appropriate or inappropriate, and by what means it is expressed.

2.7 Previous Empirical Studies

2.7.1 Introduction.

In addition to laying down the theoretical foundations for the study of disagreement, the previous sections also reflected on several studies focusing on the investigation of disagreement in general. This section (2.7) aims at providing a brief overview of previous empirical studies on the relationship of gender and disagreement (section 2.7.2), discussing studies performed on a population of adults. Before this, however, it is essential to clarify the distinction between the terms *sex* and *gender* and to give a brief review of gender studies. Another goal of the section is to summarize the limited amount of research that has been carried out to date on the interplay of disagreement and the social distance between interlocutors (section 2.7.3). Finally, I will point out several gaps observed in the relevant literature (section 2.7.3.2).

2.7.2 Gender studies and disagreement.

2.7.2.1 Terminology: *sex* vs. *gender*.

The terminological pandemonium between the concepts of *sex* and *gender* is due to their different use by the general public and theorists. The distinction between these terms originates from British feminists from the 1970s and has been emphasized in scholarly papers since then. In social sciences, *sex* refers to the biological categories of male and female that are differentiated by hormones, genitals, etc. Except in the case of some extreme disorders (e.g., having both male and female genitals or ambiguous external genitalia, etc.), it is essentially binary in nature: one is *either* male *or* female. *Gender*, on the other hand, is a social construct, which refers to the social roles, behaviour and expectations associated with *sex*.

Unlike sex, gender is not binary; people act out their gender roles combining masculine and feminine characteristics depending on the context. However, sometimes the terms are used interchangeably even in social sciences. For instance, studies investigating gender differences or similarities in communication often start with the categories *female* and *male*.³⁸ To further complicate the issue, even scholars differ in opinion about the sex/gender distinction: some emphasize it (e.g., Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2003), while others believe that both sex and gender are socially constructed (Butler, 1990). Another issue that contributes to the terminological confusion is the pre-existing linguistic use of the term gender referring to a grammatical category of nouns in some languages (such as *feminine*, *masculine* or *neutral* used for syntactic meaning in Russian or German).

The terminological distinction made by theorists is not followed in everyday practices. The terms sex and gender are used interchangeably to indicate biological sex in popular use. Although most official documents (e.g., driver's licence, birth certificate, identity card) regard the categories of male and female to belong to the category of sex, many forms ask you to select your gender from the options of male and female. It is possible that the popular use of gender is simply a more polite euphemistic term for sex and is used to avoid the sexual connotation.

2.7.2.2 Lakoff (1975).

Gendered language developed as a subfield of sociolinguistics after the publication of Robin Lakoff's groundbreaking book, *Language and Woman's Place*, in 1975. Since then interest in the subfield of language and gender has grown astronomically, resulting in a flood of research on the speech of men and women. Just as it is unimaginable to talk about politeness without mentioning Brown and Levinson's work, one cannot discuss gender studies without honouring Lakoff's (1975) pioneering volume. Lakoff argued that there are several areas of English grammar and usage which are employed primarily by women. Some of the features of so-called 'women's language' include the use of lexical hedges or fillers (*you know*, *sort of*, *well*), tag questions (*Nice weather, isn't it?*), 'empty' adjectives (*divine*, *charming*, *cute*), intensifiers (*She is so nice.*), and 'superpolite' forms (indirect requests, euphemism, frequent use of *please* and *thank you*) (pp. 53-55). Lakoff concludes that women's language is powerless, uncertain and extremely polite,

³⁸ Scholars use the categories *male*, *female*, *men* and *women* in various ways. Henceforth, I will use the labels *male* and *female* for gender and *men* and *women* for sex.

which reflects their (inferior) social standing in the male-dominated society. Lakoff's work has been a target of a lot of critique – most frequently for using introspection and anecdotal evidence as central sources of data for her study – yet it is still the most influential work in the field and has been widely read, reviewed and discussed since its publication. As Bucholtz (2004) puts it, “the fact that it persists as the single most influential work in language and gender indicates that its foundational role in the field is substantive rather than symbolic” (p. 4). The claims made by Lakoff have been tested and most of them have proved to be empirically invalid. Just as one example, the results of one of my empirical pilot studies (cf. Koczogh, 2010) failed to support all of Lakoff's claims. The study investigated how informants judge the sex of speakers after reading excerpts of English conversations and the findings did not confirm the vast majority of the stereotypes about the features of women's speech identified by Lakoff. Moreover, although the overall results of a meta-analysis of studies of power in language conducted by Timmerman (2002) supported the claim that men use more powerful language than women do, it has to be noted that the effect sizes were small.

As mentioned (section 2.6.3), other researchers (e.g., Coates, 1989; Holmes, 1995; Mills, 2003; Mullany, 2007) examining the speech of men and women report observable gender differences in the way the representatives of the two sexes talk and the functions speech fulfils in their interaction. In general, women are claimed to be more polite and also to use speech for building and maintaining relationships, while men are considered to be more competitive, using speech as a means of gaining and exchanging information as well as for showing and gaining power and status. In terms of the relationship of gender and disagreement, this means that since women value harmony and symmetrical relationships, they avoid conflict and disagreement. In contrast, men value asymmetrical relationships and thus have different perceptions of argument: they consider it a means of asserting status so disagreements have a preferred status in their eyes.

However, an attitude test I conducted on gendered stereotypes of communicative style (cf. Koczogh, 2011) did not support all of these assumptions about the gender of the speaker and disagreement, and in fact produced some surprising results. For instance, based on the opinion of 370 Hungarian informants (aged 16-83), men are slightly more polite than women and they disagree less frequently than their female counterparts do. The informants' judgement on the

indirectness of women, however, is consistent with the findings of previous research. These results are suggestive but not statistically significant and due to the relatively small sample size, further research on the area of gender and disagreement is definitely needed. In what follows, the influence of gender on the use of disagreements will be explored in more detail with the help of previous empirical studies.

2.7.2.3 Previous studies on gender and disagreement.

There is limited research available on the relationship of gender and disagreements specifically and most of these studies focus exclusively on one gender. Although gender is not in the scope of many studies on conflict talk, some of them do reflect on the influence of gender in the results. I now turn to the overview of these relevant studies in the field of gender and disagreement.

Studies investigating gender differences in children's dispute strategies (e.g., Sheldon, 1992, 1996) generally report that girls are very skilled at managing opposition and they use a variety of tactics and strategies to mitigate conflict effectively and soften the force of disagreements, while boys are likely to challenge or dispute the utterances of their peers openly. In other words, the speech of boys is adversarial and competitive, whereas girls' speech is affiliative and collaborative. From this it follows that girls prefer to agree, while boys value disagreement, a hypothesis that is supported by numerous studies (e.g., Gilbert, 1990; Holmes, 1995; Maltz &orker, 1982; Stubbe, 1991; van Alphen, 1987; etc.).³⁹

Similar patterns have been reported for adults in terms of their attitude towards and use of disagreement. Women's communication style has been generally described as cooperative, relation-oriented and egalitarian. This is in sharp contrast to the communication style of men, which has been considered to be highly competitive, status- and dominance-oriented. Gefen and Straub (1997) summarize these prevalent perceptions as follows: "men's conversation often has a hidden agenda of achieving and maintaining social standing. For men, discourse tends to be

³⁹ Some other studies on everyday argument among children, however, counter the claims about the cooperative nature of girls' conversational style. In her consecutive works, Goodwin (1980, 1983, 1988, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2002), for instance, found that black girls in Philadelphia were often involved in highly charged debate and expressed disagreement in an aggravated fashion. Her work reveals that girls' talk displays both cooperative and competitive linguistic forms and calls attention to the importance of taking specific context (such as activity type the children are engaged in) as well as social background of participants (e.g., ethnicity) into account when analysing children's interactions.

a struggle to preserve independence. By contrast, women's communication is inclined toward seeking and confirming intimacy, support and consensus" (p. 7).

Over the last three decades a considerable number of studies have suggested that women have a greater tendency to seek agreement and avoid explicit disagreement with each other both in single-sex and mixed-sex settings (Coates, 1989; Edelsky, 1981). Among women alignment seems to have a high prestige; and, argumentative, conflictious girls are often evaluated as *bossy* or *mean* (Maltz & Borker, 1982) and women as *bitchy* (Spender, 1980). The conflict-avoiding strategies in women's interactions show a marked continuity with the talk of the girls. Research on gender differences in conversational style has yielded results suggesting that women are more likely to soften their disagreements, while men tend to challenge and dispute the utterances of their conversational partner in a direct way.

Pilkington's (1992) study on same-sex groups of workers in a New Zealand bakery provides further evidence of this pattern. The women in the study used a highly cooperative conversational style with a lot of agreement and positive minimal feedback, and they frequently finished each other's utterances. The men, on the other hand, repeatedly challenged each other and disagreed bluntly. Another feature that characterized the male data was the occurrence of direct expression of hostility via open criticism and insults.

Similar gender-related patterns have been found in other contexts as well. Investigating the expression of agreement and disagreement in educational online discussion groups, Guiller and Durndell (2006) found that female postings were more likely to include agreement while male postings tended to include challenges and disagreement. Women's disagreeing utterances were rarely aggravated and were often attenuated through the use of *(I think) I'll have to*. Intensified and personalised forms of agreement (such as *I agree completely, I totally agree with you*) proved to be a solely female feature. Men, on the other hand, were significantly more likely to disagree explicitly than women and they used controversial and challenging statements more frequently. No significant gender difference was found in the use of partial agreement (such as *Yes, but...*).

Nevertheless, not all studies report findings consistent with the previous ones. Rees-Miller (2000), for instance, did not find gender an influential factor in either the rate of disagreement or the use of softeners of disagreement. However, her findings

suggest that men are more likely to use aggravated disagreements than women (p. 1106).

Kulick's (1992) findings in Gapun, a small village in Papua New Guinea, counter the notions about women's indirect and relation-oriented style. Gapun women have their own genre, called *kros*, to express their grievances and complaints in a very direct, aggressive and obscene way. The language behaviour of males and females in Gapun are the counter examples of what has been found by other researchers: Gapun women's conversational style is uncooperative, direct, adversarial and belligerent, while that of male villagers is more indirect and consensus-seeking (Cameron, 2007, pp. 32-34).⁴⁰ The gendered patterns Kulick uncovered are by no means unique. Similar linguistic practices can be found in the interaction of Malagasy-speaking people in Madagascar (Keenan, 1974). Malagasy women are associated with direct, open and confrontational conversational style (called *resaka*), while men behave the opposite way avoiding conflicts and direct language use. As a result of their language practice, women dominate situations which call for directness, such as social conflicts and bargaining at the market. Men, on the other hand, dominate situations where indirectness is desirable (e.g., ceremonial speech at weddings) (Cameron, 2007, p. 174).⁴¹

In summary, it appears that male and female conversational styles and attitudes towards disagreement differ notably. Based on the vast majority of studies described above, it seems that women's talk is cooperative and displays involvement. They avoid or mitigate disagreement and express support and interest verbally. Males, by contrast, have a competitive interactional style manifested by bald disagreements, challenges and insults, which in some contexts serve as expressions of solidarity and friendship. Contrasting results, however, warn us to refrain from generalisations and suggest that claiming that female interactional style is cooperative while male conversational style is competitive is an oversimplification of the complex linguistic behaviour of the sexes. To avoid overgeneralizations, both linguistic and extra-linguistic factors need to be considered.

⁴⁰ Gapun villagers believe that adults possess two qualities, namely *hed* (headstrongness) and *save* (judgement or good sense), but unlike men, women are unable to subordinate *hed* to *save* and this is manifested in their conflictive verbal behaviour (Cameron, 2007, p. 34).

⁴¹ It must be noted, however, that both Malagasy and Gapun women are looked down on because of their direct linguistic practices, since in these societies "the most highly-valued style involve[s] indirectness and avoidance of affront" (Ahearn, 2011, p. 210.)

2.7.3 Social distance and disagreement.

A large number of empirical studies (e.g., Das, 2010; Holmes, 1990; Or & Ong, 2008) indicate that social distance affects the production and interpretation of utterances and how interactants use politeness strategies in conversation. Thus, this section is devoted to examining the notion of this key concept, and then summarizing the results of the most significant empirical studies carried out on the interplay of social distance and disagreement.

2.7.3.1 Terminology: defining social distance.

The concept of *social distance* is widely used in linguistic research, although the construct is labelled differently by different scholars. Terms such as *distance* (Brown & Levinson, 1987), *solidarity* (Brown & Gilman, 1972), *familiarity* (Leichty & Applegate, 1991), *closeness* (Holtgraves, 1986), and *relational intimacy* (Lim & Bowers, 1991) are also alternative labels applied for the parameter *social distance* (Spencer-Oatey, 1996).⁴² This terminological turmoil also reflects a diverse conceptualization of the notion itself. In Brown and Levinson's (1987) interpretation social distance is "a symmetric social dimension of similarity/difference within which S & H stand" and "[i]n many cases (but not all), it is based on an assessment of the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material goods (including face) exchange between S & H" (p. 76). According to a more detailed definition provided by Thomas (1995), social distance is "a composite of psychologically real factors (status, age, sex, degree of intimacy etc) which 'together determine the overall degree of respectfulness' within a given speech situation" (p. 128). In contrast, Wierzbicka (1991) uses the label *intimacy*, which includes trust⁴³ and affect as its core components. Thus, it can be observed that different authors use different labels for the same term or conceptualize the same term differently.⁴⁴ Based on Spencer-Oatey's (1996, p. 7) overview of pragmatic studies, social distance is comprised of one or more of the following components: (1) social similarity/difference (e.g., Brown & Gilman, 1972); (2) frequency of contact (e.g., Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988); (3) length

⁴² I will use the term *social distance* throughout this dissertation for the sake of simplicity and also because it seems to be the most widely-accepted label.

⁴³ The existence of trust between two people is generally regarded as the foundation of a close relationship, hence a fundamental criterion in determining social distance between two people. It influences whether interlocutors are ready to reveal certain aspects of one's personality to the other party that is hidden from others (e.g., secrets, personal topics).

⁴⁴ Another problem is also worth mentioning here, namely that many scholars use the terms as if their meanings were already evident and thus do not give explicit definitions for them.

of acquaintance (e.g., Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988); (4) familiarity, or how well people know each other (e.g., Holmes, 1990); (5) sense of like-mindedness (e.g., Brown & Gilman, 1972); and (6) positive/negative affect (e.g., Baxter, 1984). Besides these components, the degree of interdependence⁴⁵ is also suggested as a factor influencing, and, at times, determining social distance (Or & Ong, 2008).

In my view, social distance forms a continuum and measuring social distance is challenging, since it is very difficult (if not impossible) to determine the closeness/distance of any relationship, especially as an outsider. Hence, I believe it is the best method to ask the persons involved to rank or label their relationship with each other. Still, in this case it is possible that two people will evaluate their relationship with the other (slightly) differently; for instance, while one might consider the other a close friend, the latter might regard him/her as “just” a friend.

In line with Spencer-Oatey (1990, p. 20), I suggest that there is no single factor that determines the relative distance/closeness of a relationship, but rather it involves a variety of (often interrelated) factors. In this study, I interpret social distance as being mainly dependent on the frequency of interaction between interlocutors and the length of their relationship. While it generally holds true that frequent interaction between interlocutors often indicates a close relationship, we must not generalize as exceptions can arise. For example, siblings temporarily living in two different countries might not have the chance to interact with each other on a regular basis due to time (sometimes time zone) and space restrictions. In contrast, colleagues might have to talk to each other almost every day even though they have a hostile relationship. Thus, basing social distance exclusively on the frequency of interaction is insufficient.

Another important factor that needs to be considered is the length of acquaintance. Since the length of the relationship might contribute to more trust in the other party and in the relationship reliability, it may indicate the closeness/distance of the persons involved. However, the length of acquaintance and the closeness of interactants do not always go hand in hand. It frequently occurs that one has a closer relationship with a person s/he has met a relatively short time before than with an old friend whom s/he has known for decades. Therefore, basing social

⁴⁵ The degree of interdependence between participants is suggested to have a significant role in determining how dependent the interlocutors are on each other and the extent they are able to impose on each other (Or & Ong, 2008, p. 5).

distance on the length of acquaintance between interactants alone is not sufficiently reliable either.

2.7.3.2 Previous studies on social distance and disagreement.

Compared to the number of studies on gender and disagreement, research examining the interplay of social distance and disagreement is even more scarce and limited. The research on disagreement to date has tended to focus on the variable of power and has made no mention of the (possible) effect of social distance between participants.⁴⁶ However, a few exceptions do arise.

For instance, García (2008) in her study on preference structure in agreeing and disagreeing responses in English and Spanish comments on the influence of social distance. She reports that no quantitative differences have been observed between the two languages in terms of the rate of disagreements. In general, with the increase of social distance between participants, the production of prefaces and pauses before disagreement also increased, while the instances of overlaps decreased in both languages. These findings suggest that interlocutors in close relationships are more inclined to deliver disagreements without any hesitation, while those who are more socially distant from each other instead employ delaying devices before the disagreement.

A fairly recent study that has been set out to reveal the interplay of social distance and the expression of oral disagreement was carried out by Or and Ong (2008) in Singaporean as an attempt to test the cross-cultural applicability of the theories on social distance and disagreement put forth by previous literature. The linguistic expression of disagreement was examined in groups of acquaintances, friends, and family. In the study, the prevalence of linguistic markers was analyzed based on Rees-Miller's (2000) taxonomy and disagreements were classified into the four categories identified by Muntigl and Turnbull (1998). In terms of the use of linguistic markers in disagreements, the study reports that with the increase of social distance between interactants (from 'family' to 'acquaintance') an increase in mitigating devices and a decrease in aggravated linguistic markers can be observed. These findings are congruent with the proposal of Brown and Levinson (1987) on the relationship between social distance and facework. Since acquaintances have a less

⁴⁶ This might be due to the fact that power and social distance are interrelated and, as Thomas (1995, p. 129) points out, some studies do not distinguish between the two as these parameters frequently co-occur.

stable relationship as compared to the other two social distance categories, disagreements pose a higher face threat and may jeopardize the relationship. Hence, interlocutors need to perform more facework. On the other hand, unmitigated and even aggravated disagreements⁴⁷ normally do not pose a risk to the relationship between family members or friends as their ties are stronger. As far as the disagreement strategies are concerned, the findings do not confirm the assumption that the use of aggravated disagreement strategies decreases as social distance increases and vice versa. The study found that family and friends used the same proportion of high aggression strategies, although acquaintances did utilize fewer of these disagreement strategies. For intermediate and low aggression strategies no clear trends were observed, therefore the results obtained for the use of disagreement strategies are inconclusive. These findings might be due to the limited classification of disagreement strategies as well as the small sample size used for analysis, with both possible limitations acknowledged by the authors.

Bándli's (2009) research on Hungarian disagreement also provides some similar findings on the relationship of social distance and the utilization of disagreement strategies. Investigating the conversations of friends and acquaintances, she reports that those in a close relationship use the most direct disagreement strategies, while more superficial relationships result in much more indirect strategies or a combination of direct strategies with indirect ones. Thus, friends are inclined to criticize their conversational partners' opinion, while acquaintances find this insufficient and make alternative suggestions. Acquaintances are also likely to utilize explanations to lessen the force of their statement (pp. 149-150).

Liang and Han's (2005) contrastive study on social distance and disagreement in American English and in Mandarin Chinese reports a significant difference in the rate of disagreements: a linear relationship seems to exist between the social distance of participants and the frequency of disagreements in American English, while the opposite is true for Chinese. In other words, the rate of disagreement increases with the increase in social distance in American English, whereas with the increase of social distance the rate of disagreement decreases in Chinese. As an explanation for these results, the authors claim that the findings support notions regarding the cultural differences between Chinese and Americans in terms of

⁴⁷ *Aggravated disagreement* here refers to the use of aggravated linguistic markers.

collectivism vs. individualism respectively (pp. 8-9). Although this study makes an important contribution to cross-cultural research on social distance and disagreement, it only investigates quantitative differences in the rate of disagreement and neglects to study how disagreement is expressed linguistically. As is clear from the above, as a result of the scarcity of studies that focus or even comment on the interplay of social distance and disagreement, further research in this field is needed.

It should be pointed out that, until now, very little empirical research concerning the act of disagreement *per se* appears to have been done, especially in mixed-sex settings. Moreover, the majority of studies to date have predominantly focused on the linguistic manifestation of disagreement and have ignored its functional spectrum. Furthermore, research on disagreement using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is needed to get a more complete picture of the processes at work. More significantly, a gap can be observed in the relevant literature as, in comparison to studies on other speech acts, research on the act of disagreement carried out in Hungarian is extremely limited. Also, in comparison to power, research on gender and disagreement as well as social distance and disagreement is rather limited. This study is an attempt to fill these gaps by exploring both the functions and expression of disagreement in mixed-sex verbal interaction of Hungarian university students within a task-based framework using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The results are interpreted in light of the variables of social distance between interlocutors as well as their gender.

2.7.4 Types of disagreement.

After the above overview of empirical studies carried out on the interface of gender and disagreement and gender and social distance, I now turn to studies differentiating different types of disagreement. In the literature of conflict talk, various types of disagreement have been identified by different researchers based on different criteria. Priesemann (1970), for instance, distinguishes between disagreements depending on whether they are aimed at factual information, interpersonal relationships, or ways of linguistic expression (Sornig, 1977, p. 366). Pomerantz (1984) categorizes disagreements as either strong or weak, whereas Kakavá (1993b) proposes a continuum with mitigated and strong disagreements on the poles and strong yet mitigated disagreements in between.

Based on structural and pragmatic criteria, Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) identify four types of disagreements:

- (1) irrelevancy claims: “meta-dispute-acts that comment on the conversational interactions” (p. 229). They indicate that the preceding utterance is irrelevant to the topic discussed using expressions like *It doesn't matter* or *It's nothing to do with it*.
- (2) challenges: frequently preceded by markers displaying disagreement with prior turn and normally have the syntactic form of questions. They imply that the other interlocutor cannot provide evidence for his/her claim. (ibid., pp. 229-230)
- (3) contradictions: negate the propositional content of the previous utterance often marked by a negative particle such as *no* or *not*. This is what Rees-Miller (1995) refers to as *Not P*. (ibid., p. 231)
- (4) counterclaim: with counterclaims “speakers propose an alternative claim that does not directly contradict nor challenge other's claim” (ibid., p. 232). They often co-occur with hesitation markers, mitigating devices and token agreement.

Muntigl and Turnbull also note that these acts can co-occur, with the most frequent combination being contradictions followed by counterclaims. In my view, irrelevancy claims cannot be considered disagreements, as they do not contradict (part of) the previous utterance, but rather call into question its relevance to the topic under discussion.

Scott (2002) distinguishes three types of disagreements based on their nature of explicitness and hostility. Echoing Kakavá (1993b), she places them on a continuum. The three types identified, in the order of increasing explicitness and escalating hostility, are (Scott, 2002, pp. 310-322):


- (1) backgrounded disagreements: less explicit and the least hostile using mitigation and lacking personal attacks.
- (2) mixed disagreements: exhibit combined characteristics of the backgrounded and foregrounded type.

- (3) foregrounded disagreements: explicit, direct and the most hostile disagreement strategies using overlaps, raised voice and short turns. Within the realm of foregrounded disagreements three subcategories have been identified. These are the following, in the order of displaying escalating hostility:
- (a) collegial disagreements: vigorous yet moderate acts without the aim of attacking and/or hurting the other interlocutor. They make use of questions requesting information or used for rhetorical purposes, mitigating devices and humour.
 - (b) personal challenge disagreements: more direct and hostile strategies with a confrontational and accusatory force. These disagreements are characterized by confrontational questions, negation and use of second person pronoun.
 - (c) personal attack disagreements: the most direct and hostile disagreement types which “display notable affective involvement, often accompanying their blunt language with looks of shock, narrowed eyes, and/or dramatic gestures” (ibid., p. 322). The main characteristics of personal attack disagreements are the heavy use of negation and repetition, fierce personal attack via blunt statements, and moderate use of accusatory *you*.

Rees-Miller (1995, 2000), investigating the expression of disagreement in academic setting, organizes the acts of disagreement into three broad categories “based on the presence or absence of identifiable linguistic markers” (2000, p. 1993): ‘softened disagreement’, ‘not softened or strengthened disagreement’, and ‘aggravated disagreement’ (see Figure 2.1 for the taxonomy and distribution of types of linguistic markers).

Rees-Miller (1995, 2000) takes Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model of politeness as the underlying point of departure for her classification of disagreement whereby the category of ‘softened disagreements’ corresponds to Brown and Levinson’s ‘off record’ and ‘on record with redress’ strategies, and the groups of ‘aggravated’ and ‘neither softened nor strengthened’ disagreements correspond to ‘bald-on-record’ strategies.

Figure 2.1
Taxonomy of disagreements (Rees-Miller, 2002: 1095)



The category of softened disagreements is further subdivided into positive politeness and negative politeness strategies, again based on the Brown and Levinsonian distinction. Positive politeness strategies include linguistic markers (e.g., humour, positive comment, etc.) that serve to soften the face-threatening force of disagreement and to increase solidarity with the addressee. In negative politeness strategies, softeners (e.g., questions, downtoners, etc.) are employed in order to indicate uncertainty (or its facade) on the part of the speaker and thus protect the negative face-needs of the addressee.

No overt linguistic markers can be identified in disagreements that are neither softened nor strengthened, still they are recognizable as disagreements as they contradict the previous utterance. Besides contradiction, verbal shadowing, a repetition of “a previous speaker’s utterance with altered words or intonation to indicate disagreement” (Rees-Miller, 2000, p. 1094), was used to express disagreement.

The category of aggravated disagreements goes beyond Brown and Levinson’s (1987) bald on record politeness in the sense that disagreements are not only expressed explicitly with no redress, but their face-threatening force is also strengthened by the use of linguistic markers such as intensifiers or accusatory *you*.

Utilizing naturally occurring data, Rees-Miller (1995, 2000) explores the complex ways of how the Brown and Levinsonian factors of power and rank of imposition affect the linguistic choice of strategies for disagreeing. This study is highly valuable, since it provides an in-depth analysis of the speech act of disagreement and thoroughly investigates the linguistic features by which it is expressed in American university settings.

Another equally significant study of disagreement was carried out by Locher (2004) focusing on the interface of power and politeness in the realization of disagreements in naturalistic language data. Disagreements are investigated in three different settings: (1) an informal dinner among family and friends, (2) a business meeting, and (3) data collected during the 2000 US presidential election featuring a radio interview of President Clinton, a US Supreme Court hearing on the 2000 presidential election, and a televised presidential debate.

In the chapter analysing the linguistic realization of disagreements in the dinner conversation, Locher (2004) identifies the following strategies through which disagreement was expressed: (1) hedges (*well, just, uhm, uh, I think, I don't know*), (2) giving personal or emotional reasons for disagreeing, (3) modal auxiliaries, (4) shifting responsibility, (5) objections in the form of a question, (6) the use of *but*, (7) repetition of an utterance by a next or the same speaker, and (8) unmitigated disagreement (p. 113). According to Locher, this list includes the main varieties of expressing disagreement during the dinner and the categories are presented in order of frequency. However, some of these categories (hedges, modal auxiliaries, discourse connectives) are ways in which disagreements are *mitigated* rather than *expressed*.

At this point, I wish to turn to Bándli's (2009) categorization of disagreement strategies in Hungarian. She claims to have identified the disagreement strategies employed by Hungarian people (aged between 20-40) in naturally occurring spontaneous verbal interactions. However, the methodology she utilized resulted in guided conversations using oral discourse completion task.⁴⁸ In the 120 dialogues she analyzed, the following disagreement strategies were identified listed from the most direct one to the most indirect one (*ibid.*, pp. 107-109):

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of discourse completion task method see section 3.2.2 (pp. 61-62).

- (1) judgement/qualification: a strategy in which the speaker makes an explicit evaluative statement on the other speaker (e.g., *Nem vagy normális!* ~ *You are insane!*), the propositional content of the other speaker's utterance (e.g., *Ezek nem jó szemüvegek.* ~ *These glasses aren't good.*) or the other speaker's opinion (e.g., *Ez hülyeség!* ~ *That is nonsense!*).
- (2) statement of completed action (e.g., *Odatettem.* ~ *I did put it there.*)
- (3) explanation/listing of reasons (e.g., *Tönkreteszi a szemedet.* ~ *It ruins your eyes.*)
- (4) alternative suggestions (e.g., *Először orvoshoz kellett volna menned.* ~ *You should have gone to the doctor first.*)
- (5) doubts/uncertainties: a strategy which criticizes/questions the validity of the other speaker's stance (e.g., *Ezt most komolyan gondolod?* ~ *Are you serious?*, *Biztos vagy benne, hogy jó?* ~ *Are you sure it's good?*) or expresses the speaker's own unwillingness to do something (e.g., *Én nem vennék be olyat.* ~ *I wouldn't take something like that.*).
- (6) partial acceptance: a strategy in which the speaker emphasizes his/her partial agreement with the previous speaker's utterance and implies that s/he is on a different opinion (e.g., *Azért maradj életben, majd mesélj róla!* ~ *Stay alive then and tell me about it!*)

Whilst the above categorization must be credited for being the first attempt to identify the linguistic strategies used for expressing disagreement in Hungarian, it cannot be denied that it has several flaws. First, some of the categories (e.g., strategies (2)-(4)) are used as if they were self-evident without any explanation of their meaning. Second, the difference between some of the strategies is not clear and the examples provided by the speaker give little help differentiating among the categories and clarifying the boundaries. For instance, the utterance *Először orvoshoz kellett volna menned.* (~ *You should have gone to the doctor first.*) can also be interpreted as criticism which includes a negative evaluation on the past action/behaviour of the other interactant. Thus, it could be easily categorized as a judgement/qualification as well. Intonation can have a meaning differentiating role in the examples listed above, however, Bándli (2009) does not discuss the prosodic features of her examples. Moreover, the examples she provides for illustrating the identified strategies are out of context, which makes it almost impossible to judge the

accuracy of the categories, since the reader is not familiar with the preceding utterance with which disagreement is expressed.

Mapping the pragmatic competence of Roma and Hungarian primary school children, Mászlainé Nagy (2010) touches upon the differences in the expression of disagreement utilized by the two groups. Based on Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory, she identifies three broad categories of disagreements ('bare disagreement' strategy, 'disagreement with recovery', 'indirect disagreement' strategy), but provides no definition of them.

These studies provide useful insight into the types of disagreement as well as the means of expressing them and will serve as a starting point for my analysis in Chapter 3. However, the major limitation of most of the above-mentioned studies is that instead of applying a single consistent criterion, disagreements are categorized on the basis of a combination of semantic, pragmatic and structural criteria. More importantly, the majority of these studies focus on the linguistic realization of disagreements regardless of their functions. The present study attempts to fill in these methodological gaps observed in literature.

2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I started out with an attempt to summarize how researchers define disagreement, which led to a definition of my own: verbal disagreement is a speech act expressing S's opinion or belief whose propositional content or illocutionary force is partly or fully inconsistent with that of the previous speaker's utterance. Then the micro- and macro-structure of disagreement was briefly discussed. In section 2.3, a concise overview of major politeness and impoliteness theories was outlined, briefly sketching their main positions, merits and limitations and highlighting their distinctive aspects. Next, the interrelationship of disagreement and im/politeness was explored with some critical insights into previous theories. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 presented a description of the features of disagreement as well as a detailed discussion of the factors influencing its interpretation and evaluation. It was argued that disagreement is very complex in nature as it is a metalinguistic, metacommunicative, analytical, multifunctional, spontaneous, and reactive act whose interpretation is highly context and culture dependent. It was also noted that the linguistic choice the speaker makes to express disagreement depends not only on culture and context but also on parameters such as age, gender, communicative

style, relational history and social distance of participants, interactional goal, norms, and topic of conversation. The notion of preference and dispreference and its relation to disagreements has also been discussed. Section 2.7 provided an overview of previous empirical research on disagreement devoting a subsection to the factors of gender and social distance each. Some fundamental terminological issues were also discussed in the section. Finally, some studies on types of disagreements and ways of expressing disagreement were described and the methodological gaps in the relevant literature were pinpointed; these gaps are addressed in Chapter 3. Thus, this chapter was set up to provide the necessary background information for the discussions to come.

PART II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology and research design best suited to examining the research questions and initial hypotheses set out in Chapter 1.2. It aims at presenting the rationale and operational details of the strategy used for the research. It provides the details of the multi-step and multi-method research strategy adopted to address the research issues. The chapter first introduces the nature of the data (3.2.1), and then describes the methods of data collection (3.2.2) and the sampling procedure (3.2.3). In addition, justification of the adopted research methods together with their potential limitations and problems are provided. Ethical issues, including how confidentiality was respected throughout the research process, are also discussed. Next, the chapter elucidates the complex analytical tools and procedures applied to the data (3.3), including a taxonomy set up for the analysis of disagreement verified by 100 informants (3.3.7.1) and a brief description of the statistical analyses applied to the data (3.3.7.3). Finally, the chapter concludes with a concise summary of the preceding sections (3.4).

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Type of data.

In previous empirical studies on disagreement, various methods have been chosen for data collection, resulting in different kinds of data. As the goal of this research is to examine how Hungarian undergraduate students disagree in real life, natural(istic) data for analysis needed to be collected in natural settings. In natural settings, the presence of the observer and the research techniques “being used do not cause those being observed to modify their behaviour in any way” (Rees-Miller, 1996, p. 54). My aim was to collect as much natural data as possible in such a way as to cause as little alteration to the interactants’ behaviour as possible. Therefore, despite the temptation of using more readily available data, I refrained from using televised material (cf. e.g., Culpeper 2005, 2011). The core corpus data of my research is comprised of audio-recorded face-to-face conversations of mix-sex

dyads,⁴⁹ supplemented by background questionnaires. Based on Beebe's (1994, pp. 3-4) categorization, the data collected for this research is best described as natural, elicited, audio-recorded and transcribed data. I employed a number of strategies (see section 3.2.4) designed to put the subjects at ease. In this way I managed to gather data that was more natural and relaxed. The conversations contain a lot of laughing, joking, teasing, personal stories and even swearing, which also suggests that the data is of a relaxed, casual nature.

The data for my analysis was recorded by myself between December 2009 and March 2010 and then transcribed and analysed. The total data recorded amounted to more than 15 hours of speech. Utilizing the criteria for corpus selection described in section 3.3.2 resulted in a corpus of 68,194 words, which is approximately 444 minutes (7hrs 24mins) of task-based speech. This corpus was used as the basis for analysis.

3.2.2 Methodology for data elicitation.

When planning research methodology, the researcher can choose from several tools for collecting data. The research questions and the objectives of the researcher largely determine the most appropriate one(s). The most common types of data collection procedures with the aim of investigating disagreement are discourse completion task (DCT), field note, role-play, and audio or video recorded interviews or conversations. Each of these methods will be briefly discussed and the weaknesses and strengths associated with a given method will be highlighted.

Since its first use in the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realizations Patterns (CCSARP) Project in 1989, the DCT has been used extensively to gather data in empirical studies. The DCT is a structured language elicitation instrument which requires informants to provide authentic language data for hypothetical situations. However, its validity has been questioned as there might be a gap between what people think they would say in a given situation and what they actually say. It has been found that the written responses given to a situational prompt are generally shorter and more simple-worded than naturally occurring speech (Yuan, 2001, p. 272). In addition, subjects generally produce a narrower range of semantic formulae

⁴⁹ As opposed to multi-party discourse, the use of dyadic (two-party) conversations ensures an equal gender distribution of interactants, contains less simultaneous speech, thus provides intelligibility and simplifies the process of transcription. Moreover, in the case of two-party discourse it is easy to follow what the given disagreement is a reaction to. For these reasons, I have chosen to use dyadic conversations instead of triadic ones.

on a DCT than in real life, so data gathered by DCT does not reflect natural speech. As a result, its use as a single method of data collection might not provide a complete picture of the speech under investigation.

Research based on observational field note data also has its advantages and disadvantages. It takes a lot of time to collect enough data this way and the presence of the observer might alter the behaviour of those being studied (this phenomenon is widely known as the Observer's Paradox).⁵⁰ Covert observation can be a solution to the latter; however, it raises ethical questions. An advantage of the field note over the DCT technique is that while the DCT cannot elicit multiple-turn conversations, observation can. However, taking down precisely what has been said over several turns is not an easy task, since it is difficult to remember the exact wording of elaborated turns.

Role-play is another common instrument of data collection. It allows the researcher to gain access to authentic data with the characteristics of natural speech (e.g., false starts, repetition, interruptions, overlaps, pauses, etc.). It can elicit multiple-turn conversations containing negotiation between the speakers and - just as in the case of DCT – variables can be adjusted to fit the research design. However, role-plays suffer from the same drawback as DCTs, namely, the question of validity. It is arguable whether the data elicited with role-plays can represent spontaneous and realistic conversations (Yuan, 2001).

If our goal is to examine what people actually say in everyday interaction, the most suitable data collection method seems to be the audio and/or video recording of authentic interchanges in natural settings without people's awareness. However, tempting as it may be to study people who are unaware of being observed, surreptitious recording raises ethical and, in some countries, legal issues as well. Although recording with consent is ethical, it also has its drawbacks. For instance, being an intrusive technique, it can inhibit participants and thus result in monitored and unnatural speech data. Nevertheless, we can record spontaneous interchanges in natural settings, such as a family dinner (e.g., Locher, 2004; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Schiffrin, 1990) or academic advising sessions (e.g., Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford,

⁵⁰ According to Labov (1972, p. 209) "the aim of linguistic research in the community must be to find out how people talk when they are not being systematically observed; yet we can only obtain these data by systematic observation". However, the presence of the observer creates a situation in which speakers will be highly conscious of their speech and, as a result, frequently modify it.

1990). Another commonly used spoken data collecting tool is the interview. As noted by Macaulay (2009, p. 32)


[i]Interviews, however, do not give evidence of how speakers interact with their peers and limit the kind of genres and styles that can be recorded. For example, it is highly unlikely that joking and teasing will occur in an interview situation unless the two individuals know each other quite well, though occasionally interviewees will tell a joke, but that is a very different kind of speech act. Similarly, it is probable that many speakers will be using a form of speech appropriate in speaking to someone who is not a friend or an intimate. This can, though it need not, lead to rather formal or even unnatural speech (Wolfson, 1988; Milroy & Milroy, 1977).

One way to counter this is to record participants whilst they are performing some task they have been asked to do. This was the method that was adopted for the purposes of my research (for further details see the next sections).

The above-mentioned methods have not been discussed in detail, nor do they comprise an exclusive list of available research tools for collecting data. However, so far, these methods - and their various combinations - have been most commonly drawn on in past research on the investigation of disagreements.

Due to the complexity of the issue investigated, in my study, a multiple research method both for data collection and analysis was adopted to strengthen the study design. The stages of the research process, as well as the steps within them, are shown in a concise form in Figure 3.1. Each stage will be elaborated on in the subsequent sections.

Figure 3.1
Research process flowchart



3.2.2.1 Tasks.

In the preliminary stage (phase A) of my research I had to design the tasks with the aim of generating as many disagreements between the interlocutors as possible. As pointed out by Yuan (2001, p. 275), one of the major drawbacks of collecting natural data is that “there is no guarantee that the speech act under investigation will occur at all or enough tokens will be produced and collected since the researcher does not have much control over informants production”. Therefore the tasks had to be designed to have the best chance of eliciting the kind of discourse in which I was interested. As discussed in section 2.6.5, topic may play a crucial role in the emergence of disagreements. Thus, I selected highly controversial topics and constructed short statements dealing with these argumentative issues. These statements were of differing grammatical patterns (*kellene* ~ *should* construction, factual statements) as well as varying levels of gravity. The statements were chosen to provide conflict and to generate disputes and heated discussions so that they would result in a high occurrence of disagreement. Nine statements were selected for inclusion in Task sheet one (see Appendix A and its English translation Appendix B) based on the following criteria:

- (1) They should be interesting, thought-provoking, and highly controversial at the same time.
- (2) They should not require any special background knowledge.
- (3) They should relate to the participants’ life and their experiences.

The statements can be grouped into the following broad categories based on the issues they deal with: (1) ethical questions (e.g., death penalty, abortion, euthanasia), (2) current topics and university life (e.g., H1N1, higher education tuition fee), (3) gender differences (e.g., in intelligence, driving and cooking skills). The next step was to create a realistic context to the statements. To make them believable, it was claimed that they were the results of an international survey. The participants’ first task in the recording stage (phase C) was to read and talk about the results of this contextualized made-up survey.

In order to provide further grounds for disagreements, I chose a story of a love triangle (see Appendix C and its English translation Appendix D) with six characters. In the second task of the recording stage, informants were asked to listen to the story

read out loud by me and then rank the characters in order of preference (for Task sheet two see Appendices E and F). They completed this task on their own, followed by a joint discussion of their individual order. Given that people in general, and men and women in particular, have different (opposing) views on cheating, this story seemed to be a potential generator of divergent opinions, resulting in conflict and disagreement.

3.2.2.2 Background questionnaire.

Data from the recordings of face-to-face interactions was supplemented by a post-recording background questionnaire (see Appendices G and H) administered to the participants in phase C. The first part of the questionnaire contained questions focusing on the informants' demographic data such as age, gender, education, parents' highest qualification obtained, etc. The second half of the questionnaire was designed with the aim of mapping the relationship (social distance, frequency of interaction, etc.) between the interlocutors and their impression (liking, intelligence, etc.) of each other based on their conversation. The final item of the questionnaire instructs them to mark on a six-grade scale the degree (1 – not at all, 6 – extremely) to which they were disturbed by being recorded and their answers resulted in a mean average of 1.3 (see Table 3.3, p. 74), which also shows that the data I gathered is comprised of natural, relaxed conversations. For further information on the relationships of conversational partners see Table 3.2 (p. 70).

3.2.3 Recruitment and participants.

Due to time issues and easy access to students, convenience sampling was used to select both the university and the subjects. This means that the subjects under study have not been chosen at random. Inevitably, as a result of this type of sampling, the findings are not representative of a broader university community and cannot be generalized. However, this is not my goal. This research aims at gaining an in-depth insight into how male and female university students disagree. In order to ensure homogeneity of participants, informants were required to meet similar criteria with regards to age, mother tongue, and educational background. Subject eligibility criteria for inclusion were as follows:

- (1) students at the University of Debrecen
- (2) aged 18-24
- (3) native speakers of Hungarian.

In the recruitment phase (step A.3) the aim of the research, as well as the nature of the study, was clearly explained to the participants. Deciding how much information to share with the participants about the focus of the research is always a great dilemma for researchers as they strive not to influence the participants' responses or even invalidate the research, while remaining ethical at the same time. As I did not wish to reveal the specific aim of the investigation, yet I was also reluctant to deceive participants, I chose to describe the goals of the research in general terms. That is, they were told that the aim is to examine the verbal interaction of university students with each other. Requests were made for the future participants to participate in a task-based mixed-sex face-to-face conversation on a voluntary basis. At this point, they were also informed about the fact that their dialogue would be audio-recorded. Participants were assured that no information would be included in the study that would reveal their identity. They were provided with my e-mail address and encouraged to consider their willingness to participate in the research and to contact me with any further questions or concerns. They were also asked to contact me via e-mail once they decided to take part in the research. They were told to find another university student of the opposite sex as a conversational partner if possible.

As noted by Macaulay (2009), “[a]udio recording takes time to collect and much more time to analyze, so that the number of respondents is limited by the resources available” (p. 38). The selection of research participants was also constrained by the availability of volunteers. 40 Hungarian university students who were enrolled in undergraduate courses at the University of Debrecen at the time of research were recruited, out of which 30 were included in my final analysis. The participants (15 men, 15 women, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.4$ years, age range: 18-24 years) comprised a (relatively) homogenous group as they were all of similar age and had obtained a similar level of education (they had all passed a high school maturation exam). Table 3.1 shows the demographic information about the selected participants.

Table 3.1
Participants' background

Speaker	Age	Sex	County	Faculty	Mother's qualification	Father's qualification
M01	21	M	HB	Arts	college degree	PhD
F01	24	F	HB	Arts	college degree	PhD
M02	20	M	BAZ	Science	technical school	college degree
F02	20	F	Pest	Arts	technical school	technical school
M03	21	M	SZSZB	Arts	college degree	technical school
F03	18	F	SZSZB	Arts	AGS	vocational school
M04	18	M	HB	Arts	college degree	university degree
F04	19	F	HB	Arts	PhD	PhD
M05	24	M	HB	Law	university degree	university degree
F05	22	F	HB	Arts	AGS	AGS
M06	23	M	HB	Eco	primary school	vocational school
F06	20	F	HB	Arts	technical school	college
M07	22	M	BAZ	Arts	AGS	AGS
F07	21	F	SZSZB	Arts	AGS	AGS
M08	20	M	HB	Arts	AGS	technical school
F08	20	F	HEVES	Arts	vocational school	AGS
M09	20	M	GYMS	Arts	college degree	university degree
F09	19	F	SZSZB	Arts	college degree	college degree
M10	20	M	HB	Arts	university degree	AGS
F10	19	F	SZSZB	Arts	technical school	technical school
M11	19	M	JNSZ	Arts	university degree	university degree
F11	21	F	HB	Arts	N/P	N/P
M12	23	M	HB	Science	AGS	technical school
F12	20	F	BÉKÉS	Arts	primary school	vocational school
M13	19	M	HB	Arts	technical school	technical school
F13	19	F	BAZ	Arts	AGS	AGS
M14	22	M	HB	Arts	college degree	technical school
F14	20	F	BÉKÉS	Arts	vocational school	technical school
M15	18	M	JNSZ	Science	vocational school	technical school
F15	20	F	SZSZB	Arts	technical school	technical school

Note.

M = male;

F = female;

HB = Hajdú-Bihar county;

BAZ = Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county;

SZSZB = Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county;

JNSZ = Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county;

GYMS = Győr-Moson-Sopron county;

Eco = Economy

AGS = academic grammar school;

N/P = not provided

A few words about the coding system of participants are in order at this point. Each participant was given a code consisting of a capital letter indicating the sex of the speaker, and a two-digit number that is identical in the case of conversational partners. In other words, speaker M01, for instance, is male, speaker F01 is female and they formed a conversational pair during the recording stage.

It can be observed from Table 3.1 that the majority (76.6%) of participants came from North-Eastern Hungary and most of them (83.3%) were studying at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Debrecen.

The relationship between the participants were at the two ends of the social distance continuum, i.e., they either had very strong ties (siblings or couples who had been dating each other for at least a year; $n=12$) or they were perfect strangers ($n=18$).⁵¹ Unfortunately, I did not manage to include any subjects from the middle of the continuum (acquaintances, distant friends) in my final analysis, but having informants from the two extremes of the scale allowed me to compare and contrast how these subjects disagree with each other and examine what role, if any, social distance plays in the verbal expression of disagreement.

Table 3.2 gives further information on the relationship of participants. It shows that speakers M01 - F06 have the lowest social distance; they have known each other for years, and interact with each other on a daily basis. Speakers M01 and F01 are siblings, while the other participants were dating each other at the time of the research. The time they had been going out with each other is indicated in brackets. Speakers M07 - F15 were from the other end of the social distance scale, i.e., they were strangers who met for the first time at the recording studio. The next section describes both the pilot phase and the recording process, and also touches upon some ethical considerations.

⁵¹ As discussed in section 2.7.3.1 (p. 49), measuring the social distance between two persons is a very difficult task for the researcher; therefore I determined the degree of closeness/distance between research participants primarily based on their self-labelling (on a scale of 1-6), also taking into account the factors of frequency of interaction and the length of their acquaintance.

Table 3.2
Relationship of interlocutors

Speaker (age)	Social distance	Length of relationship ¹	Frequency of interaction
M01 (21) F01 (24)	6	20 yrs (N/A)	daily
M02 (23) F02 (20)	6	10 yrs (3 yrs)	daily
M03 (21) F03 (18)	6	3 yrs 3 ms (same)	daily
M04 (20) F04 (20)	6	2 yrs (1.5 yrs)	daily
M05 (18) F05 (19)	6	3 yrs (1 yr 9 ms)	daily
M06 (23) F06 (21)	6	4 yrs (same)	daily
M07 (22) F07 (21)	1	N/A	N/A
M08 (20) F08 (20)	1	N/A	N/A
M09 (20) F09 (19)	1	N/A	N/A
M10 (20) F10 (19)	1	N/A	N/A
M11 (19) F11 (21)	1	N/A	N/A
M12 (23) F12 (20)	1	N/A	N/A
M13 (19) F13 (19)	1	N/A	N/A
M14 (22) F14 (20)	1	N/A	N/A
M15 (18) F15 (20)	1	N/A	N/A

Note.

N/A = not applicable

n=30

¹length of time couples have been dating each other is indicated in brackets

3.2.4 Pre-test, recording, and ethical questions.

To ensure the quality of the data collection procedure, a pilot phase (B.1 Pre-test) was performed prior to the recording stage. The pilot study was conducted with 8 participants and it allowed me to revise and, where necessary, modify the instruments on the basis of my observations and the impressions of the interlocutors. The most important change made after the pilot study (step B.2) was the elimination of the time constraints on tasks one and two, as I realized subjects felt more comfortable when no time limit was imposed for the discussion of the tasks.

Administering pilot studies also improved the reliability of the data collection procedure.

Once the pre-tests were conducted and the changes were made based on the observations, the recording sessions were performed (phase C) with the participants whom I previously had to schedule for the research (step A.5). Some interlocutors were able to bring a conversational partner of the opposite sex (often their boyfriend or girlfriend) with them, but I had to find a match for those who could not. This was not always easy, as females proved to be more willing to volunteer than males.

The recording phase can be divided into five stages (see Figure 3.1, p. 64). The first stage began with an introduction to the present study (C.1). Attendee's questions were answered at this stage. Afterwards, signed consent was obtained (C.2) from all participants.

Stage three of data collection (recording session, C.3) included semi-structured, task-based, face-to-face conversations with mixed-sex pairs of volunteer participants. First, warm-up questions were asked (C.3) to ensure that interviewees felt comfortable and willing to share their views and experiences. Then Task sheet one (see section 3.2.2.1 and Appendices A and B) was handed out and the participants were invited to share their opinion on the topics with each other and were asked to let me know when they were finished. Each conversation was audio-recorded to ensure the accuracy of data collection. To overcome the Observer's Paradox (cf. section 3.2.2), participants were left alone for the time of the discussion so that they would not monitor their speech because of my presence.⁵² This was a crucial component of the study design since it not only avoided unnatural speech on the part of the interlocutors but also the possibility of the discussion falling into a moderator-led "interview". However, not being present while the speakers were doing their tasks also meant recording without being able to directly make observations about other non-verbal ways of expressing disagreement. Upon completing the first task, the interlocutors were asked to listen to the story mentioned in section 3.2.2.1 and they were provided with Task sheet two (see section 3.2.2.1 and Appendices E and F) on which they had to individually rank order the characters based on preference. They were told to do this task individually, then discuss their lists with each other. Once again, they were left alone for the time of discussion. The overall aim of the recording session was for participants to jointly develop a conversation in

⁵² Although the discussions were recorded with no investigator present, the microphones serve as a surrogate overhearer and might cause self-consciousness.

which agreement and (more preferably) disagreement would emerge naturally, regardless of the elicited nature of the situation.

Task two brought the recording session to an end and participants were asked to fill in the background questionnaire (step C.4) described in the previous section. They provided data anonymously and used a code assigned to them to ensure that their identities remained confidential. Furthermore, participants were assured that the information they provided and the recordings would only be used to fulfil the aims of the research and were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time up until March 2010.

The majority of the recordings took place at the recording studio of the Institute of English and American Studies at the University of Debrecen. The data collection instrument used in the recording stage included a PC, a recording software (Sound Forge Pro 10) and 2 far-talk cardioid microphones (Shure 16A). With the help of this professional equipment I managed to record CD quality stereo wav files. The audio recordings of the pre-test stage (step B.1) and the first few recordings of the recording stage (step C.3) were recorded with the help of an Olympus VN-4100PC digital voice recorder with built-in Electret Condenser microphone (monoaural) in XHQ (extra high quality sound recording) mode. The microphone sensitivity was adjusted to high sensitivity mode that records sound from all directions in wav files. Unfortunately, as a result of high background noise and the general lower sound quality of the output files, some of these recordings were not suitable for transcription and analysis. Consequently, these data were deemed invalid for the research.

Each recording session was followed by an informal conversation with the participants (step C.5). My questions were oriented to eliciting the participants' views on the tasks and the topics discussed. I also asked them about how they had felt during the recordings and whether they had any comments to make. Each participant professed to have found the tasks interesting and to have enjoyed discussing the topics, which suggests that they felt engaged and comfortable during their conversation. Most of them reported to have forgotten about the microphones after a few minutes. As a result, the sample of speech collected with audio-recording should be largely representative of the interlocutors' natural way of speaking in everyday interaction. Participants were also informed about the specific goal of the research at this stage.

3.2.5 Quality, reliability, and comparability of data.

In qualitative and quantitative research quality, reliability, and comparability of data collected are of high importance. As mentioned in the previous section, a pilot phase was performed prior to the recording stage, which ensured the quality and the reliability of the data collection procedure.

The semi-structured format of the recording session also provided consistency and assured the reliability and comparability of data. Each participant was given the same stimulus, the same tasks, so task performance became comparable. Although the tasks were the same and the participants were given the same instructions, they could decide how much to talk about each statement and in what order. There was no obligation to limit their discussion to the topics on their task sheet. This created a more relaxed, non-threatening atmosphere and resulted in some small talk and digression from the main topic, which are intrinsic features of natural conversation.

Once data collection was finished, the data collected had to be analyzed. Data analysis started in the post-recording stage (phase D) and consisted of a multi-step method, which is described in detail in the following sections.

3.3 The Treatment of Data

3.3.1 Procedures.

In order to analyse my data, the following steps had to be taken: filtering, editing, and transcribing audio files (see section 3.3.2). After these preliminary steps, the analysis started with the identification of instances of disagreement (see section 3.3.3) in the transcribed corpus, followed by the determination of the functions of disagreement (see section 3.3.4). The following sections will elaborate on the above-mentioned steps.

3.3.2 Filtering, editing, and transcribing.

In order to decide which recordings are suitable for analysis, each of them was listened to again and the proper ones were selected (step D.1) based on the following set of criteria:

- (1) good audio quality (intelligible speech with minimal or no background noise)

- (2) low degree of discomfort on the part of both speakers (scale values of 1 or 2 out of 6)
- (3) small age difference (maximum of 3 years) between interlocutors

The second criterion serves to ensure the natural, relaxed nature of the data collected, while the third one aims at balancing out the relative power of interlocutors. After utilizing these criteria, the chosen files were edited (step D.2) in a way described below.

Each conversation took between forty to ninety minutes, depending on the talkativeness of interlocutors and the number of details, associations and stories they were ready to provide. Prior to transcription, the audio recordings were edited and only the two task-based dyadic conversations were included in the final form of the data. This step resulted in shorter but more focused and useful data, as the edited recordings contained only task-based discussions without long pauses or other irrelevant talk (instruction, thinking time, etc.). Table 3.3 presents a summary of the recordings. It describes the length of collected aural data (both the original and the edited versions) and the number of transcribed words used for the present study.

Table 3.3
Recordings

Conversational pairs	Degree of Discomfort ¹	Length of Recordings		Number of Words
		Original	Edited	
M01 – F01	2; 1	47:59	17:47	2628
M02 – F02	2; 1	1:06:25	37:25	5217
M03 – F03	1; 1	40:22	11:16	1820
M04 – F04	1; 1	1:29:00	48:59	8003
M05 – F05	1; 2	1:06:07	33:59	5353
M06 – F06	1; 1	59:58	37:47	5184
SUBTOTAL		6:09:51	3:07:13	28,212
M07 – F07	1; 2	58:21	27:45	4724
M08 – F08	1; 1	1:05:03	37:09	5609
M09 – F09	1; 1	1:05:53	33:54	4905
M10 – F10	1; 1	55:46	26:21	3482
M11 – F11	1; 2	1:04:59	35:22	5917
M12 – F12	2; 1	1:10:01	40:17	5110
M13 – F13	2; 1	57:23	29:00	4107
M14 – F14	1; 1	58:51	26:42	3501
M15 – F15	2; 2	45:57	16:22	2633
SUBTOTAL		9:02:14	4:16:30	39,982
TOTAL		15:12:04	7:23:43	68,194

Note.

¹ the first value refers to the male, the second one to the female speaker

It can be seen that the data from the edited recordings amounted to roughly seven and a half hours of speech; more than three hours of speech between interlocutors with strong ties and nearly four and a half hours of speech between strangers. The edited recordings range from approximately 11 to 49 minutes in length.

Next, in order to secure correct and appropriate capturing of the data, the selected and edited recordings were transcribed (step D.3) in three steps outlined below. Transcripts are visual representations of talk and it is the task of researchers to decide what information to include and what to exclude. As O'Connell and Kowal (2008, p. 94) point out, "[s]ince tapescripts are tools for analysis and intelligibility, not cosmetic devices, they should include only what is relevant for a given research project" (cited in Macaluy, 2009, p. 20). An attempt was also made to balance an accurate rendering of the discourses and legibility in order not to overwhelm the reader. Therefore, interruptions, overlaps, laughter, back-channels, emphasis, pauses, intonation, and speech quality were noted, but no effort was made to time pauses or indicate other prosodic features.⁵³ The transcription process of the audio recordings involved the following steps:

- (1) Firstly, a broad transcription was conducted by the researcher, concentrating on content only. In this step the audio files were transcribed verbatim in their entirety.
- (2) Secondly, the lexical transcript was complemented with an auditory transcription, aiming at capturing prosodic (including pauses, stress, sound lengthening), paralinguistic (i.e., features of voice quality such as whispery, laughing, ironic, sarcastic), and discourse features (i.e., interruptions, overlaps, backchannels), non-linguistic noises (including laughter, coughing, yawning), as well as the comments of the researcher for clarity.⁵⁴
- (3) Finally, the correctness of both the above-mentioned steps was checked once more and any necessary revisions were made.

As already mentioned (cf. section 2.7.4, p. 57), intonation and other prosodic features can differentiate meaning and function. Thus, on data quoted and used for

⁵³ For a detailed list of the transcription conventions see Appendix I.

⁵⁴ The classification of these auditory features is based on Roach, et al. (1998).

illustration in this dissertation, intonational patterns⁵⁵ were also marked.⁵⁶ Intonational contour was first signalled on the examples intuitively by the researcher after listening to the given utterances several times. The audio files of substantial quality were also subjected to acoustic analysis using Praat 5.3.23 speech analyser program (cf. Boersma & Weenink, 2012) and a further developed version of Prosogram (v.2.8) (cf. Mertens, 2004) by István Szekrényes⁵⁷ (cf. Szekrényes et al., 2011). The latter is a script within Praat, which serves as a tool of semi-automatic transcription of perceived intonation (Marič, 2011, p. 10). It automatically assigns the tonal labels ‘fall’, ‘stagnant’ or ‘rise’ to the given utterance. The intonational patterns of the examples cited in this dissertation were double-checked with the help of the above-mentioned programs. Prosodic features can signal (upcoming) opposition and also indicate how the given utterance is being meant, and therefore they are indispensable in the analysis and interpretation of disagreements. For this reason, let me take a little detour and briefly introduce the prosodic markers that can signal disagreement.

First of all, it has been argued that intonation is an indicator of disagreement (Brazil, 1997; Stadler, 2006). While in English final rise and fall intonation indicates that the speaker is certain about his/her statement and leaves no room for negotiation, a fall-rise intonation has the opposite effect. As Stadler (2006) observes, both types of intonation are frequent features of disagreements. Intonation also reflects the feelings of the speaker as well as his/her attitude towards what is being said, thus playing an important role in utterance interpretation. In relation to intonation, heightened pitch⁵⁸ is also associated with expressing disagreement. In English as well as in Hong Kong Chinese, high key⁵⁹ is a means of conveying that contrastive information is being communicated, and thus disagreement is taking place (Cheng & Warren, 2005, p. 264). Hong (2003) also found that strong disagreements can be expressed by high pitch and increased loudness. Raised

⁵⁵ Intonation is defined as the linguistic variation of pitch that applies to an utterance as a whole, the resultant tune of which gives the utterance a particular meaning (Ladd, 1996). In a broader and more popular sense, the term *intonation* covers the same field as prosody, including variations in voice quality, tempo, and loudness.

⁵⁶ Intonational patterns were only indicated on the given utterance expressing disagreement.

⁵⁷ I would like to thank István Szekrényes for running the program on my examples.

⁵⁸ Pitch is defined as the relative height of speech sounds as perceived by a listener. It can be “high” or “low” (Gut, 2009, p. 117).

⁵⁹ “Key describes the pitch level of an utterance in relation to the speaker’s normal pitch level” (Gut, 2009, p. 127).

intensity⁶⁰ level has been reported to correlate with competitive speech by other scholars as well (e.g., French & Local, 1986; Goodwin et al., 2002). Another prosodic cue to signal disagreement is rhythm. Studies have shown that “disfluency, breaking the rhythm, a lack of rhythmic integration and a rhythmically delayed second assessment [...] are a sign of an upcoming disagreement” (Stadler, 2006, p. 17). Finally, disagreements are also associated with accelerated tempo⁶¹ and contrastive stress (ibid.). Thus, there are a multitude of different prosodic tools that a speaker has at his/her disposal to mark an utterance as disagreement, the most prominent ones being high pitch, heightened intensity level, accelerated tempo, and contrastive stress. Taking prosody into account in utterance interpretation is of central importance since it can override lexical meaning. In other words, by employing a variety of prosodic markers (including intonation) speakers can indicate that what is being said is not to be understood literally (e.g., in the case of ironic or sarcastic statements) (ibid., p. 57).

Regarding the treatment of data, I also have to note here that in this dissertation only data quoted and used for illustration were translated into English in order to keep the data as accurate as possible. Since Hungarian and English belong to two different language families, they demonstrate some substantial syntactic and morphological differences, and, as can be expected, several Hungarian words and expressions do not have equivalents in English. As a result, these were translated in such a way as to reflect the original Hungarian meaning as closely as possible.

3.3.3 Identifying disagreements.

As defined in section 2.1.3, in this dissertation verbal disagreement is a speech act expressing S’s opinion or belief whose propositional content or illocutionary force is partly or fully inconsistent with that of the previous S’s utterance. This previous speaker, however, should not be taken literally. In the first task of the recording session participants were to share their views on written statements and they often reacted to these with disagreement. In some cases these statements were read out loud by the other interlocutor (Example 7), in others by a speaker who then

⁶⁰ “Intensity is a physical property of sounds, and is dependent on the amount of energy present. Perceptually, there is a fairly close relationship between physical intensity and perceived loudness” (Roach, 2002, p. 38).

⁶¹ i.e., speech rate

expressed disagreement with the statement he/she had just read (Example 8), and in some other cases the statements disagreed with were only referred to (Example 9).

Example 7

M02 A hármas: „Illegálisává kellene tenni az abortuszt.”

The third one: “Abortion should be made illegal.”

→ F02 Ez most *HÜLYESÉG!! @@@ ... ^*Hogy érted hogy /*illegálissá!!
@@@ *Tehát, hogy .../*törvénytelené||.

Now this is NONSENSE! @@@ ... You know, illegal! @@@ That is...
unlawful.

Example 8

→ F08 „Az *új járványok ellen *mindenkinek *feltétlenül *be kellene oltatnia
magát||.” *Nem!! @@@ [/*Én /*nem]||

“Everyone should definitely get themselves vaccinated against new
diseases.” No! @@@ [I don't]

Example 9

→ F12 Hát a /*kilencest én||... evvel *nem tudok egyet érteni||. @@@

Well number nine ... I can't agree with this. @@@

Examples of the above types were considered tokens of disagreement in my analysis. In many instances the utterance expressing disagreement was unfinished, such as in Examples 10 and 11, either because the speaker chose not to continue or was interrupted by the other interlocutor. At times, only a single word was uttered, yet the illocutionary act of disagreement is clear, and therefore these utterances were also analysed as disagreements. These unfinished disagreements will be further investigated in section 4.4.1 (p. 167-168).

Example 10

F02 Akkor örökbe lehet adni vagy akármí.

Then it can be given up for adoption or whatever.

M02 De az is szívtelenség eléggé.

But that's pretty heartless too.

- F02 Örökbe adni? Bolond vagy? Legalább lesz valaki, aki szereti! [De] sokkal jobb
 To give it up for adoption? Are you crazy? At least there'll be somebody to love him/her! [But] it's a lot better
- M02 [V•Jó, de] ||
 [Fine, but]

Example 11

- F03 Jó. ... Kötelező tandíj. ... Szerintem ez teljesen korrekt, nem?
 Good. ... Compulsory tuition fee. ... I think it is totally fair, isn't it?
- M03 /•Há:t|| ...
 We:ll...

As noted by Edstrom (2004, p. 1505), “[e]xpressions of disagreement are not always statements; they can be voiced as questions, exclamations, or even narratives and at times are communicated more by tone of voice than lexical choice.” All of these realizations manifested themselves in my data and will be discussed in the following section. Once again, I have to note that although there were several instances of non-verbal disagreement, such as in Example 12, these are beyond the scope of my analysis.

Example 12

- Talking about compulsory tuition fee in higher education
- M08 Ühüm. Viszont ez valahol ösztönzőleg hat.
 Yeah. This has a somewhat motivating effect, though.
- F08 Jó, az ösztöndíj is. Elég ösztönzés az.
 Fine, so does the bursary. That's enough incentive.
- M08 @@@
 @@@
- F08 De most miért gebedjen bele a gyerek? Nem azért jöttem ide, hogy most kizsigerelem a szüleimet.
 But why should one die from study? I didn't come here to bleed my parents white.

In this example, speaker M08 expresses his disagreement with the previous utterance by laughing. This is followed by another disagreeing utterance by speaker F08, which sheds light on the fact that disagreement can be triggered by non-verbal utterances as well. Although non-verbal ways of expressing disagreement such as the one above are not *per se* within the scope of this research, tone and laughter often contribute to the identification of an utterance as disagreement and help assign functions to it. Therefore, non-verbal cues will be discussed where applicable.

In the analysis of the data, the speech act was used as the basic unit of talk. While identifying tokens of disagreement in the corpus (step D.4) I simultaneously read the transcript and listened to the corresponding recording. In this way I managed to identify disagreements that by reading the transcript alone might have been disregarded. This also supports Edstorm's (2004, p. 1505) claim that in some cases disagreement is expressed more by intonation than lexical items. Using this method, I identified 525 tokens of disagreement in the corpus altogether. The next step was the mapping of the functional spectrum of disagreements, which is described in the following section.

3.3.4 Assigning disagreement functions.

As mentioned in section 2.7, previous frameworks of disagreement types serve as a starting point for my analysis. Namely, the functional categories were created and assigned to the tokens of disagreement (step D.5) using a mixture of Muntigl and Turnbull's (1998), Rees-Miller's (1995, 2000), and Locher's (2004) model with some modifications and additions.⁶² Similarly to Rees-Miller (1995, 2000), the disagreement strategy in my analysis is organized first into three broad categories, labelled as 'softened', 'neutral' (equivalent to Rees-Miller's category of 'not softened or aggravated strategies') and 'strengthened' strategies. As in my analysis the focus is on the functions of disagreement rather than on the linguistic markers, I created subcategories based on the functions and assigned (a) function(s) to each token of disagreement. This involved going through the transcript line by line, listening to the recordings again, and deciding which category the disagreement should be placed into. After manually indexing all tokens of disagreement in the corpus, I examined them thoroughly and I managed to identify the linguistic markers that usually help with the expression of, and co-occur with, the given strategy. The strategies and the

⁶² The functions of disagreement reported in previous research were revised and complemented on the basis of the patterns found in the research corpus.

linguistic markers are illustrated in Table 3.4 and will be defined and further illustrated on the following pages.

Table 3.4
Disagreement strategies and linguistic markers

	Disagreement strategies	Linguistic items
Softened disagreement	1. Partial agreement, token agreement (avoid disagreement)	(Hát) igen/jó/oké, de... / (Well) yes/fine/OK, but... Valamennyire igen, de... / To some extent yes, but...
	2. Explanation (give/ask for reasons, give example)	... mivel/(azért) mert... / ... since/because... Miért...? / Why...?
	3. Joke	none
	4. Ask questions	none
	5. Hedge	Hát..., / Well, -hat, -het / can, could (Hát) szerintem / (Well), I think valamennyire / to some extent lehet, hogy / maybe/perhaps m:, ö: / uhm:, u:h
	6. Impersonalize S to H, point-of-view distancing	Azt mondják... / It is said that Egyesek szerint... / According to some people...
	7. Interject	M:?, Ha!, Á: / U:hm?, Ha!, A:h!
Neutral disagreement	8. Contradictory statement	negation (Ez nem igaz!, Ne!, Nem. / This is not true!, No!, Not...) linking word expressing contrast (De/Viszont..., / But/However,...)
	9. State disagreement	Én ezzel nem értek egyet. / I don't agree with this. Ebben nem értünk egyet. / We don't agree on this.
	10. Clarify S's meaning	Nem erre gondoltam. / I didn't mean that. Nem úgy... / Not that way... Nem arra értem. / I didn't mean it that way. Én nem erről beszélek. / I'm not talking about that.
	11. Verbal shadowing	none
Strengthened disagreement	12. Use irony, sarcasm	emotive language (Ó:, igen! / Yea:h, right., Az igen! / Wow!)
	13. Intensify disagreement	egyáltalán nem / not at all sokkal / much more abszolút / absolutely teljesen / totally akkor is / still mondom / I'm telling you
	14. Ask rhetorical questions	none
	15. Challenge	interjections
	16. Judge	Judgemental vocabulary (hülyeség/marhaság/baromság, butaság / nonsense, rubbish, bullshit, silly, seggfej / asshole)
	17. Show disbelief, play down previous statement	Á: / A:h Ugyan már! / Come on!
	18. Miscellaneous	none

3.3.4.1 Softened disagreement strategies.

Similarly to Rees-Miller's (1995, 2000) taxonomy, the category of softened disagreements includes strategies that are softened with one or more mitigating devices. The illocutionary force of disagreement can be softened by the following strategies: partial or token agreement, giving or asking for examples or reasons, joking, asking questions instead of using statements, hedges,⁶³ point-of-view distancing, and the use of interjections. In softened disagreements, one of these or a combination of some of these strategies are used. The category of softened disagreements corresponds to the Brown and Levinsonian categories of 'on record with redress' and 'off record'. Softened disagreements typically occur in contexts where face considerations of the other take priority over the need to convey disagreement. In what follows, I will provide the definition and illustration of the softened disagreement strategies identified in the research corpus.

Partial agreement occurs when the speaker makes a concession before expressing disagreement in order to soften the force of the utterance. The most common forms of partial agreement are expressed by *Igen/Jó/Oké, de...* (~ *Yes/Fine/OK, but...*) optionally prefaced by the discourse marker *hát* (~ *well*). For example, in the discussion of the order of characters the female interlocutor disagrees with her boyfriend the following way:

Example 13

M03 [Hát a Vőlegény és a Bölcs között vacilál]tam, de a Vőlegény szerintem az, aki aki igazából az egész történetben semmi semmi rosszat nem tett.

[Well I was hesitating between the Wiseman and the Fiancé], but I think the Fiancé is the one who who actually didn't didn't do anything wrong in the whole story.

→ F03 *Jó de a *Bölcs se ||. *Sőt ő ő *jó tanácsot adott neki ||.

Fine, but neither did the Wiseman. Actually, he he gave him good advice.

M03 Nem adott neki SEMMIFÉLE tanácsot. @@@

He gave him NO advice. @@@

⁶³ linguistic devices with the function of softening the force of face threat to the addressee

In this example, F03 begins her utterance with an agreeing *jó* (~ *fine*) before contradicting M03's utterance and elaborating on this contradicting statement. This disagreement strategy is also noted by Sacks (1987) and Pomerantz (1984), especially when agreement is the preferred answer to an utterance (see section 2.5.3, p. 30).

Token agreement is a polite disagreement disguised as an agreement. It occurs when the speaker appears to agree with the previous speaker in order to save the addressee's positive face. It is reportedly one of the most common strategies (Bándli, 2009; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Holtgraves, 1997; Locher, 2004; Rees-Miller, 1995, 2000) and often expressed the same way as partial agreement.⁶⁴

Another softened disagreement strategy identified in my data is *explanation*. This umbrella term refers to an utterance that gives or asks for a reason or example to indicate that the speaker cannot accept the previous speaker's proposition. In Example 14, the female speaker contradicts the previous utterance indirectly, by giving a counter-example:

Example 14

Talking about gender differences in cooking skills

M05 A nők sokkal jobban el tudják találni szerintem az ízeket is.

I think women are much more sensitive to flavours.

- F05 *Hát mondjuk ... /•például a halászlét azt *nálunk általában a *Fater főzi||.
- Well, let's say ... for example fish soup is cooked by my father in my family.

When asking for a reason, the speaker's interrogation is frequently preceded by the contrastive marker *de* (~ *but*) and/or accompanied by a critical or doubtful tone. Although the contrastive marker *de* expresses opposition in itself, these utterances would generally be identified as disagreement either because of the intonation or the divergent propositional content. The following example illustrates this point:

⁶⁴ Since *token agreements* and *partial agreements* are closely-related concepts with only a thin borderline between them, I grouped them under the same category.

Example 15

M12 Én egyetértek ezzel az állítással.


I agree with this statement.

→ F12 \°De MIÉR||?

But WHY?

In the last line the emphatic MIÉR (~ *WHY*) alone clearly conveys the message of disagreement, which is strengthened by the use of *de* (~ *but*). The intonational countour and other prosodic features such as intensity (green line),⁶⁵ fundamental frequency (blue line) and voicing (thick black line) of the utterance are illustrated by Figure 3.2 below. The falling intonation on the question also reinforces disagreement.

Figure 3.2
Graphical output of Prosogram for Example 15



Providing a reason or explanation can also mitigate disagreement, as it is oriented to the hearer's positive face, and is often marked by conjunctions such as *mert* (~ *since, because*) or *mivel* (~ *as*), as illustrated by Example 16 below:

Example 16

F08 „Mindenkinek feltétlenül be kellene oltatnia magát az új járványok ellen.”

“Everybody should definitely get themselves vaccinated against new diseases.”

→ M08 Hát szerintem /°nem|| mivel \°én se \°oltattam be magam||.

Well, I don't think so, since I haven't had myself vaccinated either.

⁶⁵ The pink line marks “the intensity of the band-pass filtered speech signal” (<http://bach.arts.kuleuven.be/pmertens/prosogram/>)

Giving an explanation or listing reasons is noted as a frequently used disagreement strategy in Bándli's (2009) study as well.

Joking is another positive politeness strategy used for softening disagreement. It is included in Brown and Levinson's (1987) and Rees-Miller's (1995, 2000) framework, but other researchers have also investigated the relationship of humour and disagreement in verbal interactions. Habib (2008), for instance, examines how the two speech behaviours intertwine to, among other things, project identity, while Norrick and Spitz (2008) show how humour can be deployed as a conversational resource for mitigating conflict in everyday interaction. Joking can prevent conflict, as it puts the addressee at ease and often generates laughter on the part of the speaker and/or addressee. Consider the following example:

Example 17

F05 MÉR, a férfiak azok meg versenyeznek! A nők nem versenyeznek annyira.

Why? Men race. Women don't race so much.

→ M05 *Figyelj már|| *szerinted egy egy *hatvan éves tata \^*szerinted versenyzik||? Örül hogyha \^*beül a kocsiba||. (nevetve)

Listen, do you think a a 60-year-old fogey races? He is happy if he can get in the car. (laughing)

F05 @@@

In this extract speaker M05 uses humour to buffer the effect of his disagreement and utters his opinion in a non-serious, joking manner accompanied by laughter. This utterance creates a light-hearted atmosphere and results in the laughter of the listener, which indicates that an atmosphere of camaraderie has been established through the use of joking. There is no identifiable linguistic item that generally co-occurs with the strategy of joking, but the analyst can rely on other features such as laughter and tone.

Expressing objection in the form of a *question* rather than a direct statement is a softened disagreement strategy noted by both Rees-Miller (1995, 2000) and Locher (2004). As explained by the latter (2004, p. 133), the indirect strategy of using an interrogative form for implying disagreement can “express relational work and hence face considerations (for S and H) of various degrees *if it lacks the quality of a*

challenge” [emphasis added]. In the following example, the interrogative form is considered to be more polite than simply stating that the Fiancé has nothing to do with it.

Example 18

Talking about the Fiancé

M08 Szóval szerintem ez á ugyanazért adtam rossz pontot neki, mint a Szépleánynak, mert balfasz (nevetve). Szerintem legalább [is].

So I think this ah I gave him a bad score for the same reason as for the Pretty Girl, because he is a screw-up (laughing). At least according to [me].

→ F08 [Hát] de most ő \•mit tehet arról|| ?

[But] what could he do about it?

In Rees-Miller’s (1995) data, the use of interrogative form is the second most common mitigating device. It occurs in two forms: yes/no questions and seemingly information-seeking *Wh*-questions used to express disagreement. The second type, as well as negative questions, is reported to have been used for presenting contradictory evidence or competing alternatives (pp. 100-105). I also consider the use of questions (other than requests for reasons or examples and rhetorical questions) a softened disagreement strategy, however, I categorize negative questions as challenges since they express a higher degree of adversarialness and they question the other interlocutor’s stance. Similarly to joking, there is no identifiable linguistic marker of the strategy of using a question, only the opposing propositional content and sometimes the tone of the question yield some clues.

Hedges can also be used to mitigate disagreement. The classification of mitigating devices proposed by Rees-Miller (1995) outlines the following four groups: personal pronoun *I* followed by a cognitive verb such as *think*, question forms, downtoners (e.g., *sort of, a little, sometimes*), and verbs of uncertainty (e.g., *may, seem*). Locher (2004) reports hedging to be the most common softened disagreement strategy in her data and provides the following exhaustive list of hedges as an extension of Aijmer’s (1986) list: “*actually, anyway, as it were, basically, a bit, certainly, honestly, I mean, I think, in a way, in fact, just, kind of, let me, little, maybe, more or less, of course, perhaps, probably, say, see, so-called,*

somehow, sort of, stuff, suppose, type of, uh, uhm, well, whatever, what you call; or and and in final position” (p. 115).

It is important to note here, however, that although these linguistic items do tend to lessen the impact of opinion and disagreement on the listener, there is no direct correspondence between form and function. Some of these devices (e.g., discourse markers) are multifunctional, so they can fulfill several functions based on the context. Hence, it is crucial to interpret the meaning and function of the given item in its context in each case. To illustrate this point, there are linguistic devices which can act both as a hedge and as a booster, a point also noted by Holmes (1995, p. 78). In Example 19, for instance, *Szerintem...nem* (~ *I don't think*) is a hedge, which implies uncertainty on the part of the speaker and to some extent frees her from the responsibility of the truth value of her utterance, thus reducing the force of the disagreement. *Szerintem* (~ *I think*) is uttered at slower speech rate (0.86 sec) with a rising intonation and without special emphasis (see Figure 3.3).

Example 19

M02 „Az eutanázia bűn.”


“Euthanasia is a sin.”

→ F02 \wedge^* Szerintem ez nem bűn \parallel .

I don't think it's a sin.

Figure 3.3 displays the results of an acoustic analysis of Example 19. The figure consists of four tiers. The top tier represents fluctuation in air pressure, providing an indication of intensity and duration. The second tier displays changes in pitch (expressed in Hertz and marked by a blue line) over time and intensity (expressed in decibel and marked by a yellow line). The patterns of fundamental frequency indicate the intonation contour of the utterance. The third tier represents the actual words that were spoken and the bottom tier displays the pitch movement labels assigned by Prosogram.

Figure 3.3
Acoustic analysis of Example 19



In contrast, *szertem* functions as a booster in Example 20, where it expresses certainty and gives more weight to the utterance. This could be explained by the fact that speaker M05 is a student of law and (compared to his conversational partner) acts with some status as an expert on the topic; thus, he uses *szertem* to signal that he leaves no room for negotiation and to add weight to his proposition. In Hungarian, when used for this function, *szertem* typically occurs utterance and turn-initially and is emphasized by stronger word stress and rapid tempo, just like in the case of Example 20.⁶⁶ *Szertem* is also uttered with a falling intonation in this case, as illustrated by Figure 3.4. It must be noted here that both the meaning of and the emphatic stress on the word *hülyeség* (~ *nonsense*) also contributes significantly to the aggravated nature of the disagreement.

Example 20

F05 „Az eutanázia bűn.”


“Euthanasia is a sin.”

→ M05 *SZERINTEM ez *HÜLYESÉG ||.

I THINK it's NONSENSE.

⁶⁶ It must be noted here that differences in the duration of the word *szertem* (0.69 sec vs. 0.86 sec) may be due to the differences in the rate of speech of the two speakers.

Figure 3.4
Acoustic analysis of Example 20



Hedges and boosters can combine with each other to soften or strengthen the force of the utterance more effectively, a phenomenon observed by other researchers (e.g., Holmes, 1995; Locher, 2004; Rees-Miller, 1995, 2000). For instance, sentence initial *hát* (~well) frequently occurred in my data, which can hedge opinion and act as a delaying device especially when it contains vowel lengthening (*Há:t*), uttered with a rising intonation and/or followed by a pause. However, similarly to *szerintem* (~ I think), it can also function as a booster when uttered at fast rate and with emphatic stress.⁶⁷

In my data, the most common linguistic devices co-occurring with the strategy of *hedge opinion* are (1) the ones that soften the force of the utterance (e.g., *szerintem* ~ I think, *-hat/-het* ~ can/could, *lehet, hogy* ~ maybe, *talán/ esetleg* ~ perhaps, *valamennyire* ~ to some extent) and (2) hesitation markers (e.g., *hát* ~ well, *nem tudom* ~ I don't know, *m* ~ uhm, *ö* ~ uh), and the combination of these.

The last but one softened disagreement category includes the strategies of *impersonalize speaker and hearer* and *point-of view distancing*. These strategies are similar in the sense that they both aim at shifting responsibility, that is, making an utterance appear as coming from a different source. This can be achieved by using passive structures (see Example 21) or general subjects (see Example 22) instead of the first person pronoun *I*. These negative politeness strategies mitigate

⁶⁷ The Hungarian discourse marker *hát* is associated with a wide range of functions such as signalling emphasis, speaker's attitude or emotional state (e.g., surprise or doubt), opposition, refutation, self-correction, politeness, uncertainty, hesitation, urge, etc. In addition to its emphatic and rhetoric uses it also serves as a response marker and has a discourse-organizing function (cf. Schirm, 2008, 2011).

disagreement as well as protecting the face of the speaker. Locher (2004, p. 130) calls this strategy 'shifting responsibility' and argues that its advantage in a conversation is that "the content of what a speaker just said might be debatable, but the person as such is not as exposed to criticism as when he or she had reported the content as his or her own point of view".

Example 21

M05 Szerintem a férfiak SOKKAL intelligensebbek a nőknél.

I think men are MUCH MORE intelligent than women.

- F05 De ő: /•azt mondják|| hogy azér egy nő /•tud több dologra figyelni egyszerre || ... \•jobban használja agyának a ké /•mindkét felét || ...
But u:h it is said that women are able to pay attention to more things at the same time ... they use both of both sides of their brain...

Example 22

F01 Szerintem mindenkinek be kellene oltatnia magát H1N1 ellen.

I think everyone should get themselves vaccinated against H1N1.

M01 \•Egyesek szerint /•csak azt oltsák be aki aki aki /•veszélynek van kitéve || tehát a /•terheseket || az /•időseket || és aki \•veszélyeztetett területen dolgozik ||.

According to some people only those should be vaccinated who who who are at risk, that is, pregnant women, the elderly, and those who work in a risky area.

The last softened disagreement strategy is *interject*, which is conventionally expressed by words or phrases that convey emotion on the part of the speaker (e.g., *Ha!* ~ *Ha!*, *Á:* ~ *A:h*, *M:* ~ *U:hm*) typically placed at the beginning of an utterance. The meaning of these interjections depends on their intonation contour as well as context. Using interjections rather than stating disagreement directly is a safer and more polite way of expressing disagreement. Consider the following example:

Example 23

F03 És nézd meg a világ legjobb ... ö:... legjobb szakácsait, [szinte mind férfi].

And look at the world's best ... u:h ... best chefs, [almost all of them are male].

M03 [Na jól van]

[Ok fine]

F03 És ott van XY milyen jól főz!

And there's XY, what a great cook he is!

→ M03 /^oM:? (szkeptikus)

U:hm? (sceptical)

Here the sceptical indirect answer *m:* (~ *u:hm*)⁶⁸ uttered with a rising intonation is considered to be more polite than simply stating *Nem.* (~ *No, he isn't*).

3.3.4.2 Neutral disagreement strategies.

The second broad category of disagreement strategies I label *neutral* strategies, referring to the fact that no facework is done in order to make the utterances sound more polite or impolite. In Rees-Miller's (1995, 2000) framework this group is referred to as 'neither softened nor strengthened' and sometimes as 'not softened or strengthened' disagreement, while Locher uses the term 'non-mitigating disagreement strategies'. These strategies include straightforward disagreements, where there is no attempt on the part of the speaker either to lessen or strengthen the force of disagreement. Neutral disagreement strategies include the following categories, each of which will be discussed and illustrated below: contradictory statement, stating disagreement, clarifying speaker's meaning, and verbal shadowing.

Contradictory statement occurs when a speaker disagrees by uttering the negated proposition expressed by the previous claim. This can be expressed by the single word utterance *Nem.* (~ *No.*), by repeating the previous utterance in a negated form, as illustrated by the last line of Example 13 (p. 82); or by uttering a direct

⁶⁸ Hums in Hungarian serve a broad range of discourse functions such as signalling agreement, disagreement, surprise, hesitation, doubt, scepticism, urge, etc. depending on their prosodic features and the context of talk. For instance, while affirmative hums are associated with a descending-rising intonation, interrogative hums feature rising intonation (Markó, 2007, p. 30). For a functional analysis of humming in Hungarian see Markó (2005, 2007).

statement such as *Ez nem igaz. (~ This is not true.)*. This type of disagreement corresponds to the category of 'direct disagreement' in Rees-Miller's (1995, 2000) taxonomy. Once again, it must be noted that we cannot always equate one form with a single function. For instance, *no* does not always mean disagreement and neither does *yes* mean agreement in every case. It has been reported, for example, that *no* means *yes* in Indian English (Valentine, 1994). This is exemplified in the following example taken from Valentine (1994, p. 19, original emphasis):

Example 24⁶⁹

- fA Do you think it (wife abuse) is common?
fB In India? In rural families this is common.
→ fC **No, it's common.** Very much common even in literate families.

Here, speaker fC uses the negative *no* before agreeing (*it's common*) with speaker fB and elaborating her agreement.⁷⁰ In a similar vein, Lane (1993) also found that New Zealanders of Polynesian origin (Pacific Islanders) use *yes* and *no* the opposite way as those of European origin, especially in response to questions containing negatives. These cases also call our attention to the importance of examining a token in its context and taking into account all the contextual factors when interpreting an utterance.

Another common means of expressing disagreement is uttering a contradictory statement prefaced by a linking word expressing contrast such as *de* (*~but*) or *viszont* (*~ however*), as in the following exchange about gender differences in intelligence:

Example 25

- M09 Szerintem az biológiai tény, hogy a férfiak és a nők különböző dolgokban jók.
I think it's a biological fact that men and women are good at different things.

⁶⁹ The lower-case *f* before the capital letters indicates the sex of the speaker.

⁷⁰ An alternative interpretation of Example 24 is that speaker fB's utterance implies that wife abuse is common in rural families only and speaker fC expresses her disagreement with this implicature. Then, speaker fC makes her disagreement explicit by the emphatic statement that wife abuse is very common *even* in literate families. I would like to thank Enikő Németh T. for calling my attention to this alternative reading of the situation.

F09 Hát igen, de ha egy fiú hiába ilyen elektronika felé érdeklődik, ha kell, akkor ő ugyanúgy meg tudja tanulni az irodalmat vagy egy nyelvet vagy bármit. De a lány, mint például én is, én nem tudnám megtanulni se a fizikát, se a kémiát.

Well yes, but even when a guy is interested in electronics, if he has to, he can study literature or a foreign language or anything. However, a girl like me, I wouldn't be able to study either physics or chemistry.

→ M09 De ebbe \wedge nem lehetsz biztos szerintem \parallel . / \bullet Tehát \parallel

But you can't be sure of that, I think. So

F09 Hát próbáltam és nem ment. (nevetve)

Well, I tried and it didn't work. (laughing)

In the above example, speaker M09 expresses his disagreement with the contradictory marker *de* (~ *but*) in utterance-initial position followed by a statement whose propositional content expresses disagreement. As mentioned in section 3.3.4.1 (p. 83), contrastive markers, by themselves, express opposition (*ebbe nem lehetsz biztos szerintem* ~ *you can't be sure of that, I think*). In this case *de* (~ *but*) signals contrast, but without its use the utterance would still be recognized as disagreement.

The third subtype of contradictory statement is when the utterance, by itself, “does not bear any markers of disagreement. However, in the context in which it occurs, it contradicts a previous utterance” (Rees-Miller, 1995, p. 116). I would add to this definition that, naturally, this type of disagreement does not necessarily have to contradict the whole of the previous proposition; the contrasting information can refer to only a part of it. In this type of disagreement, contradiction is not stated but implied and so understanding the illocutionary force often involves more mental processing on the part of the listener. Consider the following example:

Example 26

M15 Főzési tudományom a tojásrántottában ki is merül.

My knowledge of cooking ends with scrambled eggs.

F15 De abba teszel jó sok mindent, igaz?

But you put a lot of things in it, right?

→ M15 \°Tojást||.
Eggs.

In the last line of this interchange the disagreement is expressed with a single word (*Tojást. ~ Eggs.*) without any linguistic markers of opposition. It is an indirect way of saying *No, I put only eggs in it*, and is understood by virtue of the Gricean maxim of relevance.⁷¹

Rees-Miller states that short contradictory statements are frequently used in correction, which she defines as “a disagreement based on independently verifiable evidence” (ibid.). These single-word utterances, she argues, are in no way marked as disagreement except in context and she gives the following example taken from a linguistic class (Rees-Miller, 1995, p. 117, original emphasis):

Example 27

Male professor: (...) one thousand, one hundred and eleven [writes 1111 on blackboard]

→ Several students **Fourteen**

Male professor Oh fourteen, I got it wrong (writes 1114)

Rees-Miller claims that *Fourteen* is recognized as a disagreement by the professor and students alike. Similarly, she gives another example in which the professor corrects the pronunciation of a student by repeating the mispronounced word with the right pronunciation. Although correction and disagreement are closely related and the boundary between them is sometimes fuzzy, I regard the above mentioned examples of Rees-Miller as rather clear-cut cases of correction and therefore similar tokens are not considered as types of disagreement in this dissertation.

Another neutral disagreement strategy is what I term *stating disagreement*. Stating disagreement, as it is used here, means an utterance that explicitly states that the speaker disagrees with the previous proposition, as illustrated by Example 28.

⁷¹ Speaker M15's brief but informative utterance also observes the maxims of quantity and manner.

Example 28

F02 “Az új járványok ellen mindenkinek feltétlenül be kellene oltatnia magát.”

“Everyone should definitely get themselves vaccinated against new diseases.”

→ M02 Hm /•nem értek vele egyet \•egyáltalán||.

Uhm I don't agree with this at all.

This type of disagreement always contains the expression *nem ért egyet*, which contains the performatives *agree* or *disagree* in its English translation, thus conveying the message with maximum efficiency. Interestingly enough, this category does not appear in either Rees-Miller's (1995, 2000) or Locher's (2004) schema at all. This might be due to the relative infrequency of the use of this strategy in the context of verbal interactions in English.⁷² However, what is more remarkable is that Bándli (2009) and Mászlainé Nagy (2011) do not make mention of this disagreement strategy in Hungarian either.

Clarifying speaker's meaning is another recently discovered disagreement strategy emerging from the research corpus that does not appear in previous literature. It has the function of clarifying the misunderstood meaning of the speaker's previous utterance, which therefore contradicts or corrects the other interlocutor's previous proposition. This strategy has a constructive effect on conversation, as it helps to avoid communication breakdowns and facilitates the smooth flow of interaction. In the following example taken from a dispute on euthanasia, the female speaker (F04) disagrees with her boyfriend (M04) twice because she wants to explain what she meant.

Example 29

M04 De én azt mondom, hogy ehhez egy nagy adag pesszimista világnézet is kell. Le kell tojni önmagunkat néha ahhoz, hogy ö: ... hogy hogy ilyen

⁷² I investigated the occurrence of the expressions *I don't agree*, *I do not agree* and *I disagree* in the British National Corpus (BNC) Spoken and in the corpus of US TV Talk (with the help of Corpus Concordance English (CCE) program) with a volume of 100 million and 2 million words respectively. My queries resulted in zero hits in CCE for each of the searches, while I found no tokens for the first, a single token for the second, and only 20 tokens for the third expression in BNC Spoken. The contexts of hits were mainly council meetings, teacher's conferences, court hearings and public debate programs.

ilyen esetekben hogy úgymond 'meg akarok halni, mert izé ronda vagyok, meg itt a púp a hátamon'. (*irónikus*)

But I say that for this you need a great deal of pessimistic worldview. Sometimes we need to get over ourselves so that u:h ... that that in such such cases like 'I want to die because I'm ugly and there is a hunch on my back'. (ironical)

→ F04 De \wedge nem úgy Maci|| én \wedge nem erről beszélek||.

But it's not that Honey Bear, I'm not talking about that.

M04 Tudom, ilyen rokkant esetekbe is, hogy ... például...mi miről is akar ...

I know in the cases of disabilities that ... for example... wha what did I want to

→ F04 \wedge Nem erre gondoltam \wedge Macika||! Ö: \wedge mondjuk egy \wedge fél even belül \wedge rákban meghalsz||. (...)

I didn't mean that, Honey Bear. U:h let's say you are going to die of cancer in half a year. (...)

Similarly to the previous strategy, this one is not mentioned in other taxonomies of disagreement strategies either. In the cases of Rees-Miller (1995, 2000) and Locher (2004), this might be explained by the fact that their studies are concerned with how disagreement is (linguistically and non-linguistically) expressed rather than with the functions of particular utterances.

The last neutral disagreement strategy identified in the research corpus is labelled *verbal shadowing* by Rees-Miller (1995, 2000). By this term I mean the act of repeating the previous speaker's words, phrases or entire utterance (sometimes with slight alteration) to question the content of the previous utterance. I take verbal shadowing in a narrower sense than Rees-Miller (1995), whose interpretation allows for significant alterations in single words in the opposing utterance. It is noteworthy that in some cases only the intonation contour is changed to express disagreement and often criticism, as exemplified in the following interchange from the dispute about gender differences in people's sense of direction:

Example 30

M05 Menjünk tovább! „A férfiak intelligensebbek a nőknél.”

Let's move on. "Men are more intelligent than women."

- F05 Hát SZERINTEM ez EGYÁLTALÁN nem igaz. Például most mondják azt is, hogy a férfiaknak jobb a tájékozódó képességük oszt mégis eltévedsz, én meg odatalálok.
Well I DON'T THINK this is true AT ALL. Now for example they also say that men have a better sense of direction but you still get lost while I find my way there.
- M05 Ó: nem igaz! Jó, most néha eltévedek, [igen], de alapból a férfiaknak O:h that's not true! Fine, I do lose my way sometimes, [yes], but men fundamentally have
- F05 [ˈNé:ha||?]
[Someti:mes?]
- M05 jobb a tájékozódó képessége.
a better sense of orientation.
- F05 Csak neked nem az! (nevetve)
Except for you! (laughing)

In this heated debate speaker F05 expresses her disagreement several times, but in the marked line she does this by simply picking up and repeating a single word from the previous utterance (*Né:ha?* ~ *Someti:mes?*) and adding a critical tone to it with the vowel lengthening and falling intonation.

3.3.4.3 Strengthened disagreement strategies.

The third group of disagreement strategies include disagreements that not only lack mitigation, but whose force is strengthened with the aims of making disagreement direct, defending the speaker's point of view more successfully, and sometimes even assaulting the interlocutor. Strengthened disagreement strategies include the following: (1) use irony, sarcasm, (2) intensify disagreement, (3) ask rhetorical questions, (4) challenge, (5) judge, (6) show disbelief, play down previous statement. Brown and Levinson (1987) did not consider the possibility of aggravating an FTA, so they did not include strengthened strategies in their framework. They only list bald-on-record strategies, which are direct ways of expressing an FTA. However, there are significant qualitative differences between bald-on-record strategies and the strengthened disagreement strategies listed above. The latter go beyond Brown and Levinson's bald-on-record strategies, as they have a higher face-threatening force

due to their aggravated nature and because they often cause offense. Strengthened disagreements can occur in contexts where defending one's point of view is more important than protecting the addressee's face, or when the speaker wishes to be rude or hurtful (Culpeper, 1996, 2011). The rest of this section aims at describing and illustrating strengthened disagreement strategies and their linguistic markers, if any.

Use irony, sarcasm is a strengthened disagreement strategy in which the real intent of the speaker is "concealed or contradicted by the literal meaning of words or a situation" (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2006), but is indicated by tone of voice (see Example 2, p. 14). Irony in early politeness theories (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987; Grice, 1975; Leech, 1983) was considered as an indirect face-saving tool; however, since then it has been suggested that irony can also be used to attack face. As already mentioned in section 2.3.2 (Impoliteness theories), the use of irony is an impoliteness strategy called 'mock politeness' in Culpeper's (1996, 2005, 2011; Culpeper et al., 2003) framework, whose primary aim is to cause social disharmony. In contrast, 'mock impoliteness' is employed with the goal to establish and maintain intimacy. Accordingly, irony is not always used antisocially and has different purposes regarding politeness or impoliteness. Its interpretation depends on various factors, such as the social distance and power relations between the interactants. Generally, it can be said that irony tends to serve as a device reinforcing solidarity among equals, typically friends, while it usually is a means of attacking face among unequals such as strangers or in situations of one-upmanship (Bousfield, 2008; Culpeper, 2011). Thus, irony is a highly complex phenomenon which can hardly be defined exhaustively.⁷³ Its central element is a discrepancy between intended meaning and actual wording as well as the expression of (mostly negative) emotion or attitude (Nauke & Braun, 2011, p. 1450). In my analysis I follow Komlósi's (2012, p. 9) definition of irony, according to which with ironic utterances the speaker intends to raise the hearer's metapragmatic awareness and draws attention to the deflection and difference between what has been said and at least one suggested meaning, while maintaining the ambiguity of the pragmatic meaning.

The terms *irony* and *sarcasm* are closely-related; they are frequently used interchangeably and they sometimes even overlap (e.g., sarcastic irony) (Toplak & Katz, 2000). They are often confused with each other since both are indirect forms of speech. Delienating the difference between sarcasm and irony would require a

⁷³ For a comprehensive overview of approaches to irony and other related phenomena (e.g., sarcasm, cynicism, mocking) see, for example, Komlósi (2007, 2010, 2012, in press) or Svindt (2007, 2008).

separate dissertation, but here it will be sufficient to say, that sarcasm is understood as a special type of irony with the intent to severely criticise something or someone (Gibbs, 2000). Irony is hidden mockery, while sarcasm is an open one. It is hard to differentiate irony and sarcasm even on the basis of prosodic features, since they both share the common characteristics of a sudden rise (or peaking) – fall intonation, faster rate of speaking, prolonged syllables, and intensified stress on syllables (Fónagy, 1971; Fónagy & Magdics, 1967).

Irony and sarcasm are frequently expressed or accompanied by emotive language such as *Ó*: (~ *O:h*) or *Ó: igen* (~ *Yea:h, right.*), as illustrated in the following two examples:

Example 31

- F05 @@@ Hát jó, de a Révésznek akkor sem kellett volna
 @@@ Well fine, but still the Ferryman shouldn't have
 M05 De lehet, hogy a Révész és a Haramiák haverok voltak.
 But maybe the Ferryman and the Thieves were friends.
 → F05 $\wedge^{\circ}\acute{O}$: igen||!
 Yea:h, right.

In this extract about the order of the Ferryman and the Thieves, speaker M05's non-serious proposal of the two characters being friends is rejected by speaker F05's ironic utterance (*Ó: igen!* ~ *Yea:h, right.*).

Example 32

- F11 Az / \circ utolsó||? „A \wedge° férfiak jobban főznek|| \backslash° mint a nők||.” \backslash° Ha-[ha]
 ||(gúnyos)
 The last one? “Men can cook better than women.” Ha-[ha] (mocking)
 M11 [Hallgat]lak, hallgatlak.
 [I'm liste]ning, I'm listening.

Similarly to the previous example, in this one the statement read out by speaker F11 is rebuffed by uttering *ha-ha* in a mocking tone.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Similarly to sarcasm, mockery shares the prosodic features of irony, thus it is hard to distinguish the two based on intonation alone. Svindt (2008, p. 3) notes that mockery more frequently maximize the opportunities provided by intonation than irony does.

Intensify disagreement is another strengthened disagreement strategy, one which makes use of certain words or expressions (e.g., *egyáltalán* ~ *at all*, *abszolút* ~ *absolutely*, *teljesen* ~ *totally*, *sokkal* ~ *much more*, *mondom* ~ *I'm telling you*, etc.) to emphasize and strengthen the effect of disagreement, a strategy also identified by Rees-Miller (1995, 2000). I refer to these linguistic items as *intensifiers* as they increase the degree of intensity of disagreement. As illustrated in section 3.3.4.1, expressions such as *szerintem* (~ *I think*), *csak* (~ *just*), *hát* (~ *well*) also belong here when they are used as boosters, since they intensify or emphasize the force of the utterance and express certainty on the part of the speaker. Intensified disagreements are frequently accompanied by paralinguistic features such as volume amplification of the intensifier and quick tempo applied to the opening phrase (e.g., *hát* ~ *well*, *szerintem* ~ *I think*). In some instances, intensifiers are used in clusters. The second line (*Hát SZERINTEM ez EGYÁLTALÁN nem igaz.* ~ *Well I DON'T THINK this is true AT ALL.*) of Example 30 (pp. 96-97) is a case in point. In this utterance three tokens of intensifiers (*hát* ~ *well*, *szerintem nem* ~ *I don't think*, *egyáltalán* ~ *at all*) are adopted with emphatic stress on two of them to reinforce the speaker's oppositional intent and make her disagreement prominent.

Another form of strengthened disagreement is the use of a *rhetorical question*, a question asked not to evoke an actual reply but to imply that there is no answer to the question or that the answer is too obvious. In some cases it is used for the sake of persuasive effect and the speaker provides an answer. "What makes a rhetorical question an aggravated form of disagreement is that its basic purpose is to score points against an opponent, not to further understanding or build consensus" (Rees-Miller, 1995, pp. 137-138). Let us consider Example 10 (pp. 78-79) again, taken from a discussion about abortion and adoption. In the interchange two rhetorical questions are used one after the other with a falling intonation, followed by an explanation (*Örökbe adni? Bolond vagy? Legalább lesz valaki, aki szereti.* ~ *To give it up for adoption? Are you crazy? At least there'll be somebody to love him/her.*). The adoption of rhetorical questions is intended to send the other interlocutor the unmistakable signal that his previous statement about giving up a baby for adoption is heartless is unequivocally rejected. Hence, the deployment of this strategy clearly displays overt disagreement.

Challenge is a disagreement strategy which displays strong disagreement with the prior proposition and typically has the syntactic forms of either imperative or

interrogative (both rhetorical and response-seeking questions). Rather than making a specific claim, this type of disagreement questions the addressee's stance and implies that (s)he cannot provide evidence for his/her claim. This strategy is often accompanied by phonetic stress, rapid tempo and ironic or sarcastic tone, all of which highlight the speaker's oppositional stance. The following example, taken from a dispute on gender differences in driving skills, illustrates how hostile challenges can be:

Example 33

- M05 „A nők biztonságosabban vezetnek, mint a férfiak.” Az igen!
(szarkasztikus)
“Women drive more safely than men do.” Wow! (sarcastic)
- F05 *Miért|| ? Szerinted ^*nem igaz || ? (irónikus)
Why? Don't you think it's true? (ironical)
- M05 Nem igaz! ... A nők nem tudnak odafigyelni a vezetésre!
It's not true! ... Women can't focus on driving!
- F05 *HA || ...! És /•elmondanád hogy *MIÉRT || ?
HA...! And could you tell me WHY?

As this scene opens, speaker M05's interjection *Az igen!* (~*wow*) uttered in a sarcastic way clearly indicates his reluctance to accept the statement and creates an antagonistic atmosphere. It evokes his girlfriend's first challenging response implying strong disapproval (*Miért? Szerinted nem igaz? ~ Why? Don't you think it's true?*). Then, he makes a blunt contradictory statement (*Nem igaz!* ~ *It's not true!*) followed by a categorical proposition (*A nők nem tudnak odafigyelni a vezetésre!* ~ *Women can't concentrate on driving!*), which generates an even more hostile atmosphere and elicits an antagonistic challenge (*És elmondanád, hogy MIÉRT?* ~ *And could you tell me WHY?*) preceded by an interjection (*HA!*) expressing resentment. The challenge in the last line of the conversation questions the stance of the other and implies that he cannot back up his claim, thus, directly attacks his competence. Hence it can be stated that challenges direct a high degree of aggravation to the other's rationality, which also explains why this disagreement strategy is claimed to be the second most face aggravating disagreement type in Muntigl and Turnbull's (1998) categorization.

Judging is a strengthened disagreement strategy in which the speaker expresses a negative evaluation of the previous proposition, often to the point of condemnation.⁷⁵ In this strategy, interlocutors often use offensive language ('judgmental vocabulary' in Rees-Miller) such as *hülyeség* (~ *rubbish*), *marhaság* (~*bullshit*), *seggfej* (~ *asshole*), etc. to show their strong disagreement. The aggravating adjectives are frequently utilized with word stress and/or falling or rise-fall intonation to exert an emphatic effect on disagreement. Consider the following example on higher education tuition fee:

Example 34

F06 „A felsőoktatási intézményekben be kellene vezetni a kötelező tandíjat, de költségét a hallgató tanulmányi átlagától kellene függővé tenni.”
Szerintem ez teljesen korrekt és helyénvaló.

“Compulsory tuition fees should be introduced in higher education, but the amount for a semester should depend on the student’s grades”. I think this is absolutely fair and right.

→ M06 De hát ez **BAROMSÁG** ||.

But that’s RUBBISH.

In the above interchange speaker F06 expresses her agreement with the statement she has just read out. The other interlocutor’s response in the subsequent turn clearly conveys the message that he strongly disagrees with both the proposal and the previous speaker and directly confronts her. The use of prefatory *de* (~*but*), the word choice of *baromság* (~ *rubbish*) and the emphatic stress and rise-fall intonation on the latter all magnify the opposition and make the disagreement explicit. For another example of judging see speaker F02’s reaction to the proposition about abortion in the preceding turn in Example 7 (p. 78).

The last strengthened disagreement strategy identified in the corpus is *show disbelief*, *play down previous statement*, a strategy in which the speaker expresses that (s)he does not believe or doubts the previous proposition and therefore cannot accept it.⁷⁶ Disbelief is often accompanied and/or expressed by interjections expressing scepticism (e.g., *Á: ~ A:h*) and emotive phrases such as *kizárt* (~ *no way*)

⁷⁵ Bándli (2009) also identifies this disagreement strategy and calls it ‘Judgement/Qualification’.

⁷⁶ Bándli’s (2009) categorization of disagreement strategies also includes a category called ‘doubts/uncertainties’, however, it accounts for utterances that express uncertainty and attempt to make the other speaker unsure of his/her stance.

or *Az ki van zárva* (~ *That's out of the question*), as exemplified in the following extract, which is the continuation of Example 18 (p. 86).

Example 35

Discussion about the Fiancé

F08 [De] hát most ő mit tehet arról? {hogy balfasz}
 [But] what could he do about it? {that he is a screw-up}


M08 M: olvasni kellett volna a sorok között.

U:hm he should have read between the lines.

→ F08 Jaj *UGYAN [*MÁ:R || !]
 Oh, COME [O:N!]

Here, the functions of the last utterance are clearly to make the previous statement appear absurd and to urge speaker M08 to abandon his supposedly foolish proposition. The imperative force of the idiom *ugyan már* (~ *come on*), the use of interjection *jaj* (~ *oh*), and the emphasis on the last two words with the prolonged vowel articulation and the falling intonation contour on the phrase (illustrated by Figure 3.5) highlight the speaker's rejection of the previous statement and overtly express her opposing stance. Similarly to challenges, this strategy often questions the other interlocutor's rationality, thus aggravating his/her face.

Figure 3.5
 Graphical output of Prosogram for Example 35



3.3.4.4 Miscellaneous.

In the course of manually indexing each token of disagreement in the corpus, I encountered three similar instances of disagreement that did not fit into any of the

seventeen functional categories. For these few tokens, I created a category named *Miscellaneous*. Consider the following example taken from a discussion about the order of two characters:

Example 36

F03 [...] Nekem ő {a Szépfíú} volt a legellen[szenvesebb].
[...] For me he {the Pretty Boy} was the most dis[tasteful].

M03 [Nekem pedig] a Szépleány. Azért mert mert szerintem ő volt a leggonoszabb azért, mert mert [megcsalta a ... megcsalta a vőlegényét.]...

[For me it was] the Pretty Girl. Because because I think she was the meanest because because [she cheated cheated on her fiancé.] ...

→ F03 [^Látszik látszik hogy ^ellenkezően gondolkodunk || .] És a ^Szépfíú || ?
^Hogy mondhat olyat neki || ? ^Mindent megtesz érte || és ^akkor azt mondja másnap hogy ^'bocs'.

[It's clear it's clear that we are thinking differently.] And the Pretty Boy?
How could he say something like that to her? She does everything for him and then the next day he says 'sorry'.

In the above dispute speaker F03 dislikes the Pretty Boy the most and refutes the proposal that the Pretty Girl is the most distasteful character in the story. First, she makes a metastatement that she and the other interlocutor are on a different opinion (*Látszik, látszik hogy ellenkezően gondolkodunk. ~ It's clear it's clear that we are thinking differently*) followed by two rhetorical questions (*És a Szépfíú? Hogy mondhat olyat neki? ~ And the Pretty Boy? How could he say something like that to her?*) aimed at proving that she is right. The falling intonation instead of a rise-fall pattern at the end of the two questions and the statement following them provide us with the rhetorical interpretation of the questions. Using a metastatement which implies that the participants disagree is a strategy that does not fit readily into any of the identified disagreement strategies.

3.3.4.5 Summary.

Section 3.3.4 has described the methodological framework used for identifying patterned disagreement strategies deployed by Hungarian undergraduate

students. Previous taxonomies of disagreement (Locher, 2004; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Rees-Miller, 1995, 2000) have been taken as points of departure for my classification of disagreement strategies. Several other categories (e.g., *stating disagreement*, *clarify speaker's meaning*), in addition to those identified by the above-mentioned researchers, were uncovered during the manual indexing process of tokens of disagreement. These new categories make a significant contribution to the research on disagreements, as they have not been identified in previous literature.

In addition to describing and widely illustrating the recurrent disagreement strategies identified in the corpus, section 3.3.4 has also examined how disagreement is expressed and what linguistic items typically co-occur with each strategy. I have also pointed out at times how prosody can contribute to the expression of disagreement. However, given the limited scope of this dissertation, as well as the insufficient audio quality of some of the recordings which prevents acoustic analysis, this issue has only been touched upon, and thus warrants further investigation.

3.3.5 Pilot study for verification.

This section will cover two further phases of the research, namely the pre-pilot (phase E) and the pilot stage (phase F), first discussing the rationale behind conducting the pilot study (3.3.5.1), then describing each step of the two phases (3.3.5.2), followed by the discussion of the results (3.3.5.3). Finally, the section will conclude with a brief summary (3.3.5.4).

3.3.5.1 Rationale for pilot study.

In the course of indexing the tokens of disagreement, while applying both the categorizing system set up in section 3.3.4, and using my intuitions as a native speaker, I encountered some difficulties. For instance, I observed that the vast majority of disagreements are multifunctional, so I could often easily assign two and sometimes even three functions to a single token. This might be partly explained by the realization that there is a degree of overlap between the categories of my framework and that boundaries are sometimes fuzzy. To illustrate this point, let us consider Example 28 one more time, repeated here for convenience:

Example 28

F02 „Az új járványok ellen mindenkinek feltétlenül be kellene oltatnia magát.”

“Everyone should definitely get themselves vaccinated against new diseases.”

→ M02 Hm /•nem értek vele egyet \•egyáltalán||.

Uhm I don't agree with this at all.

In section 3.3.4.2 (p. 95), the function of speaker M02's response to the previous proposal was categorized as *stating disagreement*; however, *egyáltalán* (~ *at all*) magnifies the opposition, so it deploys the *intensify disagreement* strategy as well. Along similar lines, apart from the softened disagreement strategy of *interject*, the disagreement (*M:?* ~ *U:hm?*) expressed in Example 23 (p. 91), also makes use of the strengthened strategy of *showing disbelief, playing down previous statement*. In a similar vein, besides the discussed function, the disagreements uttered in Examples 17⁷⁷ (*Figyelj már, szerinted egy egy hatvan éves tata szerinted versenyzik? Örül, hogyha beül a kocsiba. ~ Listen, do you think a 60-year-old fogey races? He is happy if he can get in the car.*) and 30⁷⁸ (*Né:ha? ~ So:metimes?*) can equally be interpreted as examples of *irony/sarcasm*. Furthermore, Example 21⁷⁹ illustrates a clear-cut case of *impersonalization* (*De ő: azt mondják, hogy azért egy nő tud több dologra figyelni egyszerre...jobban használja agyának a ké mindkét felét... ~ But u:h it is said that women are able to pay attention to more things at the same time...they use both sides of their brain...*), yet this opposing utterance can also be understood as a counter-example of men's mental superiority over women.

As a result of all of the above considerations, the need arose to verify both the categories of my framework and my interpretation of the tokens of disagreement. Therefore, as a following step of my research process, I conducted a pilot study in three groups as described in the next section.

⁷⁷ cf. p. 85

⁷⁸ cf. pp. 96-97

⁷⁹ cf. p. 90

3.3.5.2 Pilot study.

In the pre-pilot stage (phase E) my aim was to find a way to test my categorization of disagreements, which would help me ground both my framework⁸⁰ and linguistic intuitions on a more explicit basis, and ultimately produce an analysis that is verifiable. It was difficult to find a single task design to meet the aims of the pilot study; therefore, I decided to carry it out in three different groups with different tasks.

First, I compiled a selection of disagreements to be tested from the corpus. I chose two examples per disagreement strategy (except for *contradictory statement* where I picked three tokens) including clear-cut and more difficult cases as well, which resulted in a selection of 35 extracts (see Appendix J). Next, I edited the corresponding audio files (step E.2) so that the informants of my pilot study could both read and listen to the extracts they were to analyze.

The pilot study was carried out in three different groups (step F.1) with ten informants in each one. The informants ($n=30$; 15 male, 15 female) were first and second year BA students at the University of Debrecen majoring in English, aged 18-22. First, the most important transcription conventions were explained to the respondents and their attention was drawn to the fact that they would need to focus on the function(s) of the disagreements marked in italics on their task sheet. They were also told that one token of disagreement might have more than one function. Then, the task sheets and answer sheets were distributed and each extract was played to the informants twice with a short pause. Once they had listened to the given conversation for the second time, they were given some time to read the transcript again if they wished to, and to do their assigned task. Naturally, before playing the audio files to the informants they were familiarised with the context of each extract.

As already mentioned, each of the three groups had to perform different tasks. Group A was given the most difficult one, that is, to identify the function of disagreement in each example and then organize the functions into three groups of their choice. Group B was assigned the task of assigning each token of disagreement to one of three groups ('softened', 'neutral', 'strengthened' disagreement) based on the degree of facework carried out in the disagreement, while Group C was instructed to assign the instances of disagreement to the strategies listed on their answer


⁸⁰ based on the functions of disagreement identified in previous literature

sheets. Naturally, each category was briefly explained to the last group and a number of examples were provided where necessary. Once all the audio files were played to the informants, they were given some time to check their answers. On the answer sheet for each group space was provided for comments and informants were encouraged to include their remarks, observations, etc. on the given token of disagreement. Informants were also asked to mark the degree of certainty of their answer in each case on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from *uncertain* (value 1) to *absolutely sure* (value 4). The findings of the pilot study and the resulting changes that had to be made in the coding scheme are discussed in the following section.

3.3.5.3 Pilot results.

The aim of the pilot study in Group A was to explore what functional categories laypeople assign to the tokens of disagreement and whether they identify any new categories or not. Identifying the functions of disagreement proved to be a very difficult task and the informants assigned only a limited number of categories to the individual tokens of disagreement. In more than half of the cases they marked the two lowest values on the certainty scale (illustrated by the red line in Figure 3.6), which also indicates that the task was a challenge for them and they were uncertain of how to interpret the examples. The blue line shows the number of informants whose categorization corresponded to mine.

Figure 3.6
Results of Pilot Group A



The label *contradiction* was used for most of the examples, and the other functions identified included *evaluation* or *labelling*, *sarcasm*, *humour*, *joke*,

repetition, emphasized disagreement, doubt, and hostile disagreement (the last one referring to challenges). As can be seen from Figure 3.6 above, these functions were the most frequently recognized ones with the highest certainty level. The disagreement expressed in item 16 (see Example 37) was interpreted as a contradiction by every participant except one, and its mean certainty score is 3.3 out of 4, which means that the interlocutors identified its function with a high level of confidence. This is not surprising, as this token of disagreement is a clear-cut case of a contradictory statement.

Example 37

F03 Fú:, a harmadik a tanterv kialakításába. Ú: abba én beleszólnék.

Pf: the third one is curriculum development. U:h I would like to have a say in that.

→ M03 *Én *nem ||.

I wouldn't.

Over 50% of the participants recognized the function of disagreement in the following examples, presented in decreasing order of accuracy: item 16 (*contradictory statement*) with 90% accuracy, items 4 (*irony*) and 22 (*contradictory statement*) with 80% accuracy, and items 6 (*disbelief*), 17 (*contradictory statement*), 19 (*joke*), 34 (*judging*) with 60% accuracy. The function of disagreement assigned to excerpts 21 and 35 did not match my category of *impersonalize S to H* in any of the cases, which might indicate that laypeople are unaware of this strategy.⁸¹ These tokens of disagreement were most frequently interpreted as simple contradictions.

Associations between confidence level of the informants and the in/correctness of their answers were assessed by Spearman's rank correlation coefficient.⁸² The results show a strong positive correlation between the two variables with $r_s = .761$ ($p < .05$, two-tailed).

The other task of Group A was to organize the examples into three groups of their choice. One of the participants organized the tokens of disagreement into the

⁸¹ This confirms the underlying notion of metapragmatic awareness that not everything which happens in linguistic behaviour occupies the same place in consciousness (cf. Verschueren, 1999, 2000). Obviously, as a scholar of linguistics, I possess a higher level of metapragmatic awareness than (most of) my informants do.


⁸² Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (also Spearman's rho) is a non-parametric inferential statistical test that measures the statistical dependence between two variables.

groups of 'polite disagreement' and 'rude disagreement', six of them used the labels of 'polite', 'normal' or 'neutral', and 'impolite' disagreement, and four participants identified the three broad categories as 'weak', 'normal', 'strong' disagreement. As it turned out from their grouping, these labels all categorize disagreements in terms of the polite/impolite continuum.

Group B had a similar task to Group A, but they were given the categories 'softened', 'neutral' and 'strengthened' disagreements to which they were instructed to assign the tokens of disagreement. The categorization of Group A and B corresponds to mine with two exceptions: the majority of participants ($n=16$, 80%) judged the tokens of disagreement using the strategies of *interject* and *verbal shadowing* to be impolite. The discussion of how this influenced my taxonomy is given in section 3.3.6.1 (p. 113-116). Similarly to Group A, the association between the confidence level of informants and the number of correct answers proved to be statistically significant with $r_s = .649$ ($p < .05$, two-tailed).

As mentioned earlier, prior to the pilot study the members of Group C were familiarized with my categories, each of which was shortly explained and illustrated. They were also invited to make comments on the extracts if they wished to or when they disagreed with something. In general, it can be observed that in comparison to the other two groups, Group C achieved better results and they provided their answers with a higher degree of certainty, as seen in Figure 3.7 below.

Figure 3.7
Results of Pilot Group C



In items 4 (*irony*), 16 (*contradictory statement*), 22 (*contradictory statement*), and 28 (*judging*), the function of disagreement was identified correctly by each

participant. The most easily identified strategies matched those of Group A, while the most difficult ones proved to be the disagreements expressed via interrogatives (e.g., extracts 3, 8, 15, 26, 27, 32). Informants were the least certain (scale value of 1.5) about the function of item 18 seen below, although their interpretation corresponded to mine in half of the cases:

Example 38

F05 Akkor is a nők sokkal intelligensebbek!

Still, women are much more intelligent!

M05 Nem igaz! @@@

It's not true!

F05 De igen! ... Vagy tényleg akkor max. egyen, de hát most

It is! ... Or maximum they are equal then, but now

M05 Jól van!

Fine!

F05 hogyha azt nézzük, hogy a női agy hogy működik, akkor sokkal normálisabban, meg jobban működik, mint a férfi agy. (nevetve)

If we think about how the female brain works then it works in a lot more normal and better way than the male brain does. (laughing)

M05 Jól van, kiegyezhetünk az egyenbe.

Ok, we can agree that they are equal.

→ F05 *Esetleg||.

Maybe.

50% of participants assigned the functions of *token agreement* and *hedge* to this disagreement. Two participants placed the utterance *maybe* into the category of *contradictory statement*, two opted out and another one did not consider it as a disagreement. This item had the lowest certainty scale value, and so it will be further investigated in the subsequent sections.

The lowest score was achieved on item 20, which is a dialogue on abortion:

Example 39

M05 És mi van ha félnének a gyerekvállalástól?

And what if they were scared of having a baby?

- F05 Hát jó, de hát most aki nem akar, az védekezik, nem? Jó esetbe.
Well fine, but now those who don't want it {to have a baby} they use protection, don't they? In an ideal case.
- M05 Jó.
Fine.
- F05 És ez a lényeg!
And that's the point!
- M05 De \forall •történhetnek is balesetek||!
But accidents could still happen!

In my analysis the last utterance of speaker M05 is interpreted as a hedged disagreement because of the use of *-het* (*~ could*), but only the answers of three participants corresponded to my categorization. The others assigned the functions of either *explanation* (50%) or *contradiction* (20%) to this instance of disagreement.

Similarly to pilot Groups A and B, the Sperarmen's rho was used to determine the strength and direction of the relationship between confidence scores and the number of correct answers. Based on the measured coefficient ($r_s = .768$) there is a strong positive correlation between the two variables, which is highly significant ($p < .001$).

It is noteworthy that although subjects had the opportunity to reject any italicized tokens as disagreement, only one of them did so in the case of Example 38, as noted above. Based on the results of the three pilot groups the following observations can be made:

- (1) In more than half of the cases, participants assigned at least two functions to a single token of disagreement.
- (2) The results of the function identification task show a decreasing tendency towards the last few items indicating the student's decreased concentration and suggesting that a higher accuracy of answers might be achieved with fewer items.
- (3) A direct correlation can be observed between the number of guidelines provided to informants and the results achieved by them.

3.3.5.4 Summary.

In the previous sections I explained the reasons behind conducting a pilot study (3.3.5.1), the process of which was described on a step-by-step basis. First, the pre-pilot tasks were demonstrated (3.3.5.2) including the task design and the criteria used for compiling extracts containing disagreements. Next, the different tasks assigned to the three pilot groups were introduced (ibid.) followed by a section discussing the obtained results (3.3.5.3). In general, it can be said that the results of the pilot study reinforced the majority of the functional categories identified in my taxonomy, however, they revealed some significant differences as well. For instance, the vast majority of Group A did not consider *interject* a softened disagreement strategy, neither did they interpret *verbal shadowing* as a neutral strategy. These functions were perceived as being impolite, and thus categorized as strengthened disagreements. Among other things, these findings were considered carefully and modifications to the original model were made accordingly before carrying out another study for further verification, as described in the subsequent sections.

3.3.6 Research for validation.

As stated in section 3.3.5.2 (Pilot study), the categorizing system used for indexing disagreement strategies needed to be substantiated before analyses could be produced. The pilot study described in the foregoing sections served as a springboard for designing the research method of a study aimed at validating my coding system of disagreement strategies. Section 3.3.6.1 discusses the ways in which the pilot study helped improve the research design, followed by the presentation and interpretation of the findings in section 3.3.6.2.

3.3.6.1 Research design.

It is clear that once a researcher wants to validate his/her work, it has to be done with as many informants as possible. Although the results obtained from the 30 participants of the pilot study were valuable, the verification stage (phase G) had to be conducted with more subjects. It was also important to undertake the research with participants of a similar background to that of the subjects in the data collection phase. Therefore, as the next stage of my research (Verification stage, phase G), I

analysed data gained from 100 Hungarian university students⁸³ aged between 18 and 24, equally divided by gender.

Based on the observations made in the pilot stage, some minor changes needed to be done in the research design (step G.1). For instance, some functional categories had to be renamed because the original label was either too narrow or difficult to understand. Thus, *joke* was changed to *humour*, as the latter is a broader term incorporating the first one. In a similar vein, instead of *judge* the terms *label/evaluate* were used. Another alteration made to the name of categories was the substitution of *verbal shadowing* for *repetition* for ease of understanding. Finally, the umbrella term *explanation* incorporated the strategy of *ask questions* as well.

The observations made during the pilot study called for two further modifications to the original model and research design: the number of extracts had to be decreased to a maximum of 25 and the number of categories needed to be limited in number as well.⁸⁴ As far as the latter adjustment is concerned, some functional categories had to be merged, while others omitted. I started to narrow down the number of categories by eliminating the strategy *impersonalize S to H*, *point-of-view distancing* on the basis of its low frequency of occurrence (two tokens) in the corpus. The category of *rhetorical question* was also omitted for the same reason. There was also a need for creating broader categories by merging some loosely related functions. Thus, I drew up the category *echo*⁸⁵ including *irony and sarcasm*, *interjection* and *repetition*. Similarly, the strategies of *challenge*, *label/evaluate* and *doubt/disbelief* were placed under the umbrella term *meta-communication*. As can be observed, some category names were added to another label for ease of understanding (e.g., *emphasize* added to *intensify disagreement*). As a result of the above-mentioned steps, I managed to reduce the number of functional categories from 18 to 11 (including the category *other*). The resulting categorization system showing the abbreviations of the categories used for indexing and a short description of the functions is presented in Table 3.5 (p. 115).

⁸³ majoring in English (some of them Linguistics track students) or in Communication

⁸⁴ These changes ensured that solving the task did not require more than half an hour and (at least) one example of each category could still be provided on the task sheets.

⁸⁵ *Echo* is a relevance-theoretic term here and it includes the listed strategies since they achieve their relevance “by expressing the speaker’s attitude to the views she tacitly attributes to someone else” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 621).

Table 3.5
Categories for indexing in verification stage

Disagreement type	Abbreviation	Category
Softened	P/TA	Partial agreement, token agreement
	EXPL	Explanation (reason, example, question for clarification/reason)
	HUM	Humour
	HED	Hedge
Neutral	CST	Contradictory statement
	STD	Stating disagreement
	CS'M	Clarification of speaker's meaning
Strengthened	ECHO	Echo (irony, sarcasm, interjection, repetition)
	ID	Emphasize/Intensify disagreement
	META	Meta-communication (challenge, doubt/disbelief, label/evaluate,)
	ELSE	Other

As can be seen from Table 3.5, the categories of *repetition* (originally termed *verbal shadowing*) and *interjection* are regarded as strengthened disagreement strategies in this new version of the categorization system. After considering the results of the pilot study, the reclassification of the above mentioned strategies seemed to be justified. Since repeating a word or a phrase of the previous turn (or even the whole utterance) and using it as a way of undermining the other's position is highly face-threatening, it is a strengthened disagreement strategy. This face-aggravating nature of the utterances of this type is generally reinforced by emphasis and intonation. Similarly, Kotthoff regards repetition as a means of sharpening dissent and in her study repetition is the central tool of 'opposition formats' that "always connect locally to the preceding contribution, whose central point is turned into the extreme opposite from what the first speaker meant" (1993, p. 202). In a similar vein, interjections used for expressing disagreement frequently reflect strong negative emotions and challenge the position of the other speaker. Thus, they emphasize disagreement and belong to the category of strengthened disagreement strategies.

Narrowing down the number of extracts on the task sheet also presented a challenge. On the basis of the results of the pilot study and the feedback provided by

the participants,⁸⁶ I decided to reduce the number of excerpts to 22. The time needed for categorizing 22 tokens of disagreement appeared to be within the attention span of participants. At the same time, this number allowed me to include at least one example of each function. The task sheet (see Appendix K) used in the research (stage G.3) of the verification stage starts with a short introduction to the transcription conventions, then lists the extracts including two new ones (items 14 and 22) in comparison to the previous task sheet used in the pilot stage. Excerpt 14 illustrates the strategy of implicit *contradictory statement*, while excerpt 22 is a typical example of *explanation*. The task sheet also includes two odd-one-outs (items 8 and 19), as these disagreements make use of strategies that are not listed among the categories (*impersonalize S to H* and *rhetorical question*). The aim was to discover whether the participants can identify the functions of these tokens of disagreement, and, if not, what categories they assign to them from the list. The examples also included two tokens that caused difficulties in the pilot study. These are items 5 and 6, corresponding to items 20 (Example 39 on pp. 111-112) and 18 (Example 38 on p. 111) respectively in the pilot study.

The research was conducted the same way as described in the pilot study and informants were given the same task as Pilot Group C.⁸⁷ The answer sheet (see Appendix L and its English translation Appendix M) was administered to 100 participants. The findings of the study are presented in the next section.

3.3.6.2 Results.

As the research was conducted with the aim of validating my categorizing system, considering the answers with high certainty scale values exclusively would best serve this purpose. Although I do not question the value of the answers with low certainty values, ignoring these data ensures the elimination of answers that might have resulted from pure guesswork. Hence, only the answers with certainty scale values of 3 and 4 were included in the analysis presented below. This decision also seemed to be justified considering the fact that a statistically significant correlation was found between confidence index and the number of correct answers in each of the pilot studies (see section 3.3.5.3, pp. 108-112).

The research results are presented in two parts. First, the findings are discussed with reference to the answers that were given with a high degree of


⁸⁶ especially their complaints about the high number of examples they had to analyse

⁸⁷ i.e., they had to assign the instances of disagreement to the strategies listed

certainty indicating the individual items' perceived level of difficulty. In the second part, the research participants' categorization is compared with mine to find out whether they correlate with each other. The differences and the problematic cases are discussed in the second half of this section.

As Figure 3.8 illustrates, items 2, 22, 1, 18, 20, and 16 (in decreasing order) received the highest number of answers (over 70) with a high certainty value. Naturally, this simply means that in the case of these tokens of disagreement, participants were more confident about the function(s) they assigned to the token, but it does not necessarily mean that their interpretations were correct. It can be observed, however, that the answers given to these items are relatively homogenous in terms of the assigned functions. These disagreements are either expressed explicitly (e.g., extract 2) or deploy the strategies of *irony*, *sarcasm* (e.g., extract 18) and *disbelief* (e.g., extract 20).

Figure 3.8
Research results with certainty scale values of 3 and 4



The tokens of disagreement that were answered with a higher degree of perceived difficulty are the following (presented in increasing order): items 5, 8, 13,

19. These tokens received fewer than 50 answers with a high level of confidence and, with the exception of number 8, are more diverse with regard to the assigned categories. Each of these items will be further investigated in the second half of this section.

Table 3.6 (see the following page) provides the raw data of the answers with certainty values of 3 or 4 as well as the results in percentages. It shows which function(s) has/have been assigned to which disagreement and by how many subjects (both in numbers⁸⁸ and in percentages).

The figures displayed in Table 3.6 show correlations with my indexing in the vast majority of cases, thus verifying my categorization system. In 19 cases (86%), the function(s) assigned to a given utterance by the research participants match(es) the one(s) identified in my analysis, which is significant. The high correlation of results is remarkable given that the research participants received only a brief introduction to the categories used in my framework. What follows is the discussion of examples where a mismatch can be observed between the assigned functions.

In the first extract (see Example 31 on p. 99) the utterance *Ó: igen (~ Yea:h, right.)* was interpreted as a disagreement with two functions, i.e., *irony/sarcasm* and *doubt/disbelief* in my categorization; however, most participants ($n=63$, 82.9%) associated it with the former function and few ($n=6$, 7.9%) interpreted it as an expression of *doubt/disbelief*. The first function might be more salient in everyday interaction and the ironical tone of the utterance might have affected the choice of many subjects. Interestingly enough, four participants (5.3%) assigned the category *humour* to this token of disagreement, to which the influence of context might provide a plausible explanation.

As already mentioned, the fewest answers of high certainty were given to excerpt 5 (illustrated by Example 39 on p. 111). According to 26 participants (62%), this token of disagreement (*De történhetnek is balesetek. ~ But accidents could still happen.*) deploys the strategy of *explanation*, that is, the force of disagreement is softened by providing a reason. This interpretation seems acceptable, although the other function of *hedge* is also manifested in the token expressed by the affix *-het*, which corresponds to the English modal verb *could*. Only 12 participants (28.6%) assigned the latter function to this token, which indicates that laypeople might be less aware of this function and/or it is less salient.

⁸⁸ These figures are the same as the ones presented in Figure 3.8.

Table 3.6
Research results with certainty scale values of 3 and 4

Extract no.	Categories										
	P/TA	EXPL	HUM	HED	CST	STD	CS'M	ECHO	ID	META	ELSE
1	2.6% (2)		5.3% (4)					82.9% (63)		7.9% (6)	1.3% (1)
2					1.3% (1)				3.75% (3)	95% (76)	
3					88.6% (62)			2.9% (2)		8.6% (6)	
4		5.7% (4)	41.4% (29)					38.6% (27)		14.3% (10)	
5		62% (26)	2.4% (1)	28.6% (12)	2.4% (1)						4.8% (2)
6	67.9% (36)			26.4% (14)				5.7% (3)			
7		6.9% (4)						36.2% (21)	3.4% (2)	53.4% (31)	
8		13.7% (36)		4.6% (2)	7% (3)					2.3% (1)	2.3% (1)
9					38.2% (26)				48.5% (33)	13.2% (9)	
10				3.8% (2)				55.8% (29)		40.4% (21)	
11		3.2% (2)		91.9 (57)						4.8% (3)	
12		1.5% (1)			18.5% (12)		78.5% (51)				1.5% (1)
13	4.3% (2)			2.1% (1)				59.6% (28)		34% (16)	
14		18.2% (10)		3.6% (2)	74.5% (41)						3.6% (2)
15		79,1% (53)						4.5% (3)		16.4% (11)	
16						53.5% (38)		2.8% (2)	43.7% (31)		
17		76.8% (43)						8.9% (5)		14.3% (8)	
18			4.1% (3)		1.4% (1)			87.7% (64)		6.8% (5)	
19					12.5% (6)			33.3% (16)		47.9% (23)	6.6% (3)
20					2.8% (2)			4.2% (3)		93.1% (67)	
21	52.3% (34)	40% (26)		6.2% (4)	1.5% (1)						
22		93.7% (74)		2.5% (2)	3.8% (3)						

Note.

Bracketed figures show the number of answers given to the item at hand with certainty values of 3 or 4.

The numbers in bold show the function assigned to the given token by most participants.

The grey cells indicate the category/(ies) assigned to the given token by the researcher.

Similarly to item 5, extract 6 also proved to be problematic in the pilot study. It is illustrated by Example 38 (p. 111) and ends with the utterance *Esetleg. (~ Maybe.)*. In the verification stage identifying the function of the utterance caused less difficulty: it was interpreted as a *token agreement* by 36 participants (67.9%) and as a *hedged disagreement* by 14 participants (26.4%). These two functions correlate with my categorization.

Item 8 (Example 21 on p. 90) illustrates the strategy *impersonalize S to H* in my analysis and I was interested to learn what function participants would assign to it, as this particular category was not given on the answer sheet. Only one participant (2.3%) marked its function under the category *other*, but unfortunately she did not specify her interpretation. Most participants were unsure about the disagreement strategy adopted in the example, but most of those who were more confident ($n=36$, 83.7%) assigned the category *explanation* to the utterance. Indeed, while disagreeing the speaker provides a reason why women are more intelligent, expressed as if were coming from a different source. Therefore, I added the participants' interpretation to the analysis, while also keeping my own reading of the utterance.

Moving on to item 13, illustrated by Example 40, we can see that although the function assigned by most participants ($n=28$, 59.6%) corresponded to my categorization, a considerable number of them ($n=16$, 34%) interpreted the interjection *M:?(~ U:hm?)* uttered by speaker F04 as a way of expressing *doubt or disbelief*. I must admit that in its broader sense disbelief can include such indirect utterances as the one under discussion, especially when uttered with rising intonation.

Example 40

On death penalty

M04 Ez éppen egyet értek, hogy nem kéne alkalmazni. Ő: igaz, ö... van egy fajta megfélemlítő ereje a halálbüntetésnek a bűnözők számára.

That this I agree with that it shouldn't be used. U:h it's true that uh... death penalty has a kind of deterrent power for criminals.

→ F04 /•M: ||?
U:hm?

Extract 19 (see Example 41) illustrates a heated debate on the Pretty Boy and contains a token of disagreement that was in the focus of my interest in terms of its categorization. According to my analysis,⁸⁹ the function of speaker M12's utterance (*MI? Az az, hogy kihasználta egy éjszakára? Átment, [visszajött] ~ WHAT? That he had her for a one-night stand? He went over, [came back]*) in the last line of the excerpt is that of a *rhetorical question*; however, this strategy was not listed among the categories on the task sheet.

Example 41

- M12 Akkor lett volna gonosz {a Szépfíú}, ha Ő ment volna át a Szépleányhoz és utána visszament volna @@@. Vagy hogyha ígért volna valamit a lánynak. [AKKOR gonosz lett]
 He {the Pretty Boy} would have been mean if HE had gone over to the girl and then he had gone back @@@. Or if he had promised something to her. [THEN he would have been mean]
- F12 [Miért? Hogyha Ő megy át] a Széplányhoz?
 [Why? When HE goes over] to the Pretty Girl?
- M12 Az nem lett volna gonoszság? Átmegyek aztán visszajövök
 Wouldn't it have been a mean thing? I go over then I come back
- F12 De nem [ne:m]
 But no [no:]
- M12 [és otthagyja]. ME:RT?
 [and he leaves her there.] WHY:?
- F12 Hát mert akkor Ő tesz áldozatot a Szép[lányért]
 Well because then HE makes sacrifices for the Pretty [Girl]
- M12 \•MI||? Az az hogy ^•kihasználta egy éjszakára||? /•Átment||
 [^•visszajött||]
 WHAT? That he had her for a one-night stand? He went over, [came back]

Only three subjects assigned the function *other* to this instance of disagreement, but two of them interpreted it as a *rhetorical question*. Most of the participants ($n=23$, 47.9%) placed it into the *meta* category, identifying its function as

⁸⁹ It should be stressed that my analysis is primarily based on the functions of disagreement that were identified in previous literature and it is not based on intuition alone.

a challenge. Those subjects who assigned the function *echo* to it ($n=16$, 33.3%) justified it with the mocking tone. In my view, the tone adds a hostile attitude to the utterance, which makes it a *challenge* rather than *irony*. Also the interrogatives question the stance of the other speaker in an antagonistic way, which is a characteristic feature of challenges.

It is worth mentioning that although most participants ($n=31$, 53.4%) assigned the same function (*challenge* from the *meta* category) to the token of disagreement (*HA! És elmondanád, hogy MIÉRT? ~ HA! And could you tell me WHY?*) in extract 7 (see Example 33 on p. 101) as I did, a remarkable number of subjects ($n=21$, 36.2%) interpreted it either as an *interjection* ($n=15$, 25.9%) or as *irony/sarcasm* ($n=6$, 10.3%). This drew my attention to the fact that participants focused on different parts of the disagreement; while some felt the first part to be important, the others concentrated on the second half. This led me to conclude that my framework needed to be reconsidered.

3.3.6.3 Summary.

In general, it can be stated that the research findings verify my categorization system, as there is a strong correlation between the functions assigned to the instances of disagreement by myself (based on previous literature) and by the research participants in most of the cases. Nevertheless, the verification stage does not constitute the final phase of the development of my taxonomy. In some cases a significant number of the research participants assigned an additional function to disagreements that I had disregarded. Therefore, when I judged the new function to be justified, I added it to my analysis, thus increasing the number of multifunctional instances of disagreement. As a result of the alterations made to the original taxonomy after the pilot stage as well as the additional functions yielded by the results of the verification stage, I reannotated the corpus one more time.

3.3.7 Interpretation stage.

While thinking about the findings of the research and indexing the tokens of disagreement again, I came to the following conclusion: as my taxonomy was based on previous frameworks on disagreement, it inherited some of their weaknesses. The most important of these shortcomings is the fact that most researchers use fuzzy categorization systems due to the lack of differentiation between function and

linguistic realization. One can observe that in most of the cases when a token of disagreement was interpreted in two ways in the verification stage, only one of them is its real function while the other one is the result of focusing on a linguistic item by which disagreement is expressed. The latter does not change the token's original function; it simply serves as a modifying device.

Furthermore, the disagreements in my data are not only multifunctional but are often expressed by a combination of strategies, an observation made by other researchers as well (e.g., Culpeper, 2011; Culpeper et al., 2003; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998).⁹⁰ Moreover, the functional categories do not seem to be transparent so they are subject to individual subjects' interpretations. This also justifies the distinction between function and linguistic items that only modify the force of the utterance. As a result of these observations, it became apparent that the taxonomy used for analysing disagreements needed to be reconsidered. The new categorizing system I set up (step H.1) is discussed in the following section. I also wish to note here that the findings of the verification stage have also shaped my concept of *disagreement* and resulted in a modified definition, which is provided and commented on in section 4.5 (p. 170).

3.3.7.1 New taxonomy.

As a first logical step, a new analytical framework had to be set up (step H.1) that distinguished between content and form. For this purpose the coding system used in CCSARP (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989) for analysing requests and apologies was considered. Blum-Kulka et al. divide the two speech acts into three main parts: alerters,⁹¹ head acts,⁹² and supportive moves⁹³. Although the analytical framework of CCSARP coded both content (termed *strategies*) and linguistic markers such as conditionals, hedges, and intensifiers, the coding scheme used for indexing requests and apologies was not suitable for my data. This can partly be explained by the fact that the strategies used for coding the above-mentioned speech acts were specific to them, and thus could not be applied to disagreement. However, the taxonomy of

⁹⁰ cf. sections 2.3.2, 2.7 and 3.3.4.1

⁹¹ opening elements with the function of "alert[ing] the H's attention to the ensuing speech act" (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989: 275)

⁹² "the minimal unit which can realize" a speech act (ibid. p. 276)

⁹³ "a unit external to the request, which modifies its impact by either aggravating or mitigating its force" (ibid. p. 277)

linguistic markers used in CCSARP provided a useful starting point for the further development of my coding scheme.

The categories used in the previous versions of my taxonomy were reconsidered and divided into two groups: disagreement strategies and so-called *pragmatic force modifiers* (hereafter PFMs). I use the term *disagreement strategy* in a meaning synonymous to *function* and, similarly to Locher (2004), I do not wish to imply that the use of these strategies was the result of conscious planning. Disagreement strategies include the functional categories of disagreement types coding the implied meanings of disagreements. The group of PFMs, on the other hand, contains linguistic items (e.g., hedges, intensifiers) and other devices (e.g., rhetorical question, humour) that modify the force of disagreement by either aggravating or mitigating it. As a subsequent step, the list of PFMs was complemented with additional categories based on the taxonomy of linguistic markers used in CCSARP and Brown and Levinson's (1987) framework.

As the vast majority of the categories comprising my new system for coding disagreements have already been introduced and illustrated in section 3.3.4 (pp. 80-105), what follows is only a short definition of each for convenience and some prototypical examples of reactions to the utterance *Men can cook better than women*.⁹⁴

Disagreement strategies:

- ***partial agreement/token agreement***: partial agreement is an utterance that makes a concession before expressing disagreement in order to soften the force of disagreement (e.g., *Igen, de vannak kivételek. ~ Yes, but there are exceptions.; Jó, de vannak kivételek. ~ Fine, but there are exceptions.*). Token agreement is a polite disagreement disguised as an agreement (e.g., *Lehet. ~ Maybe.; Talán. ~ Perhaps.*).
- ***explanation (give/ask for reason/example)***: an utterance that gives (*De azt mondják, hogy a nagymamád és az anyukád főztje a legjobb a világon. ~ But it is said that your grandmother's and your mother's cooking is the best in the world.; Ha ez így lenne, akkor ők lennének a háziasszonyok. ~ If it was so, they were the housewives.; De ha megkérdeznék, akkor te is az anyukád*

⁹⁴ except for the last one (*clarification of speaker's meaning*), where an additional turn needed to be inserted the disagreeing utterance reacts to

főztjét szereted jobban, nem az apukádét. ~ *If someone asks you, you also like your mother's cooking more not your father's.*) or asks for (*MIÉRT?~ WHY?*) a reason or example to indicate that the previous speaker's proposition cannot be accepted by the speaker. When asking for a reason, the speaker's interrogation is usually accompanied by a critical or doubtful tone.

- **contradictory statement:** an utterance that expresses contradiction by either negating the proposition expressed by the previous claim (e.g., *Nem.* ~ *No.*; *Nem főznek jobban, mint a nők.* ~ *They can't cook better than women.*; *A nők főznek jobban, mint a férfiak.* ~ *Women can cook better than men.*) or directly stating that it is not true (e.g., *Nem igaz.* ~ *That's not true.*).
- **implied contradiction:** an utterance that, by itself, "does not bear any markers of disagreement. However, in the context in which it occurs, it contradicts a previous utterance"⁹⁵ (e.g., *Teát!* ~ *Tea!*; *Én meg tudok a vízen járni!* ~ *And I can walk on water!*). In this type of disagreement, contradiction is only implied, and thus understanding the implicature requires more mental processing on the part of the listener.
- **stating disagreement:** an utterance that explicitly states that the speaker disagrees with the previous proposition (e.g., *Ezzel nem értek egyet.* ~ *I don't agree with this.*).
- **challenge:** an utterance that displays strong disagreement with the prior proposition by questioning the addressee's position and implying that (s)he cannot provide evidence for his/her claim⁹⁶ (e.g., *Miért főznének jobban?* ~ *Why would they cook better?;* *És elmondanád, hogy miért?* ~ *And could you tell me why?;* *Akkor te miért főzöl olyan pocsékul?* ~ *Why do you cook so badly, then?;* *Akkor mondj már egy olyan férfit, akire ez igaz!* ~ *Then tell me a man of whom it's true.*).
- **disbelief:** an utterance that indicates that the speaker does not believe or doubts the previous proposition and thus cannot accept it (e.g., *Á!* ~ *A:h!*; *Ugyan már!* ~ *Come on!;* *Ki van zárva!* ~ *That's out of the question!*).
- **evaluation:** an utterance that expresses a negative evaluation of the previous speaker's proposition, indicating strong disapproval (*Hülyeség!* ~ *Nonsense!;* *Ez marhaság!* ~ *That's bullshit!*).

⁹⁵ Rees-Miller, 1995, p. 116

⁹⁶ It typically has the syntactic form of interrogative or imperative

- **clarification of speaker's meaning:** an utterance that clarifies the usually misunderstood meaning of the speaker's previous utterance (e.g., *Szóval te jobban főzöl, mint én?* ~ *So you can cook better than me?*; *Magyarul én béna vagyok a főzéshez.* ~ *So I am lame at cooking.*), which, therefore, contradicts or corrects the other interlocutor's previous proposition (e.g., *Én nem erről beszélek.* ~ *I'm not talking about that.*; *Nem arra értem.* ~ *I didn't mean that.*; *Nem úgy.* ~ *Not that way.*).

As is clear from the above, no new categories have been added to the disagreement strategies. The only modification made to this new version of the coding scheme is the division of *contradictory statement* and *implied contradiction* into two different categories. This is due to the fact that these categories are different from each other in terms of their directness.

The disagreement strategies listed above exhibit varying degrees of in/directness. Direct disagreement strategies are utterances in which there is a match between the propositional content and the illocutionary force of the acts, so the disagreement is uttered in a way that clearly communicates to the hearer that a disagreement is being produced. They express disagreement explicitly,⁹⁷ and therefore require no or little interpretative work on the addressee's part. Obviously, the most direct disagreement strategy is *stating disagreement*, and other direct strategies include *contradictory statement*, *disbelief* and *evaluation*.⁹⁸ In contrast, in the case of indirect disagreement strategies, the propositional content does not clearly convey a disagreement and therefore their illocutionary force is not transparent. As a result, indirect disagreements generally require more inferential effort on the part of the hearer and it may be necessary to rely on the prosodic and/or non-verbal context to recognize/interpret the utterance as a disagreement. Indirect disagreements make use of the following strategies: *partial agreement/token agreement*, *explanation*, *implied contradiction*, *challenge*, and *clarification of speaker's meaning*. It has to be noted that the disagreement strategies within the two broad categories described above also display different levels of in/directness.

⁹⁷ The terms *direct* and *explicit* as well as *indirect* and *implicit* are used as synonyms in this dissertation.

⁹⁸ This categorization of disagreement strategies in terms of in/directness is based on the opinion of 8 PhD students of linguistics, including myself. In my conceptualization, disagreement strategies form a continuum as regards their in/directness, but their exact place on the continuum warrants further research. Therefore, they are only divided into the two broad categories of 'direct strategy' and 'indirect strategy' in this dissertation.

Turning back to my taxonomy, the category of PFMs has been further divided into two groups, depending on their effect on the pragmatic force of disagreements: *mitigators* and *aggravators*. The subgroup of mitigators contains linguistic items and devices that soften the force of disagreements, each of which is listed and briefly defined below.

Pragmatic force modifiers:

Mitigators

- **humour:** a mitigating device that softens the force of the disagreement usually engendering laughter on the part of the speaker, listener, or both. The utterance is made in a non-serious, joking manner.
- **hedge:** mitigating devices used to (1) soften the face-threatening force of disagreement by indicating uncertainty on the part of the speaker (e.g., *szerintem ~ I think, lehet ~ maybe, esetleg ~ perhaps, -hat, -het ~ can, could*), (2) lower the effect on the meaning of another element (e.g., *valamennyire ~ to some extent, egy kicsit ~ a little*) or (3) fill in the time used for thinking (e.g., *ő ~ uh, m: ~ u:hm, hát ~ well*).
- **impersonalization:** the use of impersonal/passive structures to shift responsibility. It is a mitigating device as it makes the utterance appear as coming from a different source (e.g., *Egyesek szerint ~ Some say, Azt mondják, hogy... ~ It is said that...*).
- **tag question:** a short question added to a statement which requests assurance or affirmation regarding what is expressed in the main clause. It serves to seek confirmation either explicitly or rhetorically and to involve the hearer in the discourse (e.g., *ugye? ~ right?*).
- **conditional:** a mitigating linguistic device expressing a hypothetical situation, thus softening the pragmatic force of the utterance.
- **term of endearment:** a word or a phrase used to address a person in a way that conveys solidarity and affection and thus softens the propositional content of the utterance (e.g., *Maci, Macika ~ Honey Bear*).⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Naturally, I do not intend to imply that terms of endearment always reflect immediacy. These terms can have either positive or negative polarity which is determined by intonation and context. In my data, both occurrences were uttered with a soft tone and falling intonation, which conveys solidarity rather than distance or annoyance.

As one can observe, the last three categories are new additions to the taxonomy. Tag questions have several functions (e.g., epistemic, facilitative, challenging) and there is no one-to-one correspondence between an individual occurrence and a given function. As a result, tag questions need to be interpreted with regard to the given context. Here only those tag questions are considered as mitigators that soften the force of the utterance by showing positive face considerations and facilitate conversation.

The category of *conditional* refers to *l'art pour l'art* conditional, which softens the force of disagreement by expressing a hypothetical situation. Other polite uses of conditional are included among hedges.

The last category of mitigators includes the use of *terms of endearment* as in my data they were uttered in a soft tone without special emphasis and thus they soften the force of disagreement by shifting the focus from the disagreement *per se* to the camaraderie and ties existing between interlocutors. This is illustrated in Example 29 (pp. 95-96), where the last two utterances of speaker M04 are mitigated by the use of *Maci* and *Macika* (~ *Honey Bear*) emphasizing the special bond between the speaker and the hearer.

The other group of PFMs termed *aggravators* include those linguistic items and devices that aggravate the pragmatic force of disagreement. As can be seen from the list below, this group contains only one new category when compared to the previous versions of the taxonomy. It is the category of tag question with the function of challenging the other speaker.

Aggravators:

- ***irony/sarcasm***: an aggravating device (indicated by tone of voice) with the help of which the speaker intends to raise the hearer's metapragmatic awareness and draws attention to the deflection and difference between what has been said and at least one suggested meaning while keeping up the ambiguity of the pragmatic meaning.¹⁰⁰ Sarcasm is a special type of irony with the intent to severely criticize something or someone.¹⁰¹ It is an open mockery.
- ***intensifier***: words or phrases (e.g., *egyáltalán* ~ *at all*, *teljesen* ~ *totally*, *mondom* ~ *I'm telling you*) used to emphasize and strengthen the effect of disagreement.

¹⁰⁰ Komlósi (2012, p. 9)

¹⁰¹ Gibbs (2000)

- **interjection:** words or phrases used to convey emotion (e.g., disbelief, surprise, anger, irritation, etc.) on the part of the speaker typically placed at the beginning of an utterance. Their meaning depends on their intonation contour.
- **verbal shadowing, repetition:** repetition of a previous speaker's words, phrases or entire utterance (and sometimes intonation) by another speaker to question the content of the previous utterance. Intonation usually entails criticism.
- **rhetorical question:** “a question to which no answer is expected because there can be no answer, the answer is obvious (implication: to the meanest intelligence), or because the speaker provides an answer. What makes a rhetorical question an aggravating device is that its basic purpose is to score points against an opponent” (Rees-Miller, 1995, pp. 137-138). It generally occurs with a falling intonation.
- **tag question:** a short question added to a statement which has the function of strengthening the aggravating force of the utterance by challenging the position of the other interlocutor (e.g., *ugye? ~ right?, nem? ~ negative tag such as isn't it?*).

It goes without saying that neither the list of disagreement functions nor that of PFMs is exhaustive by any means. They include the categories that were identified in my data but other disagreement strategies and even PFMs might be discovered, for example, when examining disagreement in other contexts.

A significant observation made in the course of indexing disagreements is that in some cases disagreements were preceded by small segments of talk (hereafter referred to as *pre-sequence*) that are not an intrinsic part of the expression of disagreement *per se*, but resulted in a delayed delivery of the disagreement. These pre-sequences generally fulfil the following functions in my data: (1) hesitation¹⁰² (e.g., *Nem tudom. ~ I don't know.*), (2) agreement (e.g., *Jó. ~ Fine., Az biztos. ~ That's for sure.*), (3) alert hearer (e.g., *Figyelj már. ~ Listen., Nézd! ~ Look!*), and (4) metacommunication (e.g., *Tudtam, hogy ezt fogod! ~ I knew that you would {do} this!*). As discussed in Chapter 2.5.3, hesitation has been identified as a delaying

¹⁰² The term *hesitation* is interpreted here in a wider sense than in conversation analysis. In this dissertation, hesitation as a pre-sequence function refers to expressions (e.g., *Igazából a kutya sem tudja. ~ To tell the truth Goodness only knows., Ez egy jó kérdés. ~ This is a good question.*) that are used in order to gain time while thinking about the response.

device in dispreferred disagreement by Sacks (1987) and agreement as a pre-step for disagreement by Pomerantz (1984) and Kotthoff (1993).

Pre-sequences generally share at least three of the following characteristics (one is always being syntactic position), on the basis of which they can be distinguished from (core) disagreement strategies:¹⁰³ (a) they occur before the actual disagreement, (b) they do not contain the disagreeing message, (c) they form a separate syntactic unit which is signalled by intonation as well, (d) they are followed by a pause. As an illustration, in the following example the pre-sequence *Ez száz* (~ *This is for sure.*) meets all the characteristic features listed above: it precedes the disagreement (*És ezzel teljes mértékben egyet is értek veled, de:* ~ *And I totally agree with you on this, bu:t*), does not express disagreement on its own, constitutes a separate syntactic unit with a falling intonation at the end, and is followed by a short pause.

Example 42

M04 Ez nem fair, mert neki ugyanolyan diplomája less, mint neked, aki állandóan tanulsz.

This is not fair, because he'll have the same kind of degree as you who study all the time.

→ F04 Ez *száz||. ... És ezzel *teljes mértékben *egyet is értek veled || /•de:
This is for sure. ... And I totally agree with you on this, bu:t

Thus, in this example disagreement is expressed with a pre-sequence with the function of agreement, and an indirect disagreement strategy (*token agreement*).

Similarly, the disagreement in Example 43 consists of a pre-sequence and two disagreement strategies:

Example 43

M04 De ölsz vele {abortusz}. És az már bűn.

But you kill with it. And that's a sin.

¹⁰³ I would like to thank one of my opponents, Csilla Dér, for calling my attention to the importance of clarifying the characteristic features that help us differentiating between pre-sequences and actual disagreement strategies.

- F04 /•Há:t \•nem tudom||. ... Szerintem az szerintem \•nem bűn hogyha valaki \•nem akarja megtartani a /•babát|| \•megfontolta és \•elhatározta||. Tehát ... \•joga van hozzá \•igazából||.
- We:ll I don't know. ... I think I think that's not a sin if someone doesn't want to keep the baby, she has considered it and made up her mind. So ... actually she has the right to do so.


The pre-sequence *Há:t nem tudom.* (~ *We:ll I don't know.*) has the function of hesitation and it is followed by two disagreement strategies, namely *contradictory statement* and *explanation*. In this case, the pre-sequence is clearly identifiable based on the characteristics identified.

As a next step of the interpretation stage, the data was reanalysed according to the new coding scheme described above, which involved indexing each token of disagreement again (step H.2) following the steps listed below:

- (1) identifying the function(s) of the disagreement strategy/strategies,
- (2) identifying the function of pre-sequence, if any,
- (3) identifying PFMs, if any.

It was observed that disagreements had the following internal structure illustrated by Figure 3.9:

Figure 3.9
Structure of disagreement



As the figure above shows, disagreement can be expressed via a single disagreement strategy¹⁰⁴ or optionally¹⁰⁵ with a combination of strategies,¹⁰⁶ and can

¹⁰⁴ I call disagreements expressed by a single strategy *simple disagreements*.

¹⁰⁵ indicated by brackets

be preceded by a pre-sequence. Optionally, the pragmatic force of disagreements can be altered by the use of PFMs. Further details on the ratio of different kinds of disagreement in terms of structure are given in the next chapter (Findings and Discussion).

3.3.7.2 *Some examples reconsidered.*

As was mentioned before, the new coding scheme for analysing disagreement described in the previous section provided a remedy for both the multifunctionality of a single token and the differences in categorization discussed in the section on the results of the verification stage (3.3.6.2). Due to space limitations, I will only discuss some examples here, but some additional examples are provided in Appendix N.

If we reconsider Example 31, repeated below for convenience, in terms of the new taxonomy we can see that the last utterance (*Ó: igen! ~ Yea:h, right.*) employs the disagreement strategy of *disbelief* and its pragmatic force is strengthened by the aggravator *irony/sarcasm*. Originally, *Ó: igen* was assigned two functions (*disbelief* and *irony/sarcasm*) but the division between disagreement strategy and PFM provides a more suitable analysis.

Example 31

F05 @@@ Hát jó, de a Révésznek akkor se kellett volna

@@@ Well fine, but still the Ferryman shouldn't have

M05 De lehet, hogy a Révész és a Haramiák haverok voltak.

But maybe the Ferryman and the Thieves were friends.

→ F05 \wedge° Ó: igen||!

Yea:h, right.

In order to interpret the last utterance as a disagreement one needs more than mere lexical knowledge. On the surface level *O:h yeah!* can be understood as an agreement and it is the ironical tone (rise-fall intonation) that helps us arrive at the right interpretation. As Kotthoff (1993) observes, in the context of a dispute interlocutors use short assent as a means of being ironic and expressing disagreement.

¹⁰⁶ Disagreements that consist of a combination of two or three strategies are termed *complex disagreements* in this dissertation.

The following extract is taken from the end of Example 33, from a discussion on gender differences in driving skills. According to the new coding scheme, the utterance made by speaker F05 (*HA!... És elmondanád, hogy MIÉRT? ~ HA!... And could you tell me WHY?*) has the main function of challenging the other interlocutor's previous claim (*A nők nem tudnak odafigyelni a vezetésre! ~ Women can't concentrate on driving!*). The introductory interjection *HA!* already indicates reluctance on the part of the speaker and the disagreement is further aggravated through ironical tone and the intonational emphasis on the words *HA* and *MIÉRT* (~ *WHY*).

Example 33

- M05 Nem igaz! ... A nők nem tudnak odafigyelni a vezetésre!
 It's not true! ... Women can't concentrate on driving!
- F05 *HA||!... És /•elmondanád hogy *MIÉRT||?
 HA!... And could you tell me WHY?

The new coding scheme also gives a better interpretation of the utterance under investigation as it allows for assigning a single disagreement strategy (*challenge*) to the opposition whose pragmatic force is strengthened by two aggravators (*interjection, irony/sarcasm*). This analysis is also closer to the interpretation of research participants in the verification phase.

As a result of the new taxonomy for analysing disagreements, the disagreement expressed by speaker F05 in Example 21 below can be categorized clearly without having to assign several functions to it, unlike in the previous versions of the model.

Example 21

- M05 Szerintem a férfiak SOKKAL intelligensebbek a nőknél.
 I think men are MUCH MORE intelligent than women.
- F05 De ő: /•azt mondják|| hogy azér egy nő /•tud több dologra figyelni egyszerre|| ... *jobban használja agyának a ké /•mindkét felét|| ...
 But u:h it is said that women are able to pay attention to more things at the same time ... they use both of both sides of their brain...

In speaker F05's utterance the initial *de* (~ *but*) indicates that she would like to reject the previous proposition (*a férfiak sokkal intelligensebbek a nőknél* ~ *men are much more intelligent than women*) and she chooses to express disagreement in a mitigated way. The contrastive marker *de* (~ *but*) is followed by a hesitation marker (ö: ~ *u:h*) and a counter-claim that provides an explanation and supports why the speaker is right. Giving a reason or explanation attenuates disagreement and so does the use of the generic statement *azt mondják, hogy* (~ *it is said that*) (impersonalization) by serving as a means of distancing the speaker from the truth value of the proposition. Thus, in the new framework the utterance under scrutiny has the function of *explanation* and it is accompanied by two mitigators (*hedge* and *impersonalization*).

The following two examples illustrate how disagreement strategies can co-occur in order to express disagreement in a more effective way.

Example 44

- F03 „Felső]oktatási intézményekben a hallgatóknak nagyobb beleszólást kellene biztosítani a tanterv kialakí” (motyogva). *Á nem ||! Ez [ezzel *nem értek egyet] ||.
- [In high]er education, students should have a bigger say in the development of the curricu” (muttering). Ah no! That I [don't agree with that].

Example 45

- F09 ... Hát szerintem nem kellene kötelező tandíjat bevezetni, mert most én azért fizessek, mert tanulni akarok? Nekem ez így nem ... kapcsolódik össze.
- ... Well I don't think compulsory tuition fees should be introduced because should I pay because I want to study? For me this doesn't ... make any sense.
- M09 Hát /jó || de azt azért V*figyelembe kell venni ||, hogy a *háttérben azért van egy apparátus || amit *biztosítanak számodra || ^*azért hogy tanulhass ||.
- Well fine, but it needs to be taken into consideration that there is some apparatus provided (for you) in the background so that you can study.

In Example 44 above, the speaker expresses her disagreement with the statement she has just read out loud. The disagreement is conveyed by the combination of two strategies: *disbelief* (*Á nem. ~ Ah no!*) and *stating disagreement* (*Ez ezzel nem értek egyet. ~ This I don't agree with this*). No PFM's are employed in order to mitigate or aggravate the force of the disagreement.

Example 45, taken from a discussion about compulsory tuition fees in higher education, illustrates the most frequently used (9.9%)¹⁰⁷ combination of disagreement strategies in my data. The disagreement starts with a hedging device (*hát ~ well*), followed by a *partial agreement* (*jó, de ~ fine, but*) and an *explanation* (*azt azért figyelembe kell venni, hogy... ~ it needs to be taken into consideration that...*) of how tuition fees are used for the benefit of students. As Kotthoff (1993, p. 208) points out, “partial agreement can help to develop the main point of disagreement” and “is often a prestep to further disagreement”. The combined use of the *partial agreement* and *explanation* strategies is the most frequently used way of expressing disagreement with the help of a combination of two strategies in my data.

As can be seen from the examples above, the new taxonomy distinguishing between disagreement functions (*strategies*) and (linguistic) devices that either mitigate or aggravate the force of the opposing utterance (*PFM's*) serves as a suitable analytical tool for providing us with a comprehensive analysis of disagreements. In addition, this framework allows for an analysis of utterances that contain a combined use of disagreement strategies. In order to find the answers to the research questions outlined in the first chapter, the tokens of disagreements employed by Hungarian undergraduate students were not only examined via the new coding scheme but were also subjected to statistical analysis described in the following section.

3.3.7.3 Statistical analysis.¹⁰⁸

The results of the studies carried out at the pilot stage (section 3.3.5.3, pp. 108-112) were subjected to Spearman's rho so as to measure the associations between informants' confidence level and the number of correct answers they provided.

In order to find the answers to the research questions of this study and to test the initial hypotheses, both descriptive and inferential statistics were used.

¹⁰⁷ see Figure 4.3 on p. 142

¹⁰⁸ All statistical analyses were conducted with the help of SPSS 19.0.

Descriptive statistics measured the frequency of disagreements based on gender and social distance and it was also used to calculate the ratio of mitigated and aggravated disagreements as well as the disagreement strategies employed.

Given the nature of the data, the study also employed the Pearson Chi-square test (henceforth referred to as Chi-square test) to test the initial hypotheses. The Chi-square test is an inferential statistical test that investigates whether there is a relationship between two categorical variables. In this study, the Chi-square test was used to investigate whether the associations between gender and the use of disagreement strategies as well as social distance and the use of a given strategy are statistically significant.

In addition to descriptive statistics, both parametric and non-parametric t-tests were performed to see if there are significant differences between male vs. female speakers as well as between strangers vs. couples/siblings in terms of the frequency of disagreements they employed. The results of the statistical procedures are presented in Chapter 4 (Findings and Discussion).

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced and contained a discussion of the methodological approach and research design adopted to arrive at the answers to the research questions presented in Chapter 1.2. At the outset of the chapter, the nature of the data gathered for analysis and the sample selection were described, followed by a brief overview of the most common means of data collection in the field. The main advantages of these tools as well as their potential limitations were highlighted. Next, a detailed account of the data collection methods employed in this metatheoretical research was provided, along with an account of the changes made in the instrument as the research proceeded. Furthermore, some ethical considerations were also touched upon.

The second half of the chapter explained the multi-step method used for data analysis including coding schemes, (towards the end of the chapter) statistical models and extensive illustration, where applicable. A step-by-step description of the analytical procedure(s) was aimed at guiding the reader through the stages of the research whose findings constantly shaped the original framework until it reached its ultimate form. The section also described the verification processes used to

substantiate that the categories of the coding scheme set up for the analysis of disagreement are valid and reliable.

In conclusion, this chapter has taken an empirical approach to the analysis of verbal disagreement in Hungarian. As a primary goal, the chapter attempted to map the functional spectrum of disagreements employed by Hungarian undergraduate students by identifying specific disagreement strategies. Additionally, PFMs, which either strengthen or soften the illocutionary force of the utterance, were also identified, and some types of pre-sequence were listed as well. This chapter, thus, succeeded in the attempt to investigate disagreement not only in type of strategy but also in terms of modification devices. The next chapter – Findings and Discussion – presents and discusses the results of the statistical analyses (briefly outlined in section 3.3.7.3) applied to the data.

CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

So far, this study has analysed how the gender of the speaker and social distance between interlocutors interact with the overall use of verbal disagreements employed by Hungarian undergraduates. It has also investigated the degree the two above mentioned variables affect the linguistic expression of disagreement in terms of the particular strategy and PFM used. This chapter presents and discusses the key findings of statistical analyses carried out to address the research questions postulated in Chapter 1.2 (pp. 2-4).

The first part of this chapter provides the results of the research with reference to each research question. First, the results of descriptive statistics are displayed, and then the findings of inferential statistics are presented in order to determine whether the associations between the variable under investigation and the expression of disagreement can be predicted with confidence. The results of the research are also discussed in relation to previous studies.

The second part of the chapter revisits the research hypotheses to see whether they are supported by the results. Next, some miscellaneous findings of the research are presented and discussed, followed by a reconsideration of the original definition of verbal disagreement proposed in the first part of the dissertation. Finally, the last section provides a brief summary of the chapter.

4.2 Research Questions

This section aims at addressing the three sets of research questions posed in Chapter 1, repeated here for convenience:

- RQ1 How do Hungarian university students express verbal disagreement?
- RQ1.1 What disagreement strategies do they employ?
- RQ2 Are there any qualitative and/or quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement in terms of the gender of the speaker? If so, what are these differences?


- RQ2.1 Are there any gender differences in the frequency of verbal disagreements expressed by Hungarian university students participating in the study? If so, what are they?
- RQ2.2 Are there any qualitative differences in verbal disagreements (i.e., mitigated or aggravated) in terms of the gender of the speaker? If so, what are the patterns that emerge?
- RQ2.3 Does the gender of the speaker influence the pragmatic strategies (s)he employs for expressing disagreement? If yes, in what ways?
- RQ3 Are there any qualitative and/or quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement in terms of the social distance between participants? If so, what are these differences?
- RQ3.1 Are there any differences in the frequency of verbal disagreements expressed by Hungarian university students participating in the study in terms of the social distance between participants? If so, what are they?
- RQ3.2 Are there any qualitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement (i.e., mitigated or aggravated) in terms of the social distance between participants? If so, what patterns emerge?
- RQ3.3 Does the social distance between the participants influence the pragmatic strategies they employ for expressing disagreement? If yes, in what ways?

The subsequent sections serve to provide the answers to the aforementioned research questions.

4.2.1 The expression of disagreement.

The first general research question is concerned with how Hungarian undergraduates participating in my study express verbal disagreement. As discussed in the previous chapter, particularly in section 3.3.7.1, disagreement in my research was expressed either via a single disagreement strategy (DS) or optionally with a combination of two (DS1 + DS2) or sometimes even three strategies (DS1 + DS2 + DS3) (see Figure 4.1).


Figure 4.1
Overall distribution of disagreements



As can be seen in Figure 4.1, 67.05% of disagreements (352 tokens out of 525) contained a single disagreement strategy, nearly 33% (171 tokens) were expressed with two disagreement strategies and two tokens (0.38%) were expressed with a combination of three strategies. 34 tokens (6.49%) were unfinished, yet they managed to deliver disagreement and their function could also be identified. For a further discussion of unfinished disagreements see section 4.4.1 (pp. 167-168).

Disagreements were preceded by a pre-sequence in 41 cases (7.8%), the distribution of the identified functions are illustrated in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2
Distribution of pre-sequence functions



As can be observed from Figure 4.2, the most frequent function (41.5%, 17 tokens) of pre-sequence in my data is *hesitation* (HES), which has been reported to be a delay device by Sacks (1987). The second most frequent function (36.58%, 15 tokens) is that of *agreement* (AGR), which has also been identified as a common pre-step to disagreement (cf. Pomerantz, 1984; Kotthoff, 1993). The third most common function (17.06%, 7 tokens) is *alerter* (AL), whose aim is to call the attention of the hearer to

the subsequent proposition (cf. Blum-Kulka et al., 1989). The least frequently occurring (4.86%, 2 tokens) pre-sequence function in my sample is *meta-communication* (META), which has not been noted in the literature.

As already discussed, the pragmatic force of disagreements can be mitigated or aggravated by the use of PFMs. Table 4.1 provides an overall view of the distribution of PFMs in my data given both in raw figures and in percentages.

Table 4.1
Overall distribution of PFMs

PFM	Token	Percent (%)
mitigator	148	28.2
aggravator	195	37.1
no PFM	182	34.7
Total	525	100

The findings summarized in Table 4.1 show that in almost 35% of disagreements in the corpus no PFMs were used at all, approximately 37% of the tokens were aggravated and about 28% mitigated. Thus, in this study there is an observable preference for expressing disagreement overtly. This indicates that in the majority of the cases the speaker's need to express disagreement outweighed considerations of the addressee's face. In order to find out how the variables of gender of the speaker and social distance between participants influence the use of PFMs, see sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.3.2.2 respectively.


4.2.1.1 Disagreement strategies.

As discussed in section 3.3.7, the participants of this study employ a variety of strategies in conveying disagreement. The nine disagreement strategies identified in the final coding system are repeated here, along with their abbreviation for ease of reference: *partial agreement/token agreement* (P/TA), *explanation* (EXPL), *contradictory statement* (CST), *implied contradiction* (IC), *stating disagreement* (STD), *challenge* (CH), *disbelief* (DISB), *evaluation* (EVA), and *clarification of speaker's meaning* (CS'M). In this section and the following ones on disagreement strategies, first disagreements are discussed on the basis of their in/directness, followed by more detailed analyses of the specific disagreement strategies employed.

Based on the categorization of disagreement strategies in terms of their in/directness the following distribution was identified in the research corpus: out of the 525 tokens of disagreement, 223 (42.5%) were expressed with a direct or a combination of two direct strategies; a very similar number of disagreements ($n=218$, 41.5%) employed a single indirect or two indirect strategies; while the least frequently occurring ($n=84$, 16%) way of expressing disagreement in the data was with a combination of a direct and one (or two) indirect strategy(ies).¹⁰⁹ From now on, these disagreements will be referred to as direct (D), indirect (ID), and mixed (M) disagreements respectively.

A close observation of each disagreement category, including complex disagreements, reveals that, overall, *contradictory statement* (29.1%) was the most frequently used strategy, the next was *explanation* (8.8%), and the third was *disbelief* (8.4%). It also reveals that the three most commonly employed co-occurring strategies were *partial agreement* followed by an *explanation* (9.9%), *contradictory statement* preceding an *explanation* (8.4%), and *partial agreement* (4.2%) followed by a *contradictory statement*. 9.5% of the disagreements occurring in my data were expressed with other combinations of strategies.¹¹⁰ These findings are presented as a bar chart in Figure 4.3. The results are displayed in percentages, while frequency values are also provided above each column.¹¹¹

Figure 4.3
Overall distribution of disagreement strategies




¹⁰⁹ Both tokens of disagreement that applied a combination of three disagreement strategies had the pattern of ID + D + ID strategies. Although these disagreements utilized two indirect and a direct strategy, they were categorized as a mixed disagreement as a result of the presence of the direct strategy.

¹¹⁰ For examples see Appendix N

¹¹¹ This type of presentation of the data is followed in the bar charts of this dissertation.

As for the possible combinations of disagreement strategies in complex disagreements, the following patterns can be observed in my data, illustrated by Figure 4.4: *explanation* proved to be the most productive strategy, since it was combined with each strategy including itself. This is not surprising, since providing or asking for a reason or example is a common means of expressing disagreement. Being an indirect strategy, it can soften the force of direct disagreement strategies preceding or following it. *Partial agreement/token agreement* mostly combines with other indirect strategies to convey disagreement indirectly. The only direct strategy it co-occurred with in my data was *contradictory statement*. Partial/token agreement is usually considered to be a polite way of expressing disagreement, but adding a contradictory statement ensures that the illocutionary act of disagreement will be understood. The direct strategy *contradictory statement* combined with either *challenge* or another *contradictory statement* in order to achieve maximum efficiency. As already mentioned, it also co-occurred with *explanation* or with *clarification of speaker's meaning*. These strategies back up or specify the intended meaning and thus help avoid communication breakdowns or misunderstandings.

Figure 4.4
Structure of complex disagreements



Thus, it can be observed that in my data indirect disagreement strategies mainly combine with other indirect strategies, except for *partial agreement/token agreement* and *explanation*, which frequently co-occurred with direct strategies as

well. These two either soften the force of the direct strategy or provide some clarification on speaker's meaning, thus can save the face of the speaker. Direct strategies are frequently used together to deliver disagreement with maximum efficiency, thus make speaker's meaning clear. The only two indirect strategies that followed a direct disagreement strategy were *explanation* and *clarification of speaker's meaning* which could make the disagreement less face-threatening and help support the speaker's stance. Naturally, these combination of disagreement strategies are restricted to the patterns identified in my data, and thus other combinations might be used to express disagreement in Hungarian.

Figure 4.5 displays the pattern of the overall use of the first disagreement strategy in percentages. In other words, the function of disagreement where only one strategy was used as well as the first disagreement strategy where opposition was expressed with a combination of strategies. As is clear from the bar chart, the most frequently used strategy for expressing disagreement was *contradictory statement* (39%), followed by *partial agreement/token agreement* (21.7%) and *explanation* (10.7%), while the least common disagreement strategy in my data was *clarification of speaker's meaning* (1%).

Figure 4.5
Overall distribution of first disagreement strategy





Figure 4.6 illustrates the overall distribution of the second disagreement strategy in terms of its function. As can be seen in the figure, in 67% of the cases disagreement was expressed via a single disagreement strategy. In complex disagreements, the two most commonly occurring functions of the second strategy were *explanation* (23%) and *contradictory statement* (6.5%). In both instances when three disagreement strategies were adopted to convey disagreement, the function of

the third strategy was explanation. Due to the low occurrence of these multi-strategy disagreements, they will be disregarded in the following discussion and analyses.

Figure 4.6
Overall distribution of second disagreement strategy



These patterns indicate that, in general, the participants of my study utilized both direct and indirect forms of disagreement; however, the most commonly used strategy for expressing opposition was an explicit strategy (i.e., *contradictory statement*). This section served to answer the first set of research questions of how disagreement was expressed by Hungarian undergraduate students participating in the research. For the interplay between the use of disagreement strategies and gender of the speaker as well as the social distance between speakers, see sections 4.2.2.3 and 4.2.3.3.

4.2.2 Gender and disagreement.

This section aims to answer the second set of research questions with the help of both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. First, it investigates the influence of the gender of the speaker on the frequency of verbal disagreements. Then, the effect of gender is examined with respect to the use of both PFMs and disagreement strategies.


4.2.2.1 Gender and frequency of disagreements.

The gender of the speaker has been posited in the relevant literature to influence the use of disagreement (cf. Section 2.7.2, pp. 42-47). It has been suggested that in the course of everyday interaction, women in general are more

likely to seek agreement and avoid explicit disagreement (Coates, 1989; Edelsky, 1981). From this, it would follow that the number of disagreements in my study should proportionally be smaller for female speakers than for males. However, in the data collected for analysis this prediction was not borne out.

The descriptive statistical analysis reveals that of the 525 tokens of verbal disagreement that occur in the corpus, 302 (57.52%) were uttered by women while 223 (42.48%) by men. This finding, coupled with the fact that men spoke more than women did, further broadens the gap in the ratio of disagreements used by male and female undergraduates. Out of 68,194 words, 36,877 (54.08%) were uttered by the former and 31,317 (45.92%) by the latter. Figure 4.7 displays the relative proportion of disagreements and the uttered words in percentages in relation to gender.


Figure 4.7
Gender differences in the proportion of disagreements and uttered words in percentage



It can be observed that in my sample the number of disagreements is inversely proportional to the uttered words, i.e., the number of disagreements increases as the amount of talk decreases. The graphical representation of this pattern resembles the Roman letter 'X'.

The figures provided above give us a global picture of the ratio of disagreements used by male and female speakers. A clearer picture can be drawn by calculating the frequency of disagreements per 100 words. The obtained results show that men employed 0.6 token of disagreement per 100 words, while women expressed opposition nearly once per 100 words (0.96 token/100 words). This demonstrates that the female speakers in my research expressed disagreement much more frequently than their male counterparts.

Figure 4.8
Frequency of disagreements per conversational pair



An even more detailed insight into the gender differences in the ratio of disagreements is provided by Figure 4.8, which demonstrates the frequency of disagreements per conversational partners. It also calls our attention to individual differences in terms of the frequency of disagreements. It is apparent from the figure that women expressed their disagreement more frequently than men did in each conversational pair. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the frequency of disagreements in the speech of males and females participating in the study. Although the mean scores of men ($M = .68$, $SD = .48$) and women ($M = .95$, $SD = .76$) suggest a considerable difference between the two categories, the variation is not statistically significant with $t(28) = -1.15$, $p = .25$. These results suggest that gender has no effect on the frequency of disagreement. Due to the low number of samples, a non-parametric test, specifically the independent samples Mann-Whitney U-test, was also performed to test the significance of gender in terms of the frequency of disagreements. Confirming the results of the previous t-test, the Mann-Whitney U test retains the null hypothesis that the number of disagreements per 100 words is the same across the categories of gender ($p = .62$).

Although the differences found in the rate of disagreement expressed by male and female undergraduate students did not prove to be of statistical significance, the assumption that women express their disagreement less frequently than men do was not substantiated by the findings either. Thus, the findings of my study cast doubt upon the general validity of claims on women's tendency to seek agreement and calls attention to cultural and contextual variables.

There are a few possible explanations for the observed patterns, among which the influence of an academic context might be the most important one. It has been

reported that disagreements and argumentation skills are highly valued in education (Nanake, 2006). In fact, one of the aims of higher education is to teach effective argumentation skills to students as well as to encourage creative and critical thinking. Thus, in educational contexts, disagreements are appreciated and regarded as a sign of engagement as well as a way of showing academic competence (ibid.). As my informants are undergraduate students, their educational background and the academic context itself might have influenced their verbal behaviour and assessment of im/politeness. This could explain why female speakers expressed their disagreement at least as frequently as male conversants did.¹¹²

However, individual differences can also be observed in the rate of disagreement expressed by the students participating in this study, which might be due to, among other things, different personality traits and/or communicative styles (see section 2.6.3, pp. 38-41). The extent to which the variable of social distance between the speakers influences the frequency of verbal disagreements will be investigated in section 4.2.3.1.

4.2.2.2 Gender and the use of PFMs.

This section investigates the impact, if any, the gender of the speaker has on the use of PFMs (RQ2.2). As discussed in section 4.2.1, approximately 37% of the disagreements that occur in my data were aggravated, nearly 29% were mitigated by the use of PFMs and 34.7% were neither mitigated nor aggravated. In order to find out how the gender of the speaker and the use of mitigators and aggravators interact, I calculated the frequency and percentage of PFMs for both genders. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.9 display the pattern of overall use of PFMs by gender.


Table 4.2
Distribution of PFMs by gender

PFM	Men		Women	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
mitigator	66	29.6	82	27.2
aggravator	79	35.4	116	38.4
no PFM	78	35	104	34.4
Total	223	100	302	100

¹¹² I would like to thank Csilla Dér and Enikő Németh T. for calling my attention to this factor.

Although Figure 4.9 does not offer any new information, the visual representation may enhance the ease of reading the distribution of PFMs, divided by the gender of the speaker.

Figure 4.9
Distribution of PFMs by gender



As Figure 4.9 demonstrates, the relative proportion of mitigated, aggravated, and neither mitigated nor aggravated disagreements is almost equally distributed by gender. In my sample, when compared to women, men tended to use fewer aggravators, more mitigators, and slightly more unmodified disagreements, i.e., disagreements that did not contain any PFMs. Thus, the patterns observed do not lend support to my initial hypothesis that female speakers use more mitigated and less aggravated disagreements than male speakers do. These results do not seem to support Guiller and Durndell's (2006) finding that women's disagreement is rarely aggravated, either.

In order to examine if there are any associations between gender and use of PFMs the Chi-square test was performed with the result of $X^2(2, N = 525) = .59, p = .74$. Since the calculated chi-square value ($p = .74$) exceeds the .05 statistical level, the analysis revealed that there is no significant relationship between the use of PFMs in disagreements and the gender of the sampled participants.


4.2.2.3 Gender and disagreement strategies.

This section investigates the influence of gender on the disagreement strategies adopted by the participants of this study, thus addressing RQ2.3. Women have generally been reported to be more polite and more indirect than men (Lakoff,

1975; Pilkington, 1992). Hence, in the current study, female speakers were predicted to employ proportionally more indirect and less direct disagreement strategies than male speakers do.¹¹³

First, the overall distribution of disagreement strategies was investigated in terms of their in/directness across the two genders. The results obtained are presented as a bar chart in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10
Overall distribution of direct, indirect, and mixed disagreements by gender



As can be seen in Figure 4.10 the research participants used about the same proportion of direct and indirect disagreements and considerably fewer mixed disagreements. Furthermore, no gender difference can be detected in the proportion of these types of disagreements. The Chi-square test also confirms that the gender of the speaker does not affect the overall distribution of disagreement strategies in terms of their in/directness with $\chi^2(2, N = 525) = .002, p = .99$.

Similarly to the overall distribution of disagreements, no noteworthy gender difference can be identified in the use of direct and indirect disagreements consisting


¹¹³ Although indirectness and politeness are linked, indirect utterances are not necessarily polite in every context. A direct question, for example, is perfectly polite between husband and wife, while an indirect one might indicate irritation. Along similar lines, the indirect polite request *Could you possibly type that letter for me?* expresses criticism and annoyance when it is told to the secretary for the fifth time during the day. Leech (1983) also notes that indirectness can be impolite in certain contexts. As an illustration, he mentions that an indirect question such as *Haven't you something to declare?* can be more impolite and threatening than its ordinary yes/no question equivalent.

It must also be kept in mind that the indirectness-politeness scale is sensitive to cultural variation. While conventionally indirect strategies (e.g. *Could you give me a pen?*) are perceived as most polite by English and Hebrew speakers, Polish and Russian speakers consider a high level of impoliteness manipulative and a waste of the hearer's time. Thus, in Polish and Russian direct strategies are preferred and regarded as polite (Ogiermann, 2009, pp. 191-192). As a result, I do not intend to equate indirectness with politeness.

of a single strategy. Both male and female speakers used more direct disagreements (61.8% vs. 60.2%)¹¹⁴ than indirect ones (38.2% vs. 39.8%) and the slight difference between the genders is of no statistical significance ($p = .75$).¹¹⁵

As for the combination of disagreement strategies regarding their in/directness, some divergent patterns can be observed across the two genders. Figure 4.11 shows that women employed more direct disagreements (1.4% vs. 7%) and slightly fewer indirect disagreements (48.6% vs. 45%). More striking differences can be detected in the use of mixed disagreements, where female speakers used notably fewer disagreements consisting of a direct strategy followed by an indirect one (40.3% vs. 25%), and much more of the reversed pattern (9.7% vs. 23%) than male speakers.

Figure 4.11
Distribution of direct and indirect disagreement strategies in complex disagreements by gender



In order to assess the associations between the gender of the speaker and the distribution of direct and indirect disagreement strategies employed in complex disagreements, the Chi-square test was performed. According to the statistical analysis, the correlation between the two variables is significant, $X^2 (3, N = 172) = 10.294, p = .016$.


For a more detailed analysis of gender differences in the use of disagreement strategies further statistical investigations were applied. First, descriptive statistics were used to explore the association between the gender of the speaker and the

¹¹⁴ When discussing gender differences, the first value refers to men, while the second one to women. This ordering of the results is followed throughout this dissertation for clarity.

¹¹⁵ $X^2 (1, N = 353) = .098$

overall distribution of single and combined disagreement strategies. The results obtained are presented as a bar chart in Figure 4.12.

Figure 4.12
Overall distribution of disagreement strategies by gender



It is apparent that men adopted the strategies of *contradictory statement* (27.08%), *explanation* (10.3%) and *disbelief* (8.1%) the most frequently in simple disagreements, while women favoured *contradictory statement* (30.1%), *disbelief* (8.6%) and *partial agreement/token agreement* (8%). Some discrepancies can be observed in the use of certain strategies in terms of their frequency in the male and in the female corpus. For instance, when compared to men, women utilized considerably more *partial agreement/token agreement* (4.9% vs. 8%) and *evaluation* (1.8% vs. 2.6%), and they accounted for all the instances of *clarification of speaker's meaning* (0.7%). The fact that men in this study were not observed to use the last function should not be taken to mean that in general men never use this disagreement strategy. This finding needs to be substantiated by further research that investigates disagreements expressed by men and women using a larger sample of speech.

As regards the complex disagreements, the following patterns can be observed: men used slightly more *partial agreement* followed by an *explanation* (10.8% vs. 9.3%) and more *contradictory statement* followed by an *explanation* (9.9% vs. 7.3%). Women, on the other hand, employed the combination of *contradictory*

statement preceded by *partial agreement* (2.7% vs. 5.3%) much more frequently than men did.

Figure 4.12 indicates that, although both men and women utilized explicit and implicit disagreement strategies as well, women in this study tended to adopt more direct strategies (e.g., *contradictory statement*, *evaluation*) than men did. This implies that women might have a more assertive communication style than has been reported in the literature.¹¹⁶ As mentioned earlier, the difference observed in the verbal behaviour of female students participating in my study might partly be due to their educational background and the university setting. Another possible explanation might be that more educated women are possibly less inclined to submissiveness to men of equal educational background than less educated women.¹¹⁷ Although the overall distribution of disagreement strategies used by men and women show some noteworthy differences, inferential statistics indicates that the association between gender and the use of disagreement strategies is not statistically significant, $\chi^2 (12, N = 525) = 8.70, p = .72$.


An examination of the overall distribution of the first disagreement strategy by gender (represented graphically in Figure 4.13) does show some differences of statistical significance. It reveals that the two strategies most frequently utilized by both men and women were *contradictory statement* and *partial agreement/token agreement*; however, they were unevenly distributed across the two genders. Women used considerably more *partial agreement/token agreement* (15.7% vs. 26.2%) and fewer *contradictory statements* (43.5% vs. 35.8%) than men did.

Furthermore, a discrepancy can be observed in the distribution of *implied contradiction* and *disbelief*, as well. The former was employed more frequently by male speakers and the latter by female speakers. Inferential statistical analysis reveals that the relationship between the gender of the speaker and the overall distribution of the first disagreement strategy is statistically significant, $\chi^2 (8, N = 525) = 16.79, p = .032$.

¹¹⁶ It is noteworthy that studies reporting women's indirectness have been carried out on women with different social and educational background, e.g. women working in a bakery (Pilkington, 1992), middle-class white women (Coates, 1989), undergraduate psychology students (Guiller & Durndell, 2006), graduate university students (Rees-Miller, 2000); committee members of a university (Edelsky, 1981).


¹¹⁷ Obviously, these explanations require further research.

Figure 4.13
Distribution of first disagreement strategy by gender



As for the second disagreement strategy, its distribution across men and women was slightly uneven (see Figure 4.14). In complex disagreements, the two second strategies most frequently used by both men and women were *explanation* and *contradictory statement*. Men adopted more *explanations* (25.1% vs. 21.5%) as a second disagreement strategy but radically fewer (2.7% vs. 9.3%) *contradictory statements* than women did.

Figure 4.14
Distribution of second disagreement strategy by gender



Another gender difference can be observed with regards to the use of *implied contradictions*, where men accounted for more than twice as many occurrences (1.8%) as women did (0.7%). However, the importance of the latter result should be

treated with caution, since the frequency of this strategy was very low. Also, due to the low frequency of almost half of the disagreement strategies, the Chi-square test could not be performed to investigate correlations between gender and the use of the second disagreement strategy. Instead, the test was performed on the strategies in terms of their directness and their relation to gender, and it showed a high correlation between the two variables, $\chi^2 (1, N = 172) = 10.19, p = .001$. Hence, the results suggest that the gender of the speaker does have a major effect on the choice of both the first and the second disagreement strategies employed.

4.2.3 Social distance and disagreement.

The primary aim of this section is to explore the interaction of social distance between the participants of the study and the expression of verbal disagreement (RQ1). Similarly to the previous section, this one is divided into three subsections, with each subsection devoted to a different research question. Section 4.2.3.1 discusses what impact, if any, the relationship of participants¹¹⁸ has on the frequency of disagreement expressed (RQ2.1). The next section (4.2.3.2) explores the interplay of social distance and the use of PFMs (RQ2.2), while section 4.2.3.3 investigates the effect of social distance on the use of disagreement strategies (RQ2.3). Statistical evidence will also be provided when applicable.


4.2.3.1 Social distance and frequency of disagreements.

Apart from gender, another variable that has been widely reported to affect the linguistic practices of participants is the social distance between interactants. In terms of social distance, Brown and Levinson's (1987) model posits that the degree of politeness increases with the increase of social distance between interlocutors. As a consequence, it predicts that fewer face-threatening acts, i.e., disagreements, will be performed when there is greater social distance between speaker and hearer.

The descriptive analysis reveals that the social distance between participants affected the frequency of disagreements as predicted. As can be seen in Figure 4.15, interactants were more likely to express their opposing opinion when they had a close relationship with each other.

¹¹⁸ One needs to bear in mind, however, that relationships are not static but rather dynamic entities. For instance, a romantic partner at a certain time might be just a friend another time and vice versa.

Figure 4.15
Interaction between social distance and frequency of disagreements



The graph clearly demonstrates that overall, couples and siblings disagreed with each other twice as frequently as strangers did (1.05 tokens/100 words vs. 0.57 token/100 words respectively)¹¹⁹. This finding supports our initial hypothesis that the frequency of disagreements increases with a decrease in the social distance between participants.

An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the frequency of disagreements across the two social distance categories, which showed a significant difference in the means for couples and siblings ($M = 1.16$, $SD = .73$) and strangers ($M = .59$, $SD = .45$). The variation proved to be statistically significant with $t(28) = -2.66$, $p = .013$. These results suggest that social distance has a highly significant effect on the frequency of disagreements. Due to the low number of samples, the Mann-Whitney U-test was also performed to test the significance of the two variables, on the basis of which we can reject the null hypothesis that the number of disagreement per 100 words is the same across the two social distance categories ($p = .012$).

It is also evident from Figure 4.15 that women conveyed disagreement more frequently than men did in both social distance categories, although the discrepancy between the rate of disagreement produced by the two genders was highly remarkable in the case of couples and siblings, where female speakers (1.36 tokens/100 words) employed almost twice as many disagreements as male speakers (0.76 token/100 words) did.


¹¹⁹ When discussing differences between the two social distance categories, the first value refers to couples and siblings, while the second one to strangers. This ordering of the results is followed throughout this dissertation for clarity.

Thus, we can claim that both social distance and gender seem to influence the quantity of disagreements employed. To find out whether any qualitative differences exist in the way disagreement is expressed in the two social distance categories, see the subsequent sections.

4.2.3.2 Social distance and the use of PFMs.

With the increase of social distance between participants, it is assumed that the use of mitigated disagreements also increases and aggravated disagreements decreases. It is also presupposed that when compared to strangers, couples and siblings will employ more disagreements that are neither mitigated nor aggravated,¹²⁰ as these overt disagreements are considered highly face-threatening in settings where the social distance is greater between interlocutors. However, when the distribution (percentage) of PFMs is plotted onto the two categories of social distance (see Figure 4.16), these assumptions only partially hold true for this study.

Figure 4.16
Distribution of PFMs in both social distance categories



As can be seen in Figure 4.16, couples and siblings employed aggravated disagreements the most frequently, followed by disagreements in which no PFMs were employed, and the least frequently used disagreements being the ones including mitigators. Conversely, strangers used the highest proportion of neither mitigated nor aggravated disagreements and the lowest proportion of mitigated disagreements with aggravated disagreements in between. These patterns do not fully support our hypothesis.

¹²⁰ that is, fewer PFMs in general


A comparison of the results of each of the three disagreement types in the two social distance categories reveals that the figures are similar. Mitigated disagreements accounted for about the same percentage (28% vs. 28.4%) in both social distance categories, while aggravated disagreements accounted for a few percent less (39.2% vs. 34.5%), and disagreements in which no PFMs were employed for a few percent more (32.8% vs. 37.1%) in the category of strangers. These findings, with the exception of unmodified disagreements, support our original assumption. However, the results of the Chi-square test do not indicate any significant differences in the use of PFMs in terms of the social distance between the participants of this study, $\chi^2(2, N = 525) = 1.47, p = .478$.

4.2.3.3 Social distance and disagreement strategies.

As discussed in section 4.2.3.1, there are statistically significant quantitative differences between the two social distance categories investigated in this study in terms of the frequency of disagreements. In this section, special attention is given to the qualitative differences between the two groups with regard to the adopted disagreement strategies.

Brown and Levinson's (1987) discussion of factors influencing the choice of politeness strategies (pp. 71-83) implies that participants prefer more direct disagreement strategies to less direct ones when, among other factors, there is less social distance between the interlocutors. This is due to Brown and Levinson's postulate that increased facework is needed as social distance increases.

Figure 4.17
Distribution of disagreement strategies in both social distance categories



In order to investigate whether Brown and Levinson's claim is valid for the data collected for this study, first the overall distribution of direct, indirect, and mixed disagreements was mapped onto social distance, illustrated by Figure 4.17 (see the previous page).

As can be observed, couples and siblings employed proportionally more direct, fewer indirect, and fewer mixed disagreements than strangers, which is in accordance with Brown and Levinson's claim. Inferential statistics performed on the figures above, however, does not confirm the correlation between the preference for in/direct disagreement and the social distance between participants, as the Chi-square value slightly exceeds the 5% critical rate ($p = .055$).¹²¹

As for the disagreements consisting of either a single direct or an indirect disagreement strategy, the following distribution can be identified illustrated by Table 4.3: couples and siblings used more direct and fewer indirect disagreements than strangers did, which also supports Brown and Levinson's claims.

Table 4.3
Distribution of direct and indirect simple disagreements by social distance

disagreement	Couples & siblings		Strangers	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
direct	132	65.3	83	55
indirect	70	34.7	68	45
Total	202	100	151	100


The differences noted in the use of direct and indirect strategies in simple disagreements are of statistical significance with $\chi^2 (1, N = 353) = 3.91, p = .048$.

Regarding the combination of direct and indirect disagreement strategies in complex disagreements, the following patterns can be observed in the two social distance categories illustrated by Figure 4.18:

¹²¹ $\chi^2 (2, N = 525) = 5.81$

Figure 4.18

Distribution of direct and indirect disagreement strategies in complex disagreements in both social distance categories




In contrast to simple disagreements, couples and siblings utilized proportionally more complex disagreements of both direct (6.4% vs. 2.6%) and indirect types (51.1% vs. 41%) than strangers. Furthermore, the former used remarkably fewer disagreements consisting of a direct strategy followed by an indirect one (23.4% vs. 41%) and more of the reversed pattern (19.1 vs. 15.4) than the latter. In order to assess the associations between social distance and the distribution of direct and indirect strategies utilized in complex disagreements, the Chi-square test was used, which indicates no correlation between the two variables with $\chi^2(3, N = 172) = 6.82, p = .078$.

For a more detailed analysis, the distribution of each disagreement strategy was mapped onto social distance. The results are presented graphically in Figure 4.19 (p. 161), illustrating the overall distribution and patterns of simple and complex disagreements in the social distance categories.

Figure 4.19

Overall distribution of disagreement strategies in both social distance categories



As can be seen, in this study, strangers employed fewer *partial/token agreements*, *contradictory statements* and *challenges* but more *explanations*, *implied contradictions*, *statements of disagreement*, *disbeliefs*, and *evaluations* than couples and siblings did. The greatest difference in the proportion of disagreement strategies emerged in the categories of *explanation* (6.4% vs. 11.8%), *implied contradiction* (4.7% vs. 8.7%), *stating disagreement* (1.4% vs. 2.6%), *disbelief* (6.8% vs. 10.5%), and *challenge* (5.1% vs. 3.1%). It is interesting to note that the strategy of *clarification of speaker's meaning* was utilized exclusively by couples and siblings; however, we would need a larger sample to draw any conclusions from this finding.


As regards the combinations of disagreement strategies, some discrepancies can be observed across the two social distance categories. Participants with close relationships between them used *partial agreement* followed by an *explanation* (11.5%) the most frequently and the second most preferred combination was a *contradictory statement* preceding an *explanation* (7.4%), while the reverse order can be observed in the category of strangers. The third most frequently used combination (i.e., P/TA+CST) was almost equally distributed in the two social distance categories (4.1% vs. 4.4%).

The fact that strangers used proportionally more *explanations* and *implied contradictions*, fewer *contradictory statements*, but at the same time more *statements of disagreement*, *disbeliefs*, and *evaluations* than couples and siblings did indicate that strangers did not always prefer indirect disagreement strategies and sometimes the need to convey opposition outweighed consideration of the other's face needs. The results of this study indicate that social distance between participants has a considerable impact on the employed disagreement strategies, although the calculated Chi-square value slightly exceeds the 5% critical rate, $\chi^2(12, N = 525) = 20.12, p = .055$.

Considering the overall distribution of the first disagreement strategy in both social distance categories, the following patterns can be observed graphically in Figure 4.20 (see the following page): a disproportionate distribution can be detected in the two social distance categories, with strangers accounting for a greater percentage of the strategies of *explanation*, *implied contradiction*, *stating disagreement* and *disbelief*, and for a smaller percentage of the other disagreement strategies in comparison to couples and siblings. These patterns, with the exception of *stating disagreement* and *disbelief*, are in line with Brown and Levinson's claim

and also support my original hypothesis that strangers favour more indirect strategies when expressing disagreement. The greatest discrepancies between the two social distance categories emerge in the use of *implied contradiction* (4.4% vs. 11.8%), *stating disagreement* (1.4% vs. 3.5%), *evaluation* (3.7% vs. 1.3%), *challenge* (8.4% vs. 3.5%), *disbelief* (6.8% vs. 11.4%), and *explanation* (8.1% vs. 14%).

Figure 4.20
Distribution of first disagreement strategy in both social distance categories



The Chi-square test was performed to find out whether the observed differences are statistically significant and the results obtained show that the correlation between social distance (i.e., social distance between participants) and the first disagreement strategy is highly significant, $\chi^2 (8, N = 525) = 30.3, p < .001$.

As far as the use of the second disagreement strategy is concerned, it is unevenly distributed between the two social distance categories. As Figure 4.21 (see the following page) illustrates, when a combination of strategies is employed to convey disagreement, the two social distance groups differ in the use of the second strategy. For instance, it can be observed that tokens of *clarification of speaker's meaning* and *disbelief* occurred exclusively in the context of strangers disagreeing with each other, while they did not utilize the strategy of *stating disagreement* at all. However, these results need to be treated with caution, as different results may have been found had the sample size been larger.

Figure 4.21
Distribution of second disagreement strategy in both social distance categories




Figure 4.21 also shows that strangers used more *explanations*, but fewer *contradictory statements*, *implied contradictions* and *challenges* than couples and siblings did. Thus, the figures suggest that similarly to the first disagreement strategy, except for the categories of *stating disagreement* and *challenges*, the preference for indirect disagreement strategies increases with the increase of social distance between the participants. As a result of low frequencies, the Chi-square test could not be conducted to investigate the association between social distance and use of the second disagreement strategy. Thus, just like in the case of gender and the use of the second disagreement strategy, the test was performed on the second strategies in terms of their in/directness and their relation to social distance. The statistical analysis does not show any correlations between the two variables, $\chi^2(1, N = 172) = 1.98, p = .159$.

All in all, the results do not seem to support the bulge theory (Wolfson, 1988)¹²², which proposes that interlocutors at the two extremes of the social distance continuum exhibit very similar speech behaviour as opposed to the middle section. One might argue that the results above do not test the bulge theory since the current research did not include any categories from the middle of the social distance continuum. Nevertheless, when we compare the results of the two social distance categories investigated in this study, we can observe major differences.

¹²² Boxer's (1993) study did not validate the bulge theory either and Das (2010) only found partial support for the bulge pattern in his data.

4.3 Hypotheses Revisited

The aim of this section is to revisit the hypotheses laid out in Chapter One and to discover whether they are confirmed (if so, to what extent) or refuted by the findings of my study. In Chapter 1.2 two sets of hypotheses were postulated to address the second and third sets of research questions.

4.3.1 Hypothesis 2.

The first set of hypotheses was formulated to examine how the gender of the speaker affects both the frequency of disagreements and the means by which they are expressed. The three hypotheses of the first set are repeated below for ease of explanation of the results.

- H2 There will be both qualitative and quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement employed by Hungarian undergraduate students in terms of the gender of the speaker. **(partially supported)**
- H2.1 Female undergraduate students will express verbal disagreement less frequently than male undergraduate students. **(not supported)**
- H2.2 Women participating in my study will tend to use more mitigated and fewer aggravated disagreements than men. **(not supported)**
- H2.3 Female undergraduate students will favor less face-threatening, indirect strategies when expressing disagreement, while male undergraduates will be apt to employ more direct disagreement strategies. **(partially supported)**

In investigating the patterns of association between the gender of the speaker and overall frequency of use of disagreements (i.e., H2.1), the study found that female participants used a much higher rate of disagreements than male speakers did, thus not lending support for H2.1. However, it has to be noted that the differences found between the two genders did not prove to be statistically significant.

In terms of the interplay of the gender and the use of PFMs (i.e., H2.2), the results of the study revealed no significant differences in the overall distribution of PFMs, and the Chi-square test showed no statistically significant correlations

between the two categorical variables. Interestingly enough, the distribution of PFMs displayed exactly the same pattern in the data of both genders, i.e., both male and female undergraduates employed aggravators most of the time and mitigators the least frequently, with no PFMs used in between.

In investigating the effect of gender on the use of disagreement strategies, the study found partial support for H2.3, i.e., both males and females employed direct and indirect disagreement strategies equally. However, women were more likely to utilize direct strategies when the overall distribution of strategies was considered, although the pattern was not found to be of statistical significance. In complex disagreements, in comparison to men, women used more direct and fewer indirect disagreements. Furthermore, female students employed fewer disagreements with the direct+indirect pattern than the reverse, while the opposite hold true for male students. These differences proved to be statistically significant. Similarly, strong correlations were found between gender and the distribution of both the first and the second disagreement strategies. In the distribution of the first disagreement strategy, the observed gender differences lent support to H2.3 in the majority of cases and the patterns were statistically significant. On the other hand, the use of the second disagreement strategy did not follow the expected pattern.

Thus, the gender of the speaker was found to influence the frequency of verbal disagreements and the overall use of PFMs, albeit opposite the expected direction, while the hypothesis that female speakers would be more likely to adopt indirect strategies when expressing disagreement was only partially supported. In conclusion, the first general hypothesis that there are both quantitative and qualitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement in terms of the gender of the speaker was partially confirmed by the findings of the study, although not always in the way it had been predicted.

4.3.2 Hypothesis 3.

In this section, the second set of hypotheses exploring the interplay of social distance and verbal disagreement is revisited, repeated below for convenience:

H3 There will be both qualitative and quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement employed by Hungarian

undergraduate students in terms of the social distance between participants. **(partially supported)**

- H3.1 The frequency of disagreements expressed will increase with the decrease of the social distance between participants. **(supported)**
- H3.2 In comparison to couples and siblings, strangers will be inclined to use more mitigated, fewer neither mitigated nor aggravated, and even fewer aggravated disagreements. **(not supported)**
- H3.3 Strangers will use proportionally fewer direct and more indirect disagreement strategies than couples and siblings. **(partially supported)**

In investigating the patterns of association between the social distance between the speakers and overall frequency of use of disagreements (i.e., H3.1), the research findings revealed that H3.1 is fully supported in that an inverse relationship could be observed between social distance and the frequency of disagreements. In other words, the rate of disagreement used decreased in a linear fashion as the social distance between interlocutors increased.

As regards H3.2, the results of the current study partly confirm the prediction that more mitigated, fewer unmodified and even fewer aggravated disagreements would be used in the category of strangers than in the case of couples or siblings. The descriptive analysis revealed that the proportion of PFMs, with the exception of unmodified disagreements, matched the expected patterns. However, the relationship between overall use of PFMs and the social distance between the speakers did not prove to be statistically significant.

In terms of the impact of social distance on the utilized disagreement strategies, the overall distribution of strategies showed partial support for H3.3, i.e., strangers did not always employ more indirect disagreement strategies than did couples and siblings. However, the Chi-square did not find the relationship between social distance and overall disagreement strategies statistically significant, although the calculated value was just slightly over .05. As for simple disagreements, the predicted patterns were identified in the data and the differences across the two social distance categories proved to be statistically significant. In complex disagreements, however, the distribution of in/direct strategies did not fully support H3.3, since strangers employed fewer indirect disagreements than couples and

siblings did, although these differences do not bear any statistical significance. As far as the first and second disagreement strategies are concerned, except for the category of stating disagreement, the patterns found resembled those anticipated and the correlation between the use of the first disagreement strategy and social distance of the interlocutors was of statistical significance.

To sum up, in my study the impact of social distance between interlocutors proved to be highly influential on the rate of verbal disagreements, but predictions about the use of PFMs and the strategies employed to convey disagreement were only partially supported. Similarly to H2, the second general hypothesis (H3) predicting both qualitative and quantitative differences in the expression of verbal disagreement in relation to social distance was validated by the findings of this study, although sometimes not in the expected way.

4.4 Miscellaneous Findings

The following subsections will discuss some additional findings which were yielded by this study and judged to be noteworthy. Section 4.4.1, for instance, will investigate the functions of unfinished disagreeing utterances while drawing on some relevant literature in Hungarian. The subsequent section (4.4.2) will note some important issues with regard to evaluations occurring in the data and the last section (4.4.3) will comment on the structure of verbal disagreements.

4.4.1 Unfinished disagreeing utterances.

As previously mentioned (cf. sections 3.3.3 and 4.2.1), in my data approximately 6.5% of the tokens of disagreement were unfinished utterances. In some cases they only consisted of a single word, yet the illocutionary act of disagreement was clear and their function could also be identified. The majority (22 tokens out of 34) of these unfinished disagreements utilized the strategy *partial/token agreement*, expressed by (*Hát*) *igen/jó/oké, de* (~ (*Well*) *yes/fine/OK, but*).¹²³ The second most frequently occurring (9 tokens out of 34) unfinished disagreement in my corpus was *Há:t... (We:ll...)*, pronounced with vowel lengthening and rising

¹²³ See Example 10 on pp. 78-79.

intonation.¹²⁴ Instances of this kind of disagreement were categorized as expressing doubt/disbelief implicitly.¹²⁵

As regards *hát* (*well*), it is the most frequently used PFM in the data: out of the 525 tokens of disagreement, 96 (18.28%) contained *hát*. This finding is in agreement with that of Dér and Markó (2007, 2010), which reported *hát* as one of the most commonly occurring discourse markers in Hungarian.

The function of *well* as a discourse marker is widely investigated in the English literature (e.g., Furkó, 2007; Koczogh, 2007; Lakoff, 1973; Schiffrin, 1985, 1987, etc.) and that of *hát* has also been mapped in Hungarian (e.g., Dér, 2010; Kiefer, 1988; Németh T., 1998; Schirm, 2011). However, while the face-preserving function of *well* in disagreements is widely acknowledged, the association between its Hungarian equivalent (*hát*) and disagreements has only been noted very recently (cf. Schirm, 2011; Furkó & Dudás, 2012).¹²⁶ Thus, this study also complements previous research on the functions of *hát* in Hungarian.

4.4.2 Evaluations.

The disagreement strategy of *evaluation* is a very direct and highly face-threatening way of expressing opposition, since it criticizes and often condemns the interlocutor's opinion. It may have a damaging effect on the communication and could result in a communication breakdown. Accordingly, evaluation has a low occurrence (2.3%) in the corpus.

It must be noted that one third of the tokens of evaluations were not reactions to the other interlocutor's previous utterance but to the statements given in Task one read out loud by one of the participants. Thus, these evaluations did not pose a threat to the other's face.

4.4.3 Structure of disagreements revisited.

Although disagreement mainly occurred as a second pair part immediately following the first pair part of an adjacency pair in my data, in a few cases the

¹²⁴ See Example 11 on p. 79.

¹²⁵ The ways doubt/disbelief was expressed in my data demonstrated several degrees of implicitness. The degree of implicitness of *Hát:t...* is similar to that of *Á:*.

¹²⁶ However, none of these sources investigate disagreements *per se*. Furkó & Dudás (2012, p. 148), for example, mention in a footnote that *hát* is used as a hedging device before the compliment responses 'disagreement' and 'qualification'.

disagreeing utterance was preceded by an inserted sequence, illustrated by Example 46.

Example 46

F10 Mert szerintem ő {a Vőlegény} ilyen áldozat (nevetve). Meg én megértem, hogy azt mondta, hogy vége.

Because I think he {the Fiancé} is a kind of victim (laughing). And I understand why he said that it was over.

M10 Persze, csak mármint ő ő volt a második? A Vőlegény?

Sure, but you mean he he was the second one? The Fiancé?

F10 Aha. Először ő volt a második.

Yeah. First, he was the second one.

→ M10 Hát ^•annyira azért nem áldozat|| mert hogyha a /•nő mármint a \•Szépleány /•elszökik tőle|| akkor [@@@ \•valami oka] volt rá||.

Well, he isn't much of a victim, because if the woman, I mean the Pretty girl runs away from him, [@@@ she must have had a reason] for it.

In Example 46, the disagreement in the last line is a reaction to the utterance in the first line. The two turns inserted in between serve to clarify, thus contributing to the efficiency of communication.

Another point is that disagreement in my data sometimes stretched over several turns, not just an adjacency pair. As a result of the aforementioned points, the examination of disagreement on a micro-level exclusively would miss the dynamic character of disagreement. Therefore, tokens of disagreement that reverberated through several turns and instances in which the disagreement and its prompt were separated by an inserted sequence were also analysed in this research ensuring a more comprehensive analysis of verbal disagreement.

4.5 Definition of *Verbal Disagreement* Reconsidered

The aim of this section is to revisit the initial definition of *verbal disagreement* proposed in section 2.1.3 (Towards a working definition of verbal disagreement). In light of the results of the empirical research presented in Chapters 3 and 4, the original definition drawing upon speech act theory needs to be reconsidered, as the theoretical framework proved to be too rigid to account for the dynamics of

disagreement. Instead of conceptualizing disagreement as a speech act, it is rather considered a “situated activity, interactionally managed by interlocutors” (Sifianou, in press, p. 4), which has to be interpreted in context. Another important thing to remember is that disagreement can be generated by all kinds of prompts, including non-verbal expressions of opinion as well. Furthermore, as noted in the previous section, this prior prompt does not need to precede the disagreement immediately; they may be separated by sequences of talk. Thus, keeping in mind the above mentioned points as well as the four notes regarding truth value, speaker’s meaning and the specification of full and partial inconsistency (cf. section 2.1.3, pp. 13-15), the following definition for verbal disagreement is suggested:

Verbal disagreement is a situated activity whose function is to express an opinion (or belief) the propositional content or illocutionary force of which is – or is intended to be – partly or fully inconsistent with that of a prior (non-verbal) utterance.

The main modification to the definition is conceptualizing disagreement as an activity instead of a speech act. Some other slight alterations can also be observed in the newly proposed definition, resulting in a definition that is hopefully capable of capturing the complex nature of verbal disagreement.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the research questions posed in Chapter One were reiterated and addressed through the presentation and analysis of the results of descriptive and inferential analyses applied to the data. Next, the hypotheses were repeated and investigated in light of the research results. The study revealed that both variables of the gender of the speaker and the social distance between them had a notable influence on the frequency of verbal disagreements and/or the means of its expression. It supported the claim that with the increase of social distance between participants the rate of disagreement decreases. However, my analysis lent only partial support to the hypotheses that strangers would use more mitigated disagreements and more indirect strategies when expressing dissent than those who occupied the other end of the social distance scale (i.e., couples and siblings). The research findings also revealed that, contrary to expectations, women participating in

this study tended to express disagreement much more frequently and often in a more expressive and straightforward way than men did. These results refute previous findings on the communicative style of women and imply that the female speakers participating in this study were willing to sacrifice attending the other's face for the sake of efficiency of communication or the preservation of one's own face. Some other alternative explanations (e.g. the influence of education, personality, etc.) were also offered to account for the observed differences. In section 4.4, some further findings were presented in connection with unfinished verbal disagreement and the structure of disagreements occurring in the corpus. Finally, in the closing section of the chapter a new definition of verbal disagreement is proposed in light of the empirical research.

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents, first, a brief overview of the aims, hypotheses and methods of the research (section 5.2), followed by a summary of the key findings and discussion of implications (section 5.3). The contributions (section 5.4) as well as the limitations of the study (section 5.5) are assessed subsequently. The chapter concludes with some possible directions for future research (section 5.6).

5.2 Overview

The aim of this study has been to analyze the interface of gender, social distance and the expression of verbal disagreement in linguistic data, collected from mixed-sex interactions of Hungarian undergraduate students. *Verbal disagreement* is defined as a situated activity whose function is to express an opinion (or belief), the propositional content or illocutionary force of which is – or is intended to be – partly or fully inconsistent with that of a prior (non-verbal) utterance. The research for this dissertation has been grounded in speech act theory, politeness and impoliteness theories and previous research on disagreement.

In section 1.2, three general and seven specific research questions were posed, which this dissertation has sought to answer through collection and interpretation of empirical data. A triangulated approach was adopted in order to collect data by means of multiple instruments: audio-recorded, task-based conversations of mix-sex dyads and background questionnaires. The research methodology employed was a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to enrich the interpretation of the results and produce a greater insight into verbal disagreements in Hungarian. The data collected was analysed using a multi-step method including coding schemes as well as inferential and descriptive statistical models.

In Chapter 3, a model, which differentiates between functional strategies and linguistic items that modify the force of disagreement (termed *pragmatic force modifiers*), has been laid out to investigate verbal disagreements occurring in the corpus. Additionally, some pre-sequence functions have been identified. A constant feedback between linguistic data and theory ensured the development of a

metatheoretical categorization scheme that is capable of capturing the complex nature of disagreements. It was proposed that when expressing disagreement, Hungarian undergraduate students utilize one or a combination of some of the following strategies: *partial agreement/token agreement, explanation, contradictory statement, implied contradiction, stating disagreement, challenge, disbelief, evaluation, clarification of speaker's meaning*. Two groups of pragmatic force modifiers (*mitigators* and *aggravators*) were also identified including linguistic items and devices that either mitigate or aggravate the pragmatic force of disagreement. *Mitigators* contain the devices of *humour, hedge, impersonalization, tag question, conditional* and *term of endearment*; while *aggravators* include *irony/sarcasm, intensifier, interjection, verbal shadowing/repetition, rhetorical question* and *tag question*. Naturally, these lists as well as the disagreement strategies identified are restricted to the items that arose from my data; they do not purport to be lists of all possible strategies and pragmatic force modifiers. Further research in different contexts might find additional strategies and/or PFMs. Similarly, although the framework has been applied successfully to the linguistic data of this study, it awaits future research to test its validity.

The study set out (1) to examine verbal disagreement as it is accomplished linguistically in the conversations of Hungarian undergraduate students, (2) to map the functional spectrum of disagreements occurring in the data, and (3) to determine the effects of the variables of gender and social distance on the expression of verbal disagreement. Based on previous literature (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987; García, 2008; Pilkington, 1992), it has been hypothesized that both the gender of the speaker and the social distance between interlocutors would have an impact on the expression of verbal disagreement employed by the research subjects qualitatively and quantitatively as well. In particular, women were expected to disagree less frequently and in a more indirect way than men, as social equilibrium is more highly esteemed by the former group. It was also assumed that with the increase of social distance both the rate of disagreement and the directness of disagreement would decrease.

5.3 Results and Implications

The linguistic data investigated has shown that verbal disagreement in Hungarian was expressed in several ways: via a single disagreement strategy

(termed *simple disagreement*) or with a combination of two or sometimes even three strategies (termed *complex disagreement*), optionally modified by mitigators or aggravators and preceded by a pre-sequence. These results yielded insight into the creativity with which Hungarian undergraduate students can convey disagreement by combining different strategies and linguistic items/devices. The present study has shown that the research subjects employed both direct and indirect disagreement strategies; however, in general, overt disagreement was preferred over covert disagreement. Hence, the results indicate that in the majority of the cases the speaker's need to express disagreement prevailed over considerations of the addressee's face. The findings might also imply that, similarly to Polish and Russian, more direct strategies are preferred over indirect ones in Hungarian and they are not perceived as impolite. Naturally, further research is needed to test the validity of the previous supposition.

One of the most important findings to emerge from the study is that female Hungarian undergraduates do express disagreement on a regular basis, as the female speakers participating in the research employed a considerably higher proportion of disagreement than men did. Moreover, in comparison to men, women also tended to use more aggravated, less mitigated and only slightly less unmodified disagreements. In addition, in my sample, women had a tendency to utilize more direct strategies than men. In general, therefore, it seems that the women participating in my research have a more assertive communication style than it has been reported in the vast majority of previous literature. Taken together, these findings suggest that the gender of the speaker appears to index the expression of verbal disagreement in this study. The findings also call attention to the fact that the generalization that women highly value social harmony and thus are more hesitant to express disagreement may not apply to all situations or domains. As an explanation for the findings reported above, the influence of context, the role of higher education, different personality and conversational styles were offered.

The study also provided important empirical evidence that social distance between participants has a vital role in conveying disagreement. A statistically significant inverse relationship was found between the rate of disagreements and social distance. That is, the frequency of disagreements increased with the decrease of the social distance. However, there was no observable preference for mitigated disagreements and indirect strategies as the intimacy between interlocutors

decreased. This suggests that expressing disagreement and defending one's point of view outweigh the desire to satisfy the needs of the other's face. The results of the present research indicate that both gender and social distance have a significant impact on the participants' linguistic performance.

5.4 Contributions

The research conducted for this dissertation primarily contributes to the fields of pragmatics and sociolinguistics. It provides a new avenue to understand the interplay of language (more specifically disagreement), gender and social distance from an interactional sociolinguistic perspective.

The present study contributes to pragmatic theory by providing an in-depth examination of verbal disagreement based on empirical evidence. The analyses and the research findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4 refined our understanding of verbal disagreement by investigating naturally-occurring linguistic data and by setting up a framework that provides the necessary tools to do so. The previous versions of the framework were tested and validated several times and changes were made accordingly until it reached its ultimate form. This version of the framework proved to be a suitable tool for analysing the disagreements occurring in the data. Future research is warranted to test its applicability in other contexts and optionally to determine whether it might be used to address questions of culturally specific parameters.

Apart from the framework set up for analysis, another merit of the research lies in the fact that it shed light on some disagreement strategies (e.g., *implied contradiction*, *clarification of speaker's meaning*, *stating disagreement*) that have not been identified in previous literature and others (e.g., *disbelief*) that have been noted in Hungarian literature exclusively. The study of whether these strategies are unique to the Hungarian language is another avenue for further research.

The research also contributes to the field of sociopragmatics by investigating an unexplored aspect of im/politeness behaviour, that is, the effect of the factors of gender and social distance on the expression of verbal disagreements in terms of frequency and the means of expression. The present research provides insight into the sociopragmatics of contemporary Hungarian communication, specifically the disagreement management of Hungarian undergraduate students, a domain that has

not been researched to date. In addition, this research offers a counterbalance to the dominance of English (and other languages) in available research on disagreement.

In a broader sense, the findings presented in this work provide valuable insight into the norms and values of a specific Hungarian speech community and thus advance sociolinguistic knowledge in the fields of im/politeness universals and Hungarian pragmatics. Thus, the broader impact of this study includes the dissemination of a greater understanding of cross-cultural universality or variability in im/politeness behaviour that includes the influence of gender and social distance on im/politeness practices.

Finally, the research presented also has pedagogical implications. Foreigners' attitude towards and perception of disagreements may not match those of native speakers of Hungarian, which could lead to pragmatic failure in their interactions with Hungarians. The natural(istic) data collected for analysis provide real examples of Hungarian language use that language learners could use as models. With these examples, teachers of Hungarian as a second language can provide the growing number of international students living and studying in Hungary with the tools needed to make informed choices about how to disagree in Hungarian, if they desire to do so.

5.5 Limitations

A number of caveats need to be acknowledged regarding the present study. First, the most obvious limitation of the research is the relatively small sample size,¹²⁷ which inherently restricts the implications of the results. The number of participants was too small to generalize beyond the context of the study. With a larger sample, other differences might have emerged. Still, the small population did not diminish the importance of the two discussed variables in terms of their impact on the expression of disagreement. Although the findings are only indicative of the linguistic behaviour of Hungarian people at large, I believe that they imply important tendencies and it is hoped that they will contribute to and spark future studies on disagreements in Hungarian. In addition, the study used a convenience sample which also restricts the generalizability of the research results, since non-randomization may affect the validity of samples.

The research findings of this study were further limited by the inherent limitations of the instruments, and the statistical treatment of data collected. For

¹²⁷ However, an attempt was made to counterbalance the small sample by compiling a corpus that contains a high occurrence of disagreement.

instance, while it was beneficial to employ a task-based, semi-structured format to record conversations of undergraduate students, it might have harmed the authenticity of the data.

Another pitfall of this study lies in the criterion utilized to identify tokens of disagreement. Verbal disagreements were examined on a micro level, that is only those tokens were analyzed that occurred in an adjacency pair (into which a short inserted sequence might have been inserted). Needless to say, disagreements can take several turns to display and close. For considerations of space, instances such as these are not included in this dissertation.

A potential limitation of this study is its subjectivity, to which both interpretation of speakers' meaning and the use of descriptive analysis inherently subscribe. It was attempted to reduce subjectivity with the verification stage of the research involving 100 participants and the use of both qualitative and quantitative analyses to interpret the results.

Furthermore, although every effort was made to make participants feel comfortable during the recording session, the participants' linguistic behaviour might have been influenced by the presence of the microphone and the semi-public domain in which the conversations took place. As the participants were aware of the fact that their conversation would be listened to and analysed by a third party, their linguistic performance might be somewhat different from dyadic conversation in a strictly private domain.

Finally, the research did not control all the factors (e.g., personality) that are likely to influence the linguistic output of participants. Such intangible factors may also be important determinants in forming disagreements.

5.6 Directions for Future Research

Further research that would contribute to a fuller understanding of verbal disagreements in Hungarian is warranted, and a few possibilities are presented below. These directions for future research derive partly from the findings and partly from the limitations of the present study.

Examining disagreement across a variety of contexts using larger samples of speech would ensure a more comprehensive assessment of the (linguistic) expression of disagreement in Hungarian. Further research that investigates verbal disagreements in different age groups would also be of benefit.

In the present study, due to time restrictions and limited resources, verbal disagreements were scrutinized in a corpus of mixed-sex dyads. It would also be interesting to carry out some research similar to this one on disagreements in same-sex interactions in order to see whether any qualitative and/or quantitative differences exist between the two groups.

Finally, any future studies comparing Hungarian and another language in terms of the expression of disagreement would be beneficial for a deeper understanding of cross-cultural communication. A comparative study of linguistic behaviour between Hungarians and people from other cultures could shed light on the impact of culture on speakers' im/politeness behaviour in terms of gender and social distance. A comparative study of disagreement management would also better demonstrate marked differences in cross-cultural values, practices and assumptions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A Task sheet one

1. Feladat

Az alábbi felmérés elolvasása után vitassa meg beszélőtársával a felmérés eredményeinek mindegyikét.

A hazai Szonda Ipsos Média-, Vélemény- és Piackutató Intézet valamint a chicagói National Opinion Research Centre közös 2010. márciusában a felnőtt lakosság megkérdezésével készült nemzetközi felmérése szerint a következő tendenciák figyelhetők meg.

A megkérdezettek többsége úgy véli, hogy...

1. *minden országban alkalmazni kellene a halálbüntetést.*
2. *az eutanázia bűn.*
3. *illegálissá kellene tenni az abortuszt.*
4. *a férfiak intelligensebbek a nőknél.*
5. *az új járványok ellen mindenkinek feltétlenül be kellene oltatnia magát.*
6. *a felsőoktatási intézményekben be kellene vezetni a kötelező tandíjat, de költségét a hallgató tanulmányi átlagától kellene függővé tenni.*
7. *a felsőoktatási intézményekben a hallgatóknak nagyobb beleszólást kellene biztosítani a tanterv kialakításába.*
8. *a nők biztonságosabban és megfontoltabban vezetnek, mint a férfiak.*
9. *a férfiak jobban főznek, mint a nők.*

Task 1

After reading the survey below, discuss each of the results with your conversational partner.

According to an international survey carried out in March 2010* in the adult population the following tendencies can be observed:

The majority of people think that ...

1. *capital punishment should be used in every country.*
2. *euthanasia is a sin.*
3. *abortion should be made illegal.*
4. *men are more intelligent than women.*
5. *everybody should definitely get themselves vaccinated against new diseases.*
6. *compulsory tuition fee should be introduced into higher education but the amount for a semester should depend on the student's grades.*
7. *in higher education, students should have a bigger say in the development of the curriculum.*
8. *women drive more safely and carefully than men do.*
9. *men can cook better than women do.*

* by the National Opinion Research Center and the Hungarian Ipsos Media, Advertisement, Market, and Opinion Research Institute

SZÉPLEÁNY

„Volt egyszer egy SZÉPLÁNY, akinek bár VŐLEGÉNYE volt, szerelmes lett a SZÉPFIÚBA. A SZÉPFIÚ a folyóparton élt, akárcsak a lány, de a túlsó oldalon. A szerelmeseket elválasztó folyó széles volt, csak csónakkal lehetett átkelni rajta. A SZÉPLÁNY át akart menni a túlsó partra, hogy meglátogassa a SZÉPFIÚT, de nem volt csónakja. Így aztán elment a RÉVÉSZHEZ. A RÉVÉSZ azt mondta, hogy hajlandó átvinni őt a másik oldalra, de csak akkor, ha fele vagyonát (az egész sem volt sok) odaadja a lány. A SZÉPLÁNYNAK a VŐLEGÉNYE szintén a folyó túlsó partján lakott. Még nem tudta, hogy a lány másba lett szerelmes. A SZÉPLÁNY pedig nem tudta, mit tegyen. Elment tehát a BÖLCSHÖZ, hogy segítséget kérjen. Elmondta a BÖLCSNEK a gondját, aki azonban nem adott egyértelmű tanácsot a SZÉPLÁNY problémájára: Hallgass a szívedre! Majd az idő kiforogja! A SZÉPLÁNY végül úgy döntött, hogy átmegy szerelméhez, még ha fele vagyonát is kell fizetnie érte. A túlsó parton azonban HARAMIÁK kezébe került, akik a folyóparti erdő urai voltak. Ők is kérték a jussukat: csak akkor hajlandók kivezetni az erdőből a leányt, ha odaadja vagyonának a másik felét. Mit volt mit tenni, a leány elfogadta az ajánlatot és így eljutott a SZÉPFIÚHOZ. Boldogan egymás karjaiba omlottak, együtt töltötték az éjszakát, azonban másnap a SZÉPFIÚ közölte, hogy részéről ennyi volt. A SZÉPLÁNY szomorúan elindult az erdő felé, ahol újra találkozott a RABLÓKKAL. Azok az erdő túloldalára átkísérték a SZÉPLÁNYT a VŐLEGÉNYÉHEZ. A leány mindent elmondott a vőlegényének, aki így szólt: Sajnálom, így most már nem tudlak szeretni, nem élhetünk együtt.”

THE PRETTY GIRL

Once upon a time there was a PRETTY GIRL who had a FIANCÉ, but she fell in love with a PRETTY BOY. The PRETTY BOY lived by the river, just as the PRETTY GIRL did, but on the other side. The river separating the lovers was too wide to cross without a boat. The PRETTY GIRL wanted to go to the other side to visit the PRETTY BOY, but she didn't have a boat. So she went to the FERRYMAN. He promised to take her to the other side on the condition that she give him half of her wealth (which wasn't too much). The PRETTY GIRL's FIANCÉ, who didn't know that she had fallen in love with somebody else, also lived on the other side of the river. The PRETTY GIRL didn't know what to do, so she went to the WISEMAN for advice. She told him her problem but instead of a straightforward guidance the WISEMAN only said: 'Listen to your heart! Time will solve it.' The PRETTY GIRL decided to go over to his lover even if she had to give away half of her wealth. But on the other side of the river she fell among THIEVES, who were the masters of the wood. They also wanted to make her a deal: they were willing to accompany the PRETTY GIRL out of the wood provided that they got the other half of her wealth. The PRETTY GIRL couldn't do anything else but to accept the offer, and so she got to the PRETTY BOY. They fell into each others' arms happily and spent the night together. However, the next morning the PRETTY BOY said that that was it for him. The PRETTY GIRL set out for the woods sadly, where she met the THIEVES again. They accompanied her to the other side of the wood to her FIANCÉ. The PRETTY GIRL told everything to him, who said: 'I'm sorry I can't love you any more, we can't live together.'

Adapted and translated from Páskuné, J. K. (2006). *Varázsszem: 21 játéksomag önismereti foglalkozásokhoz*. Budapest: Arany János Tehetséggondozó Program. pp. 85-86.

2. feladat

Egyénileg állítsa szimpátia szerinti sorrendbe az elhangzott történet szereplőit (1-legszimpatikusabb, 6-legellenszenvesebb). Ezután ossza meg az Ön által felállított sorrendet beszélőtársával.

..... Szépleány

..... Szépfű

..... Bölcs

..... Vőlegény

..... Révész

..... Haramia

Appendix F
Task sheet two (English translation)

Task 2

Please put the characters of the story in order based on how much you liked them (1 - most likeable, 6 - least likeable). Please do it on your own, then discuss your order with your conversational partner.

Ferryman	Pretty Boy	Thieves
Fiancé	Pretty Girl	Wiseman

Appendix G
Background questionnaire

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Kód:

Kérem, jelölje/írja be a következő kérdésekre a megfelelő választ az Ön háttérével kapcsolatban!

Kitöltő neme: *férfi / nő*

Kitöltő életkora: év

Megye, ahol élete legnagyobb részét töltötte: megye

Kitöltő kedvenc szabadidős tevékenysége(i) (húzzon alá maximum 3-at): *sportolás színház kézművesség mozi TV olvasás számítógépes játékok tánc bulizás internet túrázás utazás zene barátok*

Kitöltő legmagasabb iskolai végzettsége: *8 általános vagy kevesebb szakmunkásképző szakközépiskola gimnáziumi érettségi főiskola egyetem doktori (Ph.D.)*

Kar, amelyen jelenleg tanul: *BTK / TTK / ÁJK*

Kitöltő édesanyjának/nevelőanyjának legmagasabb iskolai végzettsége: *8 általános vagy kevesebb szakmunkásképző szakközépiskola gimnáziumi érettségi főiskola egyetem doktori (Ph.D.)*

Kitöltő édesapjának/nevelőapjának legmagasabb iskolai végzettsége: *8 általános vagy kevesebb szakmunkásképző szakközépiskola gimnáziumi érettségi főiskola egyetem doktori (Ph.D.)*

Kérem, jelölje/írja be a következő kérdésekre a megfelelő választ a jelen kutatással kapcsolatban!

1. Milyen gyakran találkozik beszélőtársával? *naponta hetente többször hetente egyszer havonta párszor havonta egyszer ritkábban soha*
2. Milyen gyakran beszélget beszélőtársával? *naponta hetente többször hetente egyszer havonta párszor havonta egyszer ritkábban soha*
3. Milyen viszony áll fenn Ön és beszélőtársa között? *1 (idegen) 2 3 4 5 6 (pár, családtag)*
4. Mennyi ideje ismerik egymást?
- Párok esetén: mennyi ideje vannak együtt?
5. Beszélgetésük alapján milyen benyomás alakult ki Önben beszélőtársáról? (1- legkevésbé jellemző, 6- leginkább jellemző)
 - a. intelligens 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. tájékozott 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. udvariatlan 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d. szókimondó 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - e. kimért/távolságtartó 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - f. közvetlen/haverkodó 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - g. vicces/viccelődő 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Mennyire zavarta/feszélyezte Önt a mikrofonok jelenléte? *1 (egyáltalán nem) 2 3 4 5 6 (rettentően)*

Közreműködését köszönöm!

Appendix H
Background questionnaire (English translation)

Code:

Please mark or fill in your answers to the following questions regarding your background.

Your gender: *male/female*

Your age:

Place where you have spent most of your life so far (county):

Favorite freetime activity/activities (please underline maximum 3 items): *sports theatre arts & crafts movies TV reading computer games dancing partying internet hiking travelling music friends*

Your highest qualification held: *primary school secondary/high school vocational school bachelor's degree master's degree PhD/doctoral degree other (please specify):*

Faculty that you attend: *Arts / Science / Law*

Your mother's highest qualification held: *primary school secondary/high school vocational school bachelor's degree master's degree PhD/doctoral degree other (please specify):*

Your father's highest qualification held: *primary school secondary/high school vocational school bachelor's degree master's degree PhD/doctoral degree other (please specify):*

Please mark or fill in your answers to the following questions regarding this study.

1. How often do you meet your conversational partner? *daily several times a week once a week several times a month once a month less than once a month never*

2. How often do you talk to your conversational partner? *daily several times a week once a week several times a month once a month less than once a month never*

3. What kind of relationship do you have with your conversational partner? *1 (stranger) 2 3 4 5 6 (partner, close family member)*

4. How long have you known each other?

In case of couples: How long have you been dating each other?

5. Based on your conversation what kind of impression do you have of your conversational partner? (1 – least characteristic, 6 – most characteristic)

a. intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6

d. outspoken 1 2 3 4 5 6

g. funny 1 2 3 4 5 6

b. well-informed 1 2 3 4 5 6

e. formal 1 2 3 4 5 6

c. impolite/rude 1 2 3 4 5 6

f. casual 1 2 3 4 5 6

6. To what extent were you disturbed by the presence of the microphones during the conversation? *1 (not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 (extremely)*

Thank you very much for your cooperation!

Appendix I *Transcription conventions*

This key explains the symbols used in the data extracts reproduced throughout the dissertation whose meaning may not be obvious to the reader. The transcription conventions (modified from Du Bois et al., 1992; Tannen, 1984) applied in this dissertation are as follows:

.	:	A period is used to indicate a falling intonation with a conclusion point.
,	:	A comma signals a continuing intonation.
?	:	A question mark expresses rising or question intonation.
!	:	An exclamation mark is used to indicate strong feelings, high volumes, sentence-final exclamatory intonation.
???	:	Three question marks indicate unclear or unintelligible words.
:	:	A colon following a vowel or a consonant signals lengthening of sound.
...	:	Three periods indicate a short pause (according to the author's judgment).
... ..	:	Six periods are used to indicate a medium or long pause.
@ @ @	:	These symbols indicate laughter.
TEXT	:	Block capitals are used to indicate emphatic stress.
"text"	:	Quotation marks enclose direct quotations read out loud from the task sheet.
[text]	:	Square brackets indicate speech overlap.
(text)	:	Parentheses are used to enclose the transcriber's descriptive comments on speech quality (i.e., irony, sarcasm, etc.)
{text}	:	Curly brackets are used to signal the transcriber's comments added for clarity.
→	:	An arrow to the right highlights lines relevant to the analysis.

The following intonational symbols are adapted from Németh T. (1996) in a simplified form:

/•	:	rising intonation
\•	:	falling intonation
^•	:	rise-fall intonation
v•	:	fall-rise intonation
∧•	:	rise-fall-rise intonation
	:	intonation phase boundary

Appendix J
Task sheet for pilot study

1.	<p>N: @@@ Hát szerintem megérdemelte. F: Én én nagyon sajnálom. N: @@@ [Hát én nem.] F: [Úgyhogy] nekem azért is N: <i>De miért, hogyha a te barátnőd, a te mennyaszonyod ezt csinálná veled, akkor te mit csinálnál?</i></p>
2.	<p>F: Azért a többség csak azt mondta, hogy a fér[fiak jobban főznek]. N: [@@@] ... <i>És a többség mégis csak azt mondja, hogy a nők biz biztonságosabban vezetnek.</i></p>
3.	<p>F: Akkor lett volna gonosz, ha Ő ment volna át a Szépleányhoz és utána visszament volna @@@. Vagy hogyha ígért volna valamit a lánynak. [AKKOR gonosz lett] N: [Miért? Hogyha Ő megy át] a Széplányhoz? F: Az nem lett volna gonoszság? Átmegyek aztán visszajövö N: De nem [ne:m] F: [és otthagyja]. MERT? N: Hát mert akkor Ő tesz áldozatot a Szép[lányért] F: <i>MI? Az az hogy kihasználta egy éjszakára? Átment, [visszajött]</i></p>
4.	<p>F: @@@ Ú: a volt osztálytársam édesapja az úgy halt meg, ács volt és [leszé]dült a tetőről. N: [A:] F: De nem N: De nem ivott? F: Ne:m, lefújta a szél. N: Ó: F: @@@ Komolyan (nevetve). Belekapott a szél és így letette ... fejre. Ő: életembe akkor láttam először helikoptert. Tök jó volt. N: <i>Pf.: De jó lehetett!</i></p>
5.	<p>F: Akkor akkor csak a vita kedvéért igaz (nevetve)! N: Nem! @@@ F: Győzz meg, győzz meg, győzz meg, hogy nem igaz! N: <i>Hát most miért? Nincs nő tanárod? Szerinted ő: a nő tanárok nem intellige[nsek]? Na igen, például.</i> F: [@@@]</p>
6.	<p>F: Szóval szerintem ez á ugyanazért adtam rossz pontot neki, mint a Szépleánynak, mert balfasz (nevetve). Szerintem legalább [is]. N: [De] hát most ő mit tehet arról? F: M: olvasni kellett volna a sorok között. N: <i>Jaj, UGYAN [MÁR]!</i></p>
7.	<p>N: Nem is találkoznak. Hát a folyó két túloldalán laknak (nevetve). F: De akkor is ... á nem tudom. Vegyen egy távcsövet és úgy úgy [vizi]gálja az arcát a lánynak, N: [Jó.] F: amikor beszélgetnek telefonon, mobilon, akárhogy. [Vagy mi az galambpostán] N: <i>[Persze. Skype-ozzanak, nem?]</i> (nevetve)</p>
8.	<p>F: Szóval szerintem ez á ugyanazért adtam rossz pontot neki, mint a Szépleánynak, mert balfasz (nevetve). Szerintem legalább [is]. N: <i>[Hát] de most ő mit tehet arról?</i></p>

9.	F: Hatos? „A felsőoktatási intézményekben be kellene vezetni a kötelező tandíjat, de költségét a tanuló tanulmányi átlagától kellene függővé tenni.” N: Nem. F: <i>M:?</i>
10.	F: Harmadik? „Illegálissá kellene tenni az abortuszt.” N: <i>Nem értek vele egyet. Nagyon nem!</i>
11.	N: ... Hát szerintem nem kellene kötelező tandíjat bevezetni, mert most én azért fizessek, mert tanulni akarok? Nekem ez így nem... kapcsolódik össze. F: <i>Hát jó, de azt azért figyelembe kell venni, hogy a háttérben azért van egy apparátus, amit biztosítanak a számodra azért, hogy tanulhass.</i>
12.	Női vezetési stílusról: N: Nem, de hát nőkben is vannak olyanok, akik tudnak vezetni! Mint például én, de (nevetve) F: Bár mondjuk, hogyha megnézed a kérdést, vagy mi ez állítást, hogy ő biztonságosabban. [Tehát most lehet, hogy] N: <i>[Á: ki van zárva]</i>
13.	N: „Eutanázia bűn.” ... Szerintem nem bűn. F: <i>... Mert te kinyírnád nagyanyádat? Mondjuk.</i>
14.	N: „Az új járványok ellen mindenkinek feltétlenül be kellene oltatni magát”. F: <i>Hm nem értek vele egyet egyáltalán.</i>
15.	N: Na? ... Ki az első? A Bölcs. F: Nekem a Vőlegény. N: <i>Tudtam, hogy ezt fogod! De miért? A Vőlegény?</i>
16.	N: Fú:, a harmadik a tanterv kialakításába. Ú: abba én beleszólnék. F: <i>Én nem.</i>
17.	F: [Hát a Vőlegény és a Bölcs között vacilál]tam, de a Vőlegény szerintem az, aki aki igazából az egész történetben semmi semmi rosszat nem tett. N: Jó, de a Bölcs se. Sőt ő ő jó tanácsot adott neki. F: <i>Nem adott neki SEMMIFÉLE tanácsot. @@@</i>
18.	N: Akkor is a nők sokkal intelligensebbek! F: Nem igaz! @@@ N: De igen! ... Vagy tényleg akkor max. egyen, de hát most F: Jól van! N: hogyha azt nézzük, hogy a női agy hogy működik, akkor sokkal normálisabban, meg jobban működik, mint a férfi agy. (nevetve) F: Jól van, kiegyezhetünk az egyenbe. N: <i>Esetleg.</i> F: Hogyha neked ESETLEG az megfelel.
19.	Férfi-női vezetési stílusról: N: MÉR, a férfiak azok meg versenyeznek! A nők nem versenyeznek annyira. F: <i>Figyelj már, szerinted egy egy hatvan éves tata szerinted versenyzik? Örül, hogyha beül a kocsiba. (nevetve)</i>
20.	F: És mi van ha félnének a gyerekvállalástól? N: Hát jó, de hát most aki nem akar, az védekezik, nem? Jó esetbe. F: Jó. N: És ez ez a lényeg! F: <i>De történhetnek is balesetek.</i>
21.	F: Szerintem a férfiak SOKKAL intelligensebbek a nőknél. N: <i>De ő: azt mondják, hogy azér egy nő tud több dologra figyelni egyszerre... jobban használja agyának a ké mindkét felét...</i> F: Ó igen, csak azért mert egyel több kromoszómád van? @@@ Büszke lehetsz rá!

22.	N: Hát vannak tapló nők, de hát most akkor is @@@ F: Jó, akkor hagyjuk! N: ... Akkor is a nők sokkal intelligensebbek! F: <i>Nem igaz! @@@</i>
23.	F: Nem, de most vezetés technikailag, akkor se ... veheti fel sok nő a versenyt a férfiakkal. N: Há a versenyt nem! Az biztos. F: <i>Nem a nem ÚGY a [versenyt]</i>
24.	F: Hát ja, de a Haramia nem tudta azt, hogy először a Révész lenyúlta a másik fele pénzt. (nevetve) N: @@@ Hát jó, de a Révésznek akkor se kellett volna F: De lehet, hogy a Révész és a Haramiák haverok voltak. N: <i>Ó: igen.</i>
25.	Férfi-női intelligenciáról: F: Menjünk tovább! „A férfiak intelligensebbek a nőknél.” N: <i>Hát SZERINTEM ez EGYÁLTALÁN nem igaz.</i> Például most mondják azt is, hogy a férfiaknak jobb a tájékozódó képességük oszt mindig mégis eltévedsz, én meg odatalálok.
26.	N: Na jó, menjünk tovább! Na hát igen, 'a férfiak intelligensebbek a nőknél'. Szerintem ez alaptól nem igaz. F: Ja-ja szerinted, de szerintem meg de! N: <i>Hát na ne mondd! ... Na és mire alapozod?</i>
27.	F: „A nők biztonságosabban vezetnek, mint a férfiak.” Az igen! N: Miért? Szerinted nem igaz? F: Nem igaz! ... A nők nem tudnak odafigyelni a vezetésre! N: <i>HA! És elmondanád, hogy MIÉRT?</i>
28.	N: @@@ Illegálissá kellene tenni az abortuszt. F: <i>Hülyeség!</i>
29.	F: Vagy a tandíj vagy a költségtérítés. Kettőt együtt én ő nem támogatom. N: Az ugyanazt jelenti a tandíj és a költségtérítés. @@@ F: <i>Hát a költségtérítés az lehet, hogy más egy kicsit szerintem.</i>
30.	Halálbüntetésről: F: Ez ebben egyet értek, hogy nem kéne alkalmazni. Ö: igaz, ö: van egy fajta megfélemlítő taktika ebben a halálbüntetésben a bűnözők számára. N: <i>M:?</i>
31.	Eutanáziáról: F: De én azt mondom, hogy ehhez egy nagy adag pesszimista világnézet is kell. Le kell tojni önmagunkat néha ahhoz, hogy ö: ... hogy hogy ilyen ilyen estekben, hogy úgymond 'meg akarok halni, mert ronda vagyok, meg itt a púp a hátamon'. (irónikus) N: <i>De nem úgy Maci, én nem erről beszélek!</i>
32.	N: Jó, de lehet neki így egyszerűbb volt azt mondani, 'ha már megcsaltál, akkor vége!' Jó, én nem nem mondom, hogy én nem cselekedtem volna hasonlóképpen. Tehát ö: én is valószínűleg szakítottam volna, de: ... F: Már pedig ezzel szerintem megleckéztette a Szépleányt. N: <i>Megleckéztette? Nahát ö:</i>
33.	F: Hát jó, van mind a kettő oldalnak egy erőssége és gyengéje, mer a brit irodalom mondjuk könnyebb, mint a:z izé [a:z ö amerikai] irodalom, N: [Szerintem nem.] F: Szerintem meg abszolút, de igen az amerikai irodalom jóval nehezebb. N: <i>Dehogy is! Tökre érthető!</i>

34.	<p>F: A Bölcs meg nálam egyszerűen azért került második helyre, mert a Bölcs az mindent tud.</p> <p>N: <i>Na, a Bölcs az egy seggfej volt, már bocsáss meg! Tehát ... én őt azért nem szerettem, mit segített neki? Egy nagy fenét!</i></p>
35.	<p>N: Szerintem mindenkinek be kellene oltatnia magát H1N1 ellen.</p> <p>F: <i>Egyesek szerint csak azt oltás be aki aki aki veszélynek van kitéve, tehát a terheseket, az időseket és aki veszélyeztetett területen dolgozik.</i></p>

Appendix K
Task sheet for research group

Jelölések:

@@@ - nevetés

[szöveg] – egyszerre beszéd

... - szünet

... ... - hosszabb szünet

: - nyújtott hang (pl. m: = mmm)

NYOMTATOTT – hangsúly

„szöveg” – feladatlapról felolvasott szöveg
(szöveg) – intonáció

: - nyújtott hang (pl. m: = mmm)

1.	F: Hát ja, de a Haramia nem tudta azt, hogy először a Révész lenyúlta a másik fele pénzt. (nevetve) N: @@@ Hát jó, de a Révésznek akkor se kellett volna F: De lehet, hogy a Révész és a Haramiák haverok voltak. N: Ó: <i>igen.</i>
2.	N: @@@ Illegálissá kellene tenni az abortuszt. F: <i>Hülyeség!</i>
3.	N: Hát vannak tapló nők, de hát most akkor is @@@ F: Jó, akkor hagyjuk! N: ... Akkor is a nők sokkal intelligensebbek! F: <i>Nem igaz! @@@</i>
4.	Férfi-női vezetési stílusról: N: MÉR, a férfiak azok meg versenyeznek! A nők nem versenyeznek annyira. F: <i>Figyelj már, szerinted egy egy hatvan éves tata szerinted versenyzik? Örül, hogy ha beül a kocsiba.</i> (nevetve)
5.	F: És mi van ha félnének a gyerekvállalástól? N: Hát jó, de hát most aki nem akar, az védekezik, nem? Jó esetben. F: Jó. N: És ez ez a lényeg! F: <i>De történhetnek is balesetek.</i>
6.	N: Akkor is a nők sokkal intelligensebbek! F: Nem igaz! @@@ N: De igen! ... Vagy tényleg akkor max. egyen, de hát most F: Jól van! N: hogyha azt nézzük, hogy a női agy hogy működik, akkor sokkal normálisabban, meg jobban működik, mint a férfi agy. (nevetve) F: Jól van, kiegyezhetünk az egyenbe. N: <i>Esetleg.</i>
7.	F: „A nők biztonságosabban vezetnek, mint a férfiak.” Az igen! N: Miért szerinted nem igaz? F: Nem igaz! ... A nők nem tudnak odafigyelni a vezetésre! N: <i>HA! És elmondanád, hogyMIÉRT?</i>
8.	Férfi-női intelligenciáról: F: Szerintem a férfiak SOKKAL intelligensebbek a nőknél. N: <i>De ő: azt mondják, hogy azért egy nő tud több dologra figyelni egyszerre... jobban használja az agyának a ké mindkét felét</i>
9.	F: Hát jó, van mind a kettő oldálnak egy erőssége és gyengéje, mer a brit irodalom mondjuk könnyebb, mint a:z izé [a:z ő amerikai] irodalom, N: [Szerintem nem.] F: Szerintem meg abszolút, de igen az amerikai irodalom jóval nehezebb. N: <i>Dehogyan is! Tökre érthető!</i>

10.	<p>N: Jó, de lehet neki így egyszerűbb volt azt mondani, 'ha már megcsaltál, akkor vége'! Jó, én nem nem mondom, hogy én nem cselekedtem volna hasonlóképpen. Tehát ő: én is valószínűleg szakítottam volna, de: ...</p> <p>F: Már pedig ezzel szerintem megleckéztette a Szépleányt.</p> <p>N: <i>Megleckéztette? Nahát ő:</i></p>
11.	<p>F: Vagy a tandíj vagy a költségtérítés. Kettő együtt én ő nem támogatom.</p> <p>N: Az ugyanazt jelenti a tandíj és a költségtérítés. @@@</p> <p>F: <i>Hát a költségtérítés az lehet, hogy más egy kicsit szerintem.</i></p>
12.	<p>Eutanáziáról:</p> <p>F: De én azt mondom, hogy ehhez egy nagy adag pesszimista világnézet is kell. Le kell tojni önmagunkat néha ahhoz, hogy ő: ... hogy hogy ilyen ilyen estekben, hogy úgymond 'meg akarok halni, mert ronda vagyok, meg itt a púp a hátamon'. (irónikus)</p> <p>N: <i>De nem úgy Maci, én nem erről beszélek!</i></p>
13.	<p>Halálbüntetésről:</p> <p>F: Ez ebben egyet értek, hogy nem kéne alkalmazni. Ő: igaz, ő: van egy fajta megfélemlítő taktika ebben a halálbüntetésben a bűnözők számára.</p> <p>N: <i>M:?</i></p>
14.	<p>N: Hát a gyakorlatiasságon nagyon sok múlik, hogy hogy ki me milyen beállítottságú. Mer rengetegen vannak akik tök BÉNÁK hozzá és akármit csinál, nem tud normálisan vezetni. Úgyhogy ő: ez nem nem nem nemtől függ, hanem hanem ő: [tehetségtől]</p> <p>F: <i>[Viszont] általában ilyen videók nőkről vannak össze[válogatva, hogy]</i></p> <p>N: <i>[Igen] ilyen viccesek[re]</i></p> <p>F: <i>[sze]gények, hogy bénáznak vezetés közben.</i></p>
15.	<p>N: @@@ Hát szerintem megérdemelte.</p> <p>F: Én én nagyon sajnálom.</p> <p>N: @@@ [Hát én nem.]</p> <p>F: [Úgyhogy] nekem azért is</p> <p>N: <i>De miért, hogyha a te barátnőd, a te mennyasszonyod ezt csinálná veled, akkor te mit csinálnál?</i></p>
16.	<p>F: Harmadik? „Illegálissá kellene tenni az abortuszt.”</p> <p>N: <i>Nem értek vele egyet. Nagyon nem!</i></p>
17.	<p>F: Szóval szerintem ez á ugyanazért adtam rossz pontot neki, mint a Szépleálynak, mert balfasz (nevetve). Szerintem legalább [is].</p> <p>N: <i>[Hát] de most ő mit tehet arról?</i></p>
18.	<p>F: @@@ Ú: a volt osztálytársam édesapja az úgy halt meg, ács volt és [leszé]dült a tetőről.</p> <p>N: [A:]</p> <p>F: De nem</p> <p>N: De nem ivott?</p> <p>F: Ne:m, lefújta a szél.</p> <p>N: Ó:</p> <p>F: @@@ Komolyan (nevetve). Belekapott a szél és így letette ... fejre. Ő: életembe akkor láttam először helikoptert. Tök jó volt.</p> <p>N: <i>Pf.: De jó lehetett!</i></p>

19.	<p>F: Akkor lett volna gonosz, ha Ő ment volna át a Szépleányhoz és utána visszament volna. @@@ Vagy hogyha ígért volna valamit a lánynak. [AKKOR gonos lett]</p> <p>N: [Miért? Hogyha Ő megy át] a Széplányhoz?</p> <p>F: Hát az nem lett volna gonoszság? Átmegyek aztán visszajövök</p> <p>N: De nem [ne:m]</p> <p>F: [és otthagyja]. MERT?</p> <p>N: Hát mert akkor Ő tesz áldozatot a Szép[lányért]</p> <p>F: <i>Mi? Az az hogy kihasználta egy éjszakára?</i> Átment, [visszajött]</p>
20.	<p>Női vezetési stílusról:</p> <p>N: Nem, de hát nőkben is vannak olyanok, akik tudnak vezetni! Mint például én, de (nevetve)</p> <p>F: Bár ha úgy nézed a kérdést, vagy mi ez állítást, hogy ő biztonságosabban. [Tehát most lehet, hogy]</p> <p>N <i>[Á: ki van zárva]</i></p>
21.	<p>N: ... Hát ... szerintem nem kellene kötelező tandíjat bevezetni, mert most én azért fizessek, mert tanulni akarok? Nekem ez így nem... kapcsolódik össze.</p> <p>F: <i>Hát jó, de azt azért figyelembe kell venni, hogy a háttérben azért van egy aparátus, amit biztosítanak a számodra azért, hogy tanulhass.</i></p>
22.	<p>N: [Igen de: az]zal ha ő: ŐT megöljük azért, amit tett, azzal ugyanolya ugyanoda aljasodunk ahol ő van. Nem gondolod?</p> <p>F: <i>Hát de most figyelj. Van ő olvastam már ilyen, van x ember, megölt nem tudom két vagy három embert megölt, bezárták a börtönbe és ugye ráfogták arra, hogy elmebeteg és két hónapig ilyen elvonáson volt, kiengedték aztán megölt még nem tudom x embert. Szóval most akiket akiket utána ölt meg, azok jogosan mondhatták, hogy 'figyelj ha az az ember egy köztörvényes gyilkos akkor, miért engedték szabadon'?</i></p>

Appendix L
Answer sheet for research group

Kitöltő neve: férfi / nő
Kitöltő életkora: év
Évfolyam: év szak(ok)

KATEGÓRIÁK

I. Tompított egyet nem értés

1. Részleges egyetértés
2. Magyarázat (példa, ok, egyértelműsítésre irányuló kérdés)
3. Humor
4. Finomítás (nyersséget tompító nyelvi elemek)

II. Semleges egyet nem értés

5. Ellentmondás
6. Egyet nem értés konkrét megnevezése/kijelentése
7. Beszélő szándékának tisztázása

III. Erősített/határozott egyet nem értés

8. Echo (irónia, szarkazmus, indulatszavak, ismétlés)
9. Egyet nem értés hangsúlyozása/fokozása
10. Metakommunikáció (provokálás, minősítés, hitetlenkedés/kételkedés)
11. Egyéb

Feladat:

A fenti kategóriák számát rendelje hozzá minden egyes egyet nem értéshez (egyhez több kategória is tartozhat) és tüntesse fel 1-4-es skálán, hogy mennyire biztos válaszában (1-egyáltalán nem, 4-abszolút). Amennyiben úgy ítéli meg, hogy az adott egyet nem értés egyik kategóriához sem tartozik (11-es kategória), adja meg a beszélő szándékát a 'megjegyzés' részben. Észrevételeit szintén itt teheti meg.

Párbeszéd száma	Kategória/ Kategóriák	Bizonyosság foka	Megjegyzés
1.		1 2 3 4	
2.		1 2 3 4	
3.		1 2 3 4	
4.		1 2 3 4	
5.		1 2 3 4	
6.		1 2 3 4	
7.		1 2 3 4	
8.		1 2 3 4	
9.		1 2 3 4	
10.		1 2 3 4	
11.		1 2 3 4	
12.		1 2 3 4	
13.		1 2 3 4	
14.		1 2 3 4	
15.		1 2 3 4	
16.		1 2 3 4	
17.		1 2 3 4	
18.		1 2 3 4	
19.		1 2 3 4	
20.		1 2 3 4	
21.		1 2 3 4	
22.		1 2 3 4	

KÖZREMŰKÖDÉSÉT KÖSZÖNÖM!

Appendix M
 Answer sheet for research group (English translation)

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Your gender: male / female
 Your age: years
 Year & major(s) at university:

CATEGORIES

I. Softened disagreement

1. Partial agreement
2. Explanation (example, reason, questions for clarification/reason)
3. Humour
4. Hegde (mitigating devices)

II. Neutral disagreement

5. Contradiction
6. Stating disagreement
7. Clarification of speaker's meaning

III. Strengthened disagreement

8. Echo (irony, sarcasm, interjections, repetition)
9. Emphasizing/Intensifying disagreement
10. Metacommunication (challenge, labelling/evaluating, doubt/disbelief)
11. Other

Task:

Please assign (a) number(s) of the categories above to each token of disagreement and mark on a scale of 1 to 4 the degree you are certain of your answer (1 - not at all, 4 - absolutely). If you think that a given disagreement does not have any of the functions listed (category 11), please identify/explain the aim of the speaker in the 'comment' section. You can also note other remarks here.

Number of extract	Category(ies)	Degree of certainty	Comment
1.		1 2 3 4	
2.		1 2 3 4	
3.		1 2 3 4	
4.		1 2 3 4	
5.		1 2 3 4	
6.		1 2 3 4	
7.		1 2 3 4	
8.		1 2 3 4	
9.		1 2 3 4	
10.		1 2 3 4	
11.		1 2 3 4	
12.		1 2 3 4	
13.		1 2 3 4	
14.		1 2 3 4	
15.		1 2 3 4	
16.		1 2 3 4	
17.		1 2 3 4	
18.		1 2 3 4	
19.		1 2 3 4	
20.		1 2 3 4	
21.		1 2 3 4	
22.		1 2 3 4	

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

Appendix N

Further examples of analysis based on the final framework

Abbreviations:

AGG	: aggravator	DS3	: 3 rd disagreement strategy	INT	: interjection
AGR	: agreement	EVA	: evaluation	META	: meta
AL	: alerter	EXPL	: explanation	MIT	: mitigator
CH	: challenge	HED	: hedge	P/TA	: partial agreement/token agreement
CON	: conditional	HES	: hesitation	PRE-S	: pre-sequence
CS'M	: clarification of speaker's meaning	HUM	: humour	RQ	: rhetorical question
CST	: contradictory statement	I	: intensifier	STD	: stating disagreement
DISB	: disbelief	I/S	: irony/sarcasm	TE	: term of endearment
DS1	: 1 st disagreement strategy	IC	: implied contradiction	TQ	: tag question
DS2	: 2 nd disagreement strategy	IMP	: impersonalization	VS	: verbal shadowing/repetition

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Mitigators are in *italics*, while aggravators are underlined.

	EXTRACT	FUNCTION			PFM	
		PRE-S.	DS1	DS2	MIT.	AGG.
1.	<p>S1: Abból az oktatókat fizetni kell, ha fénymásolatokat kapsz, azt kell fizetni. Tehát ő The instructors need to be paid from that, if you get photocopies they need to be paid. So uh →S2: <i>Hát</i> igen, csak nem kapok fénymásolatokat. @@@ <i>Well</i> yes, but I don't get photocopies. @@@</p>		P/TA	CST	HED	
2.	<p>S1: [„Felső]oktatási intézményekben a hallgatóknak nagyobb beleszólást kellene biztosítani a tanterv → kialakít”. Á nem! Ez [ezzel nem értek egyet]. [“In higher] education, students should have a bigger say in the development of the curri”. Ah no! This [this I don't agree with].</p>		DISB	STD		

	EXTRACT	FUNCTION			PFM	
		PRE-S.	DS1	DS2	MIT.	AGG.
3.	<p>S1: „Eutanázia bűn.” ... Szerintem nem bűn. “Eutanasia is a sin”. I don't think it's a sin.</p> <p>→S2: ... Mert te <i>kinyírnád</i> nagyanyádat? Mondjuk. ... Why? <i>Would</i> you bump your grandma off, for example?</p>		CH	EXPL	CON	
4.	<p>S1 Remélem. Ő akkor én se akarlak ő lekezelni téged. Tehát egyenlő félként ... I hope so. Uh I don't want to scorn you either, then. So like an equal partner...</p> <p>→S2 De <i>Mackó</i>, eddig se kezeltél le. Ha lekezeltél volna, nem lennénk együtt. But <i>Honey Bear</i>, you haven't scorned me so far either. If you had scorned me, we wouldn't be together.</p>		CST	EXPL	TE	
5.	<p>S1: Hát jó, de a fele vagyonát?@@@ Azért egy kicsit furcsa átvinni a folyó túoldalára. Well fine, but half of her wealth? @@@ That's a little bit strange for taking her to the other side of the river.</p> <p>→S2: Nézd, hogyha a csajnak ez megérte, akkor <u>tökéletesen</u> ... rendbe van. Look, if it was worth it for the chick, it's <u>totally</u> fine... then.</p>	AL	EXPL			I
6.	<p>S1: Ez nem fair, mert neki ugyanolyan diplomája lesz, mint neked, aki állandóan tanulsz. This is not fair, because he'll have the same kind of degree like you who study all the time.</p> <p>→S2: Ez száz... És ezzel <u>teljes mértékben</u> egyet is értek veled, de: This is for sure... And I <u>totally</u> agree with you on this, bu:t</p>	AGR	P/TA			I
7.	<p>S1: De ölsz vele {abortusz}. És az már bűn. But you kill with it {abortion}. And that's a sin.</p> <p>→S2: Há:t nem tudom... <i>Szerintem az szerintem</i> nem bűn, hogyha valaki nem akarja megtartani a babát, megfontolta és elhatározta. Tehát ... joga van hozzá igazából. We:ll, I don't know... <i>I think</i> that's that's not a sin if someone doesn't want to keep the baby, she has considered it and made up her mind. So ... actually she has the right to do so.</p>	HES	CST	EXPL	HED	
8.	<p>S1: Úgyhogy... De az biztos, hogy megfontoltabbak a nők! @@@ So ... But women are more careful for sure! @@@</p> <p>→S2: <u>Megfontoltabbak?</u> (irónikus) <u>More careful?</u> (ironic)</p>		DISB			VS + I/S

	EXTRACT	FUNCTION			PFM	
		PRE-S.	DS1	DS2	MIT.	AGG.
9.	<p>S1: Harmadik? „Illegálissá kellene tenni az abortuszt.” The third one? “Abortion should be made illegal.”</p> <p>→S2: Nem értek vele egyet. <u>Nagyon nem!</u> I don't agree with that. <u>Not at all!</u></p>		STD			I
10.	<p>S1: Én én nagyon sajnálom {a Szépleányt}. I I feel sorry for her very much.</p> <p>S2: @@@ [Hát én nem.] @@@ [Well I don't.]</p> <p>S1: [Úgyhogy] nekem azért [So] that's why</p> <p>→S2: De miért, hogyha a te barátnőd, a te mennyasszonyod ezt <i>csinálná</i> veled, akkor te mit csinálnál? But why if your girlfriend, your fiancée <i>would</i> do this to you then what would you do?</p>		EXPL		CON	