

Doctoral Dissertation

**Frontier Mercenaries and the History
of a Forgotten Crusade
The Emergence of Mercenary
Companies in the Border Region of
the Holy Roman Empire and the
Kingdom of France 1358-1366**



**DEBRECENI
EGYETEM**

Tamás Ölbei
University of Lorraine / University of
Debrecen

August 2024

**Frontier Mercenaries and the History of a Forgotten Crusade – The Emergence of
Mercenary Companies in the Border Region of the Holy Roman Empire and the
Kingdom of France 1358-1366**

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the doctoral (PhD) degree
in ...HISTORY..... (discipline name)

Written by TAMÁS ÖLBEL..... certified

Prepared in the framework of the History and Ethnology..... doctoral school of the University
of Debrecen
(...History..... programme)

Dissertation advisors:

Prof. Dr. Attila Bárány	
Prof. Sylvain Gouguenheim	
Prof. Valérie Toureille	

The official opponents of the dissertation:

Prof. Dr. László Veszprémy	
Prof. Dr. Flocel Sabaté	

The evaluation committee:

Chairperson:	Prof. Dr. Flocel Sabaté	
members:	Prof. Dr. Gergely Kiss	
	Prof. Dr. Sylvain Gouguenheim	
	Dr. Attila Györkös	
	Dr. Florian Chamorel	
	Dr. Csete Katona	

The date of the dissertation defence: 6 December 2024...

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Debrecen, 31 August 2024



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Tamás Ölbei
doctoral student

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Preface

Throughout history, there have been famous people whose lives, spanning centuries, have inspired later generations. Books have been written about them, films have been made, paintings have depicted their deeds and their names have become an integral part of our culture. They included Cleopatra and Julius Caesar, Jeanne D'Arc and Henry V, Napoleon and Wellington, to name but a few. One of the most famous figures in Hungarian literature and our culture is a Hungarian mercenary *conestabilis* who was one of the lieutenants of Sir John Hawkwood's notorious White Company in Italy in the 60s of the 14th century. His life was first described in a poem written by Ilosvai Selymes Péter in the 16th century, and then reformulated by the Hungarian poet-genius János Arany in three ballads, which every Hungarian schoolchild knows and has had to learn the opening lines:

*«Like a herdsman's fire blazing on autumn nights
across the vast sea of the puszta, the face of
Toldi Miklós flares before me over nine or ten
generations of antique time. I see, it seems,
his towering form and the thrust of his lance in
scorching battle. The thundering sound of his voice
I hear you would now conceive as the wrath of God.
This was the man, when needed, who stood his ground.
There is no one to match him now in the seven parts
of the realm. If he were to rise up and walk among you,
his works would appear a sorcery. Three of you would
never withstand the weight of his club, his sling or
spear. Your blood would run cold at his terrible
shield and the spurs he wore upon his boots.»¹*

¹ János Arany, *Epics of the Hungarian Plain*, English and Introduction by Anton N. Nyerges, Cleveland, 1976, [available online at], <https://mek.oszk.hu/00500/00595/html/epics2.htm>.

As I write these lines, a series of cartoons on the life of Toldi Miklós is being shown on television. I think that it would be hard to find a more topical subject for this dissertation, since many of Toldi Miklós's comrades in arms served as mercenaries in the cities of Trecento Italy. It was partly as a result of his, and partly as a result of the effective actions of other English, German, Hungarian and Italian mercenaries that Arnaud de Cervole's crusade in the eastern half of the Kingdom of France and northern Italy, the campaign, which is the subject of this dissertation, was prepared.

The arrival of mercenaries during the Hundred Years' War on the border between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire significantly impacted the lives of all and altered the political equilibrium in the region. Those who could capitalize on this new development emerged victorious, whereas the majority, who suffered, found themselves among the losers. The second aim of this dissertation is to present this complex process in comprehensive detail, as it was experienced by contemporaries in the 14th century.

I first read about this crusade in early 2013, just as we were moving to Saarburg on the border of the French-German Luxembourg triangle. In 2016 I started to explore the archives of the border region and became increasingly fascinated by the subject while realising that the literature on the border region of the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France had been neglected. In terms of the history of mercenaries in the 14th century, English and French historians have concentrated on other parts of France, and in comparison, there have been few works dealing with the history of mercenaries active in Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace or Barrois in the 20th century or today, especially in non-English languages. Perhaps in this respect, too, this dissertation can contribute to a better understanding.

Introduction

«No period of the past has appeared to me more interesting and instructive than that portion of medieval history which is embraced within the limits of this work.»²

By the mid-14th century, mercenaries had become a dominant, inescapable factor in late medieval warfare. A significant part of the peoples of Europe had experienced their presence and had had daily encounters, which profoundly changed their mindset and sense of security, as the many examples found in the different European archives and chronicles show. *«In the arena of international war between 1337 and 1453, which was later labeled by historians as the Hundred Years' War, strategies, technologies, and the means of payments spread between the states of northern and southern Europe much as industrialization did in the 18th and 19th centuries.»³* The emergence of paid armies, the effect of putting warfare on a contractual basis, instead of tenurial obligations, and communal services,⁴ extended to all aspects of life. In addition to the economic, military, political and social consequences, we can examine the psychological, cultural changes resulting from the interaction between the population and the mercenaries, or the impact of the presence of foreign mercenaries on perhaps less obvious aspects of life, such as, for example fashion. By the 1360s, multiethnic mercenary companies were roaming the European theatres of war as result of concluding contracts of longer or shorter duration with rulers and princes, lords and ladies, cities and, of course, the Church. Michael Jones wrote in his study about *«Jean d'Acigné and Patry de Châteaugiron, that who had joined the Malestroit family in the service of Metz, and then the Duke of Bar in 1372, and their mercenary service seems to have been of very limited duration, less than a year, perhaps a few months, before they returned to a more*

² David Flavel Jamison, *Life and Times of Bertrand du Guesclin: A History of the Fourteenth Century*, vols. I-II, London, 1864, vol. I, p. viii.

³ Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, « Introduction », in Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon (eds.), *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies Around the Mediterranean*, Leiden - Boston, 2003, p. xxi.

⁴ Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries. Volume I: The Great Companies*, Oxford, 2000.

*normal pattern of employment for men of their status by entering the service of the French crown.»*⁵

English, French, German, Welsh, Scottish, Breton, Gascon, Provençal, Navarrese, Italian, Castilian, Catalan, Hungarian and even Polish mercenary companies fought in the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, France, the Holy Roman Empire, Bulgaria, Africa and Byzantium. Some of them went on to international careers and settled in foreign lands as respected members of the local community holding high offices. Besides Sir John Hawkwood who «*lived by the war and no one was more successful at it,*»⁶ there were a range of captains like Arnaud du Solier, also known as Limousin, who served Enrique of Trastámara as lord of Villalpando in the 1380s, Otto, Duke of Brunswick-Grubenhagen who fought all over Italy and went to France several times between 1339-1380, Conrad V, the Duke of Teck, who served the city of Ferrara and found his final resting place here after his death in 1386, Eustache d'Auberchicourt, who married Isabelle de Juliers in 1360, the niece of the Queen of England and was one of the founding members of the Order of the Garter, Pierre de Villaines, who went to Castile with Bertrand du Guesclin and became Count of Ribadeo after the accession to the throne of Enrique of Trastámara in the 1370s, Bertrand Gasc of Lombardy, who served the dukes of Burgundy faithfully for years and then became governor of Vertus in 1366, Arnaud de Cervole, «*knight and chamberlain of Charles V, immortalised in the chronicles under his nickname of Archpriest.*»⁷ Luchino dal Verme and Malatesta Ungaro were Petrarch's friends and both of them had had a long successful career when they died. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Others returned home and settled after spending a part of their lives in foreign service, such as Bertand du Guesclin, the English Robert Knolles, Hugh Calveley, the German Werner von Urslingen whose armour bore the forbidding motto «*I am the enemy of piety, God, and Charity,*»⁸ the already mentioned Hungarian Toldi Miklós. Of course, most of the captains active during this period were not as successful or lucky as those who survived these two turbulent decades. The vast majority of mercenary captains who were active between 1350 and 1370 suffered violent deaths of all kinds. The subject and the period of this dissertation are special because in late medieval society there was no other group for whom or against whom crusades were organised at the same

⁵ Michael Jones, « Une petite guerre dans un pays lointain : les carrières mercenaires des soldats bretons au service de Robert, duc de Bar, 1372-1373 », in Guilhem Pépin *et al.* (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans*, Bordeaux, 2016 (Scripta Mediævalia, 28), pp. 189-206, p. 201.

⁶ William Caferro, *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy*, Baltimore, 2006, p. 3.

⁷ Valerie Toureille, *Robert de Sarrebruck ou l'honneur d'un écorcheur*, (v. 1400-v. 1462), e-book, Rennes, 2014, p. 526.

⁸ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

time. Excommunication was applied against *«all those who attacked churches, clerics and unarmed people had to fear exclusion from the Christian community.»*⁹ Innocent VI and Urban V repeatedly used excommunication against the great companies. These measures were not without consequences. Seguin de Badefol, whom Froissart called the *«the greatest master»*¹⁰ of the mercenary captains of his generation did his best twice to obtain a dispensation from excommunication, firstly in the Treaty of Montferrand in 1364,¹¹ which recorded the delivery of Brioude. In the treaty, the governors of the Duke of Berry were obliged to undertake to ask the Pope for absolution for Badefol and his mercenaries.¹² Then a year later when he surrendered the town of Anse in 1365 followed by a long occupation, who specifically stipulated that if he joined Arnaud de Cervole, the soldiers of Margot, his company, would receive the same dispensation as other mercenaries who took part in the crusade.¹³

The *routiers* *«were attached to a company and placed under the authority of a captain»*¹⁴ by the late 1350s and early 1360s, *«these hard-bitten veterans, sometimes in the thousands banded together into «free companies,» living off the land and its civilian population, while awaiting the renewal of open warfare which would lead to their recall.»*¹⁵ Following the Treaty of Brétigny (6 May 1360), they became so numerous that the problems the mercenaries meant were beyond the means of any country. A solution had to be sought on a European level to deal with the devastation caused by the dismissed companies, and discharged *brigands*. The rival monarchies of Europe had to join forces with the Papacy to try to find a solution to the problem of the *routiers*. *«While lip service was still paid to the needs of the Holy Land in attempts to end the Anglo-French war, only with the long truce following the Treaty of Brétigny did prospects for a new eastern expedition revive.»*¹⁶ Three series of events led to the organisation of four interlinked crusades between 1362 and 1366. The first one was the growing Ottoman threat in the Levante and, more specifically, the emergence

⁹ Germain Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs des terres de l'Église (Avignon, Comtat-Venaissin) aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles », in Rosa Maria Dessì (ed.), *Prêcher la paix et discipliner la société Italie, France, Angleterre (XIII^e -XV^e siècle)*, Turnhout, 2005, pp. 225-242, p. 226.

¹⁰ Siméon Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart, vol. VI, 1360-1366*, Paris, 1876, p. 62.

¹¹ Augustin Chassaing, *Spicilegium Brivatense, Recueil de documents historique relatifs au Brivadois et à Auvergne*, Paris, 1886, p. 361, n. 136.

¹² Jacques Monicat, *Les grandes Compagnies en Velay, 1358-1392*, Paris, repr. 1928, p. 31.

¹³ ADRML 10G1931.

¹⁴ Valérie Toureille, *Vol et brigandage au Moyen Âge*, edition of Kindle, Paris, 2015, location (I) 910.

¹⁵ L. J. Andrew Villalon, « 'Seeking Castles in Spain': Sir Hugh Calveley and the Free Companies' Intervention in Iberian Warfare (1366–1369) », in Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon (eds.), *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies Around the Mediterranean*, Leiden - Boston, 2003, pp. 305-328, p. 312.

¹⁶ Christopher Tyerman, *The World of Crusades*, New Haven - London, 2019, p. 801.

of the Ottomans in Europe; the second was the already mentioned dominance of mercenary companies in Italy and France, the third was a dynastic conflict between two half-brothers on the Iberian Peninsula: Enrique of Trastámara and Pedro the Cruel, king of Castile. This was an integral part of the rivalry between Castile and Aragon, «*the long conflict of the mid-fourteenth century called by later historians the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366)*».»¹⁷

The consequences of the four crusades of 1365/66, closely linked in their preparation and, in part, in their implementation, can be traced from the Atlantic coast to the Black Sea, affecting the lives of tens of thousands of people from the English Channel to Africa. The crusade led by Peter of Lusignan, «*which has already aroused a considerable number of scholarly controversies*»¹⁸ ended with the sack of Alexandria, and the mercenaries led by Bertrand du Guesclin, nominally marching to Granada, ultimately helped the Trastámara dynasty to power. The crusade of Amadeus VI of Savoy, after the capture of Gallipoli, ended with the Bulgarian adventure, while the fourth crusade, led by Arnaud de Cervole, was the largest in terms of its participants but the shortest in terms of its execution. It would have freed northern Italy and eastern France from the mercenary companies and, with the help of the Kingdom of Hungary, driven the Ottomans out of Europe, stabilising the weakening Byzantine Empire.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the process that took place on the border between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire from the appearance of the routiers to the end of the crusade in the 1360s. The thesis endeavours to show how the presence of the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War brought about changes in local society. It also seeks to describe the mercenaries active in the areas affected by the crusade, as well as the process by which the contemporary rulers and decision-makers had developed the idea of organising a series of crusades for the members of the companies. Finally, it discusses the history of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade toward the Kingdom of Hungary. The thesis is thus divided into four parts. The first two chapters contain a brief literature and methodological summary, supplemented by a more detailed analysis of the main subjects of the dissertation, the mercenaries. The broader introduction includes a chapter on the presentation of sources and chapters on the international literature in the annexes to the dissertation. The chapter titled 'Theatres of War' examines the repercussions of the arrival of mercenaries on the

¹⁷ Donald J. Kagay, « The War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366): Aragons' successful administrative strategy of asymmetrical defense », *Imago Temporis Medium Aevum*, 2012, vol. VI, pp. 191-222, p. 192.

¹⁸ Jo Van Steenberghe, « The Alexandrian Crusade (1365) and the Mamluk Sources: reassessment of the Kitāb al-Ilmām of an-Nuwayrī al-ʾIskandarānī (d. 1372 AD) », in Krijnie Ciggaar and Herman Teule (eds.), *East and West in the Crusader States: Context - Contacts - Confrontations, III: Acta of the congress held at Hernen Castle in September 2000*, Leuven - Dudley MA, 2003, pp. 124-137, p. 124.

frontier population between 1359 and 1365. The section on 'Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy, and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies' addresses the mercenaries participating in the crusade. The concluding part of the dissertation focuses on the history of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, from its inception to its conclusion.

The first chapter provides a succinct synthesis of the literature concerning mercenaries in the mid-fourteenth century, it outlines the methodology, and offers a definition of mercenaries—the central focus of the thesis. Comprehensive literature reviews for the subsequent two centuries are included in the appendices. The chapter commences with an examination of the literature, summarising key nineteenth- and twentieth-century works on the regions affected by the Crusades. This summary aims to present the current understanding of mercenaries active in the borderlands and northern Italy during the mid-fourteenth century. The second part of the chapter scrutinises the mercenaries involved in Arnaud de Cervole's crusade. Twenty-first-century academic research offers various definitions of historical mercenaries. Numerous scholars have attempted to establish a universal definition to differentiate mercenaries from other paid soldiers across history. However, these definitions often prove to be overly broad and imprecise. More accurate are efforts focusing on defining mercenarism within specific historical contexts. The first part of the chapter also addresses the conceptual challenges of defining mercenaries in the fourteenth century, presenting major theories. Ultimately, Kelly DeVries' approach aids in refining the concept of mercenaries, leading to my own definition. The experience of archival research shows, in agreement with Kelly DeVries, that contemporaries were aware of and made a distinction in their correspondence between a mercenary and a paid man.¹⁹ At the same time, to be considered a mercenary in this period was a malleable status. The example of Arnaud de Cervole shows what it means when an outsider, a mercenary captain in Burgundy becomes a member of the local aristocracy, how the nobility, by embracing him in Burgundian correspondence, changes the way he is addressed, how he is regarded, how he is accepted by the time of the crusade.

In the Third part of this chapter, the methodological approaches used in the dissertation are presented. One of the great challenges of writing this dissertation was to combine the traditional description of the campaigns with the methodology of macro- and micro-historical research, or the new approach of New Military History. In the methodological summary, I will give examples of each of these methodological approaches from the chapters and sub-chapters of the dissertation. The following chapter of the thesis deals with the presentation

¹⁹ Michael Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy*, e-book, Barnsley, 2009, I. 184.

of the sources. This chapter offers an overview of the sources used in the following sections. While later chapters provide detailed analyses of each source, this section introduces them in a broader context. This approach highlights the range and diversity of sources, setting the stage for the in-depth investigations that follow and guiding readers through the subsequent analyses.

In fact, it is no coincidence that all four crusades began in 1365, since the original place from which the mercenary companies were to be recruited for the crusades was the eastern half of the Kingdom of France and the western frontier of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the northern and central part of Italy, where the great companies were not to rest until 1365. The Treaty of Brétigny did not bring peace to the frontiers of the Empire and the Kingdom, but war. The border provinces of Barrois, Champagne, the two Burgundies and Lorraine were largely saved from the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War, who first appeared in the region in the wake of Edward III's army just before the peace in 1360. The enduring presence of mercenary companies as a result of Edward III's campaign marked a significant shift in the socio-political landscape of the frontier regions. "The frontier in this sense can be taken to mean a 'political barrier between states or people, often militarised and such description could certainly be applied, albeit with varying degrees of contextualisation and modification, to the Anglo-Scottish"²⁰ and also to the border between the Empire and the Kingdom. For the mercenaries, the frontier was not as much of an obstacle as it had been before Edward III's campaign, and as a result, cross-border alliances became much more dominant by the 1360s. The two treaties of Colmar in the chapter Collaboration and Cooperation with the Routiers: Thévenin Senart, Guichard de la Combe and Co. illustrate this cooperation, as does the treaty of Metz, concluded during Edward III's campaign.

This dissertation aims to analyse how these mercenary companies integrated into local society, the economic and social repercussions of their presence, and the ways in which local communities adapted to these new circumstances. A detailed examination of primary sources, including city and county archives from various locations along the campaign route, has uncovered substantial evidence of the mercenaries' impact. This includes records of economic transactions, legal disputes, and personal accounts that provide a nuanced understanding of daily life during this period. Additionally, the research highlights the strategic and tactical decisions made by Edward III and his commanders, shedding light on their broader implications for the war effort and frontier society. Moreover, this dissertation

²⁰ David Simpkin, Andy King, Introduction. *Development in Late Medieval Military History and the Historiography of Anglo-Scottish Warfare. England and Scotland at War, c.1296-c.1513.* ed. Andy King, David Simpkin, Leiden-Boston: Brill. 2012. pp. 1-2.

explores the implications of the Treaty of Metz within the Duchy of Bar, illustrating how local lords and communities navigated the complex political landscape. The responses of these local actors to the challenges posed by the campaign and the presence of mercenary companies reveal the adaptive strategies employed to maintain stability and order. In conclusion, this part of the dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of medieval warfare's localised impact on the border region. By focusing on the intersection of military strategy, political dynamics, and social change, the dissertation offers a comprehensive analysis of how a single campaign could reverberate through the fabric of frontier society, shaping its development in profound and lasting ways. The findings underscore the importance of considering local contexts to fully grasp the historical significance of medieval military campaigns and their enduring legacy on affected communities.

This is the second part of 'Theatres of War', focusing on the coexistence of frontier inhabitants with mercenaries and its consequent effects. This sub-chapter does not follow a chronological order but instead examines the complex processes affecting contemporary society during the 50s and 60s of the 14th century. The primary aim is to immerse the reader in the quotidian life of the 14th century, illustrating how frontier inhabitants coexisted with mercenaries through various contemporary sources, including letters of remission, accounts from the bailliages and prévôtes, and contemporary correspondence.

Following Edward III's campaign, the presence of mercenaries became a permanent fixture, bringing about significant changes that produced both beneficiaries and victims. The example of Konrad the painter from Alsace in the summer of 1365 provides a vivid, first-hand account of the challenges faced by individuals attempting to traverse mercenary-occupied territories over relatively short distances. Few accounts like Konrad's have survived, detailing his experiences and the conversations he witnessed in the presence of Emperor Charles IV, as well as his attempts to alert the leadership of Strasbourg to the impending consequences.

The chapter further explores the transformative impact on the collective psyche of the population in cities such as Lyon and Reims. Within less than a decade, the fear of mercenaries became deeply ingrained, fundamentally altering the mental state of the populace. By examining specific instances and drawing on a rich array of contemporary sources, this study provides a detailed depiction of the rapid and profound changes in societal attitudes and everyday life brought about by the enduring presence of mercenaries. This description contributes to a deeper understanding of the far-reaching implications of Edward III's campaign on frontier society. By focusing on the very real experience and psychological transformation of the affected population, it underscores the importance of

local context in historical research and enriches our comprehension of the broader socio-political milieu of the 14th century.

One of the defining characteristics of the border region in the mid-14th century was the persistence of private wars. Those who could harness the power of the great companies and employ members of the era's most formidable war machines often emerged victorious, even against much stronger opponents or coalitions. Numerous examples of this dynamic are presented in 'Private Wars: the Great Companies that Changed the Game.'

The relationship between the aristocracy and mercenaries, which is equally significant yet from a different perspective, is explored in the sections examining the cases of Yolande de Flandre and Bruno von Rappoltstein. Yolande de Flandre's case is particularly noteworthy as few aristocratic women of her time had such intimate connections with mercenaries. Navigating between Prague and Paris, she fought tirelessly for her sons, subordinating all means to her objectives. Competing against her husband's family, the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War, and neighbouring duchies, she successfully secured her son Robert's inheritance, making him the first Duke of Bar. Yolande's efforts involved recruiting armies, hiring mercenaries—including Polish ones—leading sieges, and risking her life to govern the entrusted duchy. Aligning with both the French king and the German emperor, she ultimately transferred control to her son, elevating Bar to princely status.

The case of Bruno von Rappoltstein and John Harleston, beginning with an episode in Edward III's campaign, traces two decades of intense rivalry. This is documented in a letter written by Bruno von Rappoltstein to the city of Strasbourg, a unique source illustrating how a personal conflict between a mercenary captain and an Alsatian aristocrat could have wide-ranging consequences, influencing lives from Champagne to Burgundy. This example underscores the complexity of interpersonal relationships between mercenaries and the local population, revealing the intricate and multifaceted nature of these interactions.

The same wide-ranging, multifaceted network of relationships is examined in other sections of *Cohabitation*: 'Guillermus le Descozus and the Capricious Maria', 'Collaboration and Cooperation with the Routiers: Thévin Senart, Guichard de la Combe and Co.', 'Nivernoisie Disorder: Ryffard de Flandre', 'Anime Tribolate: se potete datevi viaggio pace e buon piacere', and 'Crimes related to Mercenaries in the Bailliage of Auxois 1360-1365.' These sub-chapters reveal that not only violence was a significant factor in the interactions between the local population and mercenaries, other interests and emotions played crucial roles, as evidenced by the nature of the surviving sources. The case of Guillermus le Descozus and Maria exemplifies this complexity, illustrating not just a love story but also the relative freedom of movement some mercenaries enjoyed within villages or towns. This dissertation

supports this with several examples, such as in 1364/65 when Seguin de Badefol's lieutenants were allowed entry into the town of Brioude after surrendering their weapons, despite the town's justified resentment due to Badefol's occupation of the town for ten months. It was here that Froissart famously recounted Limousin Inflagrantin catching his friend and comrade-in-arms with his mistress in Brioude.

Ryffard de Flandre's mission in the county of Nevers and the barony of Donzy in 1360 and 1361 aimed to mitigate the threat posed by mercenaries. His half-brother, Louis de Mâle, Count of Flanders, dispatched him to these distant estates to address the chaos caused by Breton mercenaries in the repeated chevauchées. This rare, unpublished source offers a glimpse into the conflict between feudal lords and the country gentry, exacerbated when Louis de Mâle assigned the task to an unfit relative. This sub-chapter is closely connected to the section on the costs of the mercenary presence, highlighting the rural nobility's helplessness in the face of successive waves of mercenaries.

Travel, another common aspect of coexistence, was significantly affected by the presence of mercenaries. While travelling from one place to another in peacetime seemed straightforward, the arrival of a mercenary company rendered journeys unsafe and potentially life-threatening. This sub-chapter not only describes these dangers but also explores the various strategies borderlanders employed to travel safely. These included purchasing regular safe-conducts from mercenary captains, detailing the number of escorts and the duration of the permission provided by a mercenary captain. Another means was hiring prominent mercenaries as escorts, who, due to their high rank and reputation, ensured safe passage. High-ranking overlords travelling with large escorts, ranging from a few dozen to several hundred men, also enjoyed security. Alternatively, if a route was deemed too perilous, travellers sought reliable information about potential dangers and often opted not to travel if the risks were too high.

Additionally, local inhabitants often collaborated with mercenaries in committing crimes, ranging from theft and manslaughter, trading with mercenaries to spying for the routiers. An in-depth study of the Auxois bailliage revealed a strong correlation between the numbers of mercenaries (such as during Edward III's campaign and Arnaud de Cervole's crusade) and the incidence of crimes in the region.

These micro-historical analyses illustrate the intricate and often tumultuous relationships between local populations and mercenaries in the frontier regions. The findings underscore the profound impact of mercenary presence on social structures, economic activities, and daily life during this period. In recent research on the history of the English-Scottish border region, eminent historians such as Anthony Tuck, Anthony Goodman, Cynthia Neville,

Michael Brown, Alastair Macdonald, Claire Etty, Jackson Armstrong and Andy King have sought to place the impact of medieval warfare in a local context.²¹ This approach is essential for understanding the rise of the mercenaries and the profound emotional impact on frontier societies. In the last part of the 'Cohabitation, Cooperation and Collaboration: Everyday Life in the Era of the Great Companies', my aim is to show how people experienced the presence of the mercenaries and the passage of the crusaders, based on contemporary letters, and French and German chronicles. These documents reflect a personal tone, by describing the feelings of the people who were unlucky enough to meet the companies and were lucky enough to survive this encounter. Apart from the different 14th-century chronicles, the correspondence of Imperial cities, and alliances formed against the mercenaries are particularly useful from the point of view of gaining first-hand information about the emotions of the local population preserved in the archives of Strasbourg, and Colmar. Both types of documents occupy a special place in medieval contemporary sources, which are particularly well suited to reflect the emotional subjectivity of war.²² These letters, and alliances dated from around the middle of the 1360s, have a very personal note and I have attempted to render this aspect in the English translations.

The third part of *The Theatres of War*, 'Burgundy and the Hydra Effect' describes and analyses in detail the process by which Burgundy, the richest duchy in the border region, finds itself in an increasingly difficult financial situation between 1360 and 1365, struggling with the constant and ever-increasing influx of mercenary companies and the costs of defence so draining its reserves that the only remaining solution is for Duke Philip of Valois to send the members of his companies on a crusade under the leadership of his confidant Arnaud de Cervole. The practice of buying back captured castles from mercenary captains, rather than reconquering them through military force, was initiated by Philip, the last Capetian Duke of Burgundy, during Edward III's campaign. His successor, Philip the Bold, both continued this practice and defended the duchy by hiring a series of mercenary captains to protect Burgundy's borders.

The most prominent of these was Arnaud de Cervole, who successfully integrated himself into the local aristocracy by making advantageous marriages. However, following Edward III's campaign, Burgundy became a constant target for the companies, and in the

²¹ Andy King, David Simpkin, *Introduction: Developments in Late Medieval Military History and the Historiography of Anglo-Scottish Warfare*, eds. Andy King, David Simpkin, *England and Scotland at War, c. 1296-c.1513* (Leiden, 2012), p. 6-7.

²² see Stephanie Downes and Andrew Lynch, *'In form of war': War and emotional formation in European history*, eds. Stephanie Downes, Andrew Lynch, Katrina O' Loughin, *Writing War in Britain and France, 1370-1854. A History of Emotions* Routledge, (London, New York, 2019) pp 1-23.

Burgundian War of Succession, which broke out following Philip of Rouvres' premature death, Philip the Bold had to contend with such invincible great companies as that of the Margot, Seguin de Badefol's company. The maps in this sub-chapter show, in six-monthly intervals between Edward III's invasion of 1360 and Arnaud de Cervole's march to Hungary in the summer of 1365, which castles in Burgundy were occupied by mercenaries who were in control of the region. The maps clearly show that during this period there was not even half a year in which the new Valois duke held the whole of the duchy. Of course, the rising costs of defence, of which I will give many examples, were offset by a gradual decline in revenue. Very often, many of the mercenary captains hired in large numbers by the Duke, such as Arnaud de Tallebardon, Guiot de Pin, Amenion de Pommiers, Soudic de Latrau, rebelled when they did not receive their pay, and destroyed the surroundings of the castles entrusted to them as much as the enemy against whom they were supposed to be defending them. The chapter also explains why the crusade failed at the preparatory stage, simply because the pressure on the duchy was so great that Arnaud de Cervole did not even wait until Charles IV returned to the empire from Avignon to start the crusade so that he could prepare the mercenary companies properly.

The 'Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies' is divided into two large, well-separated sections. The first section of this chapter deals with the members of the companies involved in the crusade, those who were active in the areas covered by the Theatres of War during this period. There are very few studies in modern literature that deal with the composition of the routiers who served in the mercenary companies active in the frontier areas in the second half of the 14th century. Four such names should certainly be mentioned: Bertrand Schnerb, Geoffrey Grill and Kenneth Fowler, and Germain Butaud. Their works have done much to clarify the composition of multinational mercenary companies such as those operating in Italy. Using the example of a number of individual careers, this section discusses a wide range of factors, whether economic, such as the problems of subsistence faced by Basque and Gascon-Breton mercenaries, or social, such as the relatively large number of bastards serving among the mercenaries, who were not officially recognised as the heirs of their fathers but were brought up by them. For them, the companies were a natural opportunity for social advancement, if they were lucky. Sources preserved in the *Registre criminel du Châtelet de Paris* show how mobile the ordinary members of the companies were: several examples show that they had travelled to the battlefields of Italy, the Kingdom of France, the Holy Roman Empire or the Iberian Peninsula, although most of them died relatively young.

The sub-chapter 'Participating in the Crusades: A Chance for Saving Their Souls and Other Motives' specifically examines the motifs that led numerous mercenaries to join the Crusades for the first time in the 14th century. After failing to resolve the mercenary issue through other means, the Avignon popes had repeatedly attempted to dispatch mercenaries to the outskirts of Europe to combat the Muslim threat, but these efforts were consistently rejected. However, in 1365, Urban V successfully mobilized tens of thousands of mercenaries to fight the Moors and Ottomans at both ends of Europe. The relationship between the mercenaries and their spiritual beliefs is an extremely intriguing topic, particularly how the promise of forgiveness motivated them to participate in the Crusades and their belief in escaping divine justice despite their mercenary activities. To address these questions, I draw on examples from various published and archival sources. Additionally, by analysing two letters of remission, I will highlight the individual circumstances that led frontier inhabitants to join mercenary companies on crusades. This sub-chapter also underscores the importance of micro-historical research methods in understanding the motivations of 14th-century individuals when making significant life decisions, such as taking up the cross. The next two sub-chapters, 'And Those Who Led Them: the Captains of the Companies' and 'Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol: the Military Entrepreneurs', deal with the mercenary captains who took part in the Crusade, with a special focus on two of the most important captains of the campaign, Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol. In the 1350s and 60s, the structure of the great companies was not stable. Occasionally, captains lost their leading role at the head of a company of the day. This was the case when Albert Sterz was replaced as head of the White Company in the summer of 1364 and the company members voted to elect Sir John Hawkwood as head of the company.²³ However, in the same way Heinrich von Eglingen lost his primacy at the head of his great company, as we saw in the chapter on the Hungarian mercenaries, and of the 106 captured caporalis and conestabilis of his former company, only 26 joined him when he reorganised his company.²⁴ Of course, under a captain as decisive as Arnaud de Cervole or Seguin de Badefol, there were captains with whom they fought for long periods, mainly from their immediate community and family. Of the captains active along the frontier, the likes of Espiot, Bourc Camus, Bourc Lamit, Gaillard de la Motte, Naudon Baugeran led hundreds of routiers at one point in their careers. These captains were already independent players, free to join other captains or set up their own businesses when it suited them. Those with less than 100 men found it much more difficult to do so. There are of course examples of this, just think of

²³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

²⁴ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

Bascot de Mauléon, immortalised by Froissart, but my research suggests that they were much less able to make independent decisions. In this sub-chapter, I will describe the basic uncertainties about the captains involved in the crusade, which make it possible only to estimate the number of crusaders, not to determine their exact number. The cases of Geoffroy Tête-Noir and Jean De Chauffour indicate precisely that they appear in the sources, the former being captured (if it is about him) and the latter, after his presumed execution, clearly rising from the dust and taking part in the campaign with his own company. The sub-chapters on Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol explain how the two captains stood out from the others, how they were worth more than their peers in terms of ambition, organisation, tactics and strategy. Nevertheless, they differed significantly in their methods on the border: Arnaud de Cervole deliberately made himself indispensable to various members of the Burgundian aristocracy in a narrower sense and to the French royal family in a broader sense, often with a foresight that meant for him, even at the cost of financial gain in the short term. It also happened, and not infrequently, that he pre-financed expenses for the Duke of Burgundy or the King of France which Dijon or Paris could not afford to pay at the time. Since it is clear from the dissertation that Arnaud de Cervole was first and foremost a military entrepreneur and that he was best at making money, his investments usually paid off.

Seguin de Badefol used other means to gain increasing wealth and influence on the frontier. During the Crusade, he seized and occupied Anse in the name of Charles II, king of Navarre. His chevauchées, which started from there, extended to the whole of Burgundy. From the plunder, the patis, the safe-conduct issued and the considerable sums received for the surrender of Anse, he was able to maintain his great company and to earn a considerable income. His activities are significant because, although he did not participate in the crusade, he planned to join Arnaud de Cervole after the surrender of Anse. The treaty concerning the town's surrender includes crucial details about the arrangements made with Avignon by the crusaders en route to the Kingdom of Hungary.

The section 'Clothing, Armour, Armament' deals with the clothing and armour of the companies that went on a crusade. Relatively few contemporary descriptions are available on the subject. An Alsatian chronicle, however, notes two interesting facts: firstly, only captains wore metal armour, while some of the common soldiers of the companies were barefoot. The other interesting fact, which is again an excellent example of the relationship between mercenaries and the local population, can be observed in the most unexpected areas, such as fashion. It was Arnaud de Cervole's crusade that led to the Alsatian inhabitants starting to wear pointed caps, which they adopted from the mercenaries.

The significance of the sub-chapter 'The Importance of River Valleys in the Overall Strategy of the Mercenary Companies' in the thesis is that Seguin de Badefol, at the capture of Anse and over the following ten months, systematically exploited the opportunities offered by the river valleys to pursue a series of chevauchées in all four directions. However, in this respect he was not alone in terms of the companies active on the frontier. The Great Companies of the Hundred Years' War achieved their goals by occupying bridge-towns and strategically important castles in the river valleys in the middle of 14 Century. The importance of river valleys will be shown from the point of view of the mercenary companies in the border regions of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, based on examples gathered in archives from Lyon to Lille. The cases presented show this process from the first appearance of the mercenaries until they reached the total domination of their targeted region.

Spying always used to be an essential part of the strategy of the companies, as it was always much more dangerous and it caused more loss in human life to risk a frontal assault against a walled city or castle than to use deception. Companies employed spies for several reasons: to be able to conquer a city, capture a wealthy person, or seize a shipment or treasure. On the other hand, the use of spies and military intelligence proved to be just as an important tool for the medieval cities or the regional authorities as well when they were preparing for the onslaught of the routiers, who either arrived in the form of companies or disguised as crusaders. In the sub-chapter 'Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy: Reconnaissance, Spying on Mercenaries and Crusaders', I will illustrate both sides of the coin: spying for and against the companies.

The second part of the 'Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies' is the sub-chapter 'Hungarian Mercenaries in Italy (1360-1365)'. Although Hungarian mercenaries were not involved in Arnaud de Cervole's crusade to Alsace, they were present in Italy. Besides the English and Germans, Hungarians were the most numerous in the multinational mercenary companies. They were also in the companies that the city of Florence, in response to a letter from the Pope, had asked to join the crusades led by Arnaud de Cervole and Amadeus VI against the Ottomans. Moreover, in the crusade of Amadeus VI, Hungarian mercenaries actually reached the Balkans, and they were demonstrably present at the capture of Gallipoli and presumably reached Bulgaria, where they may have met the royal army led by Louis I. Previous research has already shown a link between Amadeus VI and the crusade of Arnaud de Cervole. Hungarians in Luchino dal Verme's army also reached Crete, where they took part in putting down the rebellion under

the leadership of the condottiere²⁵ Luchino dal Verme himself, while Amadeus VI was in Bulgaria trying to free his relative, the Byzantine emperor left for Constantinople, perhaps with the intention of joining Amadeus VI. In the light of the above, it can be considered a proven fact that Hungarian mercenaries took part in the crusades launched in 1365/66, precisely in the campaign led by Amadeus VI, which is confirmed by modern literature.²⁶ The sub-chapter "Livelihood in Border Wars and Conflicts" is significant from a Hungarian perspective because, before the dissertation was written, studies conducted within the framework of the research project "Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organisation in Europe (1301-1437)" had provided new insights on the topic. This chapter of the dissertation synthesizes the research conducted by the team so far and offers a comprehensive overview of the history of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy during the six years immediately preceding the Crusades. It covers various aspects, including the equipment used by the mercenaries, changes in the number of bands, and the service of some known Conestabilis in Florence.

The sub-chapter highlights the conflicts arising from the number of Hungarian bands serving the city and the emergence of other mercenary companies. It also examines the integration of Hungarian mercenaries into multi-ethnic companies, providing examples from Perugia to Mantua. Furthermore, it explores the tactical and strategic approaches specific to Hungarian mercenaries and compares the recruitment practices of Metz and Florence between 1360-65, explaining why many individuals from the German border provinces chose to serve in Italy rather than engage in border wars and conflicts.

It explains why the Hungarian presence in the archives increases radically from the beginning of 1361, and shows what happened to the Hungarian, Burgundian, German, Italian Caporalis and Conestabilis who were captured by the Gonzagas, based on the extremely rare collection of sources in the Mantua archives. This collection of documents is important because it gives an insight into the thinking of the rulers of the time, who used their positional advantage to persuade the leaders of a large company to serve permanently without remuneration, or at least for very little money.

²⁵ He was to command the entire army assembled in Venice for the expedition, consisting of 800 knights and 2,000 infantrymen. Michael E. Mallett - DAL VERME, Luchino the Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 32 (1986) [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/luchino-dal-verme_res-c15db35e-87eb-11dc-8e9d-0016357eee51_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/luchino-dal-verme_res-c15db35e-87eb-11dc-8e9d-0016357eee51_(Dizionario-Biografico)/)

²⁶ E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 202. see sub-chapter Charles IV in Alsace in the Summer of 1365

The third part of the dissertation traces Arnaud de Cervole's crusade in chronological order from its preparation to its failure, and in the chapter preceding the conclusion it briefly summarises its impact on the immediate frontier.

The chapter 'Preparation of the Crusades 1362-1365,' which I have been researching in Florence, describes the Via Veritatis fresco by Andrea di Bonaiuto in the Spanish chapel of the church of Santa Maria Novella and its interpretation in relation to the crusade, and then analyses the ambivalent attitude of the Church towards the great companies, since on the one hand, the mercenary companies were one of the most important instruments of Gil de Albornoz's efforts. The papal legate had been fighting since 1353 to facilitate the return of the Avignon popes to Rome. At the same time, the mercenary companies had constantly threatened Avignon, the seat of the papacy, since 1359. Innocent VI and Urban V offered the mercenaries either excommunication or absolution by participating in the crusade. The chapter traces the complex political process by which, following the death of the French king, the crusade led by John the Good, originally announced in 1363, evolved into four interrelated but differently focused crusades by 1365, each with the mercenaries' participation as a common point. In this chapter, the relationship between the Catalan Company and papal policy on the Crusades will be elaborated on. The direct link between the Catalan Company and the Duchy of Athens is that they also announced the "preaching for the Crusade" in the Duchy of Athens. Accordingly, Urban V reversed decades of Avignon papal policy against the Company by lifting the excommunication in the territories occupied by the Company.

'The Crusade of the Great Companies' chapter provides an in-depth narrative of a medieval crusade, tracing the journey of mercenaries who set out primarily from Burgundy. The crusaders' route took them through Lorraine and the Duchy of Bar, ultimately reaching Alsace. However, they encountered a significant obstacle in Strasbourg, where the city's refusal to open its gates prevented them from crossing the Rhine and continuing their intended journey to Hungary. A detailed chronicle of their stay in Alsace is provided, leading up to their return to Burgundy. Here, a dispute culminated in the stabbing and death of Arnaud de Cervole, leading to the abrupt disbandment of the crusade. The mercenary companies subsequently redirected their efforts towards a campaign in Castile.

The initial section of the chapter delves into the evaluation of the number of mercenaries involved in the crusade. Accurate figures are elusive, with contemporary estimates varying widely. The account by Carla von Finstingen is regarded as the most authentic, although it likely overstates the numbers. The exact count of crusaders remains indeterminable, partly because they marched in several smaller groups rather than as a single mass.

The second section addresses the uncertainties surrounding the timing of the crusaders departure and the enigmatic relationship between Arnaud de Cervole and Avignon. Unfortunately, specific details have been lost over time, precluding a precise understanding of when the Archpriest began direct negotiations with the Holy See. It is known that he raised a substantial army, larger than any English royal army active during the Hundred Years' War up to the 1360s. Subsequently, the chapter examines preparations in Strasbourg and the Décapole, the other imperial cities, their plans and the implementation, and the reasons behind Alsace's defencelessness.

A distinct sub-chapter analyses the evolving relationships among the Strasbourg council, Emperor Charles IV, and Arnaud de Cervole during the summer of 1365 in Alsace. This period led to a significantly critical approach to the Emperor, particularly from 19th-century historians. The penultimate sub-chapter traces the crusaders' journey from Strasbourg back to Burgundy, overshadowed by a consolidated imperial army. Upon their arrival in Burgundy, Arnaud de Cervole demonstrated his talent for maximizing profit, seizing opportunities to amass a fortune during the campaign. He employed a sophisticated policy to avoid the wrath of his allies, the King of France, and the Duke of Burgundy.

The chapter concludes with the disintegration of the crusading army and the initial steps towards the south until the death of the Archpriest. This section is significant as it provides archival evidence that the crusade to Hungary was redirected towards Italy to join Amadeus VI as part of a secondary plan. This completed the papal strategy for the conquest of northern Italy and eastern France, a topic not extensively covered in modern historiography. The ramifications of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade and the associated events on the borders of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire warrant careful consideration. Following Arnaud de Cervole's death, the plan to deploy the companies eastward to combat the infidels collapsed. Many captains who had accompanied the Archpriest joined Bertrand du Guesclin in the west, while others remained in Burgundy or along the frontier. Peter I Lusignan and Count Amadeus VI of Savoy recruited only a small contingent of mercenaries from Italy. Alsace, where mercenaries from the Hundred Years' War first arrived, experienced a similar invasion a decade later. Despite having the opportunity to prepare for a second invasion after the initial appearance of the routiers on the frontiers of the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France, the border lords' plans remained unexecuted. This last chapter explores the consequences of the crusade, providing a brief summary of the Alsace adventure led by Enguerrand VII of Coucy.

In this form, the dissertation traces the history of the crusade in 14th century Hungarian history, linking the story of the mercenaries active in the Hundred Years' War to the Ottoman

threat in the Balkans. The plan to send members of the most effective military machine of the age to drive the Ottomans out of Europe was completely unknown to Hungarian historiography. In order to understand who those mercenaries were who set out for the kingdom of Hungary, it is necessary to know the mercenaries who appeared in the eastern half of the Kingdom of France in the western provinces of the Holy Roman Empire immediately before the Treaty of Brétigny. In this respect, the dissertation also fills a gap, as international, English, French and German literature since the 19th century has studied this but has not examined the areas affected by the crusade of the great companies led by Arnaud de Cervole.

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology

«Particularly instructive is the case of the Hungarian mercenaries, whose importance for the Italian mercenary market has not yet been properly recognised.»²⁷

A) Secondary literature on the mercenaries in the middle of the 14th century

The literature review will concentrate on the primary subjects of the dissertation, namely the mercenaries, with a spatial focus on the areas affected by the Crusade, namely the northern and central parts of Italy and the border region between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire. The temporal focus will be on the mid-14th century. A comprehensive overview of the English, French, American, Italian, German and Hungarian literature is provided in the appendices, namely 'Historiographical Overview of 19th and Early 20th Centuries' and 'Secondary Literature in the 20th and 21st Centuries.'

There is considerable overlap between the members of the companies that appeared on the frontier around the peace of Brétigny and the members of the crusade led by Arnaud de Cervole. However, they were not identical. The presentation of the authors of the companies in Italy from 1361 onwards is justified by the fact that captains such as Albert Sterz and John Hawkwood were active in Champagne before arriving in Italy, and subsequently traversed the entire frontier to reach their destination. In French literature, they were known as the Tard-Venus. The primary author on this topic was Georges Guigue.²⁸ A significant proportion of the mercenaries remained on the frontier, and those who survived until 1365 and served under a captain who opted to proceed eastward with Arnaud de Cervole participated in the crusade. The continuous movement of companies between the Kingdom

²⁷ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, op. cit., p. 41.

²⁸ Georges Guigue, *Les Tard-Venus de Lyonnais, Forez et Beaujolais 1356-1369*, Lyon, 1886.

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology of France and Italy in the first half of the 1360s provides further justification for the presentation of the literature on companies active in Italy.²⁹

The existing literature on the activities of mercenaries operating on the frontier in the mid-14th century is notably sparse, spanning a period of over a century. The systematic, primarily region-specific research that commenced in the second half of the nineteenth century was continued in studies and book chapters published in the early twenty-first century. In the English language, the most significant work on the subject is that of Kenneth Fowler, which deals with the Crusade itself and the history of mercenaries in the years preceding it. His influence on my dissertation is unquestionable, as this book served as the catalyst for my initial research on the subject matter. I have adopted the methodology he employed, which was based primarily on local archival sources, and have supplemented it with additional research elements. Kenneth Fowler's research illuminated the origins of the captains. Many were second or third born of a Breton or Gascon noble house, or bastards who, in addition to their noble origins, also distinguished themselves as captains of their generation, exhibiting exceptional talents.³⁰ One of the strengths of Fowler's work lies in the detail he reveals, making it possible to map the relationships between captains on the border between Kingdom and Empire in the mid-14th century. The book was an indispensable but not sufficient condition for the dissertation, as it does not go into such important details as the composition of the companies, the origins of the mercenaries serving in the companies, their individual motivations, and the underlying economic and socio-cultural motives that persuaded or encouraged them to become mercenaries. The chapters of the book that deal with Burgundy, Alsace, the Duchy of Bar or Champagne analyse the history of mercenaries mainly from the perspective of the Great Companies, leaving out the impact of the routiers on local society, the changes in everyday life, the emotional effects and changes in society caused by the presence of mercenaries.

In modern literature, the only detailed analysis of the composition of companies serving on the frontier is provided by Bertrand Schnerb, concerning the company of a Lombard captain, Bertrand Gasc, who served the Dukes of Burgundy faithfully.³¹ Details of his company can be found in the chapter 'Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies', under the sub-chapter 'Those Who Took Part in the Crusade:

²⁹ John Hawkwood may have participated in the battle of Brignais. see: K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁰ Such a career is the best example: Nicolas Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret ou le destin d'un capitaine gascon du roi d'Angleterre pendant la guerre de Cent Ans*, Archeodrom, 2007, e-book edition.

³¹ Bertrand Schnerb, « Un capitaine Italien au service de Jean sans Peur: Castellain Vasc », *Annales de Bourgogne*, 1992, vol. LXXIV, pp. 5-27.

Members of the Companies'. Suffice it to note here that Bertrand Schnerb's findings on the composition of the companies are in line with Stephan Selzer's research on the composition of German mercenary companies and my own research on Hungarian mercenaries serving in contemporary Italy. That is, the organizational structure of the companies was unstable, with the composition of a great company constantly changing at the individual and group level. In the case of the Hungarians, research to date suggests that Hungarians generally changed companies under the leadership of a single constabiles or caporalis, meanwhile there were new individual members joining Bertrand Gasc's company on the way from Italy to Burgundy.³² The members of the companies and the reasons behind their recruitment as mercenaries are discussed by Germain Butaud in his work on 14th-century routiers³³ and by Guillaume Pépin in his study of the Gascon mercenaries.³⁴

The only French-language work dealing with the period and subject of the dissertation is that of Geoffrey Grill, which analyses mercenaries specifically active in the border regions and involved in the crusade in the 1360s.³⁵ The author provides a brief overview of the initial appearance of the companies in Lorraine in 1359 and in Alsace in 1360. He then proceeds to discuss the strategy and tactics employed by the companies and their control over the occupied territories. Furthermore, the text addresses logistics, drawing upon local sources to describe the works of Philippe Contamine and Claude Gaier. It also discusses the issues of feeding an army of the period and how the companies lived up the 'plat pays'.³⁶ Nevertheless, the principal focus of his research is the incursions into Alsace by Arnaud de Cervole and Enguerrand de Coucy. Consequently, the dissertation represents one of the most significant contributions to modern literature. It is also noteworthy that the author conducted comprehensive archival research on Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, primarily utilising the archives of Bar-le-Duc, Metz and Strasbourg.

Further details on the mercenary warfare can be found in Nicolas Savy's work.³⁷ In a subsequent study, he delineates not only the espionage and tactics employed by mercenary companies, but also the methods utilized by towns under threat from mercenaries to obtain

³² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³³ Germain Butaud, *Les compagnies de routiers en France, 1357-1393*, Clermont-Ferrand, 2012. pp. 63-64.

³⁴ Guilhem Pépin, « Les routiers gascons, basques, agenais et périgourdins du parti anglais : motivations, origines et la perception de leur présence (v. 1360-v. 1440) », in Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Bériac-Lainé and Frédéric Boutoulle (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*, Bordeaux, 2016, p. 29.

³⁵ Geoffrey Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies en Lorraine et en Alsace de La Paix de Bretigny à la Mort de Charles V, (1370-1380)*, Strasbourg, 2006.

³⁶ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³⁷ Nicolas Savy, *Cahors pendant la guerre de Cent Ans*, Cahors, 2005. p. 51.

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology information about new companies emerging in their vicinity.³⁸ Naturally, as with every other strategy employed to protect against mercenaries, this one came at a significant price. A detailed analysis of this topic can be found in the subsection entitled 'Living with Mercenaries: the Costs of their Presence' in the chapter on 'Theatres of War' of this dissertation. The structure of William Caferro's book on the relationship between mercenaries and Siena provided the inspiration for this chapter.³⁹ In his discussion, Caferro addresses the expenses incurred by the companies in the Siena region, as well as how the financial depletion of Siena was influenced by the companies' presence. These parallels can be observed between the two theatres of war, as the Sienese practice can be traced from the initial appearance of the mercenaries to the duchy of Burgundy.⁴⁰ In the concluding section of the chapter on theatres of war, an examination of the hydra effect is undertaken, with a particular focus on Burgundy. The practice of redeeming castles for cash was a significant factor in the rapid depletion of the ducal treasury, ultimately rendering the defence of Burgundy ineffective. In his book, William Caferro analyses the wages of mercenaries hired by Siena to defend the city against attacking companies. I do the same for the city of Metz in the dissertation.⁴¹

Of course, William Caferro's greatest impact was on the chapter dealing with Hungarian mercenaries employed in Italy. His research provides a wealth of important information about the role of Hungarian mercenaries in multi-ethnic companies,⁴² who they served with,⁴³ how much they earned and what this meant in the context of the 14th century.⁴⁴ Furthermore, his research highlighted the long-term service of Hungarian constables and caporales in Florence.⁴⁵

Another author whose work exerted a significant impact on the dissertation's structure is Stephan Selzer. His work represents the most comprehensive account of a European author on the subject of German mercenaries serving in Italy in the 14th century.⁴⁶ The author's treatment of sources is similarly confident and thorough in the case of William Caferro and Kenneth Fowler. The text goes on to discuss the practice of recruiting German mercenaries

³⁸ Nicolas Savy, « Le renseignement à Martel », *Bulletin de la société des Etudes du Lot*, 2003, vol. CXXIV, n° 3, pp. 183-208.

³⁹ William Caferro, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena*, Baltimore, 1998.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-127.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-103.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

⁴³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴⁵ William Caferro, « Continuity, Long-term Service, and Permanent Forces: A Reassessment of the Florentine Army in the Fourteenth Century », *The Journal of Modern History*, 2008, vol. LXXX, n° 2, 219-251.

⁴⁶ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology in Italy, furthermore Stephan Selzer also analyses the relationship between German mercenaries and Italian society.⁴⁷ Many of the German mercenaries settled in Italy and married, successfully integrating into the local community.⁴⁸ The author's work offers insights into the economic and socio-cultural factors that motivated a significant number of Germans, predominantly from Swabia, to serve in Italy during the latter half of the 14th century. Additionally, it examines the experiences of the fortunate mercenaries who were able to return home.⁴⁹

One further Hungarian author is to be included on this list, thanks to whose work Hungarian research on the subject commenced after almost a hundred years. Attila Bárány's study examines the Anglo-Hungarian collaboration within multi-ethnic companies during the second half of the 14th century. It analyses the origins of the relationship between the White Company and the Company of Saint George⁵⁰ and the impact of English-style dismounted warfare on Hungary.⁵¹ Additionally, he provides an exemplary illustration of the mobility of mercenaries in Europe during the 14th century. He notes that English mercenaries were employed in the 1360s in the castle of Töröcsvár, situated along the South-Transylvanian-Wallachian border.⁵²

The works of the 21st century would not have been possible without the contributions of historians active in the second half of the 19th century. Appendix A provides a comprehensive overview of the most influential Hungarian, Italian, German, French and English authors on the subject. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I will focus on the most significant 19th-century author whose work is indispensable in the treatment of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade. Aimé Cherest's 1879 monograph represents the most comprehensive account of Arnaud de Cervole's life to this day.⁵³ The precise archival references in the monograph were instrumental in initiating the research process, as were the source notes in the *Pièces Justificatives* at the final end of the book. The book is a product of the positivist historiography of its time. In the preface, the author notes that the bibliographical antecedents were not detailed enough, leaving many points about Arnaud de Cervole's career unclear.⁵⁴ The author's work is primarily based on the sources of the

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-180.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-229.

⁵⁰ Attila Bárány, « The Communion of English and Hungarian Mercenaries in Italy », in Klára Papp and János Barta (eds.), *The first Millennium of Hungary in Europe*, Debrecen, 2002, pp. 130-143.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁵³ Aimé Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre : épisodes de la guerre de cent ans au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1879.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. III.

Dijon archives, which he describes as having been individually verified.⁵⁵ Positivist historiography faced criticism for its perceived over-reliance on empirical data and neglect of the interpretive aspects of history. Critics argued that history could not be entirely objective, as historians inevitably brought their own perspectives and biases to their work. Despite these criticisms, positivist historiography left a lasting impact on the discipline. It established rigorous standards for the use of primary sources, promoted methodological rigor, and reinforced the importance of evidence-based historical writing. The motto he selected for his work, «*Scribitur ad narrandum et ad probandum*,» is evident throughout his oeuvre. It is the rationale behind the continued reliance of contemporary authors on this principle.⁵⁶

B) The Concept of Mercenarism and Paid Men in the Border Region in the Second Half of the 14th Century

Edited by John France, the volume of papers of a conference held at the University of Wales in 2005 on mercenaries and the paid men was published. Several of the many speakers addressed the distinction between paid men and mercenaries. In the introduction to the book, John France highlights the negative connotations that the Latin *mercenarius* carried in the Middle Ages. Like John France, Kelly DeVries, and Stephen Morillo have taken a comprehensive, cross-historical approach to the problem, while other medievalists such as David Crouch, John D. Hosler, Guido Guerri Dall'Oro, Adrian R. Bell have formulated who they consider to be mercenaries through a specific example. For the purposes of this dissertation, only those approaches that focus on the 14th-century mercenaries and refer to the mercenaries who participated in the crusade on the frontier, i.e., primarily the *routiers* will be dealt with. According to John France «*if anybody was a pure mercenary, serving only for pay and available to anyone with the means, it was these routiers, and this undoubtedly lies behind the disdain in which they were held. However, they were not called mercenaries, because that meant 'hireling' and would have been a powerful reminder that almost all soldiers, of whatever status, were paid.*»⁵⁷ But who were these *routiers*, the embodiment of true mercenarism? Germain Butaud explains the etymology of the name: «*the routiers (ruptarii, ruptores), a new term derived from route (from the Latin rupta, rutta) which primarily*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. IV.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. IV.

⁵⁷ John France, « Introduction », in John France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, Leiden - Boston, 2008, pp. 1-13, p. 11.

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*meant a group of men, a detachment, and a troop. The pejorative connotation of the word 'routier' therefore goes back a long way, but it seems to have lessened over time. In the 14th century, the historian Froissart used the word without any intention to denigrate. In fact, the word was rarely used in his time.»*⁵⁸ Kenneth Fowler begins his book on great companies with a definition of *routes*: «*a group of military companies composed of contingents (known as routes) of professional soldiers, who came together in the decade following the conclusion of peace between England and France on their own account, or in the pay of whatever prince or lord would hire them.*»⁵⁹ Guilhem Pépin's opinion, however, differs from the above, as explained in the foreword he wrote for Nicolas Savy's excellent book on Bertucat D'Albret. When defining «*routiers*», he notes that the term is sometimes wrongly translated as mercenaries because the *routiers* «*were troops assembled under the command of leaders they had given themselves outside any external authority, despite the formal recognition of a sovereign power (e.g. the King of England, Navarre, France, Castile, etc.), who pursued war aims that were not, for the most part, defined or precisely defined by these same authorities. However, even if the pursuit of profit did exist, few of the leaders of the routiers acted as true mercenaries in the modern sense of the term. While some of them changed employers in the course of the war (e.g. from the King of England to the King of Navarre or France after 1360), far fewer changed allegiance - the nuance is important - and a number of them, including Bertrucat de d'Albret or even Arnaud de Cervole, known as the Archpriest, never wavered in their loyalty to their sovereign, contrary to popular belief. These troops played an essential role during the first part of the Hundred Years' War and even afterwards, including their central role in the establishment of Enrique of Trastámara on the Castilian throne in the late 1360s.*»⁶⁰ The history of the frontier in the early 1360s does not support Guilhem Pépin's conclusion, for although Arnaud de Cervole remained loyal to the French cause, he was at least involved as a mercenary commander in the Duchy of Bar and in Lorraine between 1363 and 1365.⁶¹ Contemporary sources clearly refer to mercenary captains when they use the term «*capitains de routes.*» According to a record in the Dimanche de Vitel in 1364, a messenger was paid for carrying a letter from Arnaud de Cervole to the «*capitains de routes.*»⁶² Moreover, in the sources, sometimes route and

⁵⁸ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵⁹ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶⁰ P. Guilhem, « Préface », in N. Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-11, p. 7.

⁶¹ See the relevant sections of the Theatres of War chapter on Eude, Sir de Grancey, and the Count of Vaudemont.

⁶² ADCO B 1416, f. 38v

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company are used together, as can be seen from the preceding, both refer to a group of mercenaries: «*Lettres d'Eudes, sire de Grancey, portant qu'il promet et au nom des routes et compagnies de Bretons, Gascons, Anglois et autres...*»⁶³ The term 'route', which appears regularly in French sources from Burgundy to Lille, is one of the surest signs in the sources that mercenaries were involved. In the sources, the term always appears with the name of a captain, possibly with his rank (*chevalier, escuier*): «*XIIII florins de florence delivreiz a herand de champignuelles escuier por ses gauges et por les gauges de Joffroi de Mellnicourt escuier et de leur route.*»⁶⁴ Sometimes the sources are quite clear about the identity of a mercenary captain: «*pour ce qu'ils avaient traictié avec Guillempot, capitaine d'une route de genz d'armes de compaignie, de lui bailler et faire avoir le chastel de Montsaujon.*»⁶⁵

In rarer cases, border sources also use the term 'route' for a great company: «*li grant route des Bretons...*»⁶⁶ However, in some cases, 'company' indicates the appearance of mercenaries in great companies: «*ou estoit lors la grant compaignie des dit ennemis,*»⁶⁷ «*furent arses par les grans compaignes.*»⁶⁸

«*By this time, the term compaignie (or company) had taken on great importance and a new meaning. In the military register, it was used neutrally to refer to any troop of men-at-arms led by a captain, regardless of size. In addition to this ordinary use, a new usage was added to designate armed bands with strong personalities and their own scope for action, the first examples of which can be found outside France.*»⁶⁹ Philippe Contamine has written in detail about the formation and the work of the companies and their purpose, as already mentioned in the literature review. Germain Butaud is absolutely right that the term 'company' became widespread in the sources by the 1360s, in fact it was much more used than route. The term *compaignie* became internationalised on the frontier, not only in French, but also in German or Latin sources,⁷⁰ when the term is used, we can be sure that the contemporaries mean mercenaries. In a letter to Burgundy, Charles V makes a clear distinction between mercenaries («*roubeurs, pillars et autres méffateurs*») and other armed men (*gens d'armes*),

⁶³ AMN B 522, n° 112.

⁶⁴ ADM B 2322 Compte de Colin Pallardel, f. 110v

⁶⁵ Ernst Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne de la race capétienne avec des documents inédits et des pièces justificatives*, vol. IX : Règne de Philippe de Rouvre, 1349–1361. La Bourgogne sous le roi Jean II, 1361–1363, Dijon, 1905, p. 214. n. 2.

⁶⁶ «*li grant route des Bretons...*» Archives départementales de la Meuse B. 1738, f. 73v.

⁶⁷ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 171.

⁶⁸ ADCO B 1416, f. 3r, mentioned by A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 157, n° 1.

⁶⁹ G. Butaud, *Les compaignies...* op. cit., p. 1.

⁷⁰ ADCO B 9960, n° 4.

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology calling on the nobles of the duchy to take up arms against the companies.⁷¹ As a consequence of the threat of the companies, the term '*gesellschaft*' is present in the Alsatian sources from 1360 onwards.⁷² In addition, of course, other terms were used for mercenaries, such as «*homines armorum*.»⁷³

Michael Mallett says that the armies fighting in the Hundred Years' War in the 14th century «were mercenary armies in the widest sense of the word and some of them included large numbers of foreign mercenaries.»⁷⁴ Kelly DeVries points out two things about Mallett's work: according to Mallett, what distinguishes mercenaries from paid men is their foreign origin.⁷⁵ He then explores the notion of 'foreignness' in depth, referring to it as a modern construct and suggesting that we should trust our sources and their language.⁷⁶ Fully agreeing with Kelly DeVries' approach, the best way to understand the distinction between mercenaries and paid people is to study the sources because the contemporary knew exactly who the mercenaries were and they were accurately identified in the sources. Michael Mallett is right that the locals did distinguish between mercenaries based on their real or perceived origins. Latin, French and German sources from the frontier region often add to the terms route or company the adjectives English, Gascon, Breton, Navarrese and, as was the case once with Dame de Cassel, Polish. Most often, they simply replace the company or enemy with the place of origin of the mercenaries. If the *routiers* captured a castle in a particular region, the name of the castle was linked to the origin of the mercenaries: «*les Bretons de Flory fasoient qui continuellement coroient et encore corent le Pais...*»⁷⁷ There may, of course, be cases in the sources where the place of origin is not a reference to mercenaries: this was the case with the Navarrese and German troops fighting in the war of Yolande de Flandre, under the command of Philippe of Navarre and Brocard de Fénétrange.⁷⁸ This brings us to the problem of the distinction between paid men and mercenaries. Some of the troops involved in the war were paid men-at-arms, most probably mercenaries. In this one specific case, Bar was visited by the Navarrese on a mission for Philippe of Navarre, who, as we have seen, was not a mercenary but rather the husband of Yolande. Thus, in the Bar-le-Duc sources, Philippe of Navarre is never referred to as a mercenary captain. The same is the case with Brocard de Fénétrange, who at the time, as governor of the Duchy of Lorraine, attacked Bar.

⁷¹ ADCO B 11875.

⁷² AMC AA, 48, n° 1.

⁷³ AVES AA. 81, f. 1.

⁷⁴ M. Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters...*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁷⁵ Kelly DeVries, « Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definition and Problems », in *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁷⁷ ADN B 758, n° 14451

⁷⁸ ADM B 2146, Inventaires-Sommaires

In the sources, the Germans, at this time, appear as enemies, but not as mercenaries. Therefore, in this case, the foreign place of origin did not automatically imply the designation of mercenary. However, the war took place in the first half of the 1350s, six years before the threat of mercenaries was reported. In this period, the terms company, *route* etc. are not yet present in the sources. By the 1360s, however, all that had changed. As can be seen above, the designation of the place of origin in local sources refers exclusively to the presence of mercenaries. In this case, however, how can mercenaries be distinguished from paid men? First of all, the boundary between paid men and mercenaries was not clear. In Burgundy in the first half of the 1360s, Jean d'Armagnac, with his 300 men, was never a mercenary in the service of Philip the Bold. The sources refer to *gens d'armes* as the men-at-arms serving under him. All this is because Jean d'Armagnac, a local nobleman through his mother, was part of those mobilised and paid by the Duke in case of danger, in a similar way to mercenaries, for a month at a time. As already mentioned in the chapter on theatres of war, when Jean d'Armagnac was not paid, he behaved in the same way as unpaid mercenary captains, i.e. he began to destroy the territories entrusted to his protection by force, as Tallegardon had done. Except that contemporary sources distinguished Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri's troops from Jean d'Armagnac and his men-at-arms. For Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri, the terms «*route*» or «*Yvain et cesdis Compaignons*» are used.⁷⁹ The same could be said of Louis of Navarre, when he invaded Burgundy at the head of the companies invading Le Vèvre: «*le roy de Navarre et messire Louis, son frère, ont fait leurs gens que des Compaignies*»⁸⁰ In this quote, it is interesting how he distinguishes between Charles the Bad and his brother Louis. The title also suggests that he is the captain of a route, because in the sources the name is regularly preceded by Mess, which is often the case for captains: «*Amaniu de Pommiers*»⁸¹, «*messire Soudin de Latraul chr.*»⁸² A letter from Burgundy, also written in 1364, best illustrates how mercenaries were distinguished from paid men by the locals: the letter is part of an episode in the many clashes between the county and duchy of Burgundy in 1364, where orders to mobilise were issued to mercenary captains in the service of Philippe the Bold and to the nobles and their armed escorts, the paid men. The difference between the address is clearly visible. The mercenary captains, «*mess. Jehan de St Pol et Mondon,*» the leaders of the paid men are referred to by their titles, «*seigneur*

⁷⁹ AMM EE3 liasses 6, f. 8.

⁸⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.

⁸¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 38v

⁸² ADCO B 357.

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de St Amour, » «*seigneur de Somberton*.»⁸³ However, a French nobleman could just as well be a mercenary captain in the eyes of the locals. Jean d'Armagnac's son and the Frenchmen who went with him were called «*gens de routes et de compaignes*» by Gian Galeazzo Visconti.⁸⁴ Likewise, the sources show that a mercenary captain is successfully integrated into the local elite: Arnaud de Cervole is the best example. Once he arrived in Burgundy, although he helped the French cause from the outset and thus the rise to power of Philip the Bold, until he became part of the local aristocratic elite through his marriage, the sources refer to him either as Arnaud de Cervole or *Archipêtre*. This changed by 1364/65: from then on, as with any Burgundian nobleman, his title is used in most cases: «*Erneut de Cervole, signeur de Chasteauvillain*.»⁸⁵ Except in Burgundy, he is still referred to as a mercenary captain in the border regions, a variant of Arnaud de Cervole or *Archipêtre*.⁸⁶ It is not, of course, a standardised administration, where the names and titles appearing in the sources always appear in the same way, but by studying the frontier sources of the period the above trend can be clearly identified. For example, in the chronicle of Froissart and Jean le Bel's invasion of Champagne in 1359, Brocard de Fénétrange, when he was involved in the interception of mercenary companies in Champagne with 500 horsemen, refers to the troops in a distinctive way and does not use the usual adjectives for the *routiers*. Rather, he refers to them as paid men in the sense given above.⁸⁷ A modern interpretation of 14th-century mercenaries active in border raiding is given by Guilhem Pépin: «*In this context, we can truly describe these Gascon chiefs and their troops as mercenaries, since they were fighting for money and for a political power that was not that of their 'natural' lord*.»⁸⁸ In my view, this definition is flexible enough to reconcile the interpretation provided by contemporary sources with the modern dilemma between paid men and mercenaries, resolving the contradiction that Brocard de Fénétrange in the service of Champagne, or Bruno von Rappoltstein in the service of Lorraine against the Duke of Vaudémont, could equally be considered a mercenary. However, when he fought in Alsace in 1375 against the mercenaries during Sir de Coucy's invasion and was paid for it, he could be considered a paid man, because he did it all at 'home.' And here, for a moment, the concept of 'home' needs to be considered. Several historians have thought in national terms when discussing the concept of

⁸³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.

⁸⁴ Philippe Contamine, « Les compagnies d'aventure en France pendant la Guerre de Cent ans », *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Moyen Âge, Temps modernes*, 1975, vol. LXXXVII, n° 2, p. 367.

⁸⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archipêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

⁸⁶ Archives du Nord B. 758, n° 14451.

⁸⁷ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁸⁸ G. Pépin, « Les routiers gascons... », *art. cit.*, pp. 23-41, p. 27.

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology mercenaries and foreignness and have criticized Michael Mallett's definition from this perspective. Nevertheless, Guilhem Pépin's notion of 'natural lord' resolves this conflict, since the sources make it clear that 'home' meant a small territorial unit rather than a country, a duchy, a county, the constitution in which the estate was located, be it Burgundy, Alsace, Lorraine or the duchy of Bar. The French kingdom was above that. Of course, one could remain loyal to the French cause, but the alliance between the French king and each subject was not unbreakable. Jean de Neufchâtel, equally, could swear allegiance to the King of Navarre, and was henceforth vassal of Charles the Bad, despite the fact that his estates were in the duchy of Burgundy. In this case, when he attacked Philip in collaboration with the companies of Le Vèvre, he could be considered as a mercenary as well, being in the pay of the King of Navarre. Guilhem Pépin's definition is more descriptive of the thinking of the contemporaries than interpretations based on the modern notion of a nation.

C) Methodology of the dissertation

Employing a variety of methodological approaches in a dissertation on medieval history, particularly in the study of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade and the presence of the mercenaries in the border region, is essential for a rich and engaging narrative. Microhistory brings the personal and local aspects to life, macrohistory provides the broad context, and new military history offers a comprehensive view of the military, social, and cultural dimensions. Together, these approaches create a multifaceted and compelling narrative that enhances the reader's understanding and keeps them engrossed in the historical analysis.

Campaign analysis has been much criticised for not having sufficient sources.⁸⁹ The analysis of marches, and of war in general, requires too complex an approach, based on the discovery of a sufficient number and quality of sources. Therefore, in the context of Edward III's campaign and the analysis of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, I have conducted archival research in the provincial and municipal archives of France along the route of the campaigns. In the case of Edward's campaign, I conducted archival research in Lille, and subsequently in Reims, Châlons-en-Champagne, Bar-le-Duc, and Dijon. Following Edward's departure from Burgundy and subsequent journey to Paris, a number of mercenary captains elected to remain in the region for almost a year, leading a series of chevauchées in various directions. Accordingly, I conducted research in the archives of Metz, Nancy, Strasbourg, Colmar, Kaisersberg, Sélestat, and Haguenau. In the south, I

Rachel Tecott and Andrew Halterman, *The Case for Campaign Analysis...*, *op. cit.* [available online at] https://andrewhalterman.com/files/Tecott_Halterman_Campaign_Analysis-merged.pdf p.4

The Concept of Mercenarism, Secondary Literature and Methodology conducted research in Lyon. With regard to Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, although at the time of departure companies came from the eastern half of the Kingdom of France to join the Archpriest, the largest number of them set off northwards from Burgundy. Consequently, the same archives had to be visited (with the exception of Lille and Reims), but due to the involvement of Savoy, an additional visit was made to Chambéry, where no reference to the matter was found. As will be demonstrated in the thesis, the Dijon archives contained the most significant sources pertaining to the conclusion of the campaign. In these instances, I have employed a contemporary analytical approach to the campaigns, drawing upon previous research and sources, to examine the material and military potential of the border provinces to resist the English army and the crusaders, the manner in which they organised their campaigns and the actual outcomes achieved.⁹⁰ However, the consequences of the military campaigns must also be examined, as the description of a campaign alone does not reflect the political-social-economic consequences experienced by the inhabitants of the areas affected by the campaigns.⁹¹ In their joint study on the role of military history in modern historiography, Tami Davis Biddle and Robert M. Citino put forth the argument that modern military historiography should include an examination of the relationship between society and war at the level of the individual, the group, the region, and the state. This examination should, where possible, take into account the traces of campaigns in the collective memory of society.⁹² The New Military History takes a much broader view of the impact of war than a detailed analysis of a single campaign, the commander's performance, troop movements, or descriptions of battles.⁹³ As early as 1984, David Trusk stressed that

«Although the focus of study should remain on the nation's wars, it should encompass their preludes and aftermaths as well as actual armed conflicts. In addition to scrutinizing the conduct of particular war, Trusk believes, Army historians must study the periods before and after conflicts to learn their wars'causes and consequences.»⁹⁴

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 4

⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁹² Tami Davis Biddle and Robert M. Citino, « The Role of Military History in the Contemporary Academy » *Army History*, 2015, vol. XCVI, pp. 24-30. In the case of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, I was able to do this thanks to a collection of sources in the Strasbourg archives.

⁹³ Robert M. Citino, « Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction », *The American Historical Review*, 2007, vol. CXII, n° 4, pp. 1070-1090. p. 1071.

⁹⁴ William H. Woodward, « The Citizen-Soldiers and the "New Military History" » *The Army Historian*, 1985, n° 9, pp. 13-15.

The «New Military History» not only focuses on the details of the campaign, but also on people's everyday lives, the changes in their habits, their lives transformed by the advent of war/mercenaries, such as travelling or living together with the conquerors in an occupied territory. In the Theatres of War chapter of the dissertation, it is precisely this approach that is reflected in subchapters such as 'Anime tribolate, se potete, datevi in viaggio pace e buon piacere,' '«Pour la doute dez angloix»: Changing Mentalities.' However, change did not happen overnight. Almost thirty years later, 2012 David Simpkin and Andy King «Now after a long timespent at the margins of academic history, it has come in from the cold.»⁹⁵

This raises the question of what this means for a medievalist. In order to examine the impact of war, and in the case of this dissertation, the mercenaries who embodied war, from as many angles as possible, it is primarily determined by the quantity and nature of the source material available. In a favourable case, it is also possible to employ an approach that has not yet been utilised, such as the collection of sources written by Guillaume de Clugny without interruption over a six-year period. This could be employed as a starting point for comparing the interaction between mercenaries and the population in the Auxois bailliage. Another significant source of information on the network of relations between society and mercenaries is the letters of remission. These sources, in turn, necessitate a micro-historical approach. The intricacies of the mercenaries' connections to local communities are best revealed in these sources. To fully comprehend this complexity, it is essential to investigate the motivations behind the mercenaries' initial involvement in the crusade, as well as their decision to join the crusade itself, at both the group and individual levels. Amédée de Chayneto joins Bertrand du Guesclin's crusade in order to settle a personal vendetta without awaiting the outcome of legal proceedings.⁹⁶ For a Lyonnese baker, innkeeper and merchant, joining the crusade of a nobleman who had hoped to settle his debts with his troops was a financial disaster, as their money was not returned due to the death of the knight.⁹⁷ The aforementioned examples from the Theatres of War chapter are centred on a specific focal point, capturing the moment and subsequently analysing the reactions of the participants. Guillermus the Descozus, having gained access to Maria's domicile by surreptitious means, found the evening's events to be less favourable than he had anticipated due to the vocal protests of Maria and the imminent arrival of her neighbours.

⁹⁵ A. King and D. Simpkin (eds.) *England and Scotland at War...*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁹⁶ See details in subchapter Participating in the Crusades: A Chance for Saving their Souls and other Motives.

⁹⁷ See details in subchapter Participating in the Crusades: A Chance for Saving their Souls and other Motives.

Consequently, he elected to withdraw. Similarly, Maria's decision not to pursue a romantic relationship with the mercenary was an impulsive one.⁹⁸ Micro history, *ab ovo*, is concerned with the most concrete details possible, with small things in the sources that can be used to bring us closer to the reality of everyday life, the reality as it was lived by contemporaries.⁹⁹ Paul Edward Dutton wrote in his book that microhistory and macrohistory «*more like a quantum and classical physics where one approach works better on the small and other on large phenomena, but both together constitute a more complete understanding of our cripple world.*»¹⁰⁰

Precisely in this light, a micro-historical approach could not be appropriate for the chapter on the Preparation of the Crusade, which had to describe the processes of European politics between 1362 and 1365. Macro-historical methods proved adequate to accurately trace the three years of preparation for the Crusades, with their unexpected twists and turns, the correspondence between European rulers and Pope Urban V, the envoys, the interests behind the crusades' destinies and the interconnections between the four Crusades.

When undertaking a dissertation on medieval history, the use of diverse methodological approaches, such as microhistory, macrohistory, and new military history, is not merely beneficial but essential. This variety enriches the analysis, ensuring a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the subject. In the cases of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade and the appearance of the routiers in the border region between France and the Holy Roman Empire, employing these different approaches can maintain narrative tension, providing a multi-dimensional perspective that engages and enlightens the reader. Integrating these methodological approaches creates a dynamic and layered narrative that maintains tension and interest. The microhistorical details of the arrival of the mercenary companies of the Hundred Years war and their local engagements with the frontier society captivate readers by bringing the past to life in vivid detail. Simultaneously, the macrohistorical context situates these details within broader trends, offering a sense of the larger stakes and implications. The new military history approach enriches this narrative by providing a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of medieval warfare.

⁹⁸ See details in the subchapter of or 'Other Aspects of Cohabitation: Guillelmus the Descozus and the Capricious Maria.' of the Theatres of War.

⁹⁹ István Szijártó, « Four Arguments for Microhistory. » *Rethinking History*, 2002, vol XIV, n° 1, pp. 209-215. p. 211.

¹⁰⁰ Paul Edward Dutton, *Micro Middle Ages*, Cham, 2023. p. 4.

Sources

The study of a battle presupposes a detailed approach to the question of the numbers present on the day of the battle. However, the sources at our disposal only allow us to propose uncertain estimates. In the absence of precise and reliable numbers, we are forced to make assessments that combine the indications provided by the documents of the time and what we can know about the population, wealth and military organisation of the countries involved in the battle. Any comparison with other states or principalities must be carried out with caution, since conditions varied very much from one territory to another.¹⁰¹

Introduction

This chapter serves as a broad overview of the sources utilized in the subsequent chapters. While detailed references to each source are typically provided in the following chapters, where they undergo thorough analysis, here they are presented in a more general context. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the range and diversity of sources employed in the study. By offering a glimpse into the breadth of sources available, this introductory chapter lays the groundwork for the more focused investigations that follow, providing readers with a roadmap for navigating the analytical depth of the subsequent chapters.

The sources in this dissertation exhibit geographical, linguistic, and typological diversity. They can be categorized into two groups: published sources, primarily by 19th-century Hungarian, French, German, Italian, and English historians, alongside 20th and 21st-century American historians; and unpublished sources from French and Italian archives. Research conducted in Spain yielded valuable findings from various archives (Barcelona, Pamplona, Lleida, Tarragona, Valladolid, Burgos, Zaragoza, Girona). However, these sources will be

¹⁰¹ Sylvain Gouguenheim, *Tannenberg 15 juillet 1410*, Paris, 2012, p. 51.

utilized in the postdoctoral phase since the dissertation traces the trajectory of the companies until their departure from Burgundy in 1366.

A) Published Sources

A.a) Correspondences and Letters

The published sources encompass Latin, French, German, Italian, and Hungarian texts, comprising chronicles, annals, *Urkundenbücher*, papal and royal correspondence, charters, letters of donation, papal bulls, and ecclesiastical dispensations for those associated with mercenaries.

A group of sources from the correspondence of different important persons related to the subject of the dissertation: Peter of Lusignan, Innocent VI, Urban V, Bertrand du Guesclin, King Charles V of France, Emperor Charles IV, King Charles II of Navarre, Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy. The history of the German, English, and Hungarian mercenaries active in Italy in the first half of the 1360s, and the extremely complex and constantly changing political situation, requires the processing of published and archival sources at least as varied as those on the border between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire. These include the correspondence of the papal legates Gil de Albornoz and Androin de la Roche, Petrarch's letters on mercenaries in general, and more specifically his letters to Luchino dal Verme, in which he persuaded him to lead the army sent by Venice to crush the Cretan Crusade of 1364. Equally important is the earlier mentioned letter of Saint Catherine of Siena to Sir John Hawkwood. In her letter, Catherine argued very convincingly for the participation in the crusade organized by the Pope.¹⁰² All this will be discussed in more detail later.

However, there are other types of letters to consider: correspondence from free imperial cities, correspondence of bishops, letters from mercenary captains, letters of captains of different castles, letters of donation to mercenary captains (possibly accompanied by administrative declarations), declarations and correspondence with towns from lords, nobles, or citizens containing information about mercenaries, letters of authorization given by a lawyer for legal representation with references to mercenaries, and letters from individuals reporting on mercenaries.

¹⁰² Leonardo and Quinza Francesco Venturini, (eds.) *L'Epistole della Serafica Vergine S. Caterina da Siena*, vol. II, Siena, 1713. Lettera 220. pp. 211-216.

A.b) Financial documents

The dissertation relies heavily on a diverse array of financial sources. These include records detailing expenses from the Apostolic Chamber, extracts from the Chamber of Accounts (specifically, La chambre des Comptes of Dijon), and reports on defensive measures taken by towns and their alliances against mercenaries. Additionally, there are accounts and provisions specifically dedicated to defending against mercenaries, reports on their movements and activities, as well as spy reports aiding in the organization of defence efforts. Various authorities, including towns, their leagues, baillis, castle captains, royal officials, and territorial lords responsible for defence, are involved in issuing orders for defensive measures. Furthermore, the dissertation incorporates accounts detailing the fortification of castles and towns, along with correspondence such as letters of donation to mercenary captains and contracts between different parties involved. Financial records related to Amadeus VI's crusade, consular reports, gifts to the Church resulting from battles with mercenaries, and prescribed deductions for ransom payments to mercenaries are also included in the analysis.

A wealth of notes sheds light on company activities, ranging from reconciliations of churches under company control to details of invasions and depredations committed by companies or their individual captains. Detailed records meticulously account for deductions prescribed by lords for ransom payments to mercenaries. Moreover, letters and mandates issued from towns to companies under their employment, as well as grants of safe-conduct to mercenary captains and royal donation letters for returning soldiers from foreign service, are preserved with care.

A.c) Treaties, Legal Documents, Contracts

Furthermore, the array of sources extends to encompass legal proceedings targeting specific mercenaries and their captains, along with parliamentary resolutions. Included are surrender treaties for towns and castles held by mercenaries, accompanied by their corresponding minutes. Contributions to the church originating from nobles involved in skirmishes with mercenaries are meticulously chronicled, alongside compensation letters from lords to vassals for losses sustained in conflicts with mercenary companies.

The documentation includes mercenary sources relating to the procurement of goods, alongside comprehensive accounts detailing depredations committed by companies or

individual captains. A distinct set of sources focuses on various types of contracts and treaties, encompassing peace treaties for private wars involving mercenary companies, defensive alliances against mercenaries, and agreements regarding the transfer of churches. Additionally, grants of safe-conduct for merchants or individuals by mercenary captains and sovereigns feature prominently.

Various notes provide detailed insights into agreements concerning the transfer of churches owned by mercenary companies. Contracts between towns, lords, or ladies and mercenary captains, along with declarations confirming payment for services rendered, provide invaluable insights into financial transactions. Petitions from individuals seeking restitution for damages inflicted by mercenary companies, as well as further compensation letters from lords to vassals for losses incurred in conflicts, offer a holistic perspective on the multifaceted interactions involving mercenaries during this era.

A.d) Chronicles, Annals, *Urkundenbücher*

A.d.a) Alsatian, Lorraine Chronicles

The crusade led by Arnaud de Cervole is not described in detail in the best-known French chronicles, so local *Annales* or chronicles must be relied on. Of these, Jakobs Twinger Königshofen's contemporary chronicle of Alsace is the longest and most detailed of all the chronicles covering the events in Alsace.¹⁰³ As in Königshofen, other German chronicles report the presence of mercenaries to complement Königshofen's chronicle (*Königshofen-Justinger-Chronik*). Examples include the *Chronik des Klosters Schönensteinbach*, written a hundred years later by Seraphin Dietler,¹⁰⁴ the *Berner-Chronik* by Conrad Justinger,¹⁰⁵ the *Chronicon Helvetium* by Aegidius Tschudi¹⁰⁶ the 16th century Strasbourg Chronicle by Daniel Specklin,¹⁰⁷ and the *Thann Chronicle* by Malachias Tschamser.¹⁰⁸ The events in Lorraine are best summarised in the French annals of Metz, published by Augustin Calmet

¹⁰³ Friedrich Closener and Jakob Twinger von Königshofen, « Chroniken von Closener und Königshoven », in Closener Friedrich and Twinger von Königshofen Jakob, « Chroniken von Closener und Königshoven », in *Code historique et diplomatique de la ville de Strasbourg*, contributor Georges Frédéric Schutzenberger, Strasbourg, 1843, vol. I/1, pp. 103-338.

¹⁰⁴ Seraphin Dietler and Johann Schlumberger, *Chronik des Klosters Schönensteinbach*, Gebweiler, 1897.

¹⁰⁵ Gottlieb Studer (ed.), *Die Berner-Chronik des Conrad Justinger*, Bern, 1871.

¹⁰⁶ Aegidius Tschudi, *Chronicon Helvetium*, vol. I, Basel, 1734.

¹⁰⁷ Rodolophe Reuss (ed.), *II. Les collectanées de Daniel Specklin, chronique strasbourgeoise du seizième siècle*, Strasbourg, 1890.

¹⁰⁸ Malachias Tschamser, *Chronique de Thann*, Colmar, 1864.

in 1728.¹⁰⁹ However, all these chronicles and annals only give a broad outline of the events, and it is therefore necessary to refer to the various *Urkundenbücher* to get an accurate and detailed picture.

A.d.b)Urkundenbücher

The most important of these is the fifth part of the Strasbourg *Urkundenbücher*.¹¹⁰ The source publication contains the complete material of the Strasbourg Archives fonds AA 78 AA 81. The AA 81 fonds separately catalogue the 1365 and 1375 Alsace appearances of the companies. However, the source identification was not completely accurate in the *Urkundenbücher*, as the folio numbers were not indicated, so that during the research had to identify the sources in AA 81 one by one. The rest of the *Urkundenbücher* contain pertinent information. Such *Urkundenbücher* are those of Colmar,¹¹¹ Basel,¹¹² Worms,¹¹³ Freiburg¹¹⁴ or Aarau.¹¹⁵ Also there is a complementary French edition of the sources of Basel.¹¹⁶ In the same way, the family *Urkundenbücher* contain additional sources that can be used to add new details to the 14th century history of the mercenaries of the borderlands of the Empire and the Kingdom. These include the *Urkundenbücher*, which summarises the history of the Hunolstein family,¹¹⁷ and the *Urkundenbücher* on the history of the Rappoltstein family.¹¹⁸ The *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch* is an excellent example of how we can use the resources provided by the *Urkundenbuch* to get up close and personal with the details of a campaign, by obtaining additional information that can only be accessed through this particular source. In the following case, the archives of Dijon, the richest archive of this period in eastern France, were used, together with the *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch*, and the chronicle of Froissart. It is possible to confirm or possibly disprove the claims of important historians of the period such as Froissart. There is a whole library of

¹⁰⁹ « Chronique, ou Annales du doyen de Saint-Thibault de Metz », in Augustin Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, vol. II, Nancy, 1728, pp. clxix-cclix.

¹¹⁰ USS2 1896.

¹¹¹ Richard Thommen et al. (eds.), *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Basel*, vols. I-XI, Basel, 1890-1910.

¹¹² Heinrich Boos (ed.), *Urkundenbuch der Landschaft Basel*, vols. I-II, Basel, 1883.

¹¹³ Heinrich Boos (ed.), *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Worms*, vol. II, (1301-1400), Berlin, 1890.

¹¹⁴ Heinrich Schreiber (ed.), *Urkundenbuch des Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau*, vols. I-II, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1828.

¹¹⁵ Heinrich Boos (ed.), *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Aarau*, Aarau, 1880.

¹¹⁶ Joseph Trouillat (ed.), *Monuments de l'histoire de l'ancien évêché de Bâle*, vol. IV, Porrentruy, 1861.

¹¹⁷ Friedrich Toepfer (ed.), *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Graeflichen und Freiherrlichen Hauses der Voegte von Hunolstein*, Nuremberg, 1866.

¹¹⁸ Karl Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch, 759-1500: Quellen zur Geschichte der ehemaligen Herrschaft Rappoltstein im Elsass*, vols. I-II, Colmar, 1891-1892.

literature on Froissart's chronicle, much of which has been written about its reliability or inaccuracy. One only has to think of the erroneous chronology of the Battle of Brignais in terms of subject, matter and region. However, the authenticity of the capture of Flavigny by Froissart and of the events that followed is confirmed by archival sources and the *Urkundenbuch*.

A.d.c) Italian chronicles

Fortunately, there are plenty of Italian chronicles dealing with the mercenaries who fought in northern and central Italy. One of the most famous, and of course the most detailed one, is the Chronicle of Matteo and Filippo Villani,¹¹⁹ but it is also possible to reconstruct the activities of mercenaries from other chronicles such as *Rerum Bononiensis Cronaca* A and B,¹²⁰ Petri Azarii's *Liber Gestorum in Lombardia*,¹²¹ *Chronicon Mutinense* written by Giovanni da Bazzano,¹²² *Cronache Pisane* by Raccolta Roncioni,¹²³ *Libro del Polistore* by Bartholomiei Ferrariensis,¹²⁴ *Chronicon Placentium* by Johannes de Mussis,¹²⁵ *Annales Mediolanses* by Anonymus,¹²⁶ *Cronache Malatestiane* by Aldo Francesco Massera.¹²⁷

The chronicles are well backed up by the lists of mercenaries employed in Pisa, Sienna, Florence, Bologna and Milan, published in a three-volume book by Schäffer, and by the lists of mercenaries of the papal legates Egidius Albornoz and Androin de La Roche, published between 1355 and 1365.

¹¹⁹ Giovanni Villani, Matteo Villani and Filippo Villani, *Croniche di Giovanni, Matteo e Filippo Villani* (=Villani, *Croniche*, 1857), Trieste, 1857.

¹²⁰ A. Sorbelli (ed.), *Corpus Chronicorum...*, *op. cit.*

¹²¹ P. Azario, *Liber gestorum...*, *op. cit.*

¹²² Iohannes de Bazano, *Chronicon Mutinense* (AA. 1188-1363), ed. Tommaso Casini, (RIS², 15/4), Bologna, 1916.

¹²³ Raccolta Roncioni, *Cronache Pisane*, ed., Pietro Silva, Città di Castello, 1914.

¹²⁴ Bartolomeo da Ferrara, « Polyhistoria fratris Bartholomaei Ferrariensis, ordinis Praedicatorum, ab anno MCCLXXXVII usque ad MCCCLXVII italice conscripta, et nunc primum edita e manuscripto codice marchionis Bonifacii Rangonii mutinensis », in Antonio Muratori (ed.), *RIS'*, vol. 24, Milan, 1738, coll. 695-848.

¹²⁵ Johannes de Mussis, « Chronicon Placentium », in Antonio Muratori (ed.), *RIS'*, vol. 16, Milan, 1730, coll. 441-634.

¹²⁶ Anonymus, « Annales Mediolanenses ab anno MCCXXX usque ad annum MCCCCII », in Antonio Muratori (ed.), *RIS'*, vol. 16, Milan, 1730, coll. 635-840.

¹²⁷ Baldo Branchi - Broglio di Tartaglia - Gaspare, *Cronache malatestiane dei secoli XIV e XV, aa. 1295-1385 e 1416-1452*, ed. Aldo Francesco Massera (RIS², 15/2), Bologna, 1922-1924.

B) Unpublished sources

Unpublished archival sources also include a wide range of documents that are, in most cases, identical to published sources. For this reason, I will not repeat all the different types of sources here, but instead focus on unpublished sources that do not have published equivalents. In order to get a comprehensive picture of the relationship between mercenaries and the general population in the period under study, it is necessary to examine a wide range of different unpublished sources. Fortunately, the notion 'wide range' is perfectly true for the sources to provide a comprehensive picture. The sources originate from archives along the French-German border from Lille to Lyon, but most of the sources come from the Dijon. The letters of remission issued to mercenaries are not usually about such salacious stories, but most often forgive the crimes committed by the mercenaries, one of the most egregious of which was looting.

The various mercenary lists form a significant part of the unpublished Italian sources for this dissertation. The Hungarian, German and English mercenaries were very often found together in these mercenary lists (e.g. Sir John Hawkwood, or the companies led by Albert Sterz, Count Landau, Anichino de Bongardo, Malatesta Ungaro, Anechinus de Lospurgh, Werner von Urslingen). e.g. Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera Uscita 13, 18, 21, or Camarlinghi della Camera del Comune 170-174), it is possible to identify with a high degree of certainty eg. the Hungarian mercenaries who remained in Italy from the Hungarian armies sent to the aid of Cardinal Albornoz by Louis the Great. The strong correlation between the different types of sources is well illustrated by the mercenary lists of the Hungarian forces led by Meggyesaljai Mórocz Simon and the growing numbers of Hungarian mercenaries in the service of Florence.¹²⁸ List of mercenaries, payments, charters, in the administrative books of the towns (which may have different names depending on the town) or list of payments of the same type for mercenaries in the service of the cardinal legates.

By synthesizing Italian and Hungarian sources, a comprehensive understanding emerges of the prevalence of Hungarian nobility, family members, and servants serving as mercenaries in mid-14th century Italy, alongside insights into their Italian careers and the financial rewards awaiting Hungarian *conestabiles* or *caporales* upon their return home from extended service in Italy.

The integration of published and unpublished sources, though disparate and sometimes overlapping, facilitates an exploration of various connections. These connections illuminate

¹²⁸ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera Uscita 18.

the dynamics between local populations and mercenaries, the interactions between mercenaries and the local rulers who enlisted them for private conflicts, and the efficacy of employing mercenary companies. Moreover, the juxtaposition of geographically distinct sources presents fresh avenues for research, revealing new insights.

For instance, in investigating the role of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy, a comparative analysis of payment records and mercenary lists from the archives of Metz and Florence sheds light on mercenary incomes in these two cities. This analysis underscores why service in Italy was particularly appealing to borderlanders, notably Germans, and why individuals, even from places like Strasbourg, preferred Italian city-states in the 1360s, while fewer sought mercenary work on the French side of the border. These comparative insights offer valuable lessons into the factors driving mercenary recruitment and deployment along different geographical and cultural contexts.

B.a) Archives

Metz

The Metz archives hold various types of sources relating to mercenaries in the service of the city in the second half of the 14th century. These include contracts between the companies and the city, commission orders and mercenary payment receipts. From the 1360s onwards, the sources form a coherent whole which allows a long-term study of the mercenaries employed by the city. Typically, these payments relate to wars in which the city of Metz was involved, but on at least two occasions in 1360 for Edward III's campaign and in 1365 for the Crusade, Metz hired German mercenaries to defend the city against the soldiers of the companies. The archives of Bar-le-Duc also have a wealth of sources on the period, but the vast majority of the sources are accounts from the *bailli* and *prévôtés*, which by their nature contain a different type of information from the archives of Metz. A careful study of these accounts makes it possible to trace the movements of mercenaries in the territory of the Duchy of Bar and the precautions taken against them. The sources relating to the events of 1365 will be dealt with later, but it is shown now in the context of the 1360 campaign, what can be obtained by using different types of sources from different archives. As with Edward III's campaign, these accounts provide the most reliable basis for describing the troops passing through the area and the destruction they caused. By using the different types of sources available in the various archives in a complementary way, it is possible to

successfully examine in practice the defence against adventuring companies breaking away from the English army in the field.

Bar-le-Duc

The majority of the sources in Bar-le-Duc, which are referred to in the dissertation, are account books of various *prévôts* from the period 1350 to 1375. By their very nature, these account books contain brief, reliable entries linked to a single event or person. They are time-consuming to examine, as each account book can be 40-60 folios or more, and the handwriting varies greatly between individual account books. In this case, the references of the 19th century French authors were extremely helpful, allowing further research. It was thus possible, for example, to identify the exact folio number of Polish mercenaries employed by Yolande de Flandre. The references to them are of particular importance, for example, because they are the only specific archival references to Polish mercenaries in the entire literature that I know of, in the archives that I have visited from Lille to Chambéry. This single example alone illustrates how many surprises are still to be found in the large amount of source material in French archives relating to the period and the subject of this dissertation.

Lille

Among the archival sources found in the Lille archives and used in this dissertation, the most important is a previously unpublished source, several metres long, relating to the beginning of Arnaud de Cervole's career in the frontier in the Barony of Donzy and the County de Nevers. This has been used in the chapter on Theatres of War. The source is important because it is presented as a coherent text, from different perspectives about what happens in an unprotected, abandoned region when the companies appear.

Colmar, Ribeauvillé, Kayserberg, Sélestat

The archives of smaller Alsatian archives, such as those of Colmar, Ribeauvillé or Kayserberg, contain valuable sources for the period 1360-65, when the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War posed the first threats on the borders of Alsace, and which provide many important contributions to the understanding of Strasbourg and the Décapole and their

relationship with the *routiers*. Archive sources include receipts for military services, defensive alliances and documents from the town's league.

Dijon

One of the most cited archives in the dissertation is the Dijon archives. The sources found here are extremely varied: from Latin scrolls of more than 10 metres long containing the accounts of the castle lieutenants of Amadeus VI, to orders issued to mercenaries or mobilisations ordered against them in French, all forms and types of sources relating to mercenaries can be found in the archives. The bailiffs' accounts from here are particularly important in reconstructing events.

Strasbourg

As I have already described in the printed sources, the resources of the Strasbourg archives relating to the crusade have already been published in the German *Urkundenbücher*. However, they did not have the exact folio numbers, matched to the *Urkundenbuch* serial numbers, so it was necessary to identify the archival sources with the published sources. This is why most Strasbourg references have both the folio number and the *Urkundenbücher* serial number.

Turin, Florence, Mantua

Among the Italian archival research, the sources from the archives of Turin, Florence and Mantua should be highlighted, as most of the sources from these archives were taken from the above-mentioned archives. Apart from mercenary lists, one of the most important sources from the Florentine archives is the letter of Urban V to the city of Florence, which provides direct evidence that the papal plans for the liberation of eastern France and northern Italy from the mercenaries were a unified plan. The archival sources in Turin contain documents of Amadeus VI relating to the mercenaries and the Crusade, and in Mantua, the Gonzaga archives contain, among other things, extremely rare treaties with the seals and hand-drawn coats of arms of Hungarian, German, Burgundian and Italian *conestabiles* and *caporales*, the references of which are included in this dissertation. In addition to the above archives, sources from other Italian archives have been included, such

as the Perugia archives, but the number of documents used in this dissertation is much smaller.

Conclusion

The history of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade and the preparations leading up to it have been written using the many sources of this dissertation. Thanks to archival research, it has been possible to uncover hitherto unmentioned territorial contexts, such as the consequences of the Battle of Brignais on the borderlands. This involved combining the sources of the Dijon and Lyon archives with those of the German, French and Latin archives of Bar-le-Duc, Colmar and Metz. By examining this one case alone, it is possible to see how well informed the inhabitants of the borderland between France and the Holy Roman Empire in the 14th century were of events hundreds of kilometres away, how quickly they reacted and took defensive measures, in the context of cross-border alliances, when mercenaries, in this case specifically great companies, appeared. It was precisely the extraordinary diversity of sources, their disparate yet interconnected content, that was the real beauty of this research.

Theatres of War

«The conclusion of this treaty marked the end of hostilities, and the time for riding was now, in theory, over. But for those who for years had lived on war alone, it was still possible to continue pillaging, taking advantage of the fact that the kingdom of France was still prey to major internal disorders that nothing seemed able to extinguish.»¹²⁹

Introduction

The aim of this chapter, divided into three parts, is to describe the relations between the border population and the mercenaries in the years immediately preceding the crusade, highlighting the reasons that triggered the crusade and those that led to its failure. The mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War appeared on the frontier of the Holy Roman Empire and the kingdom of France in large numbers after Poitiers. However, not at the same time and not everywhere: between Auvergne and Alsace, 8 years passed. The moment when the full weight of the Hundred Years' War fell on the frontier population came in the winter of 1359/60 in the form of Edward III's invincible English army. After the unsuccessful siege of Reims, the army of more than 10.000 swept across the frontier and left for Paris. Even before the campaign, mercenaries had appeared in the border region but they were all of local importance. However, the campaign that brought about the Treaty of Brétigny affected the whole of the frontier, establishing a permanent presence of mercenaries in the duchies and counties between the Kingdom of France and the Empire in the years that followed. The first part of this chapter therefore deals with the history of this decisive campaign.

The second part deals with the constantly changing relations between the mercenaries and the local population in the period between the first appearance of the mercenaries and the Crusade. As the mercenary presence became more permanent following Edward's campaign, the local inhabitants were obliged to accommodate to live with the *routiers*. They learnt what it meant to live under the shadow of constant threat, to suffer the consequences of permanent alertness, of momentary lapses of attention. They also witnessed the financial cost of cohabiting with mercenaries, but at the same time, quite a few of them learnt to profit from the new situation. This collaboration with mercenaries permeated society as a whole, but its form and consequences were completely different for the nobility, the urban bourgeoisie and the rural population, respectively. In the second part of this chapter, I will

¹²⁹ N. Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret...*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

draw on the results of archival research between Lyon and Lille to describe the various forms of coexistence and cooperation. The last section shows the impact of the crusading mercenaries on the locals: they had previously only appeared on the southern borders of Alsace and were thus virtually unknown to the people of Alsace. Thanks to a unique collection of sources preserved in Strasbourg, it is possible to analyse the emotions that the arrival of the mercenaries aroused in the local Alsatian population.

The third part of the chapter deals with defence against mercenaries. A defence that, in the long term, even a duchy as powerful as Burgundy had not been able to resist sustainably, and which only the crusade could have redeemed, with the hope of several thousand kilometres between the mercenaries and Burgundy. In the years before the crusade, the first new duke of the House of Valois, Philip, must have had the same feeling about the fight against the mercenaries coming into the duchy from all directions as Heracles had about the hydra at Lerna: for every head cut off, two more appeared. The solution, which for Heracles was the burning of the severed heads, was the crusade toward the kingdom of Hungary for Philip. However, while Heracles had done a thorough job and defeated Hydra with the help of Iolaos, Philip was so quick to get rid of the companies oppressing Burgundy that he considered the success of the crusade a foregone conclusion. «*Anglico turbine, impulsitque in extremi exitii discrimen Galliis.*»¹³⁰ It is with this sentence that Odorico Raynaldi begins his story of the decisive English campaign of 1360, a campaign that proved unique in the 14th century history of the Hundred Years' War in many ways: it was the first time that the English army found no opponent and the first campaign that was actually a private venture by Edward without the contribution of English taxpayers. It was this campaign that brought the indenture system to fruition, and the war to the eastern provinces of the kingdom of France and the western duchies and counties of the Holy Roman Empire. It was the campaign to which the fate of three great poets of the 14th century is linked: on the English side, the young Geoffrey Chaucer was taken prisoner by the French at Reims and had to be ransomed by Edward III for 16 pounds. On the French side, the ageing Guillaume de Machaut was on guard duty in the besieged city of Reims, while during the campaign Francesco Petrarca passed through the war-torn area on his way from Cologne to Milan and gave an eyewitness account of his experiences. The campaign that marked the culmination and conclusion of the first phase of the Hundred Years' War, a period of total English domination of France, paving the way for the era of the Great Companies in the border region.

¹³⁰ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 405.

A) Edward III's Campaign Before the Treaty of Brétigny

A.a) Prelude to the Campaign

Following the victory of Poitiers, Edward was prevented from waging war in the Kingdom of France for the next two years by the Treaty of Bordeaux, signed on 22 March 1357, but the truce expired at Easter 1359.¹³¹ Clearly, the English king sought as long as possible to reach an agreement with John, the captive French king, taking maximum advantage of his vulnerability. Despite the ever-changing French political situation, the main thrust of Edwardian policy was determined by confidence in the French fulfilment of the two peace treaties with John. As Sumption puts it, when the two kings announced the first treaty of Windsor on 8 May 1358, it struck France as a «*fait accompli*.»¹³² The news reached France by 15 May, and as regards the agreement itself, the regent and the council decided not to accept the peace treaty on these terms.¹³³ They considered that the terms were very unfavourable to the French: John's ransom was set at 4.000.000 gold ecus, the first instalment of 600.000 ecus to be paid before the king's release,¹³⁴ and he was to surrender a quarter of the kingdom of France to Edward. To give an idea of the amount, this ransom was five times the annual income of the English king.¹³⁵ The agreement was to cede a large part of the Kingdom of France to England: Bordealais, Poitou, Angoumois, Périgord, Agenais, Limousin, Quercy, Bigorre, and the territories of Gaure along the Pyrenees in the south-west. In the north, the territories around Calais, and Ponthieu, the town of Montruil in Picardy, and a large part of the Cotentin peninsula. In return, Edward no longer claimed Normandy and the territories of the western Loire. The payment of the first instalment was the main problem in securing a lasting peace, as it was due by 1 November 1358. The war and the Jacquerie made it impossible to raise the sum. On the expiry of the deadline, the French envoy informed Edward that they would not be able to meet the obligation of paying the first instalment. The King of England was understandably not overjoyed. Of the 40 hostages the treaty had stipulated the French were to deliver, none turned up in England.¹³⁶

¹³¹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, op. cit., p. 287.

¹³² Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II: Trial by Fire*, e-book, London, 2001, location (I), 7227.

¹³³ Roland Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes de Jean II et de Charles V, vols. I-II (Les grandes chroniques de France)*, Paris, 1910-1916, vol. I, p. 154.

¹³⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, op. cit. p. 293 ; J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, op. cit., I. 6613.

¹³⁵ Ch. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War...*, op. cit., p. 168.

¹³⁶ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, op. cit., I. 8318.

The King of England then made it clear that when the armistice expired he would assert his interests by force. The French blamed the mercenary companies for the delay.¹³⁷ Edward sent two of his commissioners to regulate the English captains operating in France, whether they were in a garrison or conducting a campaign against the French on behalf of the King of Navarre. On 20 December 1358, Stephen Cusington and Richard Totesham arrived in France to hunt down the «*disturbers of the peace*» and try to prevent Charles the Bad from receiving English mercenaries.¹³⁸ Of course, they did not have much success, as for example the famous James Pipe's troops made it all the way to Paris in the service of the King of Navarre and landed in the royal palace.¹³⁹

Between the two peace treaties with John, there would have been an opportunity to turn Edwardian politics in a different direction. The opportunity came in early August 1358, when Charles II and Edward's envoys sat down to negotiate at Charles's initiative following the murder of Etienne Marcell. The king of Navarre sent six of his closest advisers to work out a draft treaty with Gilbert Chastellyn, Stephen Cusington and John Fotheringhay that would be acceptable to Edward. The agreement would have effectively divided the Kingdom of France between Edward and Charles. Charles would have been given Champagne and Brie, as well as Normandy, Picardy and the Duchy of Chartres, and Edward as King of France would have been given all the remaining territories of the kingdom. On 1 August 1358, the treaty was sealed and sent to London for ratification. It was discussed in London but never signed. Of course, the fact that the King of Navarre had already played a double game with the English twice, who had been unlucky on both occasions, played a part in the rejection.¹⁴⁰

John II had grown increasingly desperate by the beginning of 1359, as his release seemed a long way off because of the war, or because things did not look as if he could defeat Charles the Bad without English help. He therefore made another attempt at a treaty on 24 March 1359. In this second Treaty of Windsor, John made even greater concessions to Edward: «*and the towns, villages, castles and strongholds, lands, country and places, the said territories and places belonging to the king of England, so that the king of England may be satisfied.*»¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Henri Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle*, ed. G.H. Martin, Oxford, 1995, p. 163.

¹³⁸ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 8355.

¹³⁹ Siméon Luce (ed.), *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*, Paris, 1862, pp. 80-81 ; S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

¹⁴⁰ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-7.

¹⁴¹ «*Traité conclu à Londres, en 1359, entre les rois Jean et Édouard* », in *Revue anglo-française*, 1833, vol. I, pp. 388-405, p. 392.

Well, Edward was not satisfied with the regent's response to the new treaty, since *«this treaty was very unpopular with the French people,»*¹⁴² so according to Charles *«this peace was not acceptable, not practicable and therefore he ordered a good war to be fought with the English»*¹⁴³ After this, Edward's campaign became inevitable.

After the armistice of Bordeaux expired on 21 April 1359, the regent Charles, aware that he could not raise an adequate army against Edward, sought European allies, and enlisted the help of Pope Innocent VI. With his brother John, the Count of Poitiers, he sent an ambassadorial delegation to Hungary, Austria and the Emperor Charles IV, as we learn from a letter written by the Pope dated 18 February 1359. Innocent VI informed Louis I king of Hungary that the Duke of Normandy, and the Count of Poitiers, sent a delegation to the Hungarian king in the person of Pierre Begon, Archdeacon of Comminges, and a knight called Étienne Fayn, on matters which it is better to discuss in person than to communicate in writing. The pope draws Louis' attention to their common descent with the French royal family, and asks to receive the envoys of the two princes, and hopes to arrive at a favourable decision:

*«We welcome into Christ our dearly beloved son, Louis, the sovereign King of Hungary, etc.' Since our beloved sons, the noble Charles, first-born Prince of Normandy, and John, Count of Poitiers, sons of our beloved son in Christ, John, King of France, ... Pierre Begon ... the archdeacon of the church of Comminges, and the noble knight Étienne Fayn, have, as we have heard, been commissioned by them as their envoys to present certain things to your Majesty in person, and we have taken note of them, that between you and them, who are of the same noble lineage, the bond of love is certainly strong, and the sentiments of love so special, we would most earnestly entreat your Majesty, in receiving the above envoys graciously in these matters which they have deemed to be brought before you.»*¹⁴⁴

Similar letters were sent to Louis's wife Elizabeth, and to the King's mother.¹⁴⁵ Innocent VI sent further letters to the Archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa, and other bishops and lords, to intercede for the envoys, to help them with advice. *«we request and urge you very strongly to endeavour to direct the above-mentioned envoys in the matter entrusted to them,*

¹⁴² «Le quel traictié fu moult desplaisant à tout le peuple de France». R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, op. cit., p. 236.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, op. cit., pp. 321-322, footnote 3.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

which is to be promoted, as far as you are able by God, by your advice to the above-mentioned King, for the favourable outcome of their task, and to endeavour diligently to assist them by your activity.....likewise to Stephen, Bishop of Nyitra; to the Bishop of Eger, Bishop of Várad; to William, Provost of the Church of Eger...»¹⁴⁶

In fact, in a contemporary reminiscence of the Regent one finds the following: «*Item, the lord wrote to the Holy Father that he wished to send two persons as envoys to the King of Hungary, who were of the House of France, and who wished to come in person to the aid and deliverance of the King, and to the defence of the kingdom, and thus to the aid of all Christendom. since this king is very brave and highly esteems the honour and interest of France, and is very much grieved that the [French] king is in prison and [hearing] of his sufferings, since he is considered the most powerful and best king in the world.*»¹⁴⁷

But Charles did not only try to gain allies in Central Europe, he also negotiated with King Waldemar III of Denmark. The idea was to land the Danes in England, reinforced by a German contingent.¹⁴⁸ Under these circumstances, the French awaited Edward III's long-heralded campaign.

A.b) The English Army and the Indenture System

Petrarch wrote of the English on 27 February 1360, while still in Paris during his campaign¹⁴⁹ that «*In my youth the Britons, whom we call English, were the most fearful of barbarians, now a warlike nation, with their many victories they have turned the ancient French military glory upside down.*»¹⁵⁰ Petrarch's words were particularly apt for Edward III's army, which was the largest¹⁵¹ since the «*annus mirabilis.*»¹⁵² About 11.900 English, Welsh and Scots left the English coast to fight the last campaign of the first phase of the war. This army «*was surpassed in size only by the Crécy-Calais armies.*»¹⁵³ Half of the army was made up of

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, footnote 2.

¹⁴⁷ « Documents historiques inédits sur le Dauphiné », 1360, in Ulysse Chevalier (ed.), *Choix de documents historiques sur le Dauphiné*, Brun, 1874, vol. 7, p. 155, n. XVI.

¹⁴⁸ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 8838.

¹⁴⁹ A. Maury, « Les Anglais en France », *art. cit.*, p. 39.

¹⁵⁰ « Lettera XIV. Degli ordinamenti militari presso gli antichi Romani, e presso i moderni », in Francesco Petrarca, *Lettere di Francesco Petrarca: delle cose familiari libri ventiquattro: lettere varie libro unico*, ed. Giuseppe Fracassetti, vol. IV, Florence, 1866, p. 478.

¹⁵¹ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁵² See Jonathan Sumption, David Green, Kelly DeVries, Craig L. Lambert.

¹⁵³ Kenneth Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster, 1310-1361*, Ph.D. diss., Leeds, 1961, p. 794.

heavy cavalry, knights or esquires.¹⁵⁴ It included the Black Prince, Lancaster, 10 earls, 20 bannerets, 870 knights, 3800 men-at-arms, 5500 mounted archers, 1100 Welsh foot soldiers.¹⁵⁵ In the army there were 300 scribes, 200 miners,¹⁵⁶ carpenters, blacksmiths, engineers and all the trades needed where operations included sieges, open battles, long marches. Edward had assembled an unprecedented army, which Froissart says consisted of 6000 chariots.¹⁵⁷ Thousands of arrows, cannons and crossbow winches, entire forges, rough ingots, nails, ropes, building raw materials, lime, leather boats for river crossing, horseshoes, grain mills,¹⁵⁸ furnaces, wine oil and grain, dried vegetables, fish, and salted meat for horses to feed made up his army's supplies.¹⁵⁹ The whole army cost £130.000.¹⁶⁰ Addressing the problems of the campaign's food supply, Bárány Attila notes that during the war England had «*the largest undertaking in terms of army supply and logistics.*»¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, the English army operated outside its radius of action with all its consequences.¹⁶² Added to the above was the cost of shipping the army across the English Channel and paying the soldiers' wages.

To transport the army, 1100 ships were needed.¹⁶³ The English passage was characterized by a notable degree of fluidity, attributed in part to the strategic significance of Calais, conferring upon the English dominion over the Channel,¹⁶⁴ and in part to the maritime triumph at the Battle of Winchelsea in the year 1350, an engagement that bestowed upon Edward the title of «*King of the Seas,*»¹⁶⁵ and which left the French inactive in the Channel for 10 years. The closest French naval expedition took place during Edward's campaign to free John from captivity in early 1360.

¹⁵⁴ A. Ayton, *The medieval military ...*, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁵⁵ K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, op. cit., p. 794.

¹⁵⁶ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War*, vol. II..., op. cit., I. 9433.

¹⁵⁷ Attila Bárány has published an excellent study on the English army and logistics in the 14th century, in which he proves in detail that the 1000 chariots Froissart refers to were not sufficient to supply the army, noting that Jean le Bel writes of 6000 chariots in his chronicle. A., Bárány, « Hadtáp és logisztika ... », art. cit., p. 112.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁵⁹ Froissart notes that in the three years preceding the campaign, the harvest was catastrophic in the region affected by the campaign, with famines in Haynaou, Cambrais, the Laon diocese and the Reims diocese. Edward was delighted to see the exceptionally large army. Siméon Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart*, vol. V, 1356-1360, Paris, 1874, p. 202.

¹⁶⁰ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War*, vol. II..., op. cit., I. 9444.

¹⁶¹ A., Bárány, « Hadtáp és logisztika ... », art. cit., pp. 108-109.

¹⁶² See A., Bárány, « Hadtáp és logisztika ... », art. cit.,

¹⁶³ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War*, vol. II..., op. cit., I. 9444 ; Georges Minois, *La guerre de Cent Ans*, Paris, 1999, p. 198. Others put this number at 800.

¹⁶⁴ Christopher Allmand, *La Guerre de Cent ans. L'Angleterre et la France en guerre, 1300-1450*, Paris, 2015, p. 84.

¹⁶⁵ Guy le Moing, *Les Opérations navales de la Guerre de Cent Ans*, Fontaine-L'Évêque, 2015, p. 84.

According to Craig L. Lambert, the English troops were transported in several waves:

1. Between July and August 1359, the first wave of horses and men were shipped across. In this phase, 400 ships were involved.
2. In the second wave, the troop movements started in the first wave continued from the end of August.
3. In the third wave, the troops of the Duke of Lancaster were brought in. This amounted to about 2300 soldiers. Edward sent Lancaster as an outpost to Calais to bring order to the city.
4. In the fourth wave, the troops of Roger Mortimer, the second Count of La Marche, were transferred.
5. In the fifth wave, the main army crossed from England with the King on 29 October 1359.
6. The rest of the army finally sailed in a few days later.¹⁶⁶

From the Norman Conquest to Edward I, there were two ways of recruiting the army: one was the *fyrd* - town militia, which in principle meant that any able-bodied man aged 16-60 with the right weapon had to serve for 40 days free of charge in case of danger, for example if the kingdom was threatened by foreign invasion.¹⁶⁷ Theoretically, the best and strongest men were always supposed to be sent, but village and town chiefs cheated, gave the worst men, without equipment, and the royal recruits could be bribed.

Another way of recruiting was the 'feudal levy,' which had existed since William the Conqueror. Barons were obliged to go to war with an armed escort at the call of the king in exchange for the land allotted to them. The allotted estates remained fiefs of the crown. The barons passed on their estates to the nobles who had sworn an oath of allegiance to their vassals. The size of each contingent varied according to the size of the estate. Later, nobles were allowed to exchange military service for a financial contribution to the Crown. However, by the time the Hundred Years' War broke out, the whole system had changed completely. The army was made up of professional soldiers, mercenaries, who served for long periods and were employed under the indenture system, i.e. on the basis of a bilateral contract. The new system was introduced by Edward III because the previous mobilisation was no longer

¹⁶⁶ G. le Moing, *Les Opérations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 90 ; Craig L. Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century*, Woodbridge, 2011, p. 146.

¹⁶⁷ Mortimer 2013.

suitable for the supply of the army. There simply were not enough troops to meet Edward's needs. In 1277, a total of 375 of the 7000 or so knights were mustered in, representing 1/18th of the total number of those called up.¹⁶⁸ The solution were mercenaries on a permanent pay, who fought much more effectively than soldiers recruited under the feudal system did. Until 1338, treaties were essentially oral, although there are examples of written treaties from as early as 1277, but Edward III gave them their final form. The development of the indenture system did not happen overnight but was a process in which the failure of Edward's first campaign against the Scots played a major role. In that campaign, he relied on the urban militia, but the campaign had such disappointing results that he introduced his father's system, making written contracts commonplace.¹⁶⁹

This was the most important change in English military history in the Middle Ages. The treaty specified the exact number and composition of the mercenary force, the place of assembly, the length of service, the obligations undertaken and the privileges enjoyed.¹⁷⁰ The companies hired usually included all arms, heavy infantry, cavalry, mounted and infantry archers, spearmen, hobblers (light cavalry used for reconnaissance), felters, chaplains, and also miners, shoemakers, carpenters, interpreters. The terms of service varied with each commission, the shortest being forty days, but there were also contracts of a year or more. The contracts for the Black Prince's expedition to Gascony in 1355 lasted as long as the Prince needed them to. The indenture system also had other advantages: mercenaries could be employed as garrisons, and new ones could be recruited abroad if necessary.¹⁷¹ Very often, captains subcontracted tasks. Some indenture contracts of Sir John Strother of Lanton from the 1374 campaign in Brittany have survived in the Northumberland County Office. This is a 'contractor's contract' between the Crown and a captain, but other subcontracts for the above contract, relating to the captain and those serving in his troop, have also been preserved. They were one step down the military ladder.¹⁷² The Strothers were a noble family from Northumberland who took advantage of the war against the Scots to become dominant in provincial politics by the mid-14th century. They adapted to the new situation more quickly than other old noble houses. By 1375, they had risen to become one of the most influential families in Northumberland. Sir John, though a knight, was always

¹⁶⁸ Alfred H. Burne, *The Crecy War*, London, 1955, p. 29.

¹⁶⁹ A. H. Burne, *The Crecy War...*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁷⁰ Ch. Allmand, *La Guerre de Cent ans...*, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

¹⁷¹ For details of the contracts of indenture of the Black Prince, see: Mollie M. Madden, *The Black Prince and the Grande Chevauchée of 1355*, Woodbridge, 2008, pp. 69-70.

¹⁷² Ch. Allmand, *La Guerre de Cent ans...*, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

short of money.¹⁷³ Mercenary service and overseas missions were the solution to his financial problems. In 1374/75, he served with the Earl of March's army for a year in Brittany. All the members of his troop took part in the campaign at Sir John's expense, all their expenses and salaries being paid by Sir John, except the cost of crossing the Channel - an expense that was included in the Count's expenses. Of the men who served in his company, it is known that there were four nobles, but there is no information about the other soldiers. Their annual salary was £45 2s, while Strother's income for his whole company was £153. To this was added 16.66% of the booty taken by the company, which earned him a total of £255 during the campaign. His income, therefore, was equal to the annual income of an ensign in 1375.¹⁷⁴ No wonder the war was popular with the English.

Before the troops left, the English did their utmost to keep the preparations secret from French prisoners of war, diplomats and generally all French residents of London. John and his court (which had been halved by then) were moved to Sommerton Castle.¹⁷⁵ However, this was of no avail: London was full of French spies, some of them of English origin, many of them in positions of sufficient authority to provide reliable information to the French.¹⁷⁶ Thus the Picardy towns and castles had time to prepare, to have a sufficient number of garrisons ready,¹⁷⁷ since «*[the towns] knew all that the King of the English was coming to besiege the good city of Reims.*»¹⁷⁸

The Dauphin received the necessary information from the spies at the latest at the beginning of July and informed the city of Reims of the danger in a letter dated 10 July:

«I have received certain news from England, from men of great faith and worth, who have certain knowledge that the King of England seems to be crossing the sea during the month of August, and intends to besiege certain cities, the names of which have been given, and among them the city of Reims is expressly named, as I have written to you, you may be

¹⁷³ Simon Walker, « Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: the Subcontracts of Sir Jonh Strother, 1374 », *The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Studies*, 1985, vol. 58, online available at <http://deremilitari.org/2014/08/profit-and-loss-in-the-hundred-years-war-the-subcontracts-of-sir-john-strother-1374/> (accessed on 18 December 2019)

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ S. Luce (ed.), *Chronique des quatre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

¹⁷⁶ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War*, vol. II..., *op. cit.*, I. 9324.

¹⁷⁷ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

*assured that the said city is not properly equipped and supplied with provisions, artillery, and all other things necessary for the defence and security of the city...»*¹⁷⁹

Edward's army was one of the most experienced ever to set foot on French soil. Among the soldiers were many who, with the Black Prince, the Duke of Lancaster, or the King himself, had been in previous campaigns, had been at Poitiers in *chevauchées*, or had had sufficient experience of sieges. None of the three generals had yet been defeated, who led the three *batailles*, or columns, in the march to Reims.¹⁸⁰

Walter Mauny was sent forward by Edward to Brabant, Hainaut and other German duchies to recruit mercenaries, with Calais as the rallying point. The German mercenaries he recruited began arriving in the city in early August. Many arrived without any equipment or supplies, as they thought they could support themselves from the loot.¹⁸¹ After constant delays, many were forced to sell their horses as prices in Calais skyrocketed and living costs became expensive, leading to riots and violence in many places.¹⁸²

The situation had become so bad that the King had to send the Duke of Lancaster forward with a team of 2300 men to restore order.¹⁸³ The only way to avoid bloodshed in Calais was a limited action raid on Picardy,¹⁸⁴ towards Béthune and Arras, just over 100 kilometres from Calais.¹⁸⁵ The crossing foreshadowed the conditions under which the main force would have to march a month later. Many were starving and thirsty, and had to march for days without any supplies, as the French had heavily garrisoned the towns and castles, but the Germans encountered no opposition outside them.¹⁸⁶ They then made their way to Péronne, where they found enough food on 18 October 1359. By this time, the *chevauchée* had lasted more than two weeks. The mercenaries had destroyed the Somme valley and besieged the castle of Bray-sur-Somme. The attack was repulsed by the defenders, who showed great courage. According to Froissart, the assault lasted all day and the defenders of the town were able to hold out because they had reinforcements from the Count of Saint-Pol.¹⁸⁷ The regent congratulated them in two letters written in January 1360:

¹⁷⁹ Pierre-Joseph Varin (ed.), *Archives administratives de la ville de Reims*, Paris, 1848, vol. 3, p. 141.

¹⁸⁰ Jean Devoisse, *Jean le Bon*, Paris, 1985, p. 443.

¹⁸¹ Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez (eds.), *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, vol. II, Paris, 1905, p. 290.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, *op. cit.*, p. 798.

¹⁸⁴ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

¹⁸⁵ J. Viard and E. Déprez (eds.), *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, vol. II..., *op. cit.*, p. 291.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 292 ; J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War*, vol. II..., *op. cit.*, I. 9468.

¹⁸⁷ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

«for having preserved and defended the said city and for having resisted with all their strength the forces of the said enemy. The Duke of Lancaster and members of his company came to the said city, and those who were in the city suffered many great injuries, assaults, and invasions for several days. The [city's] mayor, councillors, and inhabitants, by the help of God, with the aid of men-at-arms, crossbowmen, and archers, prevented the taking of [the city], and resisted in such a manner that they [the English] suffered blows, and departed.»¹⁸⁸

A.c) The Road to Reims

He finally crossed the Somme on 1 November and, when Edward arrived in Calais, Lancaster returned to the town to meet the King.¹⁸⁹



Map 1. Edward III's campaign 1359-1360. Map by Béla Nagy

¹⁸⁸ Letter of the Regent Charles to the inhabitants of Bray-sur-Somme, in S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., p. LVII, footnote 2.

¹⁸⁹ K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, op. cit., p. 800.

Edward arrived in Calais on 28 October 1359 and on 4 November, he and his troops set off in three parallel columns for Reims. However, he had to solve the problem of the German mercenaries before leaving Calais, because he simply couldn't afford to feed any more hungry mouths. Therefore, he told those assembled there that he could not support them. Naturally, this answer did not make the Germans entirely happy.¹⁹⁰ In the end, he dismissed 450 from his service.¹⁹¹

The English king's intention was to deliver the *coup-de-grace*, and his aim was the coronation ceremony in the great cathedral of Reims.¹⁹² Edward set off on a 25 km wide front towards the coronation city. The corps led by the King was heading straight for Reims from Calais, passing through Arras, Beaumetz, Saint Quentin and Craonne.¹⁹³ Tracing the direction of the corps on the map, it is clear that no more direct route could be found, so Edward either had a detailed map of the area, as Alfred H. Burne thinks,¹⁹⁴ or he used the guidance of local allies, as he did on the march to Burgundy after the siege of Reims. The central body of the army was led by the Duke of Lancaster through Agincourt, the scene of the great battle to come, and then he proceeded in a roughly parallel course in the direction of Péronne, Cerisy, to Craonne, and thence to the walls of Reims. The leader of the third *bataille*, the one furthest west, was Edward the Black Prince, who, starting from Calais, crossed Craonne, passing through Montreuil, Hesdin, Nesle, and then making a detour to Château Porcien, before turning back south-west to reach the first important stage of his campaign, Reims.¹⁹⁵ The three columns remained at a distance from each other so that they could mutually assist each other in case of trouble, as the brief description above indicates, with Craonne designated as the general rendezvous point. The progress of the armies was extremely slow, partly due to the supply train, partly due to the extremely heavy rain,¹⁹⁶ and also due to the fact that Edward was in no hurry to reach Reims, the King covered the 128 kilometres between Calais and Reims at less than 10 kilometres a day. The army was reunited at Craonne on 29 November, where two councils of war were held. At last, the English army arrived before Reims on 4 December.¹⁹⁷ The English received no news of the

¹⁹⁰ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., p. 197.

¹⁹¹ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, op. cit., I. 9478. I.

¹⁹² K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, op. cit., p. 788.

¹⁹³ Joseph Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica: by Sir Thomas Gray of Heton, Knight*, Edinburgh, 1836, p. 187.

¹⁹⁴ A. H. Burne, *The Crecy War...*, op. cit., p. 334.

¹⁹⁵ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, op. cit., p. 187.

¹⁹⁶ The winter of 1359 was one of the harshest in recent years, with rain pouring down throughout November, turning the roads into a sea of mud. J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, op. cit., I. 9478 ; J. Viard and E. Déprez (eds.), *Chronique de Jean le Bel, vol. II...*, op. cit., p. 299.

¹⁹⁷ K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, op. cit., p. 803.

regent's relief troops, which was no wonder, since Charles had chosen different tactics. He did not oppose Edward, partly because he simply could not muster such an army, and partly because he did not want to. Instead, he moved his population into walled cities and well-fortified fortresses, packed with soldiers, and left the countryside to Edward's discretion.

A.d) The Siege of Reims

In the relevant literature, the preparation of Reims for the siege is usually counted from the regent's warning of 10 July,¹⁹⁸ although the city council of Reims had had knowledge of Edward's intention much earlier, so that they had almost a year, not six months, to prepare. In a letter written on 9 September 1358, the regent informed the city council and the citizens that the enemy «*might bring very great damage, destruction and danger to the said city.*»¹⁹⁹ He therefore appointed a body of six to head the city to supervise the fortification works, effectively giving them full power in all matters relating to the defence of the city.²⁰⁰ However, the man who saved Reims was called Gaucher de Châtillon. As a descendant of a prominent Champagne family, he was elected captain of the city in that rare moment when Jean, Archbishop of Reims, and the citizens of the city agreed. Later, Jean de Craon regretted more than once the appointment of Gaucher de Châtillon. The future Charles V confirmed the election in a letter dated 30 December 1358²⁰¹. One of the first, and most important, orders of the new chaplain was to erect a strong wall, fortified with high towers, between the cathedral and the archbishop's palace, the château de Porte-Mars, which formed part of the outer defensive line.²⁰² A special tax was levied to cover the costs of the fortifications,²⁰³ after carefully assessing the taxpaying capacity of the population.²⁰⁴ Gaucher de Châtillon took advantage of his appointment which extended his grandeur to the Reims area. He had all the available grain in the area harvested and supplied to the garrison, the population and the refugees who were constantly streaming into the city. All

¹⁹⁸ A. H. Burne, *The Crecy War...*, *op. cit.*, 334 ; Henri Moranvillé, « Le siège de Reims, 1359-1360 *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, 1895, vol. 56, pp. 90-98, p. 92.

¹⁹⁹ P.-J. Varin (ed.), *Archives administratives...*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*


²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117 ; AMCR Carton 668 16 bis 1-1358.

²⁰² One of the main reasons for building the wall was that the citizens of the city did not trust the Archbishop, accusing him of excessive English ties and treason. The hostility went so far that the town council demanded that the Archbishop move from the Archbishop's palace to the palace next to the cathedral. « Commission de monsieur Gauchier de Chasteillon, capitaine de Reims, pour faire les gros murs environ le chastel de Portemars, 5 May 1359 », in P.-J. Varin (ed.), *Archives administratives...*, *op. cit.*, p. 136, doc. CCXCIX.

²⁰³ AMCR Carton 733, Rogier f. 105.

²⁰⁴ AMCR Carton 640, Liasse n. 6. Supplément 5.

the abbeys and castles in the area that were deemed unprotectable were burnt and destroyed: Livry and the stronghold of Aubilly, the abbey of Saint-Thierry, could not escape the same fate. The forests surrounding the town were felled for miles around, regardless of who owned them.²⁰⁵ The logs thus accumulated provided the building material essential for a successful defence. All the houses that were attached to the city walls were destroyed, three of the city's eight gates were walled up, and the drawbridges were dismantled.²⁰⁶ Gaucher de Châtillon had catapults set up at strategic points of defence. The citizens of the city were obliged to stand guard around the clock on the designated sections of the wall. Fortifications were placed at the main road junctions in case the English invaded the city.²⁰⁷



Map 2. Siege of Reims 4 December 1359 - 11 January 1360 Map by
Csenge Anna Ölbei

Finally, on 4 December, the English army arrived under the fortified walls of Reims.²⁰⁸ Edward had divided the army into six parts: the Black Prince, with his troops, landed in the area around Ville-Dommange, the corps led by Richmond and the Earl of Northampton was

²⁰⁵ Georges Boussinesq and Gustave Laurent, *Histoire de Reims depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. I, Reims, 1933, p. 405.

²⁰⁶ Patrick Demouy (ed.), *Reims une métropole dans l'histoire. La ville antique et médiévale*, Paris, 2014, p. 208.

²⁰⁷ This was a common defensive measure in 14th-century cities. Froissart gives a detailed description of how chains were used when he discusses the siege of Carcassonne in 1355. S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

²⁰⁸ Maurice Crubellier, *Histoire de la Champagne*, Paris, 1975, p. 182.

stationed at Saint-Thierry, the Duke of Lancaster chose Brimont, the Marshal of England was at Cernay, Jean de Beauchamps was at Bétheny, and the King himself had designated the monastery of Saint-Basle in Verzy as his headquarters.²⁰⁹

Edward made one last attempt to win Reims for the English cause before the siege.²¹⁰ The report of the Italian chronicler Villani is confirmed by Knighton's chronicle.²¹¹ Before the city was hermetically surrounded, Edward called on the defenders to surrender the city. According to Villani, however, Reims firmly refused. December 1359 proved to be a miserable December for the besiegers, with rain falling day and night,²¹² yet Edward prepared for a long siege. All this can be read in the letter the Dauphin wrote in response to the request for help of the inhabitants of Reims.²¹³ Charles promised the expected help in vain, and the *Connétable*, who had started north from Troyes with a small force, finding the English too strong, returned to Paris unfinished. Eventually the inhabitants of Reims were left alone.

Before the actual siege began, Edward tried to avoid the costly siege by a treachery he instigated and organised before the only assault on the city. Not much is known about the details, except that the plot was discovered in time and eleven nobles were convicted and executed.²¹⁴

According to the literature, the English simply sealed off the city from the outside world, but a French chronicle details an attempt to take Reims by force.²¹⁵ According to the *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*, the English only had one major attempt at the very beginning of the siege: three troops stormed the city at the same time. One attacked at the south-west corner of the city, near the fortified bridge over the Vesle River. This corps was led by Edward the Black Prince. The other two, under the command of the Duke of Lancaster and the Earl of Richmond,²¹⁶ tried the east side at the monastery of Saint-Rémi. Under covering fire, the English archers filled the moat with logs and rushes and rolled two siege towers

²⁰⁹ G. Boussinesq and G. Laurent, *Histoire de Reims I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

²¹⁰ Villani, *Cronica*, 1834, lib. IX, cap. LXIV.

²¹¹ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

²¹² Matthieu Lambert Polain (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel. 1290-1360*, translated by Nigel Bryant, Woodbridge, 2011, p. 252.

²¹³ A courier from the inhabitants of Reims managed to slip through the English siege lines undetected and successfully reached Charles in Paris. « Lettres du régent aux bourgeois de Reims, pour les engager à repousser vigoureusement les Anglois qui les assiègent, et leur annoncer qu'il enverra le connétable à leur secours 1359 December 26 », in P.-J. Varin (ed.), *Archives administratives...*, *op. cit.*, p. 136, doc. DCCXIV.

²¹⁴ Louis-Pierre Anquetil, *Histoire civile et politique de la ville de Reims*, Reims, 1761, vol. II, p. 223.

²¹⁵ K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, *op. cit.*, p. 806.

²¹⁶ S. Luce (ed.), *Chronique des quatre...*, *op. cit.*, 105. p.

towards the city walls. Under the energetic leadership of Gaucher de Châtillon, the citizens have defended themselves effectively.²¹⁷ They kept the assailants under fire with the help of the battering rams set up in the town. As a result of the day-long battle, the attackers led by the Black Prince managed to open a corridor about 10 metres wide through the moat, but they did not reach the city wall. The attack on the eastern side could not even do that. As dusk fell, the English withdrew their weary troops and made no further attempts.²¹⁸

One episode in the siege perfectly illustrates the deteriorating relationship between the city and the Archbishop, the mutual distrust that was the greatest threat to the besieged. As already mentioned, the Archbishop's Palace was an integral part of the defensive line over which the citizens of the city had no direct control. The palace had two trapdoors: one towards the city and one on the opposite side towards the field occupied by the English. The town council decided that the outer drawbridge should be dismantled and the entrance walled in. The garrison troops commissioned by the town council, armed, set off towards the Porte-Mars. Jean de Craon, the Archbishop of Reims, when informed of the approaching troops, interpreted the events as an attempt by the city council to take the palace by force of arms, so he raised the trap-bridge to the city, called his parishioners to arms, put on armour himself, prepared for the siege by lighting the Archbishop's palace with torches. All these preparations did not escape the notice of the citizens, who believed that the Archbishop had made a compromise with the English and let them into the palace. The bells rang and the citizens rushed to the main square armed with swords to ward off the threat. Eventually, Gaucher de Châtillon had to personally clarify the situation and talk to Jean de Craon. By the end of the evening, tempers had calmed as it became clear that there was no sign of the English within the city walls.²¹⁹

By mid-December, the rations in the besieging army had first to be reduced,²²⁰ and then they were completely exhausted, because, despite the logistical preparations unique in this age, the army had used up the provisions originally supplied under Reims, leaving nothing but the only solution to supply the armies fighting in the Hundred Years' War: raids. The other reason for the *chevauchées*²²¹ ravaging Champagne was boredom, for the army remained passive under the walls of Reims after an initial failed attempt (if it really

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ L.-P. Anquetil, *Histoire civile ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-207.

²²⁰ A. Bárány, « Hadtáp és logisztika ... », *art. cit.*, p. 82.

²²¹ Étienne Balouze, *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium*, Paris, 1916, vol. I, p. 339.

happened), so that those seeking individual glory or booty had to go on the raid.²²² The *chevauchées* were not confined to the vicinity of Reims, but the whole of Champagne fell prey to the English raiding parties, such as Warcq, Mézières, Donchery or Mouzon.²²³

One of the most active captains during the 40 days of the siege was not an Englishman, but a captain from the Hainaut region, Eustache d'Auberchicourt, who had an exceptional career in the 14th century history of the Hundred Years' War. He was one of the few mercenary captains who achieved everything, successfully integrating himself into the aristocracy, and he married Isabelle de Juliers, the niece of the Queen of England²²⁴ shortly after the campaign in 1360.

First, he took Attigny, some 58 kilometres northeast of Reims, where Froissart says he 'liberated' over a thousand barrels of wine.²²⁵ Edward and his sons, of course, had plenty of spoils. On 1 January 1360, he continued his *chevauchée* through the Aisne valley and reached Autry, a fortress in an exceptionally favourable position. Perched on a high cliff, the fortress was protected by a tributary of the Aisne. The castle included a mill that was essential in the event of a prolonged siege.²²⁶ Knighton, in his chronicle of the Auberchicourt *chevauchée*, gives a detailed topographical description of the castle's location.²²⁷ The defenders of the castle, frightened by the reputation of the captain of Hainaut, abandoned the fortress without any siege and hid in the surrounding woods to try to survive the coming of the mercenaries. However, this proved to be an error of judgement on the part of the defenders, as Eustache d'Auberchicourt, after occupying the fortress, left a garrison there and continued to besiege the area for six months. Finally, it was only on 16 June 1360 that he sold the fortress to Robert, Duke of Bar, for seven thousand florins of gold. Nevertheless, it was not only from Autry that he made considerable profit, but also from the sale of Attigny and the seizure of the earldom of Rethel that he made 25.000 gold.²²⁸ In the duchy and around Maizières²²⁹ Jean le Bel is described as having «*killed men, women and children without mercy.*»²³⁰

²²² Pierre d'Orgemont, *Chronique de Jean II (1350-1364)*, trans. Nathalie Desgrugillers, Clermont-Ferrand, 2012, p. 146.

²²³ H. Moranvillé, « Le siège de Reims... », art. cit., p. 94.

²²⁴ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries...*, op. cit., p. 104.

²²⁵ Attigny was indeed a wine-growing centre of Champagne in the 14th century. S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., p. 213.

²²⁶ H. Moranvillé, « Le siège de Reims... », art. cit., p. 96.

²²⁷ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, op. cit., p. 173.

²²⁸ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., p. 68, footnote 8.

²²⁹ Adolphe-Louis Leroy, *La Vallée de la Fournelle: Quatre-Champs*, Largentetière, 1924, p. 165.

²³⁰ Matthieu Lambert Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques de Messire Jehan Le Bel*, Brussels, 1863, p. 258.

While Eustache d'Auberchicourt was destroying both sides of the Aisne, Bartholomew Burghersh, in conjunction with several nobles of the court of the Black Prince, laid siege to Cormicy on 20 December 1359.²³¹ The castle of Cormicy belonged to the Archbishop of Reims and was dominated by a fortified large rectangular donjon.²³² Neither the number of defenders nor the artillery of the castle was sufficient to repel a serious attack. The attackers undermined the donjon and, according to Froissart's account, Bartholomew Burghersh ordered the defenders to surrender or they would all be massacred. Henri de Vaux,²³³ the captain of the castle, refused to believe the danger they were in. After being assured of his integrity by the English through a parliamentarian, he was willing to accept the English invitation to see for himself the real state of the undermined donjon. Having assessed that there was no chance of further defence, he surrendered the castle in exchange for a free retreat on 6 January 1360.²³⁴ After that, Bartholomew Burghersh lit the mine and the donjon was split in two.

On the night of 29 December 1359, another assorted group left the English camp to attack the castle of Cernay-en-Dormois. The chevauchée included the Duke of Lancaster, the Earl of Richmond, the Earl of March, John Chandos and John Audley, who were among the most successful English mercenary captains.²³⁵ The castle of Cernay-en-Dormois is remembered by Froissart as a «*well fortified castle*»²³⁶ surrounded by a double moat and a high rampart with fortified towers at the corners.²³⁷ The garrison was led by two determined noblemen, Edouard du Bois, from a Champagne family loyal to the King of France, and Hugues Cholet, Count of Roucy, who previously had had a serious feud with the mercenaries who had invaded Champagne. On the morning of 30 December 1359, the garrison spotted the approaching English. To begin with, the Duke of Lancaster surveyed the depth of the moat surrounding the castle from a safe distance, and then ordered the attack.²³⁸ Crossing the two ditches, the English began to besiege the walls, but suffered heavy casualties in the process.²³⁹ The most famous casualty, one of the most important, was the nobleman and English ally of Gascony, the Lord of Musidan, who was hit in the head by a thrown stone.

²³¹ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

²³² G. Boussinesq and G. Laurent, *Histoire de Reims I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

²³³ H. Moranvillé, « Le siège de Reims... », *art. cit.*, p. 98.

²³⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.

²³⁵ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

²³⁶ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

²³⁷ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 172.

Some of the defenders who survived the English invasion died in the marshes surrounding the castle, while others retreated with Edouard du Bois and Hugues Cholet to the donjon. After a short time, seeing that their situation was hopeless, they surrendered to the Duke of Lancaster.²⁴⁰ The castle itself suffered so much damage during the siege that the English finally decided to burn it.²⁴¹

Lancaster carried on *chevauchée* and reached Manre, 57 kilometres east of Reims, which its inhabitants had abandoned, as they had done with Autry.²⁴² The English burnt the town and returned unharmed to the English camp.²⁴³

The success achieved with the *chevauchée* was all that Edward needed to feed his army, which was equal in size to the population of a city, during the forty days of the siege. However, the English king made no progress towards his most important objective: the capture of Reims. Finally, in mid-January 1360, he forced his way south towards Burgundy.

A.e) Burgundy, Barrois, Alsace January-May 1360

Before Edward set out from the walls of Reims, he gave renewed evidence of the brilliant strategic thinking that had made England a success before the Treaty of Brétigny. While the main army was still encamped below Reims, Edward sent an advance party led by John of Harleston²⁴⁴ forward into the heart of Burgundy. The troops crossed Champagne at lightning speed, stopping only at the northern border of Burgundy at Chemin d'Aisey to dispose of sick and tired horses and surplus equipment and «*articles of no value.*»²⁴⁵ Later, the English horses were bought by the locals at an auction, with the '*highest bidder*' being the successful buyer.²⁴⁶ The destination of the outpost was the fortified town of Flavigny in the north of the duchy, just sixty kilometres from the centre of the duchy of Dijon. The citadel was taken by the escalade on the night of 17 January, taking advantage of the garrison's lack of vigilance. When the citizens of the town awoke the next morning, they saw the flag of Harleston flying in the tower of the impregnable citadel.²⁴⁷ Ten days later, two Burgundian lords, Philibert de

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

²⁴² K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, *op. cit.*, p. 808.

²⁴³ H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

²⁴⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

²⁴⁵ ADCO Comptes de Jean de Recey, châtelain d'Aisey B 2079, f. 139 ; E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

²⁴⁶ ADCO Comptes de Jean de Recey, châtelain d'Aisey B 2079, f. 139.

²⁴⁷ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

Lespinasse and Pierropont sent scouts to assess the situation around Flavigny,²⁴⁸ and then concluded that nothing could be done. The entire force of the duchy would have proved insufficient to take the castle, for Flavigny was one of the best fortified towns and castles in the duchy. From the English point of view, the capture of Flavigny was the perfect choice, since before the army even arrived in Burgundy, the success of the invasion was assured. All this proves that Edward's action was not ad hoc, but premeditated.

How were the English able to get into the heart of the principality undetected? There are at least two answers: firstly, in 1359, the English had precise information about Burgundy. Many of the English captains who led *chevauchées* into Burgundy knew the duchy well, including such famous figures as Robert Knolles,²⁴⁹ Ieuan Wynn, Daudel, another independent captain who was closely associated with Robert Knolles,²⁵⁰ and Nicolas Tamworth. In addition to English captains with local knowledge, Edward was advised by local French nobles such as Jean de Neuchâtel-sur-lac and Guillaume de Granson.²⁵¹ Secondly, the battle of Brion that ended tragically for the Duchy. The battle took place exactly six months before the English invasion on 2 July 1359 on the northern border of Burgundy between the Anglo-Gascon companies and the most important lords of North Burgundy. The conflict escalated into a private war, and the French nobles, not for the first time in the history of the Hundred Years' War, did not wait for the reinforcements from the rest of the duchy, but attacked the larger, more experienced mercenary forces led by John of Harleston.²⁵² It was no coincidence that Edward chose him, for he had an excellent knowledge of the region. Although the number of men who took part in the battle was not significant, it proved decisive in terms of the Burgundian lords who were captured or killed. The list of casualties includes members of almost every major northern family. After Brion, the duchy was virtually unguarded from the north.²⁵³ When the news of the battle's defeat was received, the panic at the court of Dijon was as great as after Poitiers.

Of course, the lords of Lorraine, Barrois and Alsace were informed of the departure of the English army in good time by their spies or by the envoys they sent to the English camp. One of these envoys was Thiébaud, Lord of Blâmont, who was sent by Robert, Duke of Bar,

²⁴⁸ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.* Pièce Justificatives N° 9114.

²⁴⁹ Ernest Petit, *Avallon et l'Avallonnais*, Auxerre, 1867, pp. 160-161, footnote 2.

²⁵⁰ It was active in the Troyes area in 1358-1359. Charles Lalore, *Cartulaire de Montier-la-Celle*, Troyes, 1892, vol. 6, p. xxxv.

²⁵¹ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

²⁵² E. Petit, *Avallon et l'Avallonnais...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

²⁵³ Geoffroy de Blaisy, Jean de Crux, Girard de Longchamp, Jean de Senecey, Guy de Frolois, Henri de Vienne, Seigneur de Mirebeau en Montagne, Thomas de Voudenay, Hugues and Jacques de Vienne.

to negotiate with Edward III in mid-January 1360. On his return from the English king, he stopped in Étain on 27 January.²⁵⁴ The news he brought with him caused the same panic in the ducal court of Bar-le-Duc as the defeat at the battle of Brion in Dijon. The fear is literally palpable in the sources: the researcher rarely encounters such clear expressions of emotion in contemporary sources. The accounts of the bailli are by their very nature short paraphrased entries for recorded expenditure or income. Symmonet de Verdun, and Jean De Fliery, the accounts of the bailli serving in the duchy at the time of the English march, refer in several folios to 'fear of the English' in justifying many of the expenditures.²⁵⁵ That is why Robert had hastily taken a series of protective measures to avert the threat: fortifications and garrisons had been reinforced in the regions. In Châtillon-Sur-Saône,²⁵⁶ he deployed trebuchets in his castle and built a barricade in front of the town. In Étain, Jean de Billy replenished the supplies for the castle's ditchers and fortified the walls, clearing the moat and filling it with water. At Foug, 21 new palisades were built to increase the security of the defenders. At Lachaussée, two new ditches were dug in front of the castle. All these works had to be carried out by the population of the bailliage during the cold winter days of February 1360.²⁵⁷ To do this, the Duke quickly hired German mercenaries to further reinforce the garrisons in the duchy.²⁵⁸ The rural population was moved to the castles and walled towns.²⁵⁹ The towns were fortified with guards to defend the walls against the companies. Jean de Sainte-Geneviève, bailli of Longwy, states in his account of 1360 that the town of Longwy was guarded day and night and for complete security additional guards were posted to watch the guards, who were punished if they fell asleep on guard or neglected their duties.²⁶⁰

On 11 January 1360, the English army left Reims heading south towards Châlons, threatening Provins.²⁶¹ The town was defended by Simon de Jony. The passing army completely destroyed the countryside between Méry-sur-Seine and Troyes. After Châlons, the marching army threatened Troyes and its surroundings. Under the English threat, the French, preparing to defend themselves, destroyed and burnt the abbey of Montier-la-Celle

²⁵⁴ ADM B1128, Compte de Symone du Verdun, f. 29v

²⁵⁵ ADM B 1128, Compte of Symmonet de Verdun, f. 42r-v B 1511, compte de Jean De Fliery receveur pour Henri de Bar 1359-1360 f. 9 r-v

²⁵⁶ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

²⁵⁷ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

²⁵⁸ ADM B 1128, Compte of Symmonet de Verdun. f. 99v

²⁵⁹ ADM B 798, Compte de Jean de Longville, 1360-1361 ; V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁶⁰ ADM B 1857 ; V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

²⁶¹ K. Fowler, *Henry of Grosmont...*, *op. cit.*, p. 810.

before the English arrived, as ordered by the regent.²⁶² As well as the monasteries destroyed around Reims, the abbey was considered indefensible and dangerous for Troyes if the English invaded. The monks found refuge with the Dominicans in the town of Troyes. The monks did not recover from the consequences of their campaign for many years. They appealed to both the Pope and Charles the Regent to change their fate for the better. Charles replied to them in April 1360, promising his help. As a result of this letter, a detailed programme for the restoration of the abbey was set out on 30 April 1360.²⁶³

The English advanced from north to south in three columns in a band of about 30 kilometres. This was the most logical route towards Burgundy, which was no coincidence, of course, as Daudel and Eustache d'Aubrichécourt knew the area well, not to mention the nobles who had joined the army from Franche-Comté. While Edward spent a few days in the Troyes area, the English troops attacked Saint-Florentin-sur-l'Armançon. Although the town was taken, the castle held out.²⁶⁴ According to Froissart, three thousand bottles of wine were found in the cellars of the neighbouring town of Tonnerre and the soldiers drank themselves unconscious with '*good wine*'²⁶⁵ and camped in the town for five days. Edward made his way to Auxerre, avoiding the Burgundian troops led by Robert de Fiennes. Eventually Edward arrived in the heart of Burgundy without any particular challenge and pitched his tent at Guillon, where he remained until 19 February 1360. Jean de Neuchâtel-sur-Lac and Guillaume de Granson did an excellent job in leading the English army into the heart of Burgundy and setting up camp on Montfôte Hill, a strategically well placed and easily defensible position for Edward. The English quickly contacted the English garrison at Flavigny. One of John of Harleston's important tasks was to provide enough supplies for the arriving English army.²⁶⁶ This he did with complete success. He stockpiled enough food and forage for a month before the English army arrived in Burgundy.²⁶⁷ This shows Edward's foresight in adapting to changing circumstances, for when he left London he had not anticipated that he would have to leave Reims in the second week of January.

After the English invaded Burgundy, raids began in the duchy, just as in Champagne. Vieux-Châteaux was burned several times, Courcelles-Fré moy, Saint-Léger was looted, Bierry,

²⁶² H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-241.

²⁶³ Ch. Lalore, *Cartulaire...*, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxvi-xxxviii.

²⁶⁴ Maurice Poinssignon, *Histoire Générale de la Champagne et de la Brie*, Châlons-sur-Marne, 1896, p. 344.

²⁶⁵ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, 224.

²⁶⁶ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, p. 250

²⁶⁷ E. Petit, *Avallon et l'Avallonnais...*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

Valcroissant, Vassy-lès-Avallon,²⁶⁸ Vignes,²⁶⁹ Blacy, Annay-la-Côte were destroyed. In Rougemont-sur-Armançon, John of Harleston is linked to the atrocities that shocked the whole of Burgundy.²⁷⁰ The inhabitants of Arnay were so often ransomed by the English that they finally decided to pay no more and, leaving the settlement empty, moved to safer ground. Of course, it was not only the people of Arnay who had to change their lives. The village of Chitry, in the Auxerre wine region, had 64 residents of adult age who made a deal with the English to buy their lives. Just like the people of Arnay, the inhabitants of the village had had enough of the unbearable financial burden after many payments, but instead of moving, they decided to reinforce the parish church. They finally got permission to do so in 1364.²⁷¹ The town of Saulieu was not only plundered, it was regularly razed to the ground.²⁷² As a testimony to the effectiveness of the destructive *chevauchées*, 18 stables were burnt down in the Regny area alone. The castle of Vermenton, where the local monks had taken refuge, was taken by the Duke of Lancaster, who stayed for three days with his soldiers. The English spent a further three weeks in the abandoned monastery before leaving, laden with treasure.²⁷³

Other communities, fearing that the nearby castle would be occupied by the English and that they could terrorise the area from there, decided to destroy it themselves before the English arrived. So did the town of Varzy with the castle of Hodan, which belonged to the Bishop of Auxerre. They razed it to the ground just before 1360 when they learned that the English, who were arriving next door, intended to occupy and fortify the castle of Hodan (now Oudan), which was only 4 kilometres from Varzy.²⁷⁴

The English-led *chevauchées* not only meant a risk for the local population, but also for the English. Roger Mortimer, the Earl of March, was killed during one such *chevauchée* near the town of Avalon on 26 February 1360.²⁷⁵ On 24 May 1360, Pentecost, the English appeared in the Revigny area between Dijon and Mâcon, terrorising the countryside, bringing destruction with them.²⁷⁶

²⁶⁸ ADCO Compte de Guillaume de Clugny B 2748, f. 1v

²⁶⁹ ADCO Compte de Vieux-Château B 6521, f. 4r

²⁷⁰ See details: H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-251.

²⁷¹ Christian Desplat, « Introduction », in Christian Desplat (ed.), *Les Villageois face à la guerre (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, Toulouse, 2002, pp. 7-13.

²⁷² Petit, *Avallon et l'Avallonnais...*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

²⁷³ V.-B. Henry, *Histoire de l'Abbaye de Saint-germain d'Auxerre*, Auxerre, 1853, p. 318.

²⁷⁴ *Lettres de l'abbé Lebeuf*, ed. MM. Quantin et Cherest, vol. 1, Auxerre, 1866, pp. 529-530.

²⁷⁵ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

²⁷⁶ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

At the same time, Edward's stay in Burgundy was not as unpleasant as that of the Burgundian population: he hunted and fished with members of the English court.²⁷⁷

Such devastation could not be sustained on this scale for any length of time. Negotiations between the English and the Burgundians began on 10 March.²⁷⁸ From March onwards, the *chevauchées*' radius of action increased, and the English companies completely overran the Duchy of Bar and crossed the southern border of Alsace. Even after Edward's departure, the raids into the duchy were not completed, as many English captains did not continue with the main force, but remained in Burgundy in the castle they had occupied. In the provinces concerned, a defensive coalition was formed to stop the English raids. Robert, the Duke of Bar, and the chief lords and towns of the border region entered into an alliance on 4 May 1360.²⁷⁹ Among those who signed the alliance were the Bishop of Metz, the Governor of Lorraine, and Brocard de Fénétrange.²⁸⁰ The members of the alliance agreed to cover the cost of a mobile unit of 60 horsemen under the command of a captain, and to deploy the troops in the most dangerous places.²⁸¹ Several payments for local mercenaries relating to the English campaign in general and to the battles fought by the alliance in particular have been preserved in the Metz city archives: the earliest dates from 11 February 1360²⁸² and relates to the fighting at Barrois. Combining these payments with the accounts of the bailliage of the Duchy of Bar, it is possible to piece together how the alliance worked in practice. A payment from Olris, a relative of Brocard Fénétrange, dated 4 August 1360, in which he and seven of his soldiers served in Lorraine against the English.²⁸³

He and his soldiers were compensated for all their equipment and horses lost during their service. Similarly, Brocard de Fénétrange issued a receipt for payment to the city of Metz for operations against the English.²⁸⁴ Another mercenary captain, the knight Bertouls Strangen de Bembouch, with his five men, spent two months in the Duchy of Bar, for which he received 150 florins.²⁸⁵ Frankes de Wendelisheim, fighting with 17 men against the

²⁷⁷ ADCO Compte de Guillaume de Clugny B 2748, f. 5r

²⁷⁸ Urbain Plancher, *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne, avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives*, vol. II, Dijon, 1741, p. 227.

²⁷⁹ AMM AA 49, f. 15.

²⁸⁰ Perhaps the most interesting of all the signatories, Brocard de Fénétrange was a mercenary captain from Lorraine and from one of the most influential families in Lorraine, and can be found on the battlefields of the century-old Eastern Front.

²⁸¹ « Traité entre Adhemar, évêque de Metz, Wenceslas, roi de Bohême, Robert de Bar et la Cité », AMM AA 49, n° 15 ; Nicolas Tabouillot (ed.), *Preuves de l'Histoire de Metz*, Metz, 1775, vol. I, pp. 186-189.

²⁸² AMM EE6, f. 11. Receipt of Arnould de Putanges for his services in the armed forces.

²⁸³ AMM EE6, f. 8.

²⁸⁴ AMM EE6, f. 9 ; S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., p. 164.

²⁸⁵ AMM EE 6.

English, was paid on 4 May 1360. From the account of Symonet de Verdun, the *prévôt* of the Étain, it is known that in early 1360 payments were made for mercenaries from Metz who came to help the duchy of Bar against the English. 7 sol was paid to a messenger in order for him to «*go to the prévôt of Briey in Chalcie and deliver the message that the men from Metz would stay with him.*»²⁸⁶

All these measures had their effect: the defenders of the castle of Lamarche captured 13 Englishmen on 11 March 1360. Seven of them were released for a ransom of 256 florins, the remaining six were imprisoned in the castle. A thief named Jean de Poulley was executed on 3 August. Another was released on the promise that he would return with the ransom collected for the others. They were never seen again, and this proved fatal for his companions because on 3 November they were drowned.²⁸⁷ The sire of Bulgnéville had them thrown into the water with their hands and feet tied together.²⁸⁸ Foug's garrison also captured two Englishmen. The one called Olivier paid 110 for his release.²⁸⁹

However, the above examples are more likely to be exceptions. In Burgundy, the English completely paralysed life.²⁹⁰ No one dared leave the relative safety of the fortified places. The records of the accounts of the different bailli preserve the memory of the devastation. The mills were a favourite target for the English: the mill at Andernay was completely shut down because the population was terrorised.²⁹¹ The mill at Avrecourt was destroyed,²⁹² the mill at Rancourt was robbed along with the mill at Revigny on 5 April 1360.²⁹³ The village of Brabant-le-Roi was burnt and the village chief was murdered along with many of its inhabitants. The same was done in Rancourt.²⁹⁴

Alsace was first threatened by the English invasion when the companies captured the castle of Vesoul, 63 kilometres from Montbéliard,²⁹⁵ near the southern border of Alsace. In the months that followed, they moved even closer to Alsace, capturing the fortress of Charier (Chariaco) on 30 June 1360 not far from Monjustin-et-Velotte.²⁹⁶ The agents of the Décapole, the ten free imperial cities of Alsace, followed the events closely and informed

²⁸⁶ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁸⁷ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁸⁸ The sources show that this method was a favourite way of executing mercenaries in the border areas.

²⁸⁹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁹⁰ ADM B 2204, Compte de Henrion, f. 10 r-v ; B 798, Compte de Jean de Longeville, f. 8v

²⁹¹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

²⁹² ADM B 798, Compte de Jean de Longeville, f. 7r

²⁹³ ADM B 798, Compte de Jean de Longeville, f. 9v

²⁹⁴ ADM B 798, Compte de Jean de Longeville, f. 9v

²⁹⁵ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

the alliance of the English companies' seizure of the territory.²⁹⁷ On 19 July 1360, for example, one of them, Hans zum Baume, sent a letter to the mayor of Strasbourg:

*«I inform you that the [English] are near Vesoul and have no intention of stopping any longer, raiding every day, destroying and plundering the countryside, doing great evil to the women and members of the Church....»*²⁹⁸

In his letter, he informed the Council that the Green Count Amadeus VI of Savoy, joined by the Dukes of Burgundy, Bar and Lorraine, would march north against the English companies and attack them on 24 July 1360. He also reports that nobles from Alsace joined the coalition army.²⁹⁹ In the end, the battle came to nothing as the Burgundians decided to pay the English instead.

In any case, the English invaded Alsace when they reached its southern border. In a letter to the bishop of Strasbourg, Emperor Charles IV summoned the bishop to Nuremberg on 14 July 1360 to discuss how to 'expel'³⁰⁰ *«the companies [which are] now in Alsace»*.³⁰¹ The local authorities finally succeeded in averting the threat, because Ulrich de Fénétrange, who at the time held an important office in Alsace, asked the Décapole for 150 florins to reimburse his expenses incurred in expelling the companies.³⁰²

Edward III and Philip of Rouvres, the last Capeting Duke of Burgundy, signed the Treaty of Guillon in 1360.³⁰³ The most important part of the treaty was the payment of 200.000 moutons d'or. This huge sum was, of course, to be paid in instalments, the first of which was 50.000 moutons d'or, followed by 100.000 at Christmas 1360. While the remaining 50.000 was to be paid by Easter 1361. As was subsequently discovered, the timetable was already unrealistic when it was put on paper. The Burgundians sent envoys after envoys to London because of the constant delays.³⁰⁴ Burgundy approved the agreement without delay, so that the English would leave as quickly as possible. Of course, to keep the agreement, hostages

²⁹⁷ In the late Middle Ages, a number of alliances were formed by the free imperial cities. These alliances were typically formed for a specific purpose and lasted for a few years. As for the Décapole (Foederis Decapolitani Initium), formed in 1354, the alliance of Alsatian cities was unique in that it successfully secured peace in the Rhine valley for hundreds of years. AMC AA 52/3.

²⁹⁸ Hanz zum Baume zu Strasbourg: Nachrichten über die Engländer (19 July 1360) AVES AA 81, f. 12 ; USS1 435, n° 519.

²⁹⁹ USS1 p. 435, n° 519.

³⁰⁰ AVES AA 78, f. 7.

³⁰¹ AVES AA 78, f. 7.

³⁰² AMC EE 1, f. 1.

³⁰³ « Traité de Trèves, entre Édouard III Roi d'Angleterre et Philippe duc de Bourgogne », in U. Plancher, *Histoire générale II...*, op. cit., p. CCLXXXV, n° CCIII.

³⁰⁴ « Traité de Trèves, entre Édouard III Roi d'Angleterre et Philippe duc de Bourgogne », in *Ibid.*

had to be provided, as was the custom of the time. 15 nobles and 7 prominent citizens were sent to Calais and then to London.³⁰⁵ The English agreed to surrender all the forts they had occupied in the duchy, but the treaty agreed that they would be free to move about Burgundy, but could not spend more than two nights in any one place.³⁰⁶ Under one of the most interesting clauses, if Edward was crowned King of France, the Prince could not put any obstacles in the way of his election as King, and the terms of the present peace would then remain in force.

On 10 March, Edward III allowed the inhabitants of the duchy to trade freely and confirmed their traditional rights.³⁰⁷ He was still in Guillon at the time, and two days later, he issued letters of marque to those wishing to trade in English-occupied territories. After the treaty was concluded, Edward and the English army set off westwards through the Barony of Donzy and the County of Nevers towards Paris. However, the ink was not even dry on the agreement between the king and the duke when the English broke it. Not only then, but long afterwards, Edward had many a headache caused by the English captains who, instead of keeping up with the main army, continued to harry the already hard-pressed duchy and wider border region by remaining in Burgundy, despite «*swearing with their hands to the skies*.»³⁰⁸ that they would obey the king's orders and leave Burgundy. The source includes some of the English captains who stayed behind. Jehan de Hamlle, Matin Redement, Guillaume Redement, Guillaume Scopul, Guy Fenef, Guillaume Mortin, Thomellin Perrin, and Jehan de Louchiez.³⁰⁹ Edward had to send envoys to Burgundy several times in the following months, who had little success with the English mercenary captains operating there. In addition, he was forced to release 12.000 of the first instalment, which eventually amounted to 47.261 moutons d'or, to cover the damage caused by the English.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 190.

³⁰⁶ « Traité de Trèves, entre Édouard III Roi d'Angleterre et Philippe duc de Bourgogne », in U. Plancher, *Histoire générale II...*, op. cit., p. CCLXXXV, n° CCIII.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. CCLV, n° CCLXXXVII.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. CCCI, n° CCLVIII.

³⁰⁹ « Nichoule Tamworth, Capitein de Regenne et Lieutenant de tres noble et puissant Prince le Roy d'Engleterre, Mess. Jehan de Hamlle, Matin Redement, Guillaume Redement, Guillaume Scopul come Guy Fenef, Guillaume Mortin, Thomellin Perrin, Jehan de Louchiez », in U. Plancher, *Histoire générale II...*, op. cit., p. CCLVIII, n° CCCI.

³¹⁰ Thomas Rymer (ed.), *Foedera, conventiones, literæ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliæ*, The Hague, 1760, vol. III, part II, p. 35 ; E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit. p. 197.

A.f) On the Road to Paris: Donzy, Nevers, Gâtinais, March 1360

As soon as the deal was done, Edward set off in haste from the Serain valley, and then continued on to the Yonne valley, spending several nights with Vezelay.³¹¹ Still taking advantage of the river valleys, the army entered the county of Nevers. The importance of the campaign is shown by the fact that by 18 March 1360, news of the campaign had reached the western frontier of France. Jean, son of the famous Count of Armagnac, was staying with his mother in Burgundy at the time. It was through them that news of the English king's campaign reached the town of Albi.³¹² At the same time, the English king's troops were raiding the neighbouring barony of Donzy. During this period of the campaign, two captains in particular played a prominent role: the Welshman Ieuan Wynn, alias '*Le poursivant d'amours*', and a Gascon captain Garciot de Chastel. Wynn, as commander of the fortress of Beaufort, joined the English army on the spot. Quickly capturing the town of Clamency, he made the inhabitants of the town pay 7000 florins,³¹³ and took hostages until the full amount was paid.³¹⁴ Garciot de Chastel, having captured several castles, agreed a ransom of 5000 florins with the local lords. The amount was not high thanks to the intervention of Jean d'Armagnac, who managed to reach an agreement with Garciot Chastel, and even advanced 2,000 florins to his compatriot himself. Several members of the barony undertook to repay the amount lent, but they failed to do so by the deadline. Therefore, Johannes Maurelli, the rector of the Chapel of the Holy Cross in Liège, had to write a letter to the people concerned on 4 March 1361, warning them that if they did not pay their debts within 30 days of receiving the letter, they would be excommunicated.³¹⁵ Naturally, such a rapid breach of the treaty with the English caused discontent in Dijon and Richard de Boubert was sent to Régennes to protest to Edward. As a result of his intercession, Ieuan Wynn, gave up the hostages he had requested as a collateral. In response to the complaints of Philip of Rouvres and Marguerite de France, Edward sent a letter from Calais on 26 October 1360 ordering Wynn, '*Le poursivant d'amours*' to desist from his remaining pursuits. Whether this was done at the king's intervention is not known.

³¹¹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. LXVIII, footnote 2.

³¹² ADT 4EDTCC 149, f. 21v

³¹³ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.* p. 87 ; S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 490.

³¹⁴ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

³¹⁵ ADCO B.11875.

On the way to Paris, Edward divided the army: the King marched along the Yonne River near Clamecy and along the right bank of the Seine towards the French capital.³¹⁶ He crossed at Coulanges, the next major stop on the way to the castle of Chanteloup. In the meantime, the corps marching on the left bank of the Seine destroyed Gâtinais.³¹⁷ among other things, the town of Donzy-le-Pré was sacked,³¹⁸ the castle of Turry was sacked and burnt.³¹⁹ Troops of the latter corps attacked the garrison of the castle of Villemaréchal at the end of March 1360.³²⁰ Four towers protected the irregularly shaped castle with high walls and moats, which stood on a hilltop. The castle also had a cellar, where ammunition was stored in case of a siege and it was a shelter for the garrison.³²¹ Five local noblemen, «*Haguenier de Bouville, le seigneur de Aigreville, Jehan de Bares, Guillaume du Plessis, Jehan Beaque*»³²² with their escorts, the garrison of Villemaréchal and the armed men who joined them, tried to organise resistance in the area. Not far from the castle was a small English fortress that terrorised the area and posed a direct threat to the castle of Villemaréchal. The French gathered a hundred men and laid siege to the English.³²³ The siege lasted for several days. The attackers endured all the hardships of an early spring siege, starving and hoping for success. What they did not expect, however, was a large English army marching by. Therefore, when the royal army received the news, the English surprised the French camp, slaughtered forty of the besiegers, and took the remaining sixty prisoners, including the leaders.³²⁴

An English company surprised the guards of Epernon Castle through an open window, and the irresponsible defenders ended up paying dearly for their freedom.³²⁵

³¹⁶ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

³¹⁷ Edouard Garnier, « Notice sur Robert de Fiennes, connétable de France (1320-1384) », *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, vol. 13, 1852, pp. 23-52, p. 37.

³¹⁸ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

³¹⁹ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³²⁰ Henri Stein, *Une épisode de la Guerre de cent ans dans le Gâtinais : l'affaire de Villemaréchal (1360)*, Paris, 1893, p. 8.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³²² R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

³²³ *Ibid.*

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

A.g) Chanteloup, Paris: March-April 1360

The English army finally arrived in Beauce, south of Paris, leaving behind all the hardships and deprivations of the winter campaign. Beauce was one of the few areas of France that had been relatively spared by the war, and its granaries were full of the previous year's harvest.³²⁶ Edward was billeted at the castle of Chanteloup, while the army encamped on the left bank of the Seine between Corbeil and Longjumeau³²⁷ on the road to Orléans, bringing with them the usual devastation of the campaign. They burned everything they could not take.³²⁸

At the initiative of Pope Innocent VI, the French and the English met at the negotiating table in Longjumeau on 3 April. The papal delegation was led by Abbot Androin de la Roche of Cluny, who had made several visits between the two camps before the negotiations.³²⁹ The Regent was represented by the *connétable* Robert de Fiennes and Jean le Maingre, the Boucicaut, Marshal of France, while the English delegation consisted of the Duke of Lancaster, the Earl of Warwick, John Chandos, and Gauthier de Mauny.³³⁰ The English *chevauchées* continued during the talks: first, the fortified church of Orly, in the immediate vicinity of Paris, was sacked by the English, and then the temporarily fortified parish church of Châtres was sacked by the English.³³¹ At Orly, 100 of the 200 defenders were killed and the rest taken prisoner after the French had successfully held their ground in hand-to-hand fighting on one side of the church, but had not expected the English to make a surprise entry on the other side.³³² The church at Châtres sheltered 1200 peasants - men, women and children.³³³ The church's massive belfry was converted into a donjon and, in preparation for a possible prolonged siege, a sufficient quantity of food was stockpiled along with the goods and furniture the peasants had brought with them. The church was surrounded by a wide and deep moat.³³⁴ The commander was called Philippe de Villebon,³³⁵ who also had some armed men at his disposal. The English set up stone throwers on the high ground opposite

³²⁶ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9670.

³²⁷ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

³²⁸ Colette Beaune (ed.), *Chronique dite de Jean de Venette*, Paris, 2011, p. 227.

³²⁹ The True Chronicle of Jean le Bel 2011. p. 255.

³³⁰ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

³³¹ Hercule Géraud (ed.), *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis, de 1113 à 1300, avec les continuations de cette chronique, de 1300 à 1368*, vol. II, Paris, 1843, p. 304.

³³² C. Beaune (ed.), *Chronique dite de Jean de Venette...*, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

³³³ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

³³⁴ H. Géraud (ed.), *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis...*, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

³³⁵ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

the fortified church, from which they kept the church under constant fire.³³⁶ They launched several attacks, which were repulsed by the defenders in succession. On the sixth or seventh day of the siege, Philippe de Villebon, fearing that the peasants would not hold out, decided to leave them to their own devices. Therefore, he and his soldiers withdrew to a tower less exposed to artillery fire. The peasants, seeing that they were left defenceless, wanted to surrender to the English. The French captain, fearing the consequences of surrendering the fortified church, was determined to prevent the peasants from making contact with the English, so he set fire to the church. The fire spread quickly³³⁷ and of the 1200 people, only 300 managed to escape the flames,³³⁸ but all of them fell under the sword attacks of the English.³³⁹

The people of the area also sought refuge in the castle of Toury in Beauce, just as the villagers did in the fortified church of Châtres. The village is located south of Paris on the road between Étampes and Orléans. In the mid-14th century, it had several pleasant inns where nobles travelling to Orléans often stayed.³⁴⁰ The castle of Toury, situated in the centre of the village, was filled with valuables by refugees. The moat surrounding the castle was cleared and sentries posted in preparation for the siege. When the people of the area and their families retreated to the castle, the English who had arrived burned the empty houses. One of the houses directly adjacent to the castle also caught fire and a strong gust of wind caused the fire to spread to the castle. The fire consumed much of the combustible material that had been piled up in the castle, along with the belongings and the people who were crowded there. Those who preferred to avoid death by fire threw themselves from the castle walls.³⁴¹ The English pressure on the French intensified: The town of Monthélny was sacked in front of the Dauphin's garrison.³⁴²

³³⁶ H. Géraud (ed.), *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis...*, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

³³⁸ C. Beaune (ed.), *Chronique dite de Jean de Venette...*, *op. cit.*, p. 230.


³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

³⁴² J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

A.h) The Siege of Paris 1360



Map 3. Siege of Paris 1360. by Anna Csenge Ölbei

After celebrating Easter, Edward and his army set off for Paris on the road to Orléans. His army cut through the city from the south,³⁴³ while English garrisons in the region did the same to the French capital from the north. Among the captains was James Audley, who with his company briefly captured the fortress of La Ferté-sous-Jourre.³⁴⁴ While another companion, Robert Scott held the island fortress of Isle Adam in Oise.³⁴⁵

In Paris, morale was high, but a prolonged siege would have been a hardship for the city, which, unlike Reims, was not prepared for it. The shortage of goods and the continuing devaluation of the city's markets caused prices to skyrocket, with some foodstuffs such as wine and fish almost completely disappearing from the shops. In addition, large numbers of people from the surrounding areas fled to the city, increasing congestion in Europe's most populous city.³⁴⁶ By the time the English siege began, smoke covered the horizon, as Parisians set fire to the buildings outside the city walls themselves to prevent the English from reaching them undetected.

In the south, the English army invaded the area around Châtillon. From the plateau one could see well into the town, the area originally used to house the villas of wealthy burghers

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9726.

³⁴⁵ S. Luce (ed.), *Chronique des quatre...*, *op. cit.*, 101.

³⁴⁶ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9670.

and nobles surrounded by hills of stubble. Edward's army was put in battle order while his troops burnt the walls of Notre-Dame-des-Champs.³⁴⁷ The English army, marching to the sound of fanfares and trumpets, took up position³⁴⁸ just 200 metres from the closed gates of Paris, but it was more a theatre performance than a real threat to the city. The 10.000-strong English army had no real chance of taking Paris, so for the next few days they marched up and down the city walls, burning what remained after the French in the hope of provoking a battle.³⁴⁹ However, the garrison in Paris had received strict orders from the dauphin to remain within the walls, watching the enemy.³⁵⁰

Meanwhile, negotiations continued through the mediation of the papal legate, Hugh de Geneva, but the French and English positions were still very far apart. From then on, it was a case of waiting to see if the English could cause enough damage in front of the Parisians to force the dauphin to accept their conditions, or if they would run out of food sooner and be forced to leave. The French resisted for the time being and negotiations broke down without any substantial result. As so often with major cities besieged during the Hundred Years' War, the invading army had to abandon the siege after using up its food reserves. The French made sure that the area around the city was a green desert before the siege, so that the English supplies in Beauce were exhausted. Edward tried to organise supplies for the army from England via Hornfleur. The plan was to send supplies to France from Winchelsea, one of the Five Ports Alliance. However, only part of the food bought in England was shipped in, and some of the English ships were captured by the French, while others were stranded on the sandbanks at the mouth of the Seine.³⁵¹ Communication between the English troops sent to recapture the supplies further and further away from Paris was disrupted and the surprisingly strong resistance of the French meant that the English were unable to deliver sufficient supplies to the camp. The French had accurate information about the difficulties the English were facing. An Englishman, John Cope, who had lived in Paris for a long time, managed to get through the sentries without being seen, to talk to his compatriots in the English camp, and then return to Paris to bring the dauphin the good news.³⁵² Edward, together with his two sons, had the English army put on alert on 12 April 1360. However, this was only a diversion, in fact, he began the withdrawal of the English

³⁴⁷ C. Beaune (ed.), *Chronique dite de Jean de Venette...*, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

³⁴⁸ H. Knighton, *Knighton's Chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9745.

³⁵² S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. LXIX, footnote 3.

army and, with the troops assembled, the supply wagons set off south-west towards Chartres.³⁵³ Soon afterwards, the army itself turned its back on Paris and followed the slowly marching supply wagons. The next day, disaster struck the English: the army had just left the town of Galardon and the tall towers of Chartres cathedral could be seen in the distance when a huge storm hit the slowly marching army. The sky, split by a tremendous flash of lightning, turned the road into a sea of mud in which the heavy supply wagons sank systematically. The men had nowhere to seek shelter from the icy storm in the open country. The temperature plummeted, the starving and malnourished soldiers dragged themselves on and on, wet and soaked, and more and more of them broke ranks and died on the side of the road.³⁵⁴ Others were struck dead by huge chunks of ice falling from the sky.³⁵⁵ The day was known as Black Monday for a long time, according to chronicles.

Shortly after Chartres, a small consignment of supplies reached Edward via Honfleur, which, although it did not solve all the problems of the English army marching south, at least temporarily relieved the suffering of the starving soldiers. It was, however, the last consignment to reach the English. The French did a thorough job, delivering food supplies to the fortified towns and castles right under the nose of the marching English army. The soldiers of the French garrisons struck where they could at the stranded, straggling Englishmen.³⁵⁶ Therefore, the requisition could only be carried out with significant cover, diverting forces from the main army. South of Bonneval, the English army split into two columns: one column continued south towards Vendômois, while the other turned east towards Orléans. The king took up quarters at the convent of Nids, not far from Orléans, on 18 April 1360.³⁵⁷ Here Edward had an important decision to make in which, according to Froissart, the Duke of Lancaster played no small part.³⁵⁸ In the end, Edward decided to sign a treaty with the future Charles V, whose strategy saved the country from another Crécy, or Poitiers, at a great cost, but did not save it from a peace that was decidedly unfavourable to the French. Leaving the French unprotected countryside to its fate, Charles relied on the fortified cities, leaving the English with no opponent to defeat.

³⁵³ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

³⁵⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chronique des quatre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

³⁵⁵ Auguste and Émile Molinier (eds.), *Chronique normande du XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1882, p. 152.

³⁵⁶ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

³⁵⁷ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9779.

³⁵⁸ Françoise Autrand, *Charles V*, Paris, 1994, p. 390.

While Edward was still south of Paris, the French commander of Normandy, Louis de Harcourt, occupied the area around Honfleur with a large force, preventing further supplies from reaching the English army.³⁵⁹

A.i) The Treaty of Brétigny: 8 May 1360

The next round of negotiations between the French and English took place in Brétigny, south of Paris, in May 1360. The little village had never had such illustrious guests: 16 French and 22 English envoys, together with 3 papal legates and an envoy from the King of Navarre, were gathered. They were accompanied by a host of bodyguards, servants, scribes and messengers. Among the leaders of the delegations were Boucicau on the French side, and on the English, the Duke of Lancaster, the Earl of Warwick and Walter Mauny.³⁶⁰ Once the English had given in to their initial territorial demands, the two delegations quickly came to an agreement, and the leaders of the delegations played a major role in this, as they knew each other and the arguments of the other side well. The main details of the peace agreement were agreed on the third day of the conference, on 3 May 1360.

In the hereditary estates of the English king in Gascony and Guyenne, the agreement gave Edward and his successors irrevocable rights equal to those of the French kings.³⁶¹ The new acquisitions included Poitou, Agenais, Périgord, Limousin, Quercy, the town and castle of Tarbes, the town and castle of Belleville, the county of Bigorre, the county of Gaure, the counties of Angoumois, Rouergue, and Ponthieu, the town of Montreuil-sur-mer with its territories, the castle and town of Calais, and the county of Guines.³⁶² In exchange for all this, Edward renounced the French crown³⁶³ and as a consequence, the duchy of Touraine, the duchies of Anjou and Maine, and the duchy of Brittany.³⁶⁴ With this compromise, the Plantagenets' ancestral heritage could no longer be fully restored. The English made significant concessions to their earlier demands, allowing for a settlement and ultimately peace. The King of France renounced his feudal rights over the territories ceded to Edward, which were exercised by the King of England after the peace.³⁶⁵ They also agreed on a

³⁵⁹ H. Géraud (ed.), *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis...*, op. cit., p. 297.

³⁶⁰ F. Autrand, *Charles V...*, op. cit., p. 391.

³⁶¹ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, op. cit., p. 268.

³⁶² A. and É. Molinier (eds.), *Chronique normande...*, op. cit., p. 153.

³⁶³ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, op. cit., p. 280.

³⁶⁴ ADN B. 268, n° 8497.

³⁶⁵ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, op. cit., pp. 277-79.

ransom for John II. Within four months of the French king's return, 600.000 golden ecu were to be paid at Calais, out of three million, the remainder of which was to be paid in six equal instalments of 400.000 ecu.³⁶⁶ Of course, the payment of the first instalment was not the only condition for John's release: he had to surrender to the English the town and castle of La Rochelle, the county of³⁶⁷ Guines, and forty hostages of the most important lords of the country.³⁶⁸ In a letter issued at Calais on 24 February 1360, Edward III gave instructions for the treatment of the hostages: 'we will not let the hostages suffer, we will not imprison them, but we will treat them kindly, in a manner befitting their persons and rank.'³⁶⁹

In the treaty, Edward took care of his unreliable ally, King Charles the Bad of Navarre, whose rights were restored to their original state, and under the treaty, he was given back his lost cities and castles, and all his crimes against the French king were forgiven.³⁷⁰ All other territories were restored to their pre-war status, and the captured castles and towns were returned to their original owners.³⁷¹ This article of the treaty had far-reaching consequences for France. During the autumn, the King of England sent a series of dismissal letters to the commanders of the companies serving in the French garrisons,³⁷² such as the one at Lille. In a letter dated 24 October 1360, Edward informed the captains of the garrisons of the towns and castles he had occupied that they were to do nothing against the peace treaty he had just signed, that they were to surrender the towns and castles belonging to the French king and that he forbade the English from carrying out any raids.³⁷³

Of course, the whole process was not without its problems, with many of the captains reluctant to obey the king's orders. With the Treaty of Brétigny, which was supposed to bring peace to the French kingdom after decades of fighting, the signatories to the agreement achieved the opposite, as mercenaries dismissed from French and English service lost the steady pay that had provided them with a secure livelihood. Instead of peace and prosperity, the era of the great companies was ushered in.³⁷⁴ Following the agreement, the English decided to leave in a hurry, burned all their surplus equipment and headed north towards Calais.

³⁶⁶ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, vol. II..., *op. cit.*, p. 204.

³⁶⁷ ADN B 268, n° 8497.

³⁶⁸ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes*, vol. I..., *op. cit.*, pp. 280-281.

³⁶⁹ Guigue 1886. pp. 41-42.

³⁷⁰ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes*, vol. I..., *op. cit.*, p. 288.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

³⁷² A. and É. Molinier (ed.), *Chronique normande...*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

³⁷³ ADN B 268, n° 8497 bis.

³⁷⁴ H. Janin et U. Carlson, *Mercenaries in Medieval...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

B) Cohabitation, Cooperation and Collaboration: Everyday Life in the Era of the Great Companies

In the regions where mercenaries first appeared significant transformations in daily life occurred.³⁷⁵ In the middle of the 14th century, an era as complex and dynamic as our society today, these changes had varied and compound effects at both individual and community level. As the power brokers of violence practising their profession in a context where death was inherent, the emergence of routiers was often perceived as an encounter with violence. However, an in-depth analysis of historical sources reveals a much more nuanced picture. It is undeniable that around the time of the Treaty of Brétigny, which marked the end of the first phase of the Hundred Years' War, the emergence and persistence of mercenaries on the border between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire had a profound impact on society as a whole. This sub-chapter seeks to describe these changes from the perspective of the individual and the community, using examples drawn from archival research from Lille to Lyon. These examples provide a concrete illustration of the repercussions of this mercenary presence on the social structures, interpersonal relationships and economic dynamics of the period.

B.a) Konrad the Painter

The case of Konrad, a painter from Strasbourg, illustrates from the outset the complex changes in the lives of individuals and communities that accompanied the arrival of mercenaries. For Konrad, it meant the possibility of a loan and taking a beating by one of the most illustrious people of his time. He also suffered the loss of his horse and, by his own admission at least, did his city a great service. For the Strasbourg city council, it was a matter of avoiding the emperor's wrath.

At the end of 1375, Konrad needed money and asked the city officials of Strasbourg for a loan. The date may not be coincidental, as this was the second appearance of *the hated*

³⁷⁵ On the late medieval use of the term mercenary, see Françoise Lainé, « Gens d'armes 'savoyards' guerroyant en Gascogne en 1338-1341 des alliés du roi de France », in Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Bériac-Lainé et Frédéric Boutouille (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*, Bordeaux, 2015, pp. 239-256, pp. 239-242 ; John France, « Introduction », in John France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, Leiden - Boston, 2008, pp. 1-15 ; K. DeVries, « Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology... », art. cit., pp. 43-60.

*companions*³⁷⁶ in Alsace, meaning that the city and province were in imminent danger. However, this is not the invasion led by the Earl of Bredford, Enguerrand VII, the last sire de Coucy in 1375. Rather, it was Konrad's role in the events of ten years earlier that Konrad cited to justify the legitimacy of the loan requested. In addition to the King of France, Pope Urban V, King Louis I of Hungary and Emperor Charles IV also played a major role in preparing the crusade of the companies toward Hungary. The people of Strasbourg, however, were not impressed by the international politics of the powerful; they were chilled by the arrival of tens of thousands of mercenaries in Alsace.³⁷⁷ The people of Strasbourg considered the Emperor responsible for the damage caused and expressed their despair to such an extent that even Charles IV noticed it himself. He had just returned from a visit to Avignon and stopped off in Strasbourg while mercenaries were harassing the inhabitants at the city gates. The emperor, of course, did not take this well and prepared to deal with the problems of the Strasbourg city council, which was preparing to meet him. Then came the important moment for Konrad, who painted in the emperor's presence and witnessed Charles IV's conversation. In his letter requesting the loan, the painter recalled the events:

«... I first warned you when you were in conflict with the Emperor, when he came from Avignon and had to pass with you from the Rhine to the city, but would not eat with you, and it was then that he was above all your enemy. Shortly afterwards, when you went to Selz and wanted to speak to the Emperor, he sat down in the tower of Selz, and I painted before him in that same tower. When he saw you dismount, I heard him say to von Magdeburg: «Are the Strasbourgeois arriving? » And von Megdeburg replied, «Yes, sir.» [Charles IV]: «Then send for all the carpenters to cut wood for the gallows». Then von Megdeburg said, «Sir, what do you mean?» [Charles IV]: «I want to hang the emperor Heilman of Strasbourg and all those who were with him on the Rhine, who armed themselves bravely, who marched against me in an unworthy manner and who turned me away from the Rhine towards the city with them.» This speech terrified me... I climbed down the tower... I ran to the inn, ... There I found a man

³⁷⁶ Maurice Prou, *Étude sur les relations politiques du pape Urbain V avec les rois de France, Jean II et Charles V (1362-1370)*, Paris, 1888, p. 142. Exhibit LVII. Urban V requests from Edward, Duke of Aquitaine and Prince of Wales, a letter of remission in favour of Seguin Badefol and his accomplices Avignon, 16 July 1365.

³⁷⁷ We do not know the exact number. Clara von Finstingen informed the Strasbourg Council about the number of 30.000 mercenaries. AVES, AA 81, f. 50. Estimates in the literature vary from 12.000 to 40.000. USS1, pp. 465-468, n° 560.

called Hesse Proger, and I said to him: «Will not you report me if I warn the people of Strasbourg of a danger? And he swore to me with his hand. Then I told him what I had heard from the Emperor. ... I fled to the tower. And as God gloriously willed that the watchman should not see me enter or leave, at that hour the Emperor saw you turn your heads and go home. He then said to von Megdeburg, «Tell me, who warned the people of Strasbourg?» He replied, «Sir, you know very well that I have been here with you all this time». The Emperor then said: «So it was the painter's servant who did it», and he grabbed me by the hair, dragged me under the window and beat me very badly...»³⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the painter's adventures did not end there. Even after this missed opportunity, the Emperor did not give up his plan to take revenge on the people of Strasbourg. Therefore, he convened a secret council of his closest confidants to plan in detail the punishment of the people of Strasbourg. He prepared to hang the members of the town council from the highest possible points. The painter, who had heard the meeting in the Emperor's tent, wanted to inform the people of Strasbourg of the imminent danger personally. In doing so, he risked his life and property, as he had to travel from the Emperor's camp to Strasbourg via the territory occupied by the mercenaries:

«And when I heard this among the tents, that he set himself this goal for so short a time, I ... mounted my horse, as if to lead him to water, and pursued my horse to you, to the city, ... then about four Frenchmen pursued me to the white tower and took my horse and all my possessions. I then completed my journey on foot and found the district magistrate on Saint-Michel hill ... I told him everything I had learned.»³⁷⁹

The loss of the horse must have been particularly painful for Konrad, because in the years 1350-60, the price of a good saddle horse in the border region fluctuated between 5 and 25 francs.³⁸⁰ After the failure of the Emperor's personal vendetta, the people of Strasbourg took satisfaction from this and brought the conflict to a political level. They entrusted the bishop of Speyer with the task of mediation, who drafted a letter to the people of Strasbourg setting out the emperor's grievances against the city. The townsfolk had accused the Emperor of

³⁷⁸ « Der Maler Konrad an den Meister und den Rat zu Straßburg: bittet in Ansehung seiner geleisteten Dienste um ein Darlehen », (Ende 1375 oder später.), in USS2, p. 900, n° 1238.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰ Françoise Piponnier, « Le Bourguignon et son cheval dans les inventaires après décès (XIII^e-XV^e siècles) », in Élisabeth Lorans (ed.), *Le cheval au Moyen Age*, Tours, 2017, pp. 79-90.

having personally acted in favour of the mercenaries: «...*you have claimed that with his will and advice he allowed this English crowd to penetrate the Alsace country.*»³⁸¹

What is extremely interesting about Konrad's letter is that it mentions an armed conflict between the city of Strasbourg and the Emperor on his return from Avignon. It is the only source to refer to this conflict, which escalated to such an extent:

*«The third time I also warned you when the English arrived here in the swamp by the Bischofburgtor. But when I heard the Emperor say that 'if Emperor Heilman of Strasbourg wants a battle, he can have it the next day,' I sent a messenger with my letter saying that the English will arrive in three days.»*³⁸²

As this is the only surviving contemporary reference, it is impossible to prove the authenticity of the story, but it is assumed that Konrad may have been writing the truth to the Strasbourg council, as he was asking for a loan for services rendered to the city. It seems that the appearance of the mercenaries aroused such emotions, even in a loyal city like Strasbourg, that the council was on the verge of armed rebellion.³⁸³

B.b) «*Pour la doute dez angloix*»: Changing Mentalities

Gone were the days when the citizens of a city protested against the imposition of special taxes by the local authorities to renovate the city walls. On 26 January 1357, Raymond Saquet, the Archbishop of Lyon, authorised the consuls to introduce a new tax on grain and wine in order to finance the restoration of the city's fortifications, because:

³⁸¹ « Bischof Lambrecht von Speyer an Straßburg: der Kaiser führe Klage wegen ungerechter gegen ihn erhobener Beschuldigungen bezüglich der Engländer, wegen der Pfahlbürger und wegen eines neuen Breuschzolls, er habe deshalb einen Tag nach Nürnberg angesetzt », (6 January 1366, Prague), in USS2, p. 547, n° 701.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 900, n. 1238.

³⁸³ However, the emperor had used a more intimate address and tone in his previous letters to the city council.

«From the beginning of the year 1356 until the year 1370, the aforementioned town was in a state of great disturbance due to a significant influx of members of the companies and others from the countryside who took up arms. As happened extensively at that time and was previously detailed and explained by those present at the location, a considerable number of people, including the members of the companies, were involved, leading to a significant threat throughout the region.»³⁸⁴

The citizens protested vehemently against the new taxes, since *«until now it had not been necessary to repair the walls.»³⁸⁵*

However, a few years later the situation changed profoundly. The mercenaries, *«those accursed people who armed themselves and called themselves companies,»³⁸⁶* dominated the countryside at the time of the Treaty of Brétigny and *«were not afraid to destroy, desecrate and often set fire to churches, cloisters and other places of piety and to capture, tie up and torture churchmen to death.»³⁸⁷* As the local population got to know and dislike them, names reflecting this hostility were attributed to them in contemporary sources: *«gens d'armes,»³⁸⁸* *«mercier,»³⁸⁹* *«engeländer,»³⁹⁰* *«anglois,»³⁹¹* *«Bretons,»³⁹²* *«mauvais people,»³⁹³* *«brigands,»³⁹⁴* *«société nuisible,»³⁹⁵* *«les gens diabolic contre le Dieu,»³⁹⁶* *«fiers*

³⁸⁴ AML CC 190, f. 25v

³⁸⁵ ADRML Armoire Abram, vol. 41. n. 2 ; G. Guigue, *Les Tard-Venus ...*, op. cit., p. 4.

³⁸⁶ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁸ AML CC190, f. 4v

³⁸⁹ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 38.

³⁹⁰ AVES AA 81, f. 6.

³⁹¹ ADM B 798, f. 7r

³⁹² ADM B 1420, f. 41.

³⁹³ ADCO AA 81, f. 46.

³⁹⁴ « Ein Bürger von Rheims an den Ammeister Kunz Müller: giebt Nachricht über die Engländer », Strasbourg, Archive de la Ville et l'Eurométropole de Strasbourg, USS2, p. 561, n° 724.

³⁹⁵ « Formular zu einem Briefe, in welchem sich die Stadt Straßburg gegen das Gerücht, als habe sie den Kaiser Karl IV des Einvernehmens mit dem Engländer beschuldigt, verfahren soll », Fin juillet - mi-septembre 1365, in USS2, p. 542, n° 690, AVES AA 81.

³⁹⁶ AVES AA 81, f. 56.

disciples de Lucifer,»³⁹⁷ «*gens déterminiez, et méprisans la vie,*»³⁹⁸ «*mauvaiè gens sens foy, ..., qui ne prisoient leur vie une Angevinne,*»³⁹⁹ or simply the «*enemies.*»⁴⁰⁰

Contemporary sources contain many similar descriptions of the hatred against the companies that developed among the population. In January 1360, after the failure of the siege of Reims, the English army headed south into the heart of Burgundy, threatening the entire border region. The local lords of the provinces between Reims and Dijon sent spies and emissaries to the English army to find out its intentions, as did Yolande and Robert de Bar, who sent Thiébaud, the Sire of Blamont, to confer with the King of England in the second half of January. On his way back, he found himself in Étain on 27 January,⁴⁰¹ The news that the court received in Bar-le-Duc caused panic in the duchy: the feelings of fear and dread were tangible in the sources; only very exceptionally did researchers find such clear signs of the feelings of the time in the accounts of a bailli. By their very nature, these sources consisted of brief descriptions of events relating to the income or expenditure recorded in the books. In the account of Symmonet de Verdun and Jean de Fliery in one folio, there were several expenses incurred *for the «doute dez angloix.»*⁴⁰² Thus, in the sources from the 1360s, Lyon's entrances were no longer the same; they were defined more by a feeling of fear in the border region. The Lyonnais, who in 1357 were still vehemently opposed to fortifications, put their hands in their pockets in 1365 to finance defensive investments that were far more costly than repairing the walls, and when Seguin de Badefol, one of the most important mercenary captains of the period,⁴⁰³ took the town of Anse, they did not oppose the defensive investments at all.

B.c) Between Prague and Paris: the Case of Yolande de Flandre

In the middle of the 14th century, the aristocracy of the border region between the eastern extremities of the Kingdom of France and the western frontier of the Holy Roman Empire was oscillated between royal and imperial power. Prague and Paris were focal points for the aristocracy in the pursuit of personal or family interests, especially when someone came

³⁹⁷ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442.

³⁹⁸ Augustin Calmet, *Histoire ecclesiastique et civile de Lorraine*, vol. II, Nancy, 1728, p. 552.

³⁹⁹ Doyen de Saint-Thiébaud de Metz, « Chronique, ou Annales », in *Ibid.*, p. 649.

⁴⁰⁰ ADCO 1. F. 365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois f. 55, B2752, f. 6r

⁴⁰¹ ADM B 1128, Account of Symone du Verdun, f. 29v

⁴⁰² ADM B 1128, Account of Symmonet de Verdun, f. 42r-v, B 1511, Account of Jean De Fliery receiver for Henri de Bar 1359-1360, f. 9r-v

⁴⁰³ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, op. cit., p. 62.

from outside and especially if that person was a woman. Yolande de Flandre found herself at the centre of the struggle for power in the County of Bar through her marriage to Henry IV, Count of Bar. The example of Yolande de Flandre, Lady of Cassel, the belligerent princess whose decades of political and military struggle culminated in the creation of the Duchy of Bar, illustrates how this happened on a daily basis. She came from two of the most illustrious families of the French nobility. Her father, Robert de Flandre, Sire de Cassel, played a decisive role in the Battle of Cassel in 1328. His intervention saved the new King of France, Philip VI, and granted Robert several new lands, some of which were confiscated from the rebels by the victorious French.⁴⁰⁴ Her mother, Jeanne, was the daughter of Arthur II, Duke of Brittany, and the granddaughter of Yolande de Dreux, widow of the Scottish king Alexander III. After her brother's premature death, she became sole heiress to the vast lands of the County of Cassel, in northern Flanders.⁴⁰⁵ Her marriage lasted only four years and produced two sons: Edward and Robert. In the final days of 1344, Yolande, the Lady of Cassel, was widowed at the age of 18 and became regent of the County of Bar.⁴⁰⁶ She then began a decades-long power struggle against her internal and external enemies, in which she made active use of local troops and foreign mercenaries. The County of Bar was located on the border between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, next to the Duchy of Lorraine, to the west of Alsace, to the south of Metz and to the north of Burgundy. Its strategic position had a profound influence on the political orientation of its rulers. The total absence of the House of Bar from Henry IV's will determined from the outset who Yolande's internal enemies would be: the younger branches, the lineage of the House of Bar, the Sires of Pierrefort and the Sire of Pierrepont, as well as their allies.⁴⁰⁷ Bar's external enemies, and of course those of Yolande (whose task as regent was to defend the country), were many and varied in nature: Neighbouring principalities such as the Duchy of Lorraine, foreign mercenary companies, such as the coalition of Navarrese, French, Hainauter and English captains during the invasion of Champagne in 1359, as well as powerful local mercenary captains such as Broquart de Fénétrange and his German mercenaries, local lords such as the Sires de Faucogney of Franche-Comté, important towns and bishops, for example the town and bishop of Verdun. These enemies usually formed alliances with each other against Yolande, so that the regent had to face her external and internal enemies at

⁴⁰⁴ Jules Baudot, *Les Princesses Yolande et les ducs de Bar de la famille des Valois*, Paris, 1900, p. 2.

⁴⁰⁵ Michelle Bubenicek, *Yolande de Flandre. Quand les femmes gouvernent. Droit et politique au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 2002, p. 61.

⁴⁰⁶ V. Servais, *Annales historique du ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴⁰⁷ M. Bubenicek, *Yolande de Flandre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

the same time. This happened in December 1357, when Broquart de Fénentrance and the Sire de Pierrefort simultaneously attacked the two major forts in the Barrois region, Godrecourt and Foug.⁴⁰⁸

Naturally, Yolande could not face such formidable enemies alone. She therefore had to seek powerful allies in local and international politics to act as a counterweight. Initially, in the 1340s, Yolande succeeded in obtaining the protection of the King of France, Philip VI. With the royal intervention of 23 July 1345, it succeeded in averting the first internal threat posed by the alliance between the houses of Pierrefort and Pierrepont. These repeated gestures by the King of France enabled Yolande to retain her power, even if she had to share her power temporarily over the county with her enemies. In 1352, her enemies found the ideal candidate for the regency of Bar: Jeanne de Bar, Countess of Warrenne. She was the living representative of all the cadet branches of the House of Bar, and the closest to Yolande's children. Jeanne was the sister of Edward I, Robert's grandfather, and was therefore the paternal great-aunt of Robert and Edward.⁴⁰⁹ Both princesses used mercenaries in their struggle for power. While the Countess of Warrenne hired a large number of mercenaries, mainly German, Yolande found another way of obtaining outside support. She also managed to secure the support of Philip of Navarre, brother of Charles, The Bad, King of Navarre. Yolande married Philip in order to have an experienced military leader who played a major role in the various theatres of war during the Hundred Years' War in the mid-14th century.⁴¹⁰ Looking at both sides, it is clear that this internal conflict in the border region had a direct effect on the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France. The war, with a few interruptions, lasted over a year and brought destruction and chaos to Bar, as well as the usual looting and the suffering of the local population inflicted upon them by mercenaries and other members of the armies of the warring princesses.⁴¹¹ Her second husband, Philip of Navarre, began fighting for the Barrois as soon as they married and took part in the administration of the duchy, which remained divided between the Countess of Warrenne and Yolande. The sources provide several examples of this confused situation. In Jehan Lospitaul's account of 1352-53, the county bailli had to comply with the orders of two rival countesses at the same time: he had to deliver 60 carts of firewood on the orders of Jeanne

⁴⁰⁸ V. Servais, *Annales historique du ...*, op. cit., p. 61.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

⁴¹¹ Extract from the registers of the Chancellery of France, 1353. André Duchesne, *Histoire des maisons de Dreux de Bar-le-Duc de Luxembourg et de Limbourg*, Paris, 1631, p. 50.

de Bar, Countess of Warenne, and the bailli had to make other payments for the countess,⁴¹² while shortly afterwards he had to pay part of Philip of Navarre's expenses.⁴¹³ Double taxation may have been common. If someone had paid the tax to the Countess of Warenne's men, it was possible that the soldiers in the garrisons loyal to Yolande would collect it a second time. This caused quite a stir. For example, there was a dispute over cattle taken by the garrisons of Fou and Sorcy during the war between the Countess of Bar and the Countess of Warenne.⁴¹⁴ Philip of Navarre had to fight against the Lorraine army led by Broquart de Fénétrange, made up partly of mercenaries and partly of princely troops. The sources show that he not only directed operations, but also helped to organise the forces needed for defence and provided financial support. He gave direct orders to the bailli of Sens, Vitry and Chaumont concerning the backbench of the count's troops.⁴¹⁵ Philip also ordered Gilles de la Mothe to raise funds for the war effort in the town of Chatillon.⁴¹⁶ However, Yolande was not able to use her new husband's undisputed fighting skills for long, as grand politics intervened once again and, thanks to Philip of Navarre's brother Charles II, Philip also became an enemy of the kingdom when Charles The Bad turned against the King of France. In January 1354,⁴¹⁷ on the orders of Charles the Bad, Philip ambushed and took part in the assassination of Carlos de la Cerda, Constable of France in Normandy.⁴¹⁸ John II of France considered the brother of the King of Navarre, an ally of the English, to be an enemy on the kingdom's eastern border and a threat that had to be dealt with. As a result, Yolande's husband was arrested in April by Henri de Bar, Joffroi de Fou, Vauthier de Cumières and other followers of Jeanne de Bar, and on 10 April the Navarrese prince was taken under heavy escort to the Château de Nonsard, where Philip was confined until the end of May.⁴¹⁹ Yolande of Flanders went to Nonsard and visited her husband, who was heavily guarded.⁴²⁰ Later, Philip was transferred to Pierrefort castle, where he was held in comfortable conditions. While Philip was being held in this fortress, the King of Navarre spared no effort to have his brother released. Charles had an article inserted into the treaty signed on the 10th at Valogne in which John undertook to help free Philip of Navarre and

⁴¹² ADM Compte de Jehan Lospitaul, B 675, f. 14v

⁴¹³ ADM Compte de Jehan Lospitaul, B 675, f. 6v, 9r, 11v

⁴¹⁴ ADM B 2201, Summary inventories.

⁴¹⁵ ADM B 2927, Summary inventories.

⁴¹⁶ ADM Summary inventories.

⁴¹⁷ Robin Neillands, *The Hundred Years War*, London - New York, 1990, pp. 119-120.

⁴¹⁸ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 2814.

⁴¹⁹ ADM B 1508, f. 47r

⁴²⁰ ADM B 1508, f. 47r

the members of his household arrested with him. Shortly afterwards, Charles even tried to free his brother and went with his troops to the gates of the town of Bar⁴²¹ to force the Duke of Bar to return his prisoner.⁴²² The Navarrese king even joined forces with a powerful local lord, the Count of Vaudémont, an enemy of the Count of Bar, to free his brother. Despite these attempts, Philip of Navarre's imprisonment lasted until the early days of the following January. This prince had several meetings at Pierrefort with Yolande de Flandre. Henri de Bar also visited Pierrefort several times in the last months of the year: on 13 October, for example, he went there solely to speak with his prisoner. Following the treaty signed on 8 February 1356 at Saint-Michel, Philip of Navarre was released, renouncing all his rights in the Duchy of Bar and swearing never to return. In exchange for his release, he had to provide hostages, as was customary at the time.⁴²³ Although Yolande and Philip never divorced, in fact, by leaving his wife and never returning to Bar, he made Yolande a 'quasi' widow, with all the advantages and disadvantages that entails. Having lost an important and loyal supporter to her cause, Yolande had to resort to new means in her fight for power.

As her position in France became precarious due to his marriage, he lost his French supporters and, taking advantage of the other pole of political power, turned to Emperor Charles IV for help. In the spring of 1354, Charles IV travelled to Metz and Yolande immediately seized the opportunity to strengthen her position against her opponents. On 11 March, Yolande also arrived in Metz with a large entourage. She succeeded in having her son Robert raised to the rank of Duke, and he began to wear his new title from the end of 1354. Jehan Lospitaul, gruyer des bois et des «yawes» (waters) de la comté de Bar, in his account book of 1353, begins with *for mess. the count*,⁴²⁴ whereas towards the end of the source, in 1354, the title is now *mess. the duke*.⁴²⁵

From 1356 to 1359, Yolande of Flanders showed herself to be fundamentally different from the person she had known after the death of her first husband, when she was still too young. During this period, a much more energetic ruler emerged from the sources, hiring mercenary troops, commanding siege engines to lay siege to enemy castles, conducting political negotiations, acting ruthlessly when necessary, sometimes rashly and fiercely, breaking the diplomatic conventions of the time. Nevertheless, she did her best to ensure that her only surviving son could succeed her as head of state when he came of age.

⁴²¹ ADM B.1508, f. 56r

⁴²² ADM B 1418, f. 49v-50v

⁴²³ V. Servais, *Annales historique du..., op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁴²⁴ ADM B 675, f. 1r

⁴²⁵ ADM B 675, f. 42r

During the period 1356-1360, Yolande led offensive and defensive campaigns against her enemies. During these campaigns, the sources paint the picture of a princess who reacted quickly to external threats or moved her troops in a concentrated manner to achieve realistic and limited objectives, relying on her trusted knights, local lords or hired mercenaries who had served her loyally for years. She did her utmost to raise the funds and manpower needed to mobilise her troops, sometimes calling on more modest neighbouring sovereigns who were not directly under her control. These measures led to ongoing political tensions, from which she generally emerged victorious. For the campaign against Verdun in 1356,⁴²⁶ Yolande ordered the mobilisation of 200 infantrymen at Foug *prévôté*, then sent them to Saint-Mihiel, where they joined the other troop units of the duchy. The mobilisation also extended to the territory of Gorze Abbey, which Abbot Nicolas de Priney vehemently opposed. The abbot subsequently tried to obtain compensation, but without success.⁴²⁷ As the sources indicate, «*Madame la contesse de bar*»⁴²⁸ ordered the *prévôt* of Foug to collect the wine and bread needed to supply the troops, and then to take the goods collected to Pargny, where 40 armed men awaited the arrival of supplies.⁴²⁹

Such an active role in the midst of constant warfare naturally entailed an immediate risk to her life, as Yolande did not rule the duchy from Bar, but was always on the move. Henri de Bar, one of her adversaries, seized the opportunity in December 1357 to attack Yolande by storming Bourmont, who was staying there. Fortunately for her, she was informed of the ambush in time to send help. Henrion, *prévôt* of Foug, obeying the order, rushed to Bourmont and forced Henri de Bar to abandon the siege.⁴³⁰

In 1358, the Burgundian lords of Faucogney, old enemies of the Regent, led another skirmish at Bar⁴³¹ and, a few days later, forced the Duke of Bar and his mother to take up arms in Burgundy. The Burgundians advanced as far as the gates of Châtillon-sur-Saône, taking advantage of the moment when some sentries posted on the walls had abandoned their post, attacked the town and took it by climbing into the town. However, the town did not remain in their power for long, as the Duke of Bar, on hearing of the event, hastened to put troops in place to drive the enemy out of Châtillon-sur-Saône and make them repent of their undertaking. An army was organised at Gondrecourt under the eyes of Yolande and

⁴²⁶ ADM B 1629, Summary inventories.

⁴²⁷ V. Servais, *Annales historique du..., op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

⁴²⁸ ADM B 2202, f. 9r

⁴²⁹ ADM B 2202, f. 22r

⁴³⁰ ADM B 2203, Summary inventories.

⁴³¹ ADM B 1418, f. 34v

Robert, who arrived in the town on 23 May at the head of the Poullenoix (Poles) and a corps of men-at-arms from the Barrois region.⁴³² The prince and his mother spent three days at Gondrecourt, leaving on 26 May to return to Bar, and the army then marched towards Burgundy, where it was to enter after recapturing Châtillon-sur-Saône to take reprisals against the enemy. These results were not long in coming, as the expedition lasted barely a dozen days. The enemy evacuated Châtillon-sur-Saône so hastily that they left some of their weapons and stockpiles in the castle.⁴³³ What is more, it was Yolande who, as regent, showed her leadership qualities in this episode. The intervention in Burgundy was marked by the same decisive and rapid reaction as before. She did not allow the situation to escalate, which could have been much more serious if the lords of Faucogney had gained a foothold in Châtillon-sur-Saône and, from there, ravaged the southern border of the duchy. Unfortunately, few details about the Polish mercenaries have been recorded. All that is known from the account books of the Duchy of Bar is that the mercenaries were paid 50 ecus by Yolande and some of them were captured and later released by the regent.⁴³⁴ According to archival sources, the Poles were in Yolande's service for several months, as on 15 July, Warnaire de Chastel, an *écuyer*, was commissioned to bring back the captured Polish mercenaries.⁴³⁵ During Edward's last campaign before the Treaty of Brétigny in 1359/60, Yolande disappeared from the sources as her son Robert took over the reins of the duchy and governed it alone.

B.d) Border Lords and English Captains: Bruno von Rappoltstein and John Harleston

By the mid-14th century, the border aristocracy possessed estates and family ties in both the empire and the kingdom. This only served to reinforce the fact that the border lords could not be left out of the events of the Hundred Years' War in eastern France, and that they suffered the consequences in the same way as their French contemporaries did. Thus, Edward III's campaign on the border in 1359/60 had the same effect on the Alsatian lords. A blood feud developed during the campaign between an English mercenary captain and a powerful Alsatian lord, which influenced the lives of many in the border region and led to the

⁴³² ADM B 1418, f. 34r

⁴³³ This is the only mention I have found in French archives of a French nobleman taking Polish mercenaries into his service in the 14th century.

⁴³⁴ ADM B 676, f. 48v

⁴³⁵ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 63, footnote a.

destruction of a number of settlements in Burgundy, Lorraine and Champagne. The beautifully picturesque town of Ribeauvillé (Rappoltswiller in medieval times) lies at the foot of the Vosges Mountains, which run parallel to the Rhine. The town is ideally situated near Colmar, between the gentle slopes covered by Alsace's famous vineyards. One of the three castles above the town is Hohrappoltstein Castle (Haut-Ribeaupierre), which guards the entrance to Strengbach. The castle belonged to Bruno von Rappoltstein in the mid-14th century. Bruno von Rappoltstein acquired a number of lands in Burgundy and Champagne through his marriage to Jeanne de Blamont, Lady of Magnières.⁴³⁶ Through this marriage, he became involved in the sphere of influence of the Burgundian court and in the quarrel with John Harleston, which had already been going on for several decades.

In the winter of 1360, John Harleston looted and burned everything in northern Burgundy. During the English raids in Burgundy, Bruno captured Harleston, but he had to release the English captain because Harleston's company had captured 160 nobles and commoners from the town of Schexye.⁴³⁷ At Saint-Urban, the companies used the church as a simple stable. During his meals, John Harleston placed on his table around a hundred chalices stolen from numerous monasteries.⁴³⁸ According to one witness, John Harleston offered to make a toast with one of the chalices. Horrified at the idea of committing such a sacrilege, the man refused and asked for another glass.⁴³⁹ After his release, Harleston attacked the lands of the Sire of Rappoltstein. According to the testimony of Bruno von Rappoltstein,⁴⁴⁰ Harleston:

«...with his own men and assistants, he caused me great damage in the Duchy of Burgundy, in the village of Runtinye, which comes from German-Roman imperial lands, and which is part of the inheritance I received from my late wife, worth 5056 francs, and he beat to death four of my men, who were men of good reputation. Without demolishing the monastery, he seized the holy relic, burnt the village - no one can estimate the damage caused.

⁴³⁶ Geoffrey Carter, *Bruno von Rappoltstein: Power Relationships in Later Medieval Alsace*, Ph.D. dissertation, Durham University, 2007, available at Durham E-Theses Online. <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2849/>.

⁴³⁷ Karl Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch, 759-1500. Quellen zur geschichte der ehemaligen herrschaft Rappoltstein im Elsass*, vol II, Colmar, 1894, p. 246, n° 205 ; G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁴³⁸ K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch II...* *op. cit.*, p. 246, n° 205.

⁴³⁹ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴⁴⁰ K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch II...* *op. cit.*, p. 246, n° 205.

It also caused further damage to two other villages, Buschey and Buschen, also in Burgundy. These are also part of the German-Roman Imperial Lands, which I inherited from my late wife. In addition, he burnt down the villages and [killed] four of my men of good reputation, the damage amounting to 80 francs, not including losses that we do not know about. He caused me further damage in the county of Champagne, at Humbescort, to the value of 2019 francs in the form of small livestock and furniture, taken by him and his servant, not counting the fire and the 8 men they beat to death, drowned in water or hung from trees. He and his servants also caused me damage at Urvil, by Marne, in the county of Champagne, to the value of 7406 francs, not counting the damage caused by the burning of the village and the church and the men they beat to death there, and they broke a man's teeth, and then there are the four women and maidens they raped, held captive and took with them. Because of him, I suffered further damage at Ruffier, in Champagne, to the value of 390 francs, as a result of taxation, looting, all of which was added to other losses, and he beat 5 of my men to death. In total, the damage caused amounts to 15,022 francs and the murder of 24 of my men, in addition to all the other losses, as can be seen above.»⁴⁴¹

Nine years later, in 1369, the political situation changed radically: Edward was old, and his famous son the Black Prince was ill and paralysed. Following the Treaty of Brétigny, Charles V consolidated his treasury and was able to launch one or more armies. He thus regained the initiative and could begin the reconquest of the lost French territories.⁴⁴² The most ambitious project of 1369 was to set sail for the English coast.⁴⁴³ Charles V's brother Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, also took part in this adventure, as did Bruno von Rappoltstein. However, because of John Gant's famous ride, the embarkation was cancelled and the troops were diverted to follow the English army, but Charles V forbade the French to engage in any pitched battles.⁴⁴⁴ Bruno von Rappoltstein was ordered to go to Abeuille. During this

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴² Philippe Contamine, *La guerre de Cent Ans*, Paris, 1968, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁴³ Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War III: Divided Houses*, e-book, London, 2009, I. 887.

⁴⁴⁴ M. de Barante, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne de la Maison de Valois, 1364-1477*, vol. I, Paris, 1826, p. 30.

mission, the Sire of Rappoltstein was captured near Abeuille with numerous men and sent to Calais.⁴⁴⁵

Bruno von Rappoltstein was able to take revenge on John Harleston fifteen years after his capture, when in 1384 Harleston, on his way to Rome as part of a pilgrimage, had the misfortune to choose to cross Alsace, even though he had a letter of safe conduct signed and issued by Przemyslaus I, Duke of Cieszyn in the name of Wenceslaus IV, valid throughout the Holy Roman Empire.⁴⁴⁶ He travelled with his three companions, Thomas Klenobe, Thomas Eremy and a priest called Wilhelm Kaneter. When Bruno learned of Harleston's existence, he did not hesitate to seize the opportunity and capture the pilgrims. They were held at Haut-Ribeaupierre castle, far from any help and with no real chance of escape. The captives had no choice but to sign the letter of 11 July 1384, in which they agreed to the conditions dictated by Bruno and undertook to pay a hefty ransom of 30,000 francs.⁴⁴⁷ Although Richard II, King of England, had pleaded on their behalf at the Council of Strasbourg,⁴⁴⁸ and Wenceslaus IV, King of Rome, Pope Urban VI, the Dukes of Lorraine and Luxembourg and Cieszyn had also sent letters to the city, it took five long years to obtain the release of the English prisoners.⁴⁴⁹

B.e) Private Wars: the Great Companies that Changed the Game

Germain Butaud notes, in agreement with Philippe Contamine, «*the routiers were therefore an integral part of the military society of their time, and their style of warfare was emulated, at the risk of damaging the image of the nobility in the eyes of the population*».⁴⁵⁰ The presence of great companies in the border region changed everything and proved that Germain Butaud's comment was well-founded. These mercenary armies were nothing like those hired by Yolande de Flandre or Jeanne de Bar in the first half of the 1350s, but for individuals and communities, the consequences of living with mercenaries were far more complex than mere fear or death. As with any change, there are winners and losers, but the presence of mercenaries in an area for an extended period of time has one sure aspect:

⁴⁴⁵ K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 41, n° 63.

⁴⁴⁶ G. Carter, *Bruno von Rappoltstein...*, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁴⁴⁷ K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 197, n° 234.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203, n° 245.

⁴⁴⁹ G. Carter, *Bruno von Rappoltstein...*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁴⁵⁰ B. Germain, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

their presence affects society as a whole. Whether the community or individual benefited from the presence of the mercenaries, became a beneficiary or, on the contrary, suffered, depended on a number of factors. Above all, it was a question of position on the social ladder or the talent of a community's leaders. The emergence of great companies in the border region played a decisive role in the balance of power. In private warfare, the aristocrat who could win the support of a great company was simply unopposed. There were many examples of this in the mid-14th century.

In late 1362 and early 1363, a private war broke out between Roland, Duke of Bar, and Eudes, Sire of Grancey. He and his wife had a long-running dispute with Robert de Bar over the fiefdom of Pierrepont, which included the fortress and three villages. After obtaining Arnaud de Cervole's support for his venture, Eudes attacked the Duke.⁴⁵¹ It had been announced that the sire of Grancey, allied with a '*chevatainne*' and some Bretons, was to enter Bourmont with six thousand horses.⁴⁵² On 30 November, four spies left the town of Gondrecourt in the direction of Saint-Urbain to find out about the situation of the Great Company. The Duke warned the garrisons, including that of La Mothe, of the movements and ordered them to resist.⁴⁵³ He also recruited the captains of the companies: at this time, at least three of them were in his service: Pierre de Monabo,⁴⁵⁴ Hérard de Champigneulle and Joffroy de Mellnicourt.⁴⁵⁵ Nevertheless, these captains were those of the 'second rank'.⁴⁵⁶ Robert was not strong enough and considered the invading army too powerful, and he was also convinced that Grancey's aim was not to conquer his land but to plunder and cause as much damage as possible, so he decided to withdraw to his castles and wait out the storm. Eudes and Arnaud de Cervole, the Archpriest, quickly overwhelmed the countryside when the seneschal of La Mothe found that the routiers had arrived first in Bassigny, then in Saint-Dizier.⁴⁵⁷ The flat country was left at the mercy of the mercenaries, who of course did what was expected of them. Arnaud de Cervole and Eudes's tactics were crowned with success, in that the damage was so unbearable that Robert had to enter into negotiations that resulted in the disputed fiefdom of Pierrepont being handed over to

⁴⁵¹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 131. The six thousand horses are certainly much larger than the actual size of Arnaud de Cervole's attacking company, which could have been closer to half the number quoted.

⁴⁵³ ADM B 2322, Account of Colin Pallardel, f. 114v

⁴⁵⁴ ADM B 2322, Account of Colin Pallardel, f. 112v

⁴⁵⁵ Bar-le-Duc, Archives départementales de la Meuse. B. 2322. Account of Colin Pallardel, f. 110v.

⁴⁵⁶ The independent captains of the 'second rank' commanded dozens of armed men, not hundreds. B. Germain, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57. However, they could join a great company for a mission. In France, the structure of great companies was more flexible than in Italy.

⁴⁵⁷ ADM B 2322, Account of Colin Pallardel, f. 110r

Yolande de Bar and her husband.⁴⁵⁸ Eudes became Robert's vassal for this land, renounced war against the Duke, declared in his letter that he would not start any further hostilities against Bar, would repeal the companies, and would be obliged to support Robert by retaining his power. The document is dated 7 February 1363.⁴⁵⁹

In 1371, the city of Metz was already waging war on two fronts at once: against the Duke of Lorraine and Pierre de Bar.⁴⁶⁰ They felt that their usual forces were not sufficient and that they needed additional reinforcements. One of the most renowned Welsh captains therefore entered the service of the Thirteen.⁴⁶¹ The contract between Metz and the Welsh captain was discussed earlier.

Edward Owen described the Welsh captain as «*perhaps the greatest military genius Wales has produced*»⁴⁶² and according to A.D. Carr, he was certainly «*the greatest condottiere of his time.*»⁴⁶³ In Lorraine, Owain Lawgoch, Jules Rolant and Bialux Ruis together pillaged Létricourt. They also took and set fire to the castles of Saulny and Neufchâteau south of Nancy, demolished half of Rosières, took Grals castle and captured Thierry de Grals and his son.⁴⁶⁴ After the *chevauchée*, they returned to Metz laden with booty. This brief but effective intervention⁴⁶⁵ brought the desired result for Metz. During the ride, Owain's company crossed the Duchy of Lorraine from north to south, in a radius of 130 kilometres. The damage caused was so severe in the Barrois and Lorraine that on or around 1 November, the Duke of Lorraine and Pierre de Bar signed a truce with the people of Metz, which ended at Whitsun 1372.

In both cases, the belligerent who disarmed the great company acted in the same way: by attacking, he caused so much damage to his adversary that he forced him to accept a favourable peace treaty.

In the mid-14th century, the border region was dominated by two Lorraine lords. Both had proved their worth during the Hundred Years' War and countless private wars on the border.

⁴⁵⁸ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁴⁵⁹ Letters from Eudes, sire of Grancey, stating that he promises and in the name of the routes and companies of Bretons, Gascons, English and others he has brought, not to harm the duke of Bar or his country, but on the contrary to serve him with all his might. (1363, 7 February) AMN B 522, n° 112.

⁴⁶⁰ D. de S. Thiébaud de Metz, « Chronique, ou Annales... », art. cit., ; E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. XXXIII.

⁴⁶¹ Augustin Calmet, *Preuves de l'histoire de Metz*, vol. I, Metz, 1745, pp. 270-276.

⁴⁶² A. D. Carr, « Welshmen and Hundred ... », art. cit., p. 31.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ Augustin Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, vol. III, Nancy, 1768, p. 391.

⁴⁶⁵ D. de S. Thiébaud de Metz, « Chronique, ou Annales... », art. cit., p. XXIII.

Both had demonstrated unquestionable personal bravery and leadership skills. The short but bloody war that began with their conflict and spread to Lorraine and the Barrois has all the hallmarks of the modern wars that followed the emergence of the great companies. It proves that in asymmetrical power relationships, a great company can counterbalance unequal opponents and can even counter a losing battle by calling in mercenaries. Henry V, Count of Vaudémont, a descendant of Saint Louis,⁴⁶⁶ took part in the Battle of Poitiers with Arnaud de Cervole and was taken prisoner. Then, as seneschal of Champagne, he played a decisive role in stopping the invasion of the multiethnic mercenaries, who were advancing along the river valleys and had trapped Champagne to the north and south. He led the third assault against Eustache d'Aubrichécourt's companions at Nogent-sur-Seine in 1359, as comrade-in-arms to Brocard de Fénétrange, who faced him in the decisive battle in the spring of 1363. In Edward III's campaign to set the border ablaze, which immediately preceded the Treaty of Brétigny, Henry's decisive action succeeded in sparing the town of Troyes from the English threat. The English simply razed everything to the ground, right up to the city walls but the city was saved.

Brocard de Fénétrange was perhaps one of the most colourful personalities of the period. Together with Anne de Bois, he ruled the Duchy of Lorraine for many years during the minority of John I,⁴⁶⁷ and as a mercenary captain for the future Charles V, he played a decisive role in stopping the invasion of Champagne. Froissart mentioned his deeds on several occasions, particularly after the victorious battle of Nogent-sur-Seine, when he personally wounded Eustache d'Aubrichécourt after Henry de Vaudémont's foot soldiers had managed to reduce the English archers and move the barricade. However, Eustache was taken prisoner by one of Vaudémont's knights. The role played by Brocard de Fénétrange in these years is best attested by the wealth of sources in the archives of Lorraine and Alsace, which show that he was involved in all the major alliances and political conflicts of the mid-14th century. He played an important role in the defensive coalition that formed against the last English companies after the march of Edward III. It has already been mentioned that he actively defended Lorraine and Barrois against the English.

John I of Lorraine came of age at the age of 14 and, a few years later, in 1363, still very young, he went to war against Henry V of Vaudémont. The exact reason for the outbreak of war cannot be established with absolute certainty. However, it is likely that the strained relations between Henry of Vaudémont and Brocard de Fénétrange played an important

⁴⁶⁶ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

⁴⁶⁷ Auguste Digot, *Histoire de Lorraine*, vol. II, Nancy, 1880, p. 277.

role. The former comrades-in-arms came into conflict when the regent Charles, despite the commission, failed to pay Brocard de Fénétrange's wages after the danger in Champagne had passed and, as was the custom at the time, Brocard and his mercenary troops from Lorraine began to wreak even greater havoc in Champagne, which he had protected until then. Henry, as seneschal of Champagne, turned against his former comrade-in-arms and succeeded in capturing him in the town of Wassy and imprisoning him in the château de Joinville.⁴⁶⁸ However, Brocard, after setting fire to the castle, took advantage of the confusion to escape from his captivity. A treaty of non-aggression was signed by the lords of the border region, including Brocard de Fénétrange and Henry de Vaudémont, on 25 March 1361, for a period of two years. This treaty suspended all private wars between the border regions of Lorraine and Burgundy.⁴⁶⁹ The treaty was still in force when, in 1362, the three most powerful dukes on the border (Luxembourg, Bar and Lorraine) and the cities of Metz, Strasbourg and the imperial cities of Alsace signed a treaty of defence against the companies. In the event of an attack by the companies, the contracting parties came to the aid of the attacked party.⁴⁷⁰

The Decapolis (Foederis Decapolitani Initium)⁴⁷¹ was founded in 1354 by Emperor Charles IV, who acted as its protector and granted privileges to the towns taking part in the alliance of the ten Alsatian imperial towns located between Colmar and Strasbourg.⁴⁷² The young alliance of the Decapolis had to face the threat from mercenary companies in May 1362, just one month after the disastrous defeat of the French royal army at Brignais. Burgundy found itself defenceless against the mercenary companies. The companies moved north of Burgundy to reach the Duchy of Bar again, and they were too close to the borders of Alsace. To contain the threat of the routiers, the Decapolis, the bishops of Strasbourg, Gurk and Basel, the Duke of Austria and 15 different counts and lords, including the well-known Bruno von Rappoltstein, entered into a defensive coalition. They guarded against any betrayal: «When and if anyone ... is found guilty of committing crimes lightly and fraudulently ... then

⁴⁶⁸ Jules Simonnet, *Essai sur l'histoire et la généalogie des sires de Joinville (1008-1386)*, Langres, 1876, p. 290.

⁴⁶⁹ Alliance between the Dukes of Luxembourg, Lorraine and several other Lords, from 1361 to 1363. A. Calmet, *Histoire ecclésiastique II...*, *op. cit.*, p. DCXXXIII.

⁴⁷⁰ Treaty of alliance between the Bishop of Metz, the Duke of Luxembourg, the Duke of Lorraine, the Duke of Bar, the Bishop of Strasbourg and the Imperial Cities of Alsace. A. Calmet, *Preuves de l'histoire...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

⁴⁷¹ Laurence Buchholzer-Remy and Olivier Richard (eds.), *Ligues urbaines et espace à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Strasbourg, 2012, p. 113.

⁴⁷² AMC AA 52, n° 3.

*he will have to make reparations for his act and the damage caused by it...*⁴⁷³ Nevertheless, the participants left the alliance open to anyone wishing to join: «*However, we also agreed that if someone ... decides to join us, it is up to us to decide whether to accept them ... if it seems useful to us.*»⁴⁷⁴ This treaty was renewed on 28 February 1363.

Henry V de Vaudémont had to face up to the unified forces of these two powerful coalitions. When the war between the Sire of Vaudémont and the Duke of Lorraine broke out after the expiry of the treaty of 1361, Arnaud de Cervole was Henri's first choice, as his wife, Jean de Châteauvilain, was the niece of Jean de Noyers, count of Joigny, having married the sister of the count of Vaudémont.⁴⁷⁵ News of the war, which in one way or another affected the entire border region from Luxembourg to Burgundy, reached the Emperor. He sent a letter from Nuremberg, in which he asks the city of Strasbourg to send help against the mercenaries who are ravaging Lorraine, in order to prevent the '*böse Geselleschaft*'⁴⁷⁶ Charles was sure that many knights, lords and princes would join them.⁴⁷⁷ In addition, the Duke of Lorraine had every chance of doing so. In Alsace, for example, Bruno von Rappoltstein came to John I's aid with 20 lances, not for free of course: the Duke gave him 2000 florins and covered all his losses during the war. Contrary to Italian practice, the treaty expressly stipulated that a simple oath was sufficient to prove the losses and that no other proof was required.⁴⁷⁸ The city of Metz, of course, supported the Duke of Lorraine with troops, as did Robert, Duke of Bar.⁴⁷⁹ The Marshal of Luxembourg also joined the coalition troops.⁴⁸⁰ In early 1363, the city of Metz employed a succession of mercenaries from Lorraine for the war.⁴⁸¹ Even towards the end of the war, in August, the duke of Lorraine requested additional aid to obtain the troops needed for the war.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷³ AMC AA, 48, n° 1.

⁴⁷⁴ AMC AA, 48, n° 1.

⁴⁷⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., pp. 222-223.

⁴⁷⁶ « Kaiser Karl IV ruft die Stadt Straßburg gegen die in Lothringen eingefallenen Engländer auf », 1363 März 6 Nürnberg, in USS1, pp. 473-474, n° 568.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁸ « Herzog Johannes I von Lothringen beurkundet, daß er dem Bruno von Rappoltstein 2000 Gulden schuldig ist für die Dienste, die in dieser mit 20 Gleven in dem obschewebenden Kriege gegen den Grafen von Vaudémont und den Erzpriester (Arnaut de Cervolle) leistet, und daß diese Summe im Nichtzahlungsfalle auf die Pfandschaft Dompair zugerechnet werden soll », in K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch II...*, op. cit., pp. 594-595, n° 762.

⁴⁷⁹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, op. cit., p. 138.

⁴⁸⁰ AMM EE7, 13 pièces 13.

⁴⁸¹ AMM EE7, 13 pièces 2, 6, 13, 14.

⁴⁸² AMN B 704, f. 169.

The main theatres of war were the Vaudémont campaigns in the Duchy of Lorraine and the Duchy of Bar. Two different tactics were used by the belligerents. While the coalition armies laid siege to the castles and destroyed the county, Henri and the Archpriest tried to avoid open battles and wrought as much havoc as possible in the enemy hinterland. The fortresses of Chaligny, Vézelize and Vaucouleurs were taken by Henri de Cervole's troops and served as a natural base for the *chevauchées* towards the Barrois region.⁴⁸³ Due to the unpredictability and speed of the companies' movements, this war had several objectives: to weaken the financing of the armies sent against the count of Vaudémont, to immobilise as many forces as possible in the garrisons and in the defence of the hinterland, and to force the attacking armies to withdraw. To achieve this, the besieged fortresses had to hold out for a sufficiently long period. Henri therefore entrusted the guarding of the castles bordering the Barrois to members of Arnaud de Cervole's company. The actions of Henri de Vaudémont and the mercenaries are attested by contemporary sources: the *Epitaphia Episcoporum Tullensium* gives a detailed account of the destruction carried out in Lorraine. The mercenaries were unable to attack fortified towns such as Toul, but they did destroy the immediate surroundings of the town, right up to the ramparts.⁴⁸⁴ The chronicle of the Doyen de Saint-Thiébaud de Metz reports that Archpriest's troops reached Metz, where they devastated three villages.⁴⁸⁵ Throughout the Duchy of Bar, archival sources report thorough devastation: the villages of Gouraincourt and Haut Vacon -were burnt down.⁴⁸⁶ The *prévôt* of La Chaussée, in particular, recorded extensive damage, as the baillage was one of the most exposed areas for mercenaries in the Duchy of Bar. The house of the Lombards at Château de la Chaussée was burnt down by the English.⁴⁸⁷ Henrion, *prévôt* of Foug, also reports the presence and destruction of troops recruited by Henri de Vaudémont.⁴⁸⁸ The captains of the fortified castles on the border sent out several scouts to find out about the movements of the companies.⁴⁸⁹ For example, a scout paid by Colin Pallardel, the *sénéchal* de La Mothe, reported that the mercenaries of Arnaud de Cervole and Henri de Vaudémont himself had arrived at Haréville, in the Sénéchaussée, some one hundred kilometres from the Alsatian border, at the beginning of March.⁴⁹⁰ In Colin Pallardel's account, shortly after

⁴⁸³ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 140, footnote. a.

⁴⁸⁴ D. A. Calmet, *Histoire ecclésiastique...*, *op. cit.*, p. CCXXXII.

⁴⁸⁵ D. de S. Thiébaud de Metz, « Chronique, ou Annales... », *art. cit.*, p. CLXXIV.

⁴⁸⁶ ADM B 1419, Account of Joffroi de Horville, Inventaires-Sommaires T. I. p. 184.

⁴⁸⁷ ADM B. 1630. Account of Alardin, prévôt de la Chaussée f. 4r

⁴⁸⁸ ADM B 2205, f. 22v, 24v

⁴⁸⁹ ADM B 2322, f. 114v

⁴⁹⁰ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

the reconnaissance mission was sent out, the expenses associated with the raid appeared.⁴⁹¹

The coalition troops invaded the country of Vaudémont twice during the six months of the war: at the very beginning of the war, at the beginning of March 1363, and at the end of May 1363. The March assault had a devastating effect on the Vaud hinterland and lasted two weeks. The torrential rains, on the one hand, and the destruction of Henry and Cervole's troops, on the other, forced the allied to cease their advance and withdraw from the Vaudémont region. During the fighting, several monasteries and churches were destroyed, cemeteries were turned over and graves were desecrated in the arrondissements of Metz, Toul and Verdun.⁴⁹² The next offensive took place at the end of May and resulted in a prolonged siege of Chavigny. Thanks to the perseverance of the defenders, the castle was taken only in July after a month's siege.⁴⁹³ Meanwhile, at Saint-Blin, Jean, Duke of Lorraine, faced Henry's troops, made up mainly of mercenaries. It was here, in theory, that firearms were first used in Lorraine.⁴⁹⁴ The outcome of the battle cannot be determined, but the sources certainly mention that it took place, without specifying who emerged victorious.⁴⁹⁵ According to the chronicles, Henry lost and at least 2000 men perished in the battle.⁴⁹⁶ A battle on this scale should have had a greater impact on the history of the border region. In any case, Henry concluded two relatively advantageous peace treaties, which do not make it clear that, after a humiliating defeat, he and his ally Arnaud de Cervole had to bow to the border lords on humiliating terms. Instead, Robert, Duke of Bar, paid 20.000 florins, while John, Duke of Lorraine, paid 30.000 florins to the Count of Vaudémont and Archpriest.⁴⁹⁷

B.f) Living with Mercenaries: the Costs of their Presence

In regions where mercenaries appeared and remained permanently for months or even years, the lives of the population changed. The inhabitants had to learn the new rules of coexistence, and while this experience lasted a long time, they paid dearly for it.⁴⁹⁸ The

⁴⁹¹ ADM B 2322, f. 114r

⁴⁹² H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, p. 473, n° 3.

⁴⁹³ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

⁴⁹⁴ J. Simonnet, *Essai sur l'histoire...*, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

⁴⁹⁵ ADM B. 1419, f. 43r-v

⁴⁹⁶ François Michel, *Histoire des comtes et du comté de Vaudémont, des origines à 1473*, Nancy, 1935, pp. 152-153.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁴⁹⁸ The Count of Flanders attributed the difficulty in obtaining this aid in the Nivernais to the presence of English companies, the bands of the Archpriest and other accomplices. ADN B 757, n° 14451.

presence of mercenaries was paid by the population in several ways: financially, mentally and, as we shall see, at the risk of their souls. In the vicinity of a castle or town occupied by mercenaries, the material burden placed on the inhabitants took many forms. They can be divided into two main categories: indirect and direct costs. Direct costs include all the expenses the inhabitants had paid for the mercenaries or the losses suffered as a result of the mercenaries' presence. These include the *patis*, or *appatis*, tax, already well known from other wars of the Hundred Years' War, which was in fact protection money paid by the inhabitants of villages and towns to the companies to buy their peace. The amount fluctuated widely in border areas between 1350 and 1380, ranging from a few hundred florins to tens of thousands. In 1375, e.g. Sylvestre Budes, a captain in the mercenary army marching in Alsace, received 500 florins from the town of Hagenauville to avoid the threat of mercenaries.⁴⁹⁹

However, some, particularly the wealthiest aristocrats or the most important cities, continued to defend themselves actively, hiring mercenaries to bolster their defences. A study of contemporary military service receipts preserved in the archives of the city of Metz can provide valuable information on military expenditure. Geoffrey Grill collected receipts for military services during this period and studied the subject in detail.⁵⁰⁰ From his studies we learn how many times the city of Metz hired the four captains mentioned above between 1360 and 1366:

The names of the captains	The number of military services paid by the city of Metz between 1360-1366
Olrys de Fénétrange	3
Brocard de Fénétrange	2
Bertouls Strangen de Bembouch	4
Frankes de Wendelisheim	1

Table 1. Captains in the Service of Metz

⁴⁹⁹ AMH EE 27, n° 11. The text was published by G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, Appendix I, p. 155.

⁵⁰⁰ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 156 and following.

Six years passed between the engagements of Olrys and Brocard de Fénétrange, while those of Frankes de Wendelisheim and Bertouls Strangen de Bembouch concern the year 1360. In the case of the two Fénétranges, we can see what lasting links were established between the mercenary captains and the towns.

However, this weapon often backfired, particularly when the money intended for the mercenaries hired for protection ran out and they themselves caused more damage to the community than those they were supposed to protect. This is what happened in Burgundy. In 1363, Charles of Navarre caught Jean le Bon's France in a pincer movement. The western arm of the pincer movement was the attack on Normandy, while La Charité, on the outskirts of Burgundy, was a major target of the invasion from the east. La Charité was taken on Sunday 29 October 1363.⁵⁰¹ At the same time, Charles II agreed with Jean de Neufchâtel of Franche-Comté, already an ardent enemy of the duchy, to attack the Duke.⁵⁰² Philip the Bold hastily recruited several companies of mercenaries, hundreds in all, to counter the dual threat from the west, La Charité, and the north-east, Franche-Comté. Among the captains hired were such famous names as Amenion de Pommiers,⁵⁰³ Soudic de Latrau,⁵⁰⁴ Raimond de Madaillan,⁵⁰⁵ Arnaud de Cervole⁵⁰⁶ and Arnaud de Tallebardon.⁵⁰⁷ At the same time, he had to pay the contingents of nobles such as Jean d'Armanac, son of the famous count, who had 300 men in his service.⁵⁰⁸ The Burgundians tried in vain to do their best, but the duchy, which had been subject to mercenaries for years, could not raise so much money. Between the end of 1363 and September 1364, Amenion de Pommiers alone received various sums four times,⁵⁰⁹ but had not yet been paid in full.⁵¹⁰ Soudic de Latrau received 3605 florins in three instalments between November 1363 and February 1364. This gives

⁵⁰¹ ADCO B 359 ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁵⁰² ADCO B 1416, f. 37r ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, 69.

⁵⁰³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁵⁰⁴ Soudic de Latrau had 4 knights, 31 horsemen, 2 mounted archers and 16 men-at-arms in the service of the Burgundians. AVES B 357, (1364, February 20) Mentioned in Guilhem Pepin, « Les Soudans de Preissac ou de la Trau : de Clément V à l'ordre de la Jarrettière », *Les Cahiers du Bazadais*, 2014, vol. 54, n° 187, pp. 5-72, p. 29.

⁵⁰⁵ ADCO B 359 ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73, n° 1.

⁵⁰⁶ ADCO B 1416, f. 38r ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 71, n° 1.

⁵⁰⁷ ADCO B 359, E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

⁵⁰⁸ ADCO B 1416, f. 39v Mentioned in E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 73. Jean d'Armagnac's wages were 500 florins, and ten florins per man each month.

⁵⁰⁹ ADCO B 359.

⁵¹⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

an idea of the burden that defence costs represented for the ducal court.⁵¹¹ Even a powerful lord like Jean d'Armagnac or a famous captain like Arnaud de Tallebardon did not receive the sum they had been promised. It is therefore not surprising that they were unable to obtain the necessary salaries and that the captains took matters into their own hands. On Monday 24 February 1364, Philip the Bold warned the bailli of Chalon and the surrounding towns to reinforce the guard, as «*Jehan d'Armagnac had left because of the wrath of monsieur the duke, and had said in certain places that he was going to his county of Chalon*»,⁵¹² where he could be expected to cause a great deal of damage. Arnaud de Talebardon had found an irregular way of being paid by the clerk of the Receiver General of Burgundy, who was transporting his tax from Aignay to Dijon. He arrested the clerk, whose name was Clerembaut, and took from him a sum of «*seven twenty-one gold francs*» for which he gave him a receipt. Naturally, the whole story was reported to the Duke, who did not get angry and ordered that the receipt be accepted.⁵¹³

Among the direct costs, the demolition of key infrastructure played a role, and one of the most valued key infrastructures in the countryside were the mills, which were therefore a prime target for the companies. In the Duchy of Bar, the mill at Auzécourt was destroyed twice in five years by the companies and rebuilt by the inhabitants. Firstly, on Whitsunday 1360, the English burnt the Auzécourt mill along with the Revigny and Andernay mills.⁵¹⁴ Secondly, Arnaud de Cervole's routiers demolished the mill and in 1365.⁵¹⁵ They had looted so much that the *routiers* could not transport their booty and left pieces everywhere.⁵¹⁶

Indirect expenditure includes all the costs that local people had to pay to defend themselves against mercenaries or the damage they had suffered indirectly as a result of the presence of mercenaries, i.e. all the costs that had not been paid directly to the mercenaries. These are, of course, costs associated with preventing the threat posed by mercenaries: they may be costs associated with defending villages or towns, or costs associated with stocking up on food. Occasionally, the same tax was imposed multiple times and across various villages, putting them in a significantly challenging predicament. In the most favourable scenarios, the authorities endeavoured to provide assistance to the villagers. In 1365, before the arrival of the crusaders led by Arnaud de Cervole, defence costs were

⁵¹¹ ADCO B 357.

⁵¹² ADCO B. 1416, f. 42r ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁵¹³ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-401.

⁵¹⁴ ADM B 798, Compte de Jean de Longville, 1360-61.

⁵¹⁵ ADM B 799, Account of Perrin de la Mothe, f. 21r

⁵¹⁶ V. Servais, *Annales historique du ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

repeatedly imposed on certain Alsatian villages. The town of Hagenau therefore wrote to Strasbourg asking for clarification:

*«We have been informed by the people of the empire of Kindwiller, Bitschhoffen, Überach, Zutzendorf and Schaffhausen an der Zorn that you were prepared to tax them and that you have also taxed them because of the English, which seems to us very unfair, when you can see from your accounts, drawn up for the purpose of the same taxation, that these villages are devoted supporters of the empire and of us. We therefore ask your Lordship to exempt these villages from this tax, especially as they have already paid it to us a long time ago.»*⁵¹⁷

Among the indirect financial losses caused by cohabitation with the mercenaries were fairs cancelled due to the presence of mercenaries, and fairs held and looted by *routiers*. Nevertheless, there was also the damage caused to unharvested crops, cereals or grapes. In his chronicle of the mercenaries who arrived in Alsace in 1375, the Chronicler of Königshofen writes *«of the crops and wine they found, they took what they needed and left the rest behind.»*⁵¹⁸

Indirect costs also included reconstruction costs. These, especially when they involved rebuilding a large building or group of buildings, often left the community indebted for decades. During this period, violence became commonplace, and it often focused on the church and priests, affecting both property and the people serving the church.⁵¹⁹ In the border region, wealthy monasteries were the preferred target of mercenaries. In a letter dated 24 July 1376, the monastery of Wettingen complained of the damage it had suffered for several years during the wars between the House of Austria and the cantons of Zurich and Luzern, *«particularly in the war between the noble and powerful Lord Ingram, Count of Coucy, and all his Breton companies on the one hand, and between the illustrious Princes*

⁵¹⁷ AVES AA 81, f. 34.

⁵¹⁸ Adam Walther Strobel and Ludwig Schneegans, *Code historique et diplomatique de la ville de Strasbourg*, Strasbourg, 1843, pp. 188-189.

⁵¹⁹ Jean Verdon, « Le clergé poitevin à la fin du Moyen Âge d'après les lettres de rémission », in Pierre Guichard et al. (eds.), *Papauté, monachisme et théories politiques : études d'histoire médiévale offertes à Marcel Pacaut*, vol. II, Lyon, 2009, pp. 621-634.

Albert and Leopold, Dukes of Austria, on the other.»⁵²⁰ Altdorf Abbey was destroyed by mercenaries during the Alsatian raid of 1365. Frederic, the abbot of Altdorf received 500 silver marks a year and half after Arnaud de Cervole's companies had left Alsace, from Rulmann Merswin, a citizen of Strasbourg, to rebuild his monastery because the Englishmen had completely destroyed the monastery and the warehouse as well.⁵²¹ The Söldners/Mercenaries did a meticulous job, so that the monks had nothing left. The letter indicates that this was not the only loan the monastery received. According to the letter, they had thirty years to start repaying the 500 silver marks.⁵²² By way of assurance, the abbot gave the monastery of 'zum Grünen Wörth' to Rulmann Merswin, and the abbot also promised that he would not claim it back for the next hundred years, and that the monks would then get it back, but only on condition that they paid back the 500 marks.⁵²³

The expenses incurred by the underpaid defenders were an indirect cost to the population. The example of Jean d'Armanac had already shown that even a duchy as rich as Burgundy was before the permanent presence of mercenaries could not afford to pay the soldiers hired to defend it. Eventually, the captains and soldiers of the garrisons were forced to support themselves by beating up the population around their fortress. However, the sources indicate that their means were no different from those of mercenaries. There is one major difference between mercenaries and the forces defending the country, however, when it comes to the consequences of their actions: they could be held to account more easily for the atrocities they committed, because once the mercenaries had left, they were more likely to remain in the region where they had committed the same crimes when fighting the mercenaries. Oudin de Varrenes, as a member of a small garrison called Maison Fort, near Saint Vérain des Bois, defended the population of the Nivernais and Puisaye regions against Anglo-Navarrese troops in 1359. As they were not paid and had no provisions, they had to fetch what they needed from the surrounding villages: wine, grain, livestock, fish and so on. At the same time, like mercenaries, they kidnapped people and took them to Maison Fort to extort a ransom, and raped the women. During the robbery of an abbey, Oudin de Varrenes

⁵²⁰ Baron de Zurlauben, *Mémoire de M. Baron de Zur-Lauben, sur Arnaut de Cervole ou Cervolle dit l'Archiprêtre, chevalier, chambellan du roi de France Charles V, capitaine-général des Routiers, compere et conseiller de Phippe, duc de Bourgogne*, Paris, 1760, p. 298, n. a.

⁵²¹ « Abt und Convent von Altdorf leihen von Rulmann Merswin 500 Mark Silber, deren Rückzahlung gleichzeitig mit der Rückgabe des Klosters zum Grünen Wörth, durch Merswin erfolgen soll, jedoch nicht vor Ablauf von 30 Jahren », in USS2, p. 580, n° 744.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, p. 580, n° 744.

⁵²³ « Abt und Convent von Altdorf geloben von Rulmann Merswin von Ablauf von 100 Jahren das Kloster zum Grünen Wörth nicht zurückzufordern », USS2. January 1367, in *Ibid.*, p. 582, n° 745.

killed a certain Jehan Navete. He was brought to justice for his crimes, but the future Charles V decreed a general amnesty, and Oudin de Varrenes escaped justice.⁵²⁴

B.g) Nivernoise Disorder: Ryfflard de Flandre

Nevertheless, these examples only show the costs to the individual, not the complexity of the difficulties that living with mercenaries entailed for a community. In everyday life, what costs were actually incurred at any given time, and how did people try to cope with them? How did decision-making work, how independent was the administration, and to what extent did success or failure depend on the personality of a decision-maker? It is very difficult to answer these questions from mid-14th-century sources, because the different types of sources are fragmented. What is needed is a source that shows the consequences of cohabitation with mercenaries from different angles, at a given time, around a particular theme. In the mid-14th century, Louis de Mâle, Count of Flanders, was lord of the county of Nevers and the barony of Donzy. These two lands, far from being the traditional centre of power for the Counts of Flanders, did not rival the industrial cities of Bruges, Ypres and Ghent in importance. The Nevers region soon experienced the vicissitudes of mercenary life, which had already appeared in neighbouring Berry before the Battle of Poitiers.⁵²⁵ After the battle, the Anglo-Navarrese companies established themselves in the county and barony without any particular resistance, thanks to the radical weakening of central power. Louis' mother, Marguerite de France, daughter of Philip the Long, then took charge of organising the defence of the two territories, and had Arnaud de Cervole appointed lieutenant at Bourges and in all parts of Berry and Nivernois...⁵²⁶ Nevertheless, he had other priorities at first, and later when he returned to take up his new post, his relations with the citizens of Nevers deteriorated rapidly to the point where Cervole executed some of the prominent members of the Nevers leadership. The situation required the urgent intervention of Margaret of France, who was forced to appoint another person to the post.⁵²⁷ After the revocation of his mandate, the Archpriest left behind even more chaos in the provinces entrusted to him, if possible, and occupied and refused to cede several castles belonging to

⁵²⁴ Letters of remission granted by king John to Oudin de Varennes, esquire. April, 1361. A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-378.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 77.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 374.

Louis de Mâle. The general situation in 1361 is attested to by a letter from the Count of Flanders to the King of France's advisor dated 17 January 1362:

«...very dear friend, you know and should know well how by the companies and enemies of my lord the king and also by the Archpriest and some of his other accomplices, with the commission and power of the count of Tancarville, as we have been told, who have been and still are in the country, our county was arsoned and assaulted, the food and supplies that were there, taken and gasted, subjugated, killed, taken and ransomed our people...»⁵²⁸

Following the deposition of Arnaud de Cervole, the situation in the barony and county became untenable. Mercenary companies from various nations occupied several castles and terrorised the population of the countryside, threatening both long-distance trade and local vassals. Although one castle was relieved, another was soon occupied by another mercenary force, and the financial resources of both garrisons were stretched to the limit, requiring the direct intervention of Louis de Mâle.⁵²⁹ The Count of Flanders sent his half-brother Ryfflard de Flandre to protect Donzy and the Niverois, which was a disaster for both regions, as was the march of the English army or Arnaud de Cervole. A detailed account of his actions is available at the Archives départementales du Nord in Lille. The document is particularly detailed and unique, as most sources relating to the companies' activities are one-sided: there are usually only brief entries relating to the destruction of the companies or entries relating to the organisation of defences. The source, of around 4000 words, details the actions of the companies assembled in Burgundy on the eve of the Battle of Brignais, the negotiations with them and the measures taken against them. It gives a coherent and complete picture of the relations between the companies, the local nobility and the Flemish troops sent by Louis de Mâle. The fact that it begins with the following words says much about the nature of the source: *«Mémoire des choses qui sont à dire et exposer.»*⁵³⁰ Two castles were of particular concern to the inhabitants, as the Breton companies holding Arche and Flory were the most active and the inhabitants of Donzy and Nevers were no match for

⁵²⁸ ADN B 758, n° 14451.

⁵²⁹ ADN B 757, n° 8060.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

them. When Monsieur Ryfflard finally arrived, one of his first measures was to provide food and drink for his troops. He therefore asked the towns of Dieppe and Nevers to make a substantial contribution: 12 barrels of wine came from Nevers.⁵³¹ The people of Nevers contributed a further 64 barrels of wine to the mission of the Count of Flanders' half-brother. However, this was not enough: Ryfflard de Flandre received *all the wheat and hay* and a further 400 francs. The total cost exceeded 2000 francs.⁵³² In addition, the clergy donated 100 francs.⁵³³ Meanwhile, Ryfflard's troops from Flanders consumed 250 francs worth of wine and food. Well supplied with wine and money, Ryfflard set to work and quickly reached an agreement with the Bretons of Château d'Arche for them to cede the castle to him in exchange for 4300 francs. He then promised to pass on the Bretons' new demands to the Governor of Auxerrois and to intercede on their behalf to obtain 'just satisfaction'. He then ordered the imposition of a special tax on the nobles and inhabitants of the countryside to keep his promise. Problems then arose and the initial enthusiasm for Ryfflard of Flanders waned considerably among the inhabitants, as Ryfflard had acted without consulting the nobles and local potentates. For example, the nobles did not agree to collect the extraordinary tax and also informed Ryfflard that if other towns, such as La Charité, Maisse or Berzé, did not contribute the same amount, it would be impossible to collect it. According to the inhabitants, Ryfflard de Flandre had to find the money from other sources, as he did not have the right to levy a special tax, and «*they were not subject to the obedience of the aforementioned Monsieur.*»⁵³⁴ The inhabitants claimed that before Ryfflard de Flandre arrived, they had already paid 3000 francs for the castles of Arche and Flory and that there was nothing more they could do. However, the unfortunate inhabitants had other problems, as Ryfflard de Flandre had not given the Bretons the 2000 francs he had collected. So the unpaid mercenaries got angry and resorted to the traditional pressure tactics of the 14th century: «*and then Bretons corrupted the said country.*»⁵³⁵ Before the eyes of the powerless citizens of Nevers, the *rouitiers* - literally those in front of the town gate - drove away the citizens' animals cattle, sheep etc.⁵³⁶ The angry inhabitants, demanding compensation, furiously surrounded Louis de Mâle's half-brother who, believing that the inhabitants were endangering him in their desperation, quickly mounted his horse and set off with his escort

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

⁵³² *Ibid.*

⁵³³ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

and the money he had collected. As soon as the news reached the Bretons and they realised that they would never see the money they had earned again, stealing the animals seemed to them to be a slight warning of what was to come: *«they put on fires the towns of Montenoison, Noison, Lurcy le Bourt and several other places in the said County and from there they burnt down in the land of Molins les Engibert called Montescot and Ranconne.»*⁵³⁷

Two Bretons arrived in Nevers at the same time, one the lieutenant of the captain of l'Arche, the other the connétable of the Flory garrison. The two Bretons arrived in the town accompanied by two nobles Nicole de Lignes and Madame de la Marche, who had welcomed the mercenaries, who held relatively high positions in the company hierarchy, so that they could move around the region in complete safety. They were paid quite a lot for this, 240 francs in total. The two Bretons were allowed to enter the town on condition that they left the next morning, but they stayed on despite their promise, causing some confusion, with residents claiming that they were behaving suspiciously as they roamed the town. While the Bretons were in the town, their companions left the Château d'Arche for a chevauchée and captured men, goods and livestock in the area around Nevers. Then, led by the prévôt marshal, the inhabitants went to the house of Madame de la Marche, where the two routiers stayed, and, despite the vehement protests of the noblewoman, caught the Bretons and imprisoned them. Madame de La Marche later wrote numerous letters of protest to the governor about the captured mercenaries, but without success. The inhabitants, recognising the two Bretons, drew up a long list of the crimes they had committed including murder and looting.⁵³⁸ Naturally, the garrison of the two castles could not let this pass without warning and they shouted to the town of Nevers that *«they would fight the country harder than they had done»*⁵³⁹ because they feared that two of officers would be executed. However, Nevers' suffering was not over. The future Charles V, then still Duke of Normandy, wrote a letter to the Bailli of Saint Père le Moustier,⁵⁴⁰ among others, because his father, John II, who had just been released, was on his way to Avignon and had asked the Duke to find a solution to the mercenary problem. The Prince's letter revealed that it had been invented to combat the companies that were destroying parts of *«the country of the Langue d'Oïl, who had taken several fortresses and were still taking others them day by day; pillaging, robing, ravaging and gasting the flat country.»*⁵⁴¹ He therefore held a council meeting with the barons and

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

nobles of the country and those in charge in Paris, and decided to raise a new army to fight the companies. In order to do this, funds had to be found by all means «*in each diocese of your bailliage for the aid ordered for the deliverance of our said lord.*»⁵⁴² In addition to the government delegates, the local residents also delegate 2 people to coordinate the collection of taxes. What looked good on paper turned out to be very different in practice, at least for the people of Nevers. The bailli, without consulting anyone, set about collecting taxes with draconian rigor on the basis of his own ideas. For those unable or unwilling to pay the tax, the they might lose their property was opened up. The people of Nevers pleaded and protested to the bailliage that the presence of companies (and their previous burdens would prevent them from paying the tax imposed on them, but the bailli turned a deaf ear.⁵⁴³ It is not clear from the source what happened to the two captured Bretons, or how much tax the bailli was able to collect, but it is clear that coexistence with the mercenaries was a complex issue and that many different relationships intertwined between the people of Nevers and the mercenaries. Although it is clear from the source that the basis of the relationship was a system of mutual hostility, there were always other interests at play such as, in this case, the liaison between the two nobles who used the two Bretons to ensure their safe passage through the countryside.

B.h) Anime tribolate, se potete, datevi in viaggio pace e buon piacere⁵⁴⁴

Travel was an important aspect of coexistence, as the local population had found a safe haven in fortified towns and castles when mercenaries were permanently in the area. The roads of the 14th century were not deserted; many people travelled them for a wide variety of reasons.⁵⁴⁵ Travellers met very different people. There were always many reasons for travelling: the following examples show that some people travelled for official reasons as members of embassies, or to attend a trial, or to meet the emperor, or to visit the papal court in Avignon. Many merchants frequented the border region, as it was here that the famous Champagne fairs were held. Others travelled across the border on private business like

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ « Afflicted souls, if you can, give yourself in your journey peace and good comfort », in Matteo Villani, *Cronica di Matteo Villani, a miglior lezione ridotta coll' aiuto de' testi a penna*, ed. Ignazio Moutier, Florence, 1826, vol. V, lib. XI, cap. I, p. 142. Cited and translated by : Louis Green, *Chronicle into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century Chronicles*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 85.

⁵⁴⁵ V. Toureille, *Crime et Châtiment...*, *op. cit.*, I. 2229.

John Harleston and others, on ge, or, like Petrarch, on sightseeing trips to Cologne and Paris.

In the middle of the 14th century, travelling in complete peace was more of an illusion than a reality in the frontier region. Travellers were threatened by many dangers, but some dared to travel hundreds of kilometres through territories controlled by mercenaries to reach their destination and recounted their journey in letters or poems. They were the lucky ones. In particular, two Italian poets provided authentic accounts: Petrarch, who crossed the border just after King Edward III's campaign and witnessed with dismay the devastation caused by the English army, and Fazio degli Uberti, who had travelled from Normandy to Paris a few years earlier. The two descriptions are remarkably similar, and both speak of abandoned and burnt-out towns: «*I saw the land burnt and devastated*»⁵⁴⁶ writes Fazio degli Uberti in *Il Dittamondo*, while Petrarch paints a similar picture of the border region: «*Everywhere you turn, there is loneliness, mourning, ruin: the fields are horrible, the houses are abandoned and deserted...*»⁵⁴⁷ It is particularly interesting to note that Fazio degli Uberti travelled through a region that had been devastated for decades, while Petrarch's description of the frontier was written in 1360, when the companies had only been there for three years.

In any case, in this environment, it was easy for a traveller to find himself/herself in the situation of Konrad the painter, who only had to cover a relatively short distance - 50 km - through a territory occupied by the Companies, and yet he lost everything. Two examples from Burgundy show that his case is not unique and that it is dangerous to travel even a short distance without taking precautions: in January 1364, the castle of Arconcey was taken by a Breton company and the Auxonne region was threatened. The Duke of Touraine ordered the lords, bailli and captains of the local castles to guard their fortresses day and night and to assemble with their hosts to face the imminent threat.⁵⁴⁸ Many, like Geoffroi du Bochet, arrived late because the companies had intercepted seven of the messengers.⁵⁴⁹ The messenger's job was so dangerous that sometimes no one delivered a letter, no matter how important it was. This happened after the companies hired by Charles the Bad had taken La Charité and threatened Burgundy from the West, while the troops led by Jean de Neufchâtel attacked from the East.⁵⁵⁰ The captains of La Charité's neighbouring castles,

⁵⁴⁶ Fazio degli Uberti, *Il Dittamondo*, Milano, 1826, p. 330.

⁵⁴⁷ F. Petrarca, *Lettere IV...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 478-479.

⁵⁴⁸ ADCO B 1416, f. 41r-v

⁵⁴⁹ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁵⁵⁰ ADCO B 1417, f. 43v

such as Pierre Lalemand, lord of Saint-Seine-Sur-Vigeanne, could find no one to take the letter «*for the fear of the men-at-arms in the country.*»⁵⁵¹ In 1364, the war of succession was raging in Burgundy: skirmishes at La Charité led to the occupation of Villaines-les-Prévôtes. Travel in the region became dangerous, especially for envoys. Henri Le Monnoyer, the bearer of a message for Henri de Vienne, was captured, robbed, tortured and left with fatal wounds.⁵⁵² Simon Christophe, captain of the Château de Champagne in Burgundy, did not dare leave Troyes because of the situation around Villaines-les-Prévôtes.⁵⁵³ It was precisely to avoid such situations that the messages received by the Duke on 24 August 1364 from the bailli of Dijon were essential. They indicated which roads were controlled by the enemy and which could be used.⁵⁵⁴

Last-minute information on the whereabouts of the companies was essential for anyone setting off on a journey. Envoys from Avignon travelling to the frontier were informed in advance of the whereabouts of company members. In 1362, the envoy Henri de Tonges spent eight days in a fortified village in the Comtat Venaissin, because he had been informed in good time of the arrival of bands of soldiers.⁵⁵⁵ For travellers in the Comtat Venaissin, it was relatively easy to find fortified villages to settle in, as from 1357, with the arrival of Arnaud de Cervole,⁵⁵⁶ the local population had hastened to fortify the villages.⁵⁵⁷

Even the most powerful were not immune. While Charles IV was on his way to Avignon, Philip the Bold wanted to join Charles IV with his entourage in the spring of 1365. However, Seguin de Badefol wanted to set a trap for him, as news of this trip spread quickly. Thomas de Voudenay and Guillaume de Choiseul, lords of Aigremont, wrote «*that he was well advised to keep his copy, for no news they had had from Oultre-Saône.*»⁵⁵⁸ The payment to Lienart, a messenger on foot, informs us of the trap designed by Seguin de Badefol.⁵⁵⁹ Although the prince had left with a large contingent, he had to change the planned route because the companies were on the lookout. In a letter from Thoissey dated 10 June, the

⁵⁵¹ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁵⁵⁴ ADCO B 1417, f. 40r

⁵⁵⁵ Anne-Marie Hayez, « Les courriers des papes d'Avignon sous Innocent VI et Urbain V (1352-1370) », in Luciano Rossi (ed.), *La circulation des nouvelles au Moyen Âge: Société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public (France). Congrès (24 Avignon, juin 1993)*, Rome, 1994, p. 110.

⁵⁵⁶ V. Toureille, (ed.), *Guerre et société...*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁵⁵⁷ Germain Butaud, « Villages et villageois du Comtat Venaissin en temps de guerre (milieu xiv^e-début xv^e siècle) », in Christian Desplat (ed.), *Les villageois: Face à la guerre (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, Toulouse, 2002, p. 55

⁵⁵⁸ ADCO B 1417, f. 36v

⁵⁵⁹ ADCO B. 3567, f. 15r

Duke informed them that the garrison at Anse was guarding two roads and that they were to keep a day and night watch on the town and the ramparts of the Chalon *baillage* and try to prevent the enemy from crossing the *baillage*.⁵⁶⁰

Of course, if a border lord or important official had a big enough entourage, they did not need to fear the threat of companies, and could take advantage of the journey to settle scores with the mercenaries who had chosen the wrong place as a base for their raids. These fortified buildings, known as fortified houses depending on the source, proved powerless in the face of a real attack. Their capacity was limited to a small company of 50 to 100 armed men. The mercenaries themselves could be caught off guard, even in extreme circumstances, such as near Lyon and in the Dauphiné region, on the border with Savoy, during the events surrounding the Battle of Brignais. In Raul de Louppy's account of his return from negotiations with Amadeus VI, he made a diversion to the island of Cremau, where a small company had seized the stronghold of Aute Pierre, owned by Camus de Chenay. From there, they pillaged the region. The small fortress was stormed and occupied by members of the governor's entourage, while the criminals were punished.⁵⁶¹

Roul de Louppy's captivating narrative clearly shows what it meant to have an adequate sum of money for travelling in the first half of the 1360s. These expenses, by their very nature, are accompanied by meticulous justifications as to the reason for the journey and, where applicable, the increase in the allowance due to the threat of the companies. Between 1361 and 1367, the governor regularly travelled to Avignon, Grenoble, Romans, La-Côte-St-André, Paris, Lyon and other destinations. An average journey, unless the destination was a distant place such as Paris, took two weeks, with a cavalry of between 20 and 32 horses.⁵⁶² This cost Roul de Louppy 2 to 300 florins per passage. When there was an imminent threat, as is often reported in the accounts when the companies occupied Burgundy, the escort became even more important, sometimes it was even doubled, which naturally led to a proportional increase in travel costs.⁵⁶³ In 1363, the financial situation of the crown was so precarious that when John the Good arrived in Avignon, Roul de Louppy found himself obliged to lend the king the sum of 3789 florins for his expenses.⁵⁶⁴ The journey became truly perilous in the mid-1360s, when Seguin de Badefol captured Anse in

⁵⁶⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁵⁶¹ Ulysse Chevalier (ed.) *Comptes de Louppy, gouverneur du Dauphiné de 1361 à 1369*, Romans, 1886, pp. 21-22, n° 64.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17, n° 6 ; p. 29, n° 71 ; p. 31, n° 73 ; p. 33, n° 75.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 17-18, n° 62 ; p. 19-20, n° 63.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50, n. 110.

1364. The roads to Lyon have become dangerous because «*[Seguin de Badefol] had occupied the fortress of Anse, which every day he & his people endeavoured to burden & damage the said city of Lyon & wage war, for which the whole country was in great peril.*»⁵⁶⁵ For this reason, the governor's escort in Lyon was always larger; for example, at the beginning of 1365, it amounted to 43 horses.⁵⁶⁶

Travellers could be confronted with danger that was not aimed at them personally, but which affected them. They were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, like the people of the Bishop of Chartres who were travelling from Avignon to Lyon. Jean, lord of Saint-Trivier in Dombes in the Empire, a knight, was captured and imprisoned by Seguin de Badefol's company when he was travelling from one of his castles to Lyon in 1364. Jean was captured chained with three pairs of irons and suffered for a long time in prison. To regain his freedom, Jean agreed to pay a high ransom. He had already paid a large part of this sum, but he had to leave his son as a hostage in the hands of the enemies. His son remained imprisoned until Candlemas. Once freed, Jean set out to take revenge on the members of the company. However, by an unfortunate mistake, Jean's men arrested and imprisoned some of the Bishop of Chartres' people on their way back from Avignon. However, as soon as they realised that they were the men of the Bishop of Chartres, they immediately released them and returned everything they had taken from them.

Jean then attempted to travel safely to Lyon to obtain his son's release. However, the *prévôt* of Mâcon, due to the events mentioned above, tried to arrest him and confiscated silverware in a house in Lyon belonging to Jean, and even his son's lands in the kingdom. These confiscations were carried out without Jean or his son being able to object. Jean, who had always been loyal to the kingdom, humbly asked for the charges against him to be lifted. He stressed that he had loyally served the kingdom, as well as his lord and father, during the wars in which his brother had lost his life. He declared that he was ready and willing to continue serving according to his abilities. Jean had somehow managed to pacify the situation and had reached an agreement with the royal council.⁵⁶⁷

Different solutions therefore had to be found for those who wished to use the road. Some believed that by paying a mercenary captain for safe conduct, they could cross the territory under their control in complete safety. After the occupation of Anse by Seguin de Badefol, in the name of Charles II, the king of Navarre issued a safe conduct. If someone wanted to

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56, n. 120.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57, n. 121.

⁵⁶⁷ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-148, n° 1.

travel in peace in the region, he or she had to ask one of Badefol's secretaries for a pass issued in the name of the captain of Anse and marked with his seal. All for a tidy sum. Such a *sauf et seur conduit* was given to «*Maistres Richert, Doien de Besantzon, and Estienne de Sauzet, vicars of reverend father in God*» in 1365. It sets out the exact conditions under which they passed through the territory controlled by the Margot. In this case, it concerns a maximum of 20 horses, 20 persons on horseback and 5 valets on foot. Orders were given to the members of the Margot that the holder of the pass and his escort are not to be troubled until the expiry of the duration of the pass.⁵⁶⁸

However, the possession of such a safe-conduct passes also carried its own dangers, although not from the point of view of the companies, but rather because the local authorities suspected that the safe-conduct holder was conspiring with the companies. The consequences for the safe-conduct holder were as serious as if he had fallen into the hands of the companies. Guyon Pevrier de Cove travelled from Avignon to Lyon on the Rhône in 1358. The guards criticised Guyon for not being loyal to France, arguing that he had a safe-conduct pass issued by the English rather than the French. As a result, they put him in prison, where he remained for around seven weeks. The people, intent on killing him, were nevertheless restrained by Guyon, who requested an enquiry in his defence. As part of this enquiry, Guyon took the initiative of representing himself, before being handed over to the lieutenant of the bailliage of Mâcon, at the latter's request. This lieutenant then summoned the judge, the *prévôt*, the public prosecutor and the other officers of the city of Lyon, inviting them to testify against Guyon and to present all the evidence gathered. He specified that their failure to attend on the agreed date would result in Guyon's release. However, neither these individuals nor any others turned up.⁵⁶⁹ The lieutenant decided to release Guyon from prison by giving him until the day after Saint-Rémi's Day, on pain of being found guilty of banishment and confiscation of his property to come back for his trial. However, Guyon was unable to meet this deadline due to the enemy having occupied the region, which made travel impossible. Faced with this situation, Guyon pleaded his case to Charles, emphasising his good reputation and his loyalty to his lord and the king. Given these circumstances, Charles, acting on his special grace, and his royal authority, decided to remit and forgive Guyon for the above-mentioned acts.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁸ Descroix Bernard, *Seguin de Badefol 'ce fils d'iniquité' qui fit trembler Anse et la France entière*, Lyon, 1985, p. 53.

⁵⁶⁹ Letters of remission granted by Charles, regent, to Guyon Pevrier. 23 June 1359. G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-264.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, safe-conducts were not only issued to citizens by the companies, but were also provided by the local authorities to certain mercenaries when they had to act as part of an official mission. This is why Arnaud de Cervole received such a letter on 8 July 1365 when he arrived with the crusaders at Strasbourg to meet Charles IV, who, as Konrad tells us, was also stationed in the vicinity of the city with his large entourage.⁵⁷¹

B.i) Other Aspects of Cohabitation: Guillermus the Descozus and the Capricious Maria

Maria was living with her husband Jean de Gruillion in the picturesque village of Saulieu, west of Dijon on the border with the Duchy, when Garciot de Chastel and his *route* appeared in the area, including a mercenary, Guillermus le Descozus. After their meeting, Maria was seduced and decided to invite the dashing mercenary to her home. They arranged for the mercenary to enter in Maria's house one evening and spend the night together. Guillermus the Descozus turned up as agreed and sneaked into Maria's house, but she changed her mind and started shouting loudly that a strange man was in her house. Guillermus, who this time wanted nothing more than to spend a night curled up with his mistress, was frightened because the neighbours appeared at the noise and so he quickly fled without harming anyone. This is emphasised in the letter of remission issued to him. The neighbours were probably lucky this time.⁵⁷²

Nevertheless, it is not just the case of Maria that proves that mercenaries were allowed to enter towns under certain limited conditions, such as the two Bretons authorised to enter Nevers, who were only required to stay in the town for one night. In other places, such as Brioude, mercenaries were required to surrender their weapons to the town guards and were then allowed to enter the town freely. In 1364, Louis Robaut was sent to Brioude by Seguin de Badefol to collect the money owed by the town, which was a leftover from the previous year. The mercenary also had the opportunity to visit his mistress.⁵⁷³ However, another mercenary, Limousin, in fact his friend, was already in bed with his mistress. Robaut, furious, chased his mercenary companion naked through the streets of Brioude. Limousin was quicker and managed to escape from his jealous friend. It was a fatal mistake for Louis

⁵⁷¹ AVES AA 81, f. 50.

⁵⁷² G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁵⁷³ N. Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret...*, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

Robaut, for shortly afterwards Limousin took bloody revenge by trapping his comrade-in-arms.⁵⁷⁴

Philippe Contamine notes in his study of the adventure companies that the routiers did not want to change the existing social order, but that by accepting it, they were trying to exist within its framework.⁵⁷⁵ As far as the captains active in the region during the period under review are concerned, this is all the more true as some of them came from the local aristocracy, such as the Lorrainers Olrys and Brocard de Fénétrange⁵⁷⁶ or Jean de Neufchâtel from Franche-Comté.⁵⁷⁷ Others, very few in number, managed to enter the aristocracy through marriage, such as Arnaud de Cervole who married Jeanne de Châteaouvillain on 2 May 1362,⁵⁷⁸ and named his son after Philip the Bold, with whom he had a very good relationship,⁵⁷⁹ or the already mentioned Eustache d'Auberchicourt who was married to the niece of the Queen of England,⁵⁸⁰ or Brother Darrier, to whom a young Burgundian noblewoman, Agnès de Bazoche, lady of the Château d'Agnou, proposed marriage, as she had become a widow very early on, and her late husband's family and friends had accused her of participating in his murder.⁵⁸¹ In 1364, while mercenaries were invading Villaines-les-Prévôtes and life in the region was paralysed by the English. Agnès de Bazoche turned to the mercenaries for help. Agnès, a noblewoman and the widow of Philibert des Granges, was caught up in a series of serious accusations. She was accused of having actively participated in the murder of her late husband and of having been an accomplice of the English and the leaders of the Great companies during the occupation of the fortress of Villaines-les-Prévôtés. Agnès was also engaged to Jean Poupon, an English squire.

The letter, written by Philip the Bold, began by stating that Agnès de Bazoche was currently languishing in the castle of Girart. The reason for her detention stemmed from accusations made against her by certain relatives and acquaintances of her late husband. These people claimed that she had colluded with the late Ferry de Chardoigne, a former squire, in the capture of her husband. In addition, the bailli of l'Auxois and other sources claimed that she

⁵⁷⁴ Mirot Léon (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart, vol. XII, 1356-1388*, Paris, 1931, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁷⁵ P. Contamine, « Les compagnies... », art. cit., p. 382.

⁵⁷⁶ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., pp. 184-186 ; J. Viard andt E. Déprez (eds.), *Chronique de Jean le Bel II...*, op. cit., p. 273, 280, 285.

⁵⁷⁷ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 114.

⁵⁷⁸ Valérie Toureille, *Robert de Sarrebrück ou l'honneur d'un écorcheur (v. 1400-v.1462)*, Rennes, 2014, I. 537.

⁵⁷⁹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., pp. 241-242.

⁵⁸⁰ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., p. 104.

⁵⁸¹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 296.

intended to cede the fortress of Agnou, which she owned, to forces antagonistic to the King and Philip the Bold himself. Jehan Poupon, the aforementioned English squire, appears as yet another character in the ongoing legal meanderings.

However, after assiduous examination of the relevant facts and in view of the commendable services rendered by Jehan Poupon in the service of the King and Philip the Bold during military engagements, a conclusion was reached. The Duke of Burgundy ruled that Agnès was not guilty of her husband's alleged act of capture. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the idea that she offered or promised to surrender the fortress of Agnou to the aforementioned adversaries. The only exception is a proposal of marriage made by one of these adversaries, known as Darre, on condition that he became a faithful and loyal Frenchman. Forgiveness for his former transgressions and the prospect of a marriage with Agnès were linked to this transformation. In view of the above, Philip the Bold granted clemency and issued a decree. Agnès de Bazoche was exonerated of all alleged offences and imputations.⁵⁸²

Of course, the case of Agnès de Bazoche was not the only time a noblewoman had called on mercenaries in times of need. In addition, it was not hard to find an opportunity. Indeed, when the authorities learned, through spy reports or otherwise, that mercenaries were appearing in a region, they would send messengers to warn towns and castles to reinforce their guards and bring the inhabitants of the region to the town. This is exactly what happened when Bertrand du Guesclin's troops crossed Burgundy in 1365.⁵⁸³ Nevertheless, the passing mercenaries came at just the right time for the knight Jehan de Bovair and his son-in-law Jean de Thélis, a squire known as Le Farge. The knight Berton de Suigny had attacked them in the town of Furs-en-Fores. In response, Jehan de Thélis gathered together English and Breton soldiers from Bertrand du Guesclin's troops, who arrived, and he took his revenge on Berton. Jehan de Thélis and his mercenaries approached Berton's castle, but Berton was not at home. They asked Bertrand de Saint Romain, the captain in charge of the castle, to serve them some wine outside the castle gate. As Bertrand left the castle, Jehan and some of his companions seized him and bound him by the hands and feet, making him their prisoner. This plot gave them access to the castle. By force or other means, Jehan and his accomplices entered the castle and took control of it. They expelled Berton de Suigny's wife, children and anyone else in the castle. They also plundered the castle's

⁵⁸² Ernest Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi et Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne (1363-1419), d'après les comptes de dépenses de leur hôtel*, Paris, 1888, pp. 465-466.

⁵⁸³ ADCO Compte de Baillage de Auxois B 2751, f. 16r

provisions, eating and drinking as they pleased. However, their actions had unexpected consequences. To keep warm, they made a large fire in one of the castle's halls, which caused part of the hall to burn down. Jehan and his accomplices damaged other parts of the castle as well.⁵⁸⁴

Some nobles took advantage of the confusion caused by the companies to try to make a profit. When the war was raging in the spring and summer of 1363 between the Lords of the Border and the Count of Vaudémont, which resulted in extraordinary devastation of Lorraine and the Duchy of Bar, the castle of Brixey, belonging to the bishopric of Toul, was occupied by two enterprising gentlemen. Wautrin de Laweline and Henri de Lannoy robbed Naives-en-Blois on 26 October, followed by Pagny-sur-Meuse and Gillauvillers.⁵⁸⁵ In the account of Joffroi de Horville, *prévôt* of Gondrecourt, the ravages of the Brixey garrison and the measures taken against them are briefly described.⁵⁸⁶ The countryside was so war-weary that the two adventurers had calculated the time and place well, so that they were able to exert sufficient pressure on the authorities, who were naturally seeking a suitable ransom. They even withstood a siege, before finally reaching an agreement to surrender the castle for the sum of 2000 florins.⁵⁸⁷

The pleasant but rare advantages of living with mercenaries were appreciated not only by the nobles, but also by members of the bourgeoisie, especially when a group of mercenaries stayed in one place for a long time and had time to form personal relationships. On such occasions, the citizens, men and women, who ate and entertained with the mercenaries risked the salvation of their souls, as they faced the full rigour of the Church and excommunication. This was the case of a tailor and his wife who were in contact with Seguin de Badefol's mercenaries during the occupation of Anse in 1364/65. The tailor Girardin Gobard and his wife ate, drank with the mercenaries and sold clothes to the men of the companies. For this, they were excommunicated and it was only later that they were absolved of excommunication because they «*had not taken part in any other crime*».⁵⁸⁸ Nevertheless, they were not the only people in Lyon and the surrounding area to have kept in touch with Margot members during the ten months Anse was occupied. Jacques Blanchi,

⁵⁸⁴ Letters of remission from the king to Jean de Thélis, esquire, and Jean de Bovair, knight, who had asked Bertrand du Guesclin's routiers to ransack Sugny castle. G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

⁵⁸⁵ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

⁵⁸⁶ ADM B 1420, f. 4r

⁵⁸⁷ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

⁵⁸⁸ Absolution in favour of Girardin Gobard and his wife, inhabitants of Villefranche, who had traded with the companies. G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...* *op. cit.*, p. 351.

who also sold and bought animals (donkeys, oxen), ate and drank with the members of the companies, just like the tailor, and was eventually absolved of his sins.⁵⁸⁹

The example of Ryfflard of Flanders shows the burden that the appearance of a company represents for the population and its complex consequences, whether in terms of the damage it causes or the taxes it imposes, not to mention the loss of fairs or the cost of fortifications ordered by the princely and royal authorities. The resulting insecurity and danger of death often led to despair. At the same time, people had to be careful about what they said and especially to whom, as the authorities acted with the necessary severity and those with a sharp tongue sometimes had to pay a hefty fine. In 1366, a man was fined 2 francs for having repeated in several places in Burgundy that «*The Counts of Savoy were more powerful than the King of France, for the Counts of Savoy did not impose any taxes whatsoever in all their lands, and the king imposed them in his lands.*»⁵⁹⁰ In 1368, an inhabitant of Seurre complained several times that «*By God, this duke and this king and all the order of them! They have gabelle and all the money in the world, and they bring us the companies who destroy us*». All this cost 20 francs.⁵⁹¹ Another time, Jehan de Azarilay said that «*Monsieur le Duc has brought the companies*» to Burgundy, a remark which cost him 7 francs.⁵⁹² Obviously, it was much worse to talk to mercenaries, and witness Guillaume Mathey had to pay four goldmarks for negotiating with mercenaries from La Vèvre in 1365.⁵⁹³

B.j) Collaboration and Cooperation with the Routiers: Thévenin Senart, Guichard de la Combe and Co.

According to the sources, cooperation with mercenaries was as natural an aspect of cohabitation in border areas as the other forms of coexistence mentioned above. This does not mean, of course, that the interactions between the local population and the mercenaries, which involved a wide variety of forms of punishment, were present to the same extent as the daily suffering of the local population, which formed the basis of their coexistence with

⁵⁸⁹ Absolution in favour of the inhabitants of the diocese of Lyon who had traded with the companies. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁵⁹⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

⁵⁹¹ ADCO B 2756, f. 9r-v ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

⁵⁹² ADCO B 2756, f. 8r

⁵⁹³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

the mercenaries who with *voracitatis lupine*⁵⁹⁴ ran through and gutted the country every day.⁵⁹⁵ The most serious forms of cooperation included regular trade with the companies, the purchase of stolen goods, the sale of food, drink and equipment needed by the mercenaries, espionage, theft and pillage with mercenaries, participation in raids and the rape of women. Nevertheless, there were more sophisticated forms of cooperation. If companies held a castle for a long period and the garrison regularly kidnapped people for ransom, intermediaries negotiated the most advantageous ransom with the captured people and then arranged to collect it quickly. As well as the quality of the cooperation, the frequency with which it took place also played a very important role. Subsequently, there was a close correlation between the number of mercenaries present in a specific region and the number of convicted local residents who cooperated with them.

In her fundamental work on theft and brigandage, Valérie Toureille wrote: «*The slow criminalisation of brigands took shape at the turn of the 14th century, accelerating in the years following the signing of the Treaty of Brétigny (1360), during the truce with the violence committed by the Great Companies.*»⁵⁹⁶ The spontaneous resistance of the population against the mercenaries, which had already been authorised by the royal ordinances of 1355 and 1357,⁵⁹⁷ often turned into hatred against the members of the companies. In his declaration of 10 August 1358, the Dauphin Charles noted the people's determination to fight against the companies.⁵⁹⁸ The crimes committed by the routiers provoked a reaction from the majority of the population similar to that of Arnaud de Cervole and the community of Nevers. In 1359, Arnaud de Cervole was charged with defending the County of Nevers and the Barony of Donzy. However, when he arrived in the town of Nevers with his legitimate escort, he made a serious mistake, as the people of Nevers recognised his escort as the members of the companies against whom he was supposed to be protecting the local population. The citizens of Nevers, blinded by their hatred for the mercenaries who *had* previously «killed their kinsmen and seized their land and possessions» realised that when the Archpriest

⁵⁹⁴ Letters from Louis de Villars, bishop of Valence, to the Emperor to implore his help. 9 May 1365. G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-331.

⁵⁹⁵ Letters of remission granted by King John to Oudin de Varennes, A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-378.

⁵⁹⁶ V. Toureille, *Vol et brigandage...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁵⁹⁸ Philippe Hamon, « Au temps des Jacques et des brigands: réflexions sur la 'contestation' en milieu rural dans la France de la fin du Moyen Âge », in *Contester Moyen Âge: de la désobéissance à la révolte XLIX^e Congrès de la SHMESP* (Rennes, 2018), Paris, 2019, pp. 109-123.

*«with his said company, wishing to leave the said town, made his way to one of the gates of the said town called the Gate of Ardilliers; and they, knowing that some of his company had taken and were endeavouring to take with them out of the said town some of the burghers and inhabitants of the said town were incensed by the said enemies whom they saw in the said town and in the company of those who had to guard them, and also (for) the fact that they see that in fact they were endeavouring to harm and burden the inhabitants, had run upon these enemies, and so many of these enemies and others from the company of the aforementioned knight were put to death, and the knight himself detained in the aforementioned town for two or three days.»*⁵⁹⁹

When, in 1359, Eustache d'Aubrichécourt was caught in the fighting at Nogent-sur-Seine, he was very lucky to stay alive because in Troyes the inhabitants wanted to lynch him⁶⁰⁰ and Hennequin, who also fell captive during the campaign, after the Count of Vaudémont and the Archbishop of Reims had kept him in the Château de Sissone, barely managed to avoid the enraged mob.⁶⁰¹ This general hatred of mercenaries often radicalised populations that had suffered greatly from the presence of mercenaries, such as the people of Lyon in 1362. Jean Doublet was just one member of a company that completely wiped out the royal army at Brignais. However, during the battle, he had the opportunity to capture Gérard de Tournay, Marshal of Burgundy, whom he let go without ransoming in order to obtain a pardon for his previous crimes, which he obtained from King John. However, he was unlucky, because when he arrived in Lyon with a royal officer and five of his companions a year later, on 13 March 1363, the inhabitants who recognised him were so full of hatred for the routiers that they paid no attention to his new-found immunity. They captured Jean and the others, so that the chapter condemned him as follows: They were all hanged or drowned.⁶⁰² The same hatred extended to those who cooperated with the mercenaries. Inhabitants were merciless towards those who gave effective assistance to the companies: *«In that year*

⁵⁹⁹ Letters of remission granted by Charles, Regent of France, to the inhabitants of the town of Nevers, in connection with their dealings with Arnaud de Cervole, known as the Archpriest. A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-374.

⁶⁰⁰ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes, vol. I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁶⁰¹ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9154 ; M. Poinson, *Histoire Générale...*, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

⁶⁰² G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-319.

[1365], there was a man from Maigney named L'Oreillart, who was captured at the mill of Dorcevalt by those from Metz, put in the pillory, dragged and placed on the street, because he had aided the Bretons in several ways that could not be recounted.»⁶⁰³

Another collaborator was Pierre Doin, who was under the jurisdiction of the Benedictine abbey of Savigny and had confessed to being a royal sergeant. Pierre Doin worked closely with the Anse garrison. His crimes included contacts and exchanges with the enemy, the supply of illicit food and equipment. After being found guilty of these charges, Pierre Doin was arrested and imprisoned for around three months at the Château de La Berelle, where he was forced to pay sixty gold francs to secure his release. However, after his freedom, Pierre Doin travelled to Paris to lodge a complaint against the Abbé of Savigny and obtain his summons to appear before the royal councillors. This led to a series of legal proceedings, with evocations, fines and even banishments imposed on certain individuals involved in the affair. In view of these circumstances, and taking into account the difficulties faced by Savigny Abbey as a result of the war, enemy occupation and the high death rate in the region, King Charles decided to grant a pardon and remission to the abbot, the convent and the individuals involved. However, it was specified that Pierre Doin would have to pay a sum of five hundred gold francs, which would be given to the Receiver General to support the war effort. Unfortunately, the letter of remission does not say what Pierre Doin might have known about the abbot that led him to summon him to Paris. It states that the temporal authority of the abbey had been placed under the control of the king. This means that the government and administration of the abbey were temporarily taken over by the royal authority. In addition, a garrison of guards and civil servants was stationed in the abbey, which resulted in considerable expense and damage for the religious community.⁶⁰⁴ In 1364, in Macôn, Thevenin Senart and Guichard de la Combe brought food and drink to the mercenaries, traded in stolen goods and brought news to the enemy if action was being prepared against them. When they were caught, the *prévôt* imprisoned them. However, the king showed mercy and obtained their release, even though the local authorities were in favour of severe punishment.⁶⁰⁵

Therefore, it is not unexpected that the rumour circulated indicating that an individual was merely cooperating with the mercenaries, leading to their concerted efforts to apprehend him. This is what happened in 1359, during the well-known activity of Arnaud de Cervole in

⁶⁰³ D. de S. Thiébaud de Metz, « Chronique, ou Annales... », art. cit., p. 650.

⁶⁰⁴ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, op. cit., pp. 355-358.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 381-385.

Nevers, when Regnault Ulpi and his companions took refuge in the small town of Varzy, to the north-east of Nevers, to escape the Anglo-Navarrese mercenaries who were pillaging the region and also threatening the town itself. Regnault Ulpi and his companions took up the defence of the town when they discovered that a young man by the name of Joffroy Piot had forged close links with the English companies and was plundering the region with them. Regnault believes that Joffroy represents a direct threat to Varzy and decides with his companions to track down the collaborator. After capturing him, they mistreated and beat him to such an extent that Joffroy Piot succumbed to his injuries shortly afterwards. Fearing the consequences of his actions, Regnault, who had taken the law into his own hands, fled, but was finally pardoned in April 1361.⁶⁰⁶

The importance for the authorities of reducing contact with the enemy as much as possible and their vigilance in this area are highlighted by the three Treaties of Alliance against the companies. It is no coincidence that all these treaties attempted to prevent trade between the companies and the local populations:

«We, lords and leaders aforementioned, neither ourselves, nor our men, nor our subjects, residents in our lands, neither can, should, nor ought to provide comfort, assistance, in any manner whatsoever, to the abovementioned Companies, to those aiding them, nor to anyone whatsoever, with supplies, food, or any other things, and whoever does so. We, the aforementioned lords and leaders all together, and each individually, and our men and subjects, are obligated to seize the bodies and possessions of those who would do this.»⁶⁰⁷

The second treaty has been lost over the centuries. A transliteration has been preserved in the Preuves de l'Histoire de Metz. In the Treaty of Metz, the allies agreed to reduce all contact with the companies, all parties involved in this treaty agreed not to sell any goods that might be useful to cover the daily needs of the mercenaries, and not to pay anything for the companies, no one could give or bring anything to the *routiers*:

⁶⁰⁶ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., pp. 374-377.

⁶⁰⁷ AMM AA 49, n° 15 ; A. Calmet, *Preuves de l'Histoire...*, op. cit., pp. 186-189.

*«It is also agreed that we, the aforementioned lords and cities, must maintain the aforementioned knights and squires, steadfastly and without delay, until the aforementioned term. It is also agreed that we, the aforementioned lords, cities, and towns, and all those who are living and residing under and alongside us, none of them should buy anything against the people known as the Company, nor sell anything to them, except that if any honourable man were captured, he could indeed redeem himself with his money, if he wished. These aforementioned knights and squires should not cause any harm to anyone, except in cases where it was necessary to lie in ambush, where they may take forage for the horses and other customary things in such situations.»*⁶⁰⁸

In general, there were two types of crime committed by the French against companies: the most common was trading with the enemy. There are plenty of examples of the purchase of booty stolen from road hauliers:

*«Guiot le Barbier de Mourray for Guillaume his son, who had left the country because he had been with the English and had bought plunder so that he would surely be recognised in the country.»*⁶⁰⁹ *«Gérard de Plumeron buys animals from the English who were with Pierre Perthuis.»*⁶¹⁰ *«Symon Ladeault and B. Thibaut bought pillage from the people of the company when it was in Saint Burry.»*⁶¹¹

The sources sometimes state that the purchase was made against the specific orders of the authorities, exactly as provided for in the treaty of 1360:

⁶⁰⁸ Traité d'Alliance entre l'Évêque de Metz, le Duc de Luxembourg, le Duc de Lorraine, le Duc de Bar, l'Évêque de Strasbourg, & les Villes Impériales d'Alsace, A. Calmet, *Preuves de l'Histoire...*, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

⁶⁰⁹ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 19, B 2748, f. 4v

⁶¹⁰ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 19, B 2748, f. 4v

⁶¹¹ ADCO B 2752, f. 9v

«Jehan Grapuy of Mouster-Saint-Jehan condemned for having, against the defence made to the country, bought a mare plundered by the English which must have belonged to Hugueny.»⁶¹² «Guiot de Fontaine, clerk, living in Moustar is proven to have bought from the English a certain quantity of plundered blade from despite the cry which had been made.»⁶¹³

All these crimes took place while Edward's army was in Burgundy in 1360-1361. Naturally, the French not only bought but also sold goods to the companies:

«Simonin de Servey, a cleric who resides in the Castle of Chevigny, because he was accused of supporting the English who were in Flavigny during the summer, aiding them with spurs and obtaining plunder. Furthermore, he was accused of being involved with those who had stolen cheese from the barn of Valein near Semur. Taking into account that he had been imprisoned for this matter for a long time, and considering his status as a cleric, ...a sum of 120 florins was assessed for payment.»⁶¹⁴

Simonin de Servey had to pay dearly for his actions; his punishment was comparable to the sum paid for Louis Roubaud's head. The fact that he was a cleric was taken into account as an aggravating circumstance.

The second treaty is dated 25 May 1362, a month and a half after the Battle of Brignais and was signed in Colmar against the Englis mercenaries.⁶¹⁵ The third treaty extended the Treaty of Colmar of 1363 by a year and concerned the war between Henry de Vaudémont and the front coalitions mentioned above. Namely, in addition to trading with mercenaries,

⁶¹² ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 18, B 2748, f. 3r

⁶¹³ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 18, B 2748, f. 3r

⁶¹⁴ ADCO B 2748, f. 3v

⁶¹⁵ AMC AA, 48, n° 1, Bischof Johannes von Straßburg, Bischof Johannes von Basel, Bischof Johannes von Gurk, Vertreter der Herzoge von Österreich in Schwaben und Elsaß, der Abt von Murbach, 15 genannte Grafen und Herren (darunter die Brüder Johannes, Ulrich und Bruno von Rappoltstein), ferner die freien Städte Straßburg, Basel und Freiburg, der Unterlandvogt im Elsaß, 11 genannte Reichstädte des Elsaß, endlich der württembergische Vogt zu Reichenweier und Rath und Bürger daselbest schließen gegen die sogenannten Engländer einen Bund, welcher bis zum 25 Dezember 1362 gelten soll, 25 May 1362, Colmar. Johannes Haller (ed.), *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Basel*, vol. VII, Basel, 1899, p. 570, n° 744.

the other type of crime was cooperation in looting.⁶¹⁶ Along the English army, many French captains of companies came to rob the countryside.⁶¹⁷

However, among the locals, there were also several who were prepared to plunder their fellow citizens together with the *routiers*: two brothers from Giséy-le-Vieux pillaged the garrison of St Beury and Giséy-le-Vieux. They were taken by the bailli and escaped; they caused great damage to the people of Giséy-le-Vieux...⁶¹⁸ Nicolas Lebian, from Acerry, under the orders of the English, pillaged the barn belonging to the religious of Nounes,...the English had not left them any of their property and had no means of support.⁶¹⁹

The treaty also states that no privilege can offer impunity in the event of cooperation, essentially looting, with the companies:

«If anyone happens to travel among the people or company described above, we must proceed in such a way that our friends do not become victims of pillage or fire; and that everyone with his goods may go in peace and under escort to the lord and return from him. In the event of anyone breaching these provisions, whoever the person may be, and if he is found guilty on a common and proper examination of having committed an unlawful act in a reckless and fraudulent manner, he shall make reparations for his fault and make reparations with all possible means; and he shall not be protected by any immunity or privilege, which belong to any of us.»⁶²⁰

There are many references to this in the sources, so it is no coincidence that a large part of the Treaty of Colmar is devoted to punishing collaborators:

⁶¹⁶ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 17 ; B. 2748, f. 2r-v

⁶¹⁷ Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War I: Trial by Battle*, e-book, London, 1999, l. 9567.

⁶¹⁸ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 58.

⁶¹⁹ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 19.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*

«...Or those who hung around or lived here and were attracted to this company or these wretched people or supported them, those who committed such cruel acts and lived such evil lives and stayed with them and helped them openly or secretly with advice or deeds and it would be that person, his master, his superiors or the city to which he belongs, who would accuse him and prosecute him and punish him to the extent that he fully benefited them and gave them satisfaction for it»⁶²¹ .

In this case of collaboration with the companies, the cooperation was deeper than simple pillage, such as treason or espionage, for which if the person was captured, his 'reward' was death. This was the case of Aondrier de Marmeaulx who was executed at «*Mostier St Jehan*» *he helped the companies and betrayed the «les bones gens de Marmeauls.»*⁶²² Jehan Gruaul called le Grand Jehannot had a similar fate he betrayed «*le fort de Chasteaul-Girart*» to the companies.⁶²³ Yet it also happened that the routiers forced someone to help them. In this case, the person could not avoid retaliation by the authorities, which was either corporal punishment or imprisonment, but at least he was lucky enough to avoid execution like Ligier Brouhart from Arnoul who guided the enemy to Villers-les-Aula and to other places. He was very poor so was sentenced to prison but he was not executed.⁶²⁴

B.k) Crimes related to Mercenaries in the Bailliage of Auxois 1360-1366

So far, it has been found that the interaction and collaboration between the local population and the mercenaries in border areas was complex and multifaceted, and that much attention was paid to prohibiting collaboration, or at least reducing cooperation, both in the empire and in the kingdom. However, in order to estimate the frequency of misdeeds perpetrated jointly by *routiers* and local inhabitants accurately, it was necessary to choose a region where the constant and well-documented presence of these mercenaries was attested, and to have a coherent corpus allowing for the analysis of a homogeneous period.

The bailliage of Auxois is all the more suitable for this examination as between 1360-1365 companies were present in the bailliage on a continuous basis. At the end of 1359, Robert

⁶²¹ AMC AA 48, n° 1.

⁶²² ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 50 ; B 2751, f. 3v

⁶²³ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 42.

⁶²⁴ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 55 ; B 2752, f. 6r

Knolles occupied the town of Auxerre,⁶²⁵ then in the spring of 1360 Edward III's troops invaded Burgundy, including the bailliage. Although Edward left Burgundy with his troops after the treaty with Philip of Rouvres, the captains of the many mercenary troops that had arrived in the meantime remained and caused considerable financial damage to both Edward and the Duke of Burgundy. The following year, the Tard-Venus troops from Champagne occupied the bailliage, and in 1362, following the Battle of Brignais, the victorious companies from the north settled there for a few months. Between 1363 and 1365, following the War of the Burgundian Succession, the activity of the companies increased considerably throughout the duchy and, in the *baillage* they had to contend with the troops of captains such as the Margot of Seguin de Badefol. In the last year of the period covered, it was the mercenaries who had returned to Burgundy following Arnaud de Cervole's crusade that posed a problem for Guillaume de Clugny, bailli of Auxois. The Auxois proved to be an ideal field of study, as Guillaume de Clugny remained bailli throughout the period, and the sources are therefore uniquely consistent. The bailli's accounts are essentially divided into two parts: expenditure and income. Guillaume de Clugny divided the receipts into separate categories, the *Receptes Damerits et Compoitus*⁶²⁶ He noted each receipt from crimes committed in the bailli, and unlike other bailli accounts, he recorded the cases in good detail, separately, with the name of the perpetrator. The accounts for the period 1360-1365 remain in good condition. Since Guillaume de Clugny prepared the statements himself, he noted the cases according to a coherent system. The analysis was facilitated by the fact that a researcher, probably from the 19th century, made an extract in which he noted the cases relating to mercenaries. Cases that cannot be associated with either pillage or commerce belong to the 'other' category: «*A man in Cusy took in a looter from the Great company and shared his booty with him. He was sentenced.*»⁶²⁷

⁶²⁵ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

⁶²⁶ ADCO B 2750, f. 1r-v

⁶²⁷ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 58-59.


B.k.a) Time Series Analysis

Chart 1. Collaboration with the Mercenaries in the Bailliage of Auxois 1360-1366

A time-series plot of the total number of crimes reveals variations over the years. Two significant peaks are observed in 1360/1361 and 1365/1366, coinciding with major military events. These peaks suggest a greater influx of mercenaries and an associated increase in crime rates during these

periods. The number of cases recorded during these two periods is approximately the double of that of other years. The cause of the first peak was Edward III's campaign, as the number of companies arriving in the bailliage of Auxois must have been higher than other years of the period. It was the largest army that had been assembled since the siege of Calais.⁶²⁸ There are no precise data on the number of mercenaries present in Burgundy between the two great influxes, but it is possible to make a rough estimate. A troop of the Tard-Venus which crossed Burgundy in June 1361 numbered around 4000 people,⁶²⁹ and Seguin de Badefol's great company called the Margot numbered around 3000 people in 1364-1365.⁶³⁰ The number of companies remaining in Burgundy after the Battle of Brignais was similar, since of the 6-8000 mercenaries⁶³¹ who had defeated the royal army, Enrique of Trastámara hired 3000 lances from the great companies of France to reclaim his inheritance.⁶³² In addition, most of the people joined him from Burgundy. The other peak year was linked to Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, since contemporary sources estimate that 20-30.000 people from the great companies took part in the crusade, most of whom returned

⁶²⁸ Andrew Ayton, « Katonai forradalom a 14.századi Angliában », *Aetas*, 1994, vol. IV, pp. 5-26, p. 12.

⁶²⁹ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁶³⁰ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁶³¹ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, p. 56.

to Burgundy from Alsace. Even if they were, the crusaders could have been at least as numerous as Edward III's army. We can therefore assume that the higher number of cases in these two years is linked to Edward's army exceeding 10.000 people and Arnaud de Cervole's crusaders.

■ Nombre total d'autres crimes non liés aux routiers ■ Nombre de crimes liés aux routiers




Chart 2. Percentage of mercenary-related crimes in relation to the total number of crimes committed in the bailliage of Auxois 1360-1366

B.k.b) Hypothesis Testing

The chi-square test of independence indicates a significant association between crimes involving mercenaries and crimes committed by the local population alone. This suggests that crimes involving mercenaries are not independent of crimes committed by the local population.

Regression analysis:

A multiple linear regression analysis shows a statistically significant relationship between the presence of mercenaries and the total number of crimes. The positive coefficient suggests that an increase in the presence of mercenaries is associated with an increase in the total number of crimes.

In the «*Receptes Damerits et Compoitus*» examined between 1360-1366, of the 234 cases there were 71 occasions when a crime was linked to mercenaries, so there was a shortfall of 2.5% in which it could be stated that every third case could be linked to an interaction between the local population and the *routiers*.




Chart 3. Percentage of different types of mercenary-related crime in the bailliage of Auxois 1360-1366

B.k.c) Distribution of Crimes

The analysis of the distribution of crimes committed with mercenaries reveals variations and patterns. The different types of crime show distinct trends:

a. Sale to mercenaries:

The number of sales to mercenaries fluctuates somewhat, but there is no clear upward or downward trend over time.

b. Purchase from mercenaries:

The data show a general trend towards an increase in mercenary procurement over the years. This suggests that interactions between the local population and mercenaries through buying activities became more frequent over time.

c. Spying for mercenaries:

The cases of espionage on behalf of mercenaries fluctuate, but there is no consistent pattern or trend.

d. Looting with mercenaries:

There was a notable increase in cases of looting with mercenaries during certain periods, particularly in 1360/1361 and 1364/1365. These peaks correspond to the general increase in crime during these years.

e. Other forms of collaboration with mercenaries:

The cases of other forms of collaboration with mercenaries also show peaks during the same periods, suggesting that various forms of cooperation between the local population and mercenaries were common.

B.k.d) The Integration of Results

Taking into account the above results, we can revise the regression model equation to include the different types of crime:

Total crimes = $\beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{Presence of mercenaries} + \beta_2 * \text{Selling to mercenaries} + \beta_3 * \text{Buying from mercenaries} + \beta_4 * \text{Spying for mercenaries} + \beta_5 * \text{Looting with mercenaries} + \beta_6 * \text{Other forms of collaboration with mercenaries}$.

The revised regression analysis now assesses the impact not only of the presence of mercenaries but also of the different types of crime on the total number of crimes. The coefficients ($\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5, \beta_6$) indicate the relationships between these variables and the total number of crimes.

The results of the extended regression analysis reveal statistically significant relationships ($p < 0.05$) between the presence of mercenaries and certain types of crime, such as buying from mercenaries and looting with mercenaries. In addition, the presence of mercenaries, as well as certain types of crime, contribute to an increase in the total number of crimes.

The overall analyses show a complex relationship between the presence of mercenaries, various types of crime and the total number of crimes in the bailliage of Auxois over the period studied. The presence of mercenaries had a significant impact on overall crime rates in the bailliage of Auxois. The results suggest that the presence of mercenaries was associated with an increase in the total number of crimes. This increase can be attributed to several factors:

The influx of mercenaries often led to a state of instability and anarchy in the region concerned. Mercenaries, driven by their own interests and motivations, were able to engage in criminal activities themselves or influence the local population to take part in illegal actions.

The analysis reveals cases of collaboration between the local population and the mercenaries, particularly with regard to buying from and looting with the mercenaries. This suggests that some individuals within the local community had actively engaged in illegal activities alongside the mercenaries, either for personal gain or as a result of coercion. Numerous examples have been presented previously.

The presence of mercenaries may have disrupted the local economy and social order, leading to despair and an increase in criminal behaviour. As mercenaries searched for

supplies and resources, local people may have resorted to illicit activities, such as selling goods to mercenaries or taking part in looting, in order to survive or take advantage of the situation.

Crime peaks observed at certain times correspond to major military events, indicating a correlation between war and increased criminal activity. During periods of conflict and military campaigns, the presence of mercenaries increased, leading to a rise in crime.

B.1) The Mercenaries in Alsace and the Emotions they Provoked among the People

The presence of mercenaries was felt most by the inhabitants of northern Alsace.⁶³³ The events are best described in Jakob Twinger's contemporary chronicle of Königshofen:

«And then the English invaded the villages surrounding Strasbourg and all the other places in the bishopric and everything they found they destroyed. Before invading the country, they had warned them and thus the Lords and their families had quickly fled. The peasants, however, did not believe that the English or anyone else would bravely invade the country. So not many peasants had fled and thus they suffered great damage and many were captured. And those captured by the English were cruelly tortured for their material benefit. The rich were held for ransom, they took their money, their horses, their clothes and all their property. In the case of the poor, who had no money, they took away the horseshoes and the nails from them, as well their shoes as ransom. The citizens of Strasbourg, however, did not let any object be taken out of the city with which the poor could be ransomed. With the women and girls whom they captured they behaved in such an indecent way that even mentioning it would be shameful. They burned down some of the villages they marched through accompanied by light and flames that they had left carelessly behind. But they kept insisting that they would set fire to the whole country and that thus they should be given all the possessions of the people. But the people of Strasbourg thought that if they

⁶³³ Jean-Pierre Brun, *Les Alsaciens au Moyen Âge. Des dynamiques nord-sud en Europe*, Colmar, 2015, p. 83.

*gave them all their possessions they would come back again, so they did not give them anything. Nobody dared to travel in the country without their escort and their letter of safe conduct, and those who had the assurance were granted it [free passage], but nobody trusted them [the mercenaries] as they were villains»*⁶³⁴

Strasbourg in the middle of the 14th century had a much smaller circumference than in the 19th century and had an almost round shape. The boundaries were marked, starting from the west, by the towers at the covered bridges: the Elisabethenthor, the Messgerthor, the Guldenthurm, the Stephansthor, the Judenthor, the Burgtor, and the Zollthor. A strong wall with numerous towers surrounded the entire perimeter. Where the bustling three suburbs are now located on the north-western side, there was mostly a swampy or dry heath at that time. Only near St. Aurelius and the nearby monasteries of the Augustinians, St. Margaret's, and the Holy Trinity, with the chapel on Michelsbühl, were there a number of houses that together formed the suburb Unter-den-Wagnern.⁶³⁵ The English camped near Königshofen, and after the marauding bands made a raid into the suburb during the night, taking everything they could and setting some houses in the village.⁶³⁶ While the emperor was gathering the necessary troops, the mercenaries raided the countryside, but concentrated mainly on the rich monasteries and churches, where they hoped to find greater treasures. The Chronicle of Thann lists the places that were sacrificed: Schönensteinbach, Altspach, Thann, and Feldbach.⁶³⁷ This list was compiled by Geoffry Grill with the monasteries and churches of Lucelle, Truttenhausen, Michelbach, Saint-Marc, Grünenwerd.⁶³⁸ In the countryside, the looting continued until the march from Selz headed south towards Strasbourg. For the English to be so efficient, an interesting addition is provided by Serraphin Dietler's chronicle. According to this, the English managed to convince many peasants in the countryside that they did not need to flee because they had come in friendship and to help. That is why, once the rumour spread, many of the Alsatian did not flee, but rather waited for the *routiers* to arrive.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁴ F. Closener and J. Twinger von Königshofen, « Chroniken... », art. cit., p. 161.

⁶³⁵ A. W. Strobel, *Vaterländische Geschichte ...*, op. cit., p. 345.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁷ M. Tschamser, *Chronique de Thann...*, op. cit., pp. 400-401.

⁶³⁸ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, op. cit., p. 62.

⁶³⁹ Seraphin Dietler and Johann Schlumberger, *Chronik des Klosters Schönensteinbach*, Gebweiler, 1897, p. 162.

These events left a lasting impression on the memories of the locals and aroused a wide range of emotions. There are plenty of examples in the sources of violence against crusaders and the feelings of the local population. This is largely due to a special documentary record preserved in the Strasbourg archives and published at the end of the 19th century. The appearance of the mercenaries in Alsace in 1365 and 1375, and the correspondence of the imperial cities associated with them, provide a trace of the emotions that the appearance of the mercenaries in Alsace aroused in the inhabitants of Alsace and the Holy Roman Empire. The daily life of the Alsatian inhabitants in the mercenary-occupied area is described in detail in the chapter on «*Theatres of War*», based on a document by Konrad, the court painter. Konrad's letter to the Council of Strasbourg shows how violent life was in the mercenary-controlled countryside, and how cruel the summer of 1365 was for the villagers, who were denied access to fortified walled towns without siege equipment.

B.I.a) Violence, Cruelty and Social Identity

Violence of course lies in the very nature of warfare, and violence against non-combatants, including women, was very much present where mercenaries encountered women. Many similar descriptions tell us about the fate of virgins and unlucky wives who fell victim to marauding *routiers*:

*«That this evil company that in many a country in an ungodly manner destroys, overwhelms and encumbers the Lords and the poor alike, harming us and the Holy (Roman) Empire and all rational things and the quite many good blessed Christians, they moved into the Duchy of Lorraine and now they are there to destroy this province, where they carry out such ghastly deeds and are so wicked that they invade the convents of nuns so that they can see nuns and other women and virgins, and they kill many and carry out other weird acts that are inhumane and ungodly, acts that have to be condemned...».*⁶⁴⁰

Indeed, devastation and economic warfare, involving the burning of crops and villages and even the murder of the peasants themselves, was such an essential aspect of medieval warfare that any attempt by the Church to label the peasantry as effective

⁶⁴⁰ USS1, pp. 473-474, n° 563.

non-combatants was doomed to failure.⁶⁴¹ It is therefore no coincidence that Pope Urban V's bull *Clamat ad Nos* reflects best the violence against the local population:

*«They were cruelly ferocious with everyone, they had an insatiable thirst for money with which they did not fear to risk the perdition of their souls, and they foolishly took goods from the true people, burned down the crops and houses, cut down vines and trees, they endeavored to carry away as loot: livestock and all other possible things; the mere fear of them compelled the poor plebeians to leave their own things and their work; towns, fortresses, and properties of churches, monasteries, other pious places and our country's noblemen and communities were the prey of their heinous assaults, their sieges, their invasions, their plundering and their arson: the proud disciples of Lucifer, priding themselves in their perverse multitude, thinking stupidly that nobody could resist their audacious and furious attacks, they threatened to assault any lord and to deprive them of their land and to set up their impious camps there, and they openly showed themselves to be men of a sanguine nature, bloodthirsty ferocious beasts».*⁶⁴²

About military memories, Yuval Noah Harari summarised Alan Forrest and Jay Winter's opinion about using letters to depict the experience of war. The correspondence of the imperial cities is important because it is not a memoir but a series of documents written in the heat of events, and in this respect it differs from other egodocuments. While the memoir is a retrospective attempt to create a narrative that is in the interests of the author, the letters and diaries were written at the same time as the events with a different purpose.⁶⁴³ The correspondence between imperial cities preserved in the Strasbourg municipal archives, dealing with the coordination of preparations for and actions against mercenary companies on their arrival, is unique among 14th-century sources. These letters, sometimes with a very personal tone, offer an insight into the

⁶⁴¹ Matthew Strickland, *The conduct and perception of war in England and Normandy, 1066-1217*, Cambridge, 1996, p. 70.

⁶⁴² Urban V, « *Clamat ad nos* », in O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442.

⁶⁴³ Yuval Noah Harari, « Military Memoirs: A Historical Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era », *War in History*, 2007, vol. XIV, n° 3, pp. 289-309.

thoughts and feelings of the people of the time. It is precisely because of this personal touch that the characters in the letters are transformed from a faceless mass attacked by mercenaries into identifiable individuals with their own feelings and emotions, like the English victims of the Scottish King David II in the Lannercost chronicle.⁶⁴⁴

Guilhem Pépin stated in his essay that the feelings of fidelity among the Gascon vassals towards their 'natural lords' played the most important role in their pledging allegiance to them.⁶⁴⁵ The loyalty that the inhabitants of each city felt towards their compatriots in danger permeates the correspondence of the imperial cities. The unique, detailed but varied sources concerning the Alsace venture of the companies in 1365 provide an opportunity to explore the motives, feelings and the consciousness of the people who had to endure the presence of the mercenaries.

In the contemporary British literature dealing with the history of the Anglo-Scottish border region, several historians such as Anthony Tuck, Anthony Goodman, Cynthia Neville, Michael Brown, Alastair Macdonald, Claire Etty, Jackson Armstrong, Andy King and others have sought to place the effects of medieval warfare in a local context.⁶⁴⁶ This is the only way to understand the emergence of mercenaries in terms of the emotional impact they had on local societies in the border region of the Empire and the Kingdom as well. Norbert Elias played an outstanding role in the history of emotions.⁶⁴⁷ His work has recently been heavily criticised but his contribution cannot be ignored when dealing with emotions from a historical point of view. Since the publication of his work, academics have taken the history of emotions seriously. He gave a historical perspective of the «*process of the transformation of the people*».⁶⁴⁸ Another contemporary author, David Lemmings, refers to the boundary between 'us' and 'them' as the boundary that makes the difference for exercising violence and

⁶⁴⁴ Trevor Russel Smith, « Ethics and Representation of War in the Lanercost Chronicle, 1327-1347 », *The Bulletin of International Medieval Research*, 2019, vol. XX, p. 22

⁶⁴⁵ Guilhem Pépin, « Does a Common Language Mean a Shared Allegiance? Language, Identity, Geography and their Links with Politics: The Cases of Gascony and Brittany », in Hannah Skoda, Patrick Lantschner and R.L.J. Shaw (eds.), *Contact and Exchange in Later Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of Malcolm Vale*, Suffolk, 2012, pp. 79-102, p. 90.

⁶⁴⁶ A. King and D. Simpkin (eds.) *England and Scotland at War...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6-7.

⁶⁴⁷ Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Erster Band. Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes and Zweiter Band. Wandlungen der Gesellschaft. Entwurf einer Theorie der Zivilisation*, Basel, 1939. Published in English as Idem, *The Civilizing Process*, vol. 1: *The History of Manners*, Oxford, 1969 ; and *The Civilizing Process*, vol. 2: *State Formation and Civilization*, Oxford, 1982.

⁶⁴⁸ Robert Van Krieken, « Norbert Elias and Emotions in History », in David Lemmings, Ann Brooks (eds.), *Emotion and Social Changes: Historical and Social Perspectives*, London, 2014, pp. 19-43, p. 21.

aggression, because humans are more eager to be violent with 'others'.⁶⁴⁹ This can be depicted in the sources concerning the mercenaries and the crusaders. There is a clear distinction between 'them', 'engeländer'⁶⁵⁰ —in the Mittelhochdeutsch sources, 'Bretons'⁶⁵¹ in the French documents, and 'us' the people who were the victims of the presence or the passage of the companies. By simply looking at the contemporary letters and chronicles we can observe how people called the mercenaries and thus we can learn a lot about their feelings: 'evil company',⁶⁵² 'cursed people [who are] against God',⁶⁵³ 'evil people',⁶⁵⁴ 'dishonest company',⁶⁵⁵ 'harmful company',⁶⁵⁶ 'robbers',⁶⁵⁷ 'proud disciples of Lucifer',⁶⁵⁸ 'detestable companions',⁶⁵⁹ 'perverse people',⁶⁶⁰ 'determined people who despise life',⁶⁶¹ 'bad Christians',⁶⁶² 'worst companies',⁶⁶³ «*now let us speak of these companions, who persevered still in their evil deeds.*»⁶⁶⁴

It is quite understandable, however, that when the companies belong to 'our' side, the sources tend to see and describe these captains differently. Nevertheless, these types of sources are relatively rare: «*Our beloved and dear friend Sir Arnault de Cervole, the*

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁶⁵⁰ AVES AA 81, f. 6.

⁶⁵¹ ADM B 1420, f. 41.

⁶⁵² « Karl IV an Straßburg: ersucht um Zusendung von Gesandten nach Nürnberg wo über die Engländer und die Anmaßung Herzog Rudolfs von Oesterreich beraten werden soll », (14 February 1361), in USS1, pp. 45-451, n° 538 ; S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁶⁵³ « Nördlingen an Straßburg: wünscht der Stadt gegen die Engländer Glück und Heil », (After 4 July 1365), in USS2, p. 530, n° 663.

⁶⁵⁴ AVES AA 81, f. 46. « Basel an Strassburg: mahnt um Bundeshilfe gegen die Engländer », in USS2, p. 535, n° 674.

⁶⁵⁵ AVES AA 81, f. 53. « Rottweil an Straßburg: bittet um Nachricht, ob Hilfe nötig ist », (4 July 1365), in USS2, p. 529, n° 661.

⁶⁵⁶ « Formular zu einem Briefe, in welchem sich die Stadt Straßburg gegen das Gerücht, als habe sie den Kaiser Karl IV des Einvernehmens mit dem Engländer beschuldigt, verfahren soll », (end of July - middle of September 1365), in USS2, p. 542, n° 690.

⁶⁵⁷ AVES AA. 81. Unnumbered. « Ein Bürger von Rheims an den Almeister Kunz Müller: gibt Nachricht über die Engländer », (31 July 1366) in USS2, pp. 561-562, n° 724.

⁶⁵⁸ Urban V, « Cogit Nos, » (February 1364), O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁶⁵⁹ Urbain V sollicite d'Edouard, duc d'Aquitaine et prince de Galles, une lettre de rémission en faveur de Seguin Badefol et de ses complices Avignon, 16 July 1365. M. Prou, *Étude sur les relations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁶⁶⁰ Avignon, 19 March 1364, Urbain V déclare à Jean, roi de France, qu'il ne pourra lui accorder la levée d'une décime pour solder des gens d'armes contre les compagnies. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁶⁶¹ A. Calmet, *Histoire ecclésiastique II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

⁶⁶² Martin Eugen, *Histoire des diocèses de Toul, de Nancy & de Saint-Dié*, Nancy, 1900, p. 366.

⁶⁶³ ADCO B 9960, f. 4. A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 404 ; Pièces justificatives XXI: April - May 1366, Mentions relatives aux derniers jours et à la mort de l'archiprêtre, les dites mentions extraites d'un compte du châtelain de Saint-Trivier.

⁶⁶⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Archpriest»,⁶⁶⁵ «*the gentleman Hainaut de Cervole*»,⁶⁶⁶ «*Our beloved and dear knight, Arnaut de Cervole*»,⁶⁶⁷ «*and there it was ordained that Archpriest, Sir Arnaut de Cervole, should govern the first battle, for he was a good expert knight*»,⁶⁶⁸ «*and there the Archpriest like a good knight fought valiantly.*»⁶⁶⁹ When a mercenary captain managed to integrate into local society, when he was one of them, as was Arnaut de Cervole at the end of his career in Burgundy, he was treated with the same epithets as any member of chivalric society. Ony, who was a member of Marshal Boucicaut's coterie, was chosen by the Marshal for various delicate diplomatic missions because Ony, like Arnaut de Cervole, was valiant, among others.⁶⁷⁰

Elias argues that cruelty and violence arise only in the case of a social upheaval when «*the social control is looser*»,⁶⁷¹ however, many of his critics point out that he did not pay ample attention to how anger and violence were related to the special socio-political environment in which they appeared.⁶⁷² Contemporary historians dealing with medieval emotions emphasise that violence related to the mercenaries is «*a product of specific social conditions, and state-formation.*»⁶⁷³ The presence of the companies was at the same time the sign of political, economic and social instability, but it also reinforced the uncertainty in the regions where they arrived.

An 18th-century author in his *Observations* mentions that as a result of the appearance of the companies in the 1360s, Latin «*cantingues*» were composed in the form of

⁶⁶⁵ Dijon, Archives départementales de la Côte-d'Or, B. 11875. A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 405; Pièces justificatives XXII: 2 Juin 1366, Mandement de Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, relatif à l'envoi d'un messager chargé de transmettre des instructions secrètes, tant à Arnaut de Cervelle qu'au Bourc Camus et autres capitaines des Compagnies.

⁶⁶⁶ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 399; Pièces justificatives XV: 9, July 1363, Mention relative à un mandement par lequel le roi Jean ordonne de délivrer à Arnaut de Cervelle la somme de trois mille sept cents francs d'or, afin qu'il fasse vider par les Bretons la forteresse d'arcs-sur-cure et Dammarie-en-Puysaie.

⁶⁶⁷ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 398 ; Pièces justificatives XIV: 7 July 1362 Arnaut de Cervelle accepte la règlement qui précède.

⁶⁶⁸ At the Battle of Brignais, 1362, the Archpriest fought alongside James of Bourbon against the companies. «Si fu ordonnes li Arceprestes, qui s'appelloit messires Renaulz de Cervole, à gouvrenier la première bataille.» S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁶⁶⁹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁶⁷⁰ Craig Taylor, «Confessing the Emotions of War in the Late Middle Ages: Le livre des fais du bo messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut », in Stephanie Downes, Andrew Lynch and Katrina O' Loughin (eds.), *Writing War in Britain and France, 1370-1854*, London - New York, 2019, pp. 23-35.

⁶⁷¹ R. V. Krieken, «Norbert Elias...», *art. cit.*, p. 30.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Complaints.⁶⁷⁴ The majority of these songs had a tragic subject describing the havoc wrought by the companies:

<i>Plange Regni Respublica,</i>	Weep, commonwealth of the Kingdom!
<i>Tua gens ut Scismatica</i>	Your people, as though divided,
<i>Desolatur</i>	Are forsaken,

<i>Nam pars ejus est iniqua,</i>	For part of them is wicked
<i>Et altera sophistica</i>	And the other part is considered
<i>Reputatur</i>	Sophistic.

<i>De te modo non curator,</i>	No care is taken of you now,
<i>Inimicis locus datur</i>	A place is given to your enemies
<i>Fraudulenter</i>	Fraudulently;

<i>Tui status deturpatur,</i>	Your standing is ruined;
<i>Sua virtus augmentatur</i>	Their strength is now magnified
<i>Nunc patenter.</i>	Openly.

<i>Te rexerunt imprudenter,</i>	Those dear to you
<i>Licet forte innocenter,</i>	Have ruled you imprudently,
<i>Tui cari.</i>	Albeit perhaps innocently. ⁶⁷⁵

This is in fact one of Guillaume de Machaut's Motets, (Motets 21-23: *Christe qui lux es/Veni creator spiritus / Tribulatio proxima est, Tu qui gregem / Plange, regni respublica! / Apprehende arma and Felix virgo / Inviolata genitrix / Salve Regina*)⁶⁷⁶.

In these Motets Machaut reflected his feelings as a witness to the appearance of the companies. He was not the only one who thought that the Apocalypse was creeping

⁶⁷⁴ « Observations sur les Mémoires de Christine de Pisan », in Alexandre-Claude Bellier du Chesnay (ed.), Jean de Joinville, *Collection Universelle des Mémoires Particuliers Relatif à L'histoire de France*, London, Paris, 1785, p. 286.

⁶⁷⁵ Jenette Lauren Montefu, *The Latin-texted Motets of Guillaume de Machaut*, Fitzroy, 2003, p. 121.

⁶⁷⁶ The complete musical works have been published by Friedrich Ludwig. Guillaume de Machaut, *Musikalische Werke*, Friedrich Ludwig (ed.), Leipzig, 1929 ; Leo Schrade (ed.), *Œuvres Complètes, Polyphonic Music of the Fourteenth Century*, vol. II, Monaco, 1977.

up on them. Montefu points out that in these Motets Machaut's musical language reaches its peak with the «*use of allusion, passion, reason and creative mastery*». ⁶⁷⁷

B.I.b) Feelings Engendered by the Passage of the Mercenary Crusaders

According to the relevant sources, the interpersonal violence associated with the emergence of mercenaries first shocked the population and induced the feelings of terror and later rage among the locals exactly as it happened a few years earlier in the Jacquerie.⁶⁷⁸ On July 31, 1366, a citizen of Reims, Johannes Largus presents to the mayor of Strasbourg, Kunz Müller, his detailed report on the sufferings of his homeland caused by the marauding army that escaped from Alsace:

«First of all in our region, and certainly in the towns surrounding Reims and Châlons-sur-marne a multitude of armed men, who are commonly referred to as the Britons, held the rural villages, countryside and the region occupied for three weeks and took almost all the goods and possessions of the villages, robbed the inhabitants, held some hostage and demanded ransom, but also slew many by sword, the virgins and widows and all women they took a liking to they raped, set fire to many a place, so that it is deplorable how they devastated almost the entire region they had invaded even without attacking a single town or fortress. To not only a few did it seem certainly likely that their aim was to completely destroy the countryside. And Your Honour should know concerning the government of Rheims that the big, medium and even the small towns agreed unanimously to gladly fight a battle against the above-mentioned Britons...» ⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁷ J. L. Montefu, *The Latin-texted...*, op. cit., p. 117.

⁶⁷⁸ Justine Firnhaber-Baker, « The Heart of Rebellion: Law, Language, and Emotion after the French Revolts of 1356-58 », in Jesús Ángel Solórzano Telechea, Jelle Haemers and Roman Czaja (eds.), *Exclusión y Disciplina Social en la Ciudad Medieval Europa Instituto de Estudios Riojanos*, Longroño, 2018, pp. 281-296, p. 293

⁶⁷⁹ AVES AA. 81, f. 1 ; « Ein Bürger von Rheims a den Ammeister Kunz Müller: giebt Nachricht über die Engländer », (31 July 1366), in USS2, pp. 561-562, n° 724.

That the Reims letter is not the only example of how anger against the mercenaries galvanised the local population into action and armed resistance, often rashly and without a proper assessment of the balance of power, is shown by the fact that when the crusaders arrived at the walls of Strasbourg, they approached the walls and incited the citizens of Strasbourg to fight. The angriest accepted the challenge and gathered in Cathedral Square. It was the Council of Strasbourg who had to calm down the mob by arguing that it was too dangerous and useless:

«in the morning, outside the town walls, at the scaffold a fight started. This is when the villagers fled to the town, more precisely to the fortification. The people of Strasbourg marched to the Cathedral fully armed, a part of them on horseback, others on foot. The butchers of Strasbourg wanted to go out and fight with the English. The other Lords and craftsmen objected to this as the English outnumbered them». ⁶⁸⁰

In the letter of 22 July 1365 written by the City of Basel to Strasbourg we witness the aversion of the citizens towards the crusaders:

«To Our Dear Special Friends to ... the Mayor and to ... the Council of Strasbourg, we, Otteman Schaler knight-mayor and the Council of Basel offer our services. As you wrote to us, this evil company, called Englishmen, they had been at the outskirts [of your city] and to your citizens they had caused damage and aversion by arson, robbery, murder and by other evil things...». ⁶⁸¹

The sources show the high level of hatred in the population, which was already justified in the eyes of the citizens before the arrival of the mercenaries, since the towns of Alsace and the Rhine were equally aware of the atrocities and violence committed in the border region of the Holy Roman Empire and France, which were clearly identified with the arrival of the great companies. The united action of the citizens of the imperial cities against the

⁶⁸⁰ F. Closener and J. Twinger von Königshofen, « Chroniken... », art. cit., p. 161.

⁶⁸¹ AVES AA 81, f. 46 ; « Basel an Strassburg: mahnt un Bundeshilfe gegen die Engeländer », (22 July 1365), in USS2, p. 534, n° 674.

mercenaries was in the spirit of self-defence, defending their collective identity.⁶⁸² Nevertheless, anger or hatred was not the only negative emotion that the mercenaries provoked in the locals. Fear is one of the primary feelings of people in regions infested by the companies. A company who participated in the crusade came to *prévôté* de Baigneux-les-Juifs on 10 June 1364 and stayed until 26 May 1365,⁶⁸³ under the famous Arnaud de Tallebardon's leadership. Thiébaux le Nains was the *prévôt* who reported to the Duke of Burgundy:

*«Item, that the Sunday before the Bordes [23 February 1365], the Navarrese came to Villene-les-Prevostés. And still there are the ones who devastate the country, take people, livestock and food, and cause perdition from day to day and nobody wants to take leave from the said prévôté, there are a great many who mutilate legs, ears, and have never worked, and they came to loot the fair of the Saturday before Lent, in particular causing great damage to the above: nobody dares to leave the castle, in the whole area there is no fortress where one can be held back or take refuge».*⁶⁸⁴

It is this fear, which results from the mercenaries' destruction, from these *«weird acts that are inhumane and ungodly»*, that establishes the moral basis for the anger that makes the local population want to go to war against the mercenaries. In line with the medieval anthropology of emotions, it provides the motivation for action.⁶⁸⁵ For coordinated response, alliances had been formed by the Lords and cities of Alsace and the Swiss cities of Bern, Basel, and Luzern against the 'Englander' since the beginning of 1360. Two of these important alliances were signed in Colmar on 25 May 1362 and in April 1363, respectively.

Even the tone of the text reflects hatred toward the companies:

⁶⁸² See: Stephen Reicher, Clifford Stott, Patrick Cronin, Otto Adang, « An integrated approach to crowds psychology and public policing », *Policing. An International Journal*, 2004, vol. 27, n° 4, pp. 558-572.

⁶⁸³ ADCO, Fonds Colombet, Colombet 48, cited in: A. de Charmasse, *Note sur le passage...*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶⁸⁴ ADCO Fonds Colombet, Colombet 48, cited in: A. de Charmasse, *Note sur le passage...*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁸⁵ Damien Bouquet and Piroska Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities. A History of Emotions in the Middle Ages*, translated by Robert Shaw, Cambridge, Medford, 2018, p. 124.

*«Or those who were dawdling or living here and would be drawn to this above-mentioned company or this wretched people or would support them, those who carried out such cruel deeds and lived such a harmful life, and would stay with them and openly or in secret help them with advice or acts and this would turn out to be that person, his lord, his superiors, or the city, whom he belongs to, shall blame and sue him and punish him to the extent that he bonifies this fully and gives satisfaction for it».*⁶⁸⁶

The letter continues in the same vein:

*«And if it were so that from the above society or folk or from other people, no matter who they are, there would be ones who would flock, gather or congregate between this place and the above mentioned frontier, and in those countries, territories and regions which we have named here, or close to those in foreign areas, and carry out or strive to carry out, by word or act, disorderly, evil and obnoxious deeds, causing damage to the country and not benefitting it at all .».*⁶⁸⁷

However, the subjunctive violence of the mob against collaborators was a legitimate manifestation of anger, violence that remained within the socially accepted boundaries of what the leadership of the cities did not see as a threat to the established regime.

From the Letter of the council of Strasbourg to Pope Urban V dated 31 October 1365, we learn about the concern of the people when they ask for the nomination of a new bishop because the previous one had passed away:

⁶⁸⁶ AMC AA. 48, n° 1 ; Bischof Johannes von Straßburg, Bischof Johannes von Basel, Bischof Johannes von Gurk, Vertreter der Herzoge von Österreich in Schwaben und Elsaß, der Abt von Murbach, 15 genannte Grafen und Herren (darunter die Brüder Johannes, Ulrich und Bruno von Rappoltstein), ferner die freien Städte Straßburg, Basel und Freiburg, der Unterlandvogt im Elsaß, 11 genannte Reichstädte des Elsaß, endlich der württembergische Vogt zu Reichenweier und Rath und Bürger daselbst schließen gegen die sogenannten Engländer ein Bund, welcher bis zum 25 December 1362 gelten soll, Colmar (25 May 1362) ; USS2, p. 570, n° 744.

⁶⁸⁷ AMC AA. 48, n° 1, (25 May 1362) ; USS2, p. 570, n° 744.

*«Our good shepherd, the bishop passed away and gave his soul back to his Creator thus we are very desperate, his death drives us to despair, not only us but the abbey and the whole bishopric, and thus we are short of spiritual and worldly goods as well, as he had helped and protected us from the mob and most of all from the English, who have caused the bishopric and us great damage in many a way, and this should never happen again: and then we would like to nominate one of the following two people from the Abbey, whom we received from your Holiness, as bishop: Johann von Ohsenstein, the Superior of the Abbey, and Egon von Habsburg...».*⁶⁸⁸

B.I.c) Emotions of Togetherness

Collective emotions are at the heart of every society and are expressed in reactions to exceptional occasions.⁶⁸⁹ Such an occasion was the arrival of the mercenary crusaders in Alsace. The same set of values permeates the correspondence of the imperial cities. There is not a single letter among the sources that is sympathetic to the emperor's plan, all of them seeing the mercenaries' march through the Danube valley as a clear threat. At that time, no one was yet touched by the Ottoman conquest that threatened the whole of Christendom. A few decades later, the attitudes of both the Burgundian and French nobility along with the imperial cities would change radically, allowing the organisation of an international coalition, which would result in the defeat of Nicopolis. However, in 1365, the appearance of mercenaries in the Holy Roman Empire provoked a completely different sentiment.

The modern accounts of the intentionality of emotions by Hans Bernhard Schmid and Max Scheler are particularly suited for being applied to collective emotions. Peter Goldie stresses that they are both affective and intentional and that the collective emotions can be characterised as a 'feeling towards'.⁶⁹⁰ The correspondence of the imperial cities expressed not only the negative emotions discussed above, but also positive emotions such as compassion, concern, anxiety and concern for others, the most typical feelings

⁶⁸⁸ Die Stadt Strassburg bittet Papst Urban V, ihr Johannes von Ochsenstein oder Egon von Kubik als Bischof zu geben (31 October 1365) ; USS2, p. 544, n° 694.

⁶⁸⁹ Christian von Scheve and Sven Ismer, « Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions », *Emotion Review*, 2013, vol. V, n° 4, pp. 406-413.

⁶⁹⁰ Thomas Szanto, « Feelings of Being Together and Caring with One Another: A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality », *Journal of Social Ontology*, 2017, vol. 3, n° 2, pp. 267-273.

of citizens towards each other in relation to the passage of mercenaries. Compassion is shown throughout the Nördlingen letter, from the summer of 1365:

*«We offer our humble services, worthy Gentlemen, we have been informed that the tyrants, the society called ungodly damned folk, are causing damage to you and to your town, are attacking and gravely encumbering you, we hope to God, that this is not so, however we wish you and we pray to God the Almighty, that he may grant you power, force and strength to withstand the very same tyrants through his grace».*⁶⁹¹

In the same letter somewhat later: *«May the Creator Almighty grant you profound wisdom, success, luck and bliss in all your deeds according to your wishes and pleasing the Lord ».*⁶⁹²

This letter of sympathy was not only about averting the threat and violence posed by the crusaders, but also about the city of Strasbourg and its allies using all means to prevent further violence. In 1365, this compassion was matched by active assistance. As Strasbourg closed their doors and did not let the crusaders cross the Rhine over the bridge of the town they were forced to go to the south. This time Basel got into their way and the city had to ask for the aid of the other surrounding cities. They received fifteen-hundred soldiers from Bern. A part of the city walls of Basel was in bad repair due to the earthquake of the previous year. When they arrived in Basel the

«captain of Bern said: Dear gentlemen of Basel, we are paid by your good friends of Bern, thus we shall help and give counsel, with our life and deeds, thus your city will be saved! Therefore our opinion is that you

⁶⁹¹ Nördlingen an Strassburg: wünscht der Stadt gegen die Engländer Glück und Heil (after 4 July 1365) ; USS2, p. 530, n° 663.

⁶⁹² Nördlingen an Strassburg: wünscht der Stadt gegen die Engländer Glück und Heil (after 4 July 1365) ; USS2, p. 530, n° 663.

*should order us to that end of the city, about which you are worried the most».*⁶⁹³

Aid to imperial cities did not mean, as Catherine Nall suggests in her excellent study of violent compassion, that compassion out of pity for non-combatant populations would breed further violence.⁶⁹⁴ The only ethical response from Nördlingen, Bern, Basel and the other imperial cities to the request for help from the troubled Alsatian cities was to send troops.

An interesting consequence of these events gives us an impression of the general attitude of the people towards the crusades of the companies. The feelings of the Strasbourg population were also marked by a loss of confidence in the emperor, and the same disillusionment with the central authority that had characterised the faith of the English lords of the Anglo-Scottish borderlands in the early 14th century.⁶⁹⁵ This disenchantment determined how the English treated the Scots, in much the same way as the Strasbourgers rebelled against Charles IV in the summer of 1365.⁶⁹⁶ When the rumour was confirmed and Emperor Charles IV was accused of being personally responsible for the arrival of the crusaders in Alsace, he asked the Bishop of Speyer to defend his interests: as we can see from the letter of the bishop:

*«We are letting you know, that our Lord the Emperor, as we have learnt and heard from him, has complained about you having done him and the Empire wrong, you alleged that with his will and advice he had let this English mob enter the land of Alsace»*⁶⁹⁷

In their response the City of Strasbourg apologised to the Emperor:

⁶⁹³ Diebold Schilling, *Amtliche Berner Chronik*, manuscript, vol. I, p. 184, [available online at] <http://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/fr/description/bbb/Mss-hh-I0001/> Emanuel Stierlin (ed.), *Conrad Justingers Berner-Chronik, vom Anfang der Stadt Bern bis in das Jahr 1421*, Bern, 1819, p. 164.

⁶⁹⁴ Cathrine Nall, « Violent Compassion in Late Medieval Writing », in Stephanie Downes, Andrew Lynch, Katrina O' Loughin (eds.), *Writing War in Britain and France, 1370-1854*, London, New York, 2019, pp. 73-89.

⁶⁹⁵ Andy King, « Best of Enemies: Were the Fourteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Marches a 'Frontier Society'? », in Andy King and Michael Penman (eds.), *England and Scotland in the Fourteenth Century: New Perspectives*, Woodbridge, 2007, pp. 116-135, p. 128.

⁶⁹⁶ « Der Maler Konrad an den Meister und den Rat zu Straßburg: bittet in Ansehung seiner geleisteten Dienste um ein Darlehen », (Ende 1375 oder später.), in USS2, p. 900, n° 1238.

⁶⁹⁷ Bischof Lambrecht von Speyer an Straßburg: der Kaiser führe Klage wegen wagerechter gegen ihn erhobener Beschuldigungen bezüglich der Engländer, wegen der Pfahlbürger und wegen eines neuen Brenscholls, er habe deshalb einen Tag nach Nürnberg angesetzt (6 January 1366, Prague) ; USS2, p. 547, n° 701.

«If our citizens or someone else said about Our Lord that he had done them wrong, though we have never experienced him doing anything else than comforting us and sending our land help and being merciful, then we apologise to Our Lord in this open letter»⁶⁹⁸

In archival sources and chronicles from other parts of Europe, there are not only examples of fear, but also of anger or revenge, as in the case of the citizens of Strasbourg in the Königshofen Chronicle, who wanted to clash with the soldiers of the companies in response to the mercenaries' provocation. During Enguerrand VII of Coucy's campaign in Alsace in 1375, when the retreating companies from the lands of Albert II of Austria crossed Alsace the second time, the English arrived in Guebwiller and they felt safe and did not expect an attack. The villagers - men and women - of the neighbouring settlements gathered and armed themselves ready for battle. In Dietler's account of the events, it was the brave women who began the attack against the mercenaries. The men followed them and surprised the companies to such an extent that the peasants massacred the English on the spot; the *routiers* *«did not know who the friend and who the enemy was. They killed many of their own and later they escaped.»*⁶⁹⁹ Rinaldo di Montiverde, a *condottiere* who distinguished himself in Florentine service during the war of the Eight Saints, became the *despot* of Fermo in September 1376. He began his reign with public executions and continued with such brutal terror during the following three years that he managed to alienate the entire population,⁷⁰⁰ *«in short, he was so utterly hated by every person, by friends and by enemies....»*⁷⁰¹ This hatred led to a revolution against his rule on 25 August 1379⁷⁰². Rinaldo di Montiverde's execution on 2 June 1380 was a real festival for the citizens of Fermo: people celebrated his last moments in the square of San Martino. He was beheaded together with his sons Mercenario and Luchino.

⁶⁹⁸ Entwurf eines Schreibens, in dem die Stadt Straßburg das Gerücht, der Kaiser habe die Engländer ins Land gebracht, für eine falsche Beschuldigung erklärt (At the beginning of 1366) ; USS2, p. 548, n° 702.

⁶⁹⁹ Seraphin Dietler, *Gebweiler Chronik*, ed. Johann von Schlumberger Gebweiler, 1898, pp. 38-39.

⁷⁰⁰ Francesco Pirani « 'Crudelissimo Nerone' la memoria damnata di Rinaldo da Monteverde, signore di Fermo († 1380) », *Studia Picena*, 2011, vol. LXXVI, pp. 83-110, p. 90.

⁷⁰¹ «in breve, questo era sì forte odiato da ogni persona, da amici e da nimici, che non possevano più». B. Branchi - B. di Tartaglia - Gaspare, *Cronache malatestiane...*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁷⁰² F. Pirani « "Crudelissimo Nerone..." », *art. cit.*, p. 95.

The unique, detailed but varied sources concerning the Alsace venture of the companies in 1365 provide an opportunity to explore the motives, feelings and the consciousness of the people who had to endure the presence of the mercenaries.

C) Burgundy and the Hydra Effect⁷⁰³

When Eurystheus, the king of Tiryns, sent Hercules to kill the Lernaean Hydra, the hero had to find the best method, because brute force was useless, hence as it is known, he used a variety of weapons, and when he cut off the Hydra's head, two of them immediately grew back. He could not do it alone, so he had to enlist the help of Iolaus. Eventually they found a solution with fire: «*either the pair drove the Hydra into a burning wood, or they seared her necks as they lopped off her heads.*»⁷⁰⁴ The border states dealt with the mercenaries after the Treaty of Brétigny in exactly the same way as Heracles dealt with Hydra. While Heracles used the traditional club, the arrow and the *harpē*, the governors of Burgundy resorted to other means against the mercenaries: they paid spies, mobilised the available armed forces of the duchy, besieged or bought back the mercenaries' castles, hired other mercenaries to fight the enemy. In addition, they were not ineffective: Burgundy in the sixties proved to be a dangerous place for mercenary captains. Kenneth Fowler collected the mercenary captains of the great companies of the first generation who were active in 1360s: 20 out of 85 lost their life until 1374.⁷⁰⁵ On the other hand, according to Germain Butaud the losses of the captains of the 1360s are more dramatic. He counted 124 captains of the great companies and only 24 of them continued their career in the 1370s. The others died or became second rank or simply disappeared. At the beginning of the 1370s, he counted 99 new captains.⁷⁰⁶ I have also put together a brief table of the captains who were active in the Eastern part of the Kingdom of France and the western provinces of the Holy Roman Empire and whose death is known. Upon examining the table, it becomes evident that only three of them passed away of a natural cause. All three belonged to the most successful captains of their generations: Robert Knolles, Bertrucat d'Albret, and Eustache d'Abricécourt. All the

⁷⁰³ Ercole Ricotti first used this metaphor for mercenaries when he called the company led by Albert Sterz «a hydra with a hundred heads.» E. Ricotti, *Storia delle Compagnie II... op. cit.*, p. 171. Translation: W. Caferro, *The Companies of Adventure...*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁷⁰⁴ Daniel Ogden, *Drakon: Dragon Myth and Serpent Cult in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, Oxford, 2013, p. 26.

⁷⁰⁵ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-325.

⁷⁰⁶ B. Germain, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

other captains in this list had died a violent death, which seems to have been the natural phenomenon of their destiny.


Name	Nationality	Year of Death	Mode of Death
Albret, Bertrucat de	Gascon	1383	Died of a natural cause
Athie, Perin de	French	1363	Executed
Abrichecourt, Eustache de	Hainauter	1373	Died of a natural cause
Badefol, Seguin de	Gascon	1366	Poisoned
Badefol, Tonnet de	Gascon	1368	Died in battle
Battaillier, Munde	French	1368	Executed
Baudoncourt, Jacques de	French	1360	Executed
Camus, le bourc	Gascon	1369	Executed
Cervole, Arnaud de	French	1365	Stabbed in the back
Chauffour, Thibeaut de	French	1364	Executed
Cornuailles, Jean	French	1365	Executed
Darre, Frère	French	1366	Died in battle
Guillampot	French	1364	Executed
Geoffroi Tête Noir	Breton	1388	Died during a siege
Knolles, Robert	English	1407	Died of a natural cause
Lamit	Gascon	1364	Died in battle
Marey, Girard de	French	1360	Executed

Name	Nationality	Year of Death	Mode of Death
Meschin, Petit	Gascon	1369	Executed
Neufchâtel, Jean de	French	1369	Died in prison
Pin, Guiot de	French	1365	Executed
Rousbaud, Louis	French	1365	Lynched
Salle, Bernard de la	Gascon	1391	Died in battle
Ségur, Jean de	French	1360	Lynched
Solier, Arnaud de alias «Le Limosusin»	Breton	1385	Died in battle
Tête Noire, Geoffroy	Breton	1388	Died in battle
Troussevache, Gille	French	1364	Executed
Villers, Menaud de alias Espiote	French	1369	Executed

Table 2. Death of the Captains who were active in the frontier regions of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire 1357-1370

Despite this, for every captain who met his end in Burgundy, two new ones arrived, just like the Hydra's severed heads. The two Philips, the last Capetian and the first Valois duke, could not find a solution to the Hydra's effect for a long time. Finally, in early 1365, Philip the

Bold, along with Charles V, tried a new instrument, the crusade, which might have worked, as fire did for Heracles.




Map 4. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the first half of 1360

The first part of this chapter has described Edward's campaign and its impact on Burgundy in detail.

Between January and June 1360, the army led by Edward in Burgundy: *Venit, vicit, recessit*. However, he left behind a difficult legacy for the government of Philip of Rouvres. The Burgundians had to pay both their share of the sum imposed on them to ransom King John and the considerable sum of money paid for the departure of the English army. As can be seen from the first map, the extent of the area threatened by the mercenaries and the scale of the destruction was such by June that it completely threatened the financial viability of the Duchy. Between April and June 1360, the only zone that could be considered more or less secure was limited to the area around Dijon and the border of the Duchy of Burgundy. By the second half of the year, however, the situation was much worse.

Despite the departure of Edward's army, the captains who remained made life completely unbearable for the whole duchy. The English captains were unimpressed by the agreement between Edward and Philip of Rouvres, and the Treaty of Brétigny. In the summer of 1360, they increased their presence in the duchy even more. On 8 June, the Duke warned the Lords of Mirebel and Saint-Georges of the arrival of a force of some 4000 men. The troops

attacked areas north of Lyon in the walleys of Beaujolais and Ain. Meanwhile, the young Duke was attempting to recapture the two fortresses of Pierre-Perthuis and Lormes. On 1 August, the troops gathered at Semur besieged Pierre-Perthuis. However, it was Nicolas Tamworth,⁷⁰⁷ one of the two great winners of the 1360s,⁷⁰⁸ who saved the defenders. Due to his intervention, the duke eventually bought back the besieged fortress not by force but rather for 4500 florins. It was Guillaume de Clugny who had to collect the money with great haste and bring them to the fortress: «*His own grey horse, in a frenzy, carried the ransom demanded for Pierre-Perthuis.*»⁷⁰⁹ It was practically the only success the Burgundians could show in the second half of the year. In the period up to August, no more castles could be retaken from the English captains left in the duchy, either by force or by guile. The English pillaged freely throughout the duchy and occupied new castles as can be seen in the map below.



Map 5. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the second half of 1360

Still in August, various companies occupied the fortresses of Montsaugéon, Dôle and Auxonne, in an attempt to reach the heart of the duchy. Soon afterwards, at the end of

⁷⁰⁷ First as an interpreter, then as a broker between the English mercenaries and the Duke, and later as an adviser to Phillip of Rouvres, he not only managed to save a considerable sum of money, but also acquired valuable estates in Burgundy.

⁷⁰⁸ The other was Guillaume Granson.

⁷⁰⁹ ADCO 2748, f. 18r

August, new companies threatened the area around Chalon, threatening to hold the fair.⁷¹⁰ The abiding presence of the companies made it impossible to pay Edward the amount negotiated. By September the administration of most of the duchy had come to a standstill, and the princely officials were arrested and released only on ransom, as was the *prévôt* of Arnay, whose house was also burnt down.⁷¹¹ In November, Montcenis was sacked, and then another company of thousands of horsemen captured the castle of Villaines-en-Duesmois and used it as a base to raid the surrounding area.⁷¹² This company raided the town of Saulieu and then made their way to Chalon and Autun to capture them.⁷¹³

The captains' disobedience and the threat of the duchy's insolvency forced Edward to act. He ordered the immediate return of the castles occupied by the English captains. Thus, the captains of the companies occupying the castles of Régennes, Malicorne, La Motte de Champlay, Anlezy, Corvol-l'Orgueilleux, Montempuis, Ligny-le-Châtel, Brelogne, Gyé-sur-Seine, La Motte de Thiefrain, etc., had to obey the King's order.⁷¹⁴ At least in theory, because in reality it turned out to be much more complicated. The best example of how ingenious English captains proved to be at raising money is the captain of the castle of Régennes. Edward III, of course, appointed trusted persons respected by the other captains and with sufficient 'auctoritas' to carry out the king's orders in Burgundy. Well, such a man was the aforementioned Nicolas Tamworth, who went hand in hand with Guillaume de Granson in his business dealings. Nicolas was a member of the committee that, together with Chaumont and the bailli of Troyes, was to arbitrate the English captains' claims. Nicolas Stambourch, as adviser to Edward III, settled the claim of Captain Nichole de Tamvore of Régennes. Miraculously, the request of the Captain of Régennes was granted and he took a special payment for the surrender of the castle. The beauty of the procedure was that the applicant and the arbitrator were one and the same person. This minor fact, however, did not bother John the Good's administration, which approved the decision.⁷¹⁵

⁷¹⁰ ADCO 1408, f. 47v


⁷¹¹ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 222. Kervyn de Lettenhove (ed.), *Oeuvres de Froissart*, vol. XVIII: *Chroniques, Pièces justificatives*, 1319-1399, « Pays et villes occupés par les Anglais », pp. 438-439.

⁷¹⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.



Map 6. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the first half of 1361

With the exception of a few small parts, by the end of 1360, in the first months of 1361, Burgundy was free of the English companies occupying the duchy. Guillaume de Granson and Nicolas Tamworth were rewarded for their services to the duke with substantial estates in Burgundy. Granson became lord of Fresne-Saint Mametz, while Nicolas Tamworth received the castle of Courcelles-lès-Semur and the manor of Montigny-Saint-Barthèlem.⁷¹⁶

It seemed that the duchy could breathe a sigh of relief and that, at least for a while, there would be calm on its western borders. The same was true of the County of Nevers and the Barony of Donzy. Nevertheless, this was not the case. Arnaud de Cervole, in collaboration with the French King's chamberlain, Jean de Melun, count of Tancarville, had invaded several castles north of Nevers. Above all, the French government needed money, lots of money. It wanted to extend the imposition of the subsidies and grants ordered to pay the King's ransom to the feudal estates of the Count of Nevers.⁷¹⁷ The Archpriest proved to be the most suitable for this task. Working closely with the King's tax collectors, they both plundered the area and helped to collect taxes in an area that belonged to the Count of

⁷¹⁶ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 224.

⁷¹⁷ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 92.

Flanders. Naturally, the Count and his unfortunate subjects protested vehemently against the collection of taxes, the unlawful occupation of castles and the fact that mercenaries were looting on behalf of the state.⁷¹⁸ The king finally intervened in February 1361: the unorthodox tax collection practice had to be stopped. The Archpriest had to hand over the castles of Dammarie and Blénau, and a little later the two remaining castles of Cosne and La Motte Josserand. For all this, of course, he received a generous royal reward of 16.000 gold pieces, and a letter of remission for the atrocities committed under his command, including those of the members of his company of 500 men.⁷¹⁹ However, it was not until Cervole received the money that the castles had to be handed over. Nevertheless, Tancarville, the King and Cervole's real purpose with the castles was only revealed after the handover: Dammarie and Blénau were in fact to be returned to their rightful owner, the Count of Flanders, but the other two castles were to be returned to Tancarville and through him to John the Good. They would only return it to Louis de Mâle if he agreed to collect the royal ransom.⁷²⁰

Philip of Rouvres seems to have made the right decision in placing his trust in Guillaume de Granson and Nicolas Tamworth. Their own personal interests dictated the same, if only because of their newly acquired estates, as those of the duchy: they had to defend it against the *Tard Venus*. In 1361, Guillaume de Granson and Nicolas Tamworth did so with arms, money and negotiations. In February, Auxois was threatened by a new enemy. The castle garrisons were mobilised. The fortresses of Rouvres and Argilly, where the Duke often stayed, were defended by Granson and Tamworth's companies.⁷²¹

When the Great Companies, on their way to Avignon, reached the Duchy in the first half of 1361, the captains of the companies, Guillaume de Granson and Nicolas Tamworth, whom they knew well, began negotiations for a crossing of the Duchy. They agreed that they would not despoil the duchy in return for adequate provisions and payment.

Tamworth paid the first immediate instalment out of his own fortune, as the Duke's treasury had by then been completely depleted.⁷²² In Guillaume de Clugny's account of 1361, several

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*


⁷¹⁹ Le roi Jean confirme la sentence arbitrale rendue par le comte de Tancarville, au sujet des différends qui existaient entre le comte de Nevers, la comtesse Marguerite et leur sujets, d'une part, Arnaud de Cervole, d'autre part. *Ibid.*, pp. 385-388.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁷²¹ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 225.

⁷²² Quittance délivrée par Nicolas Stamworth, capitaine de Régennes, au duc de Bourgogne Philip of Rouvres. A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 395.

entries testify to the difficulties of collecting the tax and to the fact that the agreement negotiated by the two captains would be very difficult, if not impossible, to keep.⁷²³ Because of the inaccurate payments, the English did not fully respect the agreement either, so they led *chevauchées* around Auxerre purely to exert pressure.⁷²⁴



Map 7. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the second half of

1361

The second half of the year was free of complications and marked by the Black Death.⁷²⁵ This did not mean that the princely treasury was full. The king's ransom, the payment due directly to Edward III and the payment negotiated to avoid the ravages of the companies and their destruction proved too much. The tax collectors were continually struggling to find the money they needed. The Burgundian leadership tried first to borrow and then to bargain, so Eudes, Sir de Grancy, was eventually sent to London at the beginning of September along with the letter of the duke, but Edward proved adamant and refused to accept any postponement.⁷²⁶

However, after a few months free from the ravages of the Companies, disaster struck with the unexpected death of the young duke. Like his father, he had no luck with horses, having

⁷²³ ADCO B 2748, f. 13r

⁷²⁴ ADCO B 2748, f. 12v

⁷²⁵ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 244.

⁷²⁶ ADCO B 1412, f. 49r

been thrown from the back of his horse and then he died of his injuries soon after, leaving the duchy without a direct descendant. So, his death proved to be a magnet for the companies, which this time threatened the duchy from the south. In the early days of 1362, news arrived that the companies of Lyon, Beaujolais and Forez would soon cross the borders of the duchy. Thibaud de Chauffour's company had captured the castle of Pymont south of Chalon and the fortress of Oliferne near Bourg-en-Bresse. The vicinity of Besançon to the north of the town and the mercenaries were pillaged.⁷²⁷ Marcigny-les-Nonnains was taken by another company in February 1362.⁷²⁸ The noose was visibly tightening around the duchy, with the companies reaching the borders of Burgundy from the east and south in February.

The next few years of the duchy were defined by the war of succession. However, the year 1362 did not begin in the spirit of this war, but was dominated by the great Companies, who defeated the French army at the Battle of Brignais on 6 April 1362, one of the greatest victories of the second half of the 14th century after Poitiers and Crecy.

The town of Brignais is situated in a plain, at the entrance to the Garon Valley, a tributary of the Rhône. It guarded the route to Lyon from the south-west. The companies marched directly toward Lyon and «*robbed the land, kidnapped people for ransom and plundered cities.*»⁷²⁹ They arrived at the same time at the castles of Rive-de-Gier and Brignais.⁷³⁰ None of the castles was strongly defended; there were only a few soldiers present, so the companies took both castles without any problems.⁷³¹ The news caused great panic among the citizens of Lyon. Just two months earlier, on 27 January, Guillaume de Treffort, the lieutenant of the bailli of Mâcon, surveyed the fortifications of Lyon and found them too weak, so he ordered the necessary reinforcements to be carried out.⁷³² There were three major gatherings of royal forces at the eastern theatre of the war on mercenaries. Arnoul de Audrehem, the Marshal of France, led an army in Auvergne accompanied by the Spanish forces of Enrique of Trastámara. They led a successful operation against the companies of Perrin Boias, who emptied the fortress of Saugues in the first days of March and joined the companies that had already ravaged Forez, Lyonnaise and Burgundy.⁷³³ The other group

⁷²⁷ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 284.

⁷²⁸ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises...*, op. cit., p. 407.

⁷²⁹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, op. cit., p. 260.

⁷³⁰ F. Funk-Brentano, *Les Brigands...*, op. cit., p. 50.

⁷³¹ G. Guigue, *Les Tard-Venus...*, op. cit., p. 61.

⁷³² AML CC 190, f. 2v

⁷³³ É. Molinier, *Étude sur la vie d'Arnoul d'Audrehem...*, op. cit., p. 102.

was led by the count of Tancarville, who gave the order to the nobles of Burgundy to defend the marches of Burgundy and Autunois.⁷³⁴ While he, along with Arnaud de Cervole and the royal army gathered from the surrounding provinces (Champagne, Burgundy, Sénonais, Auxerre, and Nivernais) arrived in Lyon rapidly crossing Mâconais and Beaujolais in the middle of March. Here, he joined the troops of Jacques de Bourbon, count of La Marche, who came with troops from Auvergne, Limousin, Provence, Savoy, Dophiné, Forez, and Beaujolais.⁷³⁵ It was Jacques de Bourbon who took charge of the operations by becoming the commander of the two armies. The original plan was to wait for the third army of Arnaud de Audrehem and together they planned to challenge the attacking companies. However, before this could happen, the army of Bourbon and Tancarville suffered a crushing defeat when they laid siege to Brignais. We do not know exactly what had happened because we have two detailed but contradictory descriptions of the events. One of them was written by Matteo Villani:

*«Petit Meschin, ... Having been informed of the disorder in the French camp, ...hurriedly ...arrived unexpectedly above the French camp several hours before daybreak and without a let-up attacked them with great noise and clamour. Taken by surprise, and frightened by the terrible cries, the French lost heart and although they ran for their arms to repulse the enemy, the companies pressed hard upon them that they gave them no time to arm themselves. An army which included so many barons and valiant knights thus had the misfortune to be routed and put to flight, and many were killed and wounded.»*⁷³⁶

Jonathan Sumption in his ground-breaking series on the Hundred Years' War accepts Villani's version⁷³⁷ because the brief description of another contemporary chronicle, the *Petit Thalamus* coincides with Villani's version, except for the fact that according to *Petit Thalamus*, the attack took place at *None*, that is to say 3. p.m.⁷³⁸

⁷³⁴ ADCO B. 1412, f. 37v

⁷³⁵ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁷³⁶ *Villani*, 1857, lib. X, cap. XCV, l. 362 ; K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁷³⁷ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, l. 10625.

⁷³⁸ *Le Petit Thalamus*, f. 106r. [available online at] <http://thalamus.huma-num.fr/annales-occitanes/annee-1362.html>.

Kenneth Fowler argues that Froissart's version is more detailed and that he is the only one who gives some account of the terrain and the details of the battle. According to Froissart, the companies took up their positions on the top of a hill. Seguin de Badefol was one of the leaders along with Petit Meschin of the Great Companies, while Guyot de Pin and Talebardon served under him. They threw stones at the French, who attacked the mercenaries in three successive waves.⁷³⁹ Arnaud de Cervole was one of the captains of the Duke of Bourbon and the leader of the vanguard, and he was captured in the course of the battle. In the meantime, the better armed part of the companies, around 5-6000 men-at-arms, hid themselves behind another hill and waited for the best moment to commence a side attack that took the Royal army by complete surprise.

«Thus, as the lord James of Bourbon and the other lords with their banners and pennons before them approached and coasted the said mountain, the worst armed of the companions continually cast still stones at them in such wise that the hardiest of them was driven aback, and thus, as they held them in that estate a great space, the great fresh battle of these companions found a way and came about the mountain well ranged and had cut their spears of six foot of length, and so came crying with one voice and brake in among the Frenchmen. So at the first meeting they overthrew many to the earth: there were sore strokes on both parts, and these companions fought so ardently that it was a marvel, and caused the Frenchmen to recule back: and there the archpriest like a good knight fought valiantly, but he was taken prisoner by force of arms and sore hurt, and divers other knights and squires of his company.»⁷⁴⁰

Either way the battle took place and one element is common in both descriptions: the unexpected appearance of the mercenaries which caught the royal army totally off guard, and as a result the army was completely routed. Their leader, Jacques de Bourbon, the cousin of King John II and his son Pierre, were seriously wounded and died a few days after the battle in Lyon.⁷⁴¹ Froissart is wrong about the date. He assumed that the battle took place on the Friday after Easter, 12 April 1361,⁷⁴² but in fact the exact date happened to be

⁷³⁹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, op. cit., p. 262.

⁷⁴⁰ G.C. Macaulay (ed.), *The Chronicles of Froissart*, trans. John Bouchier, Lord Berners, London, 1904, p. 41.

⁷⁴¹ Le Petit Thalamus, f. 106r.

⁷⁴² S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, op. cit., p. 29.

6 April 1362. The count of Tancarville was released upon giving his word that he would pay his ransom later. In a letter to his page dated 21 April, he indicated the reimbursement of his pages' losses in the Battle of Brignais.⁷⁴³ Similarly, Arnaud de Cervole had to discuss the figure of his personal debt with the bastard of Monsac, one of his compatriots, by whom he was captured.⁷⁴⁴ Following the battle, the captains received an enormous payment, 100 000 gold florins, and it was agreed that they would follow Enrique of Trastámara to the kingdom of Castile to take revenge on the death of his mother and to regain the throne.

Most of the powerful captains, Bertrucat d'Albert, Bérard de Labret de Sainte-Bzeille, Garciot de Chastel, Jehan Aymery, Pierre Montaut, Espiote, Arnaud de Tallebardon, Petit Meschin, the *bourc* de Breteuil and Jehan Hazenorgue signed the contract and followed Enrique to the west.⁷⁴⁵ They did not reach the border, however, because they became embroiled in the conflict between two of Midi's leading lords, the Counts of Foix and Armagnac, which culminated in the Battle of Laugnac.⁷⁴⁶

The captains who decided to stay in the east of France were recruited to serve Burgundy. Burgundy became defenceless hence the companies inflicted such a devastation on that land that even 20 years after the event people had vivid memories of the «*men of the Archpriest and the fire of Guiot du Pin and Taillevarдон, who robbed and destroyed the land*» in 1362.⁷⁴⁷


⁷⁴³ ADCO B 1412, f. 40r

⁷⁴⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, Sommarie XXVII, footnote 3.

⁷⁴⁵ N. Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret...*, *op. cit.*, l. 1493.

⁷⁴⁶ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁷⁴⁷ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. XX.



Map 8. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the first half of 1362

On 14th April, a few days after the defeat, the population around Chalon was moved into walled towns and castles, letters were sent overall in the duchy, among others to the bailli of the Montagne to raise the level of the guards «*because the enemy is coming to the Duchy of Burgundy.*»⁷⁴⁸ Two days later, the captain of the town of Semur was warned of the impending danger, and on 20 April, more envoys were sent to the other bailli of the duchy.⁷⁴⁹ Some of the companies were in the service of Henri de Bar, such as Henri Spic, who was to be appointed captain of Pontailler, but was refused by the local inhabitants.⁷⁵⁰ However, the threat was ever present. From a letter from Henri de Bar to the Bailli of Chalon 19 June, it is known that the enemy was in Chalon.⁷⁵¹ During the summer, the area around Semur-en-Auxois was heavily attacked, with Montréal, Vieux-Château and Guillon being sacked.⁷⁵²


⁷⁴⁸ ADCO B 1412, f. 40r

⁷⁴⁹ ADCO B 1412, f. 40r

⁷⁵⁰ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 294.

⁷⁵¹ ADCO B 1412, f. 42v-r

⁷⁵² E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 296.



Map 9. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the second half of 1362

Pontfailler was sacked in August, and the companies were practically free to pick out new targets. Another large group of Gascons and Bretons invaded the Auxois area. Arnaud de Cervole took Vitteaux in the heart of the duchy and gasted the Semur-en-Auxois area. Towards the end of the year, the Langres area was also ravaged by Cervole's company. When the mercenaries learned that the wine collected for the king was being kept in the cellar of the castle of Villaines-en-Duesmois, they occupied the castle and did not leave the cellar for days.⁷⁵³ The rich abbey of La Ferté-sur-Grosne was occupied in April by the companies, and three days later Borde de Reulée and Fontaine in the Chalon area were taken as well.⁷⁵⁴ Soon afterwards the negotiations commenced on paying off the companies. On 19 June, they were still planning to pay the remaining companies in Burgundy and instructed the bailli to collect the amount due.⁷⁵⁵ Problems were encountered, however, with the payment. The carrying capacity of the '*plat pays*' was finite and had reached the point where the towns openly refused to take on any more burdens. Not only were the sums paid out to the companies affected by the financial crisis, but even the 10.000 florins advanced

⁷⁵³ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-215.


⁷⁵⁴ ADCO B 1412, f. 40r ; K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 53 ; E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

⁷⁵⁵ ADCO B 1412, f. 53r

by the count of Tancarville after the defeat of the battle were not returned in the second half of 1362.⁷⁵⁶

This in turn automatically meant that the companies stayed in Burgundy even longer in the second half of the year, and continued to occupy or plunder more and more territories.

In 1363, a two-year war of succession began in Burgundy between the first Duke of Burgundy of the House of Valois, Philip the Bold, and one of the most famous figures of the Hundred Years' War, Charles the Bad, King of Navarre. The causes of the war are described in detail by Kenneth Fowler in his excellent book on the mercenary companies. Suffice it to say here that Charles attacked Burgundy simultaneously from two sides, from La Charité in the west and from Franche-Comté in the east, thanks to the alliance he had made shortly before with the nobility that was dissatisfied with the hereditary order.



Map 10. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the first half of 1363.

There was, of course, a history of anti-French hostility among the nobility of the county. Several of the nobility's barons were on the English king's payroll in January 1363.⁷⁵⁷ The attacks had already started in early January 1363. Henri de Bar, the governor of the duchy, ordered Guillaume de Clugny to be at Dijon with the assembled armed men on 19 January,

⁷⁵⁶ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 299.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

after the enemy had taken Bussy-le-Pèlet. The planned *chevauchée* was aimed at recapturing the castle.⁷⁵⁸ The arrival of the companies soon had its effect: the nearby town of Arnay-sous-Vitteaux was raided. The duchy's defenders were aware of the appearance of other companies on the duchy's borders, but they did not have precise information. Therefore, Jacques de Vienne, Lord of Longwy, asked Girard de Longchamp, bailli of Chalon, to send a trustworthy spy and obtain as much information as possible about the number and composition of the companies. He stressed that information was of prime importance for the organisation of the defence. In another letter, a few days after the first letter, Jean Chalemard wrote to the bailli of Chalon that he knew a person who could provide information about the companies. The letter also mentions that Arnaud de Cervole, with his company and Eudes, sire of Grancey, were staying in Bar on an expedition and had taken Bussy-le-Pèle on his return.⁷⁵⁹ In the light of the above, the attempt to retake the castle did not stand much chance. By February, the mercenaries had already devastated the Auxonne area and Saint-Jean-de Losne, where they stayed only until they had exhausted the resources of the town. From there, the pillaging spread to Fontaines and Chagny. The inhabitants of Fontaines fled into the woods to escape the routiers, however, they were surprised by a group of mercenaries. After the skirmish, dead men were left behind on both sides. The adventuring mercenaries also reached Nuits-sous-Beaune, where they caused considerable damage, and therefore John the Good allowed further fortifications to be built.⁷⁶⁰

The invasion of the companies did not stop for a moment. On 17 April, the count of Tancarville reported that the routiers, who had left for Castile after the Battle of Brignais, had returned and were in Auvergne, threatening the southern borders of the Duchy. From the west, however, Arnaud de Cervole's troops posed a threat and ravaged the Auxerre area for three long months.⁷⁶¹ Apart from the Archpriest, there was another captain active in the western part of the Principality: Gille Troussevache. He was responsible for the capture of Arcy-sur-Cure⁷⁶² and Vesigneux and Dammarie and the destruction of the surrounding area of Nivernais, Avallonnais, Auxois.⁷⁶³ By May, he had further extended his sphere of influence

⁷⁵⁸ ADCO B 2750, f. 10v

⁷⁵⁹ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-312.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 317.

⁷⁶² ADCO B 2751, f. 7r

⁷⁶³ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

and occupied Montréal, one of the most important castles in the duchy. He left only after burning the area and robbing the inhabitants of the city.⁷⁶⁴

Arnaud de Cervole knew Gilles Troussevache personally and agreed with the Breton captain to evacuate the forts of Arcy-sur-Cure and Dammarie in exchange for 3700 francs. This did not happen, however, as the Bretons still held the two captured forts months later.⁷⁶⁵ The count de Tancarville summoned the estates in June to raise the funds for the defence, but the whole plan came to nothing, partly because the presence of the routiers made the trip uncertain even in the heart of the duchy, and partly because of the failure of Tancarville at Brignais.⁷⁶⁶ On 27 of June, there was a major change in the governance of the Duchy. Following the king's visit, Tancarville's governorship ended and he was replaced by the first Valois Duke of Burgundy. A few days after taking control of the duchy, Philip, then the only governor of Burgundy, attempted the same thing as the count of Tancarville had done shortly before: to create the financial basis for the defence against the Companies after the estates had been convened.⁷⁶⁷

This was urgently needed simply because in July, another important captain, Tallebardon, posed a serious threat in Chalonnais and Mâconnais. With two other captains, he planned to take several fortified positions. The locals were informed of this by David Geoffroi, Bishop of Autun.⁷⁶⁸ In parallel with the threat from the south-west, the duchy was also threatened from the north by the allies of the king of Navarre from Franche-Comté. The relevant parts of the Dimanche de Vitel's records from the beginning of July are full of preparations for the invasion of Henri de Montfaucon, Count of Montbéliard.⁷⁶⁹ Dijon mobilises the available armed forces and order the captains of the cities to guard the walls day and night.⁷⁷⁰ On 15 July, Philip sent a letter to Arnaud de Cervole to lead his troops against Vesigneux, occupied by Gille Troussevache.⁷⁷¹ Finally, threats from several directions fail to repel the attack of Montbéliard, who on 22 July took the fortress of Chaussin with several other barons. The *prévôts* and *baillis* of the area would be informed in the coming days.⁷⁷² The consequences of the occupation of the castle proved disastrous. Villeneuve, Tichey and many other

⁷⁶⁴ ADCO B 2751, f. 7r

⁷⁶⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁷⁶⁶ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

⁷⁶⁷ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁷⁶⁸ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

⁷⁶⁹ ADCO B 1416, f. 45r

⁷⁷⁰ ADCO B 1416, f. 46v

⁷⁷¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 47r

⁷⁷² ADCO B 1416, f. 48v

premises were looted and destroyed.⁷⁷³ During these troubled days, the duke was still in France, but he received letters urging him to return to the Duchy as soon as possible. By the end of August, the attacks of Franche-Comté were hitting Burgundy with renewed force.⁷⁷⁴ The authorities did their utmost to prepare their castles and towns for an attack in the *baillage* of Montagne, which proved to be the most vulnerable.⁷⁷⁵ However, the biggest problem has been the financing of defence. The 200.000 gold pieces owed to Edward had not yet been repaid, and the ransom of John the Good, which, with the cost of defence against the companies, was simply beyond the financial means of the duchy, and was an equally heavy burden.⁷⁷⁶ In September the estates had to be called together again to impose further taxes, but then came the alarming news from neighbouring Auvergne that Seguin de Badefol had taken the town of Brioude with his great company, posing an unprecedented direct threat to southern Burgundy. Under the cover of the night, the city was unexpectedly taken by escalade and occupied for 10 months. The size of the force was estimated by Philibert de Lespinasse the governor of Auvergne and Berry at 2000 lances.⁷⁷⁷

The measures taken on merely receiving the news proved fatal for the financially strapped duchy: the stretched budget simply could not cope with the new burden of the panic-stricken mercenary captains. To combat such an enemy, it was necessary to hire a large number of captains, and not a few mercenaries, captains such as Amenion de Pommiers, and Soudich de Latrau.⁷⁷⁸ The troops of the hired captains contributed to the damage as much as the attacking mercenaries. Amenion de Pommiers, who was charged with defending Nolay, did the work for the companies.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁷⁷⁴ ADCO B 1416, f. 16v


⁷⁷⁵ ADCO B 1417, f. 17r

⁷⁷⁶ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁷⁷⁸ G. Pepin, « Les Soudans de Preissac... », *art. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

⁷⁷⁹ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.



Map 11. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the second half of 1363

A month after Seguin de Badefol's seizure of Brioude, Duke Philippe received further catastrophic news: the capture of La Charité. I have already dealt with Charles the Bad's campaign in Burgundy and its consequences, but suffice it to mention here that the companies attacking from La Charité made life impossible in the whole western part of the duchy in the second part of October 1363. Nevertheless, the same was true along the Saône in the bailliage of Chalon and Macôn.⁷⁸⁰

In Nivernais and Donzy, the companies met virtually no organised resistance, so the barony and the country were at their mercy. The Navarrese were particularly active, led by Yolande of Bar's husband Louis of Navarre, who, although he did not return to the Duchy of Bar, was more active in Burgundy and in Nivernais and Donzy in representing the interests of his brother the king.⁷⁸¹ He enlisted the help of famous English captains such as Robert Knolles, John Creswey and Robert Briquet. The number of attacking mercenaries was estimated at 1200, which proved too many for the defence.⁷⁸² The recapture of La Charité was of course on the agenda, but Philip wanted to wait for the return of the absent Arnaud de Cervole, who was fighting with the Count of Vaudémont against the most powerful lords of the frontier in

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

⁷⁸¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 51v

⁷⁸² E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

Lorraine. However, even with the troops of the Archiprêtre, a siege would have proved an impossible undertaking. Gilles Troussevache's troops only left the castles of Arcy-sur-Cure and Dammarie in the last half of the year. It was only in November that the King paid Arnaud de Cervole the 3700 francs that the mercenary captain had advanced from his own funds.⁷⁸³ At the same time, the siege of Vésigneux continued, which was destroyed by the Duke along with Arcy-sur-Cure after the castle was surrendered. In the month of November, the companies threatened more and more castles: Sauturne, Saint-Jean de Losne, Pontailler, among others, were on the long list. Not only did Arnaud de Cervole arrange and advance the repurchase of the castles occupied by Gilles Troussevache, but, as the duchy was in serious financial difficulties, he also paid the 3000 francs to the routiers occupying the castle of Sauturne in December.⁷⁸⁴ The financial situation led to the point where not only was it impossible to buy back the castles, but it was also impossible to pay the hired troops. In addition, these included considerably smaller sums. Suffice it to note here that the Duke also asked the Lombards for help to find a solution in this very delicate situation.⁷⁸⁵ However, even the Lombard loan was not enough, the treasury was so empty that Philip, who was then in Pontailler,⁷⁸⁶ asked the inhabitants of the towns to pay the mercenaries' wages, because the treasury was empty. Even the 4457 florins that arrived in Dijon at the end of November did not help the beleaguered treasury.⁷⁸⁷ More and more men were needed to fight the companies, so in January 1364, Philip renewed Jean d'Armagnac's contract with 300 men for another six weeks.⁷⁸⁸ The difficulties of payment and the reaction of the leaders of unpaid teams, such as Jean d'Armagnac or Amenion de Pommiers, have been mentioned before.

⁷⁸³ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 399.


⁷⁸⁴ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁷⁸⁶ ADCO B 1416, f. 39r

⁷⁸⁷ ADCO B 1416, f. 38v

⁷⁸⁸ ADCO B 1416, f. 38v



Map 12. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the first half of 1364

In early 1364, despite the measures taken, the companies found fewer protected places. The duchy's forces, with the mercenaries they had hired, had secured the major passes and the main routes, but smaller strongholds such as Orchamp on the eastern border of the duchy or Saint-Aubin-en-Jura were taken by the companies, who then used *chevauchées* to terrorise the villages along the Doubs. It is no coincidence that in February the Marshal of Burgundy was also defending the Auxois area, where a Breton company was particularly active and raiding the good wines of Beaune.⁷⁸⁹ The hydra effect can be observed: where the duchy is reinforced, the companies retreat, and then reappear when the defence is weakened. For eight days Philip pursued the companies with his troops, who did not stop fighting him, but simply disappeared and reappeared elsewhere.⁷⁹⁰ In parallel with the threat from the East, the Breton and Gascon companies in the Navarrese payroll from La Charité proved to be unmanageable, if only because of their size: captains such as Guillampot, whose company was estimated by contemporary sources at 1500 horsemen, were allowed to plunder the duchy with virtual impunity in February 1364.⁷⁹¹ In addition to Lucy-les-Bois,

⁷⁸⁹ ADCO B 1416, f. 41v

⁷⁹⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 75.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Montréal and Auxerre, Quenne was the victim of pillaging by the companies. The garrisons and bailli of Vergy, Argilly, Châlon, Beaune, Autun were warned that the *chevauchée* from La Charité would be heading for Châtillon.⁷⁹² The unstoppable companies forced Philip and the opposing forces of Franche-Comté to reconcile, because the mercenaries on the loose were causing enormous damage to both the duchy and the county. The meeting took place on 16 February, and the subsequent cease-fire gave the Outre-Saône area a breathing space, but the movement of the companies could not be prevented.⁷⁹³

At the end of March, Guillampot with his 1,500 horsemen moved from Saint-Genoux to La Charité, further reinforcing the already not small *rouitier* in the Navarre service.⁷⁹⁴ By this time, the shortage of money had reached such proportions that alternative sources had to be found to pay the troops, such as the ransom money received after the successful siege of Orchamp, or the regular loans from Arnaud de Cervole.⁷⁹⁵ However, these were only temporary solutions. In the long term, the companies and the war in general led to the consolidation of central power, which naturally led to the loss of the Burgundian estates. An important milestone in this process was the donation letters following the death of John the Good, in which Charles V not only strengthened Philip's hold on the duchy of Burgundy, but also made important changes to the tax collection system. From the spring of 1364, it was no longer necessary to ask for the consent of the estates when levying taxes for the protection of the duchy.⁷⁹⁶

During April and May, the pressure on the Duchy did not ease: the arrival of none other than Robert Knolles was reported, returning to the Duchy as an old acquaintance at the head of a «*large number of Englishmen.*»⁷⁹⁷ If this were not enough, the Franche-Comté nobility, dissatisfied with Charles V's measures, led by the Montfaucon and Neufchâtel clans in particular, resumed their hostilities with the duchy. This was, of course, helped by the fact that Jean de Neufchâtel was on the Navarrese payroll, as has already been mentioned.⁷⁹⁸

As the money had run out by May, the companies who had been paid by the duke to defend the duchy were not paid, so they wrought at least as much havoc around Auxois as the

⁷⁹² ADCO B 1416, f. 41-42. r-v

⁷⁹³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁷⁹⁴ ADCO B 3566, f. 31v


⁷⁹⁵ ADCO B 359, Several receipts paid to Arnaud de Cervole.

⁷⁹⁶ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁷⁹⁷ ADCO B 1416, f. 42r

⁷⁹⁸ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

enemy.⁷⁹⁹ More and more enemies appeared as summer approached and a Breton company invaded the castle of Pontailier-Sur-Saône, not far from Dijon, in June. The company, which threatened Dijon directly, was welcomed, to the great good fortune of the locals, by Bertrand du Guesclin when he recruited troops for Normandy.⁸⁰⁰



Map 13. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the second half of 1364

From July 1364, the duchy was caught between two fires. Coordinated attacks from the east and west simultaneously occurred when Philip was fighting in Normandy and only a weak force was left to defend Burgundy. In this respect, Charles the Bad's plan worked perfectly. The troops hired for defence left with the Duke. The few that remained in Burgundy still received no regular pay. Except for promises, no pay was given to the defenders, so the attacking companies were free to move about the duchy, especially in the southern extremities. The governor of course informed Philip of everything.⁸⁰¹ The majority of the lords guarding the western frontier left for Normandy with Foyle, leaving Nevers, Donzy and the western parts of the duchy completely unprotected for the companies occupying La

⁷⁹⁹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 263.

⁸⁰⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 88.

⁸⁰¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 46r

Charité.⁸⁰² First the western part of the dual crisis had to be addressed. The solution was Arnaud de Cervole, who returned from Normandy earlier than Philip did.⁸⁰³ On the one hand, the Archpriest had money, troops and enough prestige in the eyes of the captain in the duchy, who did not directly belong to him but remained in the duchy, to join him against the troops of Franche-Comté led by the count of Montbéliard. Between the count of Somberton, governor of the duchy, and Arnaud de Cervole, there were several exchanges of correspondence between the second half of June and the beginning of July 1364. In a letter of 10 July, Somberton, among others, desperately appealed to Arnaud de Cervole and Jean d'Armagnac to come to his aid with all their men-at-arms, as the troops of the Count of Montbéliard were approaching dangerously.⁸⁰⁴ The troops gathered by Somberton and the companies provided by Arnaud de Cervole were able to assemble an army large enough to have a chance of taking the invasion army into battle.⁸⁰⁵ However, Montbéliard refused to accept the offered battle, as it was risky to engage in open battle with an army of such experienced mercenaries. At the end of July, for the umpteenth time, peace negotiations took place between the two Burgundies.⁸⁰⁶

There were captains who had tried their luck fishing in the turmoil, taking advantage of the general crisis. They boarded a castle and plundered the area, but they belonged to neither side. The problem arose when they miscalculated and the chaotic situation was straightened out for a moment and the warring parties, suddenly reconciled, turned against the independent captain, who was not protected by anyone. This happened in the summer of 1364 with two brothers: Jean and Thibeaut Chauffour, who occupied the fortified town of Dampierre-sur-Salon and terrorised the two Burgundians from there.⁸⁰⁷ The town was besieged by the united troops of Somberton and the Count of Montbéliard. The siege lasted eight days⁸⁰⁸ and when Jean de Chauffour realised that there was no chance of resisting, he tried to escape with his young son by disguising himself as a simple routier. However, the ducal troops caught them. In return for his life, he offered to return the town to them. According to the relevant literature, in August 1364 Somberton had him beheaded in

⁸⁰² A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.* p. 272.

⁸⁰³ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

⁸⁰⁴ ADCO B 1416, f. 47r-v

⁸⁰⁵ ADCO B 1416, f. 44-46r-v

⁸⁰⁶ ADCO B 1416, f. 50v

⁸⁰⁷ ADCO B 1416, f. 48v

⁸⁰⁸ ADCO B 1416, f. 58v

Langres.⁸⁰⁹ The sources do not mention his brother, but he probably did not escape his fate either.⁸¹⁰

Once the threat from the east had been averted, the western borders had to be secured. By July, Philip had returned from Normandy. The most pressing problem was caused by the companies occupying La Charité for almost a year, led by Louis de Navarre. At the end of August, the Duke warned the bailli of Auxois that Louis de Navarre was planning an invasion with a large armed force and to put the garrison of castles and towns on alert.⁸¹¹ The fate of the Anglo-Navarrese companies occupying the city was sealed by the fatal defeat of Charles the Bad at Cocherel at mid-May, but the duchy did not have the resources to retake the city on its own and was assisted by Philip's brother, the king. Charles V gave Philip 5000 livres tournois to pay his troops.⁸¹² In the siege of the town, famous knights such as Amaury, Lord of Craon, Enguerrand, sire de Coucy, who 10 years later would lead the companies to the Swiss cantons, Charles de Châtillon or Jean du Bois, took part. After having held muster over the troops on 20 September, Philip arrived at La Charité.⁸¹³ The casualties would have been too high, so the town was hermetically sealed off, cutting off the defenders from the outside world. Although the defenders tried repeatedly to outflank the city, they were unsuccessful. However, Philip was forced to leave La Charité less than two weeks later, because of the defeat of Charles de Blois by John of Montfort at Auray.⁸¹⁴ The siege of La Charité lasted until the spring of 1365. The mercenaries left everything behind on foot, and the captains had to swear not to take up arms against the French king for three years.⁸¹⁵ The whole affair was finally closed in March 1365. The Anglo-Navarrese troops occupied La Charité for just over a year, causing incalculable losses in Burgundy and received 25.000 gold francs at the end of their stay in La Charité.⁸¹⁶

While preparations were being made for the siege of La Charité in the summer of 1364, three other groups of captains were making life miserable in the central plains of Burgundy. In July 1364, Jean de Saint-Pol, Jean de Pommiers and Munde Batallier led 1200 horsemen to the castles of Sagy and Argilly from where they led *chevauchées* into the duchy of Savoy

⁸⁰⁹ See later the in the chapter on the crusade about the arising problems of Jean de Chauffour's death. A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁸¹⁰ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

⁸¹¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 50r

⁸¹² E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

⁸¹³ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸¹⁵ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁸¹⁶ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

and the southern territories of the *baillage* of Chalon.⁸¹⁷ Later in July, four other captains, Guiot de Pin, *bourc* Camus, Guillampot and Bertrucat d'Albret, who were prominent among the leaders of the first generation of companies, captured several fortresses in Autunois and Axois.⁸¹⁸ In a letter sent to Jean d'Armanac on 25 July, it is stated that three of the four captains, Guiot de Pin, *bourc* Camus, Guillampot, are in the Beaune area.⁸¹⁹ Naturally, the garrison of the surrounding castles, Somberton's troops and Amenion de Pommiers' company serving the Duke were mobilised.⁸²⁰ Throughout September there were constant warnings to the bailli of Auxois that the captains were planning more and more *chevauchées*.⁸²¹ Starting from the castle of Le Vèvre, which had been occupied since mid-July,⁸²² they planned to surprise and capture the town of Autun, which they had discovered with the help of spies recruited from among the locals. However, the town proved too well defended and they were ultimately unsuccessful.⁸²³ Gui de Montigny, the bailli executed several of the collaborators who helped the companies shortly afterwards, while others paid heavy fines, but at least their lives were saved.⁸²⁴

A group of the same four captains pushed north as far as Troyes, planning to take Bar-sur-Seine and Châtillon-sur-Seine.⁸²⁵ Some of the captured fortresses were bought back, again with outside help: this time, thanks to the intervention of Jean d'Armagnac, the fortress of Monnay was bought back from Guiot du Pin. Jean d'Armagnac, with his own fortune, advanced the redemption of the castle. Once he had the castle back in his possession, he had to provide for the garrison at his own expense, because the prince did not even have the money. The population became so impoverished that new taxes, such as the amount to be repaid to Jean d'Armagnac, could not be collected. Thus, strategically important castles such as Le Vèvre remained in the hands of the enemy until Arnaud de Cervole bought them with his own money.⁸²⁶

Nevertheless, Le Vèvre was not the only castle that Arnaud de Cervole bought with his own money. He also came to an agreement with Jean de Saint-Pol and Mondon Batailler to pay

⁸¹⁷ ADCO B 1416, f. 49r

⁸¹⁸ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

⁸¹⁹ ADCO B 1416, f. 48r

⁸²⁰ ADCO B 1416, f. 48r

⁸²¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 51v-52v

⁸²² ADCO B 1416, f. 47r

⁸²³ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁸²⁴ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

for the surrender of the castle of Sagy. At the time of the settlement, he gave a thousand florins in advance and promised the captains a further 6000 by Christmas.⁸²⁷

The Hydra effect, which was already observed in the spring of 1364, was completed by the second half of 1364, between August and November. The ducal troops led by the Duke chased the companies. The bailli, especially Guillaume de Clugny, were particularly active and effective in resisting the companies during this period. The result was that Jean de Neufchâtel, the *prévôt* of Dijon alone, executed 120 *routiers*, murderers and plunderers during this period. Captains, whose business was particularly good, received 65 sol each.⁸²⁸ The records of the Dimanche de Vitel for this period contain a long list of items relating to the execution of *routiers*: often the justification is «*executed for his deeds*»,⁸²⁹ or, after a detailed description, «*all of them executed*». ⁸³⁰ In Guillaume de Clugny's accounts, similar records are regularly found: there was a time when several looters were executed in Semur at the same time.⁸³¹ The defenders managed to capture not only simple mercenaries, but also important captains like Guillampot or Guiot du Pin within a few months difference. On the capture of Guillampot, Guillaume de Clugny reports in a letter that at the end of a skirmish of varying success, he managed to surprise Guillampot and his companions, and then kill or capture several of them. However, the authorities then made a big mistake because, after an agreement with Jacques de Vienne, Guillampot was released on condition that he ceased all further robbery and pillage.⁸³² Shortly afterwards, another letter informs Girard de Longchamp that Guillampot is breaking his word and destroying the duchy without restraint.⁸³³ This had fatal consequences for Guiot du Pin when he was captured. He was ambushed, captured and taken to Châlon. Philip the Bold paid Renaut de Monbelot 200 florins in Florence for capturing Guiot de Pin.⁸³⁴ In Châlon, he was decapitated, his body was quartered, his head was nailed above the city gate. Later, his comrades recovered it and took it to Seguin de Badefol in Anse.⁸³⁵ Shortly afterwards, another captain was also

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁸²⁸ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁸²⁹ ADCO B 1416, f. 53v

⁸³⁰ ADCO B 1416, f. 53r

⁸³¹ ADCO B 2751, f. 14r

⁸³² E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

⁸³³ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁸³⁴ Mandement du duc de Bourgogne, Philippe le Hardi, relatif à prise de Guyot du Pin, 22 Octobre 1364, ADCO B 359 ; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

⁸³⁵ ADCO B 3567, f. 85.

captured who had long been a burden for the Burgundians.⁸³⁶ Gilles Troussevache «*Robber Captain*» was caught near Avalon and paid a bounty of 160 florins.⁸³⁷

However, even though the hydra's head was cut off, even several at a time, many more and, importantly, stronger heads emerged. During the autumn, the strongest new head was Seguin de Badefol and his great company, who, after the surrender of Brioude, arrived at the frontier of the Kingdom and the Empire in the service of Charles the Bad and took the town of Anse north of Lyon. Anse lies 28 km north of Lyon on the bank of the Saône. Already in Roman times, it had a *castellum*, which served as a refuge for the town's inhabitants in case of emergency, until the construction of the medieval castle. The town was owned by the Archbishop of Lyon from the 9th century. The town had two churches, the ancient Saint-Cyprien and the Romanesque Saint-Pierre.⁸³⁸ Outside the city walls was another convent for women, founded in 1263 and home to the Order of Saint-Damien. Anse also had two hospitals, Saint-Martin with a chapel in the south of the town and Saint-Romain in the north of the town, next to the cathedral, and a school.⁸³⁹ The town served as an outpost for the Archbishop of Lyon during the war, as an observation post and as a deployment base against the threat from the north. Situated on the banks of the navigable stretch of the Saône, it controlled the main trade route from Mâcon to Lyon and a wooden bridge linked the two banks of the river. Anse avoided the horrors of the Hundred Years' War until the autumn of 1364. Surrounded by a continuous wall, 1200 metres long, its inhabitants felt safe.⁸⁴⁰ On the night of Friday 1 November 1364, after the citizens of the town had spent most of the holiday in St Peter's Church, they prepared for a quiet night. The guards went on their usual rounds, not indicating anything unusual. Seguin and his men approached the town walls unobtrusively and then entered the town on ladders. How he achieved all this is a mystery, there is no reference to it in the sources.⁸⁴¹ The timing was not coincidental, as Marshal Arnaul d'Audrehem, in charge of the defence of Lyon, had left Paris for Lyon. Badefol received this vital information from his spies. It was a complete surprise and the battle lasted only an hour. Led by Claret de Glareins, the commander of the castle, and Humbert d'Arlbon,⁸⁴² the soldiers tried to defend themselves, but they really had no chance

⁸³⁶ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

⁸³⁷ ADCO B 2751, f. 9v

⁸³⁸ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...* *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁸³⁹ ADCR armoire Enoch 54, n° 1, f. 107v ; G. Guigue, *Les Tard-Venus...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-322 ; E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, LV.

⁸⁴⁰ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁸⁴¹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

⁸⁴² ADCR armoire Enoch volume 27, n° 1.

against the Margot. By midnight all resistance was over: Humbert d'Arlbon was taken prisoner for the third time, after Brignais and Poitiers, and again had to pay a substantial ransom.⁸⁴³ The *chevauchées* led by the Margot will be discussed in the next chapter, suffice it to say that Froissart mentions among the castles sacked by the Margot, Saint-Clément-Sous-Valsonne, Arbesle, among the townships Valsonne, Rochefort, Terasse, St Dennis-sur-Coise, more than 60 other fortresses in Mâconnais, Beaujolais, Forez, Velay and Burgundy. There were, however, some castles, albeit not many, that could successfully resist the Margot's attack: for example, Chazay with its triple ramparts.⁸⁴⁴

The presence of captains other than Badefol made life in the duchy increasingly impossible. The Bretons who occupied the fortress of Vésigneaux managed to establish close relations with the surrounding population and felt relatively safe.⁸⁴⁵ Arnaud de Tallebardon, who had long been in the service of Philip and who had retaliated the death of Guiot du Pin, went on a vendetta, burning villages. Eventually, he made a deal with Arnaud de Cervole at a meeting on 13 December, where his outstanding wages were paid.⁸⁴⁶ Tallebardon then disappears from the sources and no more is known about his fate. Perhaps he was so much cleverer than his fellow captains were that he did not push his luck in Burgundy.

Not only from the south, but also from the north, companies continued to arrive in Burgundy: The mercenaries who migrated south from Champagne threatened mainly the north-western part of the duchy, occupying the towns and castles of Nogent-sur-Seine, Marolles-sur-Seine, Trainel, Bouy, Vaurenier, Saint-Aubin-sur-Yonne, Migé, Césy. All these companies fought in the service of the King of Navarre in the Burgundian War of Succession.⁸⁴⁷ Espiot, Menaud de Esquire, who, like Seguin de Badefol, swore an oath of allegiance to Charles II on 26 May 1364 on behalf of Petit Meschin and Johann Hazenorgue, while two weeks later, on 7 June 1364, it was Eustache de Aubrichicourt's turn.⁸⁴⁸ In the oath of allegiance, they swore to fight all the King of Navarre's enemies, except the King of England and his sons. Of course, they did not do this for free: Espiot was paid 2000 florins,⁸⁴⁹ Arnaud-Amanieu received 60.000 Aragonese florins, among other things.⁸⁵⁰ Jean de San-Julian, in

⁸⁴³ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁸⁴⁴ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁸⁴⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

⁸⁴⁶ ADCO B 1417, f. 33r

⁸⁴⁷ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.


⁸⁴⁸ Jean-Auguste Brutails (ed.), *Documents des archives de la chambre des comptes de Navarre, (1196-1384)*, Paris, 1890, pp. 92-93.

⁸⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91

⁸⁵⁰ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

Pamplona, was paid the wages of 370 mercenaries to be sent to Burgundy and fight there on 22 July 1364.⁸⁵¹

Thanks to the constant reinforcements of troops, the companies threatened or occupied more and more areas. Bourg-en-Bresse, Dombes was threatened by Seguin de Badefol.⁸⁵² Likewise, the Autunois area was not safe: the Duke of Dijon received a warning on his way home that a great company was operating in the Toisey area. Only those nobles who could provide a sufficiently large escort were allowed to set out. Louis, Duke of Anjou, for example, was escorted by 300 armed men on his way to Burgundy in November 1364.⁸⁵³ At the same time Monde Bataillier was active in Chalon and by creating chaos he occupied considerable forces in the bailliage in late October 1364.⁸⁵⁴



Map 14. Mercenary-occupied castles and their estimated area of influence in the first half of 1365

When the Duke returned, he ordered a muster in mid-March 1365 and immediately set about the siege of Villaines-les-Prévôtes. The siege did not go smoothly, however, as the Duchy was attacked again from Franche-Comté, for the umpteenth time. Jean de Neufchâtel took

⁸⁵¹ J.-A. Brutails (ed.), *Documents des archives de la chambre...*, op. cit., p. 96.

⁸⁵² ADCO B 7590, f. 6.

⁸⁵³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., p. 138.

⁸⁵⁴ ADCO B 1417, f. 30r

the castle of Pontailier-sur-Saône.⁸⁵⁵ The timing of the attack was not accidental, because Jean de Neufchâtel had also coordinated this new attack with the Navarrese. This time, however, luck was on the Burgundians' side, for on the fourth day after the capture of Pontailier-sur-Saône, it was reported to the bailli of Chalon that the duke's old enemy Jean de Neufchâtel had miraculously been surprised and captured.⁸⁵⁶ Guillaume de Choiseul, a Burgundian knight, surprised the Franc-comtois captain who had felt safe, thanks to the treachery of a local. Jean de Neufchâtel was first imprisoned at Auxonne, then transferred to Chalon, and finally to the most oppressive prison in the duchy, Semur, where he lived in miserable conditions for five more years until 10 September 1369.⁸⁵⁷

Despite the recovery of Pontailier-sur-Saône, the pressure from the Companies increased.⁸⁵⁸ At the end of March 1365, the nobility of the bailliage and the castle guards were mobilised to deal with the invasion of Auxonne.⁸⁵⁹ In particular, the troops occupying Baigneux-lès-Juifs and Villaines-les-Prévôtés were a source of much trouble. Life in the duchy remained precarious as far as Troyes. Newly appointed castle captains, such as Simon Christophe, who was to take over the command of Jully-sur-Sarce, were afraid to go for fear of the Breton troops who were garrisoning the countryside. Nevertheless, even forts such as Le Vèvre, which was occupied by members of friendly companies under the command of Arnaud de Cervole, did not provide security for the inhabitants of the area. In the east and south of the duchy, the presence of Seguin de Badefol and his constant *chevauchées* were the main threat in May 1365. It was in this situation that the War of the Burgundian Succession ended and Charles of Navarre made peace with Philip the Bold in June 1365. At the same time as the peace agreement between the two kings, a peace treaty was brokered by Charles V between Philip the Bold and Marguerite de France at the same time.⁸⁶⁰

Conclusion

The Hundred Years' War is mainly known for its great battles of Crécy, Poitiers, Azincourt, although the war was much more about sieges, *chevauchées*, or smaller skirmishes.⁸⁶¹ The

⁸⁵⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

⁸⁵⁶ ADCO B 1417, f. 54r

⁸⁵⁷ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁸⁵⁸ ADCO B 1417, f. 30v

⁸⁵⁹ ADCO B 1417, f. 54r

⁸⁶⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁸⁶¹ Kelly DeVries, The Implications of the Anonimo Romano Account of the Battle of Crécy, in Gregory I. Halfond (ed.), *The Medieval Way of War. Studies in Medieval Military History in Honor of Bernard S. Bachrach*, London, 2015, pp. 309-322, p. 309.

main objective was not to destroy the enemy, but to capture them, since a lucky soldier could make a fortune for life on a good ransom. In this respect, the campaign was a typical episode in the Hundred Years' War. The campaign itself is considered by many historians as a great *chevauchée*.⁸⁶²

There is a mixed view of Edward III's campaign in the literature: some historians believe that the campaign ended in failure for the English, as Edward failed to take the city of Reims, the peace terms were more in favour of the Valois, and he had to give up the French crown in the Treaty of Brétigny. In addition, the future Charles V's strategy ultimately proved more successful during the campaign than that of the English king.⁸⁶³ According to other French historians, the campaign and the subsequent settlement proved disastrous for France.⁸⁶⁴ In fact, during Edward's last campaign, the English army completely dominated the battlefield from start to finish. For months, Edward campaigned on the frontiers of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, and then threatened Paris, penetrating into the heart of France. The King of England's exceptional command skills were repeatedly demonstrated during the campaign: he found a unique way to finance the army. While other monarchs had been unable to keep an army of Edward's size in arms for any length of time, he managed to do so by using the indenture system, which meant that he did not have to draw on the resources of the kingdom to recruit an army, but only used them to supply the army during the campaign. He was able to deliver supplies from England to the army during the campaign, which arrived at Chartres at the most crucial moment. He did this by maintaining contact with London in enemy territory 400 km south of Calais. In the same way, John Harleston's mission into the heart of Burgundy is an excellent example of how Edward was able to turn around a tight situation such as the one he found himself in at the end of the siege of Reims, where the army's food reserves were completely depleted. He was able to avoid the disintegration of the army thanks to Harleston, so that when the main army arrived in Burgundy there was already a month's supply waiting for the king. Edward made excellent use of his tactical superiority in Burgundy and Paris, brutally employing the terror of the *chevauchées*. In the former case to start peace negotiations quickly, in the latter to reach an agreement favourable to him during the negotiations. Following the expiry of the peace agreement, Charles, the regent did in fact succeed in reconquering the territory lost during

⁸⁶² L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donad J. Kagay, «Appendix II: Battles, Campaigns, Treaties », in L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donad J. Kagay (eds.), *The Hundred Years War (Part III): Further Considerations*, Leiden - Boston, 2013, pp. 511-513.

⁸⁶³ Jean Favier, *La guerre de Cent ans*, Paris, 1980, p. 276.

⁸⁶⁴ G. Minois, *La guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

the Treaty of Brétigny, but by 1360 Edward had no rival in the French kingdom and the campaign had expanded England to its largest extent since 1223. Thanks to John II's ransom, the kingdom was amply compensated for the expenses incurred during the campaign. In sons of Edward, strong, battle-hardened generals awaited the succession to the English throne.⁸⁶⁵ After the peace treaty, the best example of how successful Edward felt is the psalm book from 1361 to 1373, which depicts Edward, dressed in royal colours, triumphantly riding a charging English lion.⁸⁶⁶ Therefore, it is not surprising that on the whole the future was very favourable for Edward in 1360 when he finally returned to England. The circumstances that led to the situation changing radically fifteen years later, however, are no longer the subject of this dissertation.

The political situation after the Treaty of Brétigny made life difficult for the mercenary captains, as their employers dismissed them one after the other;⁸⁶⁷ they thus set off from the regions to which they had previously been accustomed towards the border region of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, where, by maintaining a balance between just war and criminal war, they had to provide for the daily bread of their respective companies. As we have seen, the wrong decision could have fatal consequences for both captains and ordinary *routiers*. It is no coincidence that when Seguin de Badefol occupied the town of Anse, he signed the letters issued by him as «*Seguins de Badefou, capitaine d'Anse pour le roy de Navarre*».⁸⁶⁸ Mercenaries teetered on the edge of social acceptance; we find examples of how, by complying with certain conditions, they could enjoy freedom of movement in a town: Louis Roubaud was able to chase Limousin through the town of Brioude after both had surrendered their weapons; in another case, not even a letter of remission signed by the king could save Jean Double from execution. It is also his example that shows us that among the mercenaries there were some who tried to reintegrate into society, as we have seen, with varying degrees of success. The effort was successful only for those captains who remained loyal to one side or the other.⁸⁶⁹ Examples of this are the relationship between Arnaud de Cervole and Philip the Bold or between Eustache d'Aubrichécourt and the Black Prince. Two decades later, Castellain Vasc proved to be just

⁸⁶⁵ Five sons, born between 1350 and 1355, lived to adulthood. F. Autrand, *Charles V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

⁸⁶⁶ David Simpkin, « The Organisation of Chivalric Society », in Robert W. Jones and Peter Cross (eds.), *A Companion to Chivalry*, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 39-56, p. 51.

⁸⁶⁷ ADN B 8497.

⁸⁶⁸ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...* *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

⁸⁶⁹ Jamme Armand « Routiers et distinction sociale: Bernard de La Salle, l'Angleterre et le pape », in Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Bériac-Lainé and Frédéric Boutouille (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*, Bordeaux, 2016, pp. 57-100, p. 59.

such a captain, winning the affection of Philipp the Bold despite his foreign origins and integrating into the Burgundian court.⁸⁷⁰

Many aristocrats, and even towns such as Metz, took advantage of the specific form of medieval warfare of the mid-14th century, the Great Company, for their private wars. These three examples illustrate the power of the Great Company on the borders, where armies exceptionally exceeded 3000 men. The tactics consisted mainly of wreaking such havoc on the enemy's rear that peace was forced or, in the case of powerful adversaries such as Henri de Vaudémont and Arnaud de Cervole, the enemy was forced to withdraw their troops and defend their own territory. In all three cases, the offensive tactics lived up to expectations. This type of warfare made the territory under attack unpredictable, as members of the great companies appeared in such large numbers in several places at once that defending a region, towns and castles required large numbers of soldiers. The contemporaries were well aware of this, as demonstrated by the protective measures taken by Robert, the duke of Bar.⁸⁷¹

The local population had a wide variety of relationships with the mercenaries, marrying, dating, having fun, eating, drinking and talking together. Some have used mercenaries for personal revenge, while others have exploited the instability caused by corporations to advance their own interests at the expense of others. Some hired mercenaries to travel safely, others sought the protection of mercenaries against their own families. They asked for loans and, if necessary, hired mercenaries to defend a region against their adversaries. Sometimes they went on crusades with the mercenaries to escape their creditors. They were admitted to the towns in small groups. All these examples of cohabitation are part of everyday life in border regions, where the presence of mercenaries became permanent from the 1360s onwards. However, as we have seen from the examples cited so far, many of these relationships were not authorised, on the contrary, they were even punished. Nevertheless, there is another, much closer form of cohabitation, which of course sometimes entails much harsher penalties. This is cooperation with mercenaries.

Understanding the relationship between mercenaries and crime in the bailliage of Auxois is essential to understanding the socio-political dynamics of the region at the time of the great companies. It highlights the challenges faced by local communities in the presence of mercenaries and underlines the implications of such circumstances for social order,

⁸⁷⁰ Christophe Masson, « Compagnies d'aventure et années françaises. Le cas des campagnes de Gênes et de Naples à l'époque du Grand Schisme d'Occident », in Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Bériac-Lainé and Frédéric Boutoulle (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*, Bordeaux, 2016, pp. 257-266, p. 263.

⁸⁷¹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

governance and security in general. It can be seen that the relationship between the local population and the mercenaries was defined by violence, in which the suffering party was usually the population, but there are several examples of the local inhabitants or administration not treating the mercenaries in a more humane manner, at least according to today's standards, if the opportunity arose. However, the research carried out on the bailliage of Auxois clearly shows that this system of relations was much more complex than it first appears. All levels of local society were involved in collaborating with the mercenaries; and every third case noted by Guillaume de Clugny was linked to the mercenaries. While it cannot be said that the whole of local society learned to live together with the *routiers*, there are many instances of local people taking advantage of the situation. All the same, most contemporary people had similar ideas to the ones of the author of the annals:

«[The French] *submerging themselves in the greatest possible quarrel, they led the country into danger, for the armies of the companies of thieves tore it apart, and gave free rein to their fury and impetuosity, especially under the leadership of Arnardus è Cervola.*»⁸⁷²

The Duchy fought a constant battle against the companies between the English invasion led by Edward III and the departure of the Crusaders. As the maps clearly show, the sphere of influence of the Companies was ever changing, the situation being at its most favourable just before the unexpected death of the last Capetian duke, when an agreement was finally reached with the English companies to leave the duchy, not least through the intervention of Edward III. The Duke's death came at the worst possible time, leaving Burgundy without an heir, *ab ovo*, exposed to the chaos of the War of Succession and the companies involved in it, whichever side they were on, although the southward migration of the Tard-Venus was relatively successfully avoided thanks to the English captains such as Nicolas Tamworth. By the beginning of the following year, however, the reflux of the *routiers* had affected the duchy much more unceremoniously, as the companies from all four quarters gravitated south of Lyon and the combined mercenary army destroyed the royal army at the Battle of Brignais. Burgundy, as well as the whole of the frontier, was left unprotected from the mercenaries, as is clearly visible on maps from 1362. Even so, Burgundy managed to rid the duchy and its borders of the mercenaries. The solution was Enrique of Trastámara, who set off with his army of mercenaries towards the Midi to cross the Pyrenees and take Castile. From 1363 onwards, the mercenary presence reached a new level, as Burgundy became

⁸⁷² O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 392.

the direct target of the companies again after 1360, following the outbreak of the Burgundian War of Succession. As La Charité fell and Franc-Comtois invasions persisted, by the conclusion of 1364, the situation had notably worsened, compounded by the entry of Seguin de Badefol. Alongside incursions from three directions, by spring 1365 the companies had established a presence within the heart of the duchy. Philip exerted his utmost effort and managed to yield substantial outcomes. When scrutinizing the table presented in the initial section of this chapter, it becomes evident that Burgundy became a final resting place for mercenary leaders during the initial years of the 1360s. Nevertheless, it was not only the leaders of the companies who fell victim to the bitter opposition, but also the sacrifices of the ordinary mercenaries, the *prévôt* of Dijon, in September 1364. However, the hydra effect did its work and for every head cut off, a new and stronger head grew.

Tracing the presence of mercenaries in Burgundy, there is no significant difference between the first half of 1360 and the end of 1364 and the first half of 1365. In both periods, foreign armies and mercenaries occupied the entire territory of the duchy and its immediate border region. However, while in 1360 a large part of the invading army, led by Edward, left for Paris after the Treaty of Guillon, and although for a long time Burgundy had a problem with the mercenary captains who remained behind, the situation was very different in the summer of 1365. The mercenaries who were suddenly lost their contracts in the duchy meant an imminent threat for the population of Burgundy. It was a problem for the Duchy, that had to be dealt with. Burgundy had suffered so much, needed a breathing space, and the crusade to Hungary was the solution. Since everyone knew what would happen if the *routiers* were left without work and without a purpose, as Brétigny had already shown, Philip wanted to get the mercenaries out of Burgundy as quickly as possible. Thanks to the Hydra effect, the situation was so untenable that the Duke did not care whether he succeeded in preparing the crusade thoroughly and making it sustainable in the long term. He had one goal in mind: to get as many mercenaries out of Burgundy as quickly as possible. To do this, a suitable person appeared, widely feared and respected by the companies, whose word they believed in and under whose leadership they would go to fight an enemy as exotic as the Turk, and in whom Philip the Bold had confidence: this captain was called Arnaud de Cervole.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies

*«The 'companies of adventure' have received a great deal of attention
from both professional and amateur historians»⁸⁷³*

Introduction

In the Theatres of War chapter, the relationship between the local population and the mercenaries was presented, mainly from the perspective of the inhabitants of the borderland. The Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies presents the subjects of the dissertation in two main parts, the mercenaries. The first part of the chapter focuses primarily on the participants, i.e. the mercenaries of the crusade led by Arnaud de Cervole: the members and captains of the companies. The tactics used by the companies, not forgetting their weapons and equipment, the size of the companies and the motivation that led the *rouitiers* to take part in the crusade. The second part of the chapter focuses on Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy during the same period.

The first section of the Frontier Mercenaries deals with the mercenaries and captains known to have been involved in the Crusade. Among them there are captains such as Soudic de La Trau, Bertrucat d'Albret, Seguin de Badefol, Arnaud de Cervole whose lives are better known and others such as Limousin, Ieuan Wynn, Espiot, Amenion de Pommiers etc. about whom we know much less. The sub-chapter does not take stock of the information on each captain individually, as most of them have already been mentioned several times, but rather discusses which of the leaders of the companies stood out from the rest and for what reasons. In the same chapter, there is a discussion of the ordinary mercenaries serving in the companies, about whom there is much less information than about their leaders. The Popes had planned crusades for mercenaries before, but the idea had always met with stiff resistance. However, this was first broken in 1365, and the idea of participating in a crusade

⁸⁷³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

was accepted. The reasons were complex, but one of them was to save their souls, to obtain forgiveness of their sins. Therefore, the relationship between mercenaries and death is discussed in this sub-chapter.

The second section focuses on the tactics and strategies employed by the mercenaries on the frontier during or immediately preceding the Crusade. Two aspects are highlighted here: espionage and the importance of the river valleys in the strategy and tactics of the mercenaries. Spying always used to be an essential part of the strategy of the companies, as it was always much more dangerous and caused more loss in human life to risk a frontal assault against a walled city or castle than to use deception. Companies employed spies for several reasons: so as to be able to conquer a city, capture a wealthy person, or seize a shipment or treasure. On the other hand, the use of spies and military intelligence proved to be just as an important tool for the medieval cities or the regional authorities as well when they were preparing for the onslaught of the *routiers*.

In the middle of 14th century, the great companies of the Hundred Years' War achieved their goals by occupying bridge-towns and strategically important castles in the river valleys. In this part of the dissertation, the importance of river valleys will be shown from the point of view of the mercenary companies in the border regions of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire. The cases presented show this process from the first appearance of the mercenaries until they reached the total domination of their targeted region. The importance of this is due to the fact that Seguin de Badefol, one of the main protagonists of the Crusade, used the same tactics when he conquered Anse and during the Crusade in the border areas.

In this chapter, the impact of river valleys, *espionage*, and *chevauchées* is discussed, drawing heavily on the studies published during the preparation of my dissertation

A) Frontier Mercenaries

A.a) Those Who Took Part in the Crusade: Members of the Companies

The companies involved in the crusade were made up of multiethnic mercenaries. In addition to the English, Bretons, Gascons, Welsh, French, Italians, Navarrese, and Germans may have joined them. These mercenaries were all active in 1365 and were on the frontier when Arnaud de Cervole gathered the companies involved in the crusade. It is therefore necessary to examine the composition of the smaller companies that made up the crusade, which were themselves multiethnic, and what motivated someone to become a mercenary

in the mid-14th century. In this respect, the frontier sources are scanty, generally not giving details of the composition of a company, but as already mentioned, identifying a particular company with a particular nation (English, Bretons, Gascons, Germans, etc.). One can draw on Bertrand Schnerb's excellent study to examine the composition of a company active in Burgundy in the 1360s.⁸⁷⁴ Bertrand Gasc arrived in Burgundy in 1359 with 12 *brigands à cheval* and 182 *brigands à pied* to serve Philip of Rouvres. The company was stationed mainly in the castles defending Auxois to ward off the threat from the west. Bertrand Gasc, a native of Alexandria, was a subject of Visconti and never lost touch with his native land during his career.⁸⁷⁵ The infantrymen in Gasc's company were commanded by six constables, who were given double pay. The number of infantrymen serving under each constable ranged from 23 to 33, more than twice the number of mercenaries serving as light cavalry under a Hungarian constable in Florence that year. Based on the names of the participants, Bertrand Schnerb identified 42 of the 79 mercenaries examined as Italians, half of whom, understandably, came from Bertrand Gasc's hometown of Alexandria. The rest were from Septentrional or central Italy: from Turin, Asti, Lombardy or Milan. However, there were also mercenaries from Pisa, Florence, Parma or Pavia in Gasc's company. The remainder of the infantrymen came from all corners of the French kingdom: there were also members from Brittany, and Normandy. Mercenaries from the regions of Metz, and Savoy were also in the company. A further 17 Frenchmen from Provence and Languedoc reinforced the company, together with 7 mercenaries from Avignon, 4 from Valence, 1 from Cavaillon, 1 from Carpentras, 1 from Montpellier and 1 from Aigues-Mortes. In addition, mercenaries from Blois or Rouen took part in the defence of Burgundy. The German members of the contingent came from Cologne and Frise, while the Germans from the Alps were represented by a Brabant from Bruges. As can be clearly seen locals supplemented the essentially Italo-French company during the march northwards.⁸⁷⁶ The company was still in Burgundy in 1365, now in the service of Philip the Bold. Equally misleading are the companies called Navarrese in the sources, since many of the Navarrese were Normans between 1357 and 1365, due to Charles II's interests in northern France.⁸⁷⁷ At least a third of the routiers from the Duchy of Aquitaine were of Agenais, Périgourdin and Gascon origins, since, as the composition of Bertrand Gasc's company shows, the mercenaries who formed

⁸⁷⁴ B. Schnerb, « Un capitaine Italien... », art. cit., pp. 5-38.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁸⁷⁷ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

the core of the companies came from the area where the captain lived.⁸⁷⁸ Germain Butaud, in his seminal work on the history of the 14th-century companies, argues that the Bretons had their own particular circumstances, different from others, which influenced their mercenary careers until the mid-1360s. The War of Succession continued after the Treaty of Brétigny, and their services were still needed in Brittany. As a result, before 1364, fewer Breton captains played a decisive role in the history of the companies, their numbers increasing after the victory of John of Monfort.⁸⁷⁹ While Breton captains did not play as important a role as Gascon or English captains in the history of the duchies and counties between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire in the first half of the 1360s, French, German, Latin border sources in this period are more likely to indicate Bretons than Gascons alongside Englishmen. Indeed, Burgundian sources identify the companies that arrived in the duchy after the Battle of Brignais as Breton.⁸⁸⁰ Arnaud de Cervole's company was considered more Breton than Gascon.⁸⁸¹

The question of who became a mercenary and why in the mid-14th century, as a mercenary, he would risk his life in a crusade against an unknown enemy in a country thousands of kilometres away, requires two different explanations. The common point in the answers to both questions is that, in addition to the many individual motivations and life circumstances, there are certain general factors that influenced the decision of possibly tens of thousands of mercenaries to take up the cross in France and Italy.

Concerning the first question, for the Basque, Gascon and Breton mercenaries, this common point is the prolonged war and the economic crisis and livelihood problems that naturally go with it.⁸⁸² Many of the *routiers* were of noble origin «*whose fortune was for more than a generation, closely linked with those of the royal protagonists. For them, the conclusion of peace in 1360 presented financial as well occupational problems.*»⁸⁸³ Joining a company as a knight had concrete financial benefits: knights in Owain Lawgoch's payroll were given 40 florins a month by the city of Metz, 10-15 florins more than other company members serving as cavalry.⁸⁸⁴ Guillaume Sauvent from Gien, on the Loire, entered the service of the Count of Foix in the «*lands of the Oc language*» because he wanted to earn a decent living

⁸⁷⁸ G. Pépin, « Les routiers gascons... », art. cit., p. 29.

⁸⁷⁹ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

⁸⁸⁰ ADCO B 1416, f. 3r

⁸⁸¹ «Bretons de l'Archiprêtre». A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 197.

⁸⁸² G. Pépin, « Les routiers gascons... », art. cit., p. 26.

⁸⁸³ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., p. 12.

⁸⁸⁴ AMM EE3 liasses 6, f. 8.

and own property. He later joined Petit Meschin's company and took part in the invasion of Pont-Saint-Esprit.⁸⁸⁵

Another such reason is social status, regardless of territorial origin: if someone was born a bastard, especially if he came from a noble family, in the vast majority of cases, they had no chance of inheritance. For them, becoming a mercenary was almost the only 'natural' career where they had the opportunity to excel as *routiers*.⁸⁸⁶ It is no coincidence that the account books of Guillaume de Clugny are full of bastard companions who were held responsible for some crimes between 1360 and 1365 in Auxerre.⁸⁸⁷

Of course, being a *routier* had its dangers, even for those who were cautious or simply lucky enough to survive years of fighting in the companies. Moreover, when they returned home wanting to settle down they had to face retribution. Jean Dondon, called, the Morineau from Nivernais was a mercenary, who joined one of the companies at the age of 20. He then went to Spain with Bertrand du Guesclin. When he returned and tried to settle down at home, he was imprisoned for many months for his earlier deeds, but was lucky to be released in 1369.⁸⁸⁸ The individual paths to mercenarism were extremely varied, as were the reasons why people became mercenaries. Sometimes due to the royal pardon, reducing harsh punishments meant the commencement of a mercenary career. Johan de Eslava was sentenced to 50 pounds and that «*he may lose his wrist*»⁸⁸⁹ for drawing a knife against two men of Olite, but Charles II, the Bad, king of Navarre reduced his penalty for services rendered in France.⁸⁹⁰ Jean Petit, called Barjat, was a simple member of the companies originating from Pierrecouverte in the region of Limousin. He obtained his letter of remission from Charles V in which he declared that «*I have been compelled to live up the fields, to use your lands and subjects, to plunder, rob, and hold to ransom all manner of people, whether they be churchmen, nobles, burghers, or merchants.*»⁸⁹¹ He committed crimes that «*I could not, here, say or express.*» Barjat's example may provide us with some conclusions that were generally right for the soldiers of fortune in middle of 14th century. The type of crimes he testified, the life he lived may be considered as an archetypical example of an average soldier's life regardless of his origin or in which part of Europe he was active.

⁸⁸⁵ Remissio facta Guilelmo Sauvent, February 1365. G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre... op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.

⁸⁸⁶ G. Pépin, « Les routiers gascons... », art. cit., p. 26.

⁸⁸⁷ ADCO B 2748-2752.

⁸⁸⁸ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, op. cit., p. 69.

⁸⁸⁹ ARGN Reg. 119, f. 346v

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹¹ F.-B. Frantz, *Les Brigands...*, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

In the *Registre criminel du Châtelet de Paris*, there are several similar life-paths of the members of companies. Simon de Verrue, who was considered to be «a very strong robber»⁸⁹² during most of his career he committed crimes such as robbing women, pillaging churches or abbeys, stealing horses, and participating in *chevauchées*⁸⁹³. He was hanged. Guillaume de Bruc, an esquire, robbed an inn, he was an accomplished thief with a number of cases of sneaking into houses by different manners, he naturally participated in *chevauchées* with other soldiers of fortune, and he raped women, and ransomed the land. He was a member of Geoffroy Tête-Noire's route and was decapitated.⁸⁹⁴ Besides the already mentioned crimes, an interesting case was Hennequin du Bos, called the Bastard of Gommignies, who was of noble origin and had a somewhat different career due to his social standing. The crimes he carried out were regarded as *Lèse-majesté*⁸⁹⁵ and it is mentioned several times that he had given advice to the English about the potential ransom of the captured French nobles.⁸⁹⁶ He was also decapitated and his body was hanged. In 1370, Guillen de la Hala, provost of Navarrería sentenced a French soldier, Johan de Villanova to death, who was drowned for stealing his lord's purse and having made counter-keys of his lord's ark, stealing 20 gold pieces. No executioner could be found in the town of Navarrería, so a person was entrusted to execute him, to whom 10 sueldos were paid.⁸⁹⁷ Jaquet de Lyembois embarked on his career as a mercenary at the age of twenty as well from Douai south of Lille. He served in a series of companies under various knights and esquier later in the retinue of the bishop of Paris. He was an inveterate thief, who spent his career in a series of French and Italian cities (Sens, Auxerre, Joigny, Avignon, Pavia and Lombardy) and committed various crimes. He was eventually tortured and hanged.⁸⁹⁸ Another, Jean Petit's life story is the same as that of Jaquet de Lyembois: in this case, he joined the mercenary companies around the age of 20. He was from Normandy and, like Jaquet de Lyembois, served under several captains before coming to Paris. In the same way, he went abroad, only in this case not to Italy but to the Empire. During his short career, he stole indiscriminately from everyone, gold, silver and other valuable chattels, which he

⁸⁹² Henri Duplès-Agier (ed.), *Registre criminel du Châtelet de Paris du 6 Septembre 1389 au 18 Mai 1392*, vol. I, Paris, 1861, p. 8.

⁸⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

⁸⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp 20-26

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁸⁹⁷ ARGN Reg. 138, ff. 112-112.

⁸⁹⁸ H. Duplès-Agier (ed.), *Registre criminel I...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-231.

then quickly sold. He confessed more and more as the interrogations continued, and at first, it looked as if he might get away with a beating and an ear-cutting, but when it was proved that he was a repeat thief, Jean Petit was hanged for it.⁸⁹⁹

The example of a child of around 10 years old shows that it was not only by choice that someone joined the companies. Even if he managed to escape, his life was not safe because he had already become stigmatised in the eyes of the locals. In 1366, when Seguin de Badefol was still in Anse, Margot's mercenaries captured a child aged 10-12 who was being used as a servant. The child managed to escape in the forest of Enverseurs near Renaison. However, he was captured by a local and accused of being English, i.e. a member of the Companies. The child insisted in vain, that this was not true, but was killed.⁹⁰⁰

Letters of Remission were not only issued to the members of the companies but to commoners or nobles who had anything to do with the mercenaries' death. These letters also provide important information on the *routiers*' life. In August 1397, this kind of letter was commissioned to Jean Josselin from Azay-le-Brulé who participated in Laignes in hunting down a soldier of the companies called Turpelin, who was a «*thief, a looter and a robber, pursuer of the companies*» from the castle of Saint-Maixent.⁹⁰¹

A.b) Participating in the Crusades: A Chance for Saving their Souls and other Motives

Barjat's case also shows that sometimes, actually not so rarely, it was possible for the soldiers of fortune to escape death if royal interest or 'divine intervention' required saving the *routier's* life. Among Saint Martial's miracles, there are cases when the Saint saved the life of English mercenaries. A knight who participated in a *chevauchée* fell in the Dordogne River because the girth that held his saddle had broken. He was almost drowned but his last prayer to Saint Martial saved his life. He vowed that he would never attack another fellow Christian. Miraculously he was saved along with his horse.⁹⁰² Another Englishman was captured by the garrison of Saint-Jean-de-Côle and was condemned to be hanged. When the rope was around his neck he began to cry and asked for Saint Martial's help to save his

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 231-239.

⁹⁰⁰ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

⁹⁰¹ Paul Guérin (ed.), *Recueil des Documents concernant Le Poitou contenus dans les Registres de la Chancellerie de France*, vol. VI, 1893, Potiers, p. 287, n° DCCCCXXXV.

⁹⁰² Lemaître Jean-Loup, « Miracles de guerre, miracles de paix en Limousin d'après les miracles de Saint - Martial (1388) », in Michel Sot (ed.), *Médiation, paix et guerre au Moyen Âge*, Paris, 2012, pp. 63-73, p. 71.

soul. He promised that if he was saved he would walk naked with a certain weight of wax to venerate Saint Martial's head. As soon as the vow was made, he was freed and went, naked and gave thanks to the saint and fulfilled his promise.⁹⁰³

Saint Martial's miracles help to understand the relationship between death and mercenaries and, through this, some of the reasons why ordinary mercenaries were persuaded to take part in the crusade. Death was an integral part of the mercenary's everyday life. But what was their relation to the afterlife? Whether they sought peace of their consciousness, or they really «*did not fear to risk the perdition of their souls*»?⁹⁰⁴ The answer is complicated: As Urban wrote in the Clamat ad Nos bull: «*fortresses, and properties of churches, monasteries, other pious places....were the prey of their heinous assaults*»⁹⁰⁵. In fact religious places were one of favourite targets, they often captured and ransomed priests, one of their many victims was Bouchard, a priest of Molème who had to follow the company from garrison to garrison, he had to write letters to the captains, accompany them in their *chevauchées*. When the time came for his release, the English put him in jail without food and water and demanded 50 florins from him. Finally, he was released without safe conduct⁹⁰⁶. Most crimes Barjat carried out were punished by death: pillage and theft, especially from the sacred places, churches, monasteries, were regarded as sacrilege⁹⁰⁷. Like Barjat, the *routiers* did not care when a priest asked for mercy in the name of the Lord: the English companies besieged the castle of Cortijo in 1382: the defenders killed an English squire and another Portuguese squire. When they saw that they could not defend the castle anymore, then «*Then the priests climbed to the top of the wall and showed the body of Christ and begged them to leave for the love of the Lord, but the English did not care....*»⁹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, their relation to faith was not mere ignorance: one of Bouchard's tasks in his captivity was to preach to the company. John Hawkwood who was a ruthless man when it was needed asked for and received the permission from the Pope to have a portable shrine to be able to conduct a mass while on his campaigns.⁹⁰⁹ In 1387 Sir Hugh Calveley received a licence to found and endow a college at Bunbury with a master or warden, a sub-warden two chaplains, two chanters and two choristers to say daily prayers for the souls of himself,

⁹⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰⁴ Clamat ad Nos, bull of Urbain V, O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

⁹⁰⁵ Clamat ad Nos, bull of Urbain V, *Ibid.*, p. 466.

⁹⁰⁶ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174.

⁹⁰⁷ V. Toureille, *Vol et brigandage...*, *op. cit.*, I. 662.

⁹⁰⁸ Fernão Lopes, *Crónica de D. Fernando*, foreword, index, and critical edition by Giuliano Macchi, Lisbon, repr. 2004, chapter CXLIX, p. 521.

⁹⁰⁹ W. Caferro, *J. Hawkwood, An English Mercenary...*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies and devoted a good deal of money to rebuild his parish church.⁹¹⁰ In 1385, Sir Robert Knolles, 'citizen of London', and his wife Constance founded a college or chantry in honour of the Holy Trinity and the Blessed Virgin Mary.⁹¹¹ When Geoffroi Tête Noir was fatally wounded by a crossbow strike at the siege of Ventadour, he gave 1500 frans to the church and the chapel of Saint Georges in the castle of Ventadour.⁹¹² Meanwhile, Seguin de Badefol twice asked and obtained forgiveness from the Pope. On both occasions, he had made a special effort for lifting the excommunication.⁹¹³ In the treaty of 30 April 1364, in which Seguin de Badefol surrendered the town of Brioude, which he had occupied for 10 months, a special clause stipulated that the Duke of Berry must obtain absolution from the Pope and a pardon from the King of France.⁹¹⁴

«They, the ten governors, have taken and placed in their hands, in the name of the said Duke, the task of seeking and obtaining, for the captains and companies of the said town of Brioude, absolution from the Pope and pardon from our lord the King and from the Duke of Berry and Auvergne, according to their loyal power.»⁹¹⁵

Similarly, when he gave up the city of Anse to join Arnaud de Cervole's crusade for the city of Seguin de Badefol, he stipulated in the treaty that he would have the same rights as other mercenaries going on a crusade:

«Item, the said Sir Seguin and all his aforesaid companions shall have absolution from our Holy Father, for what they have incurred and deserved through the war they have waged and conducted, in opposition to the sentences and other proceedings that our Holy Father had issued and

⁹¹⁰ T. Bostock, *Dogs of War...*, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁹¹² F.-B. Frantz, *Les Brigands...*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁹¹³ Traité consul par la médiation d'Arnaud Amanieu, seigneur d'Albret, entre les gouverneurs du duc de Berry et d'Auvergne, le comte de Boulogne et d'Auvergne, le dauphin d'Auvergne, et les gens de pays d'Auvergne, d'une part, et Séguin de Badefol, Bérard d'Albret et autres capitaines des compagnies de Brioude et de Varennes, près Monlet, d'autre part, pour que lesdites compagnies évacuent le pays et crescent tote hostalitié dans les montages d'Auvergne et de Velay et dans la party du Gévaudan dependant du dauphins d'Auvergne, ensemble la ratification de ce traité par les deputies des bonnes villas d'Auvergne 4 30 avril 1364, in Augustin Chassaing (ed.), *Spicilegium Brivatense. Recueil de documents historiques relatifs au Brivadois et à l'Auvergne*, Paris, 1886, p. 367 ; ADRML 10G1931.

⁹¹⁴ Jacques Monicat, *Histoire du Velay pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Les grandes Compagnies en Velay, 1358-1392*, Paris, 1928, p. 31 ; K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁹¹⁵ A. Chassing (ed.), *Spicilegium Brivatense...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-366.

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undertaken against the companies, and he will procure that the King of France and the Prince of Wales will also pardon and forgive the excesses they have committed through the said war.

Item, wherever the said Sir Seguin and his aforesaid companions wish to go on the journey to the Holy Land with the others who are meant to go and be in the company of the Archbishop, our Holy Father will give and grant to them the same absolution as to the others who go and participate....»⁹¹⁶

In the same way, Arnaud de Cervole had to arrange for his absolution before setting off on his crusade. The Archpriest, together with an English captain called Filefort in contemporary sources, met the papal envoy in Mâcon to obtain the papal absolution requested for the crusaders. In Mâcon, the locals provided their accommodation and food. Filefort also settled other matters with the Bailli of Mâcon «*in the interests of the city and the region*» They stayed in a tavern at the bridge where they met the envoy from Avignon and left after receiving the good news.⁹¹⁷

In 1361, the companies took the bridge town Pont-Saint-Esprit⁹¹⁸ and its surroundings up to the gate of Avignon,⁹¹⁹ because the companies stayed there for several months and collected significant ransom and booty. For several months, the Papal Court of Avignon was at the mercy of companies⁹²⁰. Innocent VI announced a crusade against the companies that was preached in France and in the Holy Roman Empire and he ordered special taxes to be levied in several dioceses to be able to cover the costs incurred. According to the papal instructions on 17 January 1361, bishop Aymo of Lausanne levied a tax on all the clergy and monasteries of his diocese for the crusade against the Great Companies⁹²¹. Cardinal Pierre Bertrand, bishop of Ostie was nominated to be the captain of the crusade, however, despite all preparations Avignon had to broker an agreement with the companies. The mercenaries were therefore concerned about what would happen to their souls in the afterlife, so they were sometimes, albeit rarely, absolved by the Pope for their sins, or, in the

⁹¹⁶ ADRML 10G1931, f. 4 ; G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-22.

⁹¹⁷ L. Michon « Documents relatifs à l'histoire de la ville de Mâcon », *Revue des Sociétés Savantes*, vol. V, n° 1, 1870, pp. 161-183, p. 166.

⁹¹⁸ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹²⁰ G. Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs... », *art. cit.*, p. 229.

⁹²¹ SKB Fontes 8. 409, 1084. <https://www.query.sta.be.ch/detail.aspx?ID=70335>

14th century, when a confluence of external circumstances favoured participation in a crusade, they even ventured, albeit reluctantly, to a distant, exotic country such as Hungary. By 1365, however, external circumstances in France had indeed changed with the simultaneous conclusion of the wars of succession in Brittany and Burgundy, so that suddenly the *routiers* who had been steadily employed on the frontier were effectively out of work. Arnaud de Cervole's personality and network of contacts must have played a part in winning such a large number of mercenaries for the cause of the crusade, and presumably the '*esprit de corps*' may have played a part. As more and more men were ploughing their way to the front, others were not to be left behind. This is illustrated by Seguin de Badefol's aforementioned agreement to surrender Anse, since Margot⁹²² stayed behind and was still in Anse when the crusaders led by Arnaud de Cervole set off. The picture that emerges from the sources is that he tried to hurry the negotiations in the summer of 1365 so that he could join the others.

Of course, as mentioned above, in addition to the general reasons, countless individual life situations determined whether a local resident would go on a crusade with the mercenaries. Two such cases from the sources are worth mentioning as examples: although both cases are linked to the crusade to Spain, the individual motivations show how different the reasons were that led someone to set off. Amédée de Chayneto, also known as Vouta, took advantage of the crusade led by Du Guesclin to try to make amends for his actions. In an act of revenge, he seized the castle of Linbone, owned by Giraud de Rossillone. The reason for this was that Giraud was the brother of Guigo de Rossillone, making him the target of Amédée's attack. Guigo, who had already taken possession of the Château de Toul belonging to the Dame de Beaucaire, had destroyed the latter's castle and plundered her possessions. Ignoring the summons from the royal lord of Saint-Symphorien-le-Châtel, Guigo retreated to his own castle. Driven by a desire for revenge, Amédée captured Giraud's castle. The castle was partially burnt, but the hostages were spared. Some, however, were mutilated, killed and robbed. For all these actions, Amédée was pardoned by the King and the Duke of Anjou. However, Amédée did not stop there. While waiting for the letter of pardon, he occupied the castle of Lancea in search of provisions. There, he simply tied up two young boys and led his men on an assault, carrying them before them to prevent the garrison from defending themselves.⁹²³ Finally, joining the mercenaries led by Bertrand du

⁹²² The name of Seguin de Badefol's great company.

⁹²³ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, op. cit., p. 160.

Guesclin, he set out «*prout accesserit in Ispaniam*» «*against the Infideles*», thus obtaining a definitive pardon from Charles V.⁹²⁴

In Lyon, a baker, an innkeeper and a merchant lent 11450 florins to the knight Johannis de Sancto Martino, who wanted to take part in the Castilian Crusade with his company. It is not clear from the text whether the knight's financial difficulties led him to take part, but it is clear that he was unable to settle his debts in full before setting off with his creditors before he left. Of the total amount, 2400 florins was the payout for his troop. In addition to money, Johannis de Sancto Martino, had left some of his property, specifically a sealed item (likely a document or an object). This item was meant to serve as security or collateral for the creditors, and it was sealed with the seal of the knight, indicating his commitment to fulfilling his debt obligations. However, the knight died during the campaign, so the creditors did not receive the full amount.⁹²⁵ In this case, the members of his band were paid in advance, so they were financially motivated to cross the whole of France and go to the Iberian Peninsula to fight, nominally, against the Moors.

A.c) And Those Who Led Them: the Captains of the Companies

Only those captains will be discussed below who were concerned in some way with the crusade, i.e. involved in some manner under the command of Arnaud de Cervole and who took up the cross to set off for Hungary, or waited to join the mercenary crusade after the surrender of Anse to Seguin de Badefol. In the third group are the captains who, independently of Seguin de Badefol, were in Burgundy when the armies of Arnaud de Cervole were on their way to Hungary and remained there when they returned to the Duchy. There was a fourth possibility: the captains who, in the service of Philip, were defending the duchy against the mercenaries returning from Alsace.

The literature and sources have been collated to provide a list of the captains who left Burgundy with Arnaud de Cervole for the remote unknown⁹²⁶, and those who joined them later when they returned to Burgundy to continue southwards towards Savoy, ruled by Amadeus VI, the Green Count. Two of the most accurate lists in modern literature are by Geoffrey Grill and Kenneth Fowler, both drawing heavily on the work of Aimé Chérest.

⁹²⁴ Letters of remission granted to Amédée de la Voulta. August 1366. *Ibid.*, pp. 372-374.

⁹²⁵ Lettres de rémission accordées par le roi à divers habitants ni de Lyon, mentionnant le départ, pour l'Espagne, de Jean de Saint-Martin, capitaine de la ville. *Ibid.*, pp. 386-388.

⁹²⁶ Jean Alexandre C. Buchon (ed.), *Les chroniques de Sire Jean Froissart...*, Paris, 1867, p. 501.

Among the 19th century historians, not only Aimé Chérest but also Jules Finot compiled a list of names. These lists are indicative because they do not include the names of all the captains, but concentrate mainly on the most important ones or those mentioned in the sources. Although the sources are varied, they do not mention everyone, so it is never possible to know exactly how many and who were the captains who joined the Archpriest. Both Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol were joined over the years by captains who remained with the Archpriest and the «*King of the companies*» throughout. Therefore, those of them who were still alive in 1365 followed their leaders. In his work, Geoffrey Grill lists the captains who were with Arnaud de Cervole in 1363, based on the treaty of alliance between Henri de Vaudemont and Arnaud de Cervole published by Lepage 100 years earlier. A summary of the war that broke out between the allies and the most powerful dukes of the frontier is given in the chapter «*Theatres of War*». Suffice it to say that this treaty is a rare source from the period leading up to the Crusade of 1365, which contains the names of the captains who served under Arnaud de Cervole: Sire de Monferrat, Jehan de Mournay, Jean de Villebeon, Meneduc de Possede, Jean de Saint-Rio, Guillaume de La Mote, Yvonet Lavalloet, Mondon Batailler, Poussit de Penesols Grimon, Guillaume de Borbit, Jacquet de Saint-Martin, Eliot de Saint-Martin, Guillaume de Mareul, Thomin le Dimoux, Ylerot le Baston-Viel, Guiot Vigier, Jehan d'Armignac, Kathelin de Ville, Bousoinnet de Pan, Champelunne Merigant, Daminge Naudinnet de Lorme, Perricant Guillonet and Bernart de Pierre-Dorgueil.⁹²⁷

In another letter, written in June 1366 to Huet Hanon, his treasurer, Philip instructs him to pay Philippe de Valais 16 francs urgently to find Arnaud de Cervole, bourc Camus, Bertran de Momprivat and Bernart Donat, «*capitaines des routes des Compaignes*», who had gone south.⁹²⁸ Although Geoffrey Grill, in his extremely thorough work, wrote that it is impossible to determine which of them took part in the crusade in 1365, two are known to have set out with Arnaud de Cervole for Alsace and on their return from there, in the county of Burgundy, to have taken the castles of Longwy, Pesmes and Estrabonne on the orders of the Archpriest. Of the captains who took part in the action, Richard Tauton held Pesmes, the Breton Bourc de Lamit held Longwy-sur-le-Doubs, the Gascon Gaillard de la Motte, Naudon Baugeran, and Bourc de Breteuil took Estrabonne.⁹²⁹ Therefore, Gaillard de la Motte and

⁹²⁷ Treaty of the Henri V count of Vaudémont and Arnaud de Cervole. Henry Lepage, « Épisode de l'histoire des routiers en Lorraine », *Journal de la Société d'Archéologie*, 1866, vol. 15, n° 9-10, pp. 165-166.

⁹²⁸ ADCO B 11875. ; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-406. Pièces justificatives XXII. Mandement de Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, relatif à l'envoi d'un messenger chargé de transmettre des instructions secrètes , tant à Arnaud de Cervole qu'au Bourc Camus et autres capitaines des Compagnies.

⁹²⁹ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

Naudon Baugeran certainly accompanied Arnaud de Cervole. The other two captains serving under Arnaud de Cervole, Jean de Saint-Rio and Bernart de Pierre-Dorgueil, must have been alive at the end of 1364 and in the service of Arnaud de Cervole, because payments relating to their service were recorded in the *Dimanche de Vitel* in April⁹³⁰ and July 1364.⁹³¹ They probably also accompanied Arnaud de Cervole to Alsace.

The other important source is found in the *Dimanche de Vitel*'s records: Arnaud de Cervole, already back in Burgundy from Caesarea, organises the passage of troops through the duchy and is in constant contact with the various captains leading the crusaders on their march. In this source, the messengers carried letters to bourc Camus, bourc d'Aussin, bourc de la Rouque, Jehannot Le Nègre, Bardot de Roussillon, Pierre d'Oingniel, Bertan de Saint Pastour.⁹³² In the same way, he ordered Frère Darre and Espiot to leave the duchy with their companies and set off for Savoy.⁹³³ In another obscure source from the Strasbourg archives, Ulrich de Fénétrange reports that he has captured a captain named Tête-Noir.⁹³⁴ This is the only reference to Tête-Noir in the archives of the frontier. Whether this captain is the same as the famous Tête-Noir, whose death Froissart so memorably recalled in his account, is not known. There is a theoretical possibility, since Limousin, who fell as marshal to King I of Castile at the Battle of Aljubarrota in 1385, served under Seguin de Badefol as one of the leaders of the Margot in Anse. A year later, at the siege of Ventadour in 1386, Geoffroy Tête-Noir, if he had taken part in the crusade in 1365, would have been about the same age as Limousin. However, there is no evidence of this, nothing is known of the captain's fate except for a letter from Ulrich de Fénétrange. This only goes to show that despite the considerable amount of sources, there is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the captains involved in the crusade. The case of Jean de Chauffour adds to the uncertainty surrounding the captains involved. According to the relevant 19th-century and modern literature, as mentioned in the chapter on «*Theatres of War*», he was beheaded following his capture in August 1364. The relevant sections of the *Dimanche de Vitel*, between 20 July 1364 and the first week of August 1364, describe in detail how the troops of the duchy and the county assembled for the siege of Dampierre-sur-Salon.⁹³⁵ After a few days of siege, Jean De Chauffour, seeing the situation as hopeless, surrenders the castle.

⁹³⁰ ADCO B 1416, f. 62r

⁹³¹ ADCO B 1416, f. 58r

⁹³² ADCO B 1423, f. 31v ; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

⁹³³ ADCO B 1423, f. 30r-v; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

⁹³⁴ AVES AA 81, f. 36 ; G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁹³⁵ ADCO B 1416, f. 48v

Shortly afterwards, the captured captain is transported to Dijon and his belongings are confiscated at the Prince's discretion.⁹³⁶ However, his death is not mentioned in the *Dimanche de Vitel* records. Probably everyone is mistaken in this case, because 10 months after his alleged death, he arrives in the Duchy of Bar, leads his Breton mercenaries, captures Lisle-en-Barrois and burns the castle. After the departure of the mercenaries, Joffroi de Horville, *Prévôt* of Gondrecourt orders the destruction of the remains of the castle.⁹³⁷ That it was Jean de Chauffour is no coincidence: in the *prévôt's* accounts, Jean de Chaffour's name appears three times on one folio, allocated to different expenses. The source specifically mentions that Jean de Chauffour arrived at the head of his 'Bretons' and left the burnt Lisle-en-Barrois.⁹³⁸ This means that Jean de Chauffour was not executed at Langres, but took part in the crusade representing the mercenary captains from the borderlands. In another source preserved in the Dijon archives, on 2 July 1366, Philip asks his lieutenant Huet Hanon to contact Arnaud de Cevole and a number of other captains who are on their way to Savoy. In addition to Bourc Camus, two lesser-known names are mentioned in this letter, Bernat Donat and Berteran de Momprivat: «*capitaines des rotes des Compaignes*.»⁹³⁹ This important source is also included in Aimé Chérest's book «*Pièces justificatives*».⁹⁴⁰ The names of three other captains are given by Ernes Petit: Pontailier, Perrière and Sagy.⁹⁴¹ They set off with Arnaud de Cervole for Hungary, and returned with Bourc Lamit, Gaillard de la Motte, Naudon Baugeran, Bourc de Breteuil to plunder Burgundy. All this is known thanks to a letter written by Gui de Pontailier, Marshal of Burgundy, to Philip the Bold, whom Philip had not paid and who, offended, left Philip in the summer of 1366 to go to the Holy Land. However, before that, in his letter, he gives a lengthy account of what he had done to defend himself against the Crusades. He then lists the three names. The sum due to him was not paid until 14 October 1367, in accordance with the prince's order.⁹⁴² Important information about another English captain, Thomas Filofait, who also accompanied Arnaud de Cervole, can be found in a document from Mâcon published by Pascal Michon in 1886. The source, preserved in the city archives, reports that the mercenaries did not want to leave without papal absolution and that Thomas Folifait and

⁹³⁶ ADCO B 1416, f. 49r

⁹³⁷ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁹³⁸ ADM B 1420, f. 33r

⁹³⁹ ADCO 11875.

⁹⁴⁰ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-406.

⁹⁴¹ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

⁹⁴² *Ibid.*

Arnaud de Cervole met the papal legate in Mâcon, who, at the request of the crusaders, obtained a favourable response from the Pope.⁹⁴³ Thomas Filofait continued to do business with the Bailli of Mâcon «*in the interests of the town and the countryside*»⁹⁴⁴ The names of Bernard de Sola and Bertrucat d'Albret are commemorated on a 12 m scroll in April 1366, a month before the death of the Archpriest, who were camped near Pont-de-Veyle waiting with Seguin de Badefol to join Arnaud de Cervole.⁹⁴⁵

Two of the captains involved in the crusade stand out: Seguin de Badefol and Arnaud de Cervole. These were the two captains who led a veritable great company of thousands, surrounded by battle-hardened captains who fought with them for years, and commanded armies that proved invincible in the frontier region of the 1360s. They could only be conciliated, not defeated. They led a close-knit team, had fought with the captains under them for a long time, and were an experienced, tried and tested unit. Pierre d'Orgueil, for example, had been one of the Archpriest's captains from the beginning of his career in 1354. Breton captains such as Jean de Saint-Pol and Mondon Batailler fought alongside Arnaud de Cervole in Burgundy in the sixties.⁹⁴⁶

Seguin de Badefol and crusading Gascon captains such as Bourc Camus, Espiote, Naudin de Bageran, Breteuil fought together in the famous adventures and battles of the sixties: Launac⁹⁴⁷ Pont-Saint-Esprit,⁹⁴⁸ La Charité,⁹⁴⁹ or Cocherel.⁹⁵⁰ Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol stood out from the other captains of the period because of the size of the great companies they assembled and ran: contemporary accounts put Arnaud de Cervole's great company at 6000 men in 1363⁹⁵¹, while the number of mercenaries led by Seguin de Badefol, including the troops of Petit Meschin, Johann Hazenorgue and Espiote, was estimated by one contemporary account at 2000 lances not counting archers and escorts. According to Germain Butaud, the number of mercenaries, including all the others, could have been as high as 10.000.⁹⁵² The main captains involved in the crusade or serving under

⁹⁴³ L. Michon (ed.), *Documents relatifs op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁹⁴⁵ ADCO 9292. Mentioned by E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁹⁴⁶ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

⁹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁹⁵¹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁹⁵² G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

them were deployed over a force an order of magnitude lower. Bertrucat d'Albret and Frère Darre, returning from Alsace, took the castle of Rouvres with 100 lances and 20 archers.⁹⁵³ In July 1364, Jean de Saint-Pot, Jean de Pommiers and Munde de Bataillier took the castle of Argilly in Burgundy with 1200 men.⁹⁵⁴ Contrary to the above, in a letter of February 1365 to Philippe de Meres, Prévôt of Baigneux-les-Juifs estimated the size of the army led by Tallebardon, Pierre d'Orgueil and other Gascon, Breton and Navarre captains at an order of magnitude higher: he puts the number of mercenaries at six thousand.⁹⁵⁵ Generally speaking, the companies of senior captains numbered a few hundred. Geoffrey Grill, in general, put the number of companies involved in the crusade at 400.⁹⁵⁶ This is perhaps a little too specific a figure, but the examples above show that there have been times when a company could number 500 or six 600 men, but certainly no more. It is no coincidence that the company which Geoffroi Tete-Noir was to join was proposed by Ulrich de Fénentrance on 27 May 1365 to be attacked with 600 spears.⁹⁵⁷

Apart from the more important captains who appear in the sources, there were of course other captains who had far fewer mercenaries serving under them. Examples are Amenion de Pommiers, Soudic de la Trau, or Bertrand Gasc, who have already been mentioned. None of them took part in the crusade, but defended the duchy against the returning companies. The size of Bertrand Gasc's company has already been discussed: Amenion de Pommiers commanded 120 men in his company: 8 knights, 88 esquires and 20 archers.⁹⁵⁸ Soudic de la Trau had even fewer: 36 men-at-arms and 2 archers.⁹⁵⁹ Shortly afterwards, in October 1363, 4 knights, 31 esquires, 2 equestrians and 16 men-at-arms.⁹⁶⁰ Germain Butaud reports even fewer captains: Bascot Mauléon commanded 40, he took part in the battle of Coherel with 12, while in Spain he followed Hugh Calveley with 6 men-at-arms.⁹⁶¹

⁹⁵³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁹⁵⁴ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁹⁵⁵ Anatole de Charmasse, *Note sur le passage et le séjour des Grandes Compagnies dans la prévôte de Baigneux-les-Juifs en 1364 et 1365*, Paris, 1881, p. 5.

⁹⁵⁶ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁹⁵⁷ AVES AA 81, f. 36.

⁹⁵⁸ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁹⁵⁹ ADCO B 355, 29 October 1363, mentioned by E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 61, n° 2.

⁹⁶⁰ G. Pepin, « Les Soudans de Preissac ... », *art. cit.*, p. 27.

⁹⁶¹ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

A.d) Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol: the Military Entrepreneurs

The short history of crusading has also been defined by profit maximisation. Arnaud de Cervole headed for the city of Metz partly because he had the opportunity to make a large sum for a relatively small investment, but he did the same on the way back when he invaded the duchy of Burgundy. In addition, Seguin de Badefol haggled over the surrender of Anse until he could conclude the contract on the terms most favourable to him. The protracted negotiations also gave him the opportunity to plunder the wider area, on both sides of the border, and to launch as many *chevauchées* as possible. On the border, Arnaud de Cervole and Seguin de Badefol pursued two different strategies to achieve the same goal: to take advantage of the opportunity offered by their great companies and, under the pressure of keeping them together, to accumulate as much cash and as much wealth as possible. In terms of means and scale, they were far superior to their contemporaries, who were active on the frontiers of the French Kingdom and Holy Roman Empire. In the 1360s, a captain on the frontier of France and the Empire had four options if he wanted to keep his company together and earn a decent income. In terms of survival chances, perhaps the best chance of survival was to be in the service of a frontier potentate, to serve faithfully, to be loyal for better or worse, to remain loyal even when money was scarce and they could not pay him. The truth is that in the whole of the frontier region, the only one able to pay a mercenary company of between 60 and 200 men, at the cost of many difficulties, was the Duke of Burgundy, given the power situation in the 1360s. Bertrand Gasc, Soudic de La Trau and Amenion de Pommiers chose this route. Even for a prince as wealthy as Philip the Bold, as shown in the chapter on «*Theatres of War*», it was a huge financial burden.

If someone did not want to be in the exclusive service of a local authority, or if they did and were not paid properly, they turned against the employer, or if they got a better offer, saw a better opportunity, they left the one they were contracted to. Such was the case of Guiot de Pin, or Tallebardon, or Frère Darre. This way of bullfighting was more profitable in the short term, but at the same time, it was more damaging for the members of the company and the captain. In practice, the captains who chose this route died violent deaths.

The third option was for a captain to join someone else's service, but to be willing and able to do more than a mere leader of a mercenary company and, by gaining the trust of the member of the high nobility, to make himself indispensable. Such was the relationship between Arnaud de Cervole and Philip the Bold. However, Arnaud de Cervole had signalled

much earlier that he wanted to be more than just a mercenary captain. Even when he took up the task of defending the county of Nevers and the barony Donzy against the Anglo-Navarre companies, he was not content with a simple commission from the Duchess of Burgundy. He wanted much more. «*His ambition was not satisfied with the titles that a simple feudatory of the crown could confer on him. He wanted to obtain from the regent himself a delegation of sovereign authority, one of those military commands that were then granted only to elite servants.*»⁹⁶² It was this ambition that led to John the Good choosing the Archpriest to accompany him to Dijon and help the Valois takeover, following the death of the last Capetian prince. It was thanks to this ambition that Philip, Duke of Burgundy, became godfather to Arnaud de Cervole's son. However, this ambition was very much coupled with a cool head and a keen eye, seeing an opportunity to make money, taking advantage of anyone and anything, but always making sure that he remained loyal to the King or to Philip, that nothing would shake their trust in him. He had already come out of the confusion around Nivernais and Donzy financially well, although he had not achieved much in terms of defending the territory he had been charged with, by taking revenge on the citizens of Nevers. In a treaty with Marguerite de France, he received 8000 gold pieces for the evacuation of the castles he had taken. This, as already mentioned in the chapter on «*Theatres of War*», not only benefited him financially, but also established his links with the aristocracy and the royal family. Even before settling in Burgundy, he had already taken advantage of his connections. Together with the Count of Tancarville, who was then in charge of Burgundy, he played an important role in preparing the Valois takeover. He fought on the losing side of the battle of Brignais in the royal army and was taken prisoner. The Treasury paid most of his ransom. By fighting in the battle with the cream of the frontier nobility, he strengthened his position in the duchy. Of course, he did not do this for free. After his release, he demanded 100.000 Florentine florins from the Burgundian treasury for his services. The Ducal Treasury refused to pay this, but the Archpriest appealed to the King, who paid Arnaud de Cervole 35.000 florins, ordering the Treasury to pay the sum immediately.⁹⁶³ Needless to say, this proved to be a huge sum for Burgundy. Nevertheless, Arnaud de Cervole took advantage of every opportunity and, as shown in the «*Theatres of War*» chapter, brought him considerable money in late 1362 and in the first half of 1363, when he attacked first the Duchy of Bar, with Sire of Grancey, and then, in alliance with the Count of Vaudemont, the Duchy of Bar, and on the second occasion, Lorraine. As a military

⁹⁶² A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 71.

⁹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 199 ; E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., pp. 395-397.

entrepreneur, what is interesting is how he and the Count of Vaudemont obtained the 20.000 florins from Prince Robert of Bar after the lost battle. The peace negotiations were over by August 1363 and Arnaud de Cervole had to withdraw from the Duchy of Bar. He did so, but one of his captains, called Ménéduc, occupied the fortress of Vaucouleurs with his Bretons, from where he constantly ravaged the area,⁹⁶⁴ inflicting the worst of his assaults on Demange-aux-Eaux, where he constantly harassed the inhabitants. The mayor of Sorcy, who was trying to settle outstanding taxes with Prévôt of Fou, was unfortunate enough to meet some raiders from the garrison of Vaucouleurs, who promptly robbed him.⁹⁶⁵ Robert, of course, complained to the Archpriest, who immediately wrote a letter and sent an envoy to Ménéduc, demanding that he should hand over the fortress.⁹⁶⁶ The captain then tore Arnaud de Cervole's letter in two in a most spectacular manner, showing that the Archpriest was not in command. Robert himself then sent an envoy to the rebel captain, but this was unsuccessful, too. Finally, Robert realised that he would not get rid of Arnaud de Cervole unless he reached into his pocket and paid the 20.000 florins. Once this was done in October 1363, Ménéduc magically disappeared from the scene.⁹⁶⁷

By 1364, he was so successfully integrated into his chosen home that when Burgundy was virtually emptied and left defenceless because Philip was taking all mobile men to the campaign in Brittany, Arnaud de Cervole was left to defend the duchy. The details are presented in the «*Theatres of War*» chapter, but suffice it to say that Arnaud de Cervole leads armies, advances payments to the depleted treasury, negotiates with renegade mercenaries for the surrender of occupied castles, and, at the end of the year, even manages to get Tallegardon out of the picture. In short, he makes himself indispensable to Philip. The year 1364 is the most striking example of how much more than an ordinary mercenary captain he desired to be, he achieved what so few captains on the periphery of society have achieved: he became a respected member of the aristocracy. He was wealthier than most, had considerable land holdings through his marriage and became a confidant of the Duke. He made the most of the fact that he was at home in both worlds, both respected and feared by the mercenaries, as Froissart so metaphorically describes before the Battle of Coherel. Captal de Buch and one of the English king's heralds, called Roi de Facuon, talk before the battle: Captal de Buch asks several questions about the direction and the disposition of the army's march under Bertrand du Guesclin. When it is Arnaud de Cervole's

⁹⁶⁴ ADM B 2205, f. 25r

⁹⁶⁵ ADM B 2205, f. 22v

⁹⁶⁶ V. Servais, *Annales historique du..., op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

turn, Captal de Buch was asked if he would like to meet the Archpriest. He then replies that he does not want to talk to Arnaud de Cervole: Faucon asks why. The much-trained knight, a general who has proved his courage in countless battles, gives the following answer: «*Jehan, Jehan, he is not here; instead, the Archpriest is a great troublemaker. If he were to come to us, he would mock and ridicule us, assessing our strength and our people. He could turn the tide against us. I care not for his words.*»⁹⁶⁸ Even if the conversation did not take place, it is instructive to know what Arnaud de Cervole's reputation was among his contemporaries.

Séguin de Badefol chose a completely different strategy. In the 1360s, he occupied, alone or in partnership with other captains, riverside towns with a population of between 1000 and 2000, which were important at the time, such as Pont-Saint-Esprit and Anse on the Rhône, and Brioude on the Allier. These towns were not chosen by chance, as they were important enough to be the starting point for a stellar launch of a *chevauchée*. All three towns were taken by surprise, Badefol using his own or local spies, based on strong and effective reconnaissance, and held for several months. However, it was not only the thorough reconnaissance that was the common point, but also the tactics used to take advantage of the river valleys, since the importance of all three cities was due to the stone bridges. As these towns were quite substantial, they were very difficult to besiege as they had stone walls and possibly fortifications. At the same time, they were large enough to separate a great company of several thousand men. The *chevauchées* launched from the three cities served several purposes: firstly, to provide the members of the company with a task, secondly, to obtain loot, and thirdly, to instil a sufficient degree of terror in the hearts of the population and the powerful in the wider environment. In this way, they could obtain risk-free income, such as *patis* or *appatis*, and establish a negotiating position in the transfer of the city so as to make the deal as profitable as possible for Badefol and the captains serving under him. The methods and tactics used by Seguin de Badefol and other captains were not ad hoc, there are many examples to show that not only Seguin de Badefol but also many other captains acted in a similar way and became successful after the peace of Brétigny. This is to be discussed later.

⁹⁶⁸ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., 113.

A.e) Clothing, Armour, Armament

In a joint paper by Emilie Bérard, Philippe Dillmann, Olivier Renaudeau, Cathrine Verna and Valérie Toureille, in an archaeometallurgical study of a plate armour from the 1440s, the authors concluded that parts of the armour they examined, made in northern Italy, showed excellent craftsmanship: use of a banded steel, quenching to harden the metal, combining several sheets of metal with different mechanical properties that may have provided better defensive properties.⁹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the successful metalwork of 15th century Northern Italy certainly had its 14th century roots. By the middle of the 14th century, blacksmiths could forge relatively large iron plates, but their quality was far below that of the iron plates forged in the first half of the 15th century. They varied in thickness from 2 to 2, 5 mm and were approximately flat.⁹⁷⁰ In northern Italy, these plates were made larger and shaped into a much more rounded form, thus achieving greater protection. One of the finest examples of armour from the Crusade years is the tomb of Johannes von Falkenstein in the monastery of Arnsburg in Germany.⁹⁷¹ The 1369 *Codice degli stipendiarii della repubblica di Firenze*, also discussed in the case of the equipment of Hungarian mercenaries, is very helpful in relation to the use of armour by mercenaries. As a general rule, all *conestabiles*, regardless of their nation of origin, were required to wear the same equipment: “*First greaves and cuisses, musekins and bracciali,*⁹⁷² *gorgiera,*⁹⁷³ *sleeves and gussets of mail, cuirass, barbuta and gauntlets of iron, sword, dagger, and targe. And their horses had to have bards or cruppers of iron or of mail.* » Nation-specifically, an English *caporalis* had to have the following equipment: shin splints, cuisse, breast plate, bracelet, iron glove, *barbuta*, sword, dagger, and spear. The German, Burgundian and Italian *caporalis* had to appear at musters with the same armour and weapons, but unlike the English, they did not have spears. Their horses had bards or cuppers of iron or mail. Only the most able-bodied members of mercenary companies, especially the captains, wore such armour in those days. According

⁹⁶⁹ Emilie Bérard, Philippe Dillmann, Olivier Renaudeau, Catherine Verna, Valérie Toureille, « Fabrication of a Suit of Armour at the End of the Middle Ages: An Extensive Archaeometallurgical Characterization of the Armour of Laval », *Journal of Cultural Heritage*, 2022, vol. LIII, pp. 88-99, p. 98.

⁹⁷⁰ László Töll, *A harci vértetékek története. A nyugat-európai hadviselésben alkalmazott testvédelmi rendszerek fejlődéstörténete a 10. századtól a 16. század első harmadáig*, Ph.D. dissertation, Debrecen, 2009, p. 116.

⁹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷² Bracelet.

⁹⁷³ Gorget.

to Froissart, Arnaud de Cervole fought and was wounded and taken prisoner in the Battle of Poitiers wearing the armour of young Pierre d'Alencon.⁹⁷⁴ While in the Battle of Brignais, as Froissart also describes, the armour of the mercenaries was far from uniform: the weaker, more poorly armoured fighters were positioned on the hilltop and protected behind chariots loaded with stones, while their better equipped counterparts fought with short spears against the attacking royal army.⁹⁷⁵

In the border areas, there is no reference to the required armour in the archival sources. In the case of the receipt for military service, when the town of Metz pays for equipment and horses lost in the war, no details are given as to what exactly the equipment covers. However, in the *condotta* for Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri, the city of Metz only stipulates that «*pour chascun homme d'arme, armez de piet en cappe.*»⁹⁷⁶ Königshofen reports on the clothing and armour, or more precisely the lack of it, of the crusaders on their march: Königshofen describes the mercenary captains as wearing expensive clothes and good armour: «*Their clothes were long and costly, and they had good armor and legwear. From this came the fashion in Strasbourg to make long clothes and jackets, legwear, and pointed hats, which was unusual in Strasbourg before.*»⁹⁷⁷ One of the most unexpected effects of the Crusade was on local fashion: as the quote above says, the peaked cap and long dress and coat became fashionable in Alsace. The lasting influence of the peaked cap on fashion is best illustrated by the Diebold Schilling Spiezer Chronicle, a miniature of the crusaders led by Arnaud de Cervole, which was made 110 years after the Crusade.

⁹⁷⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, 45 ; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁹⁷⁶ AMM EE3 liasses 6, f. 8.

⁹⁷⁷ F. Closener and J. Twinger von Königshofen, « Chroniken... », *art. cit.*, p. 161.




Figure 1. Diebold Schilling, *Spiezer Chronik*, Switzerland, Bern,
 Burgerbibliothek, Mss.h.h.l.16, p. 373.



Figure 2. Diebold Schilling, Spiezer Chronik, Switzerland, Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Mss.h.h.I.16, p. 371.

As László Töll notes, the form-fitting dress was thickly padded with long sleeves. The garment worn over the armour followed the design of the period armour.⁹⁷⁸ However, according to Königshofen, such dress and armour were worn only by the richer mercenaries, the poorer ones were barefoot and bare-legged: «*Aber die armen under den Engellendern gingent barfus un nackent.*»⁹⁷⁹

A.f) The Importance of River Valleys in the Overall Strategy of the Mercenary Companies⁹⁸⁰

A.f.a) The Preparation of Attacks

The role of river valleys in the strategy of the companies needs to be analysed in more detail because Seguin de Badefol led several *chevauchées* from Anse during the crusade. As will be discussed below, the river valleys played an important role in the capture and retention of Anse.

A Breton company, led by a mercenary captain called Gaultier, occupied the valley of the River Nièvre around the city of Nevers in the county of Nevers and the Barony of Donzy. The Breton captain and his company ravaged Nivernais, and gathered all the existing livestock - pigs, cattle, and sheep - and then brought them in front of one of the city gates of Nevers, close enough for their owners to be able to recognise them.⁹⁸¹ This is but one example of what happened when the companies occupied and dominated a river valley in the middle of the 14th century.

The key to the success of the companies were their innovative strategies and tactics, tight control, strong leadership, outstanding fighting skills, and the immensely successful strategies and tactics.⁹⁸² Once they took hold of a region 'thanks to this ingenious and lucrative system of relay in oppression, the victims had no respite in their suffering'.⁹⁸³

⁹⁷⁸ L., Töll, *A harci vérteteket története...*, op. cit., p. 126.

⁹⁷⁹ F. Closener and J. Twinger von Königshofen, « Chroniken... », art. cit., p. 161.


⁹⁸⁰ T., Ölbei, « The Importance of River Valleys... », art. cit., pp. 17-37.

⁹⁸¹ ADN B 758, n° 14451.

⁹⁸² H. Norman, « The Mercenary Companies... », art. cit., pp. 253-280, p. 253.

⁹⁸³ Siméon Luce, *Histoire de la Jacquerie*, Paris, 1895, p. 23.

Phillippe Contamine 'referred to the style of warfare [of the companies] as one where the objective was not to prevail over the adversary or to restore peace through victory, but to enrich themselves by all possible means, where elementary economic motives eclipsed political intentions'.⁹⁸⁴ The companies did not want to conquer the land, instead they wanted to maximise their profits.⁹⁸⁵ This fact was well reflected in their strategy: they used river valleys to infiltrate into a province by focusing on taking strategically important castles or towns. They endeavoured to control trade routes by land and river; hence, crossing points were of a high value to them.⁹⁸⁶ A town with a bridge made it possible for the mercenaries to advance along both banks of a specific river.



Map 15. The Strategic Situation of the Companies – Bridges & Cities.

The size of the towns was also important: they were successful in taking towns like Brioude, Anse, Châtillon-sur-Loire, Pont-Saint-Esprit, and Nogent-sur-Seine. These towns were significant enough for the companies to be able to control large areas, sometimes even ones

⁹⁸⁴ P. Contamine, « Les compagnies... », art. cit., p. 367.

⁹⁸⁵ One of the means of their earning income was a special corporate tax: the *patis*, which was paid by the locals to ensure their survival in company-controlled territories.

⁹⁸⁶ An example of the importance of the fluvial trade routes in the middle of the fourteenth century can be found in the accounts of Champtoceaux where it is indicated that in 1397 ships had used the river Loire between 1355-56. P. Contamine, *Au temps de la guerre...*, op. cit., p. 65.

with a territory of up to a two hundred kilometres in diameter. They used these areas as a base for their *chevauchées*, but these were also the starting points for isolating big cities like Metz, Strasbourg, Lyon, Avignon, Orléans, or Reims in proximity to their operations. The companies tried to, but never succeeded in taking a significant city of more than 15.000 inhabitants. Their goal instead was the collection of tolls for use of the commercial routes leading into and out of the large cities. Very often, the companies destroyed the land and the 'faubourgs' of the cities, right up to the gates in front of the incredulous eyes of the hapless citizens. This explains why they very carefully chose the castles, or towns that they intended to conquer.⁹⁸⁷

Spying was always an integral part of the tactics of the companies. However, the purposes for which the companies spied, the spies used in the border region, and the spying against the companies by the local authorities will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.

A.f.b) The Invasion by the Companies

Once the companies had gathered the appropriate information, they organised the attacking parties. This would mean a coalition of different smaller companies or an operation of a single Great Company.⁹⁸⁸


One of the two factors that determined the success of the resistance against the companies was the size of the companies. Nobody could resist the Great Companies of Robert Knolles, Seguin de Badefol, or Arnaud de Cervole. In the 1360s, when the presence of the companies became permanent in the border regions of France and the Holy Roman Empire, there was no real possibility of regaining control of a territory that the companies had once invaded.

The second decisive factor was timing. If it was possible to stop the mercenaries early enough so as to avoid the devastation of the countryside and its economy, the depopulation of the land could be prevented. The local authorities or the lords organising the resistance were then in a position to finance the forces needed to fight against the companies. This is what happened in Champagne when the first invasion of the companies was successfully halted in 1359.

⁹⁸⁷ T., Ölbei, « The Importance of River Valleys... », art. cit., pp. 18-19.

⁹⁸⁸ On the origin of the Great Companies see: G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, op. cit., pp. 5-10.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies



Map 16. Invasion of Champagne by the Alliance of Mercenary Companies

The following independent captains, who decided to share the costs and profits of this adventure, led the invasion of Champagne in 1358/9: the English Rabigot Dury and Robert Scott,⁹⁸⁹ and the German Frank Hennequin.⁹⁹⁰ Rabigot Dury and Robert Scott arrived from Picardy, where they had occupied several castles.⁹⁹¹ The companies used the political crisis caused by the rivalry between Charles the Bad and the Regent over the control of what remained of the kingdom, to invade Champagne. In Champagne, they first took the castle of Vailly on the River Soissons and at some point, they joined their forces with Frank Hennequin.⁹⁹² Together, the three captains occupied the castle of Roucy situated on the bank of the River Aisne.⁹⁹³ They swiftly took five more castles in the region between Vailly

⁹⁸⁹ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9076.

⁹⁹⁰ Auguste Molinier (ed.), « Fragments inédits de la Chronique de Jean de Noyal, abbé de Saint-Vincent de Laon (XIV siècle) », *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France*, 1883, vol. 20, N° 2, pp. 246-275, p. 258.

⁹⁹¹ Both English captains were in Navarrese service. *Chronique, ou Miroir historien, rédigé pour Jean de Noyal, abbé de Saint Vincent de Leon, 1388*, p. 168, [available online at] <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9058231d#>.

A. Molinier (ed.), « Fragments inédits de la Chronique... », art. cit., p. 259.

⁹⁹² Molinier's origin is not sure. He might have originated from Cologne or he was a Hainauter as Sumption suggests. J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9088.

⁹⁹³ «At the feast of Christmas this Robert led savage attacks on the castle of Roucy and took captive the rightful count and his gentle wife and daughter». See, P. M. Lambert (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le*

and Roucy, and were able then to control the major commercial routes north of the coronation city of Reims.⁹⁹⁴ At Easter, Frank Hennequin, with the troops of Roucy and Vailly, surprised the castle of Sissonne, 30 kilometres from Aisne. The occupation of Sissonne shows how the companies widened their field of action by using the fortresses of the Aisne Valley and how they supported each other. The new garrison was busy ransoming the surroundings and «*inflicted great misery upon the country*».⁹⁹⁵ The Count of Roucy - who had already been ransomed - attacked Sissonne with his household troops; in total, there were about forty mounted knights with their pages, but after a fierce battle, he was defeated and handed over to Rabigot Dury.⁹⁹⁶ Once again, this local attack was repelled thanks to the cooperation of the garrisons of the castles occupied by the companies, which were located close enough to each other so that, in the event of an external threat, they could concentrate their forces.⁹⁹⁷ In the beginning of 1359, Champagne was about to face yet another threat, this time from the south.⁹⁹⁸ The German Albert Sterz,⁹⁹⁹ the English Peter Audley¹⁰⁰⁰ and the Hainauter Eustache d'Auberchicourt,¹⁰⁰¹ three independent captains, invaded Champagne from the direction of Beaufort, the southeastern corner of Champagne altogether with 1000 men-at-arms.¹⁰⁰² They took two towns at the confluence of the Aube and the Seine, notably Pont-sur-Seine and the bridge-town Nogent-sur-Seine, without much effort.¹⁰⁰³ With these crossing points on the river Seine at their disposal, they were able to extend their sphere of influence toward the north. After conquering Lucy, they raided Vertus and Epernay in the heart of Champagne. Their next target was Troissy, a few kilometres to

Bel..., *op. cit.*, p. 243. 'cil finast bien de deux mille bone florins au mouton', M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

⁹⁹⁴ The political situation in France was turbulent at the time of the invasion of the Champagne region. John II, King of France, had been in English captivity since the Battle of Poitiers. He was desperate to win back his liberty, but all his attempts ended in failure, as did Etienne Marcel's struggle for power. A few months before the companies' adventure in Champagne, the Jacquerie had scorched the region. Later the Jacquerie was largely crushed by the Navarrese troops. This was when the mercenaries acquired the necessary information about the situation in Champagne.

⁹⁹⁵ P. M. Lambert (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel...* *op. cit.*, p. 244 ; M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques II...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.

⁹⁹⁶ P. M. Lambert (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel...* *op. cit.*, p. 244 ; M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques II...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.

⁹⁹⁷ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

⁹⁹⁸ These captains stayed in the region for some time see: J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War I...*, *op. cit.*, I. 9097.

⁹⁹⁹ The Champagne adventure was at the beginning of his impressive career, before he was contracted by the Italian cities and led his own international company consisting of German, English and Hungarian mercenaries. See: K. H. Schäfer, *Deutsche Ritter...*, *op. cit.*, p. 81, p. 94, p. 119 and p. 130.

¹⁰⁰⁰ M. Poinssignon, *Histoire Générale...*, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

¹⁰⁰¹ M. Crubellier, *Histoire ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

¹⁰⁰² M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

¹⁰⁰³ M. Poinssignon, *Histoire Générale...*, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

the north, on the bank of the river Marne. Troissy made it possible for the mercenaries to control one of the major fluvial commercial routes leading to Paris. From Troissy, Auberchicourt and the two other captains could continue their advance toward the troops of Scott, Dury and Hennequin. Finally, they joined their forces after the occupation of Saponay, 48 kilometres to the west of Reims.¹⁰⁰⁴ Altogether, the troops of the six captains accounted for approximately 2000 mercenaries.¹⁰⁰⁵ They established a chain of fortresses that controlled all the major river valleys of Champagne, from the northern marches to the southern borders of the province. In this way, the mercenary captains could assure each other of mutual assistance in the event of a siege or organise a sizeable army in the event of a battle. They were also able to control the immediate surroundings of great cities such as Reims or Troyes.

Nevertheless, in the beginning of June, the local authorities, with external help, managed to reverse the Rota Fortunae in Champagne. The Duke of Normandy hired Brocard de Fénétrange, a mercenary captain from Lorraine, with five hundred horsemen, as well as the troops of the Count of Vaudemont, to take part in a campaign to cleanse the Champagne region of mercenaries. At the same time, the troops of the larger cities of Champagne either accompanied the Lorraine troops, or operated in tandem with the great counter-attack from the south. Thus, an army from Reims laid siege to the castle of Sissonne the same week that the great army led by Brocard de Fénétrange, and the Count of Vaudemont laid siege to Pont-sur-Seine. Henri de Poitiers, Bishop of Troyes, also joined this campaign with 3000-foot soldiers, including nobles from Artois, Burgundy, Champagne and Brie.¹⁰⁰⁶

Because of this multiple response to the mercenaries' operations, the mercenary defenders of Sissonne were not reinforced and were subsequently massacred.¹⁰⁰⁷ However, the most important campaign was that of the south. When Eustache d'Auberchicourt, Sir Peter Audley and Albert Sterz heard of 'the gathering of the troops (they) sent word to their fellow brigand garrisons at Saponay and Crécy-sur-Serre and had soon raised a good six or seven hundred mounted lances'.¹⁰⁰⁸ Jean le Bel gives an overview of the companies' strategy, they used the same method before the Battle of Nogent-sur-Seine as the one they had used a few months earlier in Sissonne. The mercenaries cooperated with each other in order to put a

¹⁰⁰⁴ Eustache d'Auberchicourt occupied Saponay. *Ibid.*


¹⁰⁰⁵ P. Doleine, « La bataille de Nogent-sur-Seine ... », art. cit., p. 2.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁷ M. L. Polain (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel... op. cit.*, p. 245 ; M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques II...*, op. cit., p. 239.

¹⁰⁰⁸ M. L. Polain (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel... op. cit.*, p. 245 ; M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vrayes chroniques II...*, op. cit., p. 239.

large army into the field against the army of Champagne-Lorraine. The decisive battle took place on the banks of the Seine on 23 June 1359. Eustache d'Auberchicourt wanted to repeat the Battle of Poitiers on a smaller scale with his 700 soldiers. He took a defensive position at the top of a hill near Bray-Sur-Seine.¹⁰⁰⁹ He planned to rely on his archers. The French army, including the mercenaries from Lorraine, was divided into three usual '*battles*', each consisting of 300 lances. However, Vaudemont's army encircled the mercenaries, and ended up crushing them. Eustache d'Auberchicourt was captured and brought to Reims, where the enraged citizens wanted to lynch him.¹⁰¹⁰ The Battle of Nogent-sur-Seine effectively put an end to the first attempt by the mercenary companies to occupy Champagne.¹⁰¹¹



Map 17. Robert Knolles in the Loire Valley

Robert Knolles was one of the captains who organised his own Great Company. They were a «*new formation bringing together various elements of different units*» where their size was a decisive characteristic, it sometimes meant several thousand experienced combatants.¹⁰¹² Several examples can be provided for the type of invasion strategies used by a given Great

¹⁰⁰⁹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, op. cit., p. 159.

¹⁰¹⁰ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁰¹¹ To commemorate the victory, Henri de Poitiers, Bishop of Troyes, erected a chapel on the site of the battle at Nogent-sur-Seine. ADA G 2678, Testament of Henri de Poitiers.

¹⁰¹² See: K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., pp. 1-14 ; H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., pp. 188-209 ; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., pp. 31-40.

Company. This is illustrated in the case of Robert Knolles, who invaded the Loire Valley at the time of the invasion of Champagne.¹⁰¹³ Robert Knolles left Brittany, where there was nothing left to pillage.¹⁰¹⁴ Again, the governing economic principle was to sustain his Great Company and this forced him to leave behind the approximately 40 castles that he had occupied in Normandy and Brittany.¹⁰¹⁵ Having depleted the north he crossed Berry to arrive at the Loire Valley.¹⁰¹⁶ He was not able to occupy Orléans, but destroyed its 'faubourgs' and the land in the proximity of the city with his Great Company, which was composed of around three thousand combatants.¹⁰¹⁷ Then, he followed the course of the River Loire and at the end of October 1358, he seized Châteauneuf-sur-Loire.¹⁰¹⁸ He established a garrison in the town and his great company pillaged the region from Châteauneuf-sur-Loire. They did not remain there for long and soon moved further east, and on 31 October 1358, Knolles' company took the castle of Chantecoq (Loiret) and from there, set fire to and subdued the entire region. He continued his way toward the marches of Burgundy, and a part of his company took Châtillon-sur-Loing further down, in the valley of the Loire. At the same time, he went to the castle of Malicorne along with the majority of his great company. Malicorne served as a centre from where he could extend his sphere of influence. His lieutenants reached the valley of the Yonne and took a castle in Régennes that belonged to the Bishop of Auxerre on 8 December 1358.¹⁰¹⁹ Arnaud de Cervole was entrusted with the defence of Nivernois and Donzy.¹⁰²⁰ He laid siege to Malicorne to drive Knolles and his English company out of the region, but after a short unsuccessful siege, he had to withdraw. By the end of 1358, the town of Auxerre was surrounded by the fortresses that had been occupied by the English.¹⁰²¹ It was the largest town on the river Yonne, guarding the important fluvial commercial route toward Paris on the navigable section of the river. Exactly two months after an unsuccessful attempt on 10 January, Knolles succeeded in occupying Auxerre on

¹⁰¹³ October-December of 1358.

¹⁰¹⁴ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 228 ; R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹⁰¹⁵ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 159. p. XLI.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ambroise Challe, *Histoire de l'Auxerrois son territoires, son diocèse, son comté, ses baronnies, son bailliage*, Paris, 1878, p. 290.

¹⁰¹⁷ T. Bostock, *Dogs of War...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁰¹⁸ R. Delachenal (ed.), *Chronique des règnes I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹⁰¹⁹ The Yonne was the principal river on the left side of the Seine and played an important role in providing Paris with the necessary supplies.

¹⁰²⁰ J. Stevenson (ed.), *Scalacronica...*, *op. cit.*, p. 182, p. 228.

¹⁰²¹ However, during the invasion of the Loire Valley and Auxerre, Robert Knolles fought under the banner of Charles the Bad, the claim that he served Edward III as well is rather dubious. Froissart may be right that this time it was his private adventure. S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 351.


10 March 1359.¹⁰²² All the surviving inhabitants were ransomed and the surrounding region paid the *patis*.¹⁰²³ Having demolished the walls, he left Auxerre on 30 April 1359.¹⁰²⁴ The invasion of Robert Knolles shows the tactical and strategic use of river valleys during the invasion of the Great Companies. Strategically, Knolles was able to secure the long-term financing of his company thanks to the rich booty and ransom he had accumulated during the invasion, and in particular to the occupation of Auxerre. At a tactical level, by establishing a connection between the Loire and the Yonne valleys, he was able to maintain continuous communication between the different elements of his company that guarded important castles such as Malcorne in the Loire Valley or Régennes in the Yonne Valley. Knolles' method of isolating Auxerre can also be considered a typical tactical method applied by companies in the mid-14th century. First, he blocked the roads linking Auxerre to its immediate hinterland, then a series of castles were occupied around Auxerre: Champlay, Régennes to the northeast, Ligny-le-Châtel, Champost to the north-west, Molesme to the south, Malicorne to the west. Once this phase had been completed, it was only a matter of time before the town fell. Once he had succeeded, as is shown in Map 17 above, Knolles used Auxerre as the centre of his *chevauchées* in Burgundy. In the companies' strategy, this phase served a double purpose: on the one hand, it maximised the profit during his stay in Burgundy by ravaging the terrain, and on the other hand, he used terror systematically during the *chevauchées* in Burgundy to prepare the ground for the inevitable negotiations. In this undertaking, he was very successful, because as Jean le Bel says so eloquently: 'He finished up with around two hundred thousand high-quality florins'.¹⁰²⁵

¹⁰²² H. Knighton, *Knighton's chronicle...*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹⁰²³ The companies used the system of *patis* to collect a ransom from the inhabitants of the occupied land. Georges Minois, *La Guerre de Cent Ans, Naissance de deux nations*, Paris, 2008, p. 160.

¹⁰²⁴ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

¹⁰²⁵ M. L. Polain (ed.), *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel...*, *op. cit.*, p. 243 ; M. L. Polain (ed.), *Les Vraies chroniques Il...*, *op. cit.*, p. 237.



Map 18. Seguin de Badefol's Chevauchées from Anse in 1364/65.

Seguin de Badefol applied the same strategy in the case of two bridge-towns that had important strategic positions; one of them, Brioude was the interface between northern Auvergne, Toulouse and the Languedoc region. Generally speaking, the border between the Kingdom and the Empire was the eastern border of Auvergne, with the diocese of Le Puy.¹⁰²⁶ The occupation of Anse established a direct threat from the north, towards Lyon, the great city of the border region, and control over the land and river trade routes leading to the heart of France. These two towns allowed Seguin de Badefol to take control of the surrounding areas on both banks of the Allier and Saône rivers. What gave Brioude such an important strategic position is that until the construction of the Pont des Moulins and the Pont-du-Château bridges in the eighteenth century there was no stone bridge between the Vieille-Brioude and the confluence with the Loire River.¹⁰²⁷ This is why Séguin de Badefol was able to launch a series of *chevauchées* in the Auvergne, Velay, Forez, Lyonnais,

¹⁰²⁶ Marie Saudan, « L'Auvergne médiévale en cartes : entre orient et occident, entre nord et sud », *Siècles*, 2002, vol. XV, pp. 1-5.

¹⁰²⁷ Emmanuel Gréloi, « Les usages concurrents de la rivière : l'Allier en Basse-Auvergne (xiii^e-xviii^e siècle) », *Eaux et conflits : Dans l'Europe médiévale et modern*, Toulouse, 2012, (généré le 02 mars 2021), [available online at] <https://books.openedition.org/pumi/9469>, DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pumi.9469>.

Bourbonnais and Dombes regions. The raids threatened Clermont and Montferrand, Riom in the north and Le Puy in the south.¹⁰²⁸

After occupying Anse, Badefol quickly extended his sphere of influence to both banks of the Saône. One of his lieutenants, Chathelin la Ville, occupied the castle of Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or on the right bank, 14 km from Lyon.¹⁰²⁹ At the same time another group invaded the castle of the Gleteins on the river's left bank, almost opposite Anse.¹⁰³⁰ His company also acquired the two main ports of Saint-Bernard and Frans on the river's navigable sections, thus he was in control of the most important fluvial and land routes north of Lyon. Froissart gives a list of places that were targeted by the *chevauchées* of Seguin de Badefol's company called the Margot: St. Clément-Sous-Valsonne, Arbesle, Rochefort, Terasse, St. Dennis-sur-Coise and 60 other strongholds in Mâconnais, Beaujolais, Forez,¹⁰³¹ Velay, Dombes, and Burgundy.¹⁰³²

Based on Map 17, it is obvious that Badefol used Anse's strategic advantage to control both banks of the Saône and launch his *chevauchées* from Anse towards the four quarters. By building up his sphere of influence, he approached Lyon systematically, thus keeping the inhabitants of the city under constant pressure. The *chevauchées* he launched served the same dual purpose, as in the case of Robert Knolles. He managed to gather abundant spoils in both cities and, in both cases, he negotiated a large sum for the transfer of Brioude¹⁰³³ and Anse.¹⁰³⁴

¹⁰²⁸ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁰²⁹ ADRML Actes cap. vol. 1, f. 40 ; G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 109 and p. 115, n° 1.

¹⁰³⁰ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹⁰³¹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

¹⁰³² Tamás Ölbei, « Seguin de Badefol: 'A Gonoszság fia' Anse-ban, 1364-1365 », in István Lengvári (ed.), *A Hely embere, az ember helye. Helytörténeti kutatás, Emberközpontú történetírás*, Pécs, 2019, pp. 143-172, p. 154.

¹⁰³³ A. Chassaing, *Spicilegium Brivatense...*, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

¹⁰³⁴ ADRML 10G1931, f. 4.

The Margot's <i>Chevauchées</i>	
Targeted settlements	Distance from Anse (km)
Saint-Germain-au-Mont-d'Or	11
Gletteins	19
Saint Bernard	2
Frans	10
Atbresle	23
Saint-Clément de Valsonne	24
Hopital de Rochefort La Terasse	81
Saint-Victor-sur-Loire	89
Saint-Denis-lès-Bourg	56
Saint-Symphorien-le Chatel	55
Saint-Galmier-en Forez	62
Saint-Germain	11
Le Velay	79
Châlon	108
Dombes	35
Saint-Christophe	49
Saint-Trivier-sur-Moignans	24
Bois-d'oingt	13

Saint-Laurient d'Agnay	40
Saint-Jean-de-Chaussan	24
Sain-Bel	29
Amplepuis	48
Saint-Rambert-sur-Loire	122
Vienne	56
Bourg-Argental	106
Monistrol-sur-Loire	145
Montfaucon	158

Table 3. List of towns targeted by Seguin de Badefol's Chevauchées from Anse in 1364/65

Out of the 40 targets of the Margot, eight (Saint-Germain-au-Mont-d'Or, Gletteins, Saint Bernard, Frans, Châlon-sur-Saône, Pont-de-Veyle, Pont-de Vaux, Neuville-sur-Saône) were located in the Saône Valley, two (L'Arbresle, Saint-Christophe-en-Bresse) in the Brévenne Valley, one (La Terrasse) in the Furan Valley, three (Saint-Victor-sur-Loire, Saint-Rambert-sur-Loire, Monistrol-sur-Loire) in the Loire Valley, five (Saint-Symphorien-le Chatel, Le Velay, Vienne, Batterie de Sathonay, Saint-Genis-Laval) in the Rhône Valley, one (Bourg-Argental) in the Drôme Valley and one (Châtillon) in the L'Azergues Valley.¹⁰³⁵ This means that 62% of Badefol's targets were located in a river valley, which means that because of the rapidity of the *chevauchées*, which was an essential feature of these raids, Badefol chose targets that were not only easily accessible from Anse but made these mounted raids as safe as possible.

¹⁰³⁵ Of the 60 targets mentioned by Froissart, the author has been able to identify 40 of Badefol's *chevauchées*.

**A.f.c) The Role of River Valleys in the Defence against the Chevauchées
of the Margot 1364/1365**

As we have seen, the companies' offensive tactics relied heavily on the use of river valleys, but this is also true for the defensive measures of towns, lords and other local authorities that organised the defence of a region against the companies. When Lyon received news of the occupation of Anse, it was already too late and they could not intervene. Hastily, they sent troops toward Anse to prevent a surprise attack coming through the valley of the Saône; Janiard Provana, bailli of Valborne, guarded the left bank of the Saône River with 33 horsemen 'during one day and one night, when Messire Badefol took Anse'.¹⁰³⁶

The council of Lyon prepared 28 different chains to be stretched over the roads leading to the city and at major junctions within the city as well.¹⁰³⁷ Each chain weighed 30 quintaux that is to say, 1468 kg.¹⁰³⁸ Palisades protected the roads situated next to the river. Lyon was also afraid of a fluvial attack of the Margot and to prevent this, they stretched two huge chains across the river. The first chain was placed at the fortress of Pierre-Scieze, which was, approximately 100 metres long, weighing 3.6 tons.¹⁰³⁹ The second chain was approximately 136 metres long and weighed 3.9 tons. It was protected by a tower that was connected to the ramparts of the city by a wall and was guarded day and night.¹⁰⁴⁰ One of the Margot's *chevauchées* exemplifies both the defensive and the offensive aspects of the importance of river valleys.

In mid-summer 1365, the invasion of the Dombes and Bresse regions was prepared entirely by Seguin de Badefol. He sent spies to explore the ports and the main towns on the left bank of the Saône. After having been tortured, one spy confessed everything, and thus the lord of Châtillon alerted the local settlements and castles. In addition, messengers 'were sent by the order of the Lord Bailli to Saint Bernard to the vicinity of Vimy, Tournus, Riottier, Montmerle-sur-Saône and other ports of the River Saône concerning the war on Anse, because someone was captured at Burgem and he confessed that he had been sent by Lord Seguin to spy on the village of Breyss'.¹⁰⁴¹ All this menacing news was confirmed by a

¹⁰³⁶ G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, op. cit., p. 105. n° 3.

¹⁰³⁷ AML CC 373, Inventaire-Sommaire.

¹⁰³⁸ Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁰³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁰⁴⁰ AML CC 373, f. 75r

¹⁰⁴¹ ADCO B 7590 ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, op. cit., LX, pp. 332-334.

female spy called Antelise, who was sent to Anse to bring news on Badefol's intentions, as Badefol had cut off all communication between Anse and its surroundings. She warned the local authorities about the 'utterly terrible threats' in June 1365, and that Seguin was especially tempted to lay waste to the high Bresse, the territories of Saint-Trivier-de-Courtes, Pont-Veyle, and Pont-de-Vaux in the valley of the Saône.¹⁰⁴² Two soldiers were sent to meet Antelise, 'who was in the proximity of Anse so that she could gain information and listen to the words of Anse's residents'.¹⁰⁴³ It seemed that the port of Vimy was chosen as a point for crossing the Saône River, so a soldier was immediately sent to investigate the ports.¹⁰⁴⁴ One of the bands of the Margot tried to cross the Saône, but because of Antelise's warning, they found the river to be guarded at Montmerle-sur-Saône, so they searched for another, less defended crossing point to enter Bresse between Mâcon and Tournus on 20-22 June. In one of the sources, we are informed that the raiding party finally crossed the Saône and entered the region of Bresse: 'The Lord Bailli of Saint-Amour says that the enemy have made their way to enter the area of Bresse'.¹⁰⁴⁵

Having failed to prevent the Margot from crossing the river the local lords then set up a trap at the crossing points of the Saône. The aim was to capture the returning mercenaries of the Margot so they sent additional troops to guard the Saône: once 60 lances were sent to defend Vimy, a few days later another 120 glavires joined the troops in Vimy.¹⁰⁴⁶ The attack of the companies might not have succeeded as planned, because in the account of Bourg-en-Bresse, there is mention of the salary of the carnacier of Macôn, who came to Bourg-en-Bresse for the captured soldiers of the Margot.¹⁰⁴⁷ In addition, in the account of Pont-de-Veyle of 1365 we learn that the bailli of Bresse received news about the capture of the routiers of Anse in Pont-de-Veyle.¹⁰⁴⁸ Again, the crossing points of the Saône played a crucial part in organising the successful defence against Badefol's *chevauchée*.¹⁰⁴⁹

¹⁰⁴² Claude Perroud, *Les grandes compagnies en Bresse et en Dombres*, Bourg, 1874, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴³ ADCO B 7590 ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, LX, pp. 332-334.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁶ ADCO B 7590 ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, LX, pp. 332-334.

¹⁰⁴⁷ ADCO B 7116 Inventaire, Peroud, p. 15.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Archives départementales de la Côte-d'Or B 9921 Inventaire, Peroud, p. 15.

¹⁰⁴⁹ T., Ölbei, « The Importance of River Valleys... », *art. cit.*, pp. 21-35.

A.g) Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy: Reconnaissance, Spying on Mercenaries and Crusaders¹⁰⁵⁰

Seguin de Badefol took the town of Brioude in Auvergne by escalade and then occupied it for ten months.¹⁰⁵¹ Having departed from Brioude, he surprised Anse on the night of 1 November 1364, and stayed there for almost a year. He was a master of surprising the enemy, but he was not alone, spying, reconnaissance was an essential part of the companies' strategy.

The literature of military intelligence in the Hundred Years War has mostly concentrated on cases of spying which occurred among the warring states: for example the portrayal of a French mission to Buda in 1359,¹⁰⁵² the case of Breton ambassadors who were in touch with two spies in England, in 1413,¹⁰⁵³ the description of English spies, mostly of Flemish origin, who were identified in Gand in 1360,¹⁰⁵⁴ then the incident of English spies who gave information about the French preparation on the invasion of England in 1348,¹⁰⁵⁵ or the report on the activity of the French spies during the preparation of the great English naval expedition in 1346¹⁰⁵⁶ or the chronicle of the Burgundian 'messengers' who were sent to England to discover the preparation of the English army in 1425-26.¹⁰⁵⁷ Outstanding historians such as Verdon,¹⁰⁵⁸ Alban,¹⁰⁵⁹ Allmand,¹⁰⁶⁰ Contamine,¹⁰⁶¹ Offenstadt,¹⁰⁶² Léthenet¹⁰⁶³ have all made an invaluable contribution to the history of spying in the Hundred

¹⁰⁵⁰ Tamás Ölbei, « Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy: Reconnaissance, Spying on Mercenaries and Crusaders », *Imago temporis: medium Aevum*, vol. XIV, 2020, pp. 297-321.

¹⁰⁵¹ Prise de la ville de Brioude par Séguin de Badefol et les routiers 13 Septembre 1363 in A. Chassaing, *Spicilegium Brivatense...*, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

¹⁰⁵² Gilles Lecuppre, *L'imposture politique au Moyen-Âge. La seconde vie des rois*, Paris, 2005, p. 287.

¹⁰⁵³ Aude Mairey, *La guerre de Cent Ans*, Paris, 2017, p. 102.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁵ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 178.

¹⁰⁵⁶ G. Le Moing, *Les Opérations navales...*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Gemma L. Watson, « Roger Machado, Perkin Warbeck and Heraldic Espionage », *The Coat of Arms*, Third Series, 2014, vol. X, pp. 51-68, p. 53.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Jean Verdon, *Information et Désinformation au Moyen Age*, Paris, 2010.

¹⁰⁵⁹ John R. Alban and Christopher Thomas Allmand, « Spies and Spying in the Fourteenth Century », in Christopher Thomas Allmand (eds.), *War Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages*, Liverpool, 1976, pp. 73-101.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Christopher Thomas Allmand, « Intelligence in the Hundred Years War », in Keith Nielson and B. J. C. Mckercher (eds.), *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History*, Westport, 1992, pp. 31-47.

¹⁰⁶¹ Philippe Contamine, « Mécanismes du pouvoir, information, sociétés politiques », in Philippe Contamine, Charles Giry-Deloison and Maurice H. Keen (eds.), *Des pouvoirs en France, 1300-1500*, Paris, 1992, pp. 11-25.

¹⁰⁶² Nicolas Offenstadt, *Faire la paix au Moyen Âge*, Paris, 2007.

¹⁰⁶³ Benoit Léthenet, « Selon les Nouvelles que Vous Me Ferez Savoir' Essai sur le Renseignement au Moyen Âge », *Association du Revue du Nord*, 2013-2014, vol. 402, pp. 837-857.

Years War. However, there is far less information in the literature about spying for and against the routiers, that is, the members of the mercenary companies in the middle of the 14th century. Among modern historians, the following have dealt with the mercenaries in the Hundred Years War in particular: Fowler,¹⁰⁶⁴ Savy,¹⁰⁶⁵ Butaud,¹⁰⁶⁶ Cox,¹⁰⁶⁷ Toureille,¹⁰⁶⁸ Cazaux,¹⁰⁶⁹ DeVries,¹⁰⁷⁰ and Bárány,¹⁰⁷¹ who has specifically focussed on the participation and role of Hungarian mercenaries.¹⁰⁷²

The question always arises about the origin of spies, and about their 'civilian' profession. Concerning the origins of spies used for state affairs, Simonneau introduces the Burgundian case of heralds,¹⁰⁷³ Alban and Allmand in their essential work on 14th century spying state that spies may be referred to in the sources as: *nuncios*, *vespilio*, *coureur*, *chevaucheur*¹⁰⁷⁴ and when they are mentioned as *espie* or *explorator* it is quite certainly the case that we are faced with spies.¹⁰⁷⁵ Watson argues that there was a «*fine line between messengers and the spy*»,¹⁰⁷⁶ and that wages of spies were listed among the expenses incurred by the activities of messengers.

Concerning the origin of spies who worked for or against the companies, well these differ somewhat, and in fact it is even more difficult to identify them. In the sources I have encountered most of the time only their names are mentioned, but rarely their professions. Nicolas Savy states that «*most often, simple valets were used for spying tasks*»¹⁰⁷⁷ by the

¹⁰⁶⁴ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1988.

¹⁰⁶⁵ N. Savy, *Cahors pendant...*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶⁶ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies...*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶⁷ E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, *op. cit.*, p.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Valérie Toureille, *Robert de Sarrebrück ou l'honneur d'un écorcheur (v. 1400-v. 1462)*, Paris, 2006.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Loïc Cazaux, « Antoine de Chabannes, capitaine d'Écorcheurs et officier royal: fidélités politiques et pratiques militaires au xv^e siècle », in Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Lainé et Frédéric Boutoulle (eds.), *Les routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans*, Bordeaux, 2016, pp. 165-178.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Kelly DeVries, « Routier Perrinet Gressart: Joan of Arc's Penultimate Enemy », in Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Lainé and Frédéric Boutoulle (eds.), *Les routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans*, Bordeaux, 2016, pp. 227-238.

¹⁰⁷¹ Attila Bárány, « Angol-magyar zsoldoskompániák a 14. századi Itáliában », in Attila Bárány, József Laszlovsky, Zsuzsanna Papp (eds.), *Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban*, Máriabesnyő, 2011, pp. 283-300.

¹⁰⁷² T., Ölbei, « Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy... », *art. cit.*, pp. 297-321.

¹⁰⁷³ Henri Simonneau, « Le héraut bourguignon et la guerre à la fin du Moyen Âge », *Association Revue du Nord*, 2014, vol. IV, n° 402, pp. 945-944.

¹⁰⁷⁴ J. R. Alban and C. T. Allmand, « Spies and Spying... », *art. cit.*, p. 74.

¹⁰⁷⁵ J. R. Alban, « Intelligence in the Hundred... », *art. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁷⁶ G. L. Watson, « Roger Machado... », *art. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁰⁷⁷ N. Savy, *Cahors pendant... op. cit.*, p. 51.

consuls of the city of Cahors. There is a payment for a valet by the City of Lyon who was sent to deliver information on the companies to «*moss. de Savoy*». ¹⁰⁷⁸ In most of the cases their names were indicated in the sources like for example Baronat, ¹⁰⁷⁹ the already mentioned spy Antelise, ¹⁰⁸⁰ a female spy employed by the local authorities, or Pertaize, ¹⁰⁸¹ who was also sent to Anse by the City of Lyon. Yet neither their professions, nor their social status were mentioned. In other cases, more information can be found about their social standing: Erterem, was the canon of Saint Euphraig, ¹⁰⁸² then there was Humbert Grolots and his wife, and their wealth was worth 7 sols, ¹⁰⁸³ Gieffroy Charpi was a carpenter ¹⁰⁸⁴, who spied for the companies, Symorin de Genay, was a clerk. ¹⁰⁸⁵ Based on these examples, most of the spies who worked for the companies had a lower status in local society. In the archives of the border region a spy of noble origin or with a wealthy background has not been encountered. Thus, Verdon's statement suggesting that the value of spies depended upon their social conditions cannot be applied to the spies who worked for the companies.

A.g.a) Spying for the Companies

It was extremely dangerous to risk a frontal assault against a walled city or a castle, which could cost a lot of human lives. The companies thus preferred to use deception in order to reach their objectives. When they occupied a fortress for a long time, the mercenaries acted differently: they had no interest in ruining the nearest settlements, but would be much more virulent far from their base. ¹⁰⁸⁶ Therefore, the degree of aggression depended on the relationship established with the inhabitants. The *routiers* could steal from farms and carry out some distant raids. Sending spies and the request for information about the targeted area or settlements ensured, on the one hand the appropriate level of surprise for the companies and on the other their safe return to the base. Companies employed spies for different reasons, as their main objective was to gain profit from their enterprise. Below,

¹⁰⁷⁸ AML CC 190, f. 6r

¹⁰⁷⁹ AML CC 373, f. 11v

¹⁰⁸⁰ ADCO B 7590, f. 6.

¹⁰⁸¹ AML CC 373, f. 3v

¹⁰⁸² ADCO 1.F.365. Compte de Baillage de Auxois. f. 18, B 2748, f. 2v

¹⁰⁸³ ADCO 1.F.365. Compte de Baillage de Auxois. f. 44, B. 2751, f. 6r

¹⁰⁸⁴ Lettre de rémission pour la dame de Chauceris: G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre... op. cit.*, pp. 291-293. (Pièces Justificatives XXXVIII).

¹⁰⁸⁵ Archives départementales de la Côte-d'Or 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois. F. 18.

¹⁰⁸⁶ G. Butaud, *Les compagnies... op. cit.*, p. 76. Archaeometallurgical

some examples of the purposes for which spies were employed by the companies are provided.

a) to explore the targeted area as was the case with the Erterem canon of Saint Euphraig, who «*was condemned because he had given the English a lot of information about the land when they were there and who [the English] took the town of Jully and he was condemned for what the (English) had done with the women of Jully*»¹⁰⁸⁷ in 1362. In the same year, just before the Battle of Brignais, the Dame de Chauceris caught a spy of the companies named Gieffroy, accompanied by four female companions, who was sent to Burgundy to gain information on the state of the principality. He appeared to be suspicious and was therefore interrogated. Under torture he confessed that he had worked for the companies. According to his confession, he was forced to travel with the companies and during his voyage, he committed petty crimes like theft. The Dame de Chauceris had judiciary power to administer high, middle and low justice thus she beheaded Gieffroy Charpi and hanged his headless body on a tree.¹⁰⁸⁸

b) to gather intelligence on the cities to be conquered, as in the case of St Paul-en-Jarez just before the Battle of Brignais, where the citizens captured a spy of the *routiers*, who was measuring the height of the town walls with a rope. The enraged inhabitants threw him over the walls into the bottom of the ditch, where he broke his neck.¹⁰⁸⁹

c) the companies used valuable information so that they could capture an important person, such as Amadeus VI, the Green Count of Savoy, who gave a party¹⁰⁹⁰ to his friends while waiting for his army to fight off Robin du Pin and his company¹⁰⁹¹ and felt completely safe in Lanzo, which had no walls save for those of the castle. The chroniclers identify the leaders of the *routiers* as «*Messire Albrecht, Messire Robin Canole, Messire Jehan Agut, Messire Hennequin de Bongart, et maitre de La Nef, captaynes des compagnez des angloys*».¹⁰⁹² The spies of the villainous brigands had reported that the guards were not sufficiently

¹⁰⁸⁷ ADCO 1.F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois. f. 18, B 2748, f. 2v

¹⁰⁸⁸ Lettre de rémission pour la dame de Chauceris, May 1362: G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre... op. cit.*, pp. 291-293 (Pièces Justificatives XXXVIII).

¹⁰⁸⁹ ADRML Fonds du chapitre métropolitain. arm. Laban vol. 1, n° 5 ; B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol... op. cit.*, p. 33 ; G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre... op. cit.*, p. 68. (Pièces Justificatives XXXVII, 289-291)

¹⁰⁹⁰ J. Servion, *Geste et croniques...*, *op. cit.* p. 119.

¹⁰⁹¹ E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

¹⁰⁹² J. Servion, *Geste et croniques...*, *op. cit.* p. 119 ; E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies organised. The companies surprised the young lords,¹⁰⁹³ who were caught off-guard without weapons and armour. Only few could escape, like «*Prince Jaques*» for example, who climbed through the window and retreated to the castle of Verengier.¹⁰⁹⁴ To estimate the enormity of the ransom that Amadeus VI was obliged to pay to the companies, here is a comparison: the Green Count's 180.000 florins¹⁰⁹⁵ were only 20.000 florins less than what Philip I of Rouvres agreed on with King Edward III to free Burgundy of the entire English army in 1359.¹⁰⁹⁶ In addition, Amadeus VI not only had to pay one of the largest Italian ransoms of the era but also had to compensate for the losses of those who belonged to his retinue.¹⁰⁹⁷

In 1365, Tonnet and Seguin de Badefol tried to capture the new duke of Burgundy, Philip the Bold on his way to meet Emperor Charles IV, who was travelling to Avignon but «*his stratagem was disclosed*».¹⁰⁹⁸

«*To Liénart, messenger on foot who delivered letters from Tournuz and Chalon to Dijon, to the Lord Duke mentioning that Sir Seguin de Badefol's brother wants to take or wants to have the Lord Duke taken on his way to Avignon [to meet] the emperor who is there, payment to him [Liénart] for his wages*»¹⁰⁹⁹

As the duke was informed about the plan of Badefol's brother in time, he was able to escape.

¹⁰⁹³ Villani, *Cronique*, 1857, lib. X, cap. LXXXXIV, p. 359.

¹⁰⁹⁴ J. Servion, *Geste et croniques...*, *op. cit.* p. 120.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Villani, *Cronique*, 1857, lib. X, cap. LXXXXIV, p. 359.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Antoine de Fay, *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne, avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives*, vol. II, Dijon, 1741, p. 203.

¹⁰⁹⁷ AST Gonans - 13 September 1364, Gio de Cavaliere, in the retinue of Amadeus VI, was captured in the fatal surprise in Lanzo by the English company, asked to be reimbursed by Amadeus VI. There were more members among the followers of Amadeus VI to be ransomed. See Robert Biolzi, «*J'ay grand envie de veoir assaillir* » Guerre, guerriers et finances dans les États de Savoie à la fin du Moyen Age (XIVe-XVe s.), Rennes, 2024. p. 253

¹⁰⁹⁸ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 112

¹⁰⁹⁹ 2 June, 1365. ADCO B 3567, f. 15r ; G. Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

d) they tried to acquire treasure by using spies¹¹⁰⁰ as in Pont-Saint-Esprit¹¹⁰¹ The ransom of Jean le Bon, some 46,5 kg of gold¹¹⁰², the contribution of Languedoc¹¹⁰³ was collected and transported to Paris. During the night of the 28 December 1360, the companies of Batillier, Petit Meschin, Lamit and Guiot de Pin,¹¹⁰⁴ after riding from the direction of Lyon, took the city by surprise. Jean Souvain, the *sénéchal* of Beaucaire defended the town with insufficient force and once the companies were within the town walls he had no chance to fight them back. In the most critical moment of the battle, he was fatally wounded and died on 9 June the following year.¹¹⁰⁵ They were too fast, the gold transport had not yet arrived in the town thus it was saved. This was not the case of the inhabitants of Pont-Saint-Esprit¹¹⁰⁶ and its surroundings (up to the gate of Avignon),¹¹⁰⁷ because the companies stayed there for several months and collected significant ransom and booty.

A.g.b) Reconnaissance, Spying against the Companies

Surveillance had several aims: with its help it was possible to capture the companies' spies or give the settlements in the endangered regions an early warning so they could prepare themselves for the *routiers'* *chevauchées*. When they had time they could also set up a trap for the companies. It caused the downfall of Seguin du Badefol's lieutenants, including Guiot du Pin, who served under him in 1364 and 1365 in Anse. Badefol always stayed in Anse, but he sent his lieutenants on the different dangerous missions. Six of his seven lieutenants who were with him in Anse lost their lives. For Guiot du Pin an ambushade was organised and he was captured and taken to Châlon. The new duke, Philip the Bold, the brother of the French King Charles V, paid 200 Florentine florins to Sir Renaut de Monbelot for Guiot du

¹¹⁰⁰ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 317.

¹¹⁰¹ A.M. Montpellier AA9, f. 102r. Équipe projet Thalamus, «Les annales occitanes (800-1426): année 1360», *Le Petit Thalamus de Montpellier*, [available online at], <http://thalamus.huma-num.fr/annales-occitanes/annee-1360.html>.

¹¹⁰² K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 134. The entire story is described in detail in Kenneth Fowler's fundamental book on the great companies. From the point of view of the present article the fact is that the captains of the companies were aware of the timing of the gold transport. The transport should have arrived in Pont-Saint-Esprit on the same day.

¹¹⁰³ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War II...*, *op. cit.*, I. 10384.

¹¹⁰⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹¹⁰⁵ *Histoire de Languedoc*, ed. J.-B. Paya, Toulouse, 1864, p. 223.

¹¹⁰⁶ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Pin's capture.¹¹⁰⁸ He was decapitated here and his head was exposed above the gate of the city. Later his companions came to remove his head and returned it to Anse.¹¹⁰⁹

For travellers not only the *routiers* but also the garrisons of the castles meant immediate danger. As during the Crusade the companies were in the proximity of the castle of Souilly in Barroise, the soldiers were nervous and felt endangered, so when they met someone suspicious they would act without hesitation. The garrison of Souilly arrested a certain Domenget of Demange-aux-Eaux near the castle, who was suspected of spying for the Great Companies. He was imprisoned in the castle for eleven days. He declared that he was the vassal of Jean of Arrentières, the lord of Demange-aux-Eaux. The duke decided that Domenget was to be transferred to Saint-Mihiel, where he proved his origin and finally Robert released him.¹¹¹⁰

Spying or helping the *routiers* actively was a risky business for the people hired by the companies: Andrier de Marmeauy was executed in Moustier-Saint-Jean for his demerits because he spied for the enemies and Picardat de Piry.¹¹¹¹ In 1363, Bogne of Montréal (a castle of the Duke of Burgundy) was paid to deliver a letter to the bailli of Saint Bris and to the governor of justice of Neintry to inquire about Humbert Grolot's wife (of Villefrainche), who was taken to the prison of Montréal by the order of the Philip II, Duke of Burgundy, because she was suspected of spying in Chastelnul. Later Humbert Grolot's belongings were sold and the bailli received 7 sols as he and his wife died in the prison of Montréal.¹¹¹²

Conclusion

The individual cases presented in the first part of the chapter demonstrate the many reasons why someone might have joined the mercenaries on the crusade. It has also been shown, illustrated by numerous examples, that in certain situations, on special occasions, mercenaries were not entirely immune to saving their souls, and if not often, they made efforts and sacrifices to obtain the forgiveness of sins offered by the Church. Such a special moment was in June 1365, when both Italy and eastern France were at peace and the mercenaries accepted the idea of participating in the crusades.

¹¹⁰⁸ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 402. (Pièces Justificatives XIX).

¹¹⁰⁹ ADCO B 3567, f. 85.

¹¹¹⁰ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹¹¹¹ ADCO 1.F.365. Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 50 ; B 2751, f. 3v

¹¹¹² ADCO 1.F.365. Compte de Baillage de Auxois, f. 44 ; B 2751, f. 6r

It has been demonstrated that the various mercenary captains used the river valleys to their advantage according to a precise pattern: firstly, the companies used the river valleys to facilitate their entry into a targeted region; secondly, they occupied a castle or series of castles as a base in order to extend the radius of their operations. The most efficient way for companies to occupy a region was to conquer a town with a bridge. This meant that they could increase their sphere of influence on both sides of the river valley by taking further castles and fortified settlements and at the same time, they were able to organise *chevauchées* on both sides of the river. This is what happened when Pont-Saint-Esprit was occupied.¹¹¹³ On the night of 28 December 1358, the company of Batillier, Petit Meschin, Lamit and Guiot de Pin from Lyon took the town by surprise.¹¹¹⁴ In addition, based on the sources of their spies, they learned of a gold consignment that had been collected in the province of Languedoc to ransom John I (who had been captured at the Battle of Poitiers) and was going to be transported to Paris. Contrary to what the spies had been told, the 46.5 kg gold shipment was delayed, so the mercenaries arrived in Pont-Saint-Esprit too early.¹¹¹⁵ Although they were not able to seize the gold, by raiding both sides of the Rhône from Pont-Saint-Esprit to the gates of the papal seat of Avignon, they accumulated a significant war booty.¹¹¹⁶

Mercenaries were able to take advantage of river valleys, especially when they were located on the borders of countries. In the 14th century, the Saône River was one of the border rivers between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire. On 15 September 1358, Jean de Palais, in the service of Count Amadeus VI of Savoy, robbed a merchant and attempted to cross the river with his cloth-laden animals from the Kingdom of France to the Empire, partly to sell the animals there and partly to avoid French justice.¹¹¹⁷

Once the companies were established in a region and had control over the movements of goods and men, they used every means to gain profit. An example is Anse where Seguin de Badefol provided safe-conduct for those who wanted to cross his region. In return for a fee his clerk would issue the documents providing the name of the bearer, the duration of the safe conduct, limiting how many escorts could accompany the person. To

¹¹¹³ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

¹¹¹⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹¹¹⁵ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 134. The entire story is described in detail in Kenneth Fowler's book on the Great Companies. The captains of the companies were aware of the timing of the gold transport. The transport should have arrived in Pont-Saint-Esprit on the same day but accidentally was delayed.

¹¹¹⁶ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart V...*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹¹¹⁷ B. Descroix, *Seguin de Badefol...*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

make it even more official Seguin de Badefol used the title of 'Captain of Anse for the King of Navarre'.¹¹¹⁸

Champagne provides an example of how the invasion of the companies could be reversed following the decisive battle won by the locals at Nogent-Sur-Seine. Brignais meant the very opposite: the castle of Brignais was situated south of Lyon, on a plain, at the entrance to the Garon Valley, a tributary of the Rhône. It guarded the route to Lyon from the south-west.

The companies marched directly toward Lyon and 'robbed the land, kidnapped and held people for ransom and plundered cities'.¹¹¹⁹ They arrived at the same time at the castles of Rive-de-Gier and Brignais.¹¹²⁰ None of the castles was strongly defended, there were only a few soldiers present, so the companies took both castles effortlessly.¹¹²¹ This news caused great panic among the citizens of Lyon. The French royal army took a great risk in an all-out confrontation against the unprecedentedly large mercenary army. After the lost battle, the east of France, along the border of the Holy Roman Empire, was defenceless as has been illustrated by an example based on rare unpublished findings from the Archives of Lille.¹¹²²

An analysis of the population's attitude towards mercenaries has revealed the basic feelings that were common among the combatant and non-combatant elements of 14th century society, in particular, by mapping the feelings that connected the population to the mercenaries, based on contemporary sources. The emotions that have been discussed above are not unique in this period.

Sean McGlynn argues in his article on the Black Prince's *chevauchée* of 1355 that in the mid-14th century, money was the main reason for the violence and terror used during the campaigns, resulting in widespread fear among the local population. «*It was all about money, about using the hollow legitimacy of war to steal from people.*»¹¹²³ The tendencies

¹¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹¹¹⁹ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

¹¹²⁰ F.-B. Frantz, *Les Brigands...*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹¹²¹ Guigue, *Recits de la guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹¹²² The battle was fought on 6 April 1362. It ended with the third biggest defeat of a French royal army in the 14th century after the battles of Crecy and Poitiers & See footnote 2. Archives départementales du Nord, B.758, n° 14451.

¹¹²³ Sean McGlynn, « 'Sheer Terror' and the Black Prince's Grand Chevauchée of 1355 », in L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald Kagay (eds.), *The Hundred Years War (Part III): Further Considerations*, Leiden - Boston, 2013, pp. 317-331, p. 325.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies described in the sources relate to the fact that, as Sean McGlynn excellently observes, *«the worse the torture, the more the victim and onlookers would be terrified.»*¹¹²⁴ There is no better example of how widespread fear was among the population when they encountered the *routiers* than when the mercenary troops of the Black Prince marched through the Kingdom of Navarre in 1366-1367, heading for Castile. Life in the kingdom came to a standstill and hearings were suspended,¹¹²⁵ towns were closed, and the population fled to the fortified places. In one place, several estates and small farms could not be taxed *«for the companies were around those parts (comarquas) and the people of the place would not dare to leave it fearing the Bretons who came to the town's gates every day.»*¹¹²⁶

B) Hungarian Mercenaries in Italy (1360-1365)

Introduction

This second part of Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies will hopefully contribute to the decades-long polemic around the 14th century Hungarian light cavalry, although frankly it raises more questions than it answers. No such in-depth research has been carried out by Hungarian medievalists in Italian archives, so the details discussed below enriches the current picture of the Hungarian light cavalry with a lot of new information, both in terms of the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy, their armament, income, the tactics they used, whether operating on their own or as part of an Italian, English or German company. It will also be seen how much they were appreciated both by the experienced condottieri and by the cities and rulers. I am convinced that, by systematically processing the incredible amount of sources hidden in the depths of the Italian archives, and with the help of information on Hungarian mercenaries that has hitherto been integrated in the international literature, it will be possible to shed a radically new light on the Hungarian light cavalry of the second half of the 14th century.

¹¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁵ ARG reg. 119, f. 342.

¹¹²⁶ Pilar Azcárate Aguilar-Amat, « El azote de las Compañías y sus estragos en Navarra (1366-1367) », *Hispania: Revista española de historia*, 1991, vol. 51, nº 177, pp. 73-101, p. 83.

B.a) The Polemic on Hungarian Light Cavalry and their Equipment in the Literature

Among the historians who had dealt with the role of the Hungarian light cavalry, there were some who had assumed its disappearance by the mid-14th century. Among them was Zoltán Tóth active between the two world wars, who argued that «*the Hungarian soldier had at least as much of a Western appearance as we see in the miniatures of the Illuminated Chronicle*¹¹²⁷ concerning Hungarians.»¹¹²⁸ According to him, the difference between Western and Hungarian military technology disappeared in the 14th century.¹¹²⁹ András Borosy stated that the Hungarian mercenaries consisted of two elements: the «*most adventurous and less wealthy part*» of the Hungarian lords with knightly arms and the light horse with common background. He also articulated his doubts on the composition of the light cavalry: «*How many of the latter were Hungarians and how many were Cumans*¹¹³⁰ - we do not know for sure.»¹¹³¹ János B. Szabó argued that the vast majority of the troops mentioned in Western sources did not have «*the expensive, complete equipment necessary for the cavalry fighting style, but they probably had bows*», since «*there are not many references in the sources about the appearance and fighting style of these troops, why should we assume that they were not similar to the light horses described by foreign chroniclers.*»¹¹³² He concluded that this Hungarian archery was an integral part of Italian warfare.¹¹³³ He based his opinion on a study on the subject by Attila Bárány, who came to this conclusion by examining English and Hungarian mercenary companies.¹¹³⁴ In the last twenty years he has published a series of studies on the cooperation of English and Hungarian mercenaries in Italy in the second half of the 14th century including the great Hungarian army of 1372 and the mercenary company which was led, exceptionally by a

¹¹²⁷ *The Illuminated Chronicle* was produced in 1358 in the international artistic style at the court of King Louis I of Hungary. The text is the most complete record of Hungary's medieval historical tradition, dating back to the 11th century and including the mythical past of the nation.

¹¹²⁸ Zoltán Tóth, «A huszárok eredetéről» [On the origin of the Hussars], *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1934, vol. 35, n° 1, pp. 129-136.

¹¹²⁹ A., Borosy, «A XI-XIV. századi...», art. cit., p. 119-175.

¹¹³⁰ Some of the privileged peoples living in the Hungarian kingdom (the Cumans, the Besenyaks, the Szeklers) were also selected to take part in the campaigns in Italy as mercenaries. The Cumans revived the old Hungarian cavalry fighting style, which can be read in Villani.

¹¹³¹ A., Borosy, «A XI-XIV. századi...», art. cit., p. 157.

¹¹³² János B. Szabó, *A honfoglalástól a huszárokig: A középkori magyar könnyűlovasságról* [From the Hungarian Conquerors to the Hussars - Light Cavalry in Medieval Hungary], Budapest, 2010, pp. 119.

¹¹³³ J., B. Szabó, *A középkori magyarországi...*, op. cit., p. 167.

¹¹³⁴ Attila Bárány, «Angol-magyar zsoldoskompániák a 14. századi Itáliában [English-Hungarian Mercenary Companies in 14th century Italy]» in Attila Bárány et al. (eds.), *Angol-Magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban* [English - Hungarian relations in the Middle Ages], Gödöllő - Máriabesnyő, 2008, pp. 227-243.

Hungarian, Horváti János Warden of Macsó (Mačova) in 1379.¹¹³⁵ Attila Bárány rightly described the Hungarian light cavalry as a «*hobelar type, light-armoured, leather breast-plate or a double leather jerkin wearing mounted warrior.*»¹¹³⁶ Adinel C. Dincă has recently published an important study on Hungarian mercenaries serving in the Pontifical state in 1362, where he also concludes that «*The typical Hungarian company was divided into small units, usually around 20 men and horses, all light cavalrymen and bowmen, who shot arrows from their mounts...*»¹¹³⁷

The *Codice degli stipendiarii della repubblica di Firenze* from 1369, issued by the City of Florence, specified wages of the mercenaries and, in general and for each nation specifically serving Florence, the equipment and armaments they had to have before the *condotta* could be launched.¹¹³⁸ As a general rule, all *conestabiles*, regardless of their nation of origin, were required to wear the same equipment: greaves and cuisses, musekins and bracciali,¹¹³⁹ gorgiera,¹¹⁴⁰ sleeves and gussets of mail, cuirass, barbuta and gauntlets of iron, sword, dagger, and targe. Their horses had to have bards or cruppers of iron or mail. Nation-specifically, an English *caporalis* should have had the following equipment: shin splints, cuisse, breast plate, bracelet, iron gloves, *barbuta*, asword, dagger, and spear. The German, Burgundian and Italian *caporalis* had to appear at musters with the same armour and weapons, but unlike the English, they did not have spears. Their horses had to have bards or iron cuppers of iron, or mail. A Hungarian *conestabilis* and *caporalis* had to have *pancerone*,¹¹⁴¹ iron gloves, iron helmet, bow or spear, sword and dagger. The horsemen of a Hungarian *conestabilis* had to have bows and arrows, swords, daggers, and iron gloves. If they did not show up at the muster with the proper equipment, the mercenaries had to pay a penalty, again this was nation-specific: Hungarian mercenaries were fined 2 libre if they did not have the proper armour, 2 libre if they did not have a bow and arrow, 1 libre¹¹⁴² for the lack of any other type of equipment.¹¹⁴³ Florentine sources detail the punishments meted out separately to infantrymen and cavalrymen for lack of armour and weapons, including

¹¹³⁵ A., Bárány, « The Communion... », art. cit., pp. 130-148.

¹¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 134.

¹¹³⁷ Adinel C. Dincă, « Hungarian Mercenaries Serving the Pontifical State. A Vatican Source from 1362 and the Beginning of a Discussion » in Andrea Fara (ed.), *Italia ed Europa centroorientale tra Medioevo ed Età moderna: Economia, Società, Cultura*, Heidelberg, 2022, pp. 43-54.

¹¹³⁸ E. Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie...*, op. cit., pp. 315-329.

¹¹³⁹ Bracelet.

¹¹⁴⁰ Gorget.

¹¹⁴¹ Haubergeon, chainmail.

¹¹⁴² One Florentine florin was worth about 2.3 libre (lire).

¹¹⁴³ E. Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie...*, op. cit., pp. 315-329.

bows and arrows. It turns out that bows and arrows were necessary for Hungarian mercenaries at the muster and, as János B. Szabó rightly assumed, were part of their basic equipment. The Italian sources even mention the Italian name of the bow that the Hungarians used in the middle of the 14th century: it was called *stambecchino*, a small flexible bow.¹¹⁴⁴ Amadeus VI commissioned several mercenary companies from the 1360s onwards, including Johann Haneken Bongard's company of 300 Hungarian cavalrymen.¹¹⁴⁵

B.b) The Integration of the Hungarian Mercenaries in the Companies of Adventure

Hungarian soldiers served together with mercenaries from a wide variety of nations in Italy for decades after 1352. The *Codice degli stipendiarii della repubblica di Firenze* gave an account of the origin of the foreign soldiers serving in the multiethnic companies with which the Hungarians cooperated. It mentions the Burgundians, Germans, Italians, English besides the Hungarians in the service of the city. However, in the famous Werner von Urslingen's¹¹⁴⁶ company Hungarian mercenaries, besides the Germans, served along Catalan soldiers as well.¹¹⁴⁷ Between 1360 and 1366, Hungarian mercenaries reached the Eastern Mediterranean twice as part of multiethnic armies recruited in Italy. First, in 1364, they were represented in the army led by the Italian condottieri Luchino dal Verme, a friend of Petrarch, who was commissioned by Venice to put down the Cretan rebellion, together with «*Alamani, Anglici, Sclavi, Italici and Ultramontani*.»¹¹⁴⁸ Two years later, Hungarian mercenaries participated in Amadeus VI of Savoy¹¹⁴⁹'s crusade to liberate Gallipoli in 1365/6 with French, Spanish, English, Italians, and Czechs.¹¹⁵⁰

¹¹⁴⁴ ASF Dieci di balia, Deliberazioni condotte e stanziamenti, 3, f. 82r-83r ; W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

¹¹⁴⁵ R. Biolzi « A J'ay grand envie ... », *op. cit.*, p. 242.

¹¹⁴⁶ Werner Duke Urslingen was probably part of the first great company that was formed in 1338/39 in Italy. His famous motto: '*Duca Guarnieri, signore della Grande Compagnia, nemico di Dio di pietà e di misericordia*.' He was in Louis of Hungary's service in the Naples wars. In the 1350s, he was in the service of many rulers and city-states, such as Bologna and Giovanni Visconti, in central and northern Italy.

¹¹⁴⁷ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹¹⁴⁸ 29 April 1364. AOKlt p. 150, p. 272 ; MHH pp. 609-610, n. 445.

¹¹⁴⁹ He was not only an accomplished statesman, but also an *athleta Christi*, the model of a Christian knight as Eugene L. Cox states in the preface of his book on Amadeus of Savoy: «He was the child of an age of transition from medieval chivalry toward Machiavellian realism...» Eugene L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy, Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth-Century*, New Jersey, 1967, p. viii.

¹¹⁵⁰ AST Sezione Corte, Materie politiche per rapporto all'interno, Viaggio in Levante, mazzo 1 f. 22, 44, 56 ; Emanuele Federico Bollati di Saint-Pierre (ed.), *Illustrazioni della spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI. (Il Conte Verde)* ISOA, Turin, 1900, p. 64, p. 117, p. 151, p. 322.

According to the sources and research carried out so far, the Hungarians had first served mainly in the German-led companies in the 1350s and then besides the Germans in the English-led companies from the 1360s onwards and less often in Italian *compagnia di ventura* unless they were directly in the service of the individual Italian cities. There were only few examples of Hungarian captains in the second half of the 14th century between 1360 and 1366. In 1361, under the leadership of Athinay Miklós «*Nicolaum filium Johannis de Othim Comitem et Capitaneum*»¹¹⁵¹ a landlord of Sopron county,¹¹⁵² the «*Magne Societas Ungarorum*» entered the service of Queen Joanna of Naples and her consort Louis of Taranto.¹¹⁵³ Bókai Miklós, Bessenyei Péter, Erdélyi Péter, Kozmafi István, Péterfi János were asked by Egidio Albornoz in Ravenna to give their solemn oath in the name of their troops not to cause any damage to the Catholic Church in december 1362.¹¹⁵⁴

Two levels of integration can be observed: one is the level of banner, when whole banners joined the companies of adventure. In the period 1360-1365 this was the typical case, while the leaders of the Hungarian mercenaries were usually *conestabiles* much less often *caporales*¹¹⁵⁵. Such was the case of the Hungarian mercenary company led by Petrus de Grande, Buday András Andreasius de Buday and Gregoris de Tona, which in 1362 belonged to the German *condottiere* company of Heinrich von Englingen.¹¹⁵⁶ From Elemér Mályusz and Attila Bárány's research we know that Toldi Miklós served as a *conestabilis* under Sir John Hawkwood in the 1360s as well.¹¹⁵⁷ Or, as can be seen in 1384, an English *condottiere*, John Threlkeld, signed a contract with Florence for 100 lances,¹¹⁵⁸ for the duration of four months. The city specifically authorised the English captain to hire 302 Hungarian archers and integrate them into his company.¹¹⁵⁹ This is not the only reference in the Florentine archives to an English *condottiere* who reinforced his company with Hungarian archers. In September 1365, Sir John Hawkwood arrived in Tuscany with the newly formed Company

¹¹⁵¹ MHH, 571-578, n. 417.

¹¹⁵² Gy., Rázsó, « A zsoldosintézmény kezdetei... », art. cit., pp. 107-143.

¹¹⁵³ MHH, 571-578, n. 417.

¹¹⁵⁴ Jean Glénisson et Guillaume Mollat (eds.), *L'administration des États de l'Église au XIV^e siècle. Correspondance des légats et vicaires-généraux Gil Albornoz et Androin de la Roche (1353-1367)* CGAAR Paris, 1964, p. 273, p. 844.

¹¹⁵⁵ See their role in Hungarian banners below, under the 'Organisation of companies'.

¹¹⁵⁶ Pál Lukcsics, « Olaszországban vívő magyar lovagok jelvényei a XIV. században [Insignias of Hungarian Knights Fighting in Italy in the 14th Century] », *Turul*, 1931, vol. 45, pp. 84-88.

¹¹⁵⁷ A., Bárány, « The Communion... », art. cit., p. 133.

¹¹⁵⁸ A lance in the middle of Trecento Italy consisted of a man-at-arms supported by a squire and a page, each with his own horse. They fought on foot, the page took care of the horses while the squire provided support for the man-at-arms.

¹¹⁵⁹ ASF Dieci di balia, Deliberazioni condotte e stanziamenti, 2, f. 2r-2v ; E. Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie...*, op. cit., pp. 329-333.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies of Saint George,¹¹⁶⁰ where he spent six months.¹¹⁶¹ Florence, fearful of the company's plans, immediately sent envoys to «*Ambrogio Visconti da melano e mess. John Acuto.*»¹¹⁶² The Florentine ambassador, Doffo de Bardi, used every argument to convince them that Florence had always held them in high esteem and had done everything to help them, including allowing Hungarian mercenaries to leave the city's service and join the company.¹¹⁶³

At the same time, there was another level of integration, where mercenaries individually joined a multiethnic company. There are far fewer examples of this in the archives, such as a fragmentary source from Perugia, which contains the names of 25 soldiers of the *compagnia di ventura* of two German *conestabiles*, Tedericus de Sonechio and Herigus de Gulfort: Hungarians are also found here, along with Germans.¹¹⁶⁴

B.c) *Condotte*, Wages, Recruitment, Employment

It is worth comparing the situation of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy, their contracts, length of employment, frequency of employment, and their pay with that of German mercenaries, mainly from Lorraine, who served in the borderlands of the French Kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire, since the events discussed in this dissertation took place in these two theatres of war. Sources of a similar type are available in the much more researched archives of Florence and from the less known archives of Metz dating from exactly the same period between 1360 and 1365. Thus, since both cities also employed German mercenaries alongside mercenaries of other nationalities, it is worth comparing the practices of the two cities in this respect. It is therefore worth examining what was included in a *condotta* with a German condottiere concluded at the time, which also applied to Hungarian mercenaries and it is worth comparing with a similar mercenary contract that the city of Metz signed with the famous Welsh mercenary captain Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri or Owain Lawgoch (Red hand) in 1371 because the two treaties have much in common, but also show important differences.

¹¹⁶⁰ Bernabò Visconti's bastard son, Ambrogio was captain-general of the company. See Kenneth Fowler, « Sir John Hawkwood and the English condottieri in Trecento Italy », in Kelly DeVries (ed.), *Medieval Warfare, 1300-1450*, London - New York, 2010, p. 139.

¹¹⁶¹ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, 122.

¹¹⁶² ASF Signori-Carteggi, Missive I, Cancelleria 13, f. 66r

¹¹⁶³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹¹⁶⁴ ASP Miscellanea, n° 47.

«In 1363, two recruiters from Florence appeared in Constance, made numerous agreements with Wolfhard, Count of Veringen, and had his *condotta* sealed on 23 December.»¹¹⁶⁵ The Count himself led 50 mounted men, but in the *condotta* he undertook to provide a total of 125 *barbute*¹¹⁶⁶ for the duration of 6 months. The count as *condottiere* received 200 florins per month, a total 1200 florins. Wolfhard's obligations included having two destriers, a palfrey and two comedians who played on a whistle or a semi-drum. The leaders of the three additional banners received 50 Florentine florins a month. A *caporalis* led two armed men, their two horses, an unarmed servant and his smaller horse, this unit received 18 florins per month, from which nothing was deducted. An advance (*prestenza*), 1.500 Florentine florins was paid to the company of Wolfhard in the castle of Burgun.¹¹⁶⁷ After they had made the approximately 700 kilometre journey from Constance on their way to Florence, they had to stop at Padua for a muster where their service began and where they were mustered, at which point they were to be paid a monthly stipend in cash, per capita, without deductions. On arrival in Florence, they had to serve the pay they had received during 24 days of the month. One month before the expiry of the six-month *condotta*, Florence had to notify Wolfhard that it still required his services. In the case of a prolongation, the count of Veringen had to serve for another six months with the same pay and with the same conditions and rights as those enjoyed by mercenaries who had served the city of Florence for twenty years: for example, double pay in the event of an enemy attack or the capture of an enemy castle. If any member of Wolfhard's company lost a horse, he was compensated for by Florence, from which sum he was obliged to buy a new horse and had eight days to equip it. During this period the soldier received full pay. If Florence did not require the Count's further services, the company was allowed free passage, tax-free, through the areas controlled by the city. After six months of service, the members of the company were required to swear that they would not act against Florence within one year, either in word or deed. Of course they had to obey the orders of the military leaders of Florence. During the period of service, the members of the company had to appear at least twice for muster. In the event of a dispute between the city and the members of the company, it was to be settled by a committee of four, to which the Count delegated two members and the leadership of Padua and Florence each contributed one member. If no agreement could be reached, a fifth

¹¹⁶⁵ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹¹⁶⁶ Ever since German mercenaries had served in Italy, the basic unit under which they were recruited and which was also the unit of accounts for the *condotta* was called the *barbuto*, named after the German mercenaries' helmets. See S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹¹⁶⁷ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

German mercenary was to join. If there were any changes to Heinrich von Montfort-Tettnang¹¹⁶⁸'s treaty, they would apply to the Count.¹¹⁶⁹

Florence, like Metz, paid for horses destroyed in the war. However, while in the case of Metz it is not known exactly how the horses lost were accounted for as one of the most valuable assets, only it is known that the city paid compensation from the sources. In the case of Florence one can gain insight into the sophisticated compensation system that the city organised for the payments. The mercenary payments for certain years also included restitution for horses to a band of mercenaries. In the case of Hungarian banners, this was the year 1364. In each case, the name of the mercenary is indicated separately, as are the details of whose band they belonged to, the exact date of the horse's injury, the date of its death, if there is a difference between the two dates, and the evidence presented to the competent Florentine official, who approved the reports. Only then could the compensation be paid, and only then the legal basis for the payment be stated, as set out in the *condotta* analysed above. Thus, for example, Giorgio Petri, one of the Hungarian *conestabillis*, was paid 12 florins for his horse, which died in the fighting at Castel Fiorentino on 14 June 1364. The importance of this type of entry cannot be over emphasised, since it is possible to learn exactly against whom the *condottiere* or *conestabiles* had fought.¹¹⁷⁰

By 1371, the city of Metz had already been waging a war at two fronts at the same time: against the duke of Lorraine and Pierre of Bar.¹¹⁷¹ They felt that the usual forces were not enough and they needed additional reinforcement, so one of the most renowned Welsh captains, Owain Lawgoch, entered into the service of Metz. According to the contract signed on 8 July 1371,¹¹⁷² Owain and his companions would fight against all the enemies of the city. The 120 soldiers of his company had to show up armed and armoured. If possible, each soldier in the company had to have three horses, if not, a minimum of two horses was required. The treaty specified exactly who the enemy was: «*encontre Pierre de Bar, encontre Philippe et Richart des Hermoixes, freires, encontre Jehan de Bouxieres, leur*

¹¹⁶⁸ German *condottiere*, active in Italy from the mid-1360s. He served, among others, in Florence and enjoyed a long career over two decades.

¹¹⁶⁹ ASF Diplomatico, Riformagioni atti pubblici, 23 December 1363 ; S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 393-396.

¹¹⁷⁰ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21, f. 40v MMH 10051.

¹¹⁷¹ «Item en celle année vint le Duc de Lorreigne deviant Metz à si grant force par devers outre Saille, (et fut fast Chevalier en boutant le feu en une mouvée, c'est à savoir pourtant qu'il le feu en une mouvée de paixels ez vignes». Nancy A. Leseure (ed.), *Chronique, ou Annales du Doyen de S. Thiébaud de Metz*, Paris, 1973, p. XXXIII.

¹¹⁷² AMM EE3 liasses 6, f. 8 ; « Traité d'vain de Galles, par le quel il s'engage de préser du secour aux Messin contre le Duc de Lorraine, Pierre de Bar, Philippe et Richard Desarmoisses, et Jean de Bouxierés, leur cousin », in J. François and N. Tabouillot, *Preuves de l'histoire...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-276.

*Cousin, encontre tous lor aidans, et encore encontre tous autres, quilz qui soient autres, quilz qui soient, à cui nous avons, ou averons werre et werrons werrier porter damaiges»*¹¹⁷³

against all but the King of France and the allies of the city. It was strictly forbidden for Owain's company to pillage the lands belonging to Metz and those who were not the enemy of the city. It was also forbidden to hold people living in these territories for ransom without the permission of the Council. For his services, Owain Lawgoch received 1250 florins for a month, while a member of the company, armed with three horses and accompanied by a valet, received 30 florins for the same period. Mercenaries who were armed and accompanied by a valet but only had two horses, received 25 florins. Those who were knighted in his company received 40 florins. This contract was valid for a month and if the Council was satisfied with the service of Owain's company, the contract could be extended for a further month. There was an extra bonus if the company took the castles and cities of the enemy of Metz. These cities and castles would be handed over to the city. If they met the enemy on the field, they were obliged to fight until the enemy did not count more than sixty men. If they captured or killed their captain or they took the enemy's panon or banner, they would receive extra payment.¹¹⁷⁴

The two mercenary captains, Owain Lawgoch and the Earl of Veringen, were paid similar salaries, but this of course differed between the two contract durations. For the same money, Owain Lawgoch worked for one month, while Wolfhard von Veringen had to serve Florence for six months. The city of Metz was much more generous with the English company than Florence was with the German mercenaries, as a monthly salary of 30 florins, or even 40 florins for a knight, was much higher than a German mercenary of similar qualifications could earn in the service of Florence. Also, the 25 florins paid to the English was considered a higher fee than the 18 florins paid to a comparable German mercenary. However, to see how common this practice was, it is worth comparing the wages and employment practices of Hungarian and German mercenaries in the service of the two cities between 1360 and 1365. Both cities regularly hired German mercenary companies of similar size for the wars they fought, and Florence also regularly employed mercenaries of other nationalities, including Hungarians. The Metz and Florentine sources examined, although different in nature, allow for some degree of comparison and some general conclusions to be drawn.

¹¹⁷³ AMM EE3 liasses 6, f. 8 ; « Traité d'vain de Galles, par le quel il s'engage de préser du secour aux Messin contre le Duc de Lorraine, Pierre de Bar, Philippe et Richard Desarmoisses, et Jean de Bouxierés, leur cousin » in J. François and N. Tabouillot, *Preuves de l'histoire...*, op. cit., pp. 270-276.

¹¹⁷⁴ AMM EE3 liasses 6, f. 8 ; « Traité d'vain de Galles, par le quel il s'engage de préser du secour aux Messin contre le Duc de Lorraine, Pierre de Bar, Philippe et Richard Desarmoisses, et Jean de Bouxierés, leur cousin », in J. François and N. Tabouillot, *Preuves de l'histoire...*, op. cit., pp. 270-276.

The sources of the Florentine archives dating back to 1360-1365 include the name of the *conestabiles* or *caporales*, the duration and date of the *condotte*, the number of the hired banner (for Hungarians this always meant horsemen and is given in capita) and the amount per capita, as well as the amount paid to the banners at the end of the *condotte*.¹¹⁷⁵ The *quittances pour les service militaire* are available at the archives in Metz. These are effectively receipts in which the leader of a mercenary group declares in the first person that he has received from Metz City Council - at this time, called 'Treizeirers',¹¹⁷⁶ Thirteen - the amount due to him. Since the city of Metz did not standardise its receipts as Florence did with its mercenary payments, there are a number of discrepancies between sources. There are some sources which indicate exactly in which war the mercenary company took part, the number of lances of the company, and the date from which month to which month they had served, but there are others which do not even indicate the month and day, apart from the year. They usually indicate that the town compensated the troop for the horses or equipment lost.¹¹⁷⁷ In some cases, data on how many people had served and for how long are completely missing.

Nevertheless, it can be seen that with the mercenary contracts with the city of Metz, a German mercenary captain commanding an average of 7-10 lances earned at least as much as his compatriots serving Florence. For example while Hugo von Melchingen and Hermann von Winden as *condottieri* pocketed 150 florins a month, their marshals received 32.5 florins a month each. What is interesting from a Hungarian point of view is that the contracted *conestabiles* in their companies could expect to be paid 14 florins.¹¹⁷⁸ In contrast, Emes, Count of Linange, who in 1363 served the city of Metz for 36 lances and his contract with the Thirteen was remunerated at 410 florins.¹¹⁷⁹ Bertrous Strangen, another mercenary captain, served two months in the Duchy of Bar with 10 lances, for which he personally received 30 florins per month.¹¹⁸⁰ The Hungarian *conestabiles* received a uniform monthly salary of 16 florins, while the horsemen below them received 8 florins, that means they got two florins more than their German counterparts in the companies of Hugo von Melchingen

¹¹⁷⁵ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13, f. 33v, (MMH 10002.)

¹¹⁷⁶ AMM EE 6 Quittance pour les service militaire, Brocard de Fénétrange, 1360.

¹¹⁷⁷ AMM EE 7. Quittance pour les service militaire, Henri de Pinteville, 1366.

¹¹⁷⁸ G. Canestrini, « Documenti... », art. cit., p. 51, 1363, febbraio. Minuta d'istrizone per trattare la condotta del capitani Ugo di Melichin ed Ermano de Vinden, con 58 conestabili e 1000 barbuti. W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit., p. 74.

¹¹⁷⁹ AMM EE 7, 12 pièce 3, Geoffrey Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies en Lorraine et en Alsace de La Paix de Bretigny à la Mort de Charles V. (1370-1380)*, Strasbourg, 2006, p. 157.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

and Hermann von Winden. With regard to the payments made to the Hungarian banner in Florence, some general conclusions can be drawn as to how a Hungarian *conestabilis* might have calculated his income before he took the decision to go to Florence. Although there are of course differences between individual payments, the recurrent items suggest that a Hungarian *conestabilis*, if he was already in the service of Florence or before he went, could foresee the amount of the pay in advance. An average Hungarian banner of 10 people, including the *conestabilis* himself, received 88 florins for in a month in a *condotta* in 1362.¹¹⁸¹ Under the same conditions, a banner of 12 people received 104 florins,¹¹⁸² while a banner of 14 people was paid 120 florins.¹¹⁸³ These amounts are shown as standard payments in the sources. It can be estimated from the total of payments how much money the city of Florence paid to the Hungarians each year. The estimate is an approximation of the amount paid out, as the accounting was done in several instalments and the data are sometimes incomplete or do not give the exact length of the *condotta*. Taking into account that between May and June 1361, according to the records, the city of Florence had paid a total of nearly 3400 florins to the Hungarian banners.¹¹⁸⁴ What between November and December 1362,¹¹⁸⁵ the amount of payments increased sevenfold to approximately 24350 florins, which, of course, in addition to the increased number of people, is also due to the fact that in 1362 *condotte* were concluded for an average of four months.¹¹⁸⁶ Comparing the payments between June and August 1364 with those in 1362, it is clear that, despite the fact that Florence received a similar number of Hungarian banners, the income of the Hungarians fell by almost half to 13057 florins.¹¹⁸⁷ This was due to a drastic reduction in employment: in 1364, the number of four-month *condotte* were the lowest, and one, two or three-month mercenary contracts were much more common.

By comparing the income of mercenaries in Florentine service with that of mercenaries in other Italian cities it is possible to determine the value of the earnings of Hungarian mercenaries in the light of the those of others. In 1359, the city of Siena paid 7.5 florins per

¹¹⁸¹ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 33v, (MMH, 10057) ; 46v, (MMH 10080-10081) ; 44r, (MMH 10106) ; 40v ; 45v, (MMH 10114) ; 47v, (MMH 10083) ; 57r, (MMH 10095).

¹¹⁸² ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 43r, (MMH 10070) ; 43v, (MMH 10074) ; 45v, (MMH 10118) ; 46r, (MMH 10079) ; 48r, (MMH 10085) ; 56v, (MMH 10089) ; 59v, (MMH 10101)

¹¹⁸³ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 43v, (MMH 10072) ; 56r, (MMH 10088) ; 57r, (MMH 10093).

¹¹⁸⁴ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13.

¹¹⁸⁵ A large number of Hungarian mercenaries were available in Italy thanks to the arrival in Italy of a Hungarian army of about 6.000 men led by Simone della Morte. See Enikő Csukovits, *Magyarországról és a magyarokról. Nyugat-Európa-képe a középkorban*, Budapest, 2013, p. 88.

¹¹⁸⁶ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18.

¹¹⁸⁷ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21.

month for a *barbuta* when the great company of Konrad von Landau threatened their city.¹¹⁸⁸

In the early 1370s a lance in the service of Siena received 18 florins, however by 1376, it declined to 16 florins per month. In 1384, the city of Siena hired Guido d'Asciano for four months to fend off the approaching Breton threat.¹¹⁸⁹ The *condottiere* signed three contracts with the city: in the first contract they gave Guido 2 florins per horse per month for 477 horses, then when the city leaders learned that Sir John Hawkwood was also approaching the city they signed a new contract with Guido for 656 horses, again at 2 florins per month, but eventually the threat was considered so great that they hired 800 horses, but at 3 florins per month. All this is interesting because it shows the value of the Hungarian horsemen, for whom, as we have seen, Florence paid 2.5 to 4 times more a month than Siena to Guido d'Asciano's company members.¹¹⁹⁰ Karl Heinrich Schäffer came to the same conclusion that Hungarian mercenaries regularly earned more than Germans.¹¹⁹¹

How much this was worth is shown by the fact that a simple farmer or an unskilled construction worker earned 9.4 soldi per day, a spinner of wool cloths received 12.7 soldi while a master builder earned 17.1 soldi.¹¹⁹² Hence, a Hungarian *conestabilis* earned about 40 soldi a day, while a cavalryman serving in his banner earned 20 soldi that meant that a priori they could manage their daily living more easily than most of the less qualified Florentine citizens. A Hungarian *conestabilis* earned almost two and a half times as much as a master builder and more than four times as much as a construction worker. Even a horseman serving in his banner earned more than a master builder and twice as much as a farmer. The daily cost of living in 14th century Tuscany is estimated at 3 soldi, so a Hungarian horseman earning 20 soldi made a much easier living than a crossbowman earning 9.7 soldi or a simple foot soldier earning 3.8 soldi.¹¹⁹³

Added to this was the income from the loot, so it is easy to understand why so many Hungarian mercenaries served in Trecento Italy. In some cases, the income from loot or ransoms was many times higher than that of a captain or even a simple mercenary in Italy or in France. The capture of a small town or castle could mean thousands of florins for the

¹¹⁸⁸ W. Caferro, *The Companies...*, *op. cit.* p. 52.

¹¹⁸⁹ Guido d'Asciano was sent to Maremma where the Bretons, who controlled Bolsena and Canino, raided the countryside. He then successfully reconquered Corneto, also in Breton hands, and entrusted it to the Rector of the Patrimony Simonetto Baglioni. See C. Ciucciiovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

¹¹⁹⁰ W. Caferro, *The Companies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹¹⁹¹ K. H. Schäfer, *Deutsche Ritter...*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹¹⁹² The exchange rate was fixed by William Caferro for 1390 at 1 florin 75 soldi. W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹¹⁹³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

company, especially if locals wanted to get rid of the mercenaries quickly. Two mercenary captains could pocket thousands of florins during Edward III's 1360 campaign in eastern France. The English army had already left Burgundy and was on its way to Paris, crossing the barony of Donzy and the county of Nevers. During this period of the campaign, two captains in particular played a prominent role: the Welshman Ieuan Wynn, the pursuivant of love, and a Gascon captain, Garciot Chastel. Wynn, as commander of the fortress of Beaufort, joined the English army on the spot. He quickly captured the town of Clemency and made the inhabitants¹¹⁹⁴ pay 7000 florins, taking hostages until the full amount was paid.¹¹⁹⁵ Garciot de Chastel, having captured several castles, agreed a ransom of 5000 florins with the local lords. The locals did everything they could to pay the amounts they had negotiated, borrowing if they had to, regardless of the consequences, because they knew that if they did not «*otherwise the said land will be completely destroyed.*»¹¹⁹⁶ William Caferro's research revealed that the *condottieri* received special gifts in addition to the amount stipulated in the contract to be paid to the company to avoid the plundering and the destruction of the *contado* that accompanied the presence of the companies.¹¹⁹⁷ However, Adinel C. Dincă's research in the Vatican did not reveal any similar type of records concerning Hungarian mercenaries in the 1360s.¹¹⁹⁸

William Caferro has systematically examined the bribe money paid by Siena to the passing companies from 1354 to 1399. The payments examined for this period include payments to the companies of Johann Haneken Bongard and Albert Sterz and Ambrogio Visconti, in which Hungarians were involved.¹¹⁹⁹ In his analysis, William Caferro discusses other benefits in addition to cash payments, including various gifts, supplies for the troops that were passing through: wine, food and fodder for horses separately.¹²⁰⁰ Among the Italian chronicles of the period, the Chronicle of L'Aquila gives a detailed account of the march of the 800-strong company led by Athinay Miklós from Naples toward the north of Italy in May 1361. There are many similarities between the Hungarian troops marching through the territory of L'Aquila and the companies arriving in Siena, but there are also significant differences. The Hungarians approached L'Aquila with essentially peaceful intentions.

¹¹⁹⁴ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 490.

¹¹⁹⁵ E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

¹¹⁹⁶ ADN B 757, n° 8060.

¹¹⁹⁷ W. Caferro, *Mercenary Companies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹¹⁹⁸ A. C. Dincă, « Hungarian Mercenaries... », *art. cit.*, p. 52.

¹¹⁹⁹ W. Caferro, *Mercenary Companies...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

¹²⁰⁰ W. Caferro, *Mercenary Companies...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.

Before crossing, they spent two weeks in the field of Sulmona, some 60 kilometres south of the town, while negotiations were under way. The town magistrate considered the Hungarian company too large and asked the Hungarian *condottiere* to cross the proximity of the town in two groups of two groups of 400 men, surrounded by the escort provided by the town. In return, the town agreed to provide the Hungarians with all their supplies.¹²⁰¹ The big difference compared to all the other similar examples I have investigated in France, Germany and Spain in the middle of the 14th century is that the Hungarians provided hostages (60) for L'Aquila during the march. The Hungarians passed through closed gates and high city walls, under the watchful eye of guards, and without major atrocities, and crossed the territory of L'Aquila and continued their march towards Florence.¹²⁰²

However, a similar practice can be seen in the contract of 1363 between the town of Todi and the Compagnia del Cappelletto, mentioned above. According to the agreement, the company was to stay outside the city walls for five days in the area assigned by the city. During these five days, the company sent the following as hostages to the city: the nobleman Leonardo Frescobaldi of Florence and the *caporalis* Bertuccius de Sabatini of Bologna. The treaty was signed and sealed among others by one more Hungarian, Gregorius Nicolaus de Ungaria *caporalis*, in addition to the aforementioned Lanzilloti Ungari. The parties agreed that the city, like the company of Athinay Miklós in L'Aquila, would supply the Compagnia del Cappelletto with forage and food. In the contract, the company undertakes, of course, not to occupy castles, not to rob the *contado*, not to molest the inhabitants in any way. The town also allowed the members of the company, in groups of up to 25, to enter Todi and to go purchase goods in the town, but of course not to harass the local citizens in any way. If they do, they can be arrested by the town council and punished according to the town's laws. The treaty takes special care to prevent any outcasts from Todi from contacting the company, if they do, the company's leadership must turn them over to the city. Outcasts are not allowed to enter the city with members of the company. If they conspire against Todi with members of the company, the leaders of the Compagnia del Cappelletto must punish the rebels. The contracting parties have also undertaken that if, during the five days, one of them is attacked from outside by a third party, they will be obliged to use all their forces to come to the aid of the attacked party at their own expense.¹²⁰³

¹²⁰¹ Vincenzo de Bartholomaeis (ed.), *Cronaca aquilana rimata di Buccio di Ranallo di Popplito d'Aquila*, Rome, 1907, p. 280.

¹²⁰² V. de Bartholomaeis, *Cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280 ; C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 468.

¹²⁰³ L. Lorenzo, « La peste... », *art. cit.*, pp. 3-11.

Another income for the mercenaries was the ransom. If valuable prisoners were captured in battle, there was also a substantial income to be made: in the Battle of Brignais¹²⁰⁴ in 1362, the companies inflicted a crushing defeat on the French royal army, and so the prisoners were a major source of revenue. The receipt of Henry de Lorny, sire of Raon serves as proof that he had received 5500 florins from the count of Tancarville, the king's lieutenant in Burgundy, to pay for the losses, damage and ransom of several knights, mercenary captains and their troops who had served in the royal army at Brignais.¹²⁰⁵ Of the 5500 florins, 1000 florins were given to the Receiver General of Burgundy, and 4500 florins were distributed among the people mentioned in the document.¹²⁰⁶

To gain an approximative insight into the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy between 1360 and 1365, it is worth examining the number of Hungarian banners active in Florence in 1361, 1362 and 1364 before the arrival of the great Hungarian army led by Meggyesaljai Mórócz Simon in the autumn of 1361. The city of Florence had already engaged four Hungarian *conestabiles* and two *caporalis*, each with a four-month contract, for a total of 44 horsemen. Two of the four *conestabiles*, Giorgio Ghirigori¹²⁰⁷ and Lancialotto Davit¹²⁰⁸ were employed for the whole year, while the other two *conestabiles*, Niccholo Chimenti,¹²⁰⁹ and Stefano Litterato,¹²¹⁰ served for eight months, which meant that Lancialotto David's and Giorgio Ghirigori received two more *condotte*. However, the following year brought a significant change in the number of Hungarian mercenaries employed in Florence. This was due in part to the large number of Hungarian soldiers left over from the thousands of Hungarian troops led by Meggyesaljai Mórócz Simon and employed in Florence. The mercenary list for 1362 shows that there was a virtual replacement of the *conestabiles* and *caporales* except for Giorgio Ghirigori. In fact, from William Caferro's research it is known that Gregori Ghirigori, Nicolas Chimenti, Tomaso Amerighi, Banchone Johanis served permanently in Florence for six to twelve years. Gregori Ghirigori is an exception among the Hungarian *conestabiles* because he spent twelve years in Florence first in 1361-1371 then 1389-1390.¹²¹¹ Adinel C. Dincă, examining Vatican sources, came to similar conclusions

¹²⁰⁴ This was the last time the French Royal Army tried to stop the mercenary companies in an open battle on the border between the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the royal army and brought about the dominance of the great companies.

¹²⁰⁵ ADCO B 11735, Receit de Henri de Longwy, seigneur de Rahon, 26 Juin 1363.

¹²⁰⁶ ADCO B 11735, Receit de Henry de Longwy, seigneur de Rahon, 26 Juin 1363.

¹²⁰⁷ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13, f. 55v (MMH 10012).

¹²⁰⁸ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13, f. 57r (MMH 10013).

¹²⁰⁹ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13, f. 33v (MMH 10001).

¹²¹⁰ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13, f. 37r (MMH 10004).

¹²¹¹ W. Caferro, « Continuity, Long-term Service... », art. cit., p. 219-251.

about the Hungarian mercenaries in the service of the Holy See in the 1350s: Iohannes Iohannis,¹²¹² Valente Ungarus,¹²¹³ Iohannes de Aram Litteratus,¹²¹⁴ Andreas de Secullo¹²¹⁵ appear regularly in various Vatican registers.

However, the increase in numbers is not only due to the rise in the number of banners, but also to the increase in the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in each banner: while in 1361 an average Hungarian *conestabilis* only had 8-10 horsemen, in 1362, banners of 16-21 men were common, and in 1364 banners of 20-25 men can be found in the sources. The German banners were similar in number to the Hungarians in the 1360s. Of the German banners counted by Karl Henrich Schäffer numbered 20 persons, and he found only four banners with 25 and one with 26 persons.¹²¹⁶ In 1365, these numbers did not change significantly, but the number of soldiers serving in a Hungarian banner was close to 20, compared to an average of 10 in 1361.

In one year the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Florence increased fourteenfold, with 54 *conestabiles* and 638 Hungarians many of whom, as in the previous year, had their *condotte* extended. What differs from the Florentine practice of 1362 concerning the years of 1361 and 1364, is that the city of Florence, on 21 October 1362, hired seven Hungarian *conestabiles* (Giorgo de Piero Grande 18 horses,¹²¹⁷ Pagholo di Giovanni da Sala 17 horses,¹²¹⁸ Giorgio Samo 21 horses,¹²¹⁹ Niccoloso Petri with 17 horses,¹²²⁰ Petro Ceprech 16 horses,¹²²¹ Spano Lancelotti 16 horses,¹²²² Martino Biagy 15 horses,¹²²³ altogether 120 horses for a one-month *condotta*. In addition, Florence concluded a contract with 28 other Hungarian *conestabiles* in September and October 1362 for a regular interval of 4 months, with a total of 377 horsemen,¹²²⁴ broadly speaking, in two months Florence concluded a *condotta* of one to four months with 36 Hungarian

¹²¹² AAV Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f. 13r, quoted by A. C. Dincă, « Hungarian Mercenaries... », art. cit., p. 52.

¹²¹³ AAV Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f. 10v, quoted by A. C. Dincă, « Hungarian Mercenaries... », art. cit., p. 52.

¹²¹⁴ AAV Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f. 6r, quoted by A. C. Dincă, « Hungarian Mercenaries... », art. cit., p. 52.

¹²¹⁵ AAV Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f. 6r and 12v, quoted by A. C. Dincă, « Hungarian Mercenaries... », art. cit., p. 52.

¹²¹⁶ K. H. Schäfer, *Deutsche Ritter...*, op. cit., p. 69.

¹²¹⁷ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 45v (MMH 10116).

¹²¹⁸ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 45v (MMH 10117).

¹²¹⁹ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 45v (MMH 10120).

¹²²⁰ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 45v (MMH 10121).

¹²²¹ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 46r (MMH 10123).

¹²²² ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 46r (MMH 10075).

¹²²³ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 45v (MMH 10115).

¹²²⁴ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 38r (MMH 10064-10067) ; 43r-v (MMH 10070-10074, 10104-10105) ; 45r-v (MMH 10109-10121), 56r-v (MMH 10088-10091) ; 58r-v (MMH 10096-10100) ; 59v (MMH 10101-10102).

conestabiles and their 497 horsemen. The reason behind this feverish recruitment of Hungarian light cavalry is that Florence suddenly needed a large number of new recruits because of a mercenary revolt. Of course, not only Hungarians, but also mercenaries of other nationalities were hired during this period, but the proportion of Hungarians was predominant. On 30 August 1362, Italian, German and Burgundian condottieri in the service of Florence, Niccolò, Count of Urbino, Ugolino dei Sabatini of Bologna, Marcolfo dei Rossi of Rimini, rebelled by demanding double pay plus a full month's pay for taking Peccioli.¹²²⁵ This was refused by the city, so the mercenaries, about a thousand of them, left the service of Florence and founded the Compagnia del Cappelletto. Taking advantage of the confusion, the Pisans took Ajatico, killing 25 Florentine guards. The Hungarian troops took part in the ensuing *cavalcades*, which left the countryside around Pisa deserted.¹²²⁶

Florence was probably satisfied with the performance of the Hungarians, because in 1364, although it employed slightly fewer Hungarian *conestabiles* than in 1362, 46 in number, the larger number of banners resulted in a similar number to the number of Hungarian mercenaries compared to 1362. In two years, most of the *conestabiles* serving in Florence were replaced, but there were still some who were regularly in the mercenary service of Florence between 1361 and 1364. Most notably Giorgio Ghirigori, mentioned above, who, as the only *conestabilis*, was continuously contracted by Florence for four month *condotte* during the period under review. However, there are two other Hungarian *conestabiles* who were in the mercenary service of Florence at that time: Stefano di Domenicho¹²²⁷ and Pagholo Giovanni da Sala.¹²²⁸

In the names there are a few references to the regions and cities of Hungary where the *conestabiles* originated. As the name Pasgholo Giovanni indicates, he originated from the county of Zala, but not only from him but also Lancialotto Pagoli da Sala, who was in the service of Florence in 1364 at the head of a 12-man banner,¹²²⁹ or Dandreagio da Sala, who served the war effort of Florence in 1362 with 15 men.¹²³⁰ Apart from the sources from Florence, mercenaries from Zala County also appear in other contemporary Italian sources. In the agreement signed by Sir John Hawkwood and the leaders of the White Company with

¹²²⁵ Matteo Villani, Filippo Villani and Dino Compagni, *Cronica di Matteo e Filippo Villani con le Vite d'uomini illustri fiorentini di Filippo e la Cronica di Dino Compagni* (= Villani, *Cronica*, 1834), Milan, 1834, lib. IX, cap. XXIII, p. 365.

¹²²⁶ C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 501 ; A. Sautier, *Papst Urban V... op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

¹²²⁷ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita, 19, f. 32v (MMH 100384).

¹²²⁸ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita, 21, f. 38r (MMH 10043).

¹²²⁹ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21, f. 45r ; 20, f. 63r (MMH 10194).

¹²³⁰ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 45r (MMH 10113).

Egidio Albornoz, papal legate, on 29 October 1366, two Hungarians are among the main officers of the Company, and immediately after the English marshals, there are also the 'Comes' Nicolaus Ungarus, i.e. Toldi Miklós and Michael de Sala Hungarian marshal. Following the defeat of Ugolino de Montemartre, the company promised Cardinal Albornoz that they would not invade the Papal State for a year and would withdraw peacefully.¹²³¹ Nevertheless, the same reference to the county can be found in the Company of St George, which entered the service of Florence in 1365. Among the Italian, English and Hungarian *conestabiles* and *caporalis* who made up the company are Petrus de Sala, Nicholaus de Sala, and Georgius de Sala.¹²³² Zala county is the only Hungarian region specifically mentioned in the Florentine sources examined so far. The county is located in the south-western tip of the kingdom, from where the Hungarian banners had to travel the same distance to serve Florence as Wolfhard von Veringen and his German mercenaries from Constance. This may be a coincidence, there is no evidence that Florentine recruiters visited Hungary, but it is perhaps worth raising the possibility that many of the Hungarian *conestabiles* came from Zala County because the Italian theatre of war was more easily accessible from here than from other parts of the kingdom, hence the reference to the county in the Florentine sources. However, according to Hungarian medievalists, the prefix Zala in the names has a broader meaning, it probably refers not only to *conestabiles* from the county, but also to the place of origin of *conestabiles* from the wider Transdanubian region.¹²³³

It is not uncommon to find similar surnames for *conestabiles* who were in the service of Florence at the same time, which raises the possibility that such *conestabiles* were related to each other, perhaps from the same genus, so that in some cases the service of Florence could be considered a family business. Giovanni Pagholi began his *condotta* with 17 horses on 15 June 1364, while Michele Pagholi, under with 19 horses began his service in Florence three days later on 18 June.¹²³⁴ The same is the case for Lancelotto Niccolai and Ghirogoro Niccolai: both of them began their service on 26 October 1362. Lancelotto arrived in Florence with 14 Hungarian horses, while Ghirogoro Niccolai arrived with 15 Hungarian horses.¹²³⁵ Michele and Biagio Ajuti had been given a standard contract of 4 months in

¹²³¹ ASB Archivio Albornoziano, busta 361 (46) ; Gino Franceschini, « Il cardinal legato Egidio d' Albornoz e i conti di Montefeltro », in Evelio Verdera y Tuels (ed.), *El Cardenal Albornoz y el Colegio de España*, Bologna, 1972, pp. 663-664 ; W. Caferro, *The Companies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹²³² MMH pp. 639-640, n. 476.

¹²³³ A. A., Bárány, « The Communion... », *art. cit.*, p. 140. n. 63.

¹²³⁴ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21, f. 36v (MMH 10035).

¹²³⁵ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 38r (MMH 10068).

August 1362,¹²³⁶ or Pagholo and Stefano de Brenna, who also in 1364 concluded a four-month *condotta* with Florence with 15 men.¹²³⁷

In the case of the city of Metz, the mercenaries employed between 1360 and 1365/66 show many similarities with the practice in Florence. Similar to the Florentine employment of Giorgio Ghirigori, we find more than one mercenary captain who was hired on a long-term basis by Metz to participate in the city's wars. Such captains include Henri de Spanheim, who was a regular in the city's service between 1363 and 1366,¹²³⁸ and Philippe dit, Raugraf sire de Neu-Bamberg, who issued a receipt for his pay to the city of Metz in 1363 and 1364.¹²³⁹ Jean de Haine also returned to the service of Metz five years apart: first in April 1360, during the greatest danger posed by the English companies, and then in 1365.¹²⁴⁰

The Fénétrange family was one of the most powerful families in Lorraine. Members of the family were much more than simple mercenaries who, with a few lances, were in the service of a city or local potentate. Orlis de Fénétrange and Brocard de Fénétrange were active participants and shapers in frontier politics, more than once playing an important role in the fight against mercenary companies, both in France and in Alsace, or even in the Duchy of Bar. Orlis played an important role in driving the English companies out of Alsace in 1360¹²⁴¹, while Brocard, a year earlier, had scored imperishable merit in the reversal of the mercenary invasion of Champagne.¹²⁴² Sources already mentioned that they were accepted as mercenaries by the city of Metz in 1360 and actively participated in the battles against the companies in the Duchy of Bar. However, they also served the city of Metz later: Orlis de Fénétrange¹²⁴³ and Brocard Fénétrange¹²⁴⁴ are mentioned in the sources in 1366.

From a table compiled by Geoffrey Grill, who painstakingly collected and organised the mercenary payments of the city of Metz for the period, it is clear that the city employed large numbers of mercenaries, especially in its wars with the surrounding lords, which were fought at regular intervals. Such wars were the war against the widow of the lord of Hanalpierre in 1363/64, when the sources link the payment of 18 mercenary captains to this war,¹²⁴⁵ and

¹²³⁶ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18, f. 40r (MMH 10068).

¹²³⁷ ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21, f. 41r (MMH 10052).

¹²³⁸ AMM EE7 14 pièces 12, 29, EE7 15 pièces 30.

¹²³⁹ AMM EE7 13 pièces 3, EE7 14 pièces 8.

¹²⁴⁰ AMM EE7 15 pièces 9.

¹²⁴¹ AMC EE1, n° 1.

¹²⁴² See details later in the analysis of the tactics of the companies.

¹²⁴³ AMM EE7, 12 pièces 1.

¹²⁴⁴ AMM EE7, 15 pièces 34.

¹²⁴⁵ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-162.

the war against Henri and Pierre de Bar in 1364/65, when the sources link the payment of four mercenary captains to the city's war effort.¹²⁴⁶ In addition, against the mercenary companies, Metz can be shown to have hired at least 7 German mercenaries.¹²⁴⁷ Unfortunately, the total amount of the salary paid by the city to the mercenaries cannot be estimated due to the aforementioned lack of sources, but the amount paid in 1363 is proven to have exceeded 12,800 Florentine florins, roughly the amount paid by the city of Florence to the Hungarian mercenaries in 1364.¹²⁴⁸

To sum up, an average Hungarian banner in the 1360s consisted of 10-14 people and in terms of value it must have represented 400-500 florins, based on the price of a horse of 12 florins,¹²⁴⁹ as each of them had to have at least two horses, and the monthly salary of 8 florins. Considering the average monthly pay of 120 florins for a banner of 14 men, it is possible to estimate the considerable investment required by a *conestabilis* to assemble and operate a Hungarian mercenary band in Italy. Of course, here one has to look at the ratios, since the real cost of acquisition is not known. In any case, even if the *conestabiles* did not count on the income from the loot, it is clear that if they did not suffer any particular loss in men and horses, even a conservative estimate would show that the first four-month *condotta* could have already recouped the costs of the «*investment*» and the second four-month *condotta* could have been a pure profit for the members and leaders of the banner. If these estimates prove to be correct it means that the recruitment of such a banner was not a 'cheap exercise.' Looking only at the large number of Hungarian companies serving in Florence in 1362 and 1364, one wonders how many financially powerful Hungarian military entrepreneurs were active in the Italian market, and how Hungarian light horse mercenary companies were organised to undertake the Italian adventure. Another interesting finding when looking at mercenary payments is the question of losses suffered. The dangers to which the Hungarian mercenaries were exposed will be discussed later, for now it is only interesting to note that the number of soldiers serving under a *conestabilis* seems to have remained fairly stable over the years. The reason for this is not yet known. Theoretically, two answers are possible: either there were no losses, which of course can be excluded as Hungarian losses occur regularly in sources. The other possible explanation is that soldiers killed in action were replaced by *caporales* or *conestabiles* from other sources. How many

¹²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

¹²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-162.

¹²⁴⁹ «Lorenzo Iacopi, ungaro, connestabile del comune di Firenze. In risarcimento di un cavallo di pelo non uniforme e altre caratteristiche iscritto a Jacopo Giovanni sotto la suddetta bandiera e stimato 12 fiorini d'oro.» ASF Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 20, f. 23r (MMH 10139).

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men were needed and where they came from to replenish the bands that continued to serve are still unanswered questions.

B.d) The Organisation of Companies, the Role of Hungarians in Multiethnic Companies

Hungarian light cavalry was part of the most important English, Italian and German companies of the 1360s. The White Company of Albert Sterz and Sir John Hawkwood has already been mentioned, as well as the Company of the Star, the Compagnia del Cappelletto, the Great Company led by Konrad von Landau and possibly the Company of the Flower as well. The basic Hungarian unit of the multiethnic companies was the banner, and this was true of the administrative structure of the companies, the chain of command and for the tactics as well. As Villani's description makes it clear, Hungarian troops fought in units of 10-15 men, the equivalent of a banner.¹²⁵⁰ The White Company, also under the command of Albert Sterz, marched longer distances, often at night, in small units led by the *caporalis*.¹²⁵¹ The companies were headed by elected captains whose position depended largely on the loyalty of the *conestabiles* and *caporales* who served under them. Thus the *conestabiles* and *caporales* played a decisive role, as is shown by the fact that their names and seals appear regularly in the sources of the companies. The official documents relating to the Company, be it a treaty of passage, a document for the release of captured soldiers or a *condotta*, were signed by the captains, the marshals, the *caporalis* and the *conestabiles* of the company and stamped with their own seals. These documents were, of course, always written in Latin, so it was an advantage for the signatories to know Latin, as there are examples of Hungarian mercenaries with Latin knowledge.¹²⁵²

Ambrogio Visconti, the bastard son of Bernabò Visconti brought reinforcement and provisions to the weathered company of Hawkwood following his lost battle against the Germans at San Mariano on 22 July 1365.¹²⁵³ The Italian Company of St George made its way to Tuscany after its formation in October 1365. Florence, fearing the consequences,

¹²⁵⁰ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. VI, cap. LIII, p. 203. About the importance of the banner see K. H. Schäfer, *Deutsche Ritter...*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹²⁵¹ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 12. 10 October 1380, Convenzioni fatte con gli Ungheri e Giovanni Bano Maconiese, Capitano generale e Luogotenente del re d'Ungheria, a Calcinai, su quel di Poggibonsi. G. Canestrini, « Documenti... », *art. cit.*, pp. 72-74.

¹²⁵³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-122.

preferred to buy safe passage by paying 6,000 florins. The contract was signed among others by the Hungarian *conestabilis* Luchas de Valco.¹²⁵⁴ Likewise, the Hungarian *conestabiles* of the aforementioned Heinrich von Englingen's troops also signed and sealed the charter of release on 19 January 1362.¹²⁵⁵ In addition to Albert Sterz, 19 *caporalis* of the White Company signed the *condotta* with the Marquis of Montferrat in 1361, and four years later the contract signed by the Company with the city of Florence bore 24 seals. After the *condotta* was signed, it was read out and rendered by interpreters for the members of the Company, who swore on the Bible to abide by it.¹²⁵⁶

Within the company, one of the most important positions was that of the Marshal, who directly succeeded the Captain in rank. The marshal had a high degree of autonomy, leading his own troops within the company, who were directly subordinate to him. Each marshal was supposed to have 250 soldiers or 16 banners, in the company of the German Condottieri, Hugo von Melchingen and Hermann von Winden on the 12 October 1365.¹²⁵⁷ If a dispute arose between individual *caporalis* or *conestabilis*, the marshal had to settle it, and he was also responsible for taking care of the men and horses.¹²⁵⁸ There are at least three examples of Hungarian marshals from this period: two of them served in the Anglo-Hungarian White Company, one is the aforementioned Michael de Salla who served as marshal under Sir John Hawkwood in 1366, the other is Ioannis Cibol from two years earlier in 1364, when Albert Sterz was still commanding the company in Italy.¹²⁵⁹ In 1363 the Compagnia del Cappelletto had two captains and four marshals, two Italian, one German and one Hungarian.¹²⁶⁰ His surname was László, and he was one of the marshals who signed and sealed the treaty between the company and the city of Todi a few months after the defeat at Siena. The commune paid the company 1000 florins to redeem the city.¹²⁶¹

Each banner was headed by a *conestabilis* who could be Italian or foreign. As we have seen, the Hungarian banners were led exclusively by Hungarian *conestabiles*. It was up to the *conestabiles* to keep order within the banner, to carry out the orders given by the captains. *Caporales* in the Hungarian banners, as the Florentine sources show, consisted

¹²⁵⁴ G. Canestrini, « Documenti... », art. cit., p. 124. Convenzioni fermate con Ambrogio di Bernabò Visconti, Capitano generale della Compagnia Italiana di San Giorgio, e con Giovanni degli Ubaldini, e altri caporali della detta Compagnia.

¹²⁵⁵ P., Lukcsics, « Olaszországban vitézkedő ... », art. cit., p. 87.

¹²⁵⁶ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit., p. 74.

¹²⁵⁷ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, op. cit., p. 53.

¹²⁵⁸ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit., p. 66.

¹²⁵⁹ G. Canestrini, « Documenti... », art. cit., p. 57.

¹²⁶⁰ Paolo Grillo, *Cavalieri e popoli in armi. Le istituzioni militari nell'Italia medievale*. Bari, 2015. e-book, I. 3297.

¹²⁶¹ L. Leonij, « La peste... », art. cit., p. 11.

Military Machinery, Personnel, Strategy and Tactics in the Warfare of the Great Companies of 2 to 4 men, and the sources seem to indicate that they were of lesser importance than in the case of other nationalities, such as English companies. It has been mentioned before, the *caporales* may have been contracted by the cities, but their number is negligible compared to the number of Hungarian *conestabiles*.

B.e) Hungarian Mercenaries in the Strategy and Tactics of the Companies

Each nation represented by foreign mercenaries on the Italian battlefields had its own role in 14th century warfare. The Germans, in full armour, were the heavy cavalry attacking in wedge formation, who had to break up the enemy's lines in the first wave of the attack to make way for the troops following them.¹²⁶² The English were distinguished by their brand new three-man lance formation, their combination of archers equipped with longbows, and *«their habit of dismounting to fight on foot, and being accustomed to riding at night and fighting deep into winter.»*¹²⁶³

Hungarians were involved in all the conflicts in northern and central Italy in the mid-14th century, either on one or on both sides. The period was defined by two wars that lasted for several years: one was the Florence-Pisa feud, the other a series of clashes between the Papal States and the Visconti of Milan. Both conflicts involved the full range of medieval warfare, from castle and city sieges to night raids, *cavalcate* to pitched battles. Hungarians took part in all types of warfare, but above all served as light cavalry in multiethnic companies. The light cavalry as a weapon was perfectly suited to the strategic ideas of the condottieri active on the Italian battlefield, since the most important feature of warfare in the second half of the 14th century was the avoidance of high-risk pitched battles, and the dominant manoeuvre was more of a skirmish, based on rapid manoeuvres exploiting the element of surprise.¹²⁶⁴ *«They [the Hungarians] are masters of making war and assaulting enemies, and they do not care if they die.»*¹²⁶⁵

The suitability of Hungarian mercenaries is best illustrated by the events around Treviso in the Hungarian-Venetian War of 1357/58. The Hungarian troops led by Vásári Tamás set an ambush for the Venetians. As the final act of the Hungarian War of Venice, the Venetian

¹²⁶² S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

¹²⁶³ K. Fowler, « Sir John Hawkwood... », *art. cit.*, p. 99.

¹²⁶⁴ A. Sautier, *Papst Urban V....*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹²⁶⁵ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. VI, cap. XXXVII, p. 197.

garrison of Treviso and the mercenaries serving there were once again ambushed by the Hungarians. In 1358, Marco Giustinian, Captain General of the Venetian army, and Giovanni da ca' Dolfin, *podestà* of Treviso, together with the commanders of the garrison of Treviso decided to risk another raid, partly to replenish their depleted supplies and partly to strike at the Hungarian troops stationed in the area. A German mercenary named Sirampono was ordered to break out with 500 cavalry and return to Treviso with a *cavalcade* of extended range, gathering as much ammunition and livestock as possible, while attacking Hungarian troops if he had the opportunity.¹²⁶⁶ A large group of Hungarians was attacked by Sirampono and after a close fight in which both sides suffered casualties, the German commander decided to retreat. The Hungarians who attacked the troops used the same fighting style as Villani had reported earlier: They harassed the enemy with arrows at close range, but avoided body to body combat, and thanks to their light armour they moved faster than knights in full iron, so they could easily escape and return to the battle with renewed strength. The increasing pressure took its toll: the enemy retreated, leaving behind hundreds of dead¹²⁶⁷ and all their booty, while the Hungarians captured 200 Italians, including the German *condottiere* Sirampono as well. The German commander was taken to Padua, where he was imprisoned. This discouraged the Venetians from further outposts, and the Treviso garrison remained within the walls until the end of the war.¹²⁶⁸

Hungarian mercenaries could be used for many different tasks: because of their speed, the Italian *condottieri* found them effective in cutting off the enemy from its safe rear. In 1362, during the Florence-Pisa war, Rodolfo da Camerino was put in charge of the Florentine troops and immediately decided to launch a new offensive. Leading the troops invading the Pisan territories, the Hungarians advanced ahead of the main force to Montaione, halfway between Pisa and Florence, taking prisoners. Then the main force, approaching Pisa itself, provoked the Pisans only about 300 metres from the city. In mid-July, they raided the immediate area of the city, destroying Borgo San Marco, San Casciano and Valdicaprona. Then the route of the advancing army was well marked by a succession of settlements that were sacked: Valdera, Ghezano and its surroundings, Cascina and then Monte

¹²⁶⁶ Galeazzo Gatari and Bartolomeo Gatari, *Cronaca carrarese*, confrontata con la redazione di Andrea Gatari (AA. 1318-1407), eds. Antonio Medin and Guido Tolomei (RIS², 17/1), Città di Castello, 1909-1929, pp. 32-38 ; C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

¹²⁶⁷ Matteo Villani cites 300 deaths : Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. VIII, cap. XXIII, p. 252.

¹²⁶⁸ C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 318 ; G. Gatari and B. Gatari, *Cronaca carrarese...*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

Sansavino.¹²⁶⁹ Then, marching along the valley of the Arno, the Florentine troops made their way towards Peccioli. Not far from the town, a letter was intercepted from a Pisan merchant living in the town, indicating that the garrison had left for the Volterrano area and asking the Pisan leadership to send reinforcement to Peccioli as soon as possible. Rodolfo da Camerino immediately sent his Hungarian light cavalry to Peccioli to prevent the retreating garrison from returning to Peccioli.¹²⁷⁰ The main force then followed the Hungarians and began the siege of the town. However, the siege of the town, protected by its strong walls, progressed more slowly than hoped. Eventually, the Florentines managed to demolish one of the two towers that were crucial to the defence of the town, destroying a significant part of the walls. Thus, the castellan of Peccioli, finding no point in further resistance, surrendered and the town fell into Florentine hands.¹²⁷¹

The light armour allowed the Hungarians to move quickly even when dismounted. Although few such cases have survived in the chronicles, one has been preserved, when the German *condottiere* orders the Hungarian mercenaries to charge uphill on foot. On 24 July 1359, a mercenary company led by Konrad von Landau crossed a pass in the Apennines. They had agreed in advance with the local peasants to supply the troops with the food they needed, but the mercenaries did not pay for it and they tormented the peasants. The two factors together angered the locals so much that they decided to take bloody revenge. The mercenaries marching through the Scalelle Pass, which is a narrow section of the road from Biforco to Belforte in Toscana, were met by a shower of stones from the locals who had taken the top of the escarpment.¹²⁷² Landau immediately ordered the Hungarians, dismounting from their horses, to charge the peasants with bows and arrows, but even the Hungarian light armoured units could not reach the peasants. Several hundred German and Hungarian mercenaries were struck down by stones.¹²⁷³

In close combat, the light armour and smaller horses of the Hungarians could of course not compete with the heavy armour of the Germans, so they were not in competition with, but rather complemented each other. This is why the German *condottieri* integrated so many Hungarian banners into their own companies.¹²⁷⁴

¹²⁶⁹ Donato di Neri, « *Cronaca di Donato di Neri e di suo figlio Neri (aa. 1352-1381)* », in Alessandro Lisini and Fabio Iacometti (eds.), *Cronache senesi* (RIS², 15/6), Bologna, 1931-1939, vol. II, pp. 569-685, p. 596.

¹²⁷⁰ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, pp. 373-374.

¹²⁷¹ C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 495-497.

¹²⁷² Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. VIII, cap. LXXIV, p. 269 ; C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

¹²⁷³ Gy., Rázsó, « A zsoldosintézmény kezdetei... », *art. cit.*, p. 139.

¹²⁷⁴ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

In the pitched battles, the Hungarians, according to the sources, fought exclusively on horseback in cohesive banner-sized units. The only example mentioned in the chronicles of the period is when a German *condottiere* explicitly forbade the Hungarians to fight in the traditional manner and tried to force them to dismount from their horses and face the attacking English infantry on foot. However, the order had disastrous consequences for Konrad von Landau. Galeazzo Visconti sent his troops led by the German *condottiere* against the White Company, who, despite negotiations, abandoned their camp at Romagno and marched toward Briona, having plundered the countryside in 1363. Landau decided to cut off the English at the Canturino bridge and prevent them from returning to their fortified camp laden with loot. At the bridge, he ordered his army into formation and ordered the Hungarian banners under him to dismount and fight the battle. The Hungarians, however, not only disobeyed the order, distrusting the tactics, which were unusual for them, but also abandoned the Milanese troops and retreated. The German-Milanese units left on their own were unable to hold off the advancing English. Landau was wounded several times in the *mêlée* and died of his wounds in captivity.¹²⁷⁵

In one of the most important battles of the 1360s, the German Company of the Star, led by Albert Sterz and Anichino, clashed with the English White Company at San Mariano. In the battle, fought on 22 July 1365, Hungarian mercenaries fought on both sides. The English put the Hungarians along with the vanguard to guard the baggage train.¹²⁷⁶

In the battle of 7 May 1363, the Florentine army of 800 Hungarian mercenaries and 800 Italian infantries led by Piero Farnese defeated the Pisan army of 600 cavalry and significant infantry. The Florentine *condottiere* attacked the Pisans, who had been deployed in a field unsuitable for a cavalry charge. His decision to dismount the Florentines to attack on foot proved to be a good choice in the early stages of the battle. Later, however, he brought in the cavalry, which led the Florentines to victory. According to the chronicles, the Hungarians also participated in the *mêlée* and cavalry battle as well.¹²⁷⁷ Italian cities or rulers often hired Hungarian mercenaries to fight foreign mercenary companies. Johann Haneken Bongard's company in Apulia caused a lot of trouble for Louis of Durazzo, who eventually hired Athinay Miklós's Hungarian company of 3,000 men for 36,000 florins. The treaty was concluded on 21 March 1361. The combined Neapolitan-Hungarian forces pushed the Germans back to

¹²⁷⁵ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. XI, cap. XVIII, p. 373 ; E. Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie...*, *op. cit.*, p. 142 ; P. Azario, *Liber gestorum...*, *op. cit.*, p. 163 ; C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹²⁷⁶ Ariodante Fabretti, *Cronaca della città di Perugia dal 1309 al 1491*. Vol. XVI, Torino, 1850, pp. 199-200.

¹²⁷⁷ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. XI, cap. L, pp. 384-385 ; A. Sorbelli (ed.), *Corpus Chronicorum...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.

Atella, a small town between Potenza and Melfi in the province of Basilicata, which was then besieged.¹²⁷⁸ For Athinay Miklós, this was not the only time he had to fight against a foreign company: he was hired by Galeazzo Visconti, together with a German company led by Konrad von Landau, to march against the White Company, which ravaged the Tortona region in 1361. The English devastation caused many of the locals to turn against the Visconti. The anti-Visconti rebels had to be pacified by Luchino dal Verme, who did so successfully.¹²⁷⁹ In the same way, Hungarians also played their part in Siena's famous victory against the Compagnia de Cappelletto in 1363. The Siena Chronicle highlights the role of the Hungarian commander Ormanno in launching the attack.¹²⁸⁰

B.f) Messer Simone della Morte and the Siege of Parma

The most memorable siege of the first half of the 1360s, which was linked to the Hungarians, took place in Parma. The attempt to take a city such as Parma proved to be the most difficult obstacle not only for the mercenary companies of the 14th century, but for any army of the time. The fact that the largest Hungarian army of the age, led by Simone della Morte, arrived at the walls of Bologna in mid-October 1360 was the result of the turbulent history of Italian politics and the exceptional good relations between Louis I and Pope Innocent VI. Bologna was under Visconti rule for most of the 1350s, thanks to a 1352 treaty between pope Clement VI and Milan.¹²⁸¹ Giovanni Visconti da Oleggio was then lord of Bologna, who finally decided to cede the city to Albornoz, in exchange for Fermo and the Marca Anconitana - which he held until his death in May 1366.¹²⁸² Bernabò Visconti of course, was not appeased by this and did his utmost on the political and military fronts to maintain his right to Bologna. Niccolò Acciaiuoli, the grand senechal of Naples, in whom the Pope had unlimited confidence because of the gold he had brought him from the kingdom of Sicily, after a long negotiation with Bernabò, he set the conditions on which he thought an agreement was possible, namely: the Church would pay Bernabò 100.000 gold florins over five years, and Acciaiuoli would be rector of Bologna for that period.¹²⁸³ Pope Innocent VI, against Albornoz's plans, was inclined to agree, as Avignon was short of money, and came up with

¹²⁷⁸ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. XI, cap. L, p. 348.

¹²⁷⁹ P. Azario, *Liber Gestorum...*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹²⁸⁰ D. di Neri, *Cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 602.

¹²⁸¹ Francesco Filippini, *Il Cardinale Egidio Albornoz*, Bologna, 1933, p. 207.

¹²⁸² CGAAR n° 533, p. 191. Concerning the marquisate of Marca Anconitana, *Ibid.*, n° 541, p. 194.

¹²⁸³ F. Filippini, *Il Cardinale...*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

the solution of paying the considerable sum to Milan with the help of Florence. According to the *gran siniscalco del Regno*,¹²⁸⁴ Bernabò would not prevent the annexation of Bologna to the Papal State if these conditions were met. However, the Signora did not go along with the idea, so an amicable solution became impossible. The last straw that made the Albornozi situation dangerous was the transfer of two experienced German condottieri to the Visconti side at the end of 1359.¹²⁸⁵ The German mercenary companies, especially that of Konrad von Landau and Johann Haneken Bongard ravaged the land bringing destruction and death to Northern and Central Italy. Their deeds were immortalised in the papal request written by Innocent VI to Louis the Great, King of Hungary:

*«the evil-doing devilish company, spreading its wings and its many powers, incited by the enemy of the human race...spits its venom like a basilisk on the land of the said parts of the Church of Italy, and kills and destroys all who look upon it, the castles he overturns, the fortresses he raises to the ground, the lands he deserts, he spares not the women with child, nor the infant in the cradle, he tears and dismembers the devoted faithful of the Church, and breaks to pieces, slaughters and devours all of the Churchmen»*¹²⁸⁶

Such a request could not be denied, and Louis sent probably the biggest Hungarian mercenary army that came to Italy in the 14th century.¹²⁸⁷ Medgyesaljai Móróc Simon of the Pok kindred,¹²⁸⁸ *Ispán* of three Hungarian counties, member of the high nobility of Angevin Hungary¹²⁸⁹ was sent with several thousand light cavalry to Italy. Of course, the news of the arrival of the army did not remain a secret, and many people tried to get as much information as possible: a letter from the Treviso chancellery dated 24 April 1360 reveals a sense of uncertainty and an urgent desire for certain news.¹²⁹⁰ However, in the reply Treviso received on 29 May 1360, the council could read that the King of Hungary intended to travel to Italy personally with his army, although this would certainly not happen before the beginning of

¹²⁸⁴ One of the seven most powerful men of the kingdom of Sicily with the task of administering the royal properties and several other duties.

¹²⁸⁵ E. Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie...*, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

¹²⁸⁶ « Ludovico regi Hungariae ut legato apostolico gentes armigeras ad resistendum magnae societati mittat », in Augustino Theiner (ed.), *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam Sacram illustrantia, 1352-1526*, vol. II, Rome, 1860, pp. 41-42, n. LXXV.

¹²⁸⁷ Villani, *Croniche*, 1857, lib. X, cap. II, p. 332.

¹²⁸⁸ P., Lukcsics, « Olaszországban vitézkedő ... », art. cit., pp. 125-157.

¹²⁸⁹ A., Bárány, « Az Anjou-kor... », art. cit., p. 220.

¹²⁹⁰ Giambattista Verci, *Storia della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*, vol. XIII-XIV, Venice, 1789, lib. 13, p. 84. Documenti 1584. Da una lettera in carta comune della Cancellaria di Trivigi segnata Novelle d'Ungheria.

the summer..¹²⁹¹ This news caused a great stir in Italian politics.¹²⁹² Francesco da Carrara, who had gathered the information, also communicated it to Venice, but everything calmed down when it became clear that the king was only sending his armies to help Albornož to Bologna.¹²⁹³ In preparation for the army's arrival, Louis, at least according to the *Additamentum* wrote to his old ally Francesco da Carrara, in secret asking the Lord of Padua to supply the Hungarians with food and forage to help the 4,000-strong army pass through. Il Vecchio not only did everything the Hungarian king asked but received the Hungarian captains in his palace as well.¹²⁹⁴ Leaving Padua, the army headed for Mantua. Research by Carla Corradi Musi in Mantua has revealed that Feltrino Gonzaga helped the Hungarian army in marching towards Bologna.¹²⁹⁵ Several letters were exchanged between Ugolino Gonzaga and the leader of the Hungarian army at the end of November 1360.¹²⁹⁶ Finally, the Hungarians left Mantua without reports of any major atrocities.

In Bologna, on 20 September 1360, Albornož mobilised the troops to defend the *contado* of Bologna, as the Visconti troops had taken the castles around Bologna one after the other. They surrounded the city from three sides, threatening to cut it off from its *contado*.¹²⁹⁷ The papal legate sent a letter¹²⁹⁸ to a number of ecclesiastical and secular officials and lords.¹²⁹⁹ Despite this, the papal army, which was slowly gathering strength, was unable to break Visconti's hold on Bologna. This situation was radically changed by the arrival of the Hungarian army. When Bernabò Visconti received the news, he was overcome with grief, and for several days he endeavoured to appear cheerful and confident in front of third parties, minimising what had happened, yet gnawing himself implacably.¹³⁰⁰

¹²⁹¹ G. Verci, *Storia della Marca Trivigiana...*, *op. cit.*, p. 85. Documenti 1585.

¹²⁹² For example, Ugolino Gonzaga feared an incursion when the Hungarians, 2000 of them, were in the proximity of Mantua. Archivio di Stato di Mantova, Copialettere, busta 2881, libro III, n. 585, quoted by C. Corradi Musi, « L'eco dell'Ungheria di Luigi... », *art. cit.*, p. 27.

¹²⁹³ C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

¹²⁹⁴ « Additamenta duo ad Chronicon Cortusiorum unum ab anno MCCCLIX usque ad annum circiter MCCCLXV alterum ab anno MCCCLIV usque ad MCCCXCI. Patavina dialecto scripta ab auctoris anonymis et nunc primum evulgata e manuscripto codice Bibliothecae Estensis », in Ludovico Antonio Muratori (ed.), *RIS*¹, vol. XII, Milan, 1728, coll. 955-988, coll. 984.

¹²⁹⁵ C. Corradi Musi, « L'eco dell' Ungheria di Luigi... », *art. cit.*, p. 27.

¹²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26, n. 8.

¹²⁹⁷ F. Filippini, *Il Cardinale...*, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

¹²⁹⁸ Gathering the army. The vassals were obliged to follow their lords in war, or to provide him with men.

¹²⁹⁹ Just a few names of the secular dignitaries: Enrico, Count of Corniglio, count Francesco di Dovadola, Raymond Vassal Vicomte of Calisidio, Guido di Belforte Count of Civitilla, Azzo, Count of Cornilio, Ricardo di Bagno, while among the ecclesiastical officials there were several abbots (Abbot of Triponzo, Abbot of S. Ellero de Galatea, Abbot of S. Angelo de Verghereto, etc.), Bishop of Bobbio, Bishop of Ascoli. CGAAR, n° 560. p. 199.

¹³⁰⁰ I. de Bazano, *Chronicon Mutinense...*, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

The Bolognese, taking advantage of the arrival of the Hungarians, seized the initiative and recaptured the castles in Visconti's hands which had not yet been surrendered, until the time came for Cardinal Albornozy to enter the city in all his splendour. The Cardinal, after the Hungarians had completed their task, and the suspicion of treason had been raised, thought it better to remove the army, which he considered unreliable, from the walls of Bologna, sending it north-west towards Parma.¹³⁰¹ His visit proved, if possible, even worse than that of the German's presence to the people in the regions around Modena¹³⁰² and Parma:

*«And on Saturday, 21 November, the said Hungarian troop, which, as was rumoured, was composed of more than 6,000 archers, crossed the territory of Modena, from the side of the aforesaid city, raiding everything: traveling through the Parma territory, they came to those lands with strong warfare and committed ungodly deeds and captured men and women and children and tortured them cruelly and tormented them with unspeakable harsh punishments.»*¹³⁰³

Wherever Simon led his army on his *chevauchées*, he blazed a path of destruction, accompanied by a constant burning of houses, robbing and killing of peasants¹³⁰⁴ and other non-combatants, everywhere for *«forty long days.»*¹³⁰⁵ In the village of Sant' Egidio he terrorised the locals and committed particularly cruel crimes with such zeal that he alone from among all the 'Trecento' foreign and Italian condottieri carried death in his name, as he was called *«messer Simone della Morte»* in the Italian chronicles.¹³⁰⁶

According to Angelo Pezzana, the first time in the history of Parma Hungarians were the first soldiers who used artillery was when they came under the city walls and started bombarding the Porta di San Michele on the south-eastern side of Parma.¹³⁰⁷ However, the cannons proved too weak against the city walls and did not seem to achieve any results. Therefore, Medgyesaljai Mórócz Simon decided to try a new tactic and, the next day at dawn, he tried to hit Porta di San Francesco, one of the weakest points of the city. In the early morning attack, he used the element of surprise to attack the guards and surprised defenders. Before they could escape, however, they succeeded in alerting the city's

¹³⁰¹ F. Filippini, *Il Cardinale...*, op. cit., p. 237.

¹³⁰² S. Sgambati, *Le conndotte degli stipendiari...*, op. cit., p. 8.

¹³⁰³ I. de Bazano, *Chronicon Mutinense...* op. cit., p. 174 ; C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, op. cit., p. 421.

¹³⁰⁴ C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, op. cit., p. 424.

¹³⁰⁵ C. Ciucciovino, *La cronaca...*, op. cit., p. 424.

¹³⁰⁶ A. Sorbelli (ed.), *Corpus chronicorum...*, op. cit., p. 123.

¹³⁰⁷ A. Pezzana, *Storia della città...*, op. cit., p. 83.

population: the men rushed to the gate with weapons in hand and managed to stop the Hungarians from entering in time. According to the chroniclers, the fighting between the men was so close that the Hungarians had no chance to use their arrows, and they lost time and fled through the captured gate. However, the siege, which lasted only a day and a half, did not continue after the powerful help of the Visconti gold as the leader of the Hungarian army decided that he could not take the city of Parma.¹³⁰⁸

B.g) What Happened to the Captured Soldier?

There are very few sources providing information on the fate of mercenaries captured during a battle or siege, or during a *chevauchée*. The history of the Hundred Years' War abounds with sources on what happens to people when they are captured by mercenaries. The chapter on Theatres of War contains many such cases, ranging from wealthy aristocrats such as Amadeus VI of Savoy to simple peasants in Alsace. The Archives of Mantua house a compilation of documents featuring not only some of the earliest coloured coats of arms of Hungarian nobles but also detailing occurrences when an entire company, or at least a considerable portion of it, was seized in battle.

The capture of the mercenary company of 106 German, Hungarian, Burgundian and Italian *caporales* and *conestabiles* is, in a broader sense, a side episode in the attempt to restore the papal state, and in a narrower sense, the result of a family feud within the Gonzaga family. Of course, the two are closely intertwined and only together can the historical background to the Mantua charters be understood.

Soon after the victory at San Ruffillo by Gil de Albornoz, plague broke out in Lombardy and Piedmont, killing 1000 people a day in Milan alone. Galeazzo Visconti fled to Monza to escape the plague, while Bernabò and his family left for Lodi. Galeazzo managed to isolate himself from the outside world so much that news of his death spread.¹³⁰⁹

The Gonzagas, who were captains of Mantua from 1331 and Reggio from 1335, had a half-hearted relationship with the Visconti in the second half of the 14th century. On the one hand, they had to endure three major sieges (1357, 1368, 1397), and on the other hand, there were periods when some of the Gonzagas, such as Ugolino, became allies of the

¹³⁰⁸ P. Azario, *Liber Gestorum...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

¹³⁰⁹ Villani, *Cronica*, 1834, lib. X, cap. 64, p. 344.

Visconti and worked closely with them.¹³¹⁰ For the Gonzagas, the extension of papal authority in the late 1350s and early 1360s coincided with the struggle for the succession of Luigi Gonzaga, now 90 years older. In the last years before his death, his power over Feltrino and Guido Gonzaga weakened, and after 1357 they vied with each other to the control of Reggio.¹³¹¹ Feltrino, in alliance with Egidio Albornoz, chose the Papal side, while Guido and Ugolino became allies of the Visconti in the late 50s. Gonzaga's rule over the Reggio lasted 36 years from 1335 to 1371, but finally they could not resist the Visconti's pressure and had to hand over control of the city to Bernàbo Visconti.¹³¹² However, in 1361 the town was still in the hands of Feltrino, which Guido and his son Ugolino tried to take over with the help of the Visconti. In early September 1361, the Gonzagas managed to repel a Visconti army far larger than the forces at their disposal, who invaded the Mantua territories unexpectedly amidst a raging plague.¹³¹³

Under these circumstances, following the success of the Malatestas at San Ruffillo in Bologna, the war between Feltrino and Guido and his son Ugolino took place in October 1361, culminating in the battle of Podium Dei near Bologna, where Ugolino Gonzaga took many prisoners, surprising Feltrino's army.¹³¹⁴ According to Pál Lukcsics, either Galeotto Malatesta or Egidio Albornoz gave over the 300 Hungarians to Feltrino Gonzaga, among whom the *conestabiles* and the light cavalymen of their band were captured after the lost battle.¹³¹⁵ A dozen Hungarian mercenaries had preserved their coats of arms and seals, thanks to the oaths of allegiance taken at the time of their liberation.¹³¹⁶

B.g.a) Contents of the Pledge of Allegiance Letters

The pledge of allegiance letters in the Mantua archives are interesting for several reasons: on the one hand, they provide an insight into the conditions under which French, German, Italian and Hungarian mercenaries who were taken prisoners regained their freedom. On the other hand, we can see how the Gonzagas tried to take advantage of the situation by

¹³¹⁰ Isabella Lazzarini, « La difesa della città. La definizione dell'identità urbana assediata in tempo di guerra e in tempo di pace (Mantova, 1357-1397) », *Reti Medievali Rivista*, 2007, vol. 8, n° 1, p. 1.

¹³¹¹ Isabella Lazzarini, « Gonzaga, Luigi », in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 57, Rome, 2001, [available online at] https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/luigi-gonzaga_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/.

¹³¹² Isabella Lazzarini, « Reggio 1335. La città, la signoria, gli statuti' », in Gino Badini et Andrea Gamberini (eds.), *Medioevo e Rinascimento reggiano. Studi in memoria di Odoardo Rombaldi*, Milan, 2007, pp. 225-243.

¹³¹³ I. de Bazano, *Chronicon...*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

¹³¹⁴ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹³¹⁵ P., Lukcsics, « Olaszországban vitézkedő... », *art. cit.*, p. 153.

¹³¹⁶ Ádám Novák, Tamás Ölbei and Renáta Visegrádi, « Magyar zsoldosok címerei Mantovából », *Turul*, 2023, vol. XCVI, pp. 73-87. ,p 75.

securing for themselves the potential service of soldiers trained for free or at very cheaply for years to come. Furthermore, these letters show how they wanted to exercise a tight control over the mercenaries, protecting themselves from being attacked once again by captured mercenaries on the side of their opponents or allies. We are in the fortunate position of knowing the afterlife of the Pledge of Allegiance letters of the captured mercenaries, so we can see how much the written word meant.

The document of Busta 48 c. 10 was written in Mantua a little over two weeks after the capture of the company members, in front of 'witnesses.'¹³¹⁷ Henrich von Eglingen is referred to in the charter as the former captain of the company.¹³¹⁸ The pledge of allegiance letters is structured in such a way that the *conestabiles*, *caporales*, who were listed on it, had to swear separately after each pledge, laying their hands on the Bible before a notary. First of all, they swore that they would consider the Gonzagas (Ugolino, Guido, Ludovico and Francesco) as their masters and would serve them and their descendants faithfully, they would not take up arms against them, would do them no harm, would rush to their defence in case of external during a year.¹³¹⁹ The same applies to the Visconti and their descendants. If they are in the mercenary service of another, they may not enter into any treaty against the Gonzagas, and if they do, the treaty shall be considered null and void. Above all, they had to agree to appear before Guido and Ugolino Gonzaga in person, or if they were not present, before Ludovico and Francesco Gonzaga in person, at a predetermined time in Mantua. They will then receive the orders which they would have to carry out to the best of their ability. In the event of the Gonzagas becoming involved in a war, once the mercenaries had heard the news, they would have to rush immediately to Mantua to offer their services.¹³²⁰ Of course, the winning Guido and Ugolino made sure that the *condotta* to be concluded at that time was signed on terms favourable to them. The mercenaries served at their own expense for the first eight days, after which the Gonzagas paid two florins per horsemen. This proved to be a very lowest acceptable price for the time. In a normal situation on the free market, Hungarian and German mercenaries would have received several times this pay. In addition to the above, they had to undertake if they were near Mantua (within 25 miles), to inform the Gonzagas of their presence.¹³²¹ If one of the oath takers broke his word, the others had to make him keep his oath by any means, even by force of arms, or drag him

¹³¹⁷ ASM Busta 48, c. 10.

¹³¹⁸ «Henricus de Eglingen dictus de La scala olim capitaneus», *Ibid.*

¹³¹⁹ Novák Ádám, Ölbei Tamás, Visegrádi Renáta Magyar zsoldosok.... », art. cit., p. 80.

¹³²⁰ ASM Busta 48, c. 10.

¹³²¹ Novák Ádám, Ölbei Tamás, Visegrádi Renáta Magyar zsoldosok.... », art. cit., p. 81.

before the Gonzagas. Finally, the text explicitly refers to the painted coats of arms used by the *conestabiles* and *caporales* in their campaigns.

The other pledge of allegiance letters differs in practice only in the names of the oath takers, notaries and witnesses.

B.g.b) Relations Between Mercenaries and the Gonzagas after their Release

On 12 October 1362, only fifteen *conestabiles* or *caporales* of the signatories appeared before the Gonzagas. Haneken von Lövenlich was the last.¹³²² Those who came to Mantua were supposed to return to the city every year afterwards, when they served in Italy. The others were treated oath breakers (*sue fidei violatores*) by the Gonzagas.¹³²³ Of those on the charters, 26 remained in Lombardy under Henrich von Eglingen, forming the nucleus of the new company in the service of Galeazzo Visconti.¹³²⁴ However, the Gonzagas continued to try to assert their rights under the covenant, which led to a long legal dispute. It soon became clear that Eglingen and his company did not want to keep their oath. Galeazzo Visconti came to their aid and sent them to Count Amadeus VI of Savoy in the spring of 1362,¹³²⁵ where they remained until January 1363 after several extensions. During this time they did not appear once in Mantua. Naturally, the Gonzagas were not impressed, as Ugolino Gonzaga made clear in a letter to Galeazzo Visconti, advising the Lord of Milan not to trust the Germans.¹³²⁶ A year after the event, the sources are silent about the conflict between the Germans and the Gonzagas, and in 1364, in Mantua, where Guido Gonzaga was already the lord, he tried to summon Heinrich von Eglingen. The German *condottiere* used a variety of excuses to stall the proceedings: sometimes he did not have the right documents, sometimes he claimed that the oath was linked to Ugolino, now dead.¹³²⁷ Finally, he challenges the validity of the pledge of allegiance letters itself, claiming that he signed it under duress, not of his own free will. Guido Gonzaga, however, did not give in. On 19 August 1364, he offered Eglingen to settle the matter before an arbitration tribunal of

¹³²² ASM Busta 48, f. 17 ; S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹³²³ ASM Busta 48, f. 20. (22. 07.1362)

¹³²⁴ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹³²⁵ ASM Busta 48, f. 40. (06. 05. 1362)

¹³²⁶ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹³²⁷ ASM Busta 48, f. 39.

Germans and Italians, led by Galeotto Malatesta.¹³²⁸ But that wasn't enough: he also sent letters to the Count of Öttingen, who was probably Eglingen's liege lord, various German princes and Emperor Charles IV.¹³²⁹ Eglingen did not accept arbitration and eventually the Gonzagas and Eglingen never settled their dispute. The Gonzagas disclosed the names on the oath of allegiance as untrustworthy mercenaries, which was standard practice in similar cases in the era. In some cases, it could have serious repercussions when the integrity of a *condottiere* was questioned, and such a move could even escalate into a duel to the death.¹³³⁰

Conclusion

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, a series of comprehensive monographs by American, English, French, German and Italian authors appeared which took a holistic approach to the multiethnic mercenary companies in the military history of Trecento and Quattrocento Italy. The mercenaries played a decisive role in shaping the politics of contemporary Italy and the ever-changing balance of power. These works, all of which are based on the theory of the 'new military history', have two things in common: firstly, the problem of mercenaries is never discussed *en sua*, but in the context of Italian society, and secondly, the presence of Hungarians in the service of Italian cities, rulers and international companies. Hungarian historiography has been lacking a comprehensive, systematic analysis of the history of Hungarians serving as mercenaries in Italy for a century, not only in the last 20 years, but practically since the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Research Group «*The Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe, (1301-1526)*» within the *Hungarian Research Network* (HUN-REN) has been working to fill this gap since 2018, when it began preparing the current project.¹³³¹ Researchers from the University of Debrecen created a growing open-access database for *Monumenta Militaria Hungariae* (MMH).¹³³²

This chapter is a synthesis of the latest results of the 2020s, with conclusions drawn from the first hundred or so records in the ever-growing database. The potential is demonstrated by the fact that by the time this dissertation has been published, the number of sources in the database will have reached a record thousand. However, it is not only the quantitative

¹³²⁸ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹³²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹³³¹ Novák Ádám, Ölbei Tamás, Visegrádi Renáta Magyar zsoldosok..., art. cit., p. 83.

¹³³² Available online at <https://monumenta.militaria-hungaria.hu/monumenta-web/>

indicators that are growing, but also the qualitative parameters of the sources that can be researched have changed considerably. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can already be drawn from the initial data about the Hungarian mercenaries active in Italy: it is already certain that their numbers exceeded our preliminary expectations by far. There were two major waves of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy in the fifties and sixties. The first is well known in the literature: the Hungarian soldiers who remained in Italy at the end of Louis I's campaigns in Naples were the first to appear in the multiethnic companies. Apart from the *Magna Societas Ungarorum*, Hungarians were also represented in German-led companies, mainly in southern and, to a lesser extent, central Italy. At this initial stage, i.e. 1352-1360, research has not yet provided any conclusive answers as to the number of active Hungarians, their role in the companies and the extent of their involvement. As the Florentine sources show, at least in northern Italy and most probably in central Italy, the number of Hungarian mercenaries had increased severalfold from the early 1360s. This is why I have discussed in the initial phase of the presence of the Hungarian army led by Simone della Morte in Italy in detail, because the army, which numbered between 4000 and 6000, was the basis for the Hungarian mercenaries who arrived in the second wave. Many of them, as the Florentine sources so vividly show, stayed in Italy for a longer period, at least several months, a year or two, but there are already names of Hungarian *conestabiles* who served in Italy for several years, even more than a decade. And Carla Corradi Musi's research in Mantua¹³³³ is in line with the findings of other Italian historians, that Hungarian mercenaries settled in Italy, like the Germans. German historiography has made much progress in the last 150 years, most recently by Stephan Selzer, in the treatment of the history of the German mercenaries of the period. Practically nothing is known about how many of the Hungarians settled in Italy, how they integrated into local society, what careers they pursued, what became of their descendants. We still do not have answers to these and many other questions, which will shape the research directions of the coming years.

From research carried out so far, it is clear that the significant presence of Hungarians in Italy just predates the arrival of the English under the leadership of Albert Sterz. It can be seen that the two nations, with their completely different traditions of warfare, complemented each other perfectly on the Italian battlefields and cooperated within the framework of multiethnic companies. However, how exactly this happened is not yet known, which is perhaps one of the most interesting mysteries of this period, at least for me. There have been many studies of English mercenaries dismounted in battle and English archers on foot,

¹³³³ C. Corradi Musi, « L'eco dell' Ungheria di Luigi... », art. cit., p. 26.

who also worked closely with them. The English probably needed Hungarian cavalry archers because there were few English archers on the Italian battlefield. However, as I have shown in the study, the Hungarians, unlike the English cavalry archers, did not dismount at all, or at least only rarely, in battle. It is true of medieval warfare in general, and of Italian warfare in particular, that battles were the rarest form of warfare, and that raids, *chevauchées* and sieges were more typical. In this context, the cooperation between the Hungarians and the English is much more clearly understood.

I have given examples of the tasks that the Hungarians were entrusted with and how much they earned in an international context. Again, contrary to German research, we know nothing about what happened to the wealth in Hungary acquired during Italian service, nor do we have any information on whether the Hungarians who learned the art of war at the Italian level by being integrated into the most modern military organisation of the time, the multiethnic companies, benefited from it when they returned to Hungary. The archival sources in the study, do not show how the Hungarian banner made up for their losses in battle, how they reorganised their troops. It is clear from the chronicles and the archival sources that they were captured and suffered losses but at least from the sources of the Florentine archives between 1360 and 1366, the number of banners remained constant, even when they were continuously employed for a year.

Another extremely fascinating area is the question of language. In what form and language did the Hungarians, the English and the Germans communicate with each other. Albert Sterz was successful among the English because he spoke their language. We know that *condotte* were translated for the mercenaries by the Italian cities with the help of interpreters. However, there are many questions to be asked, since communication was essential in armed contact. How the Hungarians fitted into this multilingual environment is almost unknown. Although it is enough to think of Pietro Cambacorti and the history of the Hungarians who collaborated with him in 1362.

The importance of Mantua's resources cannot be overestimated. The coats of arms of the Hungarian *conestabiles* painted on the charters were used by the signatories of the charters, as can be seen from the pledge of allegiance letters, in battle. The Gonzagas made extensive use, at least in theory, of the captured company. In essence, if they had obeyed Ugolino or Guido Gonzaga, they would have seriously compromised their freedom of action in Italy. It is no coincidence that in the first year, just over a tenth of the signatories appeared in Mantua. In order for the mercenaries to be persuaded to conclude future *condotte* that would benefit not only the Gonzagas but themselves, they had to regain their independence, even at the cost of becoming oath breakers.

Preparation of the crusades 1362-1365

« *The question he had posed to those he had charged to research the battlefield of Nájera for Enrique's body, 'Is the bastard dead or taken'....* »¹³³⁴

Introduction

The joint project of several popes, kings, princes and an emperor culminated in the four crusades that changed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, from the Iberian Peninsula to the Black Sea, via the African coast in 1365/66. These unprecedented campaigns, with highly unusual participants, contributed to the rise to power of a new dynasty in Castile, the sacking of Alexandria and Gallipoli, the destruction of border lands between the kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, and the destruction of the Bulgarian coastal cities. These four campaigns have common roots, common participants, common objectives and interconnected plans in their preparation. The chapter traces the political history of the three years leading up to the crusades, which took Bertrand du Guesclin to Iberia, Peter of Lusignan to Alexandria, Amadeus VI to the Balkans and Arnaud de Cervole to the border of the Kingdom and the Empire often involving coincidence, sometimes personal decisions or political machinations.

Just published in 2022 there is a comprehensive volume of studies on Peter I, edited by Alexander D. Beihammer and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari, which explores the life of Peter I in depth, with particular attention to the citation of sources.¹³³⁵ Another hero of the four crusades, Count Amadeus VI of Savoy, was the subject of a dissertation by Florian Chamorel, published in December 2023.¹³³⁶ Thus, in both cases, up-to-date research information is available. From the point of view of this dissertation, the focus in exploring the history of the preparation of the Crusades will be on the link between Northern Italy and the Eastern France. Besides this, another key element is the participation of mercenaries in the crusades. Indeed, in all four, mercenaries were involved to a greater or lesser extent and,

¹³³⁴ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., p. 222.

¹³³⁵ Alexander Beihammer and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari (eds.), *Crusading, Society, and Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of King Peter I of Cyprus*, Turnhout, 2022.

¹³³⁶ Florian Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen. Les princes de la Maison de Savoie en Méditerranée orientale (XIV^e – XV^e siècle)*, Paris, 2023.

in the case of Arnaud de Cervole and Bertrand du Guesclin, the departure of the participants in the *passagium generale* from France was more significant than whether the crusaders achieved the goal set by the Pope. This is why it is important to explore the process by which the recruitment of crusaders involved mercenaries who were unemployed in Italy and France in the summer of 1365.

However, before papal policy seriously considered employing members of the great companies as soldiers of Christ against the infidels on the two peripheries of Europe, the Church tried a number of other solutions. The new phenomenon of the 1350s, the shock caused by mercenaries, had to be dealt with. One such means was the crusades against mercenaries in Italy and France. The other method, which both Innocent VI and Urban V tried, was excommunication. It is for this reason that this arc of papal policy, from excommunication to the involvement of mercenaries in crusades, is presented in this chapter.

One of the most comprehensive studies on the subject is that of Germain Butaud, who analysed the excommunication of the companies that attacked the papal territories of Avignon and Comtat Venaissin in the 14th and 15th centuries.¹³³⁷ In English so far Norman Housley's study has explored this topic, but he has focused on a history of just over two decades.¹³³⁸ This chapter only covers the events of three years, allowing for a much more detailed, in-depth presentation of the context.

By tracing events from the last snow of 1362 to the spring of 1365, it is possible to understand the complexity and diversity of the undertaking involved in organising one crusade, let alone four. Nevertheless, to understand what this meant for the Church, and how the sovereigns and lords involved in preparing and, in part, carrying out the crusades experienced the events, it is necessary to study a chapel and its frescoes in Florence.

A) The Spanish chapel and its *Via Veritatis* of the Santa Maria Novella

The Santa Maria Novella and its chapter house has traditionally been the centre of the Dominican Order in Florence for more than six centuries. The church is marked by the presence of the Dominicans, the solar emblem on its interior decoration, as well as the black

¹³³⁷ G. Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs... », art. cit., pp. 225-245.

¹³³⁸ N. Housley, « The Mercenary Companies... », art. cit., pp. 253-280.

and white *domini canes* at the feet of the Pope and the Emperor, who guard a flock of faithful, in Andrea di Bonaiuto's fresco in the Spanish Chapel.¹³³⁹



Figure 3. Fresco detail of the *Via Veritatis* by Andrea di Bonaiuto. Courtesy of László Milcsarek

Andrea di Bonaiuto was commissioned to paint the *Via Veritatis* in the Spanish Chapel between 1366-1368. The fresco cycle of the Spanish Chapel heralds the resurgence of the crusading idea in the mid-14th century, partly in response to the Ottoman threat to the eastern frontier of Christendom and partly as a result of the devastation by the *routiers* in France and Italy.¹³⁴⁰ At the same time, of course, *Via Veritatis* is a compendious representation of the Dominican success story.¹³⁴¹ The work of art, begun in January 1366 by Andrea di Bonaiuto during the four crusades, adorns the eastern wall of the chapel.¹³⁴²

¹³³⁹ Mary Aquinas Devlin, « An English Knight of the Garter in the Spanish Chapel in Florence », *Speculum*, 1929, vol. IV, pp. 270-281, p. 271.

¹³⁴⁰ Shazia Jagot, *Fin' amors, Arabic Learning, and the Islamic World in the Work of Geoffrey Chaucer*, Ph.D. dissertation, Leicester, 2013, p. 18.

¹³⁴¹ Messina Nicoles Demos, *The Time and the Experience of Narrative in Italian Renaissance Art*, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, 2015, p. 59.

¹³⁴² M. A. Devlin, « An English Knight ... », art. cit., p. 277.



Figure 4. Fresco detail of the Via Veritatis by Andrea di Bonaiuto. Courtesy of László Milcsarek

Christ is placed in the upper third of the fresco, flanked by the crowned Virgin Mary holding a stem of white lilies surrounded by singing angels.¹³⁴³ Below them, in the central part of the fresco, Andrea di Bonaiuto painted the preparers and executors of the Crusades with Florence Cathedral in the background.

Pope Urban V is seated next to Emperor Charles IV, accompanied by Gil de Albornoz, Peter of Lusignan, Amadeus VI and Raymond de Bérenger.¹³⁴⁴

¹³⁴³ Joseph Polzer, « Andrea Di Bonaiuto's Via Veritatis and Dominican Thought in Late Medieval Italy », *The Art Bulletin*, 1995, vol. 77, n° 2, pp. 263-289, p. 268.

¹³⁴⁴ M. A. Devlin, « An English Knight ... », art. cit., p. 280.

Brother Raymond was the Grand Master of the Knights of Rhodes from 1365-74 and joined the King of Cyprus in the Alexandrian campaign. The Via Veritatis is intended to show the close relationship between the Church and the Dominican Order, which aimed to eradicate heresy.¹³⁴⁵

In fact, between 1360 and 1366, Innocent VI and Urban V issued a series of papal bulls against mercenaries as heretics, who were banished from the bosom of the Church with severe anathemas. By the time Andrea di Bonaiuto had finished the frescoes in the Spanish



Figure 5. Fresco detail of the Via Veritatis by Andrea di Bonaiuto. Courtesy of László Milcsarek

Chapel, the characters in the fresco had been through two successful crusades. Thanks to Gil de Albornoz's tireless campaign over a decade and a half, Urban V and Charles IV marched together into Rome in 1368, a feat that had only been achieved a century

¹³⁴⁵ J. Polzer, « Andrea Di Bonaiuto's ... », art. cit., p. 267.

earlier.¹³⁴⁶ It is no coincidence that the participants in the fresco are depicted together, side by side, for the Pope and the Emperor, by actively participating in the preparation of the Crusades, helped the two *Athletae interrepidi Christi*,¹³⁴⁷ Amadeus VI and Peter I, to perform a feat admirable in the eyes of their contemporaries. Of course, persons like Arnaud de Cervole or Bertrand du Guesclin, who led the other two crusades and were the embodiment of mercenarism in the mid-14th century, could not have been included in the fresco.

B) Papal Policy on Mercenaries in the mid-14th Century in Italy and France

In church politics, the use of excommunication as one of the primary instruments for dealing with mercenaries in the mid-14th century coincided with the emergence of the great companies. In this way, excommunication was used to maintain social order by punishing with an anathema anyone who attacked churches or other ecclesial properties, priests or persons in the service of the church. The «*Peace of God*» was first applied in Provence by Raimbaud de Reillanne, Archbishop of Arles. He cursed anyone who committed violence from Wednesday evening to Monday morning, extending the period to all church holidays.¹³⁴⁸ Ironically, Provence was also the region where Arnaud de Cervole, with the first French great company, destroyed, robbed and ransomed a series of ecclesial estates in 1357-1358. Of course, papal policy was much more complicated in reality: it was Cardinal Talleyrand-Périgord, one of the most influential ecclesiastical politicians of his time, who had supported and prepared Arnaud de Cervole's arrival in Provence.¹³⁴⁹ The Pope would have cursed Arnaud de Cervole only if he had attacked territories belonging directly to the Papal States.¹³⁵⁰ Again, *Realpolitik* played a part, as the departure of the leader of the great company operating in the immediate vicinity of defenceless Avignon was rather paid by gold, and however much the Archpriest's presence threatened Avignon, he was not excommunicated. The negotiations between Naples and the Arnaud de Cervole were even mediated by Innocent VI.¹³⁵¹ Not long after that, thanks to Arnaud de Cervole, the walls of Avignon were quickly rebuilt, so Innocent VI was a little more courageous in 1361 in his

¹³⁴⁶ *Vitae paparum Avenionensium*, ed. Guillaume Mollat, Paris, 1916, vol. 1, p. 369.

¹³⁴⁷ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

¹³⁴⁸ G. Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs... », *art. cit.*, p. 225.

¹³⁴⁹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹³⁵⁰ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197, n° 2.

¹³⁵¹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

dealings with the mercenaries who occupied Pont-Saint-Esprit.¹³⁵² This time, the Pope excommunicated the mercenary troops. However, in Italy, much further away from Avignon, in 1357, where the Holy See was not under direct threat, excommunication was applied more freely than in the case of Arnaud de Cervole: Konrad von Landau's great company was found guilty of «*fautoria heresiae*» for fighting alongside Francesco Ordelafo by Gil de Albornoz.¹³⁵³ The cardinal legate used the power of excommunication against the companies on several occasions: in 1364, for example, he cursed Johann Haneken Bongard's company when he was informed that the German *condottiere* was planning to attack the Papal States. Calling the company the *pestifera societas*, he cursed everyone up to the third generation who helped the mercenaries.¹³⁵⁴ Urban V excommunicated Seguin de Badefol's company the Margot twice, also in 1364 for the capture of Brioude, and on 19 January 1365 for the capture of Anse.¹³⁵⁵ The examples given so far have shown, without claiming to be exhaustive, how often in the papal practice of excommunication against mercenaries during the period, Innocent VI or Urban V, or their legates, punished or threatened a captain or his company with an ecclesiastical curse. In these cases, it was partly a preventive measure, such as the threat of excommunication in the case of Arnaud de Cervole, to dissuade him from attacking Avignon. The same was done by Gil de Albornoz with Johann Haneken Bongard. It was, of course, much more common for excommunication to be used after the event as a reprisal for crimes committed by a captain. Less frequently, however, the Pope did not curse a specific company, but excommunicated all mercenaries active in a particular region or area at a particular time. This was the case in Italy on 13 April 1366, when Urban V excommunicated all the companies. The pontiff, in a directive tone, encouraged the Italian communes and lords to establish a collective alliance aimed at combating the mercenary companies.¹³⁵⁶ Notably, the San Giorgio company, led by Ambrogio Visconti, emerged as the most formidable one among them. Consequently, the ecclesiastical anathema pronounced against the mercenary bands was illuminated in its true context: a denouncement of the burgeoning Visconti influence and power.¹³⁵⁷ After detailing the multitude of transgressions and offenses perpetrated by the mercenaries, Urban issued an excommunication upon all members of these companies, along with their collaborators.

¹³⁵² G. Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs... », art. cit., p. 228.

¹³⁵³ N. Housley, « The Mercenary Companies... », art. cit., p. 259.

¹³⁵⁴ C. Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca...*, op. cit., p. 601.

¹³⁵⁵ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., p. 425.

¹³⁵⁶ A. Sorbelli (ed.), *Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium...*, op. cit., Cronaca B, pp. 207-208.

¹³⁵⁷ C. Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca...*, op. cit., p. 601, p. 656.

Simultaneously, an interdiction was placed upon their estates and possessions.¹³⁵⁸ Furthermore, any privileges they may have previously held were revoked. Urban also decreed that they and their progeny up to the third generation would be ineligible to hold such privileges. The companies were ordered to be disbanded within a month and pledged not to reassemble again.¹³⁵⁹ Consequently, anyone who summoned, harboured, or engaged with these mercenaries, failing to sever ties within a month, faced equivalent sanctions. Urban annulled the testamentary capacities of all associated members and negated the legal validity of their actions.¹³⁶⁰ Additionally, interactions with the *Christi fideles* were prohibited for the mercenaries. All contracts, alliances, and affiliations of these companies were rendered null and void. To ensure comprehensive accountability, mandates were issued to compile rosters listing their names. A call to arms was extended to all believers, promising absolution of their sins at the hour of death for combating these perceived adversaries of God.¹³⁶¹

Emperor Charles received directives from Urban V to augment this condemnation with the imperial ban. Charles was further tasked with rallying the German and Italian states into a cohesive alliance.¹³⁶² This directive was dispatched to the papal nuncios with specific instructions: while they were to present it to the envoys, its dissemination to the wider public was to be restrained.¹³⁶³

In terms of consequences, even if not very ineffective, the excommunications certainly did not stop mercenaries from enforcing their will.¹³⁶⁴ Guillaume de Clugny's notes in the chapter «*The theatres of war*» show that the threat of a ecclesiastical curse did not deter the inhabitants of the occupied territories from severing their financially beneficial ties with the companies. The direct impact of the excommunications on mercenaries will be discussed in the final chapter, examining what persuaded the mercenaries to participate in the crusade. However, it was also shown in the «*Theatres of War*» chapter that the population who maintained contact with the mercenaries sought relief from the ecclesiastical curse whenever they could. Both the church and the companies used excommunication as a bargaining chip in their dealings with each other. Seguin de Badefol, at the surrender of both Anse and Brioude, made sure that the papal excommunication was waived in the treaty of

¹³⁵⁸ A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, op. cit., p. 78.

¹³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹³⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁴ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, vol. II..., op. cit., p. 27.

the surrender of the city. In Poitou, on 17 March 1358, the canon of Saint-Hilaire de Poitiers was kidnapped by mercenaries on his way to Avignon. They deprived him of his money and his horse, and locked him up in the castle of Rehué until they extorted a promise from him to pay a ransom of several thousand florins. On the orders of Innocent VI, the Archbishop of Bordeaux excommunicated the mercenaries, who occupied several monasteries until they received the promise of papal absolution.¹³⁶⁵ Even excommunicating a mercenary captain was not always so easy and sometimes the Pope acted cautiously. The best example for the controversial papal policy toward the mercenaries is that in 1361, the Papacy even excommunicated the Provençals who opposed the mercenary companies and did not want to give free passage for them toward Piedmont.¹³⁶⁶ In 1368, Urban V feared that Bertrand du Guesclin's excommunication because of the invasion of Comtat-Venaissin would worsen the situation and asked the rector Philippe Cabassole not to use it unless it was necessary.¹³⁶⁷

Under Innocent VI and Urban V, a series of papal bulls condemned and excommunicated the companies between 1356 and 1366. The first of these is the *Ad reprimendas insolentias*, sent by Innocent VI to the city and diocese of Grenoble on 31 July 1356.¹³⁶⁸ In this bull, the Pope pronounced excommunication and other severe penalties against the *routiers*. It mostly concerned the churches, monasteries and hospitals of certain dioceses and the cities of Toulouse, Auch, Narbonne and Arles.¹³⁶⁹ On 27 February 1364, Urban V issued the *Cogit nos* bull for the destruction of Seguin de Badefol at Saint-Fleur.¹³⁷⁰ The *Miserabilis nonnullorum* was published three months after the *Cogit nos* bull for the three sénéchaussée of Languedoc in order to «provide spiritual back-up» 27 May 1364.¹³⁷¹ The *Cogit nos* is also strongly linked to the previous bulls and its justification was rather defensive than punitive.¹³⁷² The *Clamat ad nos* also repeats much of the *Miserabilis nonnullorum* bull by excommunicating the members of the companies, concentrating on the leaders of the companies.¹³⁷³ The big difference between the other bulls and the *Clamat ad nos* is that the latest bull before the crusades covered all of France. The background to this is already the papal pressure, which was also Urban V's attempt to persuade the mercenaries to leave for

¹³⁶⁵ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

¹³⁶⁶ G. Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs... », *art. cit.*, p. 229.

¹³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁸ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹³⁶⁹ H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-182.

¹³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

¹³⁷¹ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹³⁷² *Ibid.*

¹³⁷³ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

the crusades. The bull was published on 5 April 1365, shortly before Charles IV's visit to Avignon.

The bulls highlights the extensive reach of the *routiers*' activity, noting that they had affected various segments of the community, including clergy, ecclesiastics, secular persons, and those in positions of dignity. Each of them referred to the atrocities committed by the mercenaries against the civilian population and the Church, using the same or very similar phrases: «*violentia capere*»,¹³⁷⁴ «*detinere*»,¹³⁷⁵ «*carceribus mancipare*»,¹³⁷⁶ «*tormentis subicere*»,¹³⁷⁷ «*vulnerare*»,¹³⁷⁸ «*morti trader*»,¹³⁷⁹ «*spoliare*»,¹³⁸⁰ «*diocesis invader*»,¹³⁸¹ «*violenter rapere*»,¹³⁸² «*quoscumque terrarum dominos invadere*»,¹³⁸³ The «*pauperesque plebejos solo timore compellebant*»¹³⁸⁴ indicates that the common and poorer people were compelled or forced to flee from their labour and homes due to sheer fear, suggesting widespread terror and displacement, coinciding perfectly with the description of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade in Jakob Twinger von Königshofen's chronicle.¹³⁸⁵

In a related way, the terms used in the papal bulls for mercenaries are very similar or identical: the «*arma sectantes facibus cupiditatis accensi*»¹³⁸⁶ in other papal bulls the term used corresponds to, for example, «*Iniquitalis filii*»¹³⁸⁷ «*hostes acerrimos*»¹³⁸⁸ or «*viri nefarii*»,¹³⁸⁹ Here, the motive is not just warfare but also a deep-seated avarice driving their actions. The term «*crudeliter debacchantes*»¹³⁹⁰ intensifies the characterization of the malevolent nature of the mercenaries, suggesting unrestrained, brutal behaviour. Additionally, the invocation of «*Luciferi*» adds a spiritual dimension. The «*filios*

¹³⁷⁴ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., p. 182.

¹³⁷⁵ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». *Ibid.*

¹³⁷⁶ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., p. 182.

¹³⁷⁷ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». *Ibid.*

¹³⁷⁸ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». *Ibid.*

¹³⁷⁹ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». *Ibid.*

¹³⁸⁰ «Clamat ad nos'. O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442 ; »Ad reprimendas insolentias'. H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., p. 182.

¹³⁸¹ «Ad reprimendas insolentias» H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., p. 182.

¹³⁸² «Ad reprimendas insolentias» *Ibid.*

¹³⁸³ «Clamat ad nos». O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442.

¹³⁸⁴ «Clamat ad nos». *Ibid.*

¹³⁸⁵ The detailed quote is in the «Crusade of the Great Companies» chapter. F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, op. cit., p. 161.

¹³⁸⁶ «Miserabilis nonnullorum». H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., pp. 378-381.

¹³⁸⁷ «Ad reprimendas insolentias». H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, op. cit., p. 182.

¹³⁸⁸ «Cogit nos». *Ibid.*, p. 420.

¹³⁸⁹ «Cogit nos». *Ibid.*, p.

¹³⁹⁰ «Clamat ad nos». O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442.

contuberniones»¹³⁹¹ suggests the organized feature of the companies, alluding to the cohesion and potential ill will. The expression of «*multitudine gravi*»¹³⁹² also relates to the size of the great companies.

In these bulls, after listing the acts of the *routiers* such as «*domos cremare*»,¹³⁹³ «*vites, arbores incidere*»,¹³⁹⁴ «*ecclesias quoque, monasteria... spoliare*»,¹³⁹⁵ «*fructus... et alia bona... violenter rapere*»,¹³⁹⁶ etc., the companies were excommunicated and an attempt was made to isolate them.¹³⁹⁷ The bull *Cogit nos* and the bull *Miserabilis nonnullorum* were the main means of this. In the latter, Urban V also attempted to dissolve the companies and to surrender the castles, towns and other fortified places they occupied and to compensate them for the damage they had caused.¹³⁹⁸ Neither secular nor ecclesiastical persons were allowed to join the companies, and excommunication was extended to anyone who cooperated in any way.¹³⁹⁹ It was practically on the model of these two bulls issued to the kingdom of France that Urban V drew up his bull for the Italian Companies in 1366.

The papal bulls were often coupled with the organization of crusades against mercenaries, justifying the crusades by the fact that the *routiers* «*presented a serious threat to the well-being of the Christian community, the populus christianus.*»¹⁴⁰⁰ The crusaders were redeemed by marching against the mercenaries if they gave their lives in battle.¹⁴⁰¹ From 8 January 1361, during the preaching against the excommunicated companies occupying Pont-Saint-Esprit, those who took up the cross received the same indulgence as those who would have taken part in the liberation of the Holy Land.¹⁴⁰²

Preaching was the most successful part of the crusades against the companies. In Fano, a commission was set up with the appointment of an inquisitor tasked with preaching a crusade against Konrad von Landau.¹⁴⁰³ Agostino Tinucci, Bishop of Narni, preached

¹³⁹¹ «*Cogit nos*». H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

¹³⁹² «*Cogit nos*». *Ibid.*

¹³⁹³ «*Clamat ad nos*». O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

¹³⁹⁴ «*Clamat ad nos*». *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁵ «*Ad reprimendas insolentias*». H. Denifle, *La Désolation des églises I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

¹³⁹⁶ «*Ad reprimendas insolentias*». R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹³⁹⁷ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰⁰ N. Housley, «*The Mercenary Companies...*», *art. cit.*, p. 253.

¹⁴⁰¹ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

¹⁴⁰² G. Butaud, «*L'excommunication des agresseurs...*», *art. cit.*, p. 229.

¹⁴⁰³ J. Glénisson and G. Mollat (eds.), *L'administration des États...*, *op. cit.*, p. 121. n° 335.

powerful sermons against Konrad von Landau's great company in Florence in 1357.¹⁴⁰⁴ Every morning the bells were rung and then mass was celebrated. As a result of the preaching, 12 citizens paid the expenses of an armed cavalryman, and the sermons had the effect of bringing more than 1000 florins a day into the coffers of the city.¹⁴⁰⁵ In one month, 30.000 florins were raised. Therefore, the Florentines managed to arm 700 *barbute*.¹⁴⁰⁶ The crusading army in the service of the papal legate numbered 800 crossbowmen, 200 heavy-armed horsemen and 2000 infantrymen.¹⁴⁰⁷ All this cost 100.000 florins.¹⁴⁰⁸ Against the mercenaries occupying Pont-Saint-Esprit, sermons were preached in many cities of Europe, so that Cardinal Pierre Bertrand had a large crusading army at his disposal as well.¹⁴⁰⁹ The King of Aragon alone sent 600 men-at-arms and 1000 infantry to the assembly of the crusade.¹⁴¹⁰ Nevertheless, so too did contingents from Languedoc, Beaucaire, Gévaudan, Velay, Vivrais, or they contributed to the financing of the crusade.¹⁴¹¹ In addition, Bishop Aymo of Lausanne, who according to the papal instructions on 17 January 1361, levied a tax on all the clergy and monasteries of his diocese for the crusade against the Great Companies.¹⁴¹²

However, the successful part of the crusade against the companies was over. The armies thus recruited never once encountered the Companies, either in Italy or in the Kingdom of France. In all cases, the money raised was used to pay for the departure of the companies, preferring a peaceful solution to armed conflict.¹⁴¹³ The legates in charge of the armies were probably right to assess the combat value of their crusading armies and not to risk an open battle. Such an agreement between Konrad von Landau and Gil de Albornoz and Androin de La Roche shows well how willing the papal legates were in practice to seek compromise when faced with a seemingly invincible great company. Central to these conventions was the safeguarding of territories. The leaders of the Great Company committed themselves to refraining from causing harm to the provinces of Romagna and Marca Anconitana, as well

¹⁴⁰⁴ C. Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

¹⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰⁶ Villani, *Cronica*, 1834, lib. VII, cap. 85, p. 232.

¹⁴⁰⁷ C. Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca...*, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

¹⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰⁹ G. Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs... », *art. cit.*, p. 229.

¹⁴¹⁰ É. Molinier, *Étude sur la vie d'Arnoul d'Audrehem...* *op. cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹⁴¹² Bern, Staatarchivs des Kantons Bern, Bishcof Aymo von Lausanne erhebt von allen Geistlichen und Klöstern seiner Diözese eine Steuer für den vom Papst angeordneten Kreuzzug gegen die Grande Companie *Fontes* 8. 409, 1084.

¹⁴¹³ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

as other regions under the jurisdiction of the Church. This pledge was set for a period of three years, commencing from November 1, 1357.¹⁴¹⁴ A similar commitment was extended to protect Florence and its dominions from any adversities. Further provisions ensured the facilitation of movement.¹⁴¹⁵ The legate agreed to provide unhindered passage and essential provisions to the Great Company should they intend to journey to Tuscany or other regions. Rules of engagement were also delineated. While the legate and abbot refrained from initiating hostilities against the Great Company, they retained the prerogative to dispatch troops to their allies in regions such as Tuscany and Lombardy.¹⁴¹⁶ Florence, in turn, was bound to honour its pre-existing alliance commitments. Financial stipulations were carefully articulated. The Great Company was promised an immediate payment of 7500 florins, with the remaining balance to be settled within a fortnight.¹⁴¹⁷ Upon receipt of the full amount, the company committed to vacate Church territories, refraining from re-entry for three years, save for stipulated peaceful transit requirements.¹⁴¹⁸ Membership obligations were emphasized. Every member of the great company was mandated to solemnly swear allegiance to the conventions, with new entrants also being bound by these terms.¹⁴¹⁹ For a twelve-day period post-convention, the great company was placed at the disposal of the legate, in Italy, and select Italian cities for potential engagements. Should no new agreements materialize within this timeframe, the existing convention would remain in force.¹⁴²⁰ Further contractual conditions ensured compliance. Should certain members opt to serve the Church or other signatories, those choosing otherwise were obligated to exit Church territories and return to their origins, adhering to the agreement's stipulations for a half-year duration.¹⁴²¹ Finally in 1357, Konrad von Landau received 50.000 florins only to withdraw to Lombardy paid by Pisa and Florence.¹⁴²²

C) Recruiting Mercenaries in the Crusades

Urban V, learning quickly from the above, decided already in 1363 to try a third option to solve the problem of the companies. If excommunication or crusades against them could

¹⁴¹⁴ J. Glénisson and G. Mollat (eds.), *L'administration des États...*, op. cit., pp. 121-122, n° 336.

¹⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²² Villani, *Cronica*, 1834, lib. VII, cap. 89, p. 233.

not provide a lasting solution, he should use their formidable reputation, their many years of experience in various wars, and send them to fight the infidels. To do this, they had to be convinced in the first place, which could be achieved in several ways. As was seen in the case of Seguin de Badefol, by excommunication or by absolution. In the case of Arnaud de Cervole, the mercenaries who took part in the crusade were given the same indulgence as those who took part in the crusades against them.¹⁴²³ The third way was persuasion. In the 1360s, the Papacy tried its best to mobilise the companies in Italy and the Kingdom of France for the cause.

St Catherine of Siena, in a letter written 10 years after the events, in 1375 to John Hawkwood, calls on the English «*Condottiero, and Leader of the Company that came in the time of Hunger*»¹⁴²⁴ to stop killing Christians and turn his arms against the infidels engaged in the crusade. The tone of the letter, the reasoning used by St Catherine, shows exactly how the Church was trying to persuade the mercenaries to take part in the crusade:¹⁴²⁵

«To you, my dearest and most beloved Brothers in Jesus Christ, I, Catherine, servant and slave of the Servants of Jesus Christ, write in His precious blood with a longing to see you as true sons and knights of Christ. May it be in such a manner that you would wish a thousand times, if necessary, to give your lives in service to the sweet and good Jesus, who would atone for all our iniquities which we have committed against our Saviour.

*Oh dearest and sweetest brother in Jesus Christ, it would be of such great significance if you could withdraw into yourself and reflect upon the pains and sorrows you have endured in service, and the wages of the Devil. Now, may your soul desire to change your ways and take up the wage and the Cross of Christ Crucified, you and all your followers and companions. Thus, you might form a Company of Christ to stand against the unfaithful Dogs who possess our Holy Place, where He rested and bore the first sweet Truth, death, and pain for us....»*¹⁴²⁶

¹⁴²³ See in the chapter of the «Crusade of the Great Companies toward Hungary».

¹⁴²⁴ L. Venturini and F. Quinza (ed.), *L'Epistole...*, op. cit., pp. 211-215.

¹⁴²⁵ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit., p. 166.

¹⁴²⁶ L. Venturini and F. Quinza (ed.), *L'Epistole...*, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

From the outset, papal policy prioritised the active participation of mercenaries in the crusades to be organised. There is ample evidence of this in the papal registers and in European archives. From the very first moment when the cross was taken up in the cathedral of Avignon on 31 March 1363,¹⁴²⁷ Friday of the Holy Week, the involvement of mercenaries was treated as a concrete fact. As early as 25 May 1363, Avignon sent a letter to the captains active in the Kingdom of France and neighbouring territories, calling on them to take part in the crusade that had been announced.¹⁴²⁸ Urban V's letter is very instructive, because it clearly shows the strategy of the Holy See. The crusaders headed by John the Good and Peter I were joined by mercenary companies.¹⁴²⁹ The Pope set two goals: the «*Turks and Saracens*.»¹⁴³⁰ However, the focus was clearly the eastern Mediterranean. The Saracens are mentioned only once in the letter, while the fate of the Christians in the Armenian kingdom, the Christians who were being overrun, and the captured cities and castles are analysed at length.¹⁴³¹ In the same way, the Pope describes in practical terms the background to the announcement of the crusade to the captains, also touching on the earlier successes and the journey of Peter I. It is clear from this that the purpose of the *passagium generale* was clearly determined by the strategic interests of Peter I.¹⁴³² The Pope calls on the captains to prepare for the departure planned for March 1365 and to indicate their intention to participate, to his envoy, Brother Nicholas Brohom of the Order of St Augustine. He offered full absolution to members of the companies who decided to take part in the crusade¹⁴³³ «*For we, with paternal charity, zealous for your safety, will dedicate all the favour we can offer with diligent care.*» Another letter from the Pope, dated the same day, 25 May 1363, also confirms the original idea of the mercenaries taking part in the crusade under the French and Cypriot kings.¹⁴³⁴ According to the letter, Urban V's crusading army would be composed of 200 French knights, 2000 knights recruited from elsewhere in Europe, 6000 infantrymen and members of companies.¹⁴³⁵ Norman Housley rightly concluded that if companies refused to take part in the *passagium generale*, the whole enterprise was

¹⁴²⁷ K. M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

¹⁴²⁸ N. Housley, «*The Mercenary Companies...*», *art. cit.*, p. 272.

¹⁴²⁹ LSS pp. 63-64, pp. 63-64, n° 487. Paul Lecacheux, Guillaume Mollat (eds.), *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Urbain V (1362-1370) se rapportant a la France. Extraites des registres d'Avignon et du Vatican*, Paris, 1965, pp. 63-64, n° 487.

¹⁴³⁰ This also shows how quickly the threat posed by the Ottoman Empire, which was just beginning to expand in Europe, was recognised by the contemporaries. *Ibid.*

¹⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65, n° 488.

¹⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

doomed to failure, because the nobles who would be willing to take part in the crusade would not leave France, because they could not leave their lands behind, unprotected.¹⁴³⁶ In August 1363, John the Good invited Juan Fernandez Heredia, the Hospitaller castellan of Amposta, to the court in Paris to advise him on the forthcoming crusade.¹⁴³⁷ However, Urban did not agree to the trip, claiming that as a captain of Avignon and Comtat Venaissin, his primary duty was to fight the companies in the area, especially as there were rumours of more Catalan and Spanish mercenaries arriving.¹⁴³⁸

The Pope's initiative in 1363 was not yet well received by the *routiers* in France. However, the first positive response from the members of the companies came in April 1364, not from France but from Italy, from the company of Albert Sterz, one of the most influential condottieri of his time. Albert Sterz crossed the border between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire and arrived in northern Italy in 1361, where he fought in the service of Pisa in 1363.¹⁴³⁹ However, at the end of 1363, Albert Sterz was replaced and an English corporal, John Hawkwood, was appointed as captain of the war by the Pisans.¹⁴⁴⁰ Soon afterwards, the members of the company followed the example of Pisa and John Hawkwood was elected to head the company. Soon after this Albert Sterz, in alliance with Johann Haneken Bongard founded the Company of the Star in 1365.¹⁴⁴¹

However, when the war between Pisa and Florence was still going on in April 1364, the White Company of German, English and Hungarian mercenaries was still fighting in Tuscany along with Albert Sterz. The English members of the company held direct talks with Urban V, just prior to a planned attack on Florence.¹⁴⁴² Albert Sterz expressed an interest in participating in the crusade.¹⁴⁴³ This was the first time an envoy from a Great Company arrived in Avignon in connection with the crusade. On 18 April 1364, Robert Wodhaves, an English nobleman,¹⁴⁴⁴ visited the Pope on behalf of the *societatis Anglicorum* and informed Urban V that the members of the Company were ready to take part in the crusade for the salvation of their souls.¹⁴⁴⁵ From his letter to Gil de Albornoz, it seems that the news of the

¹⁴³⁶ N. Housley, « The Mercenary Companies... », art. cit., p 272.

¹⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁸ P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat (eds.), *Lettres secrètes et...*, op. cit., p. 80, n° 596.

¹⁴³⁹ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, op. cit., p. 371.

¹⁴⁴⁰ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit., p. 100.

¹⁴⁴¹ S. Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner...*, op. cit., p. 371.

¹⁴⁴² W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit., p. 108.

¹⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁴ P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat (eds.), *Lettres secrètes et...*, op. cit., p. 133. n° 887.

¹⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

envoy of the White Company was very well received by the Pope after the bad news in France, since it was in April 1364 that John the Good died and the very idea of a crusade seemed increasingly remote due to the disinterest of the companies. Urban threw himself into the organisation with renewed vigour, and informed his Spanish legate that he would seek out other companies in Tuscany to see if they could be included in the venture:

*«We, therefore, noting that other companies, which are in those regions
...we wish with all our heart to add significant aid to the recovery and
liberation of the Italy and the aforementioned company through a general
passage ...»¹⁴⁴⁶*

It is certain that Albert Sterz had a closer than usual relationship with Pope Urban V. The German *condottiere* had been in contact with Urban V since the summer of 1363 at the earliest, with envoys passing in and out, exchanging letters on ongoing matters. In a letter addressed to Albert Sterz on 5 September 1363, the Pope wrote to the *condottiere* *«And he [Gil de Albornoz] knows that neither you nor the said society have offended the same Church, but rather you are devoted to it and intend to be faithful and valiant defenders.»¹⁴⁴⁷*

Hence, the papal machinery was set in motion, and within a month of Robert Wodhaves' visit to Avignon, concrete plans were beginning to take shape. The Pope, with the help of English nobles such as William de la Pole, Lord of Ashby, and Thomas Ufford, son of the Earl of Suffolk, sought to ensure the widest possible participation of the companies who travelled to Avignon.¹⁴⁴⁸ A letter from the Pope to Thomas Ufford, dated 17 April 1364, reveals that they offered to Avignon to use their connections to recruit more English mercenaries fighting in Italy for the crusade:

*«Recently, your nobility has explained to us that, driven by the zeal of
devotion, you intend to cross the sea for the recovery of the Holy Land...
You hope to induce a company of Englishmen residing in Italy...»¹⁴⁴⁹*

¹⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁷ 5. September 1363. Letter to Albert Sterz, Capitaneo societatis Anglicorum. A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹⁴⁴⁸ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁴⁴⁹ A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, *op. cit.*, p. 112, n° 8.

William de la Pole took the cross from the hands of the Pope in Avignon. In a letter dated 9 May 1364, Urban V informs Joanna I, Queen of Naples that the Lord of Ashby hopes to bring many of the English mercenaries active in Tuscany with him on the crusade. The plan was to pass through Otranto, subject to Joanna's permission and the supply of food for the troops.¹⁴⁵⁰ To facilitate the English crusaders' crossing the Mediterranean, in a letter to Doge Lorenzo Celsi, dated 15 May 1364, he asks the Doge to make galleys available to the mercenaries recruited in Tuscany for the crusade.¹⁴⁵¹ Four days after the visit of Robert Wodhавos, on 18 April, Urban V issued a new bull to the White Company, thanking the members of the company for their willingness to take up the cross.¹⁴⁵²

*«Indeed, no one seems to fulfil these things more perfectly than he who,
for the love of God, having renounced earthly pleasures, forsakes father,
mother, sister, children, friends, and homeland, and taking up the cross of
weariness, danger, and toil, fearlessly follows Christ...»¹⁴⁵³*

For penances overlooked or not rightly performed, unless they pertain to another crusade or pious work, they are remitted. Those with forgotten sins, upon confession, are granted full indulgence. Those who contribute or assist in various capacities in the crusade are also included in this indulgence.¹⁴⁵⁴ Participants in the crusade are protected from extraordinary collections or levies from the time of their departure until their return or demise. They are placed under the protection of the Church and its appointed leaders. Any transgressors against them face ecclesiastical censure.¹⁴⁵⁵ Creditors who forced the mercenaries to pay their debt were obliged to refund the sum to the debtor. If they do not comply, they will face ecclesiastical penalties. This bull was followed on 20 April by another letter to the nobles of the White Company, who were entitled to carry a portable altar, and gave everyone the freedom to choose their own confessor.¹⁴⁵⁶ Pope Urban V, in a letter written to his legate Androin de la Roche on 22 June 1364, asks the legate to remove the companies raging in Tuscany because they threaten papal lands. Considering *«if they are not preparing to*

¹⁴⁵⁰ 'Regesta 246: 1363-1364', in William Henry Bliss and Jesse Alfred Twemlow (eds.), *Calendar of Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. IV, 1362-1404, London, 1902, pp. 5-13. [available online at] *British History Online* <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-papal-registers/brit-ie/vol4/pp5-13>

¹⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵² A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹⁴⁵³ LSS p. 134-135, n° 891.

¹⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵⁶ A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

participe in a general passage,» then the Italian cities should form a defensive alliance against those companies.¹⁴⁵⁷

From a letter to Bernabò Visconti, dated 25 June 1364, we learn that the Pope informs the Lords of Milan of the intention of another company to join. The company of Johann Haneken Bongard wants to participate in the crusade with other unnamed companies «*this Anechinus and his associates, who, against God and justice, their own soul's salvation and honour, are soldiering to destroy almost all of Italy, are marching against the Roman Church, as they have done before, would unjustly exercise hostility.*»¹⁴⁵⁸ The letter reveals that the Viscontis have had preliminary discussions with the company about participating in the crusade. Since Johann Haneken Bongard was close to Albert Sterz, it is likely that this close relationship played as much a role in the decision as it did for Arnaud de Cervole a year later when he recruited companies for his own crusade in eastern France. Unfortunately, it is not known who and how many mercenaries Johann Haneken Bongard intended to join up with. The letter is also important because it is the first evidence that the Holy See did not give up the idea of recruiting more companies after the death of John II of France.

At that time, there were officially nine months left until the planned date of the crusade, until March 1365. However, as expected, following the deaths of two important leaders of the crusade: the French king and the legate appointed by the Pope from Avignon, Cardinal Talleyrand of Périgord in January 1364,¹⁴⁵⁹ the date of the crusade was delayed by several months. As it turned out, events unfolded in such a way that instead of the originally planned single crusade, four separate ones were carried out. The next important milestone in the recruitment of mercenaries came with Charles IV's trip to Avignon. The imperial visit prompted a renewed effort by Urban V to implement his plan by sending companies from eastern France and Italy at the same time. By this time, Amadeus VI and Peter I, who had originally planned to carry out one crusade, had parted ways and new plans were made to carry out two separate crusades. What is important here is that, following Charles IV's visit to Avignon, Urban V sent a letter to Florence on 9 June 1365 to arrange, after consultation with the Emperor, for mercenaries from Italy and France to march against the Turks.¹⁴⁶⁰ That is why the Pope is wanted to organise a meeting in Bologna, in order to facilitate the

¹⁴⁵⁷ LSS p. 160, n° 1032.

¹⁴⁵⁸ A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, op. cit., p. 113-114, n° 9.

¹⁴⁵⁹ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., p. 120.

¹⁴⁶⁰ ASF Riformagioni atti pubblici, 1365 Giugno 9.

departure of the companies going overseas as effectively as possible.¹⁴⁶¹ This letter is important because it links the plans for the various crusades that were to be carried out separately after the death of John the Good, and thus the plans of the companies leaving Italy, with the crusade led by Arnaud de Cervole.¹⁴⁶²

The mercenaries were scheduled to set off on a crusade, crossing the Rhine at Strasbourg and continuing on to Hungary. However, if this did not happen, as the Pope had well foreseen, crusaders like Arnaud de Cervole would turn south and meet Amadeus VI in Venice as they embarked. For this reason, the Pope asked Florence to send envoys to the White Company led by Sir John Hawkwood and persuade them to participate.¹⁴⁶³ In the meantime, Albert Sterz left the White Company, making the original participation of the company's members in the crusade a matter of doubt. William Caferro, in his book on John Hawkwood, gives details of the envoys. One of them was Doffo di Bardi, the son of the founder of the famous Bardi banking house, who had lived in London for years, knew Edward III personally and spoke English.¹⁴⁶⁴ The ambassadors were given a difficult task, because they had to negotiate the lowest possible amount to persuade the English *condottiere* to leave.¹⁴⁶⁵ According to William Caferro, Hawkwood toyed with the idea of taking part in the crusade, but eventually dropped the idea.¹⁴⁶⁶ Nevertheless, not everyone did. One of his former comrades-in-arms, Walter Leslie, actually took up the cross and joined his brother Norman with King Peter I to Alexandria, where in all likelihood his brother Norman Leslie died.¹⁴⁶⁷

D) One Equals Four: the Origin of the Four Crusades

Between the beginning of the preparations for the Crusades and the departure of Peter I of Cyprus from Venice, i.e. between the winter of 1362 and the summer of 1365, the actors, the aims and the participants of the Crusades changed a lot. There were those who died, others who promised to take part and then reneged, others who no one thought would take

¹⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶² The details of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade preparations are described in the chapter «The Crusade of the Great Companies towards Hungary».

¹⁴⁶³ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁵ ASF Missive I, Cancellaria, 13, f. 50v

¹⁴⁶⁶ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

part from the start and yet found themselves at the centre of events. And finally there was Peter I, King of Cyprus, who was the catalyst for the whole process from the start, and who, travelling through the courts of Europe from England to Poland, championed the initiative. Two letters give insight into the attitude of Peter I towards the leadership of the crusade. One is to Florence, in which, referring to the fall of Jerusalem under Henry II, his great uncle, he explains «*his desire and fervent will*»¹⁴⁶⁸ to recover the holy city, which is also his inheritance: He therefore invites Florence to help him in an expedition planned for March 1364.¹⁴⁶⁹ The second letter, dated 15 September 1362, was written to Niccolò Acciaiuoli, head of a wealthy banking house in Florence. Peter thanked the banker for his offer, and promised him that he would use the ships financed by the bank against the infidels.¹⁴⁷⁰ These letters are important in that they show Peter's commitment to the crusade. Peter, on his own, could not have financed or even organised a *passagium generale*, to do this, he needed supporters. Fortunately for him, he found two at the same time in Avignon, in John II of France, and the newly elected Pope Urban. Peter arrived in Avignon on 29 March 1363, Good Friday, the Pope proclaimed the *passagium generale* and appointed John II «*rector and captain-general*» of the expedition.¹⁴⁷¹ After these events, Peter, of course, set off for Europe with high hopes of gathering further help and reinforcement for the planned campaign, which was set for 1 March 1365.¹⁴⁷² Two days later, on 31 March 1363, Urban V sent a letter to the archbishops of Zara, Spalato [Split], Ragusa, Esztergom and Kalocsa to help Peter in his campaign against the Turks and the Holy Land. Those who participated in the campaign against the Turks were of course pardoned.¹⁴⁷³ Two weeks later, on 15 April, 1363, the Pope sent an envoy to Buda in the person of Master Simon of the Dominican Order, who, as nuncio of the Apostolic See, delivered his letter of commission. His task was to outline to Louis of Hungary the state of the Church and to discuss the matter of the Holy Land campaign (*passagium ultramarinum*).¹⁴⁷⁴

When a crusade was announced in the spring of 1363, the idea at first seemed to fit into the traditional Avignon line of thought, at least as far as the organisation of French-led crusades

¹⁴⁶⁸ « Le Roi I engage la seigneurie de Florence à seconder ses armements pour le recouvrement du saint Sépulcre », in Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, Paris, 1852, vol. II, pp. 236-237.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Peter Edbury and Chris Schabel, « The Papacy and King Peter I of Cyprus », in Alexander Beihammer and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari (eds.), *Crusading, Society, and Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of King Peter I of Cyprus*, Turnhout, 2022, pp. 177-206, p. 189.

¹⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷¹ K. M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

¹⁴⁷² N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières...*, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁴⁷³ AOKlt., vol. XLVII, p. 103, n° 152.

¹⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115, n° 173.

was concerned. Its direct antecedents go back to the initiative of Philip VI to retake Jerusalem, the direct consequence of which was the preaching in France ordered by Pope John XII. However, enthusiasm quickly dried up due to the lack of adequate financial backing.¹⁴⁷⁵ In 1363, Urban V quickly adapted the goal to the needs dictated by *Realpolitik*, and the main target soon shifted from Jerusalem to the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to send the companies from Italy to the crusade, it was first of all necessary to reach an agreement and peace with the gentlemen of Milan. In a letter to Gil de Albornoz, written on 1 May 1363, the Pope informs the legate that Bernabò Visconti is willing to make peace with the Pope. During the negotiations, the Pope undertakes to suspend the excommunication.¹⁴⁷⁶ In a letter to the legate written on the same day, he points out that John the Good and Peter I are sending envoys to Milan to persuade the Visconti to reconcile.¹⁴⁷⁷ The most important step on the way to this was the surrender of the castles and territories in their hands in the Bologna area, in particular the surrender of the «*castrum Lugi*», the Pope emphasised.¹⁴⁷⁸ Eventually, Pierre Thomas managed to negotiate a peace treaty, which led to the companies leaving Bologna. The peace was announced on 20 January 1364. Under the terms of the agreement, Bernabò received 500.000 florins for vacating the Bologna area, to be paid in annual instalments of 62.500 florins over 8 years.¹⁴⁷⁹ This obstacle to the crusade was thus removed.

Urban V, in a letter dated 25 May 1363, writes that «*the other day King Peter of Cyprus, whose country is near these infidels, came to the western territories and finally to the Apostolic See, and showed the Pope, the cardinals, the Christian princes and nobles how to destroy the power of the Saracens and Turks and how to reconquer the Holy Land.*»¹⁴⁸⁰ He set the date of the crusade for 1 March 1365, and since the Pope «*is informed that Louis has long desired such a task, he asks him to join it with his strength as the most Christian and powerful prince, setting a glorious example to other Christian princes and nobles, and the Pope will assist him in undertaking and carrying it out.*»¹⁴⁸¹ The Pope asks «*Louis (from whom, to Peter's delight, he has received great promises in connection with this enterprise)*

¹⁴⁷⁵ Alexander D. Beihammer, « The Sack of Alexandria (1365), the Crusading Movement, and the Eastern Mediterranean in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century », in Alexander Beihammer and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari (eds.), *Crusading, Society, and Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of King Peter I of Cyprus*, Turnhout, 2022, pp. 77-106, p. 86.

¹⁴⁷⁶ P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat (eds.), *Lettres secrètes et...*, *op. cit.*, p. 52-53, n. 386.

¹⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷⁹ K. M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

¹⁴⁸⁰ AOKlt., vol. XLVII, p. 146, n° 240.

¹⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

to give his support to Peter, his nuncios and the people (gens) of his own country who wish to go with Peter.»¹⁴⁸² This means that Peter I and Louis exchanged letters shortly after the Crusade was proclaimed. The Pope wrote another letter to Louis in December, again asking Louis to help the campaign as much as he could. In the letter, Urban V reports that Peter «will soon be in Venice with a multitude of nobles», and therefore the Holy See asks the king to support Peter «in the matter of the galleys or other things».¹⁴⁸³ This letter is also reported by Odorico Rinaldi, who adds, however, that the Pope has not received any reply to the letter from Louis.¹⁴⁸⁴

Kenneth Setton's research drew attention to two letters from Urban V, according to which Urban V did not trust Peter to participate in the *passagium generale* he had planned.¹⁴⁸⁵ A letter sent by Urban V on 28 November 1363 reveals that the Pope had been informed that the Turks were planning to attack Cyprus and Antalya, which Peter had conquered in August 1361, during Peter's European journey. Peter is asked by the Pope: «and pray you that you do not delay your return any longer and may God help make it a fruitful return.»¹⁴⁸⁶ In fact, during Peter's European voyage, Cyprus suffered several such attacks: in the spring of 1363, Turkish raiders reached the shores of Cyprus at the same time as the plague was being broke out. Subsequently the Cypriots led retaliatory attacks on the coast of Anatolia too.¹⁴⁸⁷ Urban believed that the King of Cyprus would return home in the spring of 1364. Peter's letter to the Florentines testifies that Peter set the date of departure for 1 March 1364, exactly one year before the crusade led by John II.¹⁴⁸⁸ This meant, of course, that the originally planned crusade had already been split in two by the end of 1363, as Peter was to go on a separate campaign, independently of the French king. It follows directly from this, as Peter Edbury and Chris Schabel rightly point out, that Peter-led campaign would have targeted the area around Smyrna or Antalya, in order to stop the Turkish expansion. Palestine or Egypt seems much less likely to have been on his agenda, because the Muslim presence there did not then pose a direct threat to Christianity.¹⁴⁸⁹

¹⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 352, n° 616 ; A. Theiner (ed.), *Vetera Monumenta II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 58, n° CV.

¹⁴⁸⁴ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

¹⁴⁸⁵ K. M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

¹⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 246, n° 108.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Angel Nicolaou-Konnari, « The Life and Reign of Peter I of Lusignan (1329–69, crowned 1359). Chronology », in Alexander Beihammer and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari (eds.), *Crusading, Society, and Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of King Peter I of Cyprus*, Turnhout, 2022, pp. 13-27, p. 19.

¹⁴⁸⁸ P. Edbury and C. Schabel, « The Papacy... », *art. cit.*, p. 193.

¹⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

And it is here, in relation to the Catalan Company, that it is necessary to pause for a moment. At the time of the Crusade, the Company was going through a period of crisis in its long 14th century history.¹⁴⁹⁰ Between 1362 and 1365 the leadership of the Society was divided. On the one hand, Matteo Moncada was appointed Vicar General by Frederick III of Sicily, who spent most of his tenure in Sicily, far from Athens and Thebes.¹⁴⁹¹ On behalf of his power, his protector was Pedro de Pou, who in 1362 turned against two of the most powerful men in the company, James Fadrique of Aragon, the former Vicar General, and Roger de Lluria, the company's Marshal.¹⁴⁹² In the fighting, Pedro de Pou was killed in Thebes in 1362, together with his wife and supporters. Actual power was in the hands of Roger de Lluria between 1363 and 1366, who in turn took all the help he could get in the course of the fighting against Pedro de Pou. This is how Turkish troops came to Thebes.¹⁴⁹³ Just as John Cantacuzenus had driven the Ottomans into the Balkans during his struggles with the younger co-emperor John V Palaeologus, so Roger de Lluria had done the same for the dukedom of Athens against the Turks of Anatolia.¹⁴⁹⁴ And he did so just as, after decades, papal policy took a favourable turn and lifted the excommunication that had been renewed by successive popes of Avignon throughout the 14th century. It was only at the very beginning of the Byzantine adventure that the company, led by Roger,¹⁴⁹⁵ de Flor had the approval of the Avignon popes. Before the Duchy of Athens was even in existence, the Company fought against the Turks in Asia Minor in the name of «*in the name of the Holy Father,*»¹⁴⁹⁶ serving as an example for Innocent VI and Urban V to follow in organising their crusades 50 years later. The victory of Company Cephissus over Walter V of Brienne, Duke of Athens, on 11 March 1311 changed everything.¹⁴⁹⁷ From then on, the popes supported the Valois claim and tried to restore the pre-1311 situation by excommunicating the Company. The parallels between the history of the 14th-century companies and that of the Catalan Company are more than striking. Just as, against the mercenaries of the Grand Companies, a crusade was declared against the Catalan Companies. John XXII ordered to preach the crusade against the company.¹⁴⁹⁸ This decades-old practice was finally

¹⁴⁹⁰ Kenneth M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens 1311-1348*, London, 1975. p. 54.

¹⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹² *Ibid.* p. 57.

¹⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 58.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Jacoby David, « La "Compagnie catalane" et l'État catalan de Grèce: quelques aspects de leur histoire », *Journal des savants*, 1966, vol II, pp. 78-103, p. 81.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Robert Burns, « The Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305-1311 », *Speculum*, 1954, vol. XXIX, pp. 751-771 p. 752.

¹⁴⁹⁷ K. DeVries, « Medieval Mercenaries... », art. cit., pp. 43-61. p. 53.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Robert Burns, *The Catalan Company...*, *op. cit.*, p. 758.

abolished by Innocent VI and then Urban V on 25 December 1363.¹⁴⁹⁹ I believe that this was not a coincidence, since on 27 June 1364 Urban V sent several letters to the bishops of the Company territories in connection with the crusade.¹⁵⁰⁰ After Urban V had ordered preaching and the expulsion of the Turks for their participation in the crusade in the duchy, it is likely that Urban V wanted to mobilize the Catalan Company for the crusade that was taking shape. His efforts have met with mixed success. On the one hand, Roger de Lluria had driven the Turks out of Thebes by the summer of 1365, by which time Arnaud de Cervole's crusades had set off for Hungary, but nothing came of joining the crusade.¹⁵⁰¹

The change of the Peter's Crusade track towards Smyrna, of course, also influenced the purpose of Amadeus VI's crusade. The emergence of Amadeus VI in the preparatory phase of the crusades, however, is closely linked to a new phenomenon, the involvement of the great companies in the crusades. After Amadeus had consolidated his power and successfully crushed the rebellions by 1362, his attention turned to the crusade.¹⁵⁰² The Count of Savoy's interest in the crusade began when Pope Urban V tried to form an alliance against the great companies.¹⁵⁰³ However, the crusades against the mercenaries in France and Italy were unsuccessful, so the papal policy changed and the excommunicated mercenaries became soldiers of Christ. These troops were to take part in a crusade led by the kings of France and Cyprus.¹⁵⁰⁴ The plan was for Peter to take with him on the crusade, in addition to the 2000 horses and 6000 infantrymen «*and any men at arms from any companies, wherever they may be.*»¹⁵⁰⁵

Amadeus VI probably received the cross in January 1364, when he was personally present in Avignon.¹⁵⁰⁶ These troops were to take part in a crusade led by the kings of France and Cyprus.¹⁵⁰⁷ The initial plan for the alliance was for the combined forces of King John the Good of France, King Peter of Lusignan of Cyprus and the Count of Savoy to head for the Holy Land.¹⁵⁰⁸

¹⁴⁹⁹ Kenneth M. Setton, *Catalan Domination ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁰⁰ P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat (eds.), *Lettres secrètes et...*, *op. cit.* n. 1047, 1048, 1049, p. 163.

¹⁵⁰¹ Kenneth M. Setton, *Catalan Domination ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹⁵⁰² F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁵⁰⁴ P. Edbury and C. Schabel, « The Papacy... », *art. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁵⁰⁶ F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

On this occasion, the Count of Savoy founded his own chivalric order, the Order of the Collar.¹⁵⁰⁹ On 1 April 1364 Urban sent ten letters to Amadeus VI concerning the Crusade. In eight of the ten letters the Pope refers to Peter. The letters reveal that Amadeus was originally supposed to have fought with the crusaders led by John the Good.¹⁵¹⁰ Amadeus VI was in Avignon on 1 January 1364 to attend a meeting on the planned crusade against the mercenaries, where he agreed with the Pope to take up the cross shortly before Peter's planned departure.¹⁵¹¹ On 2 March 1364, Peter wrote a letter to Louis reporting on the progress made so far:

«because it is said that Louis has always had a zeal for the uplifting of the Christian faith and the abolition of infidels. And [Peter] being hopeful towards Louis in the matter of the holy march (sanctum passagium), he is informed of what has hitherto happened in the matter: when the king of Cyprus obtained the peace of Lombardy, he declared that he would go to Venice in April with 2000 knights of choice, and therefore the archbishop and the chancellor, going before the Venetian Doge, requested the Pope and [Peter] to see that this army was provided with ships for the passage for the march at [Peter's] expense. And the Doge and Venice not only agreed to the request, but promised to transport half of the 2000 horsemen in their ships without compensation, and to send the other half of the army out at the pleasure of the Archbishop and the Chancellor, who were allowed to arm 4 galleys in Venice for the benefit of [Peter] and the barons who were with him. Since this devotional offering is the foundation of the whole affair, the publishers of this charter are confident that this holy cause will be accepted by the Pope, Louis and all Christian princes. The king of Cyprus will visit Louis, to whom he will give a detailed account of this and other matters, but the archbishop and the chancellor will also inform Louis of all this in advance, so that the armies of this expedition may be able to find food for their money in its lands and waters.»¹⁵¹²

¹⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹⁰ F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, op. cit., p. 194.

¹⁵¹¹ «Ad partes infidelium.» F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, op. cit., p. 19.

¹⁵¹² AOKlt., vol. XLVIII, p. 89, n° 148.

In a letter dated 30 June 1364, the Pope urges Amadeus to fulfil his commitments to the Crusade and commends him to the attention of Peter, Patriarch of Constantinople.¹⁵¹³ However, Peter did not report that a rebellion broke out on Venetian-occupied Crete in early August 1363, and until Venice put down the rebellion, there was no question of any crusade, as the republic needed all the galleys it could get to Crete. Venice also sent letters to Louis I, Genoa and Johanna to break off their relations with the rebellious Cretans. On 11 October 1363, Doge Lorenzo Celsi informed Peter of Lusignan that a strong Venetian fleet was blockading Crete.¹⁵¹⁴ He also asked the King of Cyprus to ban his subjects from supporting the rebels. He pointed out that the rebellion would certainly delay the planned crusade.¹⁵¹⁵ Urban V threw himself with great zeal into the settlement of the rebellion, seeing it as a direct threat to the planned crusade.¹⁵¹⁶ Amadeus VI had been in constant contact with Philippe de Mézières since January 1364, and was thus kept informed of the preparations for a crusade.¹⁵¹⁷ Philippe de Mézières writes from Cremona to Venice in January 1364, informing the Doge that he and the Green Count are ready to sail in March 1364 as agreed. In his letter, the Doge offers to Peter and Louis that, as he needs the ships to put down the rebellion, he can transport the crusaders, but only if they first stop in Crete and put down the rebellion.¹⁵¹⁸ Phillippe de Mézières arrives in Venice at the beginning of February and is confronted with the fact that the Venetians have in the meantime made a deal with Luchino dal Verme, so there is no question of a joint Cypriot-Savoy crusade.¹⁵¹⁹ Although Amadeus had shown a willingness to participate in the suppression of the Cretan rebellion by informing Phillippe de Mézières, the latter failed to convince the Doge and negotiations stalled.¹⁵²⁰ As already mentioned in the chapter on the Hungarian mercenaries, the army led by Luchino dal Verme, including Hungarian mercenaries, sailed from Venice only on 7 April 1364 and reached Crete only on 7 May.¹⁵²¹ Meanwhile, in April 1364, the Great Companies appear on the western frontier of Savoy, but with Amadeus VI busy defending the Savoy, preparations for the crusade are delayed.¹⁵²² Thus, the possibility of a joint crusade by Amadeus VI and

¹⁵¹³ P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat (eds.), *Lettres secrètes et...*, *op. cit.*, p. 164, n° 1058.

¹⁵¹⁴ Nicholas Cureas, « King Peter of Cyprus and the Rebellion of 1363 on Crete », in Athanasios Papageorgiou (ed.), *Praktika tou tritou diethnous Kyprilogikou Synedriou (Nicosia 16-20 april 1996)*, *Acts of the Third International Congress of Cypriot Studies*, Nicosia, 2001, vol. 2, p. 520.

¹⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹⁶ N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières...*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

¹⁵¹⁷ E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹⁵¹⁸ N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières...*, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

¹⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵²¹ M. Tabarini, *Francesco Petrarca...*, *op. cit.*, p. VII.

¹⁵²² N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières...*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

Peter I was lost. The Cretan rebellion delayed both crusades by a year, until the summer of 1365. Peter is on the move again in Europe, while Amadeus is now looking elsewhere for possible targets for his own independent crusade. From the autumn of 1364 at the earliest, the Balkans and Asia Minor appear on the agenda.¹⁵²³ Amadeus' motivation is described in a chronicle from the early 15th century. According to the Chronicle Cabaret of 1418, the reason the Green Count chose the Balkans as the target of his crusade for King Louis, here known as «*King Andrew*», is to meet Amadeus in the Balkans:

*«Sire, King Andrieu of Hungary informs you that the Emperor Alexe of Constantinople, your relative, has lost a large part of his empire to the Turks. When seeking help from the kings of Hungary, France, and you, his relative, he was captured on the way by his vassal, the Emperor of Bulgaria, who now holds him prisoner. Therefore, if you, being his relative, wish to aid him and travel to Greece by sea, the King of Hungary will go by land accompanied by sixty thousand warriors. And if it pleases God that you both join forces, you will free the Emperor of Greece from prison and drive the Turks back to Turkey.»*¹⁵²⁴

Hungarian influence over parts of Serbia, Bosnia and Bulgaria brought Louis I closer to the Ottomans.¹⁵²⁵ Recognising the danger, he signalled his intention to participate in the crusades that were about to begin. Thus, the Byzantine emperor visited Buda, promising to comply with the Pope's instructions concerning the unification of the Churches.¹⁵²⁶ Urban V considered the Emperor untrustworthy for the time being and, in a letter to Louis, asked the Hungarian king not to support Byzantium.¹⁵²⁷ The Hungarian-Savoyan thread in the preparation of the crusades is confirmed by another Savoyard chronicle, which reports on the envoy mediating between the Green Count and Louis, among others: «*Thus, he sent a knight to the Count of Savoy, informing him that his relative, the Emperor Alexe of*

¹⁵²³ E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, op. cit., p. 207.

¹⁵²⁴ Daniel Chaubet (ed.), *La Chronique de Savoye de Cabaret. Texte intégral*, Chambéry, 2006, p. 196. Mentioned by F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, op. cit., p. 78.

¹⁵²⁵ Gábor Ágoston, *Az oszmán hódítás és Európa*, Budapest, 2022, p. 34.

¹⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

Constantinople, was captured and had lost a large part of Greece.»¹⁵²⁸ This chronicle suggests that there were several exchanges of envoys between Louis and Amadeus, since as early as September 1365, a Hungarian envoy arrived at the court of Amadeus VI.¹⁵²⁹ According to Nicolae Iorga, the Hungarian envoy was presented with a gift¹⁵³⁰ In fact, the Green Count made up his mind when he heard that the Byzantine Emperor had been refused to cross the territories controlled by the Ivan Alexander of Bulgaria.¹⁵³¹ The ambassadorial exchange mentioned by Servion may have taken place in May 1366.¹⁵³² This is important because during both ambassadorial exchanges, between September 1365 and May 1366,¹⁵³³ when preparations for the crusade were well under way, and in the spring of 1366, when Amadeus was already on his way through Italy to Venice, he did so in the knowledge that he would be followed by crusaders led by Arnaud de Cervole and would lead a mercenary army of at least ten thousand men into the Balkans. According to Antoine Barbier, Amadeus VI left Venice a month after the death of Arnaud de Cervole. It is possible that the Green Count's departure was closely linked to the news of what had happened to Arnaud de Cervole, i.e. that his original intention may have been to wait for the arrival of the crusading companies.¹⁵³⁴ Only in June 1366, on learning of the death of Arnaud de Cervole, did Amadeus VI hire mercenaries before embarking at Venice.¹⁵³⁵ Amadeus VI had every reason to believe this, for in the spring of 1366 Arnaud de Cervole did his utmost to ensure that the troops that had returned to the County of Burgundy and the Duchy of Burgundy at the end of the summer of 1365 would continue south towards Avignon and join the Savoy contingent in Italy. Amadeus prepared Savoy for the crossing of the companies with a series of orders. However, this will be discussed in detail in the chapter on Arnaud de Cervole's crusade.

¹⁵²⁸ Jean Servion, *Geste et croniques...*, *op. cit.*, p. 125. But, of course, the target of Amadeus VI's crusade was above all determined by dynastic reasons: the Green Count was cousin of Emperor John V Palaeologus.

¹⁵²⁹ Housley Norman, « King Louis... », *art. cit.*, p. 202.

¹⁵³⁰ «messengerio regis d'Ongrie» N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières...*, *op. cit.*, p. 332, n° 3.

¹⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵³² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³³ Florian Chamorel, «*Ad partes infidelium*»: *la croisade d'Amédée VI de Savoie, juin 1366 - juillet 1367*, Lausanne, 2016, pp. 66-67.

¹⁵³⁴ Emanuele Federico Bollati di Saint-Pierre (ed.), *Illustrazioni della spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI. (Il Conte Verde)*, Turin, 1900, p. 37. n. 62. Here I must thank Florian Chamorel for his comments on the Amadeus VI crusade

¹⁵³⁵ F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

E) The Departure of Peter of Lusignan toward Alexandria

When Clara von Finstingen wrote her letter to Strasbourg about Arnaud de Cervole's mercenaries, first giving a concrete prediction of the size of the approaching Crusader army on 27 June 1365,¹⁵³⁶ Peter of Lusignan boarded a galley in Venice and set sail for the East.¹⁵³⁷ According to Leonitis Makhairas, the Cypriot king, 33 ships set sail for the unknown destination.¹⁵³⁸ Peter kept the purpose of the crusade so secret that even the captains of the ships only learned of the fleet's final route on the high seas. The captain of the galleys bound for Alexandria, for example, only learned of the crusade's destination in a secret letter on 4 September.¹⁵³⁹

Alexandria was one of the three major commercial ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, along with Famagusta and Laiazzo [Yumurtalık].¹⁵⁴⁰ According to Peter W. Edbury, while in the first half of the 14th century there was no increase in trade through Alexandria to Famagusta, from 1345 onwards the situation gradually changed.¹⁵⁴¹ By the middle of the century, Venetian merchants were sailing directly to Africa with papal permission, which meant that the number of Venetian ships sailing to Cyprus had halved compared to previous years.¹⁵⁴² Between 1357 and 1359, while 14 galleons arrived in Egypt, only nine arrived in Famagusta, a trend that automatically meant that Famagusta was less important to European investors and traders.¹⁵⁴³ The fall in Venetian-Cypriot trade was accompanied by the decline of Florentine trade with Famagusta in the mid-14th century. After 1350, Florentine trade with Alexandria increased steadily.¹⁵⁴⁴ The Lusignan kings sought to curb both Muslim and Christian piracy, maintaining the trade embargo as an important means of limiting unfair competition.¹⁵⁴⁵ According to Alexander D. Beihammer, although Peter I's Alexandrian crusade «*was certainly in line with chivalric ideals and theoretical claims brought forward in crusaders treaties and Franco-papal agreements*»,¹⁵⁴⁶ but in the long run it had extremely

¹⁵³⁶ AVES AA. 81, f. 56 ; USS2, p. 526, n° 652.

¹⁵³⁷ A Nicolaou-Konnari, « The Life and Reign of Peter... », art. cit., p. 22.

¹⁵³⁸ Leontios Makharias, *Recital concerning the sweet land of Cyprus, entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. and trans. R. M. Dawkins, Oxford, 1932, p. 147.

¹⁵³⁹ N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières...*, op. cit., p. 277.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Nicholas Coureas, « Economy », in Angel Nicolaou-Konnari and Chris Schabel (eds.), *Cyprus. Society and Culture, 1191-1374*, Leiden - Boston, 2005, pp. 103-156, p. 130.

¹⁵⁴¹ Peter W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusaders, 1191-1374*, Cambridge, 1991, p. 152.

¹⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴⁴ Nicholas Coureas, « Economy... », art. cit., p. 138.

¹⁵⁴⁵ A. D. Beihammer, « The Sack of Alexandria ... », art. cit., p. 80.

¹⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

damaging consequences for trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, and for Cyprus itself.¹⁵⁴⁷ Florentine trade with Famagusta continued to decline after the sack of Alexandria, and by 1391 it was only a fraction of what it had been in the first half of the 14th century.¹⁵⁴⁸ The same was true of the Provençal trade between 1351 and 1391. By this time there were hardly any foreign residents left in Famagusta.¹⁵⁴⁹

After the sack of Alexandria, trade between Europe and Egypt temporarily ceased, and the Crusaders, believing they could not hold Alexandria against the Mameluke army, abandoned their positions and retreated after the unexpectedly successful siege. Although Peter continued to attack the coastal settlements of Syria, the main Italian trading states, led by Genoa and Venice, put increasing pressure on Cyprus to come to terms with Egypt.¹⁵⁵⁰ However, peace could only be concluded after the assassination of Peter. The Crusade ultimately had a negative impact on the economic, financial and military situation of Cyprus. The decline of Famagusta was unstoppable and Cyprus became increasingly isolated.¹⁵⁵¹

However, Peter did not see all this on his way to Cyprus at the beginning of September 1365, his mind-set from his youth being defined by his legacy of the liberation of Jerusalem, which, in today's terms, permeated his thinking almost to the point of obsession.¹⁵⁵² Perhaps Guillaume de Machaut's vision of Peter floating cross at Famagusta gives an answer to how deeply the idea of the crusade influenced his thinking:

*«At Famagusta was a cross,
And you are a fool not to believe
That it was the cross of the virtuous thief
Because it was fixed neither on a pediment
Nor a wooden base, but floated
Freely in the air, touching nothing»¹⁵⁵³*

¹⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴⁸ Nicholas Coureas, « Economy... », art. cit., p. 138.

¹⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁵⁵⁰ A. D. Beihammer, « The Sack of Alexandria ... », art. cit., p. 81.

¹⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹⁵⁵² Angel Nicolau-Konnari, « Peter I of Lusignan (1329–69, 1359) in Historical Sources and Modern Popular Culture », in Alexander Beihammer and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari (eds.), *Crusading, Society, and Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of King Peter I of Cyprus*, Turnhout, 2022, pp. 31-69, p. 50.

¹⁵⁵³ GMLA 290-295.

*«This young man went there to worship.
But suddenly came to him / A voice to utter,
Four times in a row: / "Son, undertake the holy passage
and conquer your heritage»¹⁵⁵⁴*

The research of Peter Edbury and Chris Schabel, as well as contemporary papal letters, show that Peter I was motivated by the need to organise a crusade when he set out on his European journeys in 1362-1365, with the aim of leaving Europe with as powerful an army as possible.¹⁵⁵⁵ This perseverance certainly contributed to the fact that, after many promises and disappointments, and after thousands of kilometres of sailing, on 4 September 1365 Peter I was able to inform the fleet captains of the final destination of the crusade, Alexandria.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how difficult it was to prepare and organise a crusade in the mid-14th century, despite the fact that there was no lack of common will on the part of European rulers and the Papacy. The successful crusades against mercenaries in Italy and in the Kingdom of France, as well as the enthusiasm of the nobles recruited during the European journey of King Peter I of Cyprus, proved that there was still a social zeal and commitment to crusades. The problem was not determination, but a change in the political situation on the one hand, and the emergence of great companies that radically changed late medieval warfare on the other, which fundamentally determined the success of such a crusade. As the western half of Europe was at war with each other, the Hundred Years' War in the second half of the 14th century was not limited to France, but extended by implication to Italy and the western provinces of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the Iberian Peninsula, including Portugal. Without the active involvement of mercenaries, as was the case, it was impossible to organise a crusade, because no one could leave their property unprotected.

One of the defining features of papal policy in the period 1362-1365, and more broadly in the second half of the 14th century, was the search for a response to the emergence of the Great Companies. Although papal policy did not achieve its ultimate goal: it did not succeed in either weakening the mercenaries in a sustainable way or in keeping them on the periphery of Europe fighting the infidels, the chapter has also demonstrated that, even if it was not felt to be entirely useless by contemporaries, the sack of Alexandria or the capture

¹⁵⁵⁴ GMLA 299-308.

¹⁵⁵⁵ A. Nicolau-Konnari, « Peter I of Lusignan... », art. cit., p. 50.

Preparation of the crusades 1362-1365
of Gallipoli gave rise to hopes that inspired the creation of a magnificent series of frescoes
by Andrea di Bonaiuto, showing the «*Church Militant and Triumphant*.»

The Crusade of the Great Companies

«*The place of the mercenary companies in the crusading movement was paradoxical.*»¹⁵⁵⁶

Introduction

The final chapter is the story of the crusade itself, from the moment the mercenaries set out, mainly from Burgundy, through Lorraine and the Duchy of Bar, to arrive in Alsace, where they were faced with the fact that Strasbourg would not open its gates to the mercenaries, so they could not cross the Rhine and continue their journey to Hungary. A brief chronicle of their stay in Alsace will be presented and then we will return to Burgundy where Arnaud de Cervole was stabbed in a dispute, so the crusade that was launched so quickly, was disbanded just as fast unexpected and the companies left the duchy for the western campaign towards Castile.

The first part is about the assessment of the number of mercenaries involved in the crusade, as there are no accurate figures available. There are contemporary estimates, but they vary considerably. One is Carla von Finstingen's account of the Crusade, which is the most authentic one, but as will be seen, it is probably an exaggerated estimate. It is not possible to give the exact number of crusaders, not least because the crusaders did not march in one mass, but in several groups of smaller or larger numbers.

The second part of this chapter will deal with the uncertainties surrounding the time of departure and the mysterious relationship between Arnaud de Cervole and Avignon, the details of which have unfortunately been lost over time, so that it is not possible to know exactly when the Archpriest began negotiating directly with the Holy See. We do not know when and how he began to raise the army, which was huge by the standards of the time,

¹⁵⁵⁶ Norman Housley, « The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy, and the Crusades, 1356-1378 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 253-280.

and certainly larger than any of the English royal armies active in the Hundred Years' War up to 1360s.

The next section will look at the preparations for Strasbourg, and the Décapole, or the other imperial cities, the various plans and their implementation, and the reasons why Alsace remained completely defenceless.

A separate sub-chapter then analyses the ever-changing relations between the trio: the council of Strasbourg, Emperor Charles IV and Arnaud de Cervole in the summer of 1365 in Alsace, which led to much criticism of the Emperor, especially from 19th century historians.

The penultimate sub-chapter traces the crusaders' journey from Strasbourg to the two Burgundies, escorted at a safe distance by a consolidated imperial army. On their arrival, once again Arnaud de Cervole demonstrates his talent for maximising profit, taking advantage of every opportunity the Crusader army gave him to pile up a fortune during the campaign. All this, combined with a sophisticated policy that enabled him to avoid the wrath of his allies, the King of France and the Duke of Burgundy.

The chapter ends with the disintegration of the crusading army, the first steps on the road further south, until the Archpriest's death. This section is important because it provides archival evidence that the crusade to Hungary was heading towards Italy to reach Amadeus VI, according to the secondary plan. This completes the papal plan for the conquest of northern Italy and eastern France, which has not been the subject of modern historiography.

A) Some Thoughts about the Number of the Participants of the Crusade

The number of crusaders who left for Hungary cannot be calculated with any great certainty. Literary references in the 21st century vary between 10.000 and 40.000. Geoffrey Grill assumed that the average size of a small company was around 400, so he counted 10.000 mercenaries in an army of 25 captains, perhaps as many as 12.000, which is about the size of the army led by Bertrand du Guesclin.¹⁵⁵⁷ In contrast, Kenneth Fowler accepts the figure of 40.000 reported in the chronicle of Saint-Thiébault de Metz.¹⁵⁵⁸ Geoffroi Grill compiled the various counts in the medieval chronicles:

¹⁵⁵⁷ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁵⁵⁸ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

Chronicle	Members of the crusaders
Berler	60.000 horsemen and foot soldiers
Hertzog	40.000 men
Matthias de Neuenbourg	12.000 horses
Limbourg	20.000 men
Zurich	4000 horsemen and many foot soldiers
Mayance	6000 men-at-arms and 12.000 fantassins without the camp followers
Gubwiller	40.000 men
Specklin	60.000 men
Königshofen	40.000 horsemen and foot soldiers
Vigneulles	60.000 without the pages
Doyen de Saint-Thiébauld	40.000 men
Lucelle	40.000 horsemen and foot soldiers
Thann (Tschamser)	40.000 men

Table 4. Different estimations of the crusaders in the contemporary chronicles given by Geoffrey Grill¹⁵⁵⁹

Clara von Finstingen, writing to the Council of Strasbourg on 27 June 1365, gives the only figure in the archives: she estimates the number of mercenaries at 30.000, but adds that more groups were still to come: «*daz ir wol driszig dûsint sint und daz in vyl folkez nottanne kûme.*»¹⁵⁶⁰ In this sentence, it is very important to note that other groups are still arriving, since the archival sources of Dijon confirm that Arnaud de Cervole did not move the crusaders as a unit, but in separate groups under the command of a captain. In other words, the mercenaries did not march as a disorganised mob. Another letter written in June 1365,

¹⁵⁵⁹ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁵⁶⁰ AVES AA 81, f. 56 ; USS2, pp. 525-526, n° 652.

according to which small and large groups are also on their way to Alsace, confirms this.¹⁵⁶¹ Arnaud de Cervole kept in constant contact with each company, urging one to move before the next arrived.¹⁵⁶² This did not mean, of course, that the companies did not raid and destroy the first settlements in their path. The sources suggest that this was true mainly of the companies returning to county of Burgundy. This is one of the reasons why exact numbers cannot be given, as in most cases; the rural population also encountered only a smaller group of the marching crusaders. Another reason is that the captains who can be identified in the crusade were mainly from Burgundy, but it is known that mercenaries followed Arnaud de Cervole's call for the crusade not only from the south, but also from the west and north towards Alsace. It is possible that one such group is described in a letter, also written in June 1365 by an unknown author, to the city council of Strasbourg, informing them that mercenaries were interested in the road to Strasbourg. The author of the letter added that there were many crusaders to come.¹⁵⁶³

It is worth checking the size of the mercenary bands mentioned in the sources. A letter from Sélestat to Strasbourg mentions a group of 2000 people on 27 June 1365.¹⁵⁶⁴ On 5 September 500 lances are reported. Zurlauben mentions a letter written from Saarburg to Hagenau on 2 September 1365, in which it is reported that a Breton troop of 1500 spears turned north towards Molsberg.¹⁵⁶⁵ Jean du Rocher, who was staying in Belleville, reports on a company returning to Burgundy. In his letter, he mentions a company of 140 lances and 200 infantries.¹⁵⁶⁶ As can be seen, the numbers mentioned in the archival sources of the time range from groups of a few hundred to several thousand, and in the case of Clara von Finstingen, up to 30.000. The fact that there is such a widespread confirms that the crusade was not moving in a single group either towards Alsace or on its return to Burgundy. The above figures were taken seriously by the local authorities, especially the city of Strasbourg, which had also organised a reconnaissance network, as will be discussed later, to gather as much and as accurate information as possible about the approaching threat. The most complete picture of the captains who joined Arnaud de Cervole in the crusade is contained in the Treaty of Corcondray, signed on 2 December 1365. One of the chief negotiators of the treaty was Arnaud de Cervole, who, on behalf of the captains with him,

¹⁵⁶¹ AVES AA 81, f. 58 ; USS2, p. 525, n° 651.

¹⁵⁶² E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹⁵⁶³ AVES AA 81, f. 57 ; USS2, p. 525, n° 650.

¹⁵⁶⁴ AVES AA 81, f. 35 ; USS2, p. 526, n° 653.

¹⁵⁶⁵ Baron de Zurlauben, *Histoire d'Arnaud de Cervole...*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

¹⁵⁶⁶ ADCO B 1417, f. 40r, mentioned by Ernest Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, 175.

agreed with Marguerite de France, countess of Franche-Comté, that the companies returning from Alsace, which had occupied the county, would evacuate the province and march southwards in return for a ransom of 21.000 florins.¹⁵⁶⁷ The treaty is summarised in the *Dimanche de Vitel*'records, a transcription of which was also published by Aimé Chérest¹⁵⁶⁸ The entry mentions Richard Tauton, Lamit, Gaillard de la Motte, Naudon Baugerant, bourc Breteuil. According to Kenneth Fowler's calculations, the army of the Black Prince in September 1366 did not count much more than 3500 lances, which he puts at between 6000 and 8500 men. The mercenaries who made up a third to a half of the army, estimated at 3000, were largely under the captains who signed the treaty of Corcondray: Bertrucat d'Albret, Lamit, bourc Breteuil, bourc Camus, Naudon Bageran, Gaillard de la Motte, Garciot de Chastel, Bigorre, Sir Richard Tauton, John Sandes, John Alain, John Shakell, and Robert Hawley. According to these calculations, the company under one captain did not exceed 250 men. On the basis of the mainly Barroise, Lorraine and Burgundy sources mentioned above, and assuming their approximate accuracy, the figure for the size of a company, at least in the case of the main captains, should be double the number calculated by Kenneth Fowler, which is closer to Geoffrey Grill's estimate, but also exceeds it.¹⁵⁶⁹ It means that in 1363, the great company led by Arnaud de Cervole, the number of mercenaries mentioned in the Treaty of Corcondray is estimated at between 8000 and 9000. To this must be added the 3-4000 who did not return to Burgundy but turned northwards towards Luxembourg, and the captains who were to go with the Archpriest but were not mentioned in the Treaty of Corcondray because they did not take part in the invasion of Franche-Comté. The number of troops led by the more important captains can be estimated at between 1000 and 2000. Based on the above figures, the army of known captains that set out with Arnaud de Cervole for Alsace may be estimated at between 13.000 and 15.000 men, on top of that there are the numbers of mercenary companies led by unknown captains who actually took part in the crusade. However, to this must be added those who did not set out with Arnaud de Cervole for Hungary in June 1365, but intended to join him later in Burgundy. These included the Margot, led by Seguin de Badefol, but possibly also smaller units. With them, the number of mercenaries involved in the 1365 crusade must have exceeded 15.000, and if we accept Germain Butaud's estimate of the number of the Margot, it could have been as high as 20.000. However, it is important to add that the above estimate

¹⁵⁶⁷ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

¹⁵⁶⁸ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, Pièces justificatives XX, pp. 403-404.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Since there is no list of mercenaries of the type used by Kenneth Fowler, it is possible only to rely on sources to verify the above statement. Of course, it is possible that the sources are exaggerated, but for the most famous captains of the time, the sources refer to companies of 400-500 men as the trend.

is also a speculation, as there are no precise sources on the number of participants, but as shown in the section on captains, even here there is a lot of uncertainty. If Clara von Finstingen's contemporary estimate cannot be verified, it seems that Arnaud de Cervole's crusading army to Strasbourg outnumbered the mercenary army of Bertrand du Guesclin to the west, and certainly outnumbered the army assembled by the Black Prince.

B) The Departure: Problems around Timing

This is one of the most confusing and mysterious periods in the history of the Crusade, and it raises many questions without satisfactory answers. At the end of the chapter on Theatres of War, it was shown why it became very urgent for Philip the Bold to rid himself of the companies as soon as possible and send Arnaud de Cervole eastwards in the hope that he would soon be able to take the troops he had brought with him thousands of kilometres from Burgundy. For this reason he wrote an urgent letter to the Archpriest and his friend the Count of Vaudémont on 6 June concerning the departure of the troops: «*pour leur parler et dire de par lui, comment ils mettent peine et facent que les Compaignies qui sont ès parties de par delà, se départent du pays.*»¹⁵⁷⁰ In his book, François Delaborde refers to Jules Simmonet, who reproduces in full the letter written by Philip in the Dijon archives¹⁵⁷¹ Only that, by 6 June, Arnaud de Cervole had already left Burgundy and was crossing the Barrois on his way to Metz with his companies, where he was visiting on the orders of Pierre de Bar.¹⁵⁷² In fact, before he left in May, unfortunately the exact date is not known, he met with Filefort, the papal envoy, as mentioned earlier, in Mâcon, who gave him the answer to the question of absolution. In addition, here we must pause for a moment, because a great many things are not clear: according to Kenneth Fowler, the idea of two crusades clearly emerged in Avignon in early May 1365.¹⁵⁷³ However, according to Roland Delachenal, the idea dates back to earlier and Arnaud de Cervole was contacted earlier about the crusade.¹⁵⁷⁴ Moreover, Maurice Prou, in his book on Charles V, also reports on two ambassadorial delegations sent to Hungary between April and May 1365. Philip the Bold and Charles V sent Pierre Aymont,

¹⁵⁷⁰ François Delaborde, *Jean de Joinville et les seigneurs de Joinville suivi d'un catalogue de leurs actes*, Paris, 1894, p. 213.

¹⁵⁷¹ Jules Simmonet, *Essai sur l'histoire et la généalogie des sire de Joinville (1008-1386) accompagné de chartes et documents inédits*, Langres, 1876, p. 292.

¹⁵⁷² V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-168.

¹⁵⁷³ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁵⁷⁴ R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V, vol. II...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223.

Bishop of Auxerre, and Eudes de Grancey, a confidant of Philip, to Bohemia, Hungary and Germany. However, at this time, before 8 May 1365, King Charles V, Pope Urban V and the Emperor Charles IV, wanted to win Bertrand du Guesclin to lead the crusade, but he was then still a prisoner.¹⁵⁷⁵ In a letter dated 8 May to the Black Prince, Pope Urban V asks him to support Bertrand du Guesclin in his campaign against the infidels.¹⁵⁷⁶ So rather than the beginning of May, it meant the middle of May. From then on, however, there are a number of unanswered questions: the phenomenal two or three weeks would have been too short, between mid and late May, for Arnaud de Cervole to be approached to take charge of the planned crusade, for the Archpriest to liaise with the captains of the companies, to send his request to Avignon for absolution, and then to meet the Pope's legate at Mâcon. In addition, that was all the time he had. The distance between Avignon and Mâcon is 300 km, which the messengers had to cover at least four times. During that time, Arnaud de Cervole had to organise, according to the calculations, an army of 15-20.000 and its departure from eastern France. Unfortunately, few sources, with the exception of a Froissart extract, have survived from which to study the relationship between the Archpriest and the other captains. There is certainly one reference to the preparations in the sources, mentioned by both Aimé Chèrest and Ernest Petit: the case of Jean de Cornouailles. The routier, described by the sources as «*capitaine de certaines rotes de gens d'armes qui faisoient grans domaige au duché*» who in turn was in the service of Philip the Bold in the Orléans area and fought with him in Normandy. After his capture, he was sold several times by his captors for a large ransom, and finally, Arnaud de Cervole, imprisoned by Guillaume de Clugny,¹⁵⁷⁷ wanted to take him with him on the crusade and tried to act on his behalf.¹⁵⁷⁸ Nevertheless, he was not the only one to intervene, important figures such as Jacques de Vienne, Lord of Longwy, lieutenant to the King and the Duke of Autun in the dioceses of Chalon, Lyon and Langres were also involved.¹⁵⁷⁹ In Guillaume de Clugny's account, the entries for the incident fall on 23, 24, and 27 May and 27 June.¹⁵⁸⁰ However, he did not do this in person, as he was already in the Duchy of Bar, on his way to Metz.

¹⁵⁷⁵ M. Prou, *Étude sur les relations ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

¹⁵⁷⁶ Nous vous prions de le [Bertrand du Guesclin] traiter honorablement et affectueusement de favoriser son entreprise et d'ajouter entière foi à tout ce qu'il vous dira touchant cette affaire. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁵⁷⁷ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹⁵⁷⁸ ADCO B 2751, f. 14r

¹⁵⁷⁹ A. Chèrest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

¹⁵⁸⁰ ADCO B 2751, f. 14r, 15r

The sources, however, indicate that the mercenaries had already been on the crusade before the Emperor even arrived in Avignon to work out the details of the crusade. The Archpriest's troops were already in *Trayn*¹⁵⁸¹ by mid-May, with the following entry in the account of Joffroi de Horville, *prévôt* of Gondrecourt, on 18 May: «*de la grant route des Bretons qui venoit devers Mets.*»¹⁵⁸² That is to say, Arnaud de Cervole set out and organised everything long before the kings and the Pope could decide anything.

To make the situation around the departure even more complicated, it is not known exactly what role Charles IV played in the preparations before May, since on 23 May, on his arrival in Avignon, the Emperor «*has revealed to us his holy purpose for the peace and tranquillity of the entire Christian people, the subjugation of the infidels, and the exaltation of the Catholic faith.*»¹⁵⁸³ Shortly afterwards, the Pope informs the Florentines that he and the Emperor have decided to send the companies against the Turks. It seems highly unlikely that the Pope would have decided to send tens of thousands of mercenaries to Hungary through the Holy Roman Empire without the Emperor's consent. He would have had to do so if he had contacted Arnaud de Cervole before 23 May and entrusted him with the organisation of a crusade of mercenaries.

It is clear from Guillaume de Clugny's notes that Arnaud de Cervole was already preparing for the crusade on the day of the Emperor's visit to Avignon and in the days that followed, that is to say, he was in such advanced negotiations with the papal court that it was a foregone conclusion that he would lead the crusade. From the preparations for the Battle of Brignais, it is possible to see exactly how much time, money and effort it took to organise a royal army of around 10.000 men on the frontier. In addition, the number of participants in the crusade certainly exceeded this number.

Moreover, Charles V was not officially informed of all this until Avignon, long after the crusade was on its way. In the letter, Pope Urban V informs the King of France that he will finance the crusade to Hungary, led by Arnaud de Cervole, the amount of which will depend on the number of crusaders to be sent.¹⁵⁸⁴ In the letter, the Pope refers to the fact that during the Emperor's visit to Avignon, Charles IV came up with the idea of sending the companies to Hungary:

¹⁵⁸¹ Perhaps today's Tran next to Luxembourg.

¹⁵⁸² ADM B 1420, f. 42v

¹⁵⁸³ ASF Riformagioni, Atti pubblici, 1365 juni 9.

¹⁵⁸⁴ M. Prou, *Étude sur les relations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

*«we have decided that the most urgent matter is the removal of those detestable companies, which are devastating your kingdom and several other parts of Christendom, by either persuading or forcing them to march against the Turks and other infidels. The emperor is convinced that the illustrious King Louis of Hungary, our well-beloved son in God, will furnish throughout his entire kingdom a free and sure passage for these companies.»*¹⁵⁸⁵

To make matters even more complicated, Odorico Raynaldi writes that Urban V also informed Emperor Charles IV so that the French king would persuade the companies to participate in the crusade.¹⁵⁸⁶ This seems a logical step, given Philip the Bold's friendship with Arnaud de Cervole. However, the Pope was also in direct contact with Arnaud de Cervole by this time.

By 20 June, the crusaders had already left the Kingdom of France and were in the Metz area. It is known from the sources that the crusaders passed through the Duchy of Bar from several directions and in several groups and arrived at Metz. They then continued their march towards Strasbourg, and the letters quoted earlier show that their numbers were steadily increasing. Therefore, Arnaud de Cervole had done a thorough job, and not only companies from Burgundy but also from other directions had gone out at his call. One of the sources relating to the crusade in the Strasbourg letters, sent to Strasbourg by the Council of Saarburch, reports that the companies were looking for a way to Strasbourg in June 1365.¹⁵⁸⁷ It meant that they must have been a company from the north heading for Strasbourg.

Since there are conflicting facts, it is not possible to know exactly what happened. Apart from a note from Mâcon, there is no evidence of when and how Arnaud de Cervole negotiated directly with Avignon. According to the sources in Bar-le-Duc, Arnaud de Cervole and his great company took a detour towards Metz at mid-May. This means that he must have met the papal envoy in Mâcon and received a favourable reply to his request for absolution before second half of May. From then on, there are no concrete archival sources as to what actually happened. One possible explanation is that negotiations had already begun with Arnaud de Cervole sometime in April. Since we have seen that Philip the Bold and Charles V had sent envoys to Hungary in preparation for the crusade, and Arnaud de Cervole was on good terms with Burgundian duke, it is likely that they had been discussing

¹⁵⁸⁵ LSS. 1822. pp. 315-316. translation by Kenneth Fowler, K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

¹⁵⁸⁶ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

¹⁵⁸⁷ AVES AA 81, f. 56.

the idea much earlier, perhaps in April 1365. Probably through Philip's mediation, negotiations between Arnaud de Cervole and the papal court had already begun. The Archpriest took advantage of the situation, not to wait for the imperial visit, but, being primarily a military entrepreneur, to set off for Metz, where he rightly hoped to be handsomely rewarded for his detour. Metz was then a city that a great company of mercenaries could not take. However, the siege was not necessary to extract the 18 000 florins from the people of Metz. The crusade gave him a good excuse to march under Metz with the other companies not directly under his command, and to show up with an army large enough to make the city pay. This scenario explains the mismatch between the dates of the crusade and the meetings and letters of the European decision-makers. Nevertheless, it also follows, of course, that Arnaud de Cervole's detour to Metz was not a commitment to the crusade, but rather a big bluff, taking advantage of the crusade to raise extra troops and make easy money. As will be seen, he had enough reason to go to Alsace regardless of the crusade as well. However, on the way between Metz and Strasbourg, Charles V's official letter to Arnaud de Cervole arrived and he became increasingly involved in the idea of a crusade. This explains the awkward situation of Charles IV on his return from Avignon, when he unexpectedly met Arnaud de Cervole in Alsace and for eight days was clearly at a loss as to what to do. All this said, it is only one potential explanation for the timing problems surrounding the departure of the crusaders.

C) The Itinerary of the Crusaders: from Burgundy to Metz

Conventionally, the crusade was conducted from the moment Arnaud de Cervole's troops started to move towards Metz, but their journey is already very well documented, so the events can be traced. We have already discussed why Arnaud de Cervole did not head directly for Alsace and why he made a detour towards Metz.¹⁵⁸⁸ The road to Metz from Burgundy passed through the Duchy of Bar. Arnaud de Cervole had to cross the duchy with the companies of his own great company and those of the duchy and the county of Burgundy that remained after the evacuation of La Charité in the neighbourhood of Nevers and Donzy. They were then joined by the companies in Lorraine and Champagne. In Bar, the news of the arrival of the companies was followed by the resettlement of the population from the

¹⁵⁸⁸ M. Prou, *Étude sur les relations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

unprotected rural villages to the walled towns.¹⁵⁸⁹ He was given a reinforced guard of knights and esquires, including Bar himself, led by Jacques de Triconville, and remained from 22 May to 8 July.¹⁵⁹⁰ That the troops marching through the duchy included Navarrese is attested to by the account of Perrin de la Mothe, *cellérier du château de Bar*. The reinforcement of the garrison of Bar was necessary because of the «*pou warder la forteresse pou la doubte des Espaignes et des Breton*».¹⁵⁹¹ The city's artillery was also put on standby under the command of Master Hue. Records show that the city had cannons by this time.¹⁵⁹² The troops marched along a 40 km wide strip between Bar and Clermont on Argonne. The crusaders crossed the Duchy of Bar in two weeks, having arrived under Metz by 1 June. The literature does not generally go into details about the march of the companies, but when it does, it highlights atrocities against the defenceless population. However, there is much more to it than that. In addition to the obligatory pillaging that accompanied their presence, which was not accidental, since they had lived up the region they were marching through, there are many other things to be noted: there is a striking parallel between the march of the English army led by Edward from north to south and the crusader march led by Arnaud de Cervole from south to north. Both were similar in size, the Crusaders may have outnumbered Edward III's army, but the fact is that both Edward and Arnaud de Cervole marched in a similar 30-40 km wide band. They did not do this all at once, but were divided into smaller units, with Edward they were 'batailles', and with Arnaud de Cervole, according to the sources, each independent company marched alone. Presumably, in the 14th century, this 30-40 km wide area could supply enough food for an army of between 12-20.000. Next to the mill of Auzécourt, just outside Barrois, which the English sacked in 1360, the marching crusaders followed a similar pattern in 1365. Not only was the mill looted, but also on both occasions, the mercenaries stayed in houses abandoned by the inhabitants.¹⁵⁹³ The mills were important because they were a major source of food.

In addition to this, the crusaders occupied strategically important locations within the duchy, which they used to secure other troops that would later move through the area. Among the areas controlled by the mercenaries were Koeurs (12-19 June), Revigny and Laheycourt (14-15 June).¹⁵⁹⁴ Both towns were on the route of the companies' passage and it was not

¹⁵⁸⁹ ADM Inventaire-Someaire B. 1228 Compte de Colet Henrion de Saint Mihiel, châtelain et prévôt de Souilly The people received the order to «*traire à forteresse pou la doubte des Breton*».

¹⁵⁹⁰ ADM B 799, f. 1r

¹⁵⁹¹ ADM Inventaire-Someaire B. 799.

¹⁵⁹² V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167, n° b.

¹⁵⁹³ ADM B 799, f. 2.

¹⁵⁹⁴ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

by chance that they were occupied until the end of June, since, as already mentioned, the sources clearly show that the companies were joined by other mercenary troops, from other directions than the south. Edward's campaign provided the mercenary captains with just enough of an example to show that mercenaries crossing the border, and specifically the Duchy of Bar, in larger units were in no particular danger, but that small groups of mercenaries who broke away were attacked by the soldiers of the garrisons and the local lords. Those who were captured, if they were simple mercenaries, had little chance of escape. One need only think of Ulrich de Fénétrange's letter of 27 May 1365, who advised the Strasbourg council to attack any group that numbered less than 600 spears. This is the letter in which he also mentions the mysterious *Tête Noir* and his capture.¹⁵⁹⁵ The mercenaries on their way to Metz reached Longeville, about 100 km from Metz, by 1 June.¹⁵⁹⁶ Pierre de Bar, lord of Pierrefort, had a long-standing dispute with the city of Metz, which led to the outbreak of war between him and the city in early 1364.¹⁵⁹⁷ Metz's military expenditure was dominated by the war against Henri and Pierre de Bar. While Yolande de Flandre's old enemy, Pierre de Bar hired Breton mercenaries for the war, Metz contracted German and Lorraine mercenaries for the duration of the war in the established manner.¹⁵⁹⁸ Nevertheless, there were French knights who took part in a family business in the war against Henri and Pierre de Bar.¹⁵⁹⁹ Metz placed great emphasis on preventing contact with the enemy, which means that cooperation between mercenaries and the local population was common. Nothing is better proof of this than Auxois bailliage in Burgundy, from where, among other places, mercenary companies set out on the crusade against the Turks. The sources paint a picture of an intense relationship, sometimes profitable for both parties involved, but always linked to an event at the expense of a suffering third party. The network of relations between mercenaries and local society encompassed the whole of society, from knights and squires, through merchants, wealthy townspeople, clergy, soldiers in the service of princes, to the penniless poor. So, when the collaborators were captured, the local population's hatred of the mercenaries was passed on to them and they were brutally treated by the population:

« This year there was a man from Maigney whose name was L'Oreillart, he was seized at the mill of Dorcevalt, and put in a pillory, and dragged and

¹⁵⁹⁵ AVES AA 81, f. 36. ; G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

¹⁵⁹⁶ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁹⁷ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

¹⁵⁹⁸ AMM. AA49, n° 16 ; AMM EE7, 15, n° 27.

¹⁵⁹⁹ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

*thrown into the street by those of Metz, because he had helped the Bretons in several ways that cannot even be described».*¹⁶⁰⁰

Geoffroi Grill processed the military expenditures of the city of Metz for the period, and his account clearly shows that in the first half of the year the city had already spent thousands of florins on the ineffective war, but from the arrival of the crusaders onwards, the expenditures, based on the contracts concluded and the payments made, increased several times over, especially from July 1365 onwards.¹⁶⁰¹ The sources contain payments for the war up to March 1366.¹⁶⁰² Despite the 18.000 florins paid to Arnaud de Cervole, when the crusaders arrived in Alsace, they left mercenary troops behind near Metz to plunder the city's environs.¹⁶⁰³ In this respect, too, the campaign of Edward III and the march of Arnaud de Cervole's crusaders are very similar, since in both cases some captains stayed behind and fought even longer in a territory occupied by the companies. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. One is the organisational structure of armies made up of several independent mercenary companies. If a mercenary captain, who was not directly dependent on the Baneret lords, in Edward's case, did not enter into an indenture contract for the duration of the campaign, but joined the army, like the German mercenaries most of whom Edward had dispatched from Calais, saw it fit to make a greater profit locally, he did not continue to follow the main army. The other option was the organisation of the march of the armies of contemporary times: as we have seen, they always marched in smaller units, just as Arnaud de Cervole did, or, as in the case of Edward III's campaign between Reims and Burgundy, the army holding capacity of the marching areas simply did not allow armies of tens of thousands to march at once. Therefore, the marching of the armies was spread out in space and time, so it was natural that there would be troops left behind who took advantage of the time it took to spread out and exploit the area around their quarters. A third possible explanation is that they also seized the army left behind to ensure the safety of the last troops to leave. All this said, the appearance of Arnaud de Cervole cost the city of Metz much more than that. The Lord of Pierrefort's gamble worked, and a peace was concluded in favour of Metz.¹⁶⁰⁴ Ever since the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War appeared on

¹⁶⁰⁰ D. de S. Thiébault de Metz, « Chronique, ou Annales... », art. cit., p. 650.

¹⁶⁰¹ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, op. cit., pp. 162-167.

¹⁶⁰² AMM EE7, 15, f. 37.

¹⁶⁰³ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Préliminaires de la paix, entre Henri de Bar, Seigneur de Pierrefort, Pierre de Bar, son fils, et la ville de Metz. J. François and N. Tabouillot, *Preuves de l'histoire...*, op. cit., pp. 222-223.

the frontiers, Henri de Bar's case fits neatly into the series of private wars decided by alliances with a single great company. Between 1360 and 1365, Arnaud de Cervole was the specialist in this field, since his great company was involved in all such wars on the frontier.

D) The Companies' Journey from Metz to Strasbourg

Strasbourg kept a constant watch on the crusaders' progress, and was not surprised by their arrival. The city organised a network of surveillance *«the gathering of information was not random, and each man sent out into the country to gather information corresponded to one or more gaps to be filled in the knowledge that the enemy had. The search for certain data depended on their sole initiative: (and was vital) when the presence of an enemy troop in an area was underestimated, or even attested, but neither its position nor its numbers were known.»*¹⁶⁰⁵ In the last days of June 1365, the council of the city received letters containing information on the crusaders and their leader Arnaud de Cervole every day. Johann Erbe, a citizen of Strasbourg, reported to the Council on the negotiations between Arnaud de Cervole and Brocard de Fénétrange in Lorraine.¹⁶⁰⁶ The letter reveals that, according to Johann Erbe, the companies were stationed around 16 June in the Metz area, just four miles from the city, and were certainly heading for Strasbourg. No precise estimate is given of the number of mercenaries, but only that there was *«ein gros volg ist.»*¹⁶⁰⁷ Furthermore, the writer of the letter would inform the Council as soon as he knew more. An unknown person reported sometime in June 1365 that there was no way of knowing which way the companies would go, but that he would try to inform Strasbourg of the latest news as soon as possible: *«But what there was on their mind, nobody knows, and as soon as I shall know more, I shall immediately let you know, as quickly as I can.»*¹⁶⁰⁸ A few days later, however, they received concrete news in Heintzemann's letter from Masmünster that a small group had already set off for Alsace and reached Wiedersdorf, now Vergaville,¹⁶⁰⁹ about 100 km from Strasbourg:

¹⁶⁰⁵ N. Savy, « Le renseignement... », art. cit., pp. 183-208.

¹⁶⁰⁶ AVES. AA. 81, f. 35 ; USS2, p. 522, n° 647 : « Johann Erbe an Straßburg: Nachrichten über die Engländer », (shortly after 18 June 1365).

¹⁶⁰⁷ 'a large crowd' AVES. AA. 81, f. 35 ; USS2, p. 522, n° 647.

¹⁶⁰⁸ AVES AA. 81, f. 57 ; « Ungenannter an den Leutpriester von Alt. Peter: Nachricht über die Engländer 1365 », in USS2, p. 525, n° 650.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Hans Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit des ersten Engländerneinfalles 1365 », *Jahrbuch für Geschichte, Sprache und Literatur Elsass-Lothringens Herausgegeben von dem Historisch-Literarischen Zweigverein des Vogesen-Clubs*, vol. XIII, Straßburg, 1897, pp. 3-55, p. 23.

«Knowing, that a small group of English armed men are staying in Wiedersdorf and a large group of armed men has not yet joined them, they are staying near Metz. So the lords also say, they have not yet been to Alben neither to Buckenheim, and I will ride further so that I can uncover more secrets of the others.»¹⁶¹⁰

This letter also proves that throughout the crusade Arnaud de Cervole directed the movement of troops in the same way, i.e. in smaller units, as has been discussed several times. A letter from Clara von Finstingen, Countess of Saarweden, a relative of Brocard de Fénétrange, dated 26 June, gives the only contemporary estimate of the date, which had been mentioned shortly before. What is interesting here is that on 26 June a larger unit, probably led by Arnaud de Cervole, passed through at Saawerden.¹⁶¹¹ The same conscious organisation of the troops' march is worth pointing out, for the distance between Sarrewerden and Vergaville is 35 km, and this is the same distance when Arnaud de Cervole organised the march of the companies northwards at Barrois on his way toward Metz, or that that marked the 1359/60 campaign of Edward III's army. The network reporting the movements of mercenaries, operated by Strasbourg, was so extensive that news was reaching the city daily by the end of June. Konrad Justinger reports that the wealthier mercenaries who made the journey to the Rhine on horseback watered their horses in the river and then continued south.¹⁶¹² On 27 June, Johann Schenke confirmed to the council that he had heard from Klaus Almant, a mercenary in the service of Arnaud de Cervole, that the mercenaries were aiming for Strasbourg and that the advance guard was already at Blâmont, only 52 km from Strasbourg.¹⁶¹³ On the same day as Johann Schenke's letter, another message was received from Sélestat that a great company of about 2000 men, lagging behind the main army, was heading directly from the Burgundian countryside towards Strasbourg and crossing the Vosges pass of Saint-Dié-des-Vosges, i.e. 86 km from Strasbourg. From the sender of the letter, we learn that this company was only 47 km from

¹⁶¹⁰ AVES AA. 81, f. 58. Heintzemann von Masmünster an Straßburg: über die Engelländer june, 1365. Archives de La Ville et l'Eurométropole de Strasbourg ; USS2, p. 525, n° 651.

¹⁶¹¹ AVES AA. 81, f. 50 ; « Clara von Finstingen an Straßburg: über die Engländer », (26. June 1365), in USS2, pp. 525-526, n° 652.

¹⁶¹² Konrad Justinger, *Die Berner-chronik*, ed. Studer Gottlieb, Bern, 1871, p. 127.


¹⁶¹³ AVES AA. 81, f. 54 ; « Johann Schenke an Straßburg: Nachrichten über den Marsch der Engländer », (27-28 June 1365), in USS2, p. 526, n° 654.

the town of Sélestat, i.e. they had chosen the direct route. This letter also proves that the Archpriest was in constant contact with the companies he led and organised.¹⁶¹⁴ It follows from this letter that the companies that did not set off with Arnaud de Cervole for Metz logically arranged to meet at Strasbourg. At some point around this time, Hennemann von Moyenmoutier's letter to the Abbot reveals that Strasbourg was systematically trying to map the progress of the companies, as the abbey was not far to the north of Saint-Dié-des-Vosges. They therefore tried to locate the direction in which the 2000-strong company indicated by Sélestat crossed the Vosges.

*«To the right honourable Mayor and Councillors of Strasbourg... (I)
Hennemann, through the Providence of God, abbot of the Convent of
Moyenmoutier, with great love I am ready to serve you. My very dear Sirs!
I hereby inform you that I received your letter this past Monday, and about
whom you inquire, namely the English, I cannot report with any certainty
about anything new. My dear Sirs, rest assured that as soon as I do know
anything I will let you know swiftly, I myself or a trustworthy servant of
mine shall write to you. I am your humble and obedient servant to
command. May the Lord Almighty grant you a long life in his name!»¹⁶¹⁵*

¹⁶¹⁴ Schlettstadt an Straßburg: Ein Haufe der Engländer liegt im Thal von St. Dié. USS. 526, no 653.

¹⁶¹⁵ « Abt Hennemann von Moyenmoutier an Straßburg: über die Engländer nicht Neues, Nachricht über den Hercog von Lothringen und den Erzbischof von Trier », (1365) AVES AA 81, f. 37 ; USS2, pp. 545-546, n° 697.



Map 19. Information system on the Crusader march. Summer 1365

As the map indicates, the council of Strasbourg had precise information on the crusaders' whereabouts. The council of Strasbourg had more than a month before the arrival of Cervole's army. The black and dotted lines indicate the *routiers'* itinerary, while the numbers indicate the settlements from where a message was sent to the council. The distance from Strasbourg is also indicated on the map.

If one regards the map, it is apparent how accurately the surveillance was organised. The authorities gathered information directly from the crusaders' immediate environment. Having sufficient information at her disposal, Strasbourg was able to prepare for the crusaders' arrival and so the council of the city asked for help from several imperial cities such as Trier,

Colmar, Basel,¹⁶¹⁶ Freiburg, Rottweil,¹⁶¹⁷ Nördlingen, Mainz¹⁶¹⁸ and different municipalities in the Palatinate. In fact, Strasbourg had had much more time to prepare for the arrival of the mercenaries, as they had been expecting the companies led by Arnaud de Cervole for some time. They had not expected such a large army, but it is clear from their preparations that on paper at least they wanted to field an army approaching the number of crusaders.

E) Preparation for the Arrival of the Mercenaries: The Alliance Policy of Strasbourg and the Décapole

As a result of the new private war waged by the Count of Blamont, Alsace, and Strasbourg in particular, was directly threatened due to its proximity to the conflict zone. The counties of Blamont and Salm, as immediate neighbours of Alsace, extended into the region, with Salm even encroaching into the Brisach.¹⁶¹⁹ The city of Strasbourg, as an ally of Bishop Johann of Strasbourg, declared war against Count Theobald of Blamont on 20 December 1364.¹⁶²⁰

With the expiration of the alliance against the English on December 25, 1364, the members of the league were already active in anticipation of an imminent armed invasion at the beginning of 1365. A new assembly was convened in Sélestat on January 14, 1365, to address the following points: 1) Appointment of six captains with the authority to issue warnings and oversee all necessary measures for the protection of the land. 2) Determination of contingents. 3) Treatment of foreigners leading the society into the land as if they were locals. 4) Inclusion of the above in the alliance letter. 5) Definition of the league's boundaries, considering various scenarios based on the participation of the Bishop of Basel, the Bishop of Strasbourg, the Abbot of Murbach, and other entities.¹⁶²¹

This assembly demonstrated the active response of the league members to the immediate threat posed by the English, necessitating quick decision-making and coordination. However, this is only true in theory, practice had shown otherwise. The last Upper Rhine

¹⁶¹⁶ AVES AA 81, f. 46.

¹⁶¹⁷ AVES AA 81, f. 56.

¹⁶¹⁸ AVES AA 81, f. 22.

¹⁶¹⁹ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 16.

¹⁶²⁰ « Meister und Rat von Straßburg sagen Dieball Herrn ut Blamont wegen seiner Thal gegen Bischof Johann die Fehde an », in USS1, p. 498, n° 611.

¹⁶²¹ Beginning of 1365: « Tagesordnung für einen in Schlettstadt gegen die Engländer projektierten Bundestag », in USS2, p. 521, n° 644.

league against the English was concluded on February 28, 1363. Since it had expired, the decision seemed to be to forego the formal renewal.¹⁶²²

The planned league assembly did not take place on January 14, as initially indicated, but rather on 10 January in Sélestat.¹⁶²³ This change likely occurred at the last moment since Freiburg had no knowledge of it on January 11 and was consequently not represented on that day. According to the agenda, the six captains were reappointed and sworn in until June 24. They were explicitly granted the authority to negotiate with the companies and recruit servants and messengers. In the event of mobilization, the league members below Colmar were to gather in that area. 400 archers were to be stationed in the fortresses of Belfort, Delle, Florimont, Rougemont, Grandvillars, Porrentruy, and Mulhouse to guard the main entry points to the land. These fortifications were guarded by local lords, such as the bishops of Strasbourg and Basel, and the cities of Strasbourg, Basel and Fribourg.¹⁶²⁴

On this day, the contingents of each league member were finally determined. The figures provide a telling picture of what Alsace and its immediate Upper Rhine neighbours could contribute in times of urgent need, at least on paper. The original estimates envisioned a league army of 16.000 armed men, 1190 pikemen, and 800 archers. However, Basel's contingents, both from the bishop and the city, were eliminated, and a reduced estimate of 1200 armed men and 200 archers was added for Basel. The pikemen for the Bishop of Strasbourg were reduced to 200. Thus, the total stood at 13.300 armed men, 840 pikemen, and 800 archers.¹⁶²⁵

Nevertheless, this was still a significant force, especially considering that the 400 archers designated to protect the Belfort Gap were not included in these numbers, Freiburg, unrepresented on that day, had not yet declared its contingent, and Ludwig and Simon of Lichtenberg, along with the Lords of Ochsenstein and Geroldseck, were willing to contribute support to the league according to their means. In comparison to the leagues of 1362 and 1363, the lord of Rappoltstein, Graf Johann von Habsburg, the Counts of Fürstenberg, the Lords of Geroldseck-Tübingen and Geroldseck-Lahr, as well as the *Landvogt* of Alsace,¹⁶²⁶ did not participate in the meeting.¹⁶²⁷ It is not certain that they were not informed in time of the change in date of the meeting.¹⁶²⁸

¹⁶²² H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 17.

¹⁶²³ K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries I...*, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁶²⁴ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 17.

¹⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁶²⁶ In the 14th century, the *Landvogt* was the highest representative of a sovereign in Alsace. The imperial *Landvogt* was appointed by German emperors and kings.

¹⁶²⁷ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 19.

¹⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

The league's combined force, if properly assembled and deployed, was still deemed strong enough to repel invaders from the easily defensible region. To fund the defence, a tax was imposed on the land. However, difficulties arose in collecting the tax, leading to conflicts between allied cities, such as Strasbourg and Hagenau. The *Landvogt* even prohibited payments from Imperial monasteries and villages. Despite the English threat having subsided by March 15, 1366, there were lingering disputes over tax collection.¹⁶²⁹

Internal conflicts and disputes hindered the collective efforts to face the common danger. The imminent threat became more tangible when Basel reported on 19 April that a large group of English forces was just two days' march away. The English threat played a significant role in the negotiations between Strasbourg and both the Lower Rhine cities and the Swiss cities. By April 22, Graf Heinrich von Veldenz informed the Strasbourg authorities that he had decided to take action against the English invaders if they entered the region, using all his power including artillery as well.¹⁶³⁰ The situation was deemed so perilous that on 22 April, the Landfriede in the Middle Rhine region decided to prepare its defences as if the enemy incursion could happen in eight days.¹⁶³¹ The neighbouring Lorraine was overrun by Arnaud de Cervole's company adding to the urgency and concern.¹⁶³²

On 24 April 1365, Charles IV arrived in Strasbourg, greeted with great pomp. All guilds adorned in armour lined the Münstergasse through which the emperor entered - it was a first for him as emperor in the city.¹⁶³³ He made only a brief stop in Strasbourg, confirming on 25 April that the city's rights.¹⁶³⁴ Thus, the emperor's whirlwind visit to the city did not improve Strasbourg's situation.

As it became more and more certain that the troops the league would have to supply would only exist on paper, a more flexible solution was sought, one that would respond more quickly to the arrival of the mercenaries led by Arnaud de Cervole. A proposal was made to recruit up to 500 mercenaries at the expense of the alliance to form a core of a potent military force, to which individual federal contingents could be attached. The inclusion of Count of Montbéliard in the alliance, whose land was strategically important between Wasgau and Jura, was also to be decided at this assembly.¹⁶³⁵ The only certainty was the appointment of the six chief officers, expected to recruit up to 500 mercenaries if deemed necessary.¹⁶³⁶

¹⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶³⁰ « Der Rheinische Landfriede an Straßburg: hat beschlossen gegen die Engländer zu ziehen », in USS1, pp. 508-509, n° 630.

¹⁶³¹ A. W. Strobel, *Vaterländische Geschichte II...*, op. cit., p. 343.

¹⁶³² A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, op. cit., p. 315.

¹⁶³³ E. Werunsky, *Geschichte Kaiser Karls IV. III...*, op. cit., p. 319.

¹⁶³⁴ A. W. Strobel, *Vaterländische Geschichte II...*, op. cit., p. 344.

¹⁶³⁵ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 21.

¹⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Nevertheless, even this latest commitment had not been fulfilled. Despite these extensive preparations, when the crusaders arrived in Alsace no armed resistance had been organised, and Alsace stood defenceless before Arnaud de Cervole and his mercenaries.

F) Charles IV in Alsace in the Summer of 1365

When Charles IV arrived back in the Empire, he hardly expected the crusade he had only recently been organizing to become a reality before his very eyes, with thousands of mercenaries on the loose raiding rural villages and the suffering population retreating to walled cities.¹⁶³⁷ When he arrived a hostile people greeted him. Part of the reason for the tension was a banal situation. One of the emperor's servants refused to give way to a citizen of Strasbourg and was imprisoned.¹⁶³⁸ The affair became so bad, that the emperor did not even enter to Strasbourg, but set up camp north of the city at Seltz.¹⁶³⁹ Nevertheless, the discontent was not confined to Strasbourg, it extended to the whole of Alsace. In the face of these events, a sense of despair must have seized the heavily afflicted Alsatian land. Held captive by foreign marauders, against whose overwhelming force no one in the land could raise arms, the council of Strasbourg had hoped day by day for the Emperor to appear on the scene as the victor and liberator with the gathered might of the Empire. Day by day, they waited in vain; the Emperor remained silent, as succinctly noted by Königshofen.¹⁶⁴⁰ He issued numerous charters, but none addressed the looming threat over the land. It was not until 4 July that he decided to urge the princes and cities of the Empire to come to Seltz with all their strength, both on horseback and on foot, for the protection of the Empire.¹⁶⁴¹ It took him four full days from his arrival in Strasbourg to make this urgently needed decision. On the same day, this message went out to the neighbouring regions, that the enemy forces had invaded Alsace.¹⁶⁴² The Emperor camped at Eckbolsheim, on the west side of Strasbourg, where he was joined by the Bishop of Strasbourg and his troops.¹⁶⁴³

¹⁶³⁷ R. Reuss, « La première invasions ... », art. cit., pp. 291-293 ; H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., pp. 32-34.

¹⁶³⁸ R. Reuss (ed.), *Les Collectanées De Daniel Specklin...*, op. cit., p. 280.

¹⁶³⁹ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 29.

¹⁶⁴⁰ F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, op. cit., p. 162.

¹⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴² R. Reuss, « La première invasions ... », art. cit., p. 295.

¹⁶⁴³ F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, op. cit., p. 162.

Now, the rumour circulated that he was the one who had summoned these formidable enemies. In Alsace, people believed the rumour that the English were in the land at the command of Charles IV. The eight day waiting of the Emperor, and above all, the fact that he had begun negotiations with the Archpriest, provided fertile ground for rampant rumours. Matthias von Neuenburg also mentions that the Archpriest himself had invoked an imperial order based on agreements between the Emperor and the Pope and the negotiations he had conducted as a result of these agreements.¹⁶⁴⁴ On 8 July, the Emperor urged the Strasbourg Council to send one of its members to accompany the Count of Leiningen, whom he sent to the Archpriest.¹⁶⁴⁵ The subject of these negotiations is not mentioned in the sources. On 12 July, the city of Strasbourg and Bishop Johann II of Lichtenberg granted Arnaud de Cervole safe passage for a round trip to the Emperor with 100 lances and 20 crossbowmen.¹⁶⁴⁶ However, the Archpriest never used these safe conduct letters to approach the Emperor; the plundering of the Alsatian land continued unabated.¹⁶⁴⁷ On the same day, Basel wrote to Strasbourg asking for help.¹⁶⁴⁸ Meanwhile, rumours accusing the Emperor as the source of the sufferings in their land spread rapidly, not limited to Alsace but extending across the entire German Southwest within a few days. The further they spread, the more unrestrictedly the imagination could indulge in their exaggeration. In Pfullendorf, it was heard that the Emperor was with the English at Seltz, building a bridge over the Rhine to lead them into Swabia. As early as 9 July, with signs of deep concern, the officials of a Swabian town asked Strasbourg for information on this matter.¹⁶⁴⁹ The Mainz chronicler also confirms the widespread belief that the Emperor intended to lead the English across the Rhine, and only the resistance of the population of the German Southwest prevented him. Such unfounded suspicions might not have gained much traction in the Alsace population due to their proximity to the events. However, concerns increased here as well due to negotiations with the Archpriest. On 12 July, Colmar felt compelled to inquire with Strasbourg about rumours circulating in the land regarding negotiations between some lords and the English.¹⁶⁵⁰

¹⁶⁴⁴ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 44.

¹⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁴⁶ 12 July 1365: « Meister und Rat von Straßburg thun kund, daß sie Arnold von Cervola sicheres Geleit zum Kaiser und zurück gegeben haben », in USS2, p. 532, n. 667.

¹⁶⁴⁷ AVES AA 81, f. 46 ; USS2, pp. 534-535, n° 674.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Senatus Basiliensis ad Argentinensem literae, quibus petit auxilium adversus Anglos 12 July 1365. Johann Daniel Schöpflin, *Alsaciae diplomaticae*, vol. II, Mannheim, 1775, p. 247, n° MCXXIII.

¹⁶⁴⁹ « Pfullendorf an Straßburg: über die Gerüchte, daß Kaiser Karl die Engländer ins Land ziehen wolle », in USS2, pp. 531-532, n° 666.

¹⁶⁵⁰ « Colmar an Straßburg: fragt an über das Gerücht, daß etliche Herren mit den Engländern verhandeln », in USS2, p. 532, n° 668.

The Archpriest's eventual rejection of the imperial proposals had the least effect of prompting the Emperor to seriously consider and prepare for a decision through military means. At the suggestion of Strasbourg's Bishop Johann II of Lichtenberg, the Emperor summoned him along with envoys from the cities of Strasbourg, Freiburg, and Basel, as well as the Count Palatine Ruprecht the Elder and envoys from Mainz, Worms, and Speyer, to meet on 17 July in Seltz to discuss the welfare of the Empire and the Alsace region.¹⁶⁵¹ The meeting was timed by the Emperor in such a way as to make Arnaud de Cervole aware of the size of the imperial forces that had been assembled. According to Daniel Specklins, these troops were equal to that of the crusader's army of the Archpriest:

*«When Boeinundus, Archbishop of Trier, became aware of these people, he assembled a large army with Cuno von Falkenslein, Wenzeslas Duke of Lülzclhurg, Waldemar of Sponheim, Veldenz, Slarkenburg, totaling 20 thousand.»*¹⁶⁵²

After the publication of the special collection of the correspondences of the imperial cities in the Strasbourg archives, studies were published in French and German, drawing on the newly published sources to reinterpret the complicated relationship between the Emperor, Strasbourg and Arnaud de Cervole. Both Hans Witte, who was involved in the compilation of the *Urkundenbuch* of Strasbourg, and Rodolphe Reuss, concluded that Charles IV had taken revenge on the city and on Alsace, partly because of his previous grievances and partly because of the insults and hostility he had suffered on his return to Alsace.¹⁶⁵³ Rudolf Bott, on the other hand, concluded that the emperor had acted rationally when he waited at Seltz for a force of sufficient size to assemble and only then started south.¹⁶⁵⁴ Then, in addition, he advanced cautiously, not risking an open battle with Arnaud de Cervole. These authors, however, were not aware of the full plan of the crusade, for Odorico Rinaldi had already published a letter written by Charles IV to King Charles V of France,¹⁶⁵⁵ and a letter of almost identical content sent on the same day to Joanna I, Queen of Naples,¹⁶⁵⁶ informing them of the Emperor's commitment to the crusade in Hungary. Moreover, Charles IV

¹⁶⁵¹ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 36.

¹⁶⁵² R. Reuss (ed.), *Les Collectanées De Daniel Specklin...*, op. cit., p. 279.

¹⁶⁵³ R. Reuss, « La première invasions... », art. cit., p. 291.

¹⁶⁵⁴ J. D. Schöpflin, *Alsatie diplomatie...*, opt. cit., p. 279.

¹⁶⁵⁵ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, op. cit., p. 442.

¹⁶⁵⁶ A. Sautier, *Papst Urban...*, op. cit., pp. 123-124, n° 19.

foresaw the difficulties of a well-prepared campaign, not to mention the situation he found himself in in Alsace in July 1365. Charles IV had specifically promised the Pope that he would ensure that mercenaries on a crusade, if they were unable to cross the empire, would make their way south and join Amadeus VI in Venice.¹⁶⁵⁷ As he notes, Plan B would of course cost much more than marching overland.¹⁶⁵⁸ The Green Count, who had been appointed Imperial Vicar by Charles IV on his way to Avignon,¹⁶⁵⁹ acted according to this plan when he invited Arnaud de Cervole to cross Savoy and head south-west towards Italy.¹⁶⁶⁰ In this context, the emperor's behaviour is perfectly understandable and rational, since no one had an interest in an open confrontation in Alsace. There is no record of a meeting between the Count of Leiningen and Arnaud de Cervole. It is thought that Arnaud de Cervole wanted to enter the imperial service, but when that did not happen, he headed south. This is borne out by the behaviour of Arnaud de Cervole after the meeting, when he tried to drive the companies south through the duchy of Burgundy. Moreover, it is also borne out by imperial policy, for Charles IV could not afford to remain completely inactive in Alsace when tens of thousands of foreign mercenaries were freely roaming the imperial territories, but he could resolve the situation by a simple negotiation, with the threat of adequate forces behind him.

G) The Departure of the Companies from Alsace, the Road back to Burgundy

As agreed, Arnaud de Cervole headed south, while his troops systematically plundering for food as any passing army of the time would, set off for Basel. It was suspected that Arnaud de Cervole's revenge was behind the looting, but there is no evidence of this.¹⁶⁶¹

The southward march of the crusaders was in the same orderly fashion, divided into smaller and larger groups. One route took the Benfeld Dambach, Sélestat line of the Rhine-Vosges river valley, while a larger flank of defenders marched towards Basel to protect the main force, which was heading towards the Belfort gap.¹⁶⁶² The Trouée de Belfort, known as the Porte de Bourgogne, in German as Burgunder Pforte, designates a region of relatively level

¹⁶⁵⁷ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

¹⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁹ F. Chamorel, *Un destin méditerranéen...*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁶⁶⁰ E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

¹⁶⁶¹ R. Reuss, « La première invasions ... », *art. cit.*, p. 294.

¹⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 297.

terrain situated in eastern France, positioned amidst the Vosges Mountains to the north and the Jura Mountains to the south. This geographical expanse serves as the demarcation line between the Rhine watershed to the east and the Rhone watershed to the west, thereby constituting an integral segment of the European watershed separating the North Sea from the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, it delineates the boundary between the historical regions of Burgundy to the west and Alsace to the east, consequently signifying the Franco-German border during in the 14th century. The emperor followed the retreating crusaders with the assembled imperial army.¹⁶⁶³ Faced with the advance of the troops, the cities of the Decapolis at least did not surrender. The resistance did not go so far as to block the mercenary army from reaching the Belfort Gap, but it was at least enough to prevent the cities from being sacked, which they were unlikely to do with the imperial army on their heels. Imperial charters issued in Speyer recognise the resistance against the English of the towns of Haguenau, Colmar, Sélestat, Wissembourg, Erstein, Rosheim, Kaysersberg, Turckheim, Munster, Mulhouse and Seltz.¹⁶⁶⁴

In this way, the emperor kept the imperial army intact and made the mercenaries leave Alsace. However, the local population paid the price for the marching troops with six years of famine.¹⁶⁶⁵ More than one of the sacked churches and monasteries fell victim to the crusaders on the march. According to Specklin, the small Alsatian town of Rouffrach was also burnt down, some of the population massacred, women and children raped, and many of the survivors taken away.¹⁶⁶⁶ As mentioned, the area around Thann was devastated while bands were certainly moving up the Thur valley to cross the Vosges.¹⁶⁶⁷ The chronicler Materne Berler, parish priest of Guebenschwihr, writing at the beginning of the 16th century, also recounts the depredations of the looters who deprived the convent of Saint-Marc: «*Hoc inhumanissimum vulgus erant Angli primarii.*»¹⁶⁶⁸

However, a larger group, estimated at several thousand men, broke away from the southbound companies and headed north instead of south. Informed by a letter from the Bishop of Strasbourg, John II, the city authorities considered the situation so dangerous that they ordered immediate fortifications at Brisach.¹⁶⁶⁹ The direct route from the south to Strasbourg, which had been taken shortly before by the 2,000 men who had missed the

¹⁶⁶³ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 42.

¹⁶⁶⁴ R. Bott, *Die Kriegszüge...*, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

¹⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁶⁶ R. Reuss (ed.), *Les Collectanées De Daniel Specklin...*, op. cit., p. 280.

¹⁶⁶⁷ M. Tschamser, *Chronique de Thann...*, opt. cit., p. 401.

¹⁶⁶⁸ R. Reuss, « La première invasions... », art. cit., p. 298, n° 2.

¹⁶⁶⁹ « Bischof Johann II an Meister und Rat: sendet Nachrichten über die Engländer », in USS2, p. 536, n° 677.

start and met Arnaud de Cervole at Strasbourg, was evidently defended. This is the first break in the fabric of the mercenary army involved in the crusade. Neither the chronicles nor the archives have been able to identify the exact composition of the army of some 3-4000 mercenaries, or about a quarter of the number recruited by Arnaud de Cervole, who were on their way to Luxembourg. It is also unknown whether it consisted of one company or of several smaller companies forming an alliance of captains. Jean Henri, *prévôt* of Gondrecourt, in September 1365, warns of the threat from the south: «*pour savoir des nouvelles des Bretons qui estoient en Barrois.*»¹⁶⁷⁰ Indeed, these companies were reported in Remiremont on 9 August, and then spent a few weeks looting in Barrois.¹⁶⁷¹ In October, they reached Luxembourg, but were defeated by the Duke of Brabant, and several of them were captured and hanged.¹⁶⁷²

H) Arnaud de Cervole in the two Burgundies

Burgundy experienced months of unprecedented peace and tranquillity as the Crusaders left. Although the peace was not complete, as the mercenaries who remained in the service of the Duke did not receive their pay from the gutted treasury, they took their revenge on the local population in the usual way. All this said, the situation of the duchy cannot be compared to the miserable conditions of early 1364/65 depicted on the maps in the final sub-chapter of Theatres of War. Philip the Bold, quickly taking advantage of the momentary lull, made his way to Paris to enjoy the summer at his brother's royal court.¹⁶⁷³ The duke was not persuaded to return immediately, even by the fact that the Crusaders had re-entered to the two Burgundies through the Belfort Gap. In the meantime, the partial evacuation of Anse had already taken place and the agreement was for Seguin de Badefol to evacuate and surrender the town by 13 September.¹⁶⁷⁴ The mercenaries, idle these days because of the deal, found it increasingly difficult to bear doing nothing. Jean de Rochier reported that a band of 160 spearmen and 200 sergeants from the Margot was preparing to sack Burgundian towns: «*de prandre bonnes ville ou forteresse en dit duché.*»¹⁶⁷⁵ Time was pressing, but they had not yet found Arnaud de Cervole, who was soon to be joined by

¹⁶⁷⁰ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 172, n° d.

¹⁶⁷¹ ADM B 1420, f. 41v

¹⁶⁷² V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹⁶⁷³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁶⁷⁵ ADCO B 1417, f. 40r

Seguin de Badefol. However, Arnaud de Cervole suddenly had a rival in Bertrand du Guesclin, who also had his eye on the returning companies heading for Italy. Bertrand du Guesclin was taken prisoner for the third time in his life on 29 September 1364, during the Battle of Auray.¹⁶⁷⁶ After a heavy ransom had been paid, Charles V instructed him to gather the remaining companies in the kingdom after the departure of Arnaud de Cervole and to help Enrique of Trastámara to the throne.¹⁶⁷⁷ He arrived in Burgundy with his cortege on 27 September 1365. By order of Guillaume de Clugny, the population of the unprotected countryside had to be moved into fortified castles and towns, «*pour cause des gens de messire Bertrand de Guesclin, qui devoient passer par Bourgoigne*»¹⁶⁷⁸ In Auxerre, he met Guardia Raymond to contact the companies still here and those that had already returned and to persuade them to join the Spanish adventure.¹⁶⁷⁹ Guardia Raymond was one of the recruiters who had good relations with the English, Gascon and Navarrese captains.¹⁶⁸⁰ This was the moment when Bertrucat d'Albret arrived in Chalonnaise with several other captains.¹⁶⁸¹ Girard de Longchamp reported that «*ils vont en la terre de mgr le duc de Bourgoigne pour faire guerre.*»¹⁶⁸² Crossing Limagne and Forez, he came to Burgundy with his great company of 360 men to join Seguin de Badefol.¹⁶⁸³ His appearance, of course, posed a serious threat to the duchy. By now, Arnaud de Cervole had returned to Burgundy with his troops. Frère Darre, who remained with Bertrucat d'Albret, occupied the castle of Rouvres, since he did not want to follow Arnaud de Cervole south, nor did he want to join Bertrand du Guesclin.¹⁶⁸⁴ Later, at the death of Arnaud de Cervole, the two of them will be important, but now we must return to Arnaud de Cervole, who, after leaving Alsace with the Crusaders, disappeared for a while, leaving the troops themselves behind on their way to Burgundy. The only certainty is that on 20 October, he was back in the Duchy, returning to his estate in Châteautilain, where the Duke had sent him a letter.¹⁶⁸⁵ Several 19th century authors suggest that he gathered additional reinforcement from the banks of the Meuse and returned to Burgundy.¹⁶⁸⁶ However, there is no information on this in the archives. A letter

¹⁶⁷⁶ P. Contamine, *La guerre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

¹⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁶⁷⁸ ADCO B 2751, f. 16r ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

¹⁶⁷⁹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

¹⁶⁸⁰ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VI...*, *op. cit.*, p. LXXXI, n° 3.

¹⁶⁸¹ ADCO B 1423, f. 29r

¹⁶⁸² ADCO B 1423, f. 29r ; E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

¹⁶⁸³ N. Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret...*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁶⁸⁴ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

¹⁶⁸⁵ ADCO B 1417, f. 40v, mentioned by A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

¹⁶⁸⁶ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

from Saarburch, sent to Hagenau on 5 September, reveals that there was another group of 500 lances that, on their return to Alsace, was to have been reinforced. The writer of the letter urged the authorities to resist and not to allow the return of the *rouiers*. In the same letter, there is a vague reference to the Archpriest having gone away somewhere, and the captains of this regiment waiting for Arnaud de Cervole to arrive with reinforcements before returning to Alsace.¹⁶⁸⁷ However, no other precise information is available.

One thing was certain, as the crusading companies marched southwards, the *potestas* entrusted to Arnaud de Cervole by the Pope eroded over the mercenary companies during the crusade. By the time the Archpriest returned home at the end of October 1365, the army he had recruited and held together was falling to pieces. The crusade in the east was becoming increasingly unpopular among the companies. The captains returning to the two Burgundies had three choices: either to leave the Duchy and head for Montpellier to join Enrique of Trastámara, or to continue south with Arnaud de Cervole to Avignon, the third option was to go nowhere, stay put and continue plundering Burgundy and the borderlands, either for their personal gain or to join the private war of one of the border lords. The captains who choose these three options are well separated geographically, which shows how the Archpriest's influence had been reduced from an army of 15-20.000 in its heyday. Those captains who did not want to go the south were those who crossed the Belfort Gap into the Duchy, such as Frère Darre, Jehannot Le Nègre, or Bourc Camus. Some of them, sooner or later, did follow Bertrand du Guesclin westwards, others stayed, as we have seen, and enjoyed themselves in Burgundy. While these companies stopped at Chalonais in October 1365,¹⁶⁸⁸ Espiot's company paralysed life around Dion.¹⁶⁸⁹

Those, not a few, who continued to stick with Arnaud de Cervole arrived in the County of Burgundy and did not do badly. As has already been said, the Archpriest was first and foremost a military entrepreneur, skilled at making money in a clever, no-nonsense way. He was accompanied by Richard Tauton, Breton Bourc de Lamit, Gaillard de la Motte, Naudon Baugeran, and Bourc de Breteuil, in addition to his own company.¹⁶⁹⁰ This was still a considerable army of about 10, 0000 men occupying the county of Burgundy. It is worth pausing here for a moment to briefly consider Arnaud de Cervole's tactical choice.¹⁶⁹¹ It can

¹⁶⁸⁷ AVES AA 81, f. 40 ; USS2, pp. 540-541, n° 688. n. 2.

¹⁶⁸⁸ ADCO B 3567, f. 19v

¹⁶⁸⁹ ADCO B 1421, f. 29r-v

¹⁶⁹⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹⁶⁹¹ This estimate is based on the number of Arnaud de Cervole's company cited earlier, and the combined number of the companies of the other captains occupying the county.

be seen that the Archpriest kept the troops under his control away from the duchy, not wishing to antagonise the Prince, and his brother the King. On 24 November 1365, the Archpriest ordered the companies to leave the duchy.¹⁶⁹² It was a general order given to captains such as Frère Darre or Espiote who did not want to go south.¹⁶⁹³ Arnaud de Cervole was in constant consultation and collaboration with the ducal administration, notably Jean de Somberton, warning in advance the settlements on the southern route of the passage of the companies.¹⁶⁹⁴ The order, of course, further increased the captains' dissatisfaction with the Archpriest. Not everyone obeyed Arnaud de Cervole and the patience of the princely administration was wearing thin when, in December 1365, many of the companies were still in the duchy. In Mâcon, the executioner was constantly employed so that he had a good month to be paid for the executed *routiers*.¹⁶⁹⁵

The county, then ruled by Marguerite de France, was, on the other hand, a free prey from which a handsome sum could be plucked. Franche-Comté was beyond the border, belonging not to the kingdom but to the Empire. Arnaud de Cervole was not an ally of Charles the Bad, so there was no threat from that side. Through his excellent contacts, he ensured that the forces controlled by Philip the Bold did not act against the companies occupying the northern part of the county. He arranged the negotiations so that the 21.000 florins agreed on were paid as quickly as possible, after agreeing that the troops would not stay long, but would join the Green Count, cross Savoy 'peacefully' and then embark on the river Saône for Avignon.¹⁶⁹⁶ Marguerite de France knew that she was helpless, for the remnants of the Crusade were far more than the Countess, ruined by the wars of the past few years, could successfully take up arms against them. She therefore reached an agreement with Arnaud de Cervole. The Treaty of Corcondray was concluded in the winter of 1365, a summary of which is preserved in the *Dimanche de Vitel* records and published by Aimé Chérest.¹⁶⁹⁷ The implementation was even helped by Edward III, who had sent two well-known captains leuan Wynn and Nicolas Tamworth, who had been in the borderlands since Edward III's campaign, to help persuade the captains to leave.¹⁶⁹⁸ Between the autumn of 1365 and the spring of 1366, Arnaud de Cervole's attitude to the crusade changed radically from the summer of 1365. While in late May and June 1365 there was still some

¹⁶⁹² A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

¹⁶⁹³ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹⁶⁹⁴ ADCO B 1423, f. 29r

¹⁶⁹⁵ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

¹⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-184.

¹⁶⁹⁷ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 403-404.

¹⁶⁹⁸ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

doubt as to his commitment to the idea of crusading, by then there was no question that he identified with the idea and was doing his utmost to drive the companies southwards towards Italy in as large numbers as possible.¹⁶⁹⁹ The sources are full of the energetic Archpriest everywhere, he is in extensive correspondence with Dijon, Amadeus VI, urging ever more hesitant companies to make the journey to Savoy and trying to persuade the resistant companies in the duchy.¹⁷⁰⁰ In the accounts of Humbert de Corgenon, *bailli* of Bresse, for the spring of 1366, there are several entries about the arrival of Arnaud de Cervole and the movement of troops towards Saint-Trivier Cuiseaux.¹⁷⁰¹ Moreover, everyone regardless of which side of the border they lived on, wanted to get rid of the *routiers*, so the Archpriest could organise the departure of the companies from the two Burgundies peacefully. Of course, this does not mean that Amadeus and Savoy would welcome the companies with open arms, the Green Count would notify the towns and castles in the passing areas to reinforce the guard and move the population in from the defenceless villages. In the meantime, more than 200 ships were requisitioned to transport the troops.¹⁷⁰² Thanks to Amadeus VI's warning, the garrisons in Bresse and Bugey were reinforced one by one: the garrisons in the castles of Saint-André de Briord and Lhuis were put on standby for the passage of the companies.¹⁷⁰³ The town of Pont-de-Veyle, on the banks of the Veyle, a natural crossing point, was alerted to the arrival of the troops of Bernard de Sola and Gaillard de la Motte, who were heading for the Saône.¹⁷⁰⁴ The captain who made the longest way south was Bardet de Roussillon, who landed at the abbey of Maizières to embark for Avignon.¹⁷⁰⁵ Girard de Longchamp, *bailli* of Chalon, among other things, organised four large ships to transport the mercenaries and hired 120 sailors.¹⁷⁰⁶ At that time, the companies were about 330 km north of Avignon. The news of the arriving companies naturally caused panic in Avignon,¹⁷⁰⁷ after one of the companies had continued southwards, on reaching Comtat Venaissin, they began looting.¹⁷⁰⁸ And that is when Arnaud

¹⁶⁹⁹ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 339.

¹⁷⁰⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

¹⁷⁰¹ It is worth noting here that Arnaud de Cervole organized the marching army to keep the distance between them at the distance of about 30 km, as previously noted. ADCO B. 7117. roller 13,8 m long.

¹⁷⁰² E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

¹⁷⁰³ ADCO B 9509, roller 27m long, mentioned by *Ibid.*, p. 200, footnote 2.

¹⁷⁰⁴ ADCO B 9292, roller 12m long, mentioned by *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

¹⁷⁰⁷ O. Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici XVI...*, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

¹⁷⁰⁸ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

de Cervole was killed near Mâcon, on 25 May 1366.¹⁷⁰⁹ His death was not an accident, not a showdown fuelled by violent passions, but a premeditated plot, carefully prepared by those involved.¹⁷¹⁰ The identity of those who planned the murder remain a mystery to this day, except for one person, Petit Derby, cousin of the Archpriest.¹⁷¹¹ From Guillaume de Clugny's account, it is known that the Archpriest's murderers, at least those who carried out the murder, were from Arnaud de Cervole's company. Before the news had spread, Petit Derby had already captured Arnaud de Cervole's widow in her home in the castle of Thil and was willing to release the widow for 3500 florins.¹⁷¹² The conspirators even ensured that the news reached Dijon with a suitable delay, so that the mail from Mâcon could be intercepted and the letter taken away in order to begin the crucial first 24 hours to their advantage. Philip the Bold also only sent an envoy on 1 June 1366 to find Arnaud de Cervole, Bourc Camus, Bernard Donat and Berteran de Montprivat.¹⁷¹³ There is no evidence, but it is perhaps no coincidence that Frère Darre and Bertrucat d'Albret were in the immediate vicinity of the assassination, both having opposed the continuation of the crusade. In addition, Bertrucat d'Albret appeared at the scene of the murder the two days after the murder with 40 lances, a considerable haul, and was reported to have been in the mood to plunder Burgundy.¹⁷¹⁴ The death of Arnaud de Cervole naturally left a great deal of uncertainty, both among the companies and the authorities.¹⁷¹⁵ The *bailli* of Chalon wondered what would happen to the companies moving south, whether they would embark as originally planned.¹⁷¹⁶ However, those companies that had stuck to the original plan agreed by the Emperor and the Pope did not continue south after the death of Arnaud de Cervole, but either returned to the Duchy or headed west after Bertrand du Guesclin. At the same time, the army remaining in the duchy was split into parts, the smaller troops that, unfortunately for them, decided to return to the duchy were hunted down by Philip the Bold in the summer and autumn of 1366.¹⁷¹⁷

¹⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

¹⁷¹⁰ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

¹⁷¹¹ ADCO B 2752, f. 16r

¹⁷¹² ADCO B 2752, f. 12r

¹⁷¹³ ADCO B 11875 ; A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 351, pp. 404-405.

¹⁷¹⁴ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

¹⁷¹⁵ A. Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre...*, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

¹⁷¹⁶ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

Conclusion

The crusade, planned for years by so many European monarchs: princes, kings, popes and an emperor, started as suddenly as it ended and as unexpectedly. Nevertheless, an unprecedented mass of mercenaries was mobilised for a cause that had seemed impossible until then, and at least in principle it became possible to send the Ottoman Empire, which had been a constant foothold in Europe for a few years, back to Asia with the help of a professional army hitherto unknown to it. Despite the many sources, English, French and German literature, there are still many unresolved questions surrounding the short but bloody history of the crusade. If the estimate is correct and the number of mercenaries exceeded 15.000, perhaps approaching 20.000, the question arises as to how Arnaud de Cervole managed to organise all this and, above all, when. There has already been discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the departure, which is of course closely linked to the political history of the months immediately preceding the crusade. What reputation did Arnaud de Cervole really have among the captains that so many obeyed his call at once? Equally doubtful is Seguin de Badefol's attitude to the crusade. In fact, he had waited for Arnaud de Cervole's return, but the waiting was becoming increasingly tiresome for him. It was apparent that the troops had to be withdrawn, for an agreement had already been reached on the surrender of Anse, and the soldiers of the Margot were growing impatient. However, there is no written record that, apart from an agreement to hand over Anse, he really wanted to go east into the unknown. There is one further question that arises as to whether Arnaud de Cervole really intended to cross the Rhine at Strasbourg. Seguin de Badefol, in the summer of 1365, early July to be precise, was in no hurry to surrender Anse, and did not immediately set out to accompany the crusading army, which was already at Strasbourg and was supposed to have crossed the Rhine. Instead, he was busy organising the *chevauchées* to the Savoy territories, as the spy Ancelissia's report showed.¹⁷¹⁸ He was calmly awaiting the troops returning to Burgundy to join the crusaders led by Arnaud de Cervole.¹⁷¹⁹ Unless he had had the gift of foresight, he must have known that the mercenaries would not cross the Rhine, i.e. return to Burgundy.

Who else lost the most during the whole crusade, apart from the border population, than of course Charles IV. The Emperor, perhaps, supported the idea of the crusade in order to gain the support of the Pope in his exercise of political influence over the kingdom of Arles

¹⁷¹⁸ ADCO B 7590, roller 6,2 m long.

¹⁷¹⁹ E. Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-168.

and thus reverse, or at least slow down, the French advance. Even if he had done so, the price was too high: he became unpopular not only in Strasbourg and Alsace, but also in the Rhine provinces of the Empire. He lost face, because it would have been very difficult to explain to anyone in the Empire that a monarch, whose duty in principle was to defend the Empire, had imposed a *societas detestabilis* on a peaceful population without the latter deriving the slightest benefit from it. The correspondence of Strasbourg and the imperial cities illustrates the reputation of the mercenaries among the population of the empire. It is clear from the correspondence of the imperial cities and Strasbourg that the emotions of the population, other than fear of war, were determined by feelings of solidarity and mutual assistance amongst themselves, and hatred towards the mercenaries. This can be seen in contemporary chronicles, for example in the case of the detachment sent from the city of Bern. At the same time, so strong was the indignation against the monarch that Strasbourg, as the painter Konrad's letter testifies, was on the verge of open rebellion. In this situation, the Emperor, agreeing with Rudolf Bott, chose the only possible course: he tried to reach an agreement with Arnaud de Cervole, while gathering an army of sufficient size to take strong action in case negotiations failed. However, he was cautious in moving south from Seltz, because an open battle against an army of professional soldiers of this size was doubtful at the very least. At Brignais, a much smaller army destroyed the royal army, leading to the kingdom's third catastrophic defeat after Crecy and Poitiers. The solution he had chosen, to derail the crusaders marching southwards from a suitable distance, was the safest possible for the emperor and his army, but it also brought six years of famine for the people of Alsace.¹⁷²⁰

In the chapter, a number of parallels have been drawn between the organisation of the armies led by Arnaud de Cervole in 1365 and Edward III in 1360: the movement of troops, and the local targets, such as mills, chosen as they advanced. Likewise, the consequences of the marches of the two armies for the population were similar. This is not surprising, of course, in the light of the fact that both armies were companies, with the same mercenaries, some of whom were trained or serving under English command for decades. They had been through the same school of the Hundred Years' War. The similarity between the two campaigns goes even deeper: Edward III was abandoned by a number of captains after the invasion of Burgundy, remaining in the duchy to pursue his own enrichment, just as Arnaud de Cervole was after Belford Gap. The big difference, of course, was that Edward III as King of England had a comparatively greater reputation in the army; Edward III had an *imperium*

¹⁷²⁰ H. Witte, « Straßburg zur Zeit... », art. cit., p. 42.

in his army, while Arnaud de Cervole's *auctoritas* - thanks to the Pope - manifested itself as *potestas* in the eyes of the companies involved in the crusade, outside his own company. He never possessed an *imperium* like Edward III. Which meant in practice that while Edward did not have to fear for his life during the campaign, because there was no one in his army who was a threat to his person. In the situation of Arnaud de Cervole, this was not the case: the captains of the independent companies that were with the Archpriest obeyed him as long as it was in their interests to do so. When the situation changed, they either abandoned him or, as it eventually happened, put him out of the way.

Finally, the chapter proves that Pope Urban V's grand design of sending companies from Italy and France at the same time was not just a written word, but was actually implemented, at least its implementation had begun, and the participants took it seriously. The death of Arnaud de Cervole changed everything, however, and the crossing of the companies to Italy was not to be. All this, in its present form, has been hitherto unknown in the modern historiography of the Crusades.

The Aftermath of the Crusade in the Border Region 1366-1375

« Enguerrand de Coucy VII, born around 1340 at Coucy Castle in north-west France, is the protagonist of the Gugler War of 1375. »¹⁷²¹

Introduction

The consequences of Arnaud de Cervole's crusade and the events directly connected with it on the frontiers of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire should also be considered.

With the death of Arnaud de Cervole, the plan to send the companies east to fight the infidels failed. Many of the captains who went with the Archpriest went west with Bertrand du Guesclin, but many remained in Burgundy or on the frontier. Peter of Lusignan and Count VI Amadeus of Savoy took only a small number of mercenaries and had recruited them in Italy. Alsace, where the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War first set foot, suffered a similar invasion ten years later. Between the two appearances of the *routiers* in the frontiers of the Holy Roman Empire and the kingdom of France, the lords of the border provinces would have had the opportunity to prepare to repel a second invasion, but, as at the time of the first invasion, the plans remained only empty words on paper. The chapter traces the consequences of the first crusade, briefly summarising the Alsace adventure of the mercenaries led by Enguerrand VII of Coucy.

A) Following Arnaud de Cervole's crusade

The unprecedented devastation caused by the companies urged the border region to ensure the safety of states and cities. New alliances were forged on both sides of the border involving the biggest power brokers, such as the French king or the Count of Flanders. In

¹⁷²¹ Barbara Gloor, « Enguerrand de Coucy VII. und der Guglerkrieg von 1375: mögliche Hintergründe zum Erbkonflikt in der Darstellung bei Jean Froissart und in weiteren Quellen », *Argovia: Jahresschrift der Historischen Gesellschaft des Kantons Aargau*, 2012, vol. 124, p. 229.

the beginning of 1367, Robert, Duke of Bar signed an alliance with Charles V¹⁷²² and the Count of Flanders. He also reinforced his alliance with Jean, the Duke of Lorraine. It was a defensive alliance against everybody except the Pope, Emperor Charles IV, Charles V, King of France, the Archbishop of Trier, the Dukes of Brabant and Luxembourg, the Count of Flanders and Messin.¹⁷²³ This web of alliances was extended to Alsace when one of the powerful lords of Lorraine, Brocard de Fénétrange, the famous mercenary captain, led a delegation to Strasbourg in May 1367. The same participants of the above alliances – the Archbishop of Trier, the Bishop of Metz, the Dukes of Lorraine and Brabant - signed this treaty with Strasbourg for a period of five years. They agreed to help each other against external enemies and in case of internal conflicts, they would try to end the war as soon as possible.¹⁷²⁴

Despite all these peace efforts and the lack of external threats, the continuous private wars attracted the mercenaries to the border region and gave them employment in the ten years following Arnaud de Cervole's crusade toward Hungary. These private wars engulfed Lorraine and the Duchy of Bar and caused the Décapole a great deal of concern¹⁷²⁵. The city of Metz, which had ongoing disputes with the nobles of Bar, was one of the focal points of these wars. Pierre de Bar, a relative of Duke Robert, waged wars in Metz on several occasions,¹⁷²⁶ relying on Breton mercenaries.¹⁷²⁷ However, in the pay list of Metz, German soldiers were also mentioned.¹⁷²⁸ At the end of 1367, Worms sent a letter to Speyer about the incoming threat of the 'Engländer' who - according to the letter - wanted to cross the Rhine:

¹⁷²² Augustin Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, vol. III, Nancy, 1748, p. 381.

¹⁷²³ Jean François, *Histoire de Metz par des religieux bénédictins de la congrégation de S. Vanne*, vol. II, Metz, 1775, p. 563.

¹⁷²⁴ « Burckard Herr zu Finstingen schließt mit der Stadt Straßburg ein Bündnis auf fünf Jahre », in USS2, pp. 590-591, n° 757.

¹⁷²⁵ Between 1365 and 1375, that is between the two big operations of the companies in Lorraine, Barrois and Alsace, I have counted not fewer than twenty peace treaties signed by the city of Metz and the different local lords.


¹⁷²⁶ Out of the twenty peace treaties, three were signed by the city of Metz and Pierre of Bar, in 1365, 1370 and 1375, respectively, which means that this enmity covered the entire period between the two invasions. In fact, Pierre of Bar was responsible for inviting Arnaud de Cervole to Metz in 1365 that cost the city 17.000 florins.

¹⁷²⁷ As an annalist put it so eloquently: « Soixante et sept mil trois cens,
Pierre de Par, fort et puissant
Sans besoing, ni nécessité,
Print guerre contre la Cité »

V. Servais, *Annales historique du..., op. cit.*, p. 197.

¹⁷²⁸ AMM EE. 7.

«The heinous society will soon arrive at the Rhine. What does this mean for us? In this respect our Council has come to the conclusion that our envoys will arrive in your city on the Saturday after the 12th day (8 January 1368), we have sent word to our ally Metz, too, so that they send their envoys, so that we can discuss this, for our benefit. And we think it is a good idea to inform our ally Strasbourg about this as soon as possible, so that they can send their delegates, too, so we can discuss how best we can protect the country and ourselves against this heinous society by joining our forces.»¹⁷²⁹



Map 20. Enguerrand VII of Coucy's Campaign in Alsace 1375

¹⁷²⁹ USS2, pp. 584-585, n° 748.

Exactly ten years had passed since the first appearance of the mercenary companies in Alsace when they returned there under the leadership of a French noble, who was also the Earl of Bedford, Enguerrand VII, the last sire of Coucy. On the paternal side, he originated from a prestigious baronial family, while his mother was Catherine of Austria, daughter of Leopold I. He was perhaps the luckiest among the forty hostages who were sent to England in 1359, because Isabella of England, the eldest daughter of Edward III, chose him to be her husband. It was a happy marriage, and it also gave Enguerrand the means to reclaim his Habsburg heritage. Froissart was wrong concerning Coucy's main destination, as was Baron de Zurlauben, it was not Austria, but Alsace and the Swiss cantons of Brisgau, Argovie and Thurgovie, that is to say, «*the countries where the allodial lands claimed by the sire de Coucy were located.*»¹⁷³⁰

As in 1365, there was a special momentum in the course of the war when the companies remained unemployed following the truce of Bruges¹⁷³¹. Charles V had chosen the well-proven technique of sending the *rouitiers* abroad. When Enguerrand received the permission from Edward and the financial contribution of the French king, he contracted 25 captains¹⁷³² including Jean de Malestroit,¹⁷³³ Sylvestre Budes, Jean de Sant-Pol,¹⁷³⁴ Yves d'Uclaib¹⁷³⁵ and Owen Lawgoch and his lieutenant leuean Wynn, the Pursuant of Love. In the contract between Coucy and Owain Lawgoch, which can be found in the Archives of the City of Bern,¹⁷³⁶ signed on 14 October 1375, the Welsh Captain was to lead 400 men for a pay of 400 francs a month, plus another 100 francs were to be paid to Owain ap Rhys.¹⁷³⁷ Owain undertook to serve Coucy in his war against the duke of Austria. According to the contract, they could keep the booty and the towns they had conquered, save those which possessed an artillery. These would remain in the possession of Enguerrand VII. Owain could keep the prisoners worth less than 200 francs, if he captured the Duke of Austria, he would receive

¹⁷³⁰ Siméon Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart, vol. VIII, 1370-1377*, Paris, 1888, p. CXXXI.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. CXXVI.

¹⁷³² F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹⁷³³ Jean-Christophe Cassard, « Les «Gestes des Bretons en Italie» ou le voyage sans la découverte », in Jean Kerhervé and Daniel Tanguy (eds.), *1491, la Bretagne, terre d'Europe: colloque international, Brest, 2 - 4 octobre 1991 ; organisé par le Centre de Recherche Bretonne et Celtique (CNRS) de l'Université de Bretagne Occidentale*, Quimper, 1992, pp. 101-117.

¹⁷³⁴ S. Luce (ed.), *Chroniques de J. Froissart VIII...*, *op. cit.*, p. CXXXI.

¹⁷³⁵ Baron de Zurlauben, *Brétons et autres Routiers en Alsace et en Suisse en 1375 et 1376 sous la conduit de Enguerrand VII, sire de Coucy*, vol. II (*Bibliothèque Militaire Historique et Politique*), Paris, 1760, p. 285.

¹⁷³⁶ « Vertrag des Ingelram von Coucy mit Yvo von Wales (Yvain de Galles) über den Zug gegen den Herzog von Österreich », in *Fontes rerum Bernensium: Bern's Geschichtsquellen*, vol. 9, Bern, 1908, pp. 467-469, n° 972.

¹⁷³⁷ Barbara W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror. The Calamitous 14th Century*, New York, 1978, p. 271.

10.000 francs.¹⁷³⁸ The company would not serve any other lord during the campaign and would not leave the sire of Coucy unless required by Charles V.¹⁷³⁹ Some of the members of Owain's company knew Lorraine and Alsace very well, especially Wynn, who had been active for almost twenty years in the border region and was one of the very few captains who managed to survive the sixties when the first generation of the independent mercenary captains practically died out and were replaced by the new generation.¹⁷⁴⁰ Among the captains there were a number of Bretons, whose *routes* advanced toward Avignon and they stayed in the proximity of Pont-Saint-Esprit and Carpentras in the beginning of May. Along with leuean Wynn, at least two of the Breton captains: Jules Rolant and Jean de Malestroit had detailed knowledge about the duchies of Bar and Lorraine, because they had been in the service of Metz in 1371 and 1372.¹⁷⁴¹ A month later, they decided to join Coucy's quest, but it did not prevent them from ransoming the Papal State once they were close to the Holy See. Their passage cost Pope Gregory XI 5000 francs.¹⁷⁴²

Enguerrand's army, however, did not consist exclusively of mercenaries, there were also a number of knights of Vermandois, Picardy, Artois, Hainault, and Barrois who participated in the campaign with their squires and men-at-arms. Some of them were famous knights, such as Olivier Clisson, the future constable of France, who was called the 'butcher' by Cuvelier,¹⁷⁴³ and Raoul de Coucy, Enguerrand's uncle, the Vicomtes de Meaux and Aunay,¹⁷⁴⁴ or Pierre de Bar.¹⁷⁴⁵ Before joining the army, Pierre signed one of his peace treaties with the city of Metz before his departure,¹⁷⁴⁶ suspending his never-ending hostility against Metz.

Twelve days after the signature of the indenture between Coucy and Owain a last attempt was made to avoid the war. The representatives of Enguerrand and Albert II of Austria met on 26 October 1375. The Habsburg delegation was made up of Count Rudolf von Habsburg, Heinrich von Montfort and Sigmund von Thierstein, while Coucy was represented by Jean de Vienne,¹⁷⁴⁷ No details have been preserved about the negotiations, but they were

¹⁷³⁸ Ibid., p. 271.

¹⁷³⁹ A. D. Carr, *Owen of Wales: The end of the House of Gwynedd*, Cardiff, 1991, p. 47.

¹⁷⁴⁰ Out of the 31 mercenary captains who were active between 1358-1370 in the border region of France and the Holy Roman Empire and whose fate is known to me there were only 4 who died of a natural cause, the others faced a violent death.

¹⁷⁴¹ AMM EE3 liasses 6.

¹⁷⁴² L. Mirot, « Sylvestre Budes ... », art. cit., p. 590.

¹⁷⁴³ Thierry Lassabatère, *Du Guesclin Vie et fabrique d'un heroes medieval*, Paris, 2015, p. 362.

¹⁷⁴⁴ B. W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror...*, op. cit., p. 270.

¹⁷⁴⁵ AMM EE8 liasses 5.

¹⁷⁴⁶ AMM AA48 liasses 9.

¹⁷⁴⁷ Barbara Gloor, *Enguerrand de Coucy VII...*, op. cit. p. 244.

doomed to failure as the invading army had already devastated the land in Lorraine, Barrois and Alsace before the negotiations could have been brought to a conclusion.¹⁷⁴⁸

Defensive preparation took place in the entire border region to withstand the incoming threat that can be only compared to Arnaud de Cervole's crusade. As always, Barrois and Lorraine were in the way of the mercenary companies, but preparations were extended to areas as far as Franche-Comté.¹⁷⁴⁹ In the summer, the very same preparations were under way as ten and fifteen years earlier, during Edward and Arnaud de Cervole's campaign respectively: the quick renovation of the fortifications in Foug, Lamothe, strengthening the garrisons of Saint-Mihiel, Gondrecourt¹⁷⁵⁰ and Foug, hiring German mercenaries as auxiliary troops from Zweibrücken, and sending the population to fortified places: walled cities and castles¹⁷⁵¹. The first companies passed Revigny at the end of August 1375.¹⁷⁵² The companies occupied the faubourg of Gondrecourt on 11 September.¹⁷⁵³ The mercenaries belonged to Jean de Maslestrait's *route*.¹⁷⁵⁴ Huart de Bauffremont, who was appointed the captain of Gondrecourt,¹⁷⁵⁵ was obliged to defend the town and the castle until the middle of September, but could not prevent the trespassing mercenaries from occupying the faubourg and ravaging the countryside.¹⁷⁵⁶ The *prévôt* of Sancy noted that «*a great number of Bretons went to Metz*»¹⁷⁵⁷ The city did the same thing as in 1365: it purchased its peace, but this time it cost much more than in 1365: the city paid 34.000 francs.¹⁷⁵⁸ In Alsace, the Décapole and Strasbourg asked for the same *Bundeshilfe* from the other imperial cities as in 1365. A series of letters have been preserved in the municipal archives in Strasbourg that bear witness to these exchanges of correspondence: the sequence of events is nicely outlined in the sources. First, Enguerrand Coucy sent two letters to Alsace on 31 August¹⁷⁵⁹ and on 24 September,¹⁷⁶⁰ respectively, in which he explains the reason of his decision to ask for the support of Strasbourg and the Décapole:

¹⁷⁴⁸ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁷⁴⁹ É. Clerck, *Esseai sur l'histoire II...*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

¹⁷⁵⁰ The *prévôté* was taxed quickly to reinforce the castle of the town. ADM B 1424 Inventaires-Sommaires.

¹⁷⁵¹ V. Servais, *Annales historique du ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-304.

¹⁷⁵² ADM B 1424, f. 25r

¹⁷⁵³ ADM B.1424, f. 25r

¹⁷⁵⁴ ADM B 1424, f. 2r, 26r

¹⁷⁵⁵ V. Servais, *Annales historique du...*, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

¹⁷⁵⁶ ADM B 1423, f. 52v

¹⁷⁵⁷ ADM B 1738, f. 73v

¹⁷⁵⁸ Jean François, *Histoire*, p. 579.

¹⁷⁵⁹ USS2, pp. 887-888, n° 1213.

¹⁷⁶⁰ USS2, pp. 890-891, n° 1218.

*«The Duke of Austria took away the territories we were entitled to as our maternal inheritance, with force, wrongfully, unlawfully. It is now he, who reaps the benefits of those areas. We have resorted to words, the law and warnings against him to convince him to give back these territories, even though the legality of our claim is indisputable, he has not rendered our property so we have to wage a war against him and we ask of you to support us and we promise you that no harm will come to you because of this war.»*¹⁷⁶¹

A week after the second letter, the endangered cities asked Strasbourg for news about the planned invasion. Basel,¹⁷⁶² Breisach,¹⁷⁶³ and Worms¹⁷⁶⁴ sent their letters demanding precise information about the course of events. In return, Strasbourg asked for their help against the mercenary companies emerging in Alsace.¹⁷⁶⁵ Regarding the date of this last letter, it was obvious that Strasbourg and the Décapole were already too late in asking for help because Coucy and his army arrived in Alsace three days later, on 5 October.¹⁷⁶⁶ These three days seemed to have been the average time Strasbourg and the Décapole had to prepare for the imminent arrival of Coucy's army. The captains began arriving in Alsace before Enguerrand had made his way to the border through France. When the captains were interrogated about their objectives the answer was always that they would not depart until they obtained *«60 000 florins, sixty stallions fit for combat and sixty garments of golden fabric.»*¹⁷⁶⁷ Several Alsatian chronicles prove how right Philippe Contamine was, when he stated that the mercenaries' aim was not conquering but wealth itself.¹⁷⁶⁸ On 3 October 1375, Worms wrote to Strasbourg that the number of *routiers* was around 30.000¹⁷⁶⁹ and that they were waiting for the Sire of Coucy and as soon as he arrived they would get to Strasbourg.¹⁷⁷⁰ Hence, it is not a surprise that most of the preparations took place at the

¹⁷⁶¹ USS2, pp. 887-888, n° 1213.

¹⁷⁶² AVES AA 81, f. 24 ; USS2, p. 891, n° 1219.

¹⁷⁶³ AVES AA 81, f. 23 ; USS2, p. 891, n° 1220.

¹⁷⁶⁴ USS2, p. 892, n° 1221.

¹⁷⁶⁵ Strasbourg demanded greater financial support to cover the costs of reinforcement and Bâle did not find this claim justified. USS2, p. 892, n° 1222. For details, see : G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

¹⁷⁶⁶ F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹⁷⁶⁷ P. Contamine, « Les compagnies... », *art. cit.*, p. 371.

¹⁷⁶⁸ F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, *op. cit.*, p. 188 ; S. Dietler, *Gebweiler Chronik...*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁷⁶⁹ In fact this number was around one third of the 30 000 mentioned, somewhat similar to the numbers of the crusaders of 1365. Even such a number proved to be too difficult to handle in France, Castille or Alsace, but not for the Swiss cantons.

¹⁷⁷⁰ USS2, p. 892, n° 1221.

very last moment, when the companies were already present in Alsace. Jakob Twinger Königshofen gives a picturesque description of the hasty steps taken by Strasbourg to defend the city and her suburbs.

The companies marched close to the city. The mayor rang the bells, and then some of the defenders rushed to take their designated places on the ramparts, while others gathered in the square of the cathedral, armed, on foot or on horse. The monasteries and the suburbs asked the Council to defend them. Some of the suburbs were left empty, while elsewhere the defenders set up traps in the trenches. The towers were guarded and *ballistas* were placed in the courts of three churches to bombard members of the companies if they were to come too close. They also demolished the sheds attached to the city walls so that nobody could hide in them. In Brumath, the companies bribed two men to let them in, but they were recognized and the citizens of the town broke them on the wheel.¹⁷⁷¹

The fate of the settlements depended upon the vigilance of the guards and whether they could identify the traitors on time. In the town of Wagen, west of Strasbourg, the guards run out of luck, because the town was captured when the traitors were more successful than in Brumath and the companies occupied it. In another Alsatian village, Marlenheim, a few hundred peasants attacked *routiers* and killed 24 of them, when the companies crossed the Saverne strait and spread out over the plain. According to Specklin, the mercenaries took revenge and massacred more than 350 of them.¹⁷⁷² Other towns of the Décapole were too frightened when the mercenaries mercilessly massacred people in front of their gates. Hagenau paid 500 gold to Sylvestre Budes to purchase their peace¹⁷⁷³. Enguerrand Coucy's letters to the lords and cities of Alsace seem to have had some effect, because the crossing of Coucy's army remained unhindered. The cities suspected that some of the nobles, like Eberhard de Wittenberg and the lords of the Swabian league¹⁷⁷⁴ backed Enguerrand's endeavour by acknowledging his claim to his inheritance, therefore Strasbourg and the other cities refused to join the allied army of the dukes of Austria, Bavaria and the Bishop of Spire.¹⁷⁷⁵ Geoffrey Grill also describes in his profound study on the companies' invasion of 1375 the unspoken sympathy of Jean de Vienne, Bishop of Basel, who let Coucy's army

¹⁷⁷¹ R. Reuss (ed.), *Les Collectanées De Daniel Specklin...*, op. cit., p. 304 ; G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, op. cit., p. 121.

¹⁷⁷² R. Reuss (ed.), *Les Collectanées De Daniel Specklin...*, op. cit., p. 305.

¹⁷⁷³ AMH EE 27, n° 11. The text was published by Geoffrey Grill. G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, op. cit., Appendix I, p. 155.

¹⁷⁷⁴ Baron de Zurlauben, *Mémoire de Le Baron de Zur-Lauben, sur Arnaut de Cervole ou Cervolle, dit l'Archiprêtre, chevalier, chambellan du roi de France Charles V capitaine-général des Routiers, compere et conseiller de Philippe, duc de Bourgogne*, Paris, 1760, p. 293.

¹⁷⁷⁵ Elhen von Wolfhagen, *Die Limburger Chronik*, ed. Arthur Wyss, Hannover, 1883, pp. 71-72.

cross his land freely.¹⁷⁷⁶ Königshofen even explains the German presence in Coucy's army with the same sympathy.¹⁷⁷⁷

The lack of organized defence brought about unspeakable atrocities of the mercenaries:

«From the crops and wine they found they took what they needed and left the rest behind. Moreover, those they captured they tied up so strongly that the rope would cut through their flesh. ... they plundered and pillaged... when they coveted a woman or a girl, they disgraced and dishonoured them in such a way that it would be shameful to describe. They took up quarters in the country wherever they wanted to: in Pfaffenhofen, Lampartheim, Altdorf, Bibelnheim, Barre, Erstheim and their surroundings.»¹⁷⁷⁸

In his letter dated 6 December 1376, Franz Neffe from Colmar reported to Strasbourg that the invading army had arrived in the proximity of Basel, but they had kept the distance of two crossbow shots¹⁷⁷⁹ between them and the city, the English, however, surprised the locals and killed twelve of them. Neffe also reported that his captured son spent eight days with the English until his ransom was paid¹⁷⁸⁰. It is not surprising that Basel did not feel safe given such neighbours. They wrote a letter to Strasbourg only nine days after Franz Neffe's letter, to ask for two hundred crossbowmen from Strasbourg because Coucy's army had taken the towns of Kluse, and Waldenburg.¹⁷⁸¹

The favourite targets of the pillagers were the churches and monasteries in Alsace,¹⁷⁸² exactly as during Arnaud de Cervole's invasion. Nevertheless, this time the number of pillaged and destroyed ecclesiastical edifices was even higher than in 1365: 13 monasteries and churches were devastated during the Coucy campaign in Alsace.¹⁷⁸³ One of the reasons of the unprecedented destruction of monasteries was that the incursion of the companies continued from Alsace toward the Swiss territories, they marched in three columns: Enguerrand de Coucy went toward the monastery of St Urban, Owain Lawgoch aimed at

¹⁷⁷⁶ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

¹⁷⁷⁷ F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, op. cit., p. 188.

¹⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁷⁷⁹ USS2, pp. 898-899, n° 1234.

¹⁷⁸⁰ AVES AA 81, f. 14 ; USS2, pp. 898-899, n° 1234.

¹⁷⁸¹ USS2, p. 899, n° 1235.

¹⁷⁸² Ae. Tschudi, *Chronicum Helveticum...*, op. cit., p. 485.

¹⁷⁸³ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, op. cit., p. 62.

the monastery of Fraubrunnen¹⁷⁸⁴ and Jean of Vienne's objective was the monastery of Gottstatt.¹⁷⁸⁵ In the letter dated 24 July 1376, the monastery of Wettingen complained a great deal about all the damage it had suffered for several years during the wars of the House of Austria with the cantons of Zurich, Luzern. *«Especially in the war between the noble & powerful Lord Ingram, Count de Coucy, & all his Breton Companies on the one hand, & the illustrious princes Albert & Leopold, dukes of Austria, on the other.»*¹⁷⁸⁶

The relation between Leopold of Austria and the Swiss cantons was so disastrous that at first everybody refused to cooperate with the Habsburg prince. Tschudi in his chronicle stressed that:

*«It is also said that Leopold, Duke of Austria, had done his country more harm than his enemies, the latter having burned and destroyed only what they were obliged to win by force, as opposed to Leopold, who, in order to cut off their supplies, had devastated three leagues of land in Alsace.»*¹⁷⁸⁷

Michael Stettler in his Chronicle argued that Leopold turned Coucy against the cantons. Later, when the threat of Enguerrand Coucy's army became much more tangible, most of the cantons were forced to enter into an agreement with Leopold, except for the canton of Swyss. Albert III, duke of Austria applied the ancient scorched earth tactics with considerable success; however, he caused more damage to his own subjects than to the invading army.¹⁷⁸⁸ This further reduced his already low popularity. The scorched earth tactics coupled with the winter campaign meant unbearable hardships for the *routiers*. Adding the three battles of Christmas of 1375, in which they had suffered considerable losses, was more than enough for those 25 captains who managed to survive the campaign to protest loudly against staying among the 'wild Germans.' Enguerrand protested in vain, the captains decided to return to France. In this paper, I do not wish to discuss the details of the 'Guglerkrieg.' Suffice it to say here, that during Christmas 1375, the peasants and citizens of the Swiss cantons and the city of Bern killed several hundreds of soldiers of the

¹⁷⁸⁴ F. Closener and J. T. von Königshofen, *Chroniken...*, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁷⁸⁵ B. Gloor, « Enguerrand de Coucy... », *art. cit.*, p. 245.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Baron de Zurlauben, *Expedition des Anglois...*, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

¹⁷⁸⁷ Ae. Tschudi, *Chronicum Helveticum...*, *op. cit.*, p. 489.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Francis Rapp, « Les villes du saint Empire et le problème militaire : l'exemple de Strasbourg » *Journal des savants*, 1996, vol. II, pp. 377-417; p. 387

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invading army in three battles at Buttisholz, Ins and Fraubrunnen.¹⁷⁸⁹ In all three battles, the mercenaries were taken by surprise by the local armies. In the monastery of Fraubrunnen, the army of Bern attacked Owain Lawgoch's troops while they were sleeping. Eight hundred mercenaries were either massacred, or burnt in the monastery, Owain could barely escape by leaving everything behind. To commemorate the victory a monument was erected in Fraubrunnen and a ballade was written, called the Bear Song (the bear is the emblem of the city of Bern):

«Duke Owen of Wales came to Fraubrunnen. The Bear roared: 'You cannot escape me. I shall slay you and stab you and burn you to the death'. In England and in France the widows all cried together 'Alas! Alas! Against Berne no one will march again.'»¹⁷⁹⁰

News about the retreating companies caused concerns and urged preparations at the same time, and not without reason. From an unknown letter (the possible author might have been the mayor and the Council of the city of Mulhouse) addressed to Ulrich and Bruno of Rappoltsein, one learns that during the last week of December 1375, the companies returned to the proximity of Basel, crossed the River Rhine and took the town of Watwiller, only 20 kilometres to the west of Mulhouse, in Alsace. The authors of the letter were desperate and asked for military aid from the lords of Rappoltsheim to be able to defend the castles as soon as possible:

«Therefore we ask you to send as many men as you can to help [guard] the castles. We are going to do the same if you need it. We have just received the news that they [mercenaries] have taken Watwiller... we do not know yet who has been captured and who has been killed».¹⁷⁹¹

According to Seraphin Dietler, the companies killed one hundred men in the town and took a number of prisoners with them to France.¹⁷⁹² Nevertheless, Wattwiller was not the only

¹⁷⁸⁹ At Buttisholz (24-25 December 1375), at Ins (25-26 December 1375) and at Fraubrunnen (26-27 December 1375).

¹⁷⁹⁰ Konrad Justinger, *Bern Chronik*, Bern, 1814, p. 192.

¹⁷⁹¹ Ungenannte (Meister und Rath von Mülhausen) berichten and Ulrich und Bruno von Rappoltstein über kriegerrische Bewegungen der Engländer und bitten um schleunige Hülfe. (Anfang des Jahres 1376), in K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch...*, opt. cit., vol. II, p. 120, n° 132.

¹⁷⁹² S. Dietler, *Gebweiler Chronik...*, op. cit., p. 39.

settlement in Alsace marked by the destruction of Coucy's retreating army: certain companies engulfed the Valley of Thur between Belfort and Mulhouse. Uffolhotz¹⁷⁹³, Wittelsheim, Aspach Schweighausen, Leimbach, Roderen, Willer, Saint-Amarin, Cernay and Thann were pillaged and altogether forty villages were ransacked. A series of castles was stormed and destroyed, such as Herrenfluch, Rougemont, Schrankefels and Stettenberg.¹⁷⁹⁴ There were some rare exceptions such as Guebwiller, which was saved by the prince-abbot of Murbach. When the English arrived in Guebwiller, they felt safe and did not expect an attack. The villagers - men and women - of the neighbouring settlements gathered and armed themselves ready for battle. In Dietler's account of the events, it was the brave women who began the attack against the mercenaries. The men followed them and surprised the companies to such an extent that the peasants massacred the English on the spot, the *routiers* «*did not know who the friend and who the enemy was. They killed many of their own and later they escaped.*»¹⁷⁹⁵ However, such victory over the companies was exceptional. On their way to France, most of Coucy's army left Alsace, they went toward Bar and Franche-Comté seeking safety.

Conclusion

Six years after its foundation, the Décapole faced repetitive crises caused by the mercenaries of the Hundred Years' War. Due to its strategic situation, the alliance was exposed to any threat coming from France. The Zehnstädtebund asked for and received help from the other Imperial Cities in the early 1360s, but despite all its might and potential, as has been shown, the Décapole was able to withstand the invasion of companies composed of only a few hundred soldiers. When the companies that entered Alsace were made up of 10-15.000 mercenaries or more, the Décapole was hapless and helpless. Fortunately, for the alliance, the aim of the crusaders was only to cross Alsace, because Arnaud de Cervole did not plan to stay and settle down in the region for a longer period. In 1375, Enguerrand Coucy's army proved to be more or less similar in size to that of the crusaders of 1365. The presence of the Emperor's army made the difference. On the way back from Avignon, Charles IV arrived in Alsace, when the companies asked Strasbourg for permission to cross the Rhine. Arnaud de Cervole and Charles IV met near Strasbourg¹⁷⁹⁶.

¹⁷⁹³ K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch...*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 120, n° 132.

¹⁷⁹⁴ G. Grill, *Les Grandes Compagnies...*, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

¹⁷⁹⁵ S. Dietler, *Gebweiler Chronik...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁷⁹⁶ AVES AA 77, f. 50.

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The companies were afraid of the Imperial army and they wanted to quit Alsace faster than they would ten years later. Another difference between the two invasions of Alsace was the preparedness of the Décapole for the arrival of the *routiers*. In 1365, Strasbourg and the Décapole had more time to prepare for the incoming threat than they would ten years later. In 1375, Alsace suffered more due to the fact that Arnaud de Cervole only wanted to cross Alsace, whereas the objective of Coucy's army in 1375 was the acquisition of the territories held by the Habsburg family.

However, it is true, that in the middle of the 14th century, there was no kingdom or alliance, with perhaps the exception England, which could have contained such a powerful army as that of the crusaders of 1365 or Coucy's companies in 1375. In the middle of the 14th century, professional soldiers dominated the battlefields of Western Europe. Alsace was not an exception in this case, only the walled cities and the fortresses were large enough to host a large a garrison with vigilant guards that could withstand the companies, but the countryside was left to the mercy of the *routiers*. The scale of destruction brought about by the arrival of the invading armies was the same as that of the battered regions of the French side of the borderland. There was no town or imperial city of the Décapole that was occupied for ten months or a year like Brioude, Anse, Auxerre or Pont-Saint-Esprit, which were similar in size to Colmar, Kaysersberg, or Hagenau.

On every other occasion, in 1360, 1362 or 1363, the Décapole proved capable of reacting quickly to the real or potential threats coming from the west. The Décapole could contain the average size companies and ensure peace in the Rhine Valley by organizing powerful alliances with local lords or other imperial cities, asking for *Bundeshilfe* and employing mercenary companies.

Conclusion

«However, according to contemporary authorities, besides the Englishmen, it was the hords of Hungarians that were considered the most relentless mercenaries (sometimes addressed as the «devil incarnated»), thus, in the service of the Holy See they joined together with the English maintaining in this way an excellent allied fighting team of the Italian Middle Ages.»¹⁷⁹⁷

In the years between the beginning of my research and the completion of my dissertation, I visited the archives of Spain, France and Italy in search of mercenaries. This shows the complexity of the history of the crusades and the great companies that emerged in the mid-14th century. The subject of this dissertation deals with a very narrow period in time, a few years in a broad sense, and in a narrower sense, less than a year in the border region of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, and in the Septentrionale region of Italy. At the same time, the crusades that escalated in 1365/66 had an impact on the lives of tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of people from the eastern end of Europe to the Atlantic Ocean, since in Castile, with the accession to the throne of the Trastámara dynasty, the changes they brought about had a lasting effect. In the same way, the sack of Alexandria ultimately contributed to the lasting decline of Famagusta in the second half of the 14th century. In addition, in the Balkans, the crusade of Amadeus VI contributed to the creation of the Vidin-based Bulgarian Banate.¹⁷⁹⁸

The 1350s and 1360s are particularly exciting because they mark the beginning of a period of transformation and, like all changes in history, the consequences of change and the alternative responses it induces can be traced and examined through archival research. Although many examples of the emergence of mercenaries in medieval warfare can be cited earlier, the impact on society as a whole can only be reckoned from the mid-14th century onwards. It was one of the aims of this dissertation to analyse the emergence of mercenaries in the Hundred Years' War and its impact on the eastern frontiers of the Kingdom of France,

¹⁷⁹⁷ A., Bárány, « The Communion... », art. cit., p. 141.

¹⁷⁹⁸ Pál Engel, *Magyarország világi archontológiája, 1301–1457*, Budapest, 1996. p. 34.

by bringing examples from the whole spectrum of society. As with all change, the appearance of mercenaries, and in particular that of the great companies, had its winners and losers. Of course, the proportions are not balanced in this case, since disproportionately more people suffered from the mercenary phenomenon than benefited from it. At the same time, the traditional approach, which only talks about the destruction caused by mercenaries, is a simplistic attempt, because reality has always been much more complex than the simplistic explanations. One of the best examples of this is an examination of the account books of Guillaume de Clugny, where virtually a third of the crimes he records are linked to mercenaries or to locals who collaborated with them. Similarly, the emergence of the great companies on the frontiers fundamentally altered the balance of power. In all the cases discussed in this dissertation, where a border lord or town was able to contract a great company, he was able to defeat even stronger opponents, whether they were alone or organised in coalitions. Such were the city of Metz, the Sire de Grancy, or the Count of Vaudémont.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from archival research in different countries on the resistance to the great companies, the way they were treated and the damage they caused. From the Iberian Peninsula to Italy, local authorities, lords and possibly rulers used similar means and reacted in similar ways. It was essential to obtain adequate information about the number of the approaching or, in the worst case, already present great companies, their purpose, the identity of the captains and constables leading them. As has been mentioned, the spies were not only spying for the companies but also against them, as the Lyon city archives have provided ample evidence. Another general feature, which was true everywhere, was that if the defenders were informed in time of the approach of a company, the population of unprotected villages and unfenced towns was moved to the surrounding castles or fortified towns. This was also true when an allied mercenary army was needed to cross a country or a small area. This was the case, for example, when Bertrand du Guesclin had to cross Burgundy in 1365, or the armies of the Black Prince crossed the kingdom of Navarre in May 1366. When they could, the local authorities tried to break up the army crossing their territory into smaller units of a few hundred men, and to severely restrict the route and ensure supplies for the troops crossing. This happened, for example, with the army led by Enrique of Trastámara in Aragon in early 1366, or with the Hungarian company led by Athinay Miklós in L'Aquila in May 1361. At the same time, they reinforced the garrisons of the settlements in the area, equipped the towns with siege engines, destroyed the houses built against the town walls (see Anse), and stockpiled food (several such occasions in the Duchy of Bar are mentioned in the dissertation. If mercenaries appeared

as enemies, they mobilised the local nobility, possibly hiring mercenaries. This was the case with Bertrand Gasc, Amenion de Pommiers, Soudic de la Trau in the service of Philip the Bold, or Pierre de Monabo, Hérard de Champigneulles and Joffroy de Melnicourt, who were hired by Robert, Duke of Bar. The same applies to the multinational great company led by Henrich von Eglingen, forced into the service of Mantua, or the case of Guido d' Asciano with Siena.

Throughout the dissertation, a number of alliances and treaties have been presented which were established against mercenaries. These included the treaties of Colmar following the Battle of Brignais, or the related treaty of Metz, but also the alliance to be established by the imperial cities before the arrival of Arnaud de Cervole, or the meeting of Urban V in Bologna in Italy in 1366. These alliances and treaties had many common features. They forbade any contact with mercenaries, they were for a fixed period and they had a geographical scope. Most of them included the local troops financed by the alliance. Where this was done, as was the case with Edward III's 1359/60 campaign, it produced limited results.

When all these measures failed to produce satisfactory results, which was the case in most situations, it was necessary to buy the departure of the great companies. There are numerous examples of this in the dissertation, one need only think of Seguin de Badefol in connection with the abandonment of Anse and Brioude, or the case of the Papal States or the duchy of Burgundy with Arnaud de Cervole, or the great company of Konrad von Landau in 1357, but the list could go on.

Generally speaking, this was the safest way of disposing of a great company, since in these contracts the money was not given unconditionally, and the company had certain obligations: it could not return for a certain period, for example a year or two, and could not be in the service of the enemies of the ruler, city or nobleman who had bought its departure. However, this was only possible as long as they could pay the high price for the departure of the *routiers*. If a city-state or duchy was unlucky, the mercenaries who left were replaced by new ones. I have called this the hydra effect and my analysis of the situation in Burgundy in 1360-65 was intended to illustrate the point. It showed how quickly a duchy that was still so wealthy and had enjoyed relative peace before the arrival of Edward III was faced with immediate liquidation problems due to the constant presence of mercenaries. Not only Burgundy, but also Navarre and Alsace, were prime illustrations of how life came to a standstill as a result of the mercenaries, how roads in the occupied territories became dangerous, how the grapes were left on the vine and the harvest could not be reaped. As a consequence, no taxes could be collected. Nothing illustrates the process better than a rare

source preserved in the archives of Lille, which deals with the mercenaries' time in the County of Nevers and the Barony of Donzy.

The papal policy on mercenaries under Innocent VI and Urban V was characterised by the same uncertainty, the same search for the way forward. How to deal with the phenomenon of the great companies, which are and indispensable to Gil de Albornoz in his decade-long struggle to restore papal supremacy. On the other hand, they must be cursed for the atrocities they are committing in the meantime, for the sea of suffering they are inflicting on the Christian population. The first, natural step was excommunication and, as the examples have shown, it only had partial results. The instrument of excommunication itself had been used by the Church, sometimes with caution in certain cases. If this did not work, a crusade against the mercenaries had to be announced. As has been seen, the public's hatred of mercenaries, combined with the redemption the Church was offering, was an attractive offer and many took it up. However, it was one thing to raise the necessary funds, to raise an army, it would also have to clash with the members of the companies. This was never done in the context of a crusade; whenever a papal legate was appointed to lead a crusade in France or Italy, the papal legates preferred to appease and buy the mercenaries' departure. The only open armed conflict in the 1360s was a battle between a royal army and a several thousand-strong army of great companies. This led to the third greatest battlefield disaster of the 14th century in April 1362 at Brignais, where mercenaries inflicted a crushing defeat on the royal army led by the Count of Bourbon, leaving the entire frontier unprotected for the *routiers*. There are two very different accounts of how the battle was fought, thanks to Villani and Froissart. From the sources preserved in the archives of Dijon, only the scale of the defeat is certain. Mercenaries were also on the losing side, recruited by Arnaud de Cervole and later replaced by the royal treasury. Arnaud de Cervole alone benefited from the battle on the losing side, because it reinforced his indispensable image at the court of the Duke of Burgundy and was an important stage in the process of his integration into the Burgundian aristocracy.

If, however, the mercenaries could not be defeated or changed by spiritual or secular force, there was only one logical solution, which the Holy See had not tried before, to convince them to participate in a crusade to save their souls and prepare for the afterlife by gaining forgiveness. In the chapters on mercenaries, there is a separate section on the means, the people and the methods used to persuade the mercenaries to leave Italy and France at the same time to fight the «*Canes infidels*» that threatened Christianity on the two peripheries of Europe. Granada and the Balkans, and possibly Asia Minor, seemed far enough away from Avignon that once crusading mercenaries arrived there, they would not return easily,

and especially in large numbers. The whole concept is contained verbatim in a letter from Urban V to the city of Florence. If it was not an easy plan to implement, it was certainly not a hopeless idea, as the mercenaries were men of the times and not entirely immune to the potential negative consequences that awaited them in the afterlife. This is the point of the analysis of the mercenaries and death, the natural conflict between their Christian faith and the violence of their profession, in which a number of examples illustrate that many individual life-or-death motivations were responsible for joining the mercenaries and going on the crusade with them. These examples only demonstrate how complex the society and the people of that era were, and how similar and at the same time different from the people of our day. At the same time, these cases also serve as a good example of the fact that it is not enough to examine macro processes, but that it is necessary to delve as deeply as possible into the details, pursuing micro-historical studies, because only by combining the two approaches can an authentic picture of the late Middle Ages and of the position of mercenaries in society be constructed. It suffices to understand the difference between the integration of German mercenaries in Italy and the similar attempts of the *routiers* of the Hundred Years' War on the borderland between the empire and the kingdom.

In the same section, it was also mentioned who made up the companies, including the captains who led them. Among them, the two most important captains, Arnaud de Cervole, the leader of the crusade, and Seguin de Badefol, who took Anse, were discussed in more detail. Both stood out from the captains fighting with them, using different strategies. Of course, they also had some common traits: personal courage and ruthlessness, two characteristics that were essential in their time to be captain of a company. Nevertheless, these two traits can be said to be typical in general of any captain who had served in Italy or in the battles of the Hundred Years' War. It took much more than that to stand out among the hundreds of mercenary captains who were active in combat in 1350-66. In the case of Arnaud de Cervole, one of these additional qualities was his organisational skills. He embodied the ideal military entrepreneur, who could make money out of anything, see an opportunity and, in all likelihood, take advantage of it. He gave two examples of this during the crusade at Metz and on his return from Alsace in the Duchy of Burgundy. However, this alone would not have been enough; it was very important that he be well versed in both worlds, that he found his way around, that he found the right tone with the *routiers* in the same way as he did with the King of France or the Duke of Burgundy. In addition, as long as he was able to balance that, both the mercenaries and the aristocracy needed the Archpriest, and it worked perfectly. To be accepted in society and successfully integrated

into the aristocracy, he needed two other important qualities: unbroken French loyalty, which was not the case for all the captains who fought in the Hundred Years' War, and a career. Seguin de Badefol excelled in other things than Arnaud de Cervole. He proved to be an excellent strategist who showed his talents both on the battlefield and during the sieges of the city. Whether Matteo Villani is right or Froissart is wrong, Seguin de Badefol was one of the captains of the great companies who had a decisive say in the strategy of the Battle of Brignais. The unsuspecting royal army, unprepared for battle, may have been taken by surprise, or the knights may have been taken by surprise by the unexpected appearance of the mercenaries, who were attacking the royal army, which was storming the hill, in a closed formation, on foot, English-style, from the flank.

In both the capture of Brioude and Anse, Seguin de Badefol was able to approach a major walled town of 2000 inhabitants without being detected, pick out an unprotected or poorly defended point on the town wall and take it by surprise. In discussing the importance of the river valleys in the strategy of the companies, it has been shown in detail how Seguin de Badefol made masterly use of the location of Anse, with its stone bridge, to extend his sphere of influence in the second half of 1364 on both banks of the Saône. Nevertheless, he was not only an excellent strategist, he also proved to be a very good negotiator, for on both occasions he was able to negotiate a peace that was to his advantage. Seguin de Badefol proved to be a cautious captain, Anse being the best example of this, while six of his seven lieutenants were killed in the course of a year, he himself did not embark on any adventure that would have proved dangerous for him. Like Arnaud de Cervole, he was careful to observe formalities, and while he kept Anse under occupation, he made it clear when signing the letters he proclaimed that he was occupying the town not in his own name, but on behalf of King Charles the Bad of Navarre. The trouble was that the King of Navarre considered that Seguin de Badefol was not serving him effectively enough in Burgundy, but was more concerned with his own enrichment. Therefore, he offered him poisoned fruit, and he died in agony on the way to Castile.

Arnaud de Cervole's crusade came at a special moment when the French kingdom and Italy were simultaneously silenced and at peace, leaving, at least for a very short time, the mercenaries without a commission and the papal policy of persuading the mercenaries to go on the crusade, which had been going on for several years, to be fulfilled. This process began at the end of 1362 with the visit of King Peter I of Cyprus to Avignon. By the time Peter I arrived in Avignon the new Pope Urban V had been waiting for the king, who, fortunately for Peter, was as committed to the organisation of the crusade as his

predecessor. The idea received support from an unexpected source, John II Good, who was in Avignon on his return from his imprisonment in London, indicated his intention to participate and shortly afterwards took up the cross. The chapter on the Preparation of the Crusade traces in detail the twists and turns of what was originally a French-led crusade, which evolved into four crusades, each with four different aims, but all converging, launched almost in parallel between the summers of 1365 and 1366. The idea of using mercenaries had been mooted from the start and, although it was rejected in France and Italy at the time, the situation changed dramatically a year later. Drawing on archival sources in Florence and Dijon, the research has succeeded in tracing the link between Arnaud de Cervole and the crusade of Amadeus VI, thus linking the two theatres of war. What unfortunately remain unanswered are two very important questions. One is the Hungarian role in the preparations. Although many points of the Hungarian - French diplomatic relations in the spring of 1365 have been clarified, the details of the exchanges of envoys remain obscure, so it is not known whose idea it was to send the crusading companies through the Holy Roman Empire to Hungary. Similarly, doubts remain as to the direct link between Arnaud de Cervole and Avignon. This has been explained in detail in the chapter on the Crusade, but the fact remains that it is not known exactly when and how Arnaud de Cervole was able to assemble such a large crusade. Further research is needed to answer these questions. Likewise, further research is needed on the Hungarian mercenaries serving in Trecento, Italy and on Hungarian-Avignon relations, since the two questions are closely related. Fortunately, at the time of writing this dissertation, two Hungarian research groups are working in parallel to create databases to facilitate the work of medievalists in two areas that have not been researched in detail. The two research groups and other research related to the dissertation are presented below, indicating the research directions for the coming years.

Excursus

Current Research, Related to the Topic of the Dissertation

During the preparation of this dissertation, two important research groups were set up in Hungary and are continuing their work, resulting in open databases for all researchers interested in the Hungarian military presence in Western Europe. Likewise, a number of ongoing research projects will in the near future provide important contributions to the history of late medieval warfare in the mid-14th century, and to the changes that accompanied the emergence of the great companies in Europe. As regards the presence of mercenaries in

Iberia in the 14th century, the research of the University of Lleida is decisive, especially as regards the presence of the Routiers in Aragon.

The Research Group «*The Sources of the Medieval Hungarian Military Organisation in Europe (1301-1437)*» of the Debrecen University has been working to fill this gap since 2018, when it started to prepare the current project. At this stage, the members of the research group have created a database, according to predefined criteria, which includes all the archival notes on the presence of Hungarians in Italy, in Hungarian and international literature and published source works, referred to by historians working on the subject over the last two hundred years. The database has served as a starting point for the preparation of the research and the planning of a systematic study of the archives in Italy. Two types of archival records were and are being processed by members of the research team. The first type includes the works of historians active in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the second type includes books and studies written after the Second World War. In the case of the former, due to the multiple changes in the Italian archival system, each time a preliminary consultation was held with the archives concerned to ensure the identifiability and validity of the references, while the latter group of source references served as a secure starting point for the members of the research team. For this reason, the archive where the ratio of the two types of source designations offered the best prospects of success on the basis of preliminary discussions and correspondence was chosen to start the research process.

Based on preliminary research, the research team wanted to answer the following questions:

- Estimation of the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy, its changes during the period under study,
- The rate of turnover of Hungarian mercenaries over a coherent, shorter period,
- The frequency and form of their employment,
- Where possible, the Hungarian constables and caporals can be identified by their geographical origin and name,
- Their level of income, monthly and annual, and international comparisons,
- Their place and role in the strategy and tactics of international companies, mainly German and British,
- What was the role of the Hungarians in the hierarchy of the companies,
- If possible, find out what happened to the wealth accumulated in Italy (based on similar English and German research),
- The history of the Hungarian-led companies should be researched in as much detail as possible,

- What equipment, armament and armour did the Hungarian light cavalry have (here we wanted to contribute to the decades-long debate in the literature on whether the Hungarian light cavalry used bows in the mid-14th century),
- For what purpose did the rulers and cities of Italy welcome the Hungarians
- Whether the state-of-the-art warfare of the period, acquired in the Italian theatres of war, is in any way reflected in the Angevin period Hungarian warfare,
- Communication within the multinational companies and with the Italian principals.
- What was the value of an average-sized Hungarian mercenary force in the 14th and 15th centuries
- What battlefield casualties were suffered, how were resupply arrangements made,
- The role of the *banderia* in the organisational structure of the Hungarian mercenary companies.
- If possible, to explore possible relations between Hungarian companies serving in Italy at the same time,
- Tracing the careers of some constables in Italy in the light of available sources,
- Hungarian mercenaries in Italy, which war did they participate in, and
- Where did Hungarian mercenaries, recruited in Italy, fight outside Italy

The research results have been made available on the internet through the MMH resource database. In the development of the SQL-based database, the objective was to establish a platform that could be easily accessed and managed by both interested parties and researchers. An interface was designed with the intention of ensuring that users do not feel 'in the dark', particularly when confronted with limited knowledge of the source data.

This multifaceted approach is intended to accommodate users with varying levels of familiarity with the source data. The inclusion of numerous search options is crucial, as it allows users to expedite the search process. By enabling search based on various criteria such as index, date, type of source, and others, users are provided with a versatile and user-friendly platform. Furthermore, the program automatically presents related records during the search process, streamlining and accelerating the retrieval of relevant information.

Until the completion of the dissertation, members of the research team carried out research in Florence, Bologna, Siena, Turin, Mantua and the Vatican Archives. The number of records in the database is in the order of thousands, and the type of records is extremely varied, ranging from mercenary registers, correspondence from Italian city-states, individuals and

rulers concerning Hungarian mercenaries, cryptographically written sources, to Hungarian mercenary-related monuments, weapons and equipment.

Another important research group related to this topic is connected to the University of Pécs, where research is being carried out on 14th century Papal-Hungarian relations, including Gil de Albornoz's Hungarian connections. The objective of the research encompassed compiling a comprehensive biographical and official record of active papal delegates (legates, delegates, envoys, papal tax collectors, conservators, executors, administrators, and delegated judges) in Hungary before 1378.¹⁷⁹⁹ The collection of biographical and administrative data was structured to cover the entire life and various stages of each person's official career, including data preceding or following their activities in Hungary. This thorough approach allows for the study of the complete life and official career of each individual, forming a valuable starting point for further research.¹⁸⁰⁰

To address contemporary challenges, the data are now accessible in the database created within the project framework. Each identified individual in the system is assigned a numerical ID, forming a personal datasheet that can be expanded and updated at any stage of the research.¹⁸⁰¹ This adaptability facilitates the inclusion of new data, ensuring the provision of up-to-date, high-quality information. The database is constructed from specific records, and a detailed search interface is provided for user convenience.¹⁸⁰²

The research methodology and data upload process primarily rely on primary sources, including archival and narrative sources, supplemented by information from secondary sources (historiography).¹⁸⁰³ This research is not confined to Hungarian sources alone; international partners and their research contribute to enriching the results. Data collection encompasses nine main areas: 1) basic summary information about the person, 2) kinship, 3) studies, qualifications, 4) ecclesiastical order, 5) ecclesiastical office, 6) cardinal title, 7)

¹⁷⁹⁹ KISS Gergely and BÁLING Péter, *Papal Representatives in Hungary in the Eleventh-Fourteenth Centuries. DeLegatOnline Online Porosopographical Database*, [available online at], (<https://delegatonline.pte.hu/index>), 3.

¹⁸⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰² *Ibid.* p. 4.

¹⁸⁰³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

other events, 8) papal authorizations. The data for each individual are categorized into biographical and event data, following the experience of previous projects.¹⁸⁰⁴

The data uploading process is initiated with recording basic biographical data, including gender, name, name variants, bibliography, and sources, for each papal envoy. This meticulous approach ensures the thorough and accurate documentation of each individual within the database.¹⁸⁰⁵ The entered data holds potential for advancing the comprehension of various historical facets, including the history of diplomacy, particularly within Hungarian-papal relations.¹⁸⁰⁶ Additionally, it contributes to institutional history, shedding light on aspects such as the papal court, representation, and jurisdiction. The legal history dimension is enriched by insights into canon law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Furthermore, the data proves valuable for delving into the history of culture and cultural studies, encompassing topics such as university studies, cultural mediation, and canonization.¹⁸⁰⁷ The prosopographical information concerning each papal envoy serves as a valuable resource for future research endeavours, offering deeper insights into the representation of the papacy in Hungary, and more broadly, within the region.¹⁸⁰⁸ This is particularly pertinent when considering instances where a papal envoy may have been assigned to multiple neighbouring areas, thereby contextualizing the country within a center-periphery coordinate system.¹⁸⁰⁹

A third research group, the «*Consolidated Research Group on Studies of Space, Power and Culture in the Middle Ages*» is currently investigating the relationship between 14th century mercenaries and the Kingdom of Aragon from the early 21st century at the University of Lleida. The results of a decade and a half of research have provided a unique level of detail on the subject in local archives on both sides of the Pyrenees: Perpignan, Tàrraga, Girona, Solsona, Barcelona, Aran, Olot, Cervera, Lleida, Tortosa, Reus, Olot, Puigceedà, etc.¹⁸¹⁰ Such detailed, systematic research has never been carried out before. The main thrust of the research is the impact of mercenaries on local society. The results of this research will

¹⁸⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p. 4.

¹⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p. 4.

¹⁸⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p. 10.

¹⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹⁰ FLOCEL Sabaté, *D'étranges Envahisseurs. La Catalogne face aux compagnies de routiers au XIV^e siècle*, To be published in 2025, p. 3.

be published next year in a book that will be decisive for the researchers dealing with this subject. The research sets the stage by highlighting the surprising lack of attention given to this critical subject beyond sporadic local references and underscores the interconnectedness of historical dynamics and societal stimuli by emphasizing how these factors shape historical narratives.¹⁸¹¹

The research contends that unlike regions where such companies served as mercenaries for local lords, in Catalonia, they presented a genuine and formidable threat, disrupting established norms in defence mechanisms, administrative structures, territorial networks, economy, taxation, and political dynamics.¹⁸¹² The realization of the substantial impact of *routiers* invasions on both the population and the political structure leading to the development of this comprehensive work. It aims to rectify this imbalance by providing a comprehensive view of how these invasions, largely absent from Catalonia's historical records, underscored the structural vulnerabilities within its institutions.

The invasions of the *routiers* began with the fourth crusade led by Bertrand du Guesclin in 1366. This crusade was well-versed in historiography, which consistently posited that the *routiers* during the Hundred Years' War had penetrated the southern territories, or that King Peter the Ceremonious had sought aid from armed French companies in the conflict against Castile. However, it escaped the notice of researchers that in reality, a prolonged series of invasions unfolded over a span of four decades.¹⁸¹³ These invasions coincided with regions contending with concurrent challenges such as pandemics, crop failures, natural disasters like earthquakes, and conflicts initiated by the Crown of Aragon along the peninsular border with Castile and in the Mediterranean expansion. The cumulative impact of these events on the populace and the simultaneous examination of the responsiveness of the contemporary Catalan institutional structure, rooted in the interplay between the sovereign and the states, had not been duly acknowledged.¹⁸¹⁴

The research showed that despite being familiar with the historical episodes, they have been under-studied concerning their real impact on Catalonia's society and politics. Therefore, the research aims to rectify this oversight by meticulously analysing the repercussions of French companies on Catalonia in the second half of the 14th century, with a particular emphasis on their effects on Catalan life and politics.

The book extends to the examination of the societal dynamics in responding to these invasions. The invasions disrupted not only the physical and economic aspects of life but

¹⁸¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 4.

¹⁸¹² *Ibid*.

¹⁸¹³ *Ibid*, p. 5.

¹⁸¹⁴ *Ibid*.

also the delicate balance between urban centres and their rural counterparts. A key focus is on the weaknesses within the Aragonese defence system and the institutional challenges in organizing a swift and efficient armed response. The population's resort to self-reliance, fortifying towns with walls as a preventive measure, becomes a central theme. In the second half of the 14th century, the *routiers* invaded the kingdom from the north more than a dozen times, causing confusion among the local population, who could not even say exactly who was attacking them. The only recurring term was 'companies'.¹⁸¹⁵ The research does not merely recount historical events but emphasizes the broader implications of these invasions on Catalonia's political model during the Late Middle Ages. It asserts that these invasions, beyond being historical anecdotes, mirror and influence the prevailing political landscape characterized by urban dominance and monarchical weaknesses.¹⁸¹⁶

In conclusion, indeed, the presence of foreign troops in 14th-century Aragon played a pivotal role, permeating various facets of the socio-political landscape. This influence has become a focal point in historiographical advancements across diverse fields in recent years. Areas such as taxation, driven by the urgent need to secure resources for defence, witnessed significant impacts.¹⁸¹⁷ Town and country planning underwent transformations, marked by specific demarcations around the captaincies, responding to the exigencies imposed by these invasions. The quest for urban supplies during times of cereal shortages and the intertwining of invasions in political conspiracies underscored the multifaceted repercussions.¹⁸¹⁸ Particularly notable was the explicit anticipation by cities like Barcelona and Valencia in 1396, where they confronted individuals associated with the royal curia, openly accusing them of collusion with companies for invading the country. Recent studies underscore the centrality of the actions of these companies in shaping historical narratives.¹⁸¹⁹ Yet, there remains a need to intricately weave together these aspects and delve into other influential factors. Foremost among these is an exploration of the impact exerted by these companies on both the population and the territory. This involves scrutinizing the suffering endured by men and women who fell victim to these invasions and assessing the economic consequences borne by towns and cities compelled to incur substantial costs in fortifying themselves with walls. The foreign troop presence in 14th-

¹⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁸¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*

century Aragon emerges as a crosscutting factor, demanding comprehensive examination and interconnected exploration across various dimensions of historical analysis.¹⁸²⁰

The steady stream of contributions from the above research groups, together with the volume of studies on Peter of Lusignan published last year, will allow a future monograph to be written on the synthesizing history of the four crusades. Such a work has not yet been produced, covering in a single volume the detailed history of the preparation and implementation of the four crusades from Portugal to the Black Sea, aspects of which I have briefly discussed in this dissertation.

¹⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

Appendix 1

Historiographic Overview of 19th and Early 20th Centuries

«Vividly written texts are often overlooked or dismissed in the search for reliable evidence about the past. This is especially true in the study of medieval conflicts, in which scholars often try to filter conflicting sources to recreate complicated events»¹⁸²¹

Mercenaries of the 14th century have been researched by generations of historians over the past two centuries. Thanks to the accumulating data and the ever increasing research opportunities, it is possible to write the story of Arnaud de Cervole and his crusading mercenaries, unravelling the tangled web of international politics that led, after so many twists and turns, to the four simultaneous crusades. The topic of this dissertation covers a relatively narrow interval in time, only two decades, but is very broad in geographically, at least as far as the preparation for the crusades and their causes are concerned. The historiographic overview will therefore be adapted to the above, taking stock of the work of historians who worked on the history of medieval mercenaries in Italy, the Kingdom of France in the mid 14th century and studied the history of the four crusades. Kenneth Fowler wrote in his Preface of the *Medieval Mercenaries* that *«all historians working on medieval French history are aware of the immense debt they owe to the accumulated French historical scholarship of more than a century and the historiography of the companies provides no exception.»*¹⁸²² Without the meticulous research of the French historians who published during the 19th and early 20th centuries, today's researchers would have a much harder time. Among these were those who worked on the 14th century history of the Hundred Years' War covering the whole of France, including Denifle,¹⁸²³ Luce,¹⁸²⁴ Delachenal¹⁸²⁵ and

¹⁸²¹ Trevor Russel Smith, *Ethic and Representation of War in the Lanercost Chronicle, 1327-1347*, 2019. (manuscript), [available online at], <https://www.academia.edu/38629036>.

¹⁸²² K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries...*, *op. cit.* p. xii.

¹⁸²³ Henri Denifle, *La Désolation des églises, monastères et hôpitaux en France pendant la guerre de Cent ans: La Guerre de Cent ans jusqu'à la mort de Charles V*, vol. II, Paris, 1899.

¹⁸²⁴ Siméon Luce, *La France pendant la guerre de cent ans: épisodes historiques et vie privée aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles*, Paris, 1893.

¹⁸²⁵ Roland Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, vol. I-III, Paris, 1909.

Molinier.¹⁸²⁶ Their works are essential in the understanding of the large scale processes. Some of these authors concentrated on the mercenaries focusing on one captain. Luce wrote his book on Bertrand du Guesclin's life.¹⁸²⁷ The book made a lasting impression on contemporary historians: «*the history of Duguesclin, which appeared several years later, is the work of a man in full possession of means, provided with information which supposes long and very patient research, and which astonishes by its multiplicity.*»¹⁸²⁸ Mirot dealt with Sylvestre Budes (13??-1380) and his Breton comrades's adventure in Italy.¹⁸²⁹ Boudet presented a study on Bernard de Garlan (captain of Alleuze in the 1380s), known as the 'Evil Hunchback'.¹⁸³⁰ Lorette wrote an article on Arnaud Amanieu, sire d'Albret,¹⁸³¹ Chanson wrote about the famous Aymerigot Marchès¹⁸³² (1360??-1391) but among them the most important from the point of view of this study is Chérest.¹⁸³³

There are some authors who concentrated on the routiers, for example Fréville presented a study on the Great Companies,¹⁸³⁴ Durrieu on the Gascon mercenaries in Italy,¹⁸³⁵ Funk-Brentano in his book on the brigands¹⁸³⁶ devoted a chapter to the mercenaries in the middle of the 14th century, Gand published a study on the Breton mercenaries in the Hundred Years' War.¹⁸³⁷ Maury wrote an article on the English in France in the 14th century and among them he gave some details on the mercenaries as well.¹⁸³⁸

¹⁸²⁶ Émile Molinier, *Étude sur la vie d'Arnoul d'Audrehem, maréchal de France 130-1370*, Paris, 1883.

¹⁸²⁷ Siméon Luce, *Histoire de Bertrand du Guesclin et de son époque. La jeunesse de Bertrand (1320-1364)*, Paris, 1876.

¹⁸²⁸ Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire, « Discours de M. le Président (l'abbé Sauvage; Siméon Luce) », *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Normandie*, 1895, vol. VIII, pp. 87-100.

¹⁸²⁹ Léon Mirot, « Sylvestre Budes (13??-1380) et les Bretons en Italie », *Bibliothèque de l'École de Chartes*, 1897, vol. LVIII, pp. 579-614. and 1898, vol. LIX, pp. 262-303.

¹⁸³⁰ Marcellin Boudet, « L'Histoire d'un bandit méconnu: Bernard de Garlan, dit le «Méchant Bossu», capitaine d'Alleuze », *Revue de la Haute-Auvergne*, 1912, vol. XIV, pp. 93-122, pp. 230-264, pp. 339-367.

¹⁸³¹ Gabriel Lorette, « Arnaud Amanieu, sire d'Albret, et l'appel des seigneurs gascons en 1368 », in *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à M. Charles Bémont par ses amis et ses élèves à l'occasion de la vingt-cinquième année de son enseignement à l'école pratique des hautes études*, Paris, 1913, pp. 317-341.

¹⁸³² Maurice Chanson, « Un procès criminel sous Charles VI. Aimerigot Marchez au Châtelet de Paris (juillet 1392) », *Revue d'Auvergne*, 1888, vol. V, pp. 1-19.

¹⁸³³ Aimé Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre: épisodes de la guerre de cent ans au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1879.

¹⁸³⁴ Ernest de Fréville, « Des Grandes Compagnies au Quatorzième siècle », *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 1843, vol. V, pp. 232-253.

¹⁸³⁵ Paul Durrieu, *Les Gascons en Italie, études historiques*, Auch, 1885.

¹⁸³⁶ Frantz Funk-Brentano, *Les Brigands*, Paris, 1913.

¹⁸³⁷ Roger Gand, « Les routiers bretons pendant la guerre de Cent Ans », *Mémoires de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Bretagne*, 1924, vol. V, n° 2, pp. 23-78.

¹⁸³⁸ Alfred Maury, « Les Anglais en France au XIV^e siècle et la délivrance du territoires sous Charles V », *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1876, vol. XVI, p. 5-50.

There were more numerous historians who dealt with this topic at a regional, or municipal level concentrating on or discussing the history of the mercenaries in the Hundred Years' war in a specific, well described part of France. Their works are indispensable when a modern historian wants to see the details but also explore new links between regions situated far from each other. Nicolas Savy stated in his excellent biography on Bertrucat d'Albret that it is very hard to follow the trace of the captains: «*they remain mysterious, mentioned one day here and another there before disappearing from the archives for weeks and then reappearing.*»¹⁸³⁹ Fortunately, It is a long list, therefore, I will only give a brief overview of the literature on the history of mercenaries in the regions outside the territories affected by Arnaud de Cervole's crusade. I will present the literature focusing on the border regions between the Holy Roman Empire and the eastern provinces of the Kingdom of France, and dating from the first half of the 19th and 20th centuries in much more detail. Labroue's work concerns captains in Périgord,¹⁸⁴⁰ while Rouquette's focus was La Rouerge,¹⁸⁴¹ Quicherat wrote a short study on the English invasion of 1358 in Sens.¹⁸⁴² Naturally Vaisette's ninth volume of the history of Languedoc is one of the principle works on the routiers of the *Midj*¹⁸⁴³ in the 14th century. Moisant's research resulted in a dissertation on the Black Prince in Aquitaine.¹⁸⁴⁴ Stein's paper on the village of Villemaréchal¹⁸⁴⁵ described an episode of Edward III last campaign before the Treaty of Brétigny. Latouche's research concentrated on the sources located in the archives of Saint-Antonin-de-Rouergue.¹⁸⁴⁶ André-Michel wrote a study in the same volume on the English and Breton routiers, and Castilians led by Enrique of Trastámara in Carpentras in 1362.¹⁸⁴⁷

¹⁸³⁹ Nicolas Savy, *Bertucat d'Albret ou le destin d'un capitaine gascon du roi d'Angleterre pendant la guerre de Cent Ans*, Pradines, 2005, 14.

¹⁸⁴⁰ Émile Labroue, *Le livre de Vie, les seigneurs et les capitaines du Périgord Blanc au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, Bordeaux, 1891.

¹⁸⁴¹ Joseph Rouquette, *La Rouergue sous les Anglais*, Millau, 1887.

¹⁸⁴² Jules Quicherat, « Récit des tribulations d'un religieux du diocèse de Sens pendant l'invasion anglaise de 1358 », *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 1857, vol. XVIII, p. 357-360.

¹⁸⁴³ Dom Claude Devic et Dom Joseph Vaissete, *Histoire Generale de Languedoc*, vol. IX, Toulouse, 1885.

¹⁸⁴⁴ Joseph Moisant, *Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine (1355-1356, 1362-1370)*, Paris, 1894.

¹⁸⁴⁵ Henri Stein, *Un épisode de la guerre de cent ans dans le Gatinais. L'Affaire de Villemaréchal (1360)*, Paris, 1893.

¹⁸⁴⁶ Robert Latouche, « Saint-Antonin-de-Rouergue et la domination Anglaise au XIV^e siècle (1358-1369) », in *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à M. Charles Bémont par ses amis et ses élèves à l'occasion de la vingt-cinquième année de son enseignement à l'école pratique des hautes études*, Paris, 1913, pp. 305-317.

¹⁸⁴⁷ Robert André-Michel, « 'Anglais', bretons et routiers à Carpentras sous Jean le Bon et Charles V », in *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à M. Charles Bémont par ses amis et ses élèves à l'occasion de la vingt-cinquième année de son enseignement à l'école pratique des hautes études*, Paris, 1913, pp. 341-365.

Labande in his biography on Bertrand du Guesclin described in detail the crossing of the routiers at Languedoc on the way to Spain.¹⁸⁴⁸ Moisant worked on the years the Black Prince spent in Aquitaine in the mid-14th century.¹⁸⁴⁹ Mazure gave a detailed account of the presence of the mercenaries in Auvergne between 1356-1392.¹⁸⁵⁰

As far as the history of mercenaries on the borders of the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France is concerned, first of all, three historians from this period should be mentioned. Petit's books on Burgundy, Servais's research on the Barrois, Guigue's volume on Lyon and its surroundings. Petit also devoted a piece on the history of Avallon in which he gave details of the mercenaries' present in the proximity of the city in the 1360s.¹⁸⁵¹ His other two big series with detailed archival references concern the history of Burgundy under the Capetian and under Valois dukes. From the point of view of this dissertation the ninth, last volume of the Capetian¹⁸⁵² and the first of the Valois dukes¹⁸⁵³ are the most relevant. Servais's account of the history of Barrois is also as detailed and precise as Petit's works, and is heavily based on the archival sources in Bar-le-Duc.¹⁸⁵⁴ Guigue's book differs from those of Petit and Servais in that, while the latter two authors, in a history of duchies of Burgundy and Bar, provide many details on the history of mercenaries active in the region, Guigue focuses specifically on the history of the routiers in and around Lyon between 1350 and 1370. Guigue, whose «*colleagues were amazed at his knowledge of the history of his country and his experience of scholarly work.*»¹⁸⁵⁵ relied heavily on sources in the municipal and departmental archives of Lyon.¹⁸⁵⁶ As three books in all, they are characterised by a very rich collection of *pièces justificatives*. Ainé wrote a short but valuable article on Guillaume de Thurey, the archbishop of Lyon which contains supplementary information on the mercenaries between 1358-1365.¹⁸⁵⁷ Among 19th century historians, Barante wrote a

¹⁸⁴⁸ Léon-Honoré Labande, *Bertrand du Guesclin et les États Pontificaux de France. Passage des Routiers en Languedoc (1365-1367), Guerre de Provence (1368)*, Avignon, Paris, 1904.

¹⁸⁴⁹ Joseph Moisant, *Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine 1355-1356, 1362-1370*, Paris, 1894.

¹⁸⁵⁰ Adolphe Mazure, *L'Auvergne au quatorzième siècle: tableau historique de cette province durant l'invasion Anglaise, 1356-1392*, Clermont, 1845.

¹⁸⁵¹ Ernest Petit, *Avallon et l'Avallonnais*, Auxerre, 1867.

¹⁸⁵² E. Petit, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne...*, *op. cit.*,

¹⁸⁵³ Ernest Petit, *Ducs de Bourgogne de la maison de Valois, d'après des documents inédits. Philippe le Hardi 1363-1380, vol. I*, Paris, 1909.

¹⁸⁵⁴ Victor Servais, *Annales historiques du Barrois de 1352 à 1411 ou Histoire politique, militaire et ecclésiastique du duché de Bar sous le règne de Robert, duc de Bar*, Bar-le-Duc, 1865.

¹⁸⁵⁵ Maurice Prou, « Nécrologie, Georges Guigue », *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, 1926, vol. LXXXVII, pp. 433-436, p. 433.

¹⁸⁵⁶ G. Guigue, *Les Tard-Venus ...*, *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁵⁷ Pericaud Ainé, *Guillaume de Thurey, Archevêque de Lyon 1358-1365*, Lyon, 1856.

book on the history of the Valois dukes¹⁸⁵⁸ but it contains less precise references than those in Petit's book.

Gresser wrote the story of the Hundred Years' War in Franche-Comté, a county which *«although it was a land of Empire and not part of the Kingdom of France, Franche-Comté did not live independently of the history being played out on French soil.»*¹⁸⁵⁹ In the second volume of Clerc's series on the history of Franche-Comté, he discusses the presence of mercenaries in Burgundy in detail, not only reporting the presence of Arnaud de Cervole, but also giving an account of captains such as Espiot, who also took part in Arnaud de Cervole's, the Archpriest's crusade.¹⁸⁶⁰ Among the 19th century historians who dealt with Franche-Comté, Finot and Vernier wrote specifically on the Great Companies and the English incursion in the county and in the duchy of Burgundy.¹⁸⁶¹ A short but positive review was presented by Bruel on Finot's accomplishment: *«It is in fact mainly by means of the accounts of the châtelains that our colleague has followed the progress of the routiers in Burgundy step by step for more than fifty years, and that he has proved that the great companies had lasted longer than was previously thought. It is to be hoped that the industrious archivist of the Haute-Saône, who has the necessary qualities for the historian, will one day present us with a more considerable work on his province.»*¹⁸⁶² This is an important work, which discusses the history of the companies in detail, contributing greatly to the analysis of the relevant Dijon archival sources. Vernier presented two articles on the mercenaries of the middle of the 14th century at the beginning of the 1900s. One focuses on the resistance organised by Philip the Bold against the companies¹⁸⁶³ as Barande puts it so eloquently: *«Those of the Côte d'Or are particularly abundant in documents, making it possible to follow the trail of these bands of routiers who, scattered throughout the country*

¹⁸⁵⁸ Amable Guillaume Prosper De Barante, *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la maison de Valois 1364-1477*, Paris, 1826.

¹⁸⁵⁹ Pierre Gresser, *La Franche-Comté au temps de la guerre de cent ans*, Besançon, 1989.

¹⁸⁶⁰ Édouard Clerck, *Essai sur l'histoire de la Franche-Comté, vol. II*, Besançon, 1846.

¹⁸⁶¹ Jules Finot, *Recherches sur les incursions des Anglais et des Grandes Compagnies dans le duché et le comté de Bourgogne à la fin du XIV^e siècle, précédées de considérations sur l'origine des Grandes Compagnies, leurs diverses dénominations, leur influence sur point de vue politique et militaire, etc.*, Vesoul, 1874.

¹⁸⁶² Alexandre Bruel, « Jules Finot, Recherches sur les incursions des Anglais et des Grandes Compagnies dans le duché et le comté de Bourgogne à la fin du XIV^e siècle, précédées de considérations sur l'origine des Grandes Compagnies, leurs diverses dénominations, leur influence sur point de vue politique et militaire, etc. », *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, 1875, vol. XXXVI, pp. 321-326.

¹⁸⁶³ Jules-Joseph Vernier, « Le duché de Bourgogne et les Compagnies dans la seconde moitié du XIV^e siècle », *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences, Arts, et Belles-Lettres de Dijon*, 1901-1902, 4th series, vol. VIII, pp. 219-230.

or ambushed in fortresses, were the despair of a province. It is these documents that our colleague M. Vernier presents in a pleasant account, linking them as far as possible to the general history.»¹⁸⁶⁴ Vernier's second work dealt with the enmities between the duchy and the county of Burgundy just before the crusade toward Hungary was launched. This study gives an background in understanding the political and military situation in the region and the reasons why Philip the Bold urged Arnaud de Cervole's departure.¹⁸⁶⁵ Gauthier has reworked an episode in the history of the great companies in Burgundy at the end of the 1360s.¹⁸⁶⁶ It was the siege of Rochefort which was started in 1368 and lasted for fifty days, by order of Marguerite de France, against Jean IV de Chalon-Auxerre.¹⁸⁶⁷

Moranvillé elaborated on Edward III's failed attempt on the city of Reims in the winter of 1359.¹⁸⁶⁸ Poinson devoted a chapter of his book on the history of Champagne and Brie to the events in the middle of the 14th century including Edward III campaign and the presence of the mercenaries in the early sixties.¹⁸⁶⁹ Digot's work on the medieval history of Lorraine is based on chronicles but he did not use archival references.¹⁸⁷⁰ Dumont analysed criminal justice in the duchies of Lorraine and Bar giving examples on the duties of baillis and prévôts.¹⁸⁷¹ Doleine wrote an article on the battle of Nogent-sur-Seine.¹⁸⁷² Reuss wrote on the history of Arnaud de Cervole's mercenary companies in Alsace.¹⁸⁷³ He analysed the medieval German chronicles and 19th century literature such as Chérest.¹⁸⁷⁴ Strobel

¹⁸⁶⁴ Léon-Honoré Labande, « Le Duché de Bourgogne et les Compagnies dans la seconde moitié du XIV^e siècle par J.-J Vernier », *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 1902, vol. LXIII, pp. 704-705.

¹⁸⁶⁵ Jules-Joseph Vernier, « Une page d'histoire bourguignonne. Hostilités entre les Deux Bourgognes au XIV^e siècle (1363-1365) », *Revue Champenoise et Bourguignonne*, 1904, vol. I, pp. 1-33. and pp. 183-203.

¹⁸⁶⁶ Jules Gauthier, « Le siège de Rochefort-sur-le-Doubs et la mort de Jean IV de Chalon-Auxerre, prisonnier à Grimont. Épisode de la guerre des Grandes Compagnies (1368-1370) », *Académie des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Besançon. Procès-verbaux et mémoires*, 1899, pp. 141-163.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Jean IV de Chalon-Auxerre refused to pay homage to Marguerite de France for the lands he owned in Burgundy.

¹⁸⁶⁸ Henri Moranvillé, « Le siege de Reims, 1359-1360 », *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 1895, vol. LVI, pp. 90-98.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Maurice Poinson, *Histoire de la Champagne et de la Brie*, Châlons-sur-Marne, 1896.

¹⁸⁷⁰ Auguste Digot, *Histoire de Lorraine*, vol. I, Nancy, 1848.

¹⁸⁷¹ Charles-Emanuel Dumont, *Justice criminelle des duchés de Lorraine et de Bar du Bassigny et des Trois-Évêchés*, vol. I, Nancy, 1848.

¹⁸⁷² Paul Doleine, « La bataille de Nogent-sur-Seine 1359 », in *Extraits des Causeries sur l'Histoire de Nogent-su-Seine et des Environs*, Nogent-sur-Seine, 1935.

¹⁸⁷³ Rodolphe Reuss, « La première invasion des 'Anglais' en Alsace, épisode de l'histoire du XIV^e siècle », in *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à M. Charles Bémont par ses amis et ses élèves a l'occasion de la vingt-cinquième année de son enseignement a l'école pratique des hautes études*, Paris, 1913, pp. 281-305.

¹⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

devoted nine pages in his book to the companies Alsatian adventure in 1365.¹⁸⁷⁵ Bott wrote a rare dissertation dealing with the two Alsatian invasions of the companies in 1365-75.¹⁸⁷⁶ Delaborde provided details on the events of 1365 in his book on Jean de Joinville. but he has interesting comments on the cross border conflicts at the beginning of the 1360s.¹⁸⁷⁷ Tuefferd, in his work on the counts of Montbéliard, devoted a few pages to the events of 1360-1366, mentioning also the companies of Arnaud de Cervole.¹⁸⁷⁸ The already cited Monicat's study on the great companies provides important details for the second half of the 14th century including rare sources.¹⁸⁷⁹ One of the most important 19th-century writings on the preparation of the four crusades is associated with Jorga.¹⁸⁸⁰ The role of Philippe de Mézières in the crusades is described in his book.¹⁸⁸¹ Jorga's work was well received by historians of the time. Jarry wrote an unusually long, extremely positive review of the book: *«Philippe de Mézières has found in N. Jorga an exact, convinced and sometimes eloquent historian. Under his pen, the life of this man of heart unfolds pleasantly, whose only thought, in spite of all the obstacles, was the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre.....Suffice it to say that his work is entitled to a prominent place among the publications relating to the 14th century.»*¹⁸⁸²

*«The 14th century saw a long series of civil wars and antagonistic clashes between the Lombardian and Tuscan city states, they were always falling out with the Papal State as well. However, the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 that put an end to the Anglo-French hostilities made thousands of English mercenaries without work, who were more than kindly welcome by the Italian city states in the midst of civil wars.»*¹⁸⁸³ As we shall see, Urban V and Emperor Charles IV, together with Louis I and King Charles V of France, agreed to link the two great war zones where the mercenaries were most active in the 1360s, where the inhabitants were most in need of relief, and to organise, at least for a time, a grand crusade to the east. It is for this reason after the overview of the French literature of the 19th century, it is

¹⁸⁷⁵ Adam Walther Strobel, *Vaterländische Geschichte des Elsasses von der frühesten bis auf die gegenwärtige Zeit*, vol. II, Strasbourg, 1842.

¹⁸⁷⁶ Rudolf Bott, *Die Kriegszüge der englisch-französischen Soldkompagnien nach dem Elsaß und der Schweiz unter der Regierung Kaiser Karls IV*, Inaugural Dissertation, Halle, 1891.

¹⁸⁷⁷ Henri-François Delaborde, *Jean de Joinville et les seigneurs de Joinville*, Paris, 1894.

¹⁸⁷⁸ Paul Edmond Tuefferd, *Histoire des comtes souverains de Montbéliard*, Montbéliard, 1877.

¹⁸⁷⁹ Jacques Monicat, *Les grandes Compagnies en Velay, 1358-1392*, Paris, 1928.

¹⁸⁸⁰ In the literature, the name Jorga is used in two different ways. In this dissertation, I refer to him as 'Jorga' in his book by Philippe de Mézières and not as 'Iorga.'

¹⁸⁸¹ Nicolae Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières, 1327–1405 et la croisade au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1896.

¹⁸⁸² Eugène Jarry, « N. Jorga, Philippe de Mézières (1327-1405) et la croisade au XIV^e siècle », *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 1897, vol. LVIII, pp. 169-171.

¹⁸⁸³ A., Bárány, « The Communion... », art. cit., pp. 130-143.

necessary to look at both Italian and international literature on the Italian condottieri of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Since, in Italy, the Germans and the Hungarians were the two dominant nations in the 1350s, while the English appeared in greater numbers in the early 1360s, I will focus on the literature of these three nations. Attila Bárány stated in his outstanding study on the military history of Hungary in the Angevin era that the Hungarian mercenaries «were excellent at fighting in close combat with light horsemen, and for this tactical skill they competed with Siena, Pisa and Florence.»¹⁸⁸⁴ Perhaps the most important work on the presence of German mercenaries in Italy between 1350 and 1370 is by Schäffer.¹⁸⁸⁵ «It is the German knights and squires» he wrote in the introduction of his book, «from the duke and count to the single-shielded ministerial and middling man, whom we can trace in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries almost in all parts of the then known world.»¹⁸⁸⁶ The three volumes cover the subject in great depth, with a detailed bibliography of sources, including many valuable details not only on the German but also on the Hungarian mercenaries. Unfortunately, the archival identification of the source references often runs into problems due to the multiple changes in the Italian inventory system. As among the French historians of the 19th century, so among the Germans there were those who concentrated on the life of a famous German mercenary captain. Bronner's book tells the story of Werner von Urslingen, including his years in the service of King Louis I.¹⁸⁸⁷ Gessler wrote an essay on the mercenary captain Hüglin von Schöneegg of Basel, who began his career in Italy in the service of papal legate Cardinal Albornož¹⁸⁸⁸ whose task was to restore the papal authority in the states of the Church.¹⁸⁸⁹ Waschow's study is of the life of Otto von Braunschweig, who fought for forty years in the most remote battlefields of Italy, taking part in the Hundred Years' War alongside King John II of France, with whom he enjoyed a particularly good relationship.¹⁸⁹⁰ Köhler gave a comprehensive picture of the mercenaries

¹⁸⁸⁴ Attila Bárány, «Az Anjou-kor hadtörténete», in Veszprémy László (ed.), *Magyarország hadtörténete I. A kezdetektől 1526-ig*. Budapest, 2017, 12-58.

¹⁸⁸⁵ Karl Henrich Schäffer, *Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien während des 14. Jahrhunderts*, vol. I-III, Paderborn, 1911.

¹⁸⁸⁶ K. H. Schäffer, *Deutsche Ritter... op. cit.* p. 2.

¹⁸⁸⁷ Franz Xaver Bronner, *Abenteuerliche Geschichte Herzog Werner von Urslingen. Anführers eines großen Räuberheeres in Italien*, Aarau. 1828.

¹⁸⁸⁸ Gil Álvarez Carrillo de Albornož was entrusted by Innocent VI with the restoration of papal authority in the state of the Church. He led two campaigns to Italy in the middle of the 14th century. See the details later.

¹⁸⁸⁹ Eduard Gessler, «Hüglin von Schöneegg. Ein Basler Reiterführer des 14. Jahrhunderts in Italien. Ein Beitrag zur damaligen Bewaffnung», *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Alterumskunde*, 1923, vol. XXI, pp. 75-126.

¹⁸⁹⁰ Julius Waschow, *Herzog Otto von Braunschweig, Fürst von Tarent. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des XIV Jahrhunderts*, Breslau, 1874.

of the late Middle Ages, with rare details of German mercenaries in service in Florence.¹⁸⁹¹ Klein studied the history of the mercenaries of Salzburg in the 14th century. His paper also contains references to the involvement of the Salzburg mercenaries in Italy.¹⁸⁹² Sautier's book is an important contribution to this dissertation because it deals with the mercenary companies in the service of Urban V in the 1360s.¹⁸⁹³ Werunsky's three-volume work on the life of Charles IV is still in use today and contains important sources.¹⁸⁹⁴

In Italy, «*the mercenaries had no kinsmen in the cities, no patrons, no friends, no factions*» wrote Ricotti in the second volume of his series on mercenary captains in 1845 discussing in detail the history of the German, Hungarian, English and Breton companies.¹⁸⁹⁵ Caferro noted that «*the meagre scholarship consists of mostly studies by Italian and German scholars, dating from the 19th century, and is suffused with nationalistic bias and less for their own sake than as a stage in the broad evolution of Italian warfare*»¹⁸⁹⁶ including the work of Canestrini, Schäfer and Ricotti. The Italian literature on condottieri in the 19th century and early 20th century like the French, and German ones, covers the life of individual captains, the relationship between towns and the mercenaries, the history of the Church and specifically mercenaries in the service of the papal legate Albornoz, or the companies fighting against him. Several studies provide important information on the Hungarian mercenaries active in Italy. One such example is Pezzana, who, in a discussion of the 14th-century history of Parma, reports on the actions of the Hungarian army led by Meggyesaljai Mórócz Simon in the Parma and Padua area.¹⁸⁹⁷ Canestrini relied upon the archival sources of Florence, Siena and Genoa and discussed the condottieri and the companies hired by Pisa, Siena, and Florence containing also precious Hungarian mercenary references.¹⁸⁹⁸ In the book written by Giovanni d'Oleggio, there are many references to the history of the mercenaries employed by Bologna.¹⁸⁹⁹ Berenzi's book on Pontevico's 14th-century history

¹⁸⁹¹ Gustav Köhler, *Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesens und der Kriegsführung*, Breslau, 1886.

¹⁸⁹² Herbert Klein, « Das salzburgische Söldnerheer im 14. Jahrhundert », *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde*, 1926, vol. LXVI, pp. 99–158.

¹⁸⁹³ Albert Sautier, *Papst Urban V und die Söldnerkompagnien in Italien in den Jahren 1362–1367*, Zürich, 1911.

¹⁸⁹⁴ Emil Werunsky, *Geschichte Kaiser Karls IV. und seiner Zeit*, vol. I–III, Innsbruck, 1880–1892.

¹⁸⁹⁵ Ercole Ricotti, *Storica delle Compagnie ventura in Italia 1311-1327*, vol II, Torino, 1845.

¹⁸⁹⁶ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁸⁹⁷ Angelo Pezzana, *Storia della città di Parma. Vol. I. 1346-1400*, Parma, 1838.

¹⁸⁹⁸ Giuseppe Canestrini, « Documenti per servire alla storia della milizia italiana dal XIII secolo al XVI », *Raccolti negli archivi della Toscana Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1851, vol. XV, 1851, pp. 11-129.

¹⁸⁹⁹ Lino Sighinolfi, *La signoria di Giovanni da Oleggio in Bologna, 1355-1360*, Bologna, 1905.

described the wars with the Visconti.¹⁹⁰⁰ Mazzatini analysed the affairs of Cardinal Albornoz in the Marche region and Umbria, giving important details about the mercenaries he had hired.¹⁹⁰¹ Silva in his study on Pietro Gambacorta (1355-1435) also describes the Hungarian mercenaries who served in Pisa and the city's Hungarian connections in the mid-14th century.¹⁹⁰² In another book analysing the chronicles of Pisa, we find details of foreign mercenaries in service in the city of Pisa.¹⁹⁰³ Tagliabue analysed the financial history of Gian Galeazzo Visconti's government.¹⁹⁰⁴ Novati prepared a fascinating study on a less known *venturiero* Filippo di Messer Chiovolò Guazzalotti (1330??-1390) «*who... did not take up arms in the service of those who aroused in him a desire for profit or honour; instead, he was always dedicated to the defence of Florence*» in the 1360s and 70s.¹⁹⁰⁵ Fabretti's monumental four-volume work on the *capitani venturieri* active in Umbria was well received by contemporary critics.¹⁹⁰⁶ Leoni wrote after the publication of the first volume that «*honour [is] to Fabretti who dared to throw a curse on those bloodthirsty men, and while confessing, or rather raising their warlike virtue, to strip them of their armour and examine the man and compare him with other men.*»¹⁹⁰⁷ Leoni published a very interesting study and source on the contract between the city of Todi and the Compagnia del Cappelletto, a company led by Italians, Germans and Hungarians in 1363 and about the plague that struck Italy and Todi in the same year, and did not even spare the city's leadership.¹⁹⁰⁸ In his book on 14th-century Rimini, Tonini recounts the life of Malatesta Ungaro (1327-1372), knighted by King Louis the Great in 1347.¹⁹⁰⁹ The second volume contains many sources related to the

¹⁹⁰⁰ Angelo Berenzi, *Storia di Pontevico*, Cremona, 1888.

¹⁹⁰¹ Giuseppe Mazzatini, « Il Cardinale Albornoz nell' Umbria e nelle Marche », *Archivio storico per Le Marche e per L'Umbria*, 1888, vol. IV, pp. 466-494.

¹⁹⁰² Pietro Silva, « Il Governo di Pietro Gambacorta in Pisa e le sue relazioni col resto della Toscana e coi Visconti », *Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Filosofia e Filologia*, 1912, vol. XXIII, p. i, pp. iii-v, pp. 1-35, pp. 37-133, pp. 135-219, pp. 221-261, pp. 263-291, p. 293, pp. 295-343, pp. 345-347, pp. 349-352.

¹⁹⁰³ Pietro Silva, « Questioni e Ricerche di Cronistica Pisana », in Vittorio Fiorini (ed.), *Archivio Muratoriano studi e ricerche in servizio della nuova edizione dei Rerum Italicarum Scriptores di L. A. Muratori*, vol. I, Città di Castello, 1913.

¹⁹⁰⁴ Chiara Tagliabue, « La politica finanziaria nel governo di Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1378-1402), I parte », *Bolletino di Società Pavese di Storia Patria*, 1915, vol. XV, pp. 19-75.

¹⁹⁰⁵ Francesco Novati, « Un venturiero toscano del Trecento: Filippo Guazzalotti », *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1983, ser. V, vol. XI, n° 189, p. 88.

¹⁹⁰⁶ Ariodante Fabretti, *Biografie dei Capitani venturieri dell' Umbria*, vol. I-IV, Montepulciano, 1842-46.

¹⁹⁰⁷ Cesare Cantù, « Carlo Leoni », in Jacopo Crescini et Guglielmo Stefani (ed.), *Rivista. Giornale Euganeo di scienze, lettere ed arti*, Anno II, Padua, 1846, pp. 396-398, p. 398.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Lorenzo Leonij, « La peste e la Compagnia del Cappelletto a Todi nel 1363 », *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1878, ser. IV, Vol. II, n° 106, pp. 3-11.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Luigi Tonini, *Rimini nella signoria de' Malatesti*, vol I-II, Rimini, 1880.

activities of Malatesta Ungaro. Tabarrini's study explores the special friendship between Petrarch and Luchiano dal Verme.¹⁹¹⁰ It is about the relationship between Petrarch and a mercenary captain who, after serving the Scaliger and Visconti families, took command of the Venetian army in 1364 at Petrarch's instigation, with the task of crushing the Cretan revolt, and then took part in the crusade led by Count Amadeus VI of Savoy, as one of the most striking examples of a 14th century mercenary in crusading service. Professione's book on the relationship between the city of Siena and the *compagnie di ventura* at the end of the 19th century brought a new approach and hitherto unknown sources to the historians.¹⁹¹¹ «*This research by the indefatigable Professione is new and important, because the Companies of Fortune are one of the most characteristic institutions of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance.*»¹⁹¹²

The focus of attention for the English and American historians of the 19th century and the turn of the 20th century was Sir John Hawkwood. Marcotti and Temple-Leader wrote a biography on Sir John Hawkwood first in Italian and then later it was translated to English.¹⁹¹³ «*Temple-Leader planned and wrote it; Giuseppe Marcotti did the fact gathering in local archives. Temple-Leader was not a professional historian but an Englishman of the lordly class, who, like the subject of his book, passed many years of his life in Italy.*»¹⁹¹⁴ Cook discussed Chaucer's relationship with Lionel, Duke of Clarence, son of Edward III, and his marriage to Violante, daughter of Galeazzo II Visconti in 1368. The work draws on Italian, French and Latin sources, but does not include archival ones.¹⁹¹⁵ In an extremely interesting article, Devlin writes about Despenser¹⁹¹⁶'s Italian campaign against Milan in 1369, when he had to face Sir John Hawkwood, in an analysis of a painting by Andrea di Bonaiuto, «*Church Militant and Triumphant*», in the Spanish Chapel of the Church of Santa Maria Novella in Florence.¹⁹¹⁷

¹⁹¹⁰ Marco Tabarrini, *Francesco Petrarca e Luchino dal Verme condottiero dei veneziani nella guerra di Candia*, Roma, Voghera, 1893.

¹⁹¹¹ Alfonso Professione, *Siena e le Compagnie di ventura nella seconda metà del secolo XIV. Ricerche ed Appunti, con Appendice di documenti inediti*, Civitanova-Marche, 1898.

¹⁹¹² Giuseppe Rondoni, «Alfonso Professione, Siena e le Compagnie di ventura nella seconda metà del secolo XIV. Ricerche ed Appunti, con Appendice di documenti inediti», *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1898, ser. V, vol. XII, n° 212, pp. 377-379.

¹⁹¹³ John Temple-Leader et Giuseppe Marcotti, *Giovanni Acuto (Sir John Hawkwood), Storia d'un Condottiere*, Firenze, 1889.

¹⁹¹⁴ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁹¹⁵ Albert Stanburrough Cook, «The Last Months of Chaucer's Earliest Patron», *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 1916, vol. XXI, pp. 1-144.

¹⁹¹⁶ Henry le Despenser (1341-1406) Bishop of Norwich.

¹⁹¹⁷ Mary Aquinas Devlin, «An English Knight of the Garter in the Spanish Chapel in Florence», *Speculum*, 1929, vol. IV, n° 3, pp. 270-281.

The Hungarian literature of the 19th century focused on Toldi Miklós in relation to the Hungarian mercenaries in Italy, just as much as the English literature is focused on Sir John Hawkwood. The most important study on the subject in the first decades of the 20th century is by Elemér Mályusz on Toldi's stay in Italy.¹⁹¹⁸ The study draws heavily on Schâffer's book, but also refers to Temple-Leader and published Hungarian archival sources, but lacks archival research in Italy. Mályusz's second short work is a study of Toldi Miklós's stay in Italy, drawing on the same literature and sources as his more detailed study. The 1926 study is actually an extended version of this 1923 one.¹⁹¹⁹ Pór wrote his biography of King Louis the Great based on extensive European literature, published Hungarian and Italian sources and documents.¹⁹²⁰ Szekfű's book contains important information about the familiars who served as mercenaries in Italy and returned from there, and who received a royal donation.¹⁹²¹ Wertner published several articles related to the Hungarian presence in Italy. In one of his essays, he discussed the itinerary of Louis the Great's campaigns in Italy.¹⁹²² In another study, he wrote about the visit of Toldi Miklós to Florence, when he came to Florence as an envoy of Louis the Great to convey the king's request for a female lion cub. He also mentions, of course, his role in the White Company.¹⁹²³ In another article he summarises the Hungarian campaigns of the 14th century, not only those led by the king, but also those led by one of his leading barons (e.g: Lackfi István) to Italy on royal order.

¹⁹¹⁸ Elemér Mályusz, « A Toldi-monda történeti alapja [The Historical Basis of the Toldi Saga] », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1924, vol. XXV, n° 1, pp. 3-33.

¹⁹¹⁹ Elemér Mályusz, « Toldy Miklós Olaszországban [Toldy Miklós in Italy] », *Irodalomtörténet*, 1923, vol. XII, pp. 17-23.

¹⁹²⁰ Antal Pór, *Nagy Lajos 1326-1382*. [Louis the Great 1326-1382], Budapest, 1892.

¹⁹²¹ Gyula Szekfű, *Szerviensek és familiárisok* [Serviens and Familiars], Budapest, 1912.

¹⁹²² Mór Wertner, « Nagy Lajos király hadjáratai (1343-1383), I-II, [The Campaigns of King Louis the Great] », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 1918, vol. XIX, pp. 59-97, pp. 202-271.

¹⁹²³ Mór Wertner, « Adalékok Toldi Miklós életrajzához. [Additions to the Life of Toldi Miklós] », *Akadémiai Értesítő*, 1913, vol. XXIV, pp. 172-180.

Appendix 2

Literature in the 20th and 21st centuries

«Although historians have done a great deal of work over the last thirty years to reconstruct a Middle Ages that is more in keeping with what it was, it is on the question of violence that the clichés remain both the most numerous and the most deeply rooted. And it is on this point that work must continue to be enriched in order to transmit a historical heritage that is finally free of all the dross that has accumulated since the Enlightenment, and which still remains at the dawn of the 21st century.»¹⁹²⁴

A) Literature on Late Medieval Warfare

The literature on mercenaries, as Valérie Toureille stated on the historiography of the Middle Ages in general, has developed enormously since the second half of the 20th century, and has become immensely richer. This is particularly true for the last forty years. Through the work of English, French, American, Italian and German historians, we know much more about the transformation of medieval warfare in the mid-14th century and its impact on different aspects of life. We Hungarians, however, have something to contribute to this area, since Hungarians played a significant role among the foreign mercenaries active in Italy in the twenty years between 1350 and 1370. However, this has been a hitherto neglected area of Hungarian medieval research only recently has systematic research begun under Attila Bárány's leadership. There were several reasons for this lack of attention. First, during the communist period, access to Italian archives was extremely difficult. And in the last three decades, mainly due to financial constraints research could not be carried out.

The rise to prominence of mercenaries and the transformation of medieval warfare went hand in hand, which is why I will also provide a thematic review of the literature covering the 20th century and the present day. This chapter will be a representation of the wide range of works already published and will be limited to the most relevant works on the subject.

¹⁹²⁴ Valérie Toureille, *Crime et châtement au Moyen Âge (v^e-xv^e siècle)*, e-book, Paris, 2013, p. 105.

The chapter is essentially divided into three parts: the first part reviews works on 14th-century military history, the second part presents the literature on mercenaries, while the third part discusses the literature on mercenaries and the Crusades and the relationship between mercenaries and the Church.

For decades, several American historians have published seminal works analysing the transformation of warfare in the mid-14th century. Today, their names are synonymous with medieval military history: John France, Kelly DeVries, Clifford J. Rogers, Donald J. Kagay, Andrew Villalon, William Caferro. All of them are the authors or editors of numerous studies and books, and have in common that their works have laid new foundations for the research of late medieval military history. Suffice it to mention only the works organized around *The Journal of Medieval Military History*, *De Re Militari* or *History of Warfare*. Some of them are specialised in a specific part of Europe like William Caferro¹⁹²⁵ in Italy, Andrew Villalon¹⁹²⁶ and Donald J. Kagay¹⁹²⁷ in the Iberian Peninsula. Their books and studies have covered all aspects of 14th century warfare: from the emergence of the cannon in the 14th century,¹⁹²⁸ the use of the English longbow,¹⁹²⁹ the devastation caused by marching armies,¹⁹³⁰ the role of the cavalry in warfare,¹⁹³¹ the culture of combat in the Western warfare,¹⁹³² to the analysis of 14th century general ship,¹⁹³³ until the dialectics of strategy,¹⁹³⁴ and of course the decisive the great battles.¹⁹³⁵ Trevor Russel Smith wrote in his review on the book of the battle of Crecy, that «*Nothing quite encapsulates for us the seemingly pervasive wars of the later*

¹⁹²⁵ William Caferro, *The Companies of Adventure and the Decline of Siena: A Study of the Impact of Mercenary Bands on a Fourteenth Century Italian Commune*, Ph.D. diss., New Haven, Yale University, 1992.

¹⁹²⁶ Andrew Villalon, « Pedro the Cruel: Portrait of a Royal Failure », in Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow (eds.), *Medieval Iberia, Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain* (Iberica Series, vol. XXV), New York, repr. 1997, pp. 201-216.

¹⁹²⁷ Donald J. Kagay and Andrew Villalon, *Conflict in Fourteenth-Century Iberia: Aragon vs Castile and the War of the Two Pedros*, Leiden - Boston, 2021.

¹⁹²⁸ Kelly DeVries, « Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State », in Kelly DeVries (ed.), *Medieval Warfare, 1300-1450*, London - New York, 2010, pp. 457-479.

¹⁹²⁹ Clifford J. Rogers, « The Efficacy of the English Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries », *War in History*, 1998, vol. V, n° 2, pp. 233-242.

¹⁹³⁰ Clifford J. Rogers, « By Fire and Sword: Bellum Hostile and 'Civilians' in the Hundred Years' War », in Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (eds.), *Civilians in the Path of War*, Lincoln, 2002, pp. 33-78.

¹⁹³¹ Stephen Morillo, « The 'Age of Cavalry' Revisited », in Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, Woodbridge, 1999, pp. 45-58.

¹⁹³² John France, « Close Order and Close Quarter: The Culture of Combat in the West », *International Review*, 2005, vol. XXVII, n° 3, pp. 498-517.

¹⁹³³ Donald J. Kagay, « Battle-Seeking Commanders in the later Middle Ages: Phases of Generalship in the War of the Two Pedros », in L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donad J. Kagay (eds.), *The Hundred Years War (Part III): Further Considerations*, Leiden - Boston, 2013, pp. 63-84.

¹⁹³⁴ Clifford J. Rogers, « Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy 1327-1360 », in Kelly DeVries (ed.), *Medieval Warfare, 1300-1450*, London - New York, 2010. pp. 3-23.

¹⁹³⁵ Michael Livingston and Kelly DeVries (eds.), *The Battle of Crécy: A Casebook*, Liverpool, 2015.

*Middle Ages as well as large battles. Foremost amongst these in the English-speaking world are the great battles of the Hundred Years' War: Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415).»*¹⁹³⁶

However, in the 20th century, military history was not a preferred subject for historians. For a long time, it was treated as a pariah in Europe and America. In the second half of the century, and more so in the last two or three decades, a new generation of military historians has emerged and has marked out entirely new lines of research.¹⁹³⁷ The path set by military historians on the relationship between war and society is often referred to as the «*new military history*»¹⁹³⁸ as Kelly DeVries wrote in 2006: «*Most specifically, at least for the premodern period, and in particular for my speciality the Middle Ages, culture appears to be incomplete as a means of the history of warfare and its success.*»¹⁹³⁹

Lynn White was the first American military historian to challenge Heinrich Brunner's thesis on the role of the cavalry in warfare, in 1962. According to Lynn White, it was not the Muslim cavalry attacking the Frankish kingdom of Charles Martel that induced the shift from infantry to cavalry warfare, but the European adoption of the stirrup. White's thesis has defined the thinking of generations of historians but has met with several challengers from among today's historians: one of them is Bernard S. Bachrach, who not only questioned White's thesis in a series of articles, but also challenged the very premise of the dominance of the cavalry.¹⁹⁴⁰ As for the 14th century, Kelly DeVries joined Bernard S. Bachrach. Kelly DeVries's book on the role of the infantry in 14th century warfare was a breakthrough in modern historiography, challenging in a completely new way the prevailing view that training had no role in the 14th century, that it was not the commander and the soldiers but the numerical and technical superiority of the attacking heavy cavalry, that was decisive. This approach ignored all the battles in which the infantry played a decisive role in victory, all of which were presented as fortunate coincidences. Kelly DeVries' argument is hard to disagree with, since there were 19 such battles in the first half of the century between 1302 and 1347 alone.¹⁹⁴¹ The controversy surrounding Lynn White's thesis forced historians

¹⁹³⁶ Trevor Russel Smith, « Michael Livingston and Kelly DeVries (eds.), *The Battle of Crécy: A Casebook* », *De re militari*, 18 May 2016, [available online at] <https://deremilitari.org/2016/05/michael-livingston-and-kelly-devries-eds-the-battle-of-crecy-a-casebook-smith/>.

¹⁹³⁷ Lynn White Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, Oxford, 1962.

¹⁹³⁸ R. M. Citino, « *Military Histories...* », art. cit., pp. 1070-1090.

¹⁹³⁹ Kelly DeVries, « Medieval Warfare and the Value of a Human Life », in Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi (eds.), *Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities: Warfare in the Middle Ages*, Leiden - Boston, 2006, pp. 27-55.

¹⁹⁴⁰ Bernard S. Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire*, Philadelphia, 2001.

¹⁹⁴¹ Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology*, Woodbridge, 2000.

working around the turn of the millennium to move beyond the description of battles to a more complex approach, to the interrelationship of politics, culture, society and war,¹⁹⁴² like John France whose main area of research is the history of the crusades, analysing the reasons for the wars' endurance and their conclusion.¹⁹⁴³ William Caferro has not only dealt with the mercenary companies in Italy and specifically with Sir John Hawkwood, but has also studied the financing of war in 14th and 15th century Italy, especially in cities in northern and central Italy such as Pisa, Milan, Florence and Siena.¹⁹⁴⁴

Alongside American historians, of course, a number of British historians have written books and studies on 14th-century military history, and their names are as intertwined with the transformation of late medieval warfare as those of their American colleagues. Often in close collaboration with their American colleagues, they co-published volumes of studies. They are: Andrew Ayton,¹⁹⁴⁵ Kenneth Fowler,¹⁹⁴⁶ Jonathan Sumption,¹⁹⁴⁷ Craig Taylor,¹⁹⁴⁸ Christopher Allmand,¹⁹⁴⁹ Antony D. Carr,¹⁹⁵⁰ Maurice Keen,¹⁹⁵¹ Norman Housley.¹⁹⁵² Among them, Jonathan Sumption's monumental work occupies a unique place in the historiography of the Hundred Years' War. The various parts of the series have been praised around the world. According to David Green «*This series of books has offered, and continues to provide, a meticulous narrative of the Anglo-French struggle, and it is difficult to foresee any need for a similar study for many years. Sumption's achievement, however, is not only in his painstaking reconstruction of the war but his ability to make the conflict accessible to readers beyond the academy.*»¹⁹⁵³ I presented a review in Hungary as well in 2016: «*The*

¹⁹⁴² R. M. Citino, « *Military Histories...* », art. cit., p. 1077.

¹⁹⁴³ John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300*, London, 1999.

¹⁹⁴⁴ William Caferro, « Warfare and Economy in Renaissance Italy, 1350-1450 », *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 2008, vol. XXXIX, n° 2, pp. 167-209

¹⁹⁴⁵ Andrew Ayton, *The medieval military revolution: state, society and military change in medieval and early modern Europe*, London, 1994.

¹⁹⁴⁶ Kenneth Fowler, « L'emploi des mercenaires par les pouvoirs ibériques et l'intervention militaire anglaise en Espagne (vers 1361-vers 1379) », in Adeline Rucqoi (ed.), *Réalidad e imagines de poder: España a fines de la edad media*, Valladolid, 1988, pp. 23-55.

¹⁹⁴⁷ Jonathan Sumption, *Edward III: A Heroic Failure*, London, 2016.

¹⁹⁴⁸ Craig Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War*, Cambridge, 2013.

¹⁹⁴⁹ Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-1450*, Cambridge, 2005.

¹⁹⁵⁰ Antony D. Carr, « Welshmen and Hundred Years' War », *Welsh history review*, 1968/69, vol. IV, pp. 21-46.

¹⁹⁵¹ Maurice Keen, *England in the Later Middle Ages*, London - New York, repr. 2003.

¹⁹⁵² Norman Housley, « The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy, and the Crusades, 1356-1378 », *Traditio*, 1982, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 253-280.

¹⁹⁵³ David Green, « Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War. Volume IV: Cursed Kings », *The English Historical Review*, 2017, vol. CXXXII, pp. 125-127.

above excerpt best illustrates that Jonathan Sumption is continuing in the finest tradition of English historiography. It is not only his extremely thorough knowledge, his richly detailed presentation of events, but also the light-hearted, occasionally ironic nature of the narrative, which makes it impossible to put down «*The Cursed Kings, the fourth volume of The Hundred Years War.*»¹⁹⁵⁴

The anthology on medieval warfare edited by Maurice Keen in the early 2000s contains a number of studies on 14th century warfare, covering recruitment, equipment of soldiers, armour, and sieges, supplemented by studies on pitched battle analysis and irregular warfare.¹⁹⁵⁵ Christopher Allmand, in his book on the Hundred Years' War, adds how the French nobles, members of a caste for whom '*vivre noblement*', with all its material burdens, was a social obligation, became victims of the *routiers* and how the mercenary style of warfare deprived the nobility of a significant part of their income. Not only the destruction of their estates, but also the huge ransoms paid contributed to the impoverishment of the nobility, many of whom had to sell their lands and estates for far less than their real value.¹⁹⁵⁶ Craig Taylor has a number of publications on late medieval chivalry among them he analyses the English writings on chivalry and warfare in the Hundred Years War mentioning the *Scalacronica* of Sir Thomas Grey or Chandos Herald's biography on Edward of Woodstock.¹⁹⁵⁷ John Haldon edited a book and was the author of several articles on Byzantine warfare. Studies in the book include an analysis of the role of infantry and cavalry, Byzantine logistics and equipment.¹⁹⁵⁸ The most interesting is Dimitri Obolensky's study on the geostrategic situation in the Balkans, to what extent it had been an obstacle or rather a bridge for Byzantium.¹⁹⁵⁹ Justine Firnhaber-Baker presented a paper on seigneurial warfare which «*generally involved a few hundred men, whose hostile actions took the form of short sieges and raids against the enemy's property and peasants. Although such warfare is known to have been endemic in France in earlier periods, it is supposed to have become increasingly infrequent in the 14th century as the growth of public, royal authority overcame*

¹⁹⁵⁴ Tamás Ölbei, « Jonathan Sumption, Elátkozott királyok – A Százéves háború sorozat negyedik kötete (Cursed Kings Volume V of the Hundred Years War) », *Klió. Történelmi szemlélő folyóirat*, 2016, vol. XXV, pp. 11-20.

¹⁹⁵⁵ Maurice Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History*, Oxford, 1999.

¹⁹⁵⁶ Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. French edition: *La guerre de Cent Ans : L'Angleterre et la France en guerre 1300-1450*, trad. Christian Cler, Paris, 2013, pp. 87-88.

¹⁹⁵⁷ Craig Taylor, « English Writings on Chivalry and Warfare in the Hundred Years War », in Peter Coss and Christopher Tyerman (ed.), *Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen*, Woodbridge - Rochester, 2009, pp. 64-84.

¹⁹⁵⁸ John Haldon (ed.), *Byzantine Warfare*, London - New York, 2016.

¹⁹⁵⁹ Dimitri Obolensky, « The Balkans in the Ninth Century: Barrier or Bridge? », in *Ibid.*, pp. 295-315.

the old, violent privileges of the feudal nobility.»¹⁹⁶⁰ Around the Second World War, many works on medieval warfare were written in French, which influenced historians such as Philippe Contamine. Among Belgian historians, Jan Frans Verbruggen published a study of chivalric military tactics.¹⁹⁶¹ Ferdinand Lot wrote two books in the 1940s dealing with European and French medieval warfare respectively. One of his books discusses the situation of the French military organisation in the first half of the 14th century, looking at the causes of the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War. Ferdinand Lot noted that the cost of employing mercenaries in Genoa was such a drain on the budget that it was one of the reasons for «*the numerical mediocrity of armies.*»¹⁹⁶² His other two-volume work has been the subject of much criticism around the world, unanimous in the view that his work is indispensable to researchers¹⁹⁶³ and «*instead of an interest which was too often narrowly concentrated on the evolution of tactics, he brings an understanding of warfare as a part of general history, affecting and affected by political, economic, and social development.*»¹⁹⁶⁴ At the same time as the work of Ferdinand Lot, another work on the history of the Hundred Years' War by Édouard Perroy was published, which Philippe Contamine commented as follows: «*It must never be forgotten that you have to look at both sides! And this is the merit of another of my masters whom I have not mentioned until now, Édouard Perroy, who in 1945 wrote La guerre de Cent Ans. I appreciate this work very much...*»¹⁹⁶⁵

Philippe Contamine, in his dissertation, takes a close look at the military organisation of the Kingdom of France, covering infantry and cavalry, recruitment, training and naturally, mercenaries, including an assessment of the performance of mercenary companies.¹⁹⁶⁶ The final lines of Raymond Cazelles' lengthy analysis of the work's reception at the time say it all: «*Be that as it may, in its intentions and in its realization, here is an excellent work, meticulously written, testifying to very extensive research, bringing to historians the*

¹⁹⁶⁰ Justine Firnhaber-Baker, « Seignorial War and Royal Power in Late Medieval Southern France », *Past and Present*, 2010, vol. 208, n° 1, pp. 37-76, p. 38.

¹⁹⁶¹ Jan Frans Verbruggen, « La tactique militaire des années de chevaliers », *Revue du Nord*, 1947, vol. XXIX, n° 115, pp. 161-180.

¹⁹⁶² Ferdinand Lot, *La France des origines à la guerre de Cent Ans*, Paris, 1941, p. 244.

¹⁹⁶³ Richard A. Newhall, « Ferdinand Lot, L'Art Militaire et les Armées au Moyen Age en Europe et dans le Proche Orient. Two volumes », *The American Historical Review*, 1949, vol. 54, n° 3, pp. 575-577.

¹⁹⁶⁴ R. C. Smail, « Ferdinand Lot, L'Art Militaire et les Armées au Moyen Age en Europe et dans le Proche Orient », *The English Historical Review*, 1949, vol. 64, n° 250, pp. 92-95.

¹⁹⁶⁵ Caroline zum Kolk, « Entretien avec Philippe Contamine », Paris, Cour de France.fr, 2013. [Interview published online on 1 October 2013], <https://cour-de-france.fr/article2885.html>.

¹⁹⁶⁶ Philippe Contamine, *Guerre, État et société à la fin du Moyen Âge : Études sur les armées des rois de France (1337-1494)*, vols. I-II, Paris - La Haye, 1972.

explanations they were waiting for on the military structures and on the combatants of this long period where peace could not be concluded because it was not desired by those who made it a profession.»¹⁹⁶⁷ Since his initial work, he presented a series of important articles and books on medieval warfare, mercenary companies,¹⁹⁶⁸ the Hundred Years' War¹⁹⁶⁹ and on the daily life during the struggle between France and England.¹⁹⁷⁰ Robert Fossier wrote in a review on the book that *«it provides a very good basis for reflection on medieval society, at a time when its evolution towards more 'modern' times and structures is accelerating.»*¹⁹⁷¹ It is not a wonder that he has a long lasting influence on the forthcoming medievalists.

The Belgian Claude Gaier, who defended his doctoral thesis at the same time as Philippe Contamine, followed a career similar to Philippe Contamine's and published important works on medieval warfare, such as his 1997 book of studies, which has been the subject of reviews such as that by Michael Wolfe. In the second part of his volume, he analyses the tactics of medieval armies, from siege techniques and the impact of the development of armour and saddles on cavalry warfare.¹⁹⁷² According to Michael Wolfe *«readers will marvel at Gaier's mastery of different genres of historical writing, from gripping narratives of pitched battles to subtle analyses of changing military technologies and mentalities as reflected in art and literature.»*¹⁹⁷³

Germain Butaud, Florence Berland, Sara Fourcade, Valérie Serdon and Valérie Toureille studied the relationship between late medieval warfare and society in a synthesis of the most important wars of the period in Western Europe at the time of the Hundred Years' War and the wars between the Houses of France and Burgundy in France, England, Scotland and the western margins of the Holy Roman Empire. The book's greatest strength is the comparative analysis, following a brief case history, which, starting from a theoretical approach to warfare, discusses ideological changes in war, the question of the ethics of war and the war of the body, the contemporary perception of a just and good war and the violence that accompanied war and the crusades. It discusses the virtues and qualities of warriors, such as loyalty and courage, whether knights, mercenaries or members of urban

¹⁹⁶⁷ Cazelles Raymond, « Philippe Contamine, Guerre, État et société à la fin du Moyen Âge. Études sur les armées des rois de France (1337-1494) », *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 1973, vol. CXXXI, pp. 289-293.

¹⁹⁶⁸ P. Contamine, « Les compagnies... », art. cit., pp. 365-396.

¹⁹⁶⁹ Idem, *La guerre de Cent Ans : France et Angleterre*, Paris, repr. 1994.

¹⁹⁷⁰ Idem, *La vie quotidienne pendant la guerre de Cent ans : France et Angleterre (XIV^e siècle)*, Paris, 1976.

¹⁹⁷¹ Robert Fossier, « Philippe Contamine, La vie quotidienne pendant la guerre de Cent ans : France et Angleterre (XIV^e siècle) », *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes*, 1977, vol. CXXXV, pp. 214-215.

¹⁹⁷² Claude Gaier, *Armes et combats dans l'univers médiéval* (Bibliothèque du Moyen Âge, 5) Brussels, 1995.

¹⁹⁷³ Michael Wolfe, « Claude Gaier, Armes et combats dans l'univers médiéval », *Speculum*, 1997, vol. 72, n° 3, pp. 822-823.

militias. They examine what was believed to be reasonable in the period, what means of punishment and discipline were available, and they explore the theme of war and death, analysing what was considered a good death in the period, the burial customs of those who died in war and the surviving tombs.¹⁹⁷⁴

Hans Delbrück¹⁹⁷⁵ was one of the leading figures in German medieval research between the two world wars. His work focused primarily on the course of battles and the role of warfare. This heritage remained largely untouched after the Second World War until the *Deutsche Wiedervereinigung*.¹⁹⁷⁶ On the eve of the Second World War, Otto Brunner published one of his most influential works on medieval warfare who interpreted private wars as militarily organised violence and a legitimate legal form of politics. The reinterpretations of his approach persisted until the end of the 20th century.¹⁹⁷⁷

Jörg Rogge wrote in his article on the German literature of medieval warfare that «*until recently, warfare were not among the topics that were popular in German medieval studies after the Second World War.*»¹⁹⁷⁸ In pre-unification Germany, the study of medieval warfare was not one of the mainstream topics of German medieval research. Those who did so sometimes faced serious difficulties. Among German medievalists, Wolfram Benziger published a study¹⁹⁷⁹ and a sourcebook¹⁹⁸⁰ on late medieval Italian warfare. A volume of studies on late medieval warfare, edited by Horst Brunner, was published in 1987 and several German authors on the subject have published including e.g. Gerd Althoff,¹⁹⁸¹ or

¹⁹⁷⁴ Germain Butaud *et al.* (eds.), *Guerre et société, 1270-1480*, Neuilly, 2013.

¹⁹⁷⁵ Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, vol. 3: *Das Mittelalter*, Berlin, 1923.

¹⁹⁷⁶ Jörg Rogge, « Das Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter und seine Erforschung: neue englische und deutsche Arbeiten zu Krieg, Staat und Gesellschaft », *Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 2004, vol. VIII, pp. 20-33.

¹⁹⁷⁷ Otto Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*, Baden bei Wien, 1939. See the details on the debate: Gadi Algazi, *Herrengewalt und Gewalt der Herren im späten Mittelalter: Herrschaft, Gegenseitigkeit und Sprachgebrauch*, Frankfurt am Main - New York, 1996 ; and the responses: Sigrid Schmitt, « Schutz und Schirm oder Gewalt und Unterdrückung? Überlegungen zu Gadi Algazis Dissertation ‚Herrengewalt und Gewalt der Herren im späten Mittelalter‘ », *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 2002, vol. LXXXIX, pp. 72-78.

¹⁹⁷⁸ J. Rogge, « Das Kriegswesen... », art. cit., p. 20.

¹⁹⁷⁹ Wolfram Benziger, « Zwischen «bellum iustum» und modernem Völkerrecht. Überlegungen zum Denken über Krieg und Frieden am Ende des Mittelalters », *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 2006, vol. LXV, pp. 131-152.

¹⁹⁸⁰ Wolfram Benziger, *Zur Theorie von Krieg und Frieden in der italienischen Renaissance: Die «Disputatio de pace et bello» zwischen Bartolomeo Platina und Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo und andere anlässlich der Pax Paolina (Rom 1468) entstandene Schriften: Mit Edition und Übersetzung*, Berlin - Bern - New York - Paris - Wien, 1996.

¹⁹⁸¹ Gerd Althoff, « Schranken der Gewalt, Wie gewalttätig war das „finstere Mittelalter“? », in Horst Brunner (ed.), *Der Krieg im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit. Gründe, Begründungen, Bilder, Bräuche, Recht*, Wiesbaden, 1999, pp. 1-23.

Volker Schmidtchen.¹⁹⁸² In his book, Wilhelm Erben undertook a general analysis of medieval warfare, touching on the question of strategy and tactics, the main directions of medieval warfare, the Church's position on war.¹⁹⁸³ He analyses «*the theoretical works on the military art and the influence of those of Isidore of Seville, Vegez, Vincent de Beauvais, and Byzantine authors.*»¹⁹⁸⁴ Volker Schmidtchen concentrated on the armaments in the late Middle Ages.¹⁹⁸⁵

The position of military history research, which had been treated as a pariah in German medieval studies, changed at the end of the 20th century: military history research was not examined as self-contained research, but as part of the history of society. One of the most important representatives of late medieval military historiography in the 1990s is Norbert Ohler, whose work reflects the pre-millennial generation of historians.¹⁹⁸⁶ He touches on religious ideals (just war, holy war) and the preparation for war (weapons and equipment), fortifications and the use of cavalry. He then discusses the different types of belligerents, and then looks at the reasons and motives for waging war (the desire for peace, the restoration of violated rights, the desire for protection, the threat and the desire for power, the desire for the right to live in peace. Ohler also deals with the topographical and climatic, economic and technical conditions of warfare.¹⁹⁸⁷ In a comprehensive study, Jörg Rogge compares, from a German perspective and in a highly critical manner, the results of 20th and 21st century German and Anglo-Saxon historiography on the analysis of late medieval warfare. According to him, German medievalists have a fundamental deficit compared to their English, American and French colleagues, because they have come up with far more new findings in the fields of recruitment, military organisation, logistics, technology and tactics in their analysis of the Hundred Years' War than German historians have.¹⁹⁸⁸ They have achieved this by reinterpreting narrative and archival sources and by adopting a fresh approach to bring late medieval warfare back into mainstream historiography.

¹⁹⁸² Volker Schmidtchen, « Ius in bello und militärischer Alltag: Rechtliche Regelungen: Kriegsordnungen des 14. bis 16. Jahrhunderts », in Horst Brunner (ed.), *Der Krieg im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit: Gründe, Begründungen, Bilder, Bräuche, Recht*, Wiesbaden, 1999, pp. 25-56.

¹⁹⁸³ Wilhelm Erben, *Kriegsgeschichte des Mittelalters* (Historische Zeitschrift / Beihefte, 16), Munich, 1929

¹⁹⁸⁴ Fritz Quicke, « Wilhelm Erben Kriegsgeschichte des Mittelalters », *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 1930, vol IX, n° 1, pp. 215-217.

¹⁹⁸⁵ Volker Schmidtchen, *Bombarden, Befestigungen, Büchsenmeister: Von den ersten Mauerbrechern des Spätmittelalters zur Belagerungsartillerie der Renaissance*, Düsseldorf, 1977.

¹⁹⁸⁶ Norbert Ohler, *Krieg und Frieden im Mittelalter*, Munich, Nikol, 1997.

¹⁹⁸⁷ J. Rogge, « Das Kriegswesen... », art. cit., p. 21.

¹⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

Hans-Henning Kortüm decisive essay is one of the fine examples of this development of the Regensburg research group.¹⁹⁸⁹ He gives a new understanding of war with a focus on violence. «*Following sociological and ethnological research, he proposes to speak of war only when two or more groups are hostile to each other and use military means to achieve their goals, taking into account the enemy's death as well as their own.*»¹⁹⁹⁰ At the beginning of the 21st century, of course, German research also showed new results. The research of Heinz-Dieter Herman and Uwe Tresp, analysing the pay, hiring and casualty lists of mercenaries in Bohemia and Thuringia, published new sources, correspondence and accounts that had not been known before. This research has made it possible to understand the organisational structure of the mercenary armies active in the Holy Roman Empire in the 15th century.

In a study by Piero Del Negro divided the Italian military historiography of the last two centuries into three phases.¹⁹⁹¹ The first period, which goes from the 19th century to the first decades of the following century, in which there is a pre-eminence of Italian historians and the influence of German historiography; the second is the thirty years of pre-eminence of Pieri, from about 1930 to the 1960s; the third one covers the remaining decades of the 20th century, marked by the hegemony of English historiography and by 'discontinuous and casual', though promising, Italian attempts. The last decades of the 1990s, as it was the case in the contemporary American, English, French and German literature, brought about the possibility of understanding society and social structures through the analysis of war, the possibility of using the theoretical tools offered by the human sciences for this purpose, renewed the traditional military history to the margins of academia, and to make a full concession to historians working in the academies and military schools of the division; but it also created new obstacles. At the end of the second millennium Francesco Storti pointed out that a social approach to the study of the phenomenon of war is in fact the only way forward.¹⁹⁹² This new interpretation of medieval military history research arrived in Italy across the Alps. Aldo A. Settia is the leading Italian representative of the social approach of military history «*whose contributions are marked by utmost philological rigour and sustained*

¹⁹⁸⁹ Hans-Henning Kortüm, « Das Kriegswesen im späteren Mittelalter », in Reinhardt Butz and Gert Melville (eds.), *Coburg 1353: Stadt und Land Coburg im Spätmittelalter: Festschrift zur Verbindung des Coburger Landes mit den Wettinern vor 650 Jahren bis 1918*, Coburg, 2003, pp. 65-80.

¹⁹⁹⁰ J. Rogge, « Das Kriegswesen... », art. cit., p. 30.

¹⁹⁹¹ Piero del Negro, « La storia militare dell'Italia moderna nello specchio della storiografia del Novecento », *Cheiron. Materiali e strumenti di aggiornamento storiografico*, 1995, vol. XII, n° 23, pp. 11-33.

¹⁹⁹² Francesco Storti, « Istituzioni militari in Italia tra Medioevo ed età moderna », *Studi Storici*, 1997, vol. XXXVIII, n° 1, pp. 257-271.

by a high degree of technical competence, appear to be fuelled by a predominant interest in problems directly related to the practical sphere of war. The careful examination of the forms of settlement in Italy in the central centuries of the Middle Ages, one of Settia's favourite subjects, is thus translated in some of his research into the accurate typological definition of fortified settlements, in the precise analysis of the defensive structure and weapons of these settlements.»¹⁹⁹³ His book that was published in 1993 contains 14 different articles on medieval warfare. His research has resulted in treatises on tactics, armour, the performance of military engineers in Italian cities in the 12th and 13th centuries, and the relationship between war and society.¹⁹⁹⁴ Aldo A. Settia pays attention to problems concerning military terminology, which allows him to unravel important interpretative knots. One of his most interesting studies on the theoretical issues of 14th-century military history is his analysis of the famous and long-neglected book by Theodore I, Marquis of Montferrat, published in 1999. His work was written in 1326 «*in between his war and government activities, during a day in Constantinople, he was able to write down his military experiences in the form of a theoretical treatise.*»¹⁹⁹⁵ In the mid-1990s, an important school developed around the journal 'Cheiron', which gave space to research on medieval and early modern Italian military history. Authors such as Piero Evangelisti,¹⁹⁹⁶ E. Maria Nadia Covini,¹⁹⁹⁷ or Igor Mineo¹⁹⁹⁸ have published in the journal. All of them made an important contribution to the 21st century historiography of the Trecento condottieri.

The modern Hungarian military historiography of the 14th century, which in fact refers to the period of the Hungarian Angevin rulers, is marked by such names as Gyula Kristó,¹⁹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

¹⁹⁹⁴ Aldo A. Settia, *Comuni in Guerra: Armi ed eserciti nell'Italia della città*, Bologna, 1993.

¹⁹⁹⁵ Idem, « Gli 'Insegnamenti' di Teodoro di Monferrato e la prassi bellica in Italia all'inizio del Trecento », *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1999, vol. CLVII, n° 4, pp. 667-690.

¹⁹⁹⁶ Piero Evangelisti, « La proposta di un francescano per l'organizzazione dell'esercito crociato e il suo comando: Il trattato di Fidenzio da Padova », *Cheiron. Materiali e strumenti di aggiornamento storiografico*, 1995, vol. XII, n° 23, pp. 35-48.

¹⁹⁹⁷ Maria Nadia Covini, « Guerra e « conservazione del stato»: note sulle fanterie sforzesche », *Ibid.*, pp. 67-104.

¹⁹⁹⁸ Igor Mineo, « Note su guerra e aristocrazia in Sicilia tra il primo e il terzo decennio del Quattrocento », *Ibid.*, pp. 49-65

¹⁹⁹⁹ Gyula Kristó, *Az Anjou-kor háborúi*, Budapest, 1988.

András Borosy,²⁰⁰⁰ János B. Szabó,²⁰⁰¹ László Veszprémy,²⁰⁰² Attila Bárány,²⁰⁰³ Béla Király,²⁰⁰⁴ István Miskolczy,²⁰⁰⁵ Pál Engel,²⁰⁰⁶ Ferenc Szakály.²⁰⁰⁷

András Borosy was influenced by Elemér Mályusz, who started to study medieval military history. In addition to researching the history of the medieval Hungarian cavalry and the social strata that served in the military, he also placed great emphasis on the cultivation of so-called «*classical military historiography, which aims to describe the structure of armies, military events and the causes of these events, and he also worked closely on the narrative analysis of the military history of the contemporary Hungarian charters.*»²⁰⁰⁸ András Borosy's thesis is that the light cavalry and the heavy cavalry provided the 14th century generals with a tactical repertoire. This thesis was challenged by János B. Szabó in a study published in 2001.²⁰⁰⁹ The narrative parts of the Hungarian charters are unique in Europe and provide an important source material for military historians, thanks to their unique feature of detailing the merits of the donor. András Borosy found these sources to be authentic and used them in his research, a significant part of which was the analysis of the military service of different social strata.

János B. Szabó's book²⁰¹⁰ on Byzantium led him to his research on medieval military history. He believed that there was still an under-researched area where there was still room for a later generation of military historians to make new contributions. It was this idea that led him to write his dissertation on the history of the light cavalry from the Hungarian conquest, through the Tatar invasion, to the Battle of Mohács.

²⁰⁰⁰ András Borosy, *A telekkatonaság és a parasztság szerepe a feudális magyar hadszervezetben*, Budapest, 1971.

²⁰⁰¹ János B. Szabó, *A középkori magyarországi könnyűlovasság, X-VI. század*, Máriabesnyő, 2017 ; Idem, *A honfoglalástól a huszárokig*, Budapest, 2010.

²⁰⁰² László Veszprémy, « Nagy Lajos harcai a 'török' ellen: Egy hagyomány kérdőjelei (1365/1375) », in János Szabó (ed.), « *A hadi történet kútfeje minden hadtudománynak...* »: *Tanulmányok Ács Tibor tiszteletére*, Budapest, 2007, pp. 355-366 ; Idem, *Az Árpád- és Anjou-kor csatái, hadjáratai*, Budapest, 2008.

²⁰⁰³ A., Bárány, « Az Anjou-kor ... », art. cit., p. 12-58.

²⁰⁰⁴ Veszprémy László (eds.), *A magyar hadtörténelem évszázadai*, Budapest, 2003.

²⁰⁰⁵ István Miskolczy, « Nagy Lajos második nápolyi hadjárata (1350) », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1934, vol. XXXV, n° 1, pp. 41-57.

²⁰⁰⁶ Pál Engel, « Adatok az Anjou-kori magyar hadseregről », in Tibor Neumann (ed.), *Tanulmányok a középkorról* (Analecta Mediaevalia, I), Budapest, 2001, pp. 73-82.

²⁰⁰⁷ Ferenc Szakály, « A török-magyar küzdelem szakaszai a mohácsi csata előtt (1365-1526) », in Ferenc Szakály and Lajos Rúzsás, *Mohács: Tanulmányok a mohácsi csata 450. évfordulója alkalmából*, Budapest, 1986, pp. 11-59.

²⁰⁰⁸ Péter Farkas, « Fél évszázad a középkori hadtörténetírás szolgálatában: In memoriam Borosy András (1922. január 10-2011. december 16.) », *Aetas*, 2013, vol. XXVIII, n° 2, pp. 209-213.

²⁰⁰⁹ János B. Szabó, « Gondolatok a XI-XIV. századi magyar hadviselésről: A fegyverzet, a harcmód és a taktika összefüggéseinek kérdései », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 2001, vol. CXIV, n° 1, pp. 75-103.

²⁰¹⁰ János B. Szabó - Győző Somogyi, *Elfeledett háborúk: magyar-bizánci harcok a X-XIII. században*, Budapest, 1999.

László Veszprémy, one of the leading figures in contemporary military historiography, is the head of the intellectual workshop of the Institute and Museum of Military History, and is credited with placing the military historical trajectories of Hungarian medieval narrative sources in a Western European context.²⁰¹¹ In his study on *The Birth of Military History in Hungary*, László Veszprémy stated that «*the historiography of the previous decades had examined the events from a fundamentally political point of view,*» and that Louis' campaigns had wasted the country's military strength, instead of focusing solely on the Turks. «*More recent Hungarian military historiography generally exonerates the Hungarian kings, and considers that the country's resources, even with international cooperation, would not have allowed a decisive showdown with the rapidly growing Ottoman Empire, which from the mid-14th century also entered into military conflict with the Hungarians.*»²⁰¹² The present study joins this latter line of thought, showing how difficult it was to organise an international coalition to fight the Turks in the mid-14th century, and how Louis I, only three years after the conquest of Adrianople, took the initiative in European politics and tried to organise a crusade with the participation of mercenaries, which was unique in history. In other words, Louis was aware of the threat from the south and, recognising it, tried to spearhead a European initiative that seemed to be sufficient in terms of both numbers and combat value to have a chance of success against the Turks.

Pál Engel's methodology was characterised by the complete extraction of information from the sources, with the help of Elemér Mályusz and György Györffy. He was the first to create a computerised database, which he used in the 1980s in his Angevin period research. Engel was primarily interested in the power elite. He re-examined many questions, and highlighted many problems. He put it all together in a mosaic, and his book «*Hungarians in Europe,*» the first volume of which was published in 1990, is one of the most important comprehensive books of the period, making the complex causal relationships and processes of the period easy to understand.²⁰¹³

Ferenc Szakály was an expert on the Ottoman period in the second half of the 20th century. By the 1980s, his decades of work had set the main directions for Turkish studies for the next generation of historians. Although he was mostly concerned with the 16th and 17th centuries, his study of the Angevin period is still relevant.

²⁰¹¹ Katalin Mária Kincses, « Lectori salutem! », in Katalin Mária Kincses (ed.), *Hadi és más nevezetes történetek: Tanulmányok Veszprémy László tiszteletére*, Budapest, 2018, pp. 9-10, p. 9.

²⁰¹² László Veszprémy, « A hadtudomány megszületése Magyarországon: Az Anjou és luxemburgi királyok kora 1301-1458 », in László Veszprémy (eds.), *A magyar hadtörténelem évszázadai*, Budapest, 2003, pp. 27-42, p. 27.

²⁰¹³ Pál Engel, *Beilleszkedés Európába a kezdetektől 1440-ig*, Budapest, 1990.

Apart from Ferenc Szakály, another important historian of the second half of the 20th century was Gyula Kristó, who established a school in Szeged and researched the Árpád and late medieval Hungarian history for thirty years. His works cover political, state, institutional, ideological, social, ecclesiastical, cultural and military history. His work was characterised by an unconditional respect for sources, and he was able to construct grand theories, which he then argued for in the most heated debates in a clear and logical manner. His works from the Angevin period reflect the same incredible colourful research: one of his most important professional achievements was the organisation and launching of the Anjou archives, which is still in progress. However, he was also involved, together with Elemér Mályusz, in the critical edition of the Thuróczy chronicle.²⁰¹⁴ His most important work about this dissertation was on the wars of the Angevin period, which was a continuation of a monograph on a similar topic from the Árpadian period. It dealt with the period 1301-1382 in a similar structure and discussion. In his book, in the traditional manner, he placed great emphasis on battle descriptions.²⁰¹⁵

Among the 21st century historians who have worked directly on the subject, Attila Bárány is a key contributor, synthesising the knowledge he has gathered after Gyula Kristó, and writing a military history of the Angevin era, but he also dealt with the logistical challenges of Edward III's last campaign before the treaty.²⁰¹⁶ As stated by Tamás Fedeles in his review of Attila Bárány's work, «*The idea that Bálint Hóman's most significant Angevin military innovation was the creation of a banderial military organisation has now become completely obsolete. The battalion (vexillum) formed in the Árpád era formed the basic units of the army, which was replaced from the 14th century by the Latin equivalent of the Italian word bandiera, which has a similar meaning.*»²⁰¹⁷ An important novelty of his work is the integration of the county system in Angevin warfare. In doing so, he linked the study of military history with the study of the Angevin period's power structure, i.e. its social history implications. The king's supporters served Louis I in various capacities and could even administer several counties on his behalf. The holder of the honour was entitled to all the royal revenues, but therefore served the king at his own expense during his campaigns, in

²⁰¹⁴ Elemér Mályusz, *Thuróczy János krónikája* (Értekezések a történeti tudományok köréből, 26/3), Budapest, 1944.

²⁰¹⁵ Tamás Fedeles, « Fegyverek, seregek, háborúk. Kézikönyv a középkori magyar hadtörténetről », *Történelmi Szemle*, 2018, vol. LX, n° 1, pp. 153-165.

²⁰¹⁶ Attila Bárány, « Hadtáp és logisztika Angliában a Százéves Háború korában », in László Pósn and László Veszprémy (eds.), «*A hadtáp volt maga a fegyver*»: *Tanulmányok a középkori hadszervezet és katonai logisztika kérdéseiről*, Budapest, 2013, pp. 59-115.

²⁰¹⁷ T., Fedeles, « Fegyverek, seregek, háborúk... », art. cit., p. 157.

accordance with the king's will.²⁰¹⁸ The military history of the Angevin period is an excellent example of the transformation of Hungarian historiography, which, following the American and Western European models, gave a new impetus to military history research in the 21st century. Attila Bárány, in collaboration with László Pósán, created a centre of medieval military history in Debrecen, working with young talented versatile researchers such as Ádám Novák.²⁰¹⁹

László Pósán's research is primarily concerned with the Teutonic Knights. As a result of his research on medieval military history, he has published several works on various aspects of medieval military history (sieges, battles, campaigns²⁰²⁰, Teutonic Knight²⁰²¹) often in collaboration with László Veszprémy and Attila Bárány. Naturally, in line with the current trend in historiography, his research is not limited to the traditional areas of military historiography, but also covers the broader context of settlement structure and population history.²⁰²²

The most recent results of the Hungarian medievalists were published around the 2020s in a series of important treatises, mainly on the history of the Hungarian mercenaries of the 15th century. In his writings, Bence Péterffy highlights the challenges faced by the administration in ensuring timely payments to mercenary troops, who often resorted to dishonoring their superiors when demanding their dues for perceived or actual grievances. He provides a detailed account of the documents verifying the allocation of these payments, demonstrating transparency in the process. Furthermore, Bence Péterffy identifies which of the ruler's revenues were allocated or redistributed to ensure the military security of various regions, thereby shedding light on the financial strategies employed to maintain stability and order.²⁰²³ József Csermelyi finished his dissertation on foreign mercenaries serving in Hungary. The dissertation examines the noble families of German and gentry origin who acquired lands in the Counties of Moson, Sopron, and Vas in West-Hungary, focusing on the Baumkircher, Grafeneck, and Weispriach families. Their landownership was significant

²⁰¹⁸ A., Bárány, « Az Anjou-kor ... », art. cit., p. 32.

²⁰¹⁹ Ádám Novák, « Hadi események és résztvevői a Felső Részekén 1440 és 1445 között: Azok a bizonyos 'zavaros idők' », in László Pósán and László Veszprémy (eds.), *Elfeledett háborúk - Középkori csaták és várostromok (6-16. század)*, Budapest, 2016, pp. 310-330.

²⁰²⁰ László Pósán, « A 'lovass háború': A Német Lovagrend és Lengyelország közötti utolsó háború (1519-1521) », in *Ibid.*, pp. 127-145.

²⁰²¹ For instance: László Pósán, « Die ungarische Beurteilung des Deutschen Ordens zu der Zeit von Andreas II. », in Attila Bárány and Réka Bozzay (eds.), *The Image of States: Nations and Religions in Medieval and Early Modern East Central Europe*, Debrecen, 2018, pp. 8-17.

²⁰²² László Pósán, *A Német Lovagrend Poroszországban: a népesség és a településszerkezet változásai*, Máriabesnyő, 2015.

²⁰²³ Bence Péterffy, « "Adj, király, katonát!": « "Adj, király, katonát!": Zsoldosok és hadifinanszírozás a stájer-magyar határvidéken az 1480-as években », in István Kádas, Renáta Skorka and Boglárka Weisz (eds.), *Veretek, utak, katonák : gazdaságtörténeti tanulmányok a magyar középkorról*. Budapest, 2018. pp. 165-184.

for their long-term plans. The study covers the period following King Albert of Hungary's death in 1439, highlighting the rise of Duke Frederick of Habsburg and his brother Duke Albert, and key events like Queen Elisabeth entrusting her son and the Holy Crown to Frederick. These families gained influence as military officers during this turbulent period, with the Weispriachs remaining influential until 1572. The research timeframe extends from the mid-15th century to the mid-17th century. The dissertation also explores how the Habsburgs secured control over West-Hungarian estates through treaties. The study details the careers and relationships of these noble families, their impact on their Hungarian estates, and their interactions with local and foreign nobility. An appendix examines their relationships with the Church, focusing on the mercenary captains' attitudes and their institutions.²⁰²⁴

Special mention should be made of those Hungarian historians who have dealt with French-Hungarian and Papal-Hungarian relations in the 14th century, since the results of their research directly contributed to the preparation of this dissertation. In their focus, there are the papal legates and other embassies sent to Buda, and the Hungarian embassies to Avignon. Among them, the work of three historians must be mentioned: Gergely Kiss,²⁰²⁵ Attila Györkös²⁰²⁶ and Ágnes Zapala-Maléth.²⁰²⁷ Gergely Kiss specialises in church history, and his numerous books and studies deal with French-Hungarian ecclesial relations.²⁰²⁸ Together with Ágnes Zapala-Maléth, and other researchers such as Gábor Barabás he is conducting one of the most important research projects regarding this dissertation in Hungary, which deals with the visits of papal legates to Hungary in the Middle Ages.²⁰²⁹ This has enabled me to clarify the exchanges of envoys between the Holy See and Buda between

²⁰²⁴ József Csermelyi, *Idegen származású katona és hivatalviselő nemesi családok a 15–16. századi Nyugat-Magyarországon: Különös tekintettel a Baumkircherekre, a Grafeneckekre és a Weispriachokra*. Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem (PPKE), PPKE Történelemtudományi Doktori Iskola, Phd Thesis 2021.

²⁰²⁵ Gergely Kiss, « Les légats pontificaux en Hongrie aux XIII^e-XV^e siècles » : in Gergely Kiss - Montaubin Pascal (eds.), *Actes du colloque international Les légats pontificaux. Paix et unité de l'Eglise, de la restructuration grégorienne à l'aube du Concile de Trente (mi XI^e-mi XVI^e siècle)*, Paris, 9-12 février 2009, Turnhout, 2015. (under publication)

²⁰²⁶ Attila Györkös and Gergely Kiss (eds.) ' *M'en anei en Ongria* ' » : *relations franco - hongroises au Moyen Âge, II*, Debrecen, 2017.

²⁰²⁷ Ágnes Zapala-Maléth, *A Magyar Királyság és a Szentszék kapcsolata I. Károly korában (1301-1342)*, Pécs, 2020.

²⁰²⁸ Gergely Kiss, « A Sainte-Chapelle intézménye és lehetséges magyar kapcsolatai », in Márta Tóber and Ágnes Maléth (eds.), *Középkortörténeti tanulmányok 8. - A VIII. Medievisztikai PhD-konferencia (Szeged, 2013. június 17-19.) előadásai*, Szeged, 2015, pp. 127-149.

²⁰²⁹ Gergely Kiss, *Pápai megbízottak a 11-14. századi Magyarországon – online adattár* (NKFIH NN 109690; 124763) Papal Delegates in Hungary in the 11th-14th Centuries – Online Database (NKFIH NN 109690; 124763)

1360 and 1365, which were partly in preparation for the less well-known Hungarian relations of the Hundred Years' War and Arnaud de Cervole's crusade of 1365.²⁰³⁰ Attila Györkös's numerous works on military history, focusing on French-Hungarian and European-Hungarian military history research in the 14th and 16th centuries, deal with issues such as the crusades and European unification,²⁰³¹ the clashes between the French aristocracy and the monarchy in the Middle Ages²⁰³², or the role of border castles in medieval warfare.²⁰³³

B) Historiography on Mercenaries in the Middle of 14th Century

Since the turn of the millennium, the demand for 14th-century mercenary companies has increased greatly. Several important works have been written by American, French, Italian, English and German authors. Among them are monographs and volumes of studies focusing on Italian warfare and the warfare of the Hundred Years' War, the lives of some important mercenary captains, the formation of the great companies, the analysis of the tactics and strategies used by mercenary companies. Among the research topics there are the relationship between society and mercenaries, the history of the Church and mercenary companies, the relationship between knight armies and mercenaries, the history of mercenaries in the service of Italian city-states, and the role of mercenaries in the complex system of private warfare in the 14th century. However, mercenaries had already appeared in modern historiography. The most important work in the French-language literature is that of Philippe Contamine. The impact of this study, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say, has set the direction of research for decades, not only in France but also in European and American literature. Philippe Contamine's interpretation of *«the word 'adventure' also refers to a particular type of warfare, in which a group of combatants leave the camp, the garrison or the main body of the army for an unusually quite a short period of time, in search of booty*

²⁰³⁰ Gergely Kiss, « A pápaság és Magyarország kapcsolatrendszere a 11-14. században Áttekintés », in Gergely Kiss, *Varietas delectat: A pápai-magyar kapcsolatok sokszínűsége a 11-14. században*, Pécs, 2019, pp. 59-77.

²⁰³¹ Attila Györkös, « Keresztes háború és az európai összefogás Podjebrád György 1460-as évekbeli tervezetében », *Rubicon Online Plusz*, 2014, n° 1, pp. 1-5.

²⁰³² Attila Györkös, « A 'bolond háború' - avagy a francia monarchia és az arisztokrácia utolsó összecsapása a középkorban », in László Pósn and László Veszprémy (eds.), *Elfeledett háborúk - Középkori csaták és várostromok (6-16. század)*, Budapest, 2016, pp. 100-112.

²⁰³³ Attila Györkös, « A határvárak szerepe a francia monarchia megerősödésében (12-13. század) », in László Pósn et al. (eds.), *Őrzők, vigyázatok a határra!: Határvédelem, határőrizet, határvadászok a középkortól napjainkig*, Budapest, 2017, pp. 107-118.

and ransom...»²⁰³⁴ Successive generations of French historians have used Philippe Contamine's findings and enriched the body of knowledge that now provides a comprehensive picture of the role of mercenaries in 14th century history. One of the outstanding achievements of this generation was the conference held in Berbiguières on 13-14 September 2013. The speakers were all prominent figures in the field, and their presentations covered the best of 21st century research. The presentations from the colloquium are available online, but have also been published.²⁰³⁵ The studies of the book can basically be divided into two parts: «*thematic presentations of an often general nature - Guilhem Pépin, Justine Firnhaber-Baker, Nicolas Savy, Pierre Prétou, Michael Jones, Germain Butaud, Françoise Lainé, Christophe Masson, Bertrand Schnerb, Werner Paravicini and Anne Curry - and others focusing on characters (Armand Jamme, Philippe Contamine, Loïc Cazaux, Valérie Toureille and Kelly DeVries). Many of the papers end with the presentation of supporting documents in appendices, which are of particular interest to researchers, as they are mostly unpublished and presented with a developed critical apparatus.*»²⁰³⁶ The geographical distribution of studies shows the regions on which the majority of French historians focus: Guilhem Pépin, Armand Jamme, Nicolas Savy, Pierre Prétou deals with the gascon companies in the south, Justine Firnhaber-Baker concentrates on the north, in the centre of Philippe Contamine's paper is Auvergne, Loïc Cazaux writes about a Burgundian *écorcheur*, Valérie Toureille, Michael Jones, Germain Butaud and Françoise Lainé write about the mercenaries in the east of France. Anne Curry focuses in particular on the origins and importance of *routiers* in battles fought during the fifteenth century, where *routiers* proved to be indispensable tools for victory. Werner Paravicini also deals with one of the peripheral issues of the Hundred Years' War, the 'Prussian journey.' The studies cover all areas of modern historical research. They include an analysis of the origins and the motivation of the *routiers* (Guilhem Pépin), and the life histories of the individual captains (Armand Jamme, Valérie Toureille), an analysis of the atrocities committed by mercenaries (Justine Firnhaber-Baker), a study of the tactics used by the companies (Nicolas Savy) and the organisation of their defence (Pierre Prétou), and an analysis of the relationship between mercenaries and the royal army (Loïc Cazaux,

²⁰³⁴ Philippe Contamine « Les compagnies d'aventure en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans », *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome. Moyen Âge, Temps modernes*, 1975, vol. LXXXVII, n° 2, pp. 365-396.

²⁰³⁵ Guilhem Pépin et al. (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*, Bordeaux, 2016.

²⁰³⁶ Brice Rabot, « Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption », *Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest*, 2017, vol. CXXIV, n° 1, pp. 154-156.

Christophe Masson, Bertrand Schnerb), as well as the mercenaries activity outside France (Werner Paravicini).

Another important volume of studies was published in Leiden and Boston in 2003. The list of authors of *Crusaders, Condottieri and Cannon* is impressive. Some of the leading Anglo-Saxon military historians are represented among the book's authors. The book was edited by L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay where else the essays were written by David A. Cohen, Joseph F. Callaghan, Douglas Sterling, Timothy M. May, Kelly DeVries, Mark Dupuy, Valerie Eads, Theresa M. Vann, Steven Bowman, William Caferro, Albert D. McJoynt, Weston F. Cook Jr, Josep David Garrido i Valls, Cynthia L. Chamberlin and Nicolas Agrait, among others.²⁰³⁷

William Caferro is an expert on the history of mercenaries in Italy and has published several studies and monographs, mainly on Sir John Hawkwood and the related mercenary history of Florence, Milan, Pisa, Bologna. William Caferro's work is permeated by the results of research in local archives, more than one of which provides accurate references to the presence of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy, which I have used as a starting point for my research in Florence. Thanks to this research, we can speak of an unprecedented intensity of Hungarian presence in Florence between 1350-70.²⁰³⁸

The same observations apply to the work of L. J. Andrew Villalon on Iberia. His study of Sir Hugh Calveley and the Free Companies, published in this volume, is also closely related to the dissertation, since it deals with one of the four crusades mentioned in the introduction, which proved to be the most successful and had the greatest impact on European history, ending with the accession of the Trastámara dynasty.²⁰³⁹

The third major book, which specifically covers the history of medieval mercenaries from the 9th to the 17th centuries, boasts the same professionally competent and distinguished authors as *Crusaders, Condottieri and Cannon*. John France is the editor of *Mercenaries and Paid Men* the Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages and the author of the Introduction. Of course, there is an overlap between the authors of the two books, such as Kelly DeVries, but among the authors of the *Mercenaries and Paid Men*. There are such important names as Stephen Morillo, Davis S. Bachrach, Bernard S. Bachrach, Adrien R. Bell, Eljas Oksanen,

²⁰³⁷ L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (eds.), *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies Around the Mediterranean*, Leiden - Boston, 2003.

²⁰³⁸ William Caferro, « 'Slaying the Hydra-Headed Beast': Italy and the Companies of Adventure in the Fourteenth Century », in *Ibid.*, pp. 285-305.

²⁰³⁹ L. J. Andrew Villalon, « 'Seeking Castles in Spain': Sir Hugh Calveley and the Free Companies ' Intervention in Ibererian Warfare (1366-1369) », in *Ibid.*, pp. 305-329.

John E Law, Adrian R. Bell, Alan V. Murray, John H. Pryor or David Crouch.²⁰⁴⁰ One of the book's many strengths is that it contains studies that discuss the role of mercenaries in periods of the Middle Ages where their presence was not as obvious as in the 14th and 15th centuries. Bernard S. Bachrach, in his study of mercenaries in the late Roman and Merovingian periods, argues that there were already troops who could be called 'companies', like Childeric's company, or the company of the Gallo-Roman magnate came Vedatus, referring to the most important form of mercenary organisation in the mid-14th century.²⁰⁴¹

Charles R. Bowlus examines the use of Hungarians as mercenaries in the 9th century and discusses Hungarian and German warfare in the Age of Adventures.²⁰⁴²

In the 10th century, Richer de Reims mentions the use of mercenaries, which historiography considers to be the earliest mention of mercenaries. Richard Abels attributes the first mention of mercenaries to economic development in the 10th century, with the advent of the money economy.²⁰⁴³

Several authors have studied the role of mercenaries in 12th century warfare. David Crouch argues that one of the most important elements of the self-identity of those who belonged to the upper classes of medieval society at the end of the 12th century was their privileged social status as protectors of the poor and the helpless. At the same time, an integral part of 12th-century warfare were the systematic destruction of enemy territory and atrocities against non-combatants regularly carried out by members of the aristocracy in private warfare. Mercenaries played a particularly important role in this.²⁰⁴⁴

John D. Hosler has shown how the use of mercenaries was a common practice in private warfare in the 13th century. He examined the practice of using mercenaries under Henry II, why and how the English king used mercenaries to achieve his goals. It finds that mercenaries were an integral part of Henry's army, often acting as an independent unit.²⁰⁴⁵

Alan V. Murray has taken a close look at the number of troops available to the kings of Jerusalem.²⁰⁴⁶ The kingdom's army was made up of mercenaries in addition to Templars,

²⁰⁴⁰ John France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, Leiden - Boston, 2008.

²⁰⁴¹ Bernard S. Bachrach, « Merovingian Mercenaries and Paid Soldiers in Imperial Perspective », in *Ibid.*, pp. 167-192.

²⁰⁴² In Hungarian historiography we call the period of Hungarian campaigns to various parts of Europe in the 9th century. Charles R. Bowlus, « The Early Hungarians as Mercenaries, 860-955 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 193-206.

²⁰⁴³ Richard Abels, « Household Men, Mercenaries and Vikings in Anglo-Saxon England », in *Ibid.*, 2008, pp. 143-166.

²⁰⁴⁴ David Crouch, « William Marshal and the Mercenariat », in *Ibid.*, pp. 15-32.

²⁰⁴⁵ John D. Hosler, « Revisiting Mercenaries under Henry Fitz Empress 1167-1188 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 33-42.

²⁰⁴⁶ Alan V. Murray, « The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem », in *Ibid.*, pp. 275-286.

Hospitallers, and possibly additional troops provided by pilgrims. Like many other medievalists dealing with this period, Alan V. Murray is confronted with the problem of the stipendiary: whether they were mercenaries or recipients of money-fiefs. In his view, it may not be necessary to distinguish strictly between the two categories.

An excellent study by John H. Pryor deals with southern Italy in the 13th century, specifically Naples, which, with the loss of imperial influence, provided good opportunities for mercenaries. Nicolas Prouteau tells the story of the mercenaries used to besiege castles and towns in the age of the Crusades. John Pryor analyses the situation of the mercenaries who served in the navy of Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily (1265-1285) at the end of the 13th century.²⁰⁴⁷

Kelly DeVries is a specialist of 14th-century warfare, and his work is unmissable, so it is no coincidence that his name appears so many times in the introduction to this dissertation. In this paper, however, he explores the problem of medieval mercenaries in a much broader spectrum: questions such as the origin and identity of mercenaries, the extent to which they were regarded and treated as foreigners by local society, the extent to which paid soldiers could be considered mercenaries, etc.²⁰⁴⁸

Guido Guerri dall'Oro discusses the mercenary aspects of Louis I's two campaigns in Naples, based on Domenico da Gravina's *Chronicon de rebus in Apulia gestis*, (1347-1350). He gives an overview of the situation of the active condottieri in Italy in the mid-14th century, discussing their recruitment, their remuneration, the situation and organisation of the various, mainly German, companies, the relationship of their captains with Louis, and the Hungarian mercenaries who remained in Italy after the campaigns.²⁰⁴⁹

Adrian R. Bell examines the military careers of knights active in the last decades of the 14th century in the context of Chaucer's *Knight of Canterbury Tales*. His study focuses on English knights who took part in the wars of Richard II, sometimes as crusaders, sometimes as mercenaries.²⁰⁵⁰

Carlos Andrés Gonzales Paz writes about the role of mercenaries in the War of the Two Pedros. His study, as well as the works of Donald J. Kagay and Andrew Villalon, is extremely important for the dissertation, since mercenaries were the main actors in the events of

²⁰⁴⁷ John H. Pryor, « Soldiers of Fortune in the Fleet of Charles I of Anjou, King of Sicily ca. 1265-85 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 119-143.

²⁰⁴⁸ K. DeVries, « Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology... », art. cit., pp. 43-60.

²⁰⁴⁹ Guido Guerri dall'Oro, « Les Mercenaires dans les Campagnes Napolitaines de Louis le Grand, Roi de Hongrie, 1347-1350 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 61-88.

²⁰⁵⁰ Adrian R. Bell, « The Fourteenth Century Soldier-More Chaucer's Knight or Medieval Career? », in *Ibid.*, pp. 301-316.

1365/66 in Castile and Aragon. Using the chronicles of Pedro López de Ayala, he analyses the role of the White Company in the 1366 campaign, the relationship between Enrique of Trastámara and Bertrand du Guesclin, and the Battle of Nájera. An interesting aspect of the work is that it describes the careers of such *routiers* as Pierre de Villanes, who ended his career as Count of Ribadeo.²⁰⁵¹

Stephen Morillo's essay in this volume deals with the problem of medieval mercenaries from a theoretical point of view. He analyses the situation of mercenaries by looking at three questions: he tries to construct a cross-cultural typology of paid and unpaid military service, he seeks to answer the question, «*can we make those definitions correspond, at least roughly, to variations in different societies' view of variations of military service, especially as they affected notions of the cultural identity of paid fighters?*» and thirdly he, he asks whether all this can be done by, in Bernard Bachrach's words, 'committing sociology.'²⁰⁵²

Spencer Gavin Smith's study of the legacy of Owain Lawgoch, an iconic Welsh mercenary figure of the 14th century, occupies a unique place in the volume as a study in archaeology. Owain's family owned four estates: Bidfield, Gloucestershire, Althurst, Cheshire, Tatsfield, Surrey, Olas yn Dinas, Montgomeryshire. He presents the fate of these four estates, which passed to the English Crown on the death of Owain Lawgoch.²⁰⁵³

Among the monographs, it is worth highlighting some of the works that are most closely related to the subject of this dissertation. One of the most important ones is Kenneth Fowler's *Medieval Mercenaries*, which not only takes stock of the mercenaries active in the mid-14th century, but directly assigns a whole chapter to Arnaud de Cervole's crusade. The work contains many important details, including the names of the captains involved, and traces the careers of many of them. He also makes a good assessment of the role of Louis I in the preparations.²⁰⁵⁴ The biggest advantage of the book is the extremely accurate treatment of the history of the mercenary companies, tracing the life of each captain in the 1360s. It is precisely for this quality that the book has received, in my opinion, unjust criticism: «*In summary, a useful but rather narrowly focused study stronger on recounting events than the interpretation of wider contexts- and, as an account of an era full of violence, plotting,*

²⁰⁵¹ Carlos Andrés Gonzales Paz, « The Role of Mercenary Troops in Spain in the Fourteenth Century: the Civil War », in *Ibid.*, pp. 331-344.

²⁰⁵² Stephen Morillo, « Mercenaries, Mamluks and Militia, towards a Cross-Culutural Typology of Military Service », in *Ibid.*, pp. 243-274.

²⁰⁵³ Spencer Gavin Smith, « What does a Mercenary Leave Behind? The Archaeological Evidence for the Estates of Owain Lawgoch », in *Ibid.*, pp. 317-331.

²⁰⁵⁴ Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries, vol. I: The Great Companies*, Oxford, 2001.

*treason and mayhem, surprisingly bloodless and unexciting.»*²⁰⁵⁵ In fact, the work is a continuation of well-established historical works by 19th-century French authors based on archival sources, spiced up with the methodological insights of modern historiography, as Richard W. Kauper stated in his 2002 review that book is the story of the Great Companies *«that Kenneth Fowler tells in this «thick narrative» that obviously draws upon several decades of work and utilizes the entire range of evidence available: modern scholarship, and printed and manuscript sources. This book will surely stand as the standard history of the companies for generations to come.»*²⁰⁵⁶

The book devotes a separate chapter to Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, but also gives a detailed account of the actions of the mercenary captains involved in the campaign between 1360-65, all set in the context of the situation of mercenaries in Europe in the mid-14th century.

The other important monograph on the history of mercenaries in 14th-century France is by Germain Butaud, who reviews the circumstances of the formation, and the rise of the Great Companies. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between mercenaries and settlements in the areas south of the Loire, and to the difficulties of extricating the companies from certain areas. Germain Butaud devotes a special chapter to the origins of the captains and the common mercenaries, analysing their position in local society. A clear and precise definition of the defining form of the seraphim that made up the companies, the *glavier*, is very important. In the final part of the book, he analyses the warfare that characterised the companies, including, as all historians on the subject have done, an analysis of the difference between *guerre juste* and *guerre criminel*, a discussion of the atrocities committed against the local population, and the central role of ransom in the late medieval history of mercenary warfare.²⁰⁵⁷

Stephan Selzer's is the third complete work on mercenaries, filling a void in modern German historiography of the German mercenary companies active in 14th-century Italy since Karl Heinrich Schäfer. The book is indispensable in several respects: firstly, it contains sources on German mercenaries broken down by Italian archives, with precise source identification. This is important because Hungarian mercenaries joined the German companies in the period, thus this greatly facilitates research on the presence of Hungarian mercenaries in

²⁰⁵⁵ Brian G.H. Ditcham, « Kenneth Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, vol. I, The Great Companies », *De Re Militari*, [available online at] <https://www.deremilitari.org/REVIEWS/review23.htm>.

²⁰⁵⁶ Richard W. Kauper, « Kenneth Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, Vol. I, The Great Companies », *The American Historical Review*, 2002, vol. CVII, n° 2, [available online at] <https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/107/2/600/196525?redirectedFrom=fulltext>

²⁰⁵⁷ Germain Butaud, *Les compagnies de routiers en France ,1357-1393*, Clermont-Ferrand, 2012.

Italy. On the other hand, the activities of certain mercenary captains who play an important role in the dissertation, such as Albert Sterz, are discussed in detail. Like Germain Butaud, he examines the composition and organisation of companies, analysing recruitment, strategy and tactics, and discusses the role of the '*Helm und Lanze*' in mercenary warfare. He examines the actual size of the companies and the reasons for their creation, since the German companies of 1350-70 were multiethnic organisations, and therefore he specifically discusses the role of the English and the Hungarians, Spaniards, French, Italians. There is a separate sub-chapter on the question of pay, the Italian campaigns, the so-called 'princely companies' and the '*Romzüge*.'

Stephan Selzer takes a thorough look at mercenary warfare, broadly along the same lines as Germain Butaud, but in more detail concerning the mercenary warfare in Italy, the distribution of booty, the question of ransom, but also as regards the question of honouring of the treaties and the extent to which the cities could trust the companies to fulfil their treaty obligations.

There is a separate chapter on the relationship between mercenaries and knights, and the extent to which the two classes could be separated, how interchangeability existed, how a mercenary could attain the title of knight, and what it takes to be part of the nobility. The book is interesting in that it tries to trace the integration of the mercenaries who settled in Italy, their relationship with the local society, and the fate of those who, thanks to the fortune of war, returned to the Empire alive.²⁰⁵⁸

Together with Ursula Carlson, Hunt Janin has undertaken a survey of the history of mercenaries in medieval and Renaissance Europe. Their book aims to answer two basic questions: Who were the medieval and Renaissance mercenaries? What did they do? They have undertaken nothing less than to synthesize 900 years of mercenary history, and they have sought to «*let the reader focus on particular interesting moments of mercenary history.*» The overwhelming majority of the references are to Anglo-Saxon literature with some French references, and the chronicles are mostly cited in secondary translations rather than in the original language. However, the vast majority of the literature cited includes the relevant American and English authors of today. Nevertheless, their books are fragmented and only broadly review the history of the various periods, in this case the great companies of the mid-14th century.²⁰⁵⁹

²⁰⁵⁸ Stephan Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento*, Tübingen, 2001.

²⁰⁵⁹ Hunt Janin and Ursula Carlson, *Mercenaries in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, London -Jefferson, 2013.

One of William Caferro's many studies of Florence and the situation of mercenaries in Italy in the 14th century in general is the long-term employability of mercenaries. The author confidently draws on sources in Italian archives such as those in Florence where Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera mercenary censuses have been fortunately preserved over successive long years. William Caferro scans the sources and analyses the nationality of each caporal, captain, seneschal, how long they served the city and how long their commissions were. From these data, it is possible to draw a wide range of conclusions and even arrive at surprising results.²⁰⁶⁰

Many books on the lives of individual mercenary captains have been written by English, American, French and Italian authors. Here I will mention just a few that are relevant to the subject. An important monograph is William Caferro's book on John Hawkwood²⁰⁶¹ which, thanks to its accurate notes, has contributed greatly to reconstructing Pope Urban V's plan for mercenaries, thus linking two important 14th-century theatres of warfare, eastern France and northern Italy. It is only natural that William Caferro has written his book with such thoroughness, having spent 16 years on it. One of William Caferro's important conclusions regarding this dissertation, is Saint Catherine's relationship with Sir John Hawkwood. Catherine of Siena sent a letter to Hawkwood in which, as in her letter to Albert Sterz, she urged the mercenary captain to accept the Pope's offer to put aside his past antagonism and sinful life in order to serve Christ.²⁰⁶²

Another important biography of John Hawkwood that has become part of 21st century literature is that of Duccio Balestracci who describes the lives of knights and mercenaries, the structure of the companies, the relationship with the people and patrons, money, the tools of the trade and the transformation of the companies of fortune into regular armies.²⁰⁶³

Nicolas Savy has written a biography of Bertrucat D'Albret, one of the most important Gascon captains of the 14th century, who spent his long career in all the major battlefields of the Hundred Years' War, in France and in Spain. His character is also important because Bertrucat D'Albret was active in Burgundy in the 1360s and during Arnaud de Cervole's crusade along with Seguin de Badefol, and then responded to Bertrand du Guesclin's call to take part in the Castilian adventure after the companies involved in the crusade against

²⁰⁶⁰ These will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. W. Caferro, « Continuity, Long-term Service... », art. cit., pp. 219-251.

²⁰⁶¹ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood...*, op. cit.

²⁰⁶² Letter n° 220 of Saint Catherine of Siena, « A Misser Giovanni Condottiero, e Capo della Compagnia, che venne nel tempo della fame », in Leonardo Venturini (ed.), *L'opere della serafica santa Caterina da Siena: L'epistole della serafica vergine s. Caterina da Siena*, vol. 3, Siena, 1713, pp. 211-216.

²⁰⁶³ Duccio Balestracci, *Le armi i cavalli, l'oro: Giovanni Acuto e i condottieri nell'Italia del Trecento*, Bari, 2009.

Hungary were disbanded following Arnaud de Cervole's unexpected death in November 1365.²⁰⁶⁴

The life of Bertrand du Guesclin, the most renowned French mercenary captain of the era, has been widely written about. French, English and American historians have written about his life throughout the 20th century. Among others Jacques D. de Certaines,²⁰⁶⁵ Kenneth Fowler,²⁰⁶⁶ Philippe Contamine²⁰⁶⁷ dealt with the subject. Bertrand du Guesclin was actively involved in the organisation of the four crusades to Castile. He had originally been the Pope's choice to replace Arnaud de Cervole as head of the Hungarian Crusade, but was still in English captivity at the beginning of the summer of 1365. After the death of Arnaud de Cervole, Bertrand du Guesclin was charged with persuading the companies involved in the Eastern Crusade to join the Western Crusade. So it is natural that monographs and studies on his life contain important information about the Eastern campaign.

Two equally famous English mercenary captains, Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir Robert Knolles, have been chronicled by an English local historian, Tony Bostock. Their fates are intertwined with that of Bertrand du Guesclin, for Calveley first marched with the French captain to Castile in the mercenary company of Enrique of Trastámara, and then, after the overthrow and expulsion of Pedro, Enrique's half-brother, Sir Hugh Calveley returned to Spain with Edward of Woodstock to defeat and capture Bertrand du Guesclin at Nájera in one of the greatest battles of the age.²⁰⁶⁸

There have been numerous studies on the role of mercenaries in late medieval warfare, and the role they played in the transformation from knightly warfare in the second half of the 14th century to the emergence of professional armies at the end of the 15th century. Maurice Keen, in the introduction to his book on Medieval Warfare explains the roots of the «*future power structures of Europe*,»²⁰⁶⁹ how professionalized administration made possible the existence of the mercenary companies in the middle of the 14th century, the forerunners of the standing armies. These mercenary companies were «*already equipped with standing*

²⁰⁶⁴ Nicolas Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret ou le destin d'un capitaine gascon du roi d'Angleterre pendant la guerre de Cent Ans*, Pradines, 2015.

²⁰⁶⁵ Jacques D. de Certaines, *Deux chefs de guerre au Moyen Âge, l'admiral Jean de Vienne et le connétable Bertrand du Guesclin*, Rennes, 2008.

²⁰⁶⁶ Kenneth Fowler, « Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIV^e siècle: Bertrand du Guesclin et Sir Hugh Calveley », in *Le combattant au Moyen Âge : Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public, 18^e congrès*, Montpellier, 1987, pp. 243-256.

²⁰⁶⁷ Philippe Contamine, « Bertrand du Guesclin, une gloire usurpée », in Philippe Contamine, *Les Chevaliers*, Paris, 2006, pp. 75-89.

²⁰⁶⁸ Tony Bostock, *Dogs of War: Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir Robert Knolles*, London, 2017.

²⁰⁶⁹ Maurice Keen, « Introduction », in Maurice Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare*, Oxford, 1999, pp. 1-13, p. 24.

forces and technical military skills.»²⁰⁷⁰ Anthony D. Carr is the author of many books and studies on Welsh mercenaries and captains who played an active role in the mid-14th century, and has published studies on Ieuan Wynn and Owen Lawgoch,²⁰⁷¹ among others. Of particular relevance to the length of this dissertation is the role of Ieuan Wynn, one of the few first-generation captains active in the border region of the Empire and the Kingdom who survived 1360s. Jochen G. Schenk presented an interesting paper on the terminological consideration of medieval warfare and new wars. Writing about the role of mercenaries in medieval warfare, he notes that «*there was no shortage of mercenaries—irregular fighters par excellence – in medieval armies.*»²⁰⁷² During his long career as a specialist in Burgundy, Bertrand Schnerb published several books and studies on the second half of the 14th century, 1360s to be precise, including an important reference study on a Lombard mercenary captain, Catellain Vasc, who served John the Fearless in Burgundy.²⁰⁷³ Franco Cardini's book *Quell'antica festa crudele* (That cruel old feast), was originally published in 1982, reviews the socio-political background to seven centuries of warfare from the Middle Ages to the early modern period, taking into account the changes brought about by tactical-strategic, economic and technological developments.²⁰⁷⁴ The radical transformation of medieval warfare, which began in the mid-14th century with the emergence of the great companies, is explained by the spiritual crisis of the knighthood. The Crusades, chivalrous wars par excellence, were animated by the very spirit, by fighting in the name of Christ. In the 14th century, chivalry was hit by a real spiritual crisis or crisis of values, due in part to the failure of the Crusades and in part to the discomfort caused by the advance of the new classes: the merchants and the bourgeoisie. The sovereigns, too, did not fail to influence the descent of knightly dignity through stricter control of military orders and decorations. The bursting onto the scene of infantrymen of bourgeois origin did the rest. While the knights fought for glory, booty and their conception of war as a party game, the more uncouth and boorish bourgeoisie did not fight wars by profession, but only to kill and win. And if the knights saw an equal rank in their adversaries, this new force of *pedites*, far from seeing the knight as a brother in arms, ultimately identified him as an enemy to be beaten. With the rise of the new ruling classes, the feudal institutions not only gradually

²⁰⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁰⁷¹ Anthony D. Carr, *Yvain de Galles: Knight of France and Welsh Prince*. Conference paper given in the conference at Mortagne, 2003, [available online at] <https://estuairegironde.net/doc/docu/yvain.pdf>, pp. 1-18.

²⁰⁷² Jochen G. Schenk, « 'New Wars' and Medieval Warfare: Some Terminological Considerations », *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 2016, vol. XIV, 2016, pp. 149-162, p. 150.

²⁰⁷³ B. Schnerb, « Un capitaine Italien... », art. cit., pp. 5-27.

²⁰⁷⁴ Franco Cardini, *Quell'antica festa crudele: Guerra e cultura della dall'età feudale alla grande rivoluzione*, Florence, 1982.

wiped out the prestige and function of the knightly aristocracies, but also, in a certain sense, favoured the rise of a new figure of fighter: the mercenary. The wars of the time were in fact characterised as wars of manoeuvre, of encampment, very long and expensive for those vassals who, according to feudal rules, had to serve their lord militarily and were forced to give up their business for the period of the long military conflicts. The companies of fortune were used more and more frequently for these reasons, provoking the harsh stance of those who, like Machiavelli in *Dell'arte della guerra*, stigmatised the use of mercenary troops for the defence of the city. The condottieri thus became the protagonists of a season in which the wars fought by these companies were characterised by their length, given also the economic interests of the mercenaries, linked to the length of the conflicts. It was not until the end of the Hundred Years' War that the mercenary companies were surpassed, when Charles V took the first important step towards the creation of a standing army, founding those armies loyal to the Crown that would characterise the centuries to come. The period defined as that of the 'professionals of war', whether knights or mercenaries, was the best, since 'war is waged by those who want it, those who have a certain inclination towards it, those who believe in some of its values.'²⁰⁷⁵

The transformation in warfare brought with it the social status of mercenary captains, which can be traced very well, especially in the works of contemporary writers on captains. This transformation is studied by Duccio Balestracci in his article on *La metamorfosi del condottiero. Da brigante a eroe rinascimentale*. «*The biographers of the commanders are no longer the bourgeois chroniclers appalled by the devastation and damage suffered by these people; ... Now it is the humanists who write about their lives and their adventures (much less their misdeeds).*»²⁰⁷⁶

Of course, this transformation did not happen overnight, and was one interpretation of how 15th-century biographers saw the life of mercenary captains, and another of how it was experienced by the inhabitants of Italian cities a century earlier. Naturally, Duccio Balestracci emphasises that the methods remain the same. Francesco Pirani describes these methods in his study of Rinaldo da Monteverde, ruler of Fermo, in which he discusses the relationship between the inhabitants and certain mercenary captains who used oppression as a means

²⁰⁷⁵ Raimondo Fabbri, *Franco Cardini, Quell'antica festa crudele. Discussioni*, 2019, [available online at] <https://www.azioniparallele.it/49-la-guerra-al-tempo-della-pace/discussioni/285-cardini-festacrudele.html>.

²⁰⁷⁶ Duccio Balestracci, « *La metamorfosi del condottiero. Da brigante a eroe rinascimentale* », in Stefania Zucchini (ed.), *Il capitani di ventura: guerra e società nell'Italia centrale del Trecento: atti del convegno*, Perugia, 2006, pp. 22-39.

of exerting their power, and how the citizens reacted when the mercenary captain's position was shaken.²⁰⁷⁷

Alessandro Barbero analyses the history of the condottieri of the 14th centuries, their origins, how and why they became mercenary captains, the relationship between the Papal State and the mercenaries.²⁰⁷⁸ Fabio Romanoni worked on the three-year war between Milan and Pavia between 1356 and 1359, after Galeazzo II Visconti had moved his seat to Pavia. Using archival sources and contemporary chronicles, Fabio Romanoni also analyses the role of Italian and German mercenaries in the service of the Italian cities, such as Fredericus von Hebingen or Ugolino Gonzaga.²⁰⁷⁹

Simone Sgambati dealt with the calligraphic styles of the entries in the municipal archives of the mercenaries employed by the city of Bologna. His work is «*a catalogue that combines art history, local and military history, and archivistics, in the analysis of an aspect of the second half of the 14th century in Bologna, and it is based on a close relationship of intertextuality between the different specialisations.*» His work includes many important archival source notes on mercenaries in the second half of the 14th century, which can be used for further research.²⁰⁸⁰

In a study, Valeria Braidì deals with Bologna during the Visconti reign in the mid-14th century. Petrarch had a special relationship with the mercenaries. On the one hand, he had first-hand experience of the devastation of the Hundred Years' War, the depopulation of the territories the mercenaries roamed, and the suffering of the population, as he reported in his letters following Edward III's 1359 campaign in eastern France. He himself, on the other hand, maintained friendly relations with Italian *condottieri*, such as Luchino dal Verme or Malatesta Ungaro,²⁰⁸¹ and, as a shaper of Italian politics in the 1360s, he played an active role in liaising with the condottieri, lobbying for specific mandates. For example, he persuaded Luchino dal Verme to accept Venice's offer to join the Venetian army that was fighting to put down the Cretan rebellion. It is in the light of the above that James Hankins's book on Renaissance Italian political thinkers, analysing Leonardo Bruni, Baldo degli Ubaldi,

²⁰⁷⁷ Francesco Pirani, « 'Crudelissimo Nerone': la memoria damnata di Rinaldo da Monteverde signore di Fermo († 1380) », *Studia Picena*, 2011, vol. LXXVI, pp. 83-111.

²⁰⁷⁸ Alessandro Barbero, « *I signori condottieri* », in Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur (ed.), *Signorie cittadine nell'Italia comunale*, Rome, 2013, pp. 229-241.

²⁰⁷⁹ Fabio Romanoni, « 'Come i Visconti asediare Pavia'. Assedi e operazioni militari intorno a Pavia dal 1356 al 1359 », *Reti Medievali Rivista*, 2007, vol. VIII, pp. 1-29.

²⁰⁸⁰ Simone Sgambati, *Le condotte degli stipendiari di Bologna. Immagini dalle copertine dei registri in Archivio di Stato. Tesi di Laurea in Storia dell'arte medievale*, Bologna, 2019.

²⁰⁸¹ Leardo Mascanzoni, « Il pellegrinaggio di Malatesta 'Ungaro al cosiddetto 'Purgatorio di S. Patrizio (Irlanda a. 1358) », *Atti e Memorie della Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Province di Romagna*, 2000, vol. LI, pp. 243-266.

Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Petrarch and others, deals with power, politics, living with Renaissance tyrants, the politics of virtue and Cola di Renzo's populism and its limits.²⁰⁸²

Carlo Ciucciovino in his *Cronaca del Trecento* discusses the extremely complex political history of mid-14th century Italy, which can be used as a guideline for historians writing detailed studies on the changes in the federal systems of individual cities and rulers, the use of mercenary companies, or the ever-changing military situation in central and northern Italy.²⁰⁸³

Only a few important monographs and studies have been written on the activities of 14th century Hungarian mercenaries in Italy between 1350 and 1370. The most detailed work on Hungarian-Neapolitan relations was written by István Miskolczy in 1937. In his monograph he discussed the Neapolitan enterprises of Louis I and Charles of Durazzo, using the available English, French and Italian literature of the time, published Hungarian sources and sources in the archives of Naples and the Vatican. Unfortunately, he does not cover the events of 1350-1378 in detail, so the book is mainly relevant to the Hungarian mercenaries who remained in Italy after Louis' last campaign in Naples.²⁰⁸⁴

In the 30s and 40s of the 20th century, there was more interest in the history of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy. Then, 30 years later, in the 1960s, new works were published on the Italian adventures of Toldi Miklós and his companions. Another 40 years later, Attila Bárány was the only one to work on the subject until the foundation of his research group. Apart from Miskolczy's book, only five Hungarian and one or two Italian historians have dealt with the presence of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy in the 14th century. This also shows how far we are at the beginning of systematic research. The first four Hungarian studies were written in 1932,²⁰⁸⁵ 1942²⁰⁸⁶ 1960²⁰⁸⁷ and 1962,²⁰⁸⁸ while the fifth study is by Attila Bárány. The first four studies are based on the rare work by Schäffer, the Vatican Apostolic Archives, Hungarian source publications and contemporary Italian chronicles, while Attila Bárány wrote a study on the Anglo-Hungarian mercenary collaboration with Toldi Miklós in Italy

²⁰⁸² James Hankins, « *Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and statecraft in Renaissance Italy* », London, 2019.

²⁰⁸³ Carlo Ciucciovino, « *La Cronaca del Trecento Italiano, vol. III, 1351-1375* », Rome, 2019.

²⁰⁸⁴ István Miskolczy, « *Magyar-olasz összeköttetések az Anjouk korában: Magyar-nápolyi kapcsolatok* », Budapest, 1937.

²⁰⁸⁵ Pál Lukcsics, « Magyar zsoldosok a pápaság szolgálatában a XIV. században », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1932, vol. XXXIII, n° 1, pp. 125-57.

²⁰⁸⁶ Albert Gárdonyi, « A középkori zsoldosintézmény és a magyarság », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1942, vol. XLIII, n° 1, pp. 129-143.

²⁰⁸⁷ Gyula Rázsó, « A zsoldosintézmény kezdetei Magyarországon », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* (1960), n° 2, pp. 107-143.

²⁰⁸⁸ Gyula Rázsó, « A zsoldosság gazdasági és társadalmi előfeltételei és típusai a XIV-XV. századi Magyarországon », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1962, vol. IX, n° 1, pp. 160-217.

using more up to date sources and literature.²⁰⁸⁹ Pál Lukcsics wrote a history of the mercenaries in Italy between 1352 and 1367. His study is concise, but provides important details that can be used for future research. Gárdonyi Albert used the same sources for his study as Pál Lukcsics had used ten years earlier, so he did not add much more to the knowledge about mercenaries. Gyula Rázsó explores the concept of the mercenary in his 1960 study. Grouping the mercenaries into five categories (by nationality, by the nature of the grant, by the social origin of the mercenaries, by their type of weapon, by the way they were employed), he examined the activities of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy. In his 1962 study, he takes stock of the socio-economic preconditions in 14th-century Hungary that made the use of mercenaries possible. He emphasizes the regular income that developed under the Angevin kings as one of the indispensable preconditions. According to András Borosy, among the Hungarian mercenaries of the 14th century, the original nomadic cavalry fighting style was represented by the Cumans. Under Louis the Great, the Cumans converted to Christianity *en masse*, and the light cavalry so popular with the Italian city-states and their chroniclers disappeared by the 15th century. The vast majority of the light cavalry were archers.²⁰⁹⁰ Attila Bárány, writing about the interplay of Hungarian and English mercenaries, analyses how the different arms complemented each other in battle «*The proper proportion of his [John Hawkwood's] company gave him an advantage on the battlefield: he did not indulge in sieges and he also benefitted from the alteration of the heavily armoured mounted cavalry in the Hungarian style into a light-armoured one for maximum mobility.*»²⁰⁹¹ Carla Corradi Musi studied the Gonzagas of Mantua who managed to survive by skilfully choosing the most advantageous alliances. «*In 1347, when Louis I of Hungary, the son of Charles Robert, was about to invade the kingdom of the two Sicilies, he had to pass through the small state of Mantua with his troops, so he made offers of friendship to the Gonzaga, who in turn were interested in establishing good relations with him, in accordance with the directives of their policy of balance.*»²⁰⁹² The most valuable part of this paper are the precise sources of the Archivio di Stato di Mantua concerning the Hungarian mercenaries in the 1360s who were in the service of Bernabò Visconti. These sources concern among others the passage of Meggyesaljai Mórócz Simon's troops toward Parma.

²⁰⁸⁹ A., Bárány, « *The Communion...* », art. cit., pp. 128-143.

²⁰⁹⁰ András Borosy, « A XI-XIV. századi magyar lovasságról », *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 1962, vol. IX, n° 2-3, pp. 119-174.

²⁰⁹¹ A., Bárány, « *The Communion...* », art. cit., pp. 131.

²⁰⁹² Carla Corradi Musi, « L'eco dell'Ungheria di Luigi I nell'Italia settentrionale - Sulla base di documenti dell'epoca », *Rivista di Studi Ungheresi*, 1990, vol. V, pp. 24-32, p. 24.

C) Mercenaries, Crusades and the Church

The last part of the literature review will be devoted to a survey of the literature on the papacy and mercenaries in the 14th century, with particular attention to the work of a French and an English historian. Norman Housley has been mentioned briefly: he has been teaching at the University of Leicester since 1991,²⁰⁹³ his research revolves around four themes:

- The systems of ideas that characterized the practice of crusading, in terms of the way the crusades were justified, preached about and revolves, as well as the various critiques and polemical exchanges that they generated
- The role of the papacy in promoting and managing crusades
- How participation in crusading expeditions was made possible in terms of leadership, shipping, finance and provisioning
- The variable popularity of the crusade and the questions of intentionality and behaviour linked to its interpretation

Norman Housley has published several studies and books examining crusades from various angles. In one of his works, analysing the relationship between crusades and medieval warfare, he devotes a study to the relationship between the Church and mercenary companies, writing about the Church's crusades against mercenary companies.²⁰⁹⁴

In 2001, Norman Housley published a book of his most important studies.²⁰⁹⁵ His studies cover all sides of the complex relationship between the church and the mercenaries, where, as it was mentioned earlier, the church has used both the carrot and the stick policy against the mercenaries. The Avignon leaders of the Papacy were both terrified of the threat posed by mercenaries in 1361 and employed them in large numbers in the decades-long struggle for control of the Papal States in Italy. Norman Housley, in one of his studies, discusses the anti-heretical crusades in Italy between 1200 and 1500.²⁰⁹⁶ Another study deals with the relationship between messianism and holy war in the same period. Two other studies discuss the relationship between frontier societies and crusades.²⁰⁹⁷ Likewise, his study of

²⁰⁹³ https://www.ae-info.org/ae/Member/Housley_Norman

²⁰⁹⁴ Norman Housley, « The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy, And the crusades, 1356–1378 », *Traditio*, vol. 38, 1982, pp. 253-280

²⁰⁹⁵ Norman Housley, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Singapore - Sydney, 2001.

²⁰⁹⁶ Norman Housley, « Politics and heresy in Italy: anti-heretical crusades, orders and confraternities, 1200-1500 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 193-208.

²⁰⁹⁷ Norman Housley, « The Eschatological Imperative: Messianism and Holy War in Europe 1260-1556 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 123-150.

the 14th century crusades in France and England also contains relevant information and interpretations.²⁰⁹⁸

The last three elements of his work are the most relevant from the point of view of this dissertation: the first one is on the history of Cyprus and the Crusades and is of particular importance for clarifying the intricate links between the preparations for the four crusades of 1365/66.²⁰⁹⁹ The second deals with the crusades of Louis I between 1342-82, one of the rare works in Western literature specifically dealing with the history of the crusades of the Angevin kingdom of Hungary, written in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, and incorporating the results of research over the last fourteen years.²¹⁰⁰ The third study of particular relevance to the subject of this dissertation is the study of the interrelations between mercenary companies, the papacy and the crusades between 1356 and 1378.²¹⁰¹ These three studies are discussed in detail in later chapters.

Another historian who has devoted much attention to the history of mercenaries active in the Papal States is Germain Butaud. His publications include a special focus on Comtat Venaissin and the Avignon area. In one of his studies he discusses the institution and practice of excommunication. Anyone who turned against the Church, who violated the peace of God, first practised in Provence, was condemned to excommunication. This was the fate of the captains of the companies who threatened Avignon in the mid-14th century. Innocent VI and the popes who followed him resorted to this means to get rid of captains such as Arnaud de Cervole. In the context of excommunications, Germain Butaud gives details of the preparations for the crusades of 1365.²¹⁰² Germain Butaud gave a detailed overview of how the towns and villages of the Comtat Venaissin, located in the territories under papal authority, responded to the threats of mercenaries during the war: *«From the middle of the 14th century onwards, these village communities had to face a new military context which required them in many ways to be in a state of defence and to face up to the men-at-arms. The inhabitants participated personally and financially in the war efforts.»*²¹⁰³

²⁰⁹⁸ Norman Housley, « France, England, and the 'National Crusade', 1302-1386 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 183-201.

²⁰⁹⁹ Norman Housley, « Cyprus and the Crusades, 1291-1571 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 187-206.

²¹⁰⁰ Norman Housley, « King Louis the Great of Hungary and the Crusades, 1342-1382 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 192-208.

²¹⁰¹ Norman Housley, « The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy, and the Crusades, 1356-1378 », in *Ibid.*, pp. 253-280.

²¹⁰² Germain Butaud, « L'excommunication des agresseurs des terres de l'Église (Avignon, Comtat-Venaissin) aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles », in Rosa Maria Dessì (ed.), *Prêcher la paix, et discipliner la société : Italie, France, Angleterre (XIII^e-XV^e siècle)*, Turnhout, 2005, pp. 225-244.

²¹⁰³ Germain Butaud, « Villages et villageois du Comtat Venaissin en temps de guerre (milieu XIV^e-début XV^e siècles) », in Christian Desplat (ed.), *Les Villageois face à la guerre (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, Toulouse, 2002, pp. 53-64.

Another study by Germain Butaud, analysing the history of mercenary captains in the Provençal civil war, shows that Avignon's relations with the mercenary companies were extremely varied: if necessary, they bought the departure of certain captains: *«Some of these warriors chose to reside for a time or to settle in the Provence region. The persistence of the war catalysed by Raymond de Turenne, but also the attractiveness of Avignon during the pontificate of Clement VII facilitated this choice. The presence of the Apostolic Chamber, Italian bankers and armourers, made it a familiar city for men-at-arms.»*²¹⁰⁴

Maurice Keen, in the introduction to his book on Medieval Warfare, explains how difficult it is to reduce the Crusades to well-defined categories of military history *«because the popes, in the course of their long struggle with the emperors for universal authority in Christendom, came often to give the status of crusader (with its formal privileges and indulgences) to those who would serve them against their imperial rivals (as also to those prepared to fight other excommunicates, heretics, or schismatics within the Christian homeland) and a crusading war can blend easily into the history of the major internal confrontations of Europe, which did so much to shape its future political map.»*²¹⁰⁵

Sharon Dale in her article presented in the Journal of Medieval History concentrates on the relationship between the Avignon papacy and the Visconti lords of Milan during the 14th century. Avignon popes generally viewed the Visconti as the major obstacle to temporal papal power in Italy and thus fashioned propaganda that demonised them. In his letter Innocent VI to Louis I of Hungary in 1360, called Bernabo Visconti *«vir pestilens, maledictionis alumnus Bernabos de Vicecomitibus.»*²¹⁰⁶ The popes found their natural allies in Florence, which reinforced the bad reputation of the Milanese lords. However, in day-to-day papal politics, relations with the Visconti were not always one-sided. Different popes regularly granted papal vicariates to the Visconti. The great political shift in traditional alliances was marked by the War of the Eight Saints in 1378. In this two-decade long political struggle for dominance in northern and central Italy between Avignon and Milan, foreign and Italian condottieri and companies were widely used. Finally, this article suggests that a re-evaluation of 14th century diplomacy might accord closer scrutiny to the role played by the Church in destabilising Italy.²¹⁰⁷

²¹⁰⁴ Germain Butaud, « Les mercenaires et les routiers actifs durant la guerre civile de Provence (1383-1388) », Guilhem Pépin et al. (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*, Bordeaux, 2016, pp. 207-226.

²¹⁰⁵ M. Keen, « Introduction... », art. cit., p. 2.

²¹⁰⁶ Odorico Raynaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. XVI, Cologne, 1691, p. 408.

²¹⁰⁷ Sharon Dale, « Contra damnationis filios: the Visconti in fourteenth-century papal diplomacy », *Journal of Medieval History*, 2007, vol. XXXI, n° 1, pp. 1-32.

In a 1951 study, Robert Brun examined the arms trade of Avignon in the 14th century, based mainly on surviving sources by Francesco di Marco Datini.²¹⁰⁸ Brun also highlights the importance of this particular collection of sources in his paper: «*These archives, which are prodigiously rich and still imperfectly explored, have provided us with precious information on the trade in art objects in the papal city.*»²¹⁰⁹ The period during which the Italian merchant was active in Avignon coincides with the threat posed by the Great Companies and the considerable fortifications and arms purchases undertaken to counter this.

Victor-Louis Bourrilly's study of the invasion of Provence in 1368 by Bertrand Du Guesclin and the Duke of Anjou analyses Pope Urban V's policy towards the mercenaries involved in the invasion. His interesting insight is that the timing of the invasion was influenced by Urban V's trip to Italy, leaving the territories of the Papal States and Provence unprotected, despite the fact that Pope Urban V was not content with excommunicating the mercenaries, but played an active role in creating an active alliance against the companies. Before setting out on his journey, he appointed officers to defend the papal state in his absence. The mercenary companies returning from Spain, with the help of Enrique of Trastámara were directly in the service of the Duke of Anjou. This study analyses the situation of the resisting towns and their relations with the companies, and the effectiveness of the papal measures taken against the invasion.²¹¹⁰

Oskar Halecki's book examines relations between Byzantium and Avignon in the light of the Ottoman threat in the 14th century. Urban V, who aimed for the unification of the Church, directed papal policy towards the idea of aid, but there was no realistic chance of unifying the Church because the Byzantine clergy never tolerated the State settling its affairs without them, especially when their independence was at stake. Thus, while outwardly the abjuration of the Basileus became the starting point for vast diplomatic action, inwardly it was the much-appreciated occasion for doctrinal struggles against which, once again, the fortunes of the empire were to be shattered. As Oscar Halecki stated that for the test imposed by the wisdom of the Popes on the good faith of the Greeks justified the old fears, the expected military aid, compromised by the troubled situation in the West, the weakening of the crusading idea and incessant conflicts of private interests, was offered belatedly, sluggishly and without coordination. This armed support was manifested in the crusade of

²¹⁰⁸ Robert Brun, « Notes sur le commerce des armes à Avignon au XIV^e siècle », *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 1951, vol. CIX, n° 2, pp. 209-231.

²¹⁰⁹ Robert Brun, « Notes sur le commerce » p. 209.

²¹¹⁰ Victor-Louis Bourrilly, « Duguesclin et le duc d'Anjou en Provence (1368) », *Revue Historique*, 1926, vol. CLII, n° 2, pp. 161-180.

Arnaud de Cervole, and in another crusade led by Amadeus VI, which ended in Bulgaria after the capture of Gallipoli.²¹¹¹

In his book on Christianity and the political relationship between the Muslim world, Tomaž Mastnak looks at the ideology behind the crusades. Traversing the interconnectedness of just war, holy war and crusade, he explores how the church has turned to the instrument of war. A separate chapter addresses the issue of the Papal States and the Crusades in the 14th century, highlighting the role of mercenaries in what he calls «*Popes fomented wars among the Christians (spending wealth on mercenary soldiers) in order that they may in the end be able to subject the faithful to their tyrannical power.*»²¹¹² Taking stock of efforts to organise the crusades of the 1360s, he notes that «*during the mid to late fourteenth century the papal monarchy and the empire were being challenged and Christendom was disintegrating, but the crusading movement did not share the fate of the world it had helped to create and whose expression it was. While the crusading movement remained relevant and popular, its character changed slightly.*»²¹¹³ According to him, three factors fundamentally determined the renewed push for crusades. The first was the plague, which led to an economic downturn in Europe, and the atrocities of war committed by mercenaries. «*The destructiveness of the bella intestina (the wars among Christians, especially the Hundred Years War) and the violence of the routiers, or “free companies” (unemployed mercenary soldiers who harassed the civilian population), were more acutely felt because of the devastating effects of the Black Death. The perception of the horrors of warfare became sharper and the attitude toward war more critical.*»²¹¹⁴ The second factor is the declining role of the papacy in organising crusades, The third factor was the rising power of the Ottoman Turks, because of which the anti-Turkish crusade emerged and grew in importance. In the second half of the 14th century the 'Turk' became the most dangerous enemy of Christianity and Christendom. When Pope Urban V appealed in 1363 to mercenary companies in the *Midi*,²¹¹⁵ hoping to recruit them for the crusade, the old and the new enemy

²¹¹¹ Oskar Halecki, *Un empereur de Byzance à Rome* (Travaux historique de la Societé des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie), vol. III, Warsaw, 1930, pp. 8-416.

²¹¹² Tomaž Mastnak, *Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World and Western Political Order*, Los Angeles, London, 2002, p. 311, n. 215.

²¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

²¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

²¹¹⁵ «*Midi, cultural region encompassing the southern French regions of Aquitaine, Languedoc, and Provence. The Midi is bounded by Spain and the Pyrenees to the south and by Italy and the Alps to the northeast. The southern flank of the Massif Central extends into Languedoc. Lowlands include the Aquitaine Basin and the plains of Languedoc and the Rhône Basin. A Mediterranean climate prevails throughout most of the Midi. The northern boundaries of the Midi roughly coincide with the limit of the cultivation of olive trees.*» <https://www.britannica.com/place/Midi-region-France>

figures made a joint appearance in his address. The *routiers* were reminded that “*both the perfidious Saracens and those cruel pagans commonly called Turks, who live in the East close to Christian peoples . . . have invaded the lands of the faithful with such force and audacity that none or few can resist them.*»²¹¹⁶

In his beautifully illustrated book, Chistopher Tyerman reviews the history of the Crusades, briefly summarising the role played in organising the 1365 crusades by experienced church officials such as Elias of Périgord, Cardinal Talleyrand, or Pierre de Thomas who «*supported by papal subsidies, had assembled a polyglot force of perhaps 10,000 at Venice, including hired troops and recruits from France, England, Scotland and Geneva. Although the papal crusade bull had not distinguished between Mamluks and Turks, the Cypriot leadership took the bold decision to attack Alexandria, Egypt’s main and massively defended port.*»²¹¹⁷

Regarding the situation in Byzantium in the mid-14th century, he notes that «*In any case, church union did not work; no grand crusade was forthcoming. Steady erosion of territory and revenue, accelerated by civil wars and the consequent presence of expensive foreign mercenaries such as the Ottomans, reduced Byzantium to military, economic and political dependency, hardly more than a client city state under Turkish sufferance or protection.*»²¹¹⁸

«*While working on these volumes, I have often thought as I do now in jotting down this preface of the shortness of human life and transitory possession of power*»²¹¹⁹ Kenneth

Setton wrote in the preface of the first book of his iconic volume of on the relation of Avignon and the Levant. The 2000 double-column pages and 4400 footnotes, the book, which covers in several chapters the four crusades that preceded and led to the capture of Gallipoli by Amadeus VI and the 1365 crusade that led to the sack of Alexandria by Peter of Lusignan. A separate chapter is devoted to the relationship between the Avignon popes and the Crusades, which he follows from the early 14th century. «*The fourteenth century began as a relatively peaceful era in the eastern Mediterranean.*»²¹²⁰ However, all that changed by the middle of the century. The «*Turkish threat to Christendom became more immediate, and therefore of more concern to the papacy yet at the same time its best sources of information on the intentions and actions of the arch-enemy were gone. So the popes were forced to seek intelligence wherever they could -from spies, travellers, undercover agents, and*

²¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

²¹¹⁷ Chistopher Tyerman, *The World of the Crusades*, New Haven - London, 2019.

²¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

²¹¹⁹ Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. I: *The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, Philadelphia, 1976, vii.

²¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

*ambassadors maintained in the west by other powers - and sift through the vast mass of data for clues on what likely to happen next. It is in this mountain of material, almost all of it unpublished, that Professor Setton has found most of the raw material for his study. And from it he has created the definitive account of the Ostpolitik, pursued by the leading Italian states of the Renaissance.»*²¹²¹

In his study, John H. Pratt attempts to prove that Chaucer's famous knight was in fact a mercenary. He details the travels of the knight mentioned in the prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*. What is interesting for the dissertation is that the knight's identifiable destinations include Alexandria and the modern Turkish city of Adelia (Satalye). Two years later, following Arnaud de Cervole's crusade, he took part in the fighting around Lajazzo (Lyeys) in 1367. In his study, John H. Pratt makes many references to the book by Terry Jones.²¹²² Finally, the author concludes that «*Chaucer's Knight is a veteran warrior of siege, open battles.»*²¹²³

John France began his chapter of the Failure and Fragmentation, 1337-1444 by stating that «*The history of the Christendom in the fourteenth century is often seen as a catalogue of disasters.»*²¹²⁴ John France concluded that «*In many ways what was happening in Spain exemplified the new forces of expansionism in Catholic Christendom»*²¹²⁵ The language of the book, John France's style, makes it easy for the reader to consume, analysing the crusades in a European context and their impact on European expansion from the high middle ages to the early modern time using illustrations, maps, timelines and a detailed list of rulers across Europe, and the Muslim world.

Joëlle Rollo-Koster takes stock of the fortifications of the city of Avignon, carried out by successive popes mainly because of the threats posed by mercenary companies. «*In the mid-1350s attacks by bands of unemployed mercenaries (the famous routiers) forced Innocent VI to initiate the construction of the new protecting walls...*»²¹²⁶

²¹²¹ Geoffrey Parker, « Kenneth M. Setton: The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571): Vol. I. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries », *European History Quarterly*, 1987, vol. XVII, pp. 367-395.

²¹²² Terry Jones, *Chaucer's Knight: Portrait of a Medieval Mercenary*, Baton Rouge, 1980.

²¹²³ John H. Pratt, « Was Chaucer's Knight Really a Mercenary », *The Chaucer Review*, 1987, vol. XII, n° 1, pp. 8-27.

²¹²⁴ John France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of the Catholic Christendom 1000-1714*, London - New York, 2005, p. 250.

²¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

²¹²⁶ Joëlle Rollo-Koster, « The Politics of Body Parts: Contested Topographies in Late-Medieval Avignon » *Speculum*, 2003, vol. LXXVIII, n° 1, pp. 66-98.

Kenneth Fowler's study, published in 2004, deals with the history of mercenaries between 1360 and 1400.²¹²⁷ His aim is to try to explain «*the main phases of foreign mercenary activity in France, Spain and Italy in the period falling between 1360 and 1400.*»²¹²⁸ He does this by concentrating on the recruitment of mercenaries, the composition and numerical strength of the companies, the contracts they sign, the excessive violence that characterised the companies, and their motivation. Of course, an inescapable element of the study is the analysis of the relationship between papal policy and the mercenaries. There were many forms of contact, ranging from excommunication, through negotiation, to armed service. More than once the popes hatched elaborate schemes to get rid of mercenaries. However, «*such attempts as were made to remove them from the realm to foreign parts, through royal and papal agency, were only partially successful.*»²¹²⁹ The paper briefly discusses two of the papacy's most successful attempts to persuade mercenaries to leave the French kingdom for the east and west in 1365. Most of the study, however, analyses the situation of the mercenaries of the companies in France, Italy and Spain in a comparative way, based on the above aspects.

²¹²⁷ Kenneth Fowler, « Great Companies, Condottieri and Stipendiary soldiers. Foreign Mercenaries in the Service of the State: France, Italy and Spain in the Fourteenth Century », in Miguel Ángel and Ladero Quesada (ed.), *Guerra y diplomacia en la Europa Occidental*, Pamplona, 2005, pp. 141-162.

²¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

²¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

Appendix 3

Source transcriptions

Archivio di Stato di Mantova Busta 48 C. 10., 12. November 1361.

In Christi nomine, amen. Anno nativitatis eiusdem millesimo trecentesimo sexagesimo primo, indictione quarta decima die Veneris duodecimo mensis Novembris, presentibus egregiis militibus domino Marsilio, condam domini Jacobi de Cavalcabobus, marchione Vitaliane, honorabili potestate civitatis Mantue, domino Zucio, condam domini Nichole de Martinellis de Burgo sancti sepulcri, domino Conradino, condam domini Petri de Caprianis de Mantua ac infrascriptis conestabilibus Teuthonicis, domino Henrico de Xendorf milite, Henrico de Scande, Anichino de Galisen, Johanne de Balghen et Durlosio omnibus testibus ad hec vocatis specialiter et rogatis. In civitate veteri Mantue in palatio infrascriptorum magnificorum dominorum dominorum Guidonis et Ugolini sito in contrata Sancti Alexandri, ibidem nos Henricus de Eglingen dictus de la Scala olim capitaneus omnium et singulorum infrascriptorum, et nos omnes et singuli infrascripti mereschalchi, consiliarii, conestabiles et caporales olim de societate et comitiva supradicti domini Henrici, nunc captivi et presonerii magnificorum dominorum dominorum Guidonis de Gonzaga et Ugolini eiusdem primogeniti Mantue et Regii pro imperiali maiestate Romana vicariorum generalium, sub nostra bona fide promittimus Crescimbeno, condam domini Franceschini de Guezis et Matheo, notario infrascripto tamquam publice persone stipulantibus et recipientibus nomine et vice magnifici domini Ugolini predicti et nomine et vice dicti magnifici domini genitoris sui et vice et nomine dominorum Ludovici et Francisci fratrum ipsius domini Ugolini, et corporaliter tactis scripturis ad sancta Dei evangelia nos iuramus in manibus dicti Crescimbeni et notarii infrascripti recipientis vice et nomine predictorum dominorum et cuiuslibet ipsorum, quod in perpetuum numquam erimus dicto, facto, opere vel consilio, nec per directum, nec per indirectum, nec per aliquem modum, qui dici vel excogitari possit, nec ulla ratione vel causa contra et adversus dictos dominos Guidonem et Ugolinum, Ludovicum et Francischum vel aliquem ipsorum, nec contra filios et heredes aliquos predictorum vel alicuius ipsorum neque contra aliquos, qui subditi, fautores, sequaces vel adherentes essent ad presens vel in futurum fuerint dictorum dominorum Guidonis et Ugolini, Ludovici et Francisci vel alicuius ipsorum, sed semper ipsos dominos Guidonem et

Ugolinum ac dominos Ludovicum et Francischum fratres ipsius domini Ugolini habebimus et reputabimus nostros dominos, nec contra gentes, capitaneum vel officialem, nec contra insignia ipsorum vel alicuius eorum unquam aliqua arma feremus, imo dictas gentes, capitaneum vel officialem et dicta eorum insignia pro posse nostro curabimus defensare, nec aliqua dampna vel molestias inferemus, nec inferri faciemus in personis vel rebus subditis, fautoribus, sequacibus vel adherentibus dictorum dominorum vel alterius ipsorum, nec eorum dominorum civitatibus, castris vel villis nunc vel in futurum possessis vel possidendis per ipsos dominos vel alterum ipsorum nec castris, personis, subditis, villis vel locis ad presens vel in futurum possessis vel possidendis per dictos fautores, sequaces vel adherentes vel alterius ipsorum.²¹³⁰

²¹³⁰ Transcription finalised by Renáta Visegrádi

Archives départementales du Nord B. 757. 8060. (Transcription detail f.1)

Item, ledit Monsieur RIFFLAIT et plusieurs de sa compaignie se sont plusieurs foiz transportée et demoréz en la ville de Dippe. Les habitantz de laquelle ville li donnirent cent bischez de froment, deux centz bischez advene, vint et quatre tonneaux de vin, deux cenz frans, et gastéz les bléz et les vins dudit Monsieur, et en oultre gaste et despendu en la dicte ville envoirons deux cenz et cinquante frans, dom le lieutenant dudit receveur de Nyvernoys est tenuz et obligié du commandement dudit Monsieur RIFFLAIT. Item, ledit Monsieur RIFFLAIT estanz on dit pais, par luy, les chevaliers estanz en sa compaignie et plusieurs chevaliers du pais, fut délibéré, que le chastel de Arche seroit achapté des Bertons qui le tenoient se par aucun petit pris l'on le pavoit avoir pour la doubte ou pour cause des compaignies qui estoient envoirons le pais, qui estoient aliéz es Bertons qui tenoient la dite forteresse, si comme fut rapporté au dit Monsieur RIFFLAIT, et à ceulx de sa dite compaignie par Monsieur GAULTIER dessoubz la tour, et Monsieur Jehan de BILLY. Amprès laquelle délibéracion ledit Monsieur RIFFLAIT, Monsieur GAULTIER et aucuns autres chevaliers, composirent et accordièrent aux ditz Bertons à cause du dit fort à la somme de quatre mile et troys centz frans et en oultre promist à luy saisy ung des Bertons du dit fort de Arche que de certaines demandes que il faisoit au Seigneur de Saillenay, comme gouverneur de Au[xeur]rays et les habitantz d'ycelluy pais ilh faroit et procureroit faire raison et jouir de son droit sans la délibéracion du gouverneur de Nivernoys, de Monsieur Jehan BERNAIGE et du conseil du dit Monsieur et sanz le consentement des plus grans et notables chevaliers du dit Pais de Nyvernoys pour quoy les diz chevaliers ne veulent consentir que le subsidie ordene pour la dite finance fere soit auculnement levé en leur terre.

Item, lou dit traicté fait, ledit Monsieur RIFFLAIT se déppartit du pais, et lessa Monsieur Jehan BERNAIGE pour faire lever ladite finance sur ledit pais, lequel incontinent fist assembler le conseil et des plus soussignés et notables de ladite ville de Neverz, lesquelx assembléz, et grant deliberacion heue ne peurent veoir que lever se pehust sur le Pais de Ma Dame ne de Monsieur, pour quoy fut rescript en continant au dit Monsieur RIFFLAIT par le dit Monsieur JehanBERNAIGE que se il ne faisoit avant son département, que le Pais et villes de la Chairté, de Berze, la terre du Conté d'Estampes et la Terre de Maisse et de Naunay qui ne sont mie obéissent au dit Monsieur, contribuassent à la dite finance, elle ne porroit auculnement estre ordenée, ne levée sur les diz pais de Ma Dame et de Monsieur ou se il ne fasoit et procuroit finances promptement pour faire la plus grand partie du dit paiement ne il ne pourroit tenir ne acomplir ce que promis avoit, lesquelles villes et Pais

aucunement ny heut contribué ne ne les ha le dit Monsieur Jehan B BERNAGE pehu contraindre pour tant qu'elles ne sont mie de la obéissance dudit Monsieur.

Item, depuys le département du dit Monsieur RIFFLAIT, le dit Monsieur Johan BERNAGE et ses genz demore mout agréablement et cortoisement sur le Pais, et la plus grant partie du temps avesqu du sien. Quar ledit receveur de Monsieur ne li ha pehu ne ne pavoit faire aucune finance sur ledit Monsieur, ne autrement et a fait et fait faire par luy et ses genz toute diligence de lever et cuillir la dite finance sur le Pais du dit Monsieur et de ses subgiez mais en Plat Pais rien n'a pehu estre levé tant pour la povreté des habitanz, tant pour l'empeschement que les Bretons de Flory fasoient qui continuellement corioient et encore corent le Pais, comme pour ce que la mèrepartie des nobles du Pais n'on volu consentir ne souffrir que aucune chose en feust levée en leur terres pour ce que il n'avoient mie consenti la somme promise qui leur samble estre très grant et excessive et dient que avant la venue du dit Monsieur RIFFLAIT l'ong ehut ehu les deux foiz de Arche et de Flory pour troys mile se le Pais les eust pehu paier, et pour ce que le dit Monsieur Johan BERNAGE n'avoit plus doin il ne ses genz peust vivre ne demorer on dit Pais, ne lever ne assambler ladite finence, ne n'avoit poissance de resister aux diz Bretons Il va convenir que il s'en soit partis du dit Pais, quar le terme du paiement estoit passé et les diz Bretons corioient le dit Pais.

Archives municipales de Metz EE7, 1366 Quittances pour services

Je Henris de Pinteville escuiers fais savoir et cognissant à tous que li Maistres eschevins, li trezes juréz et toute li communiteis de la citeit de Mes m'ont bien salt et paieit de touz lez solz et gaiges et de tout ceu enthierement qu'il me devoient et poient devoir pour tous lez servixes que je leur ai fait mi tiers de glanes on tempz de la werre qu'il ont eut encontre Willame Ponloize com dit palleniant et encontre sez aidans. Et ancor de toutes perdes de chivalz et de hernex d'armes, que je et mez compaignons et noz magnieez avons eut perdu on servixe lez dis de Mes pour le fait et cause de ladicte werre. Et ancor de toutez autrez choses quelconques dont li diz de Mes estoient et poeint estre tenuz à moi et à mez diz compaignons pour le fait et cause de la werre dessus dicte. Et n'en puix ne ne doi je ni autres pour moi ne por mez diz compaignons de toutez ses choses dessus dictes. Az dis de Mes ni à autres pour eaulz jamaix de nous pu ne ne mant demander ne reclamer ains en acquite bien dès maintenant pour tousjours maix pour moi et pour mez dis compaignons lez dis de Mez et tous autres a an quitence en appartient à faire. En tesmoignaige de veriteit ai, je Henris de Pinteville escuiers dessus diz, mis mon seel en ces presentes lettres, que furent faites l'an de graice Nostre Seigneur mil trois cens etsexante seix.

Archives municipales de Kayzersberg n. 6.

Wir, Karl von gots gnaden roemischer kûnig ze allen ziten merer des richs, und kûnig ze Beheim. Erbieten den | wisen lûten, dem schultheißen, den burgermeistern, dem rate und den burgern gemeinlich unserre stette ze Keyzersperg | unsern und des richs lieben getrüwen unser gnade und alles gut. Umb die veste stetikeit als wir wol vernomen | hant und die gantze begirde, die ir zu uns und dem rich hant, und noch fûrbas des wir uch getrüwen haben | soellent. So bekennen wir und gelobent uch, mit ûrkunde dis buches, das wir uch, noch unser und des riches | stat noch burg ze Keyzersperg, von den andern unsern stetten ze Aelsaz, von Colmar, von Steltzstat, von Aehenheim, | von Mu^elnhusen, von Mu^enster und von Tûrenkein, inn pfandes wis niemanne versezen sollen, noch von in, in deheine | weg su^enderen sollen, wand das ir under uns und dem rich und bi den vorgenanten unsern stetten bliben sollent | und uns und unserm lantvogt den wir uch und den andern stetten gemeinlichen, einen herren von dem lande | ze Aelsas geben wollen, undertenig und gehorsam wesen sollent mit allen sachen, als ir von reht sollent jze | ûrkûnde so geben wir uch disen brief versigelt mit unserm kûniglichen ingesiegel. Geben ze Hagenûwe | an sant Lnoren tag, nach Cristes gebu^ert drûzehenhûndert und syben und vierrzigt jar in dem andern jar unserre rich.

Per dominum Johannes Nonifor.... ad relationem domini cancellarii

Archives municipales de Sélestat AA 98.

Wir die burgermeistere, die rête, die burger und die gemeinden gemeinliche, der stette Colmer und Sletzstat, tünd kunt allen den die disen brief sehent oder ho^erent lesen. Daz wir durch nutz und notdurft, der selben unsrer stette, und der gemeinden gemeinlich, umb sunder frûntschafft, uns zû samem hant verbunden, enander ze ratende und ze helfende getruwelich, wider aller mengelichem, usgenomen unsern gnedigen herren den keyser sinen vicarien des richs, unsern lant vogt, und die buntniß und gelûbde, die vor disem tage, von uns sint geschehen, mit des richs stetten, und mit dem lantfriden zu Elsaß. Und sol dirre bunt weren hinnant untz zû unsrer frôwen tag, der erren nû nehest und dannanthin ûber zwey jar, die nehesten, in der wis, und mit den stûcken, alz hie noch mit worten underscheiden stat. Des ersten so ist beret, das wir die vorgenannten von Colmer us unserm rate, dar hant geben zwene, das ist her Walther Schulth ritter und meister Andres Gloggener, und wir die von Sletzstat öch zwene von unserm rate verwart der alt vogt von richenwir und Hans Hombûrge dem men spricht Blopolzthein. und sol ie die stat ein viertel iares einen fûnftman haben. Daz ist von der von Colmer wegen Claus Egelolf, und von der von Sletzstat wegen, Hans Botzheim. Und sullent wir die von Colmer, dis erst viertel iares unsern fûnftman han, und daz ander vo^ertel iares, die von Sletzstat den iren, und denne ie ein stat noch der andern, iegeliche ein viertel iares daz zil uß. Unt hant öch die viere und die zwene fûnftman, an den heiligen gesworn, daz reht ze sprechende, umb die sache, die von uns fûr sû werdent braht. Und sùllent bi dem selben eÿde weder durch lieb, durch miete, noch durch miet... nût sprechen denne das reht ietweder stat, alz verre sû sich vorstant âne geverde. Und ist daz under uns den vorgenannten zwein stetten, in disen ziln, deheim not oder gebreste âne gat, we oder von wem daz dar kême, dar umb sol und mag die selbe stat, die also gebresten hette, der andern stat versterben, und sû manen, daz sû unverzôgenlich, ire zwene, die sû dar gebe hant, und den fûnften ob sû den zû der zit, in irre stat sùllent han, dar schiken, und so^ent die selben bi iren eÿden unverzôgenlich do hin riten. Und sol die stat die alsus gebrest oder ... ane gat, den fûnfen iren bresten fûrlegen, und sont die fûnf daz fûr sich nemen, und dar umb in den nehesten zwein dagen han erkant, waz sû dunket daz reht sie alz verre sû sich verstant, es were denne, daz sû es sus, mit der klagenden stat willen übertragen möhtent. Und was die fûnfe oder der merre teil under in erkennt, daz der klagende stat ze tûnde ze helfende, oder ze ratende sie, mit uszôgen und mit allen sachen, daz sont wir die vorgenannten zwo stette beÿdersit bi geswornen eÿden getruwelich vollefûren, âne alles ander erkennen alz verre, wir mûgent âne hinderung und âne geverde. Were aber, daz der vieren oder der fûnften, daheiner uf soliche zit nût heime were, oder vor libes not ...t dar zû möht komen so mag die stat andere dar zû schicken, an des oder an der stat, die sû denne do haben sollent unverzôgenlich, und sùllent die oder der, die dar zû geschiket werdent öch sweren daz reht ze

sprechende in die wis alz vorbescheiden stat, und und des maht han zû erkennende, waz der, oder die, der men denne brêsten hette soltent tûn âne geverde. Were oder daz in disen ziln de-

heiner stat, under uns not oder gebreste an gevallen were, und daz vor dem zil, so dirre bunt usgat nût berihtet were, dar umb sûllent wir doch, nach dem zû enander behelfen sin

noch der vorgenannten fûnfer erkennen oder des merre teilz under in âne geverde. Wir sint öch des mit enander überein komen. Waz ie die stat zölle under uns het, von unserm herren dem keyser

oder von dem vicarien, die ir burger und selder selber gent, die zölle sol öch die ander stat und die iren da geben, âne widerrede. Was aber ietweder stat andere zölle uf setzent oder

hant, die sû noch ir burger selber nût gent, die sol öch die ander stat noch die iren nût geben. Were öch daz einre von Colmer, deheins gûtes ze Sletzstat ze erbe kôme, oder

einre von Sletzstat deheins gûtes zû Colmer ze erbe kôme. Wa daz erbe do vellet, in der stat sol der dem es vellet, reht nemmen und geben. Alz der stat reht denne ist ân geverde.

Ist öch daz ieman von einer stat in die ander zûhet, waz sache sich da vor an erhebt het, oder ergangen, dar umb sol er reht nemmen. In der stat dannan er getzogen ist, und

mag men öch die sachen wol fûrbringen mit den lûten, dannan er ist getzogen. In weler stat under uns zwein stetten, ein man oder ein wip sitzet mit der besten husere

da sol er öch reht nemmen und geben, und sol in daz nût schirmen, ob er in der andern stat burger oder selderen würde âne geverde. Wie öch wir die vorgenannten von Colmer, unser usburger

haltent, daz hant wir den fûnfen versterben geben, also sûllent öch die von Sletzstat die iren usburger halten, woltend aber sû iren burgern fûrbaß helfen, dar umb sûllen

wir die von Colmer, inen umbeholfen sin, wir tetind ob denne gerne. Und umb ander sache und stûcke so ie die stat, von reht oder von gewonheit ist, die nût hie be-

griffen sint, daz sol ie der stat behalten sin âne geverde. Und alsus so hant wir zû beýdensiten, an den heiligen gesworn, disen bunt und alle die versterben ding zû hal-

tende und getruwelich zû volle fûrende âne aller slahte gewerden. Dar ûber zû eim steten urkûnde, han wir die vorgenannten zwo stette, Colmer und Sletzstat dirre

briefe zwene, do iede stat einen sol haben mit unsern ingsigeln besigelt, an sant Jacobus tag, des heiligen zweif botten, in dem jar do men zelt noch Gottes ge-

bûrt, tusent drû hundert sehtzig und siben jar

Archivio di Stato di Firenze Diplomatico, Riformagioni atti pubblici, 9 Giugno 1365

Urbanus episcopus servus servorum dei dilectis filiis prioribus artium ac vexillifero iusticiae necnon regimini ac communi civitatis Florentinensis salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.

Sicut iam venit in publicam notionem carissimus in Christo filius Carolus Romanorum imperator semper augustus et Boemie rex, tanquam princeps Christianissimus, nuper ad apostolicam

sedem accedens nobis sui sancti propositi quod habet ad pacem et tranquillitatem totius populi Christiani et ad depressionem infidelium, exaltationemque Catholice fidei archana detexit

nosque cum ipso super hiis, votis ardentibus concurrentes et pluries conferentes, communi voluntate decrevimus, ut ad pravarum comitivarum devastantium nonnullas partes ecclesie et im-

perii Romani totalem exterminationem prius efficaciter intendatur, ita quod voluntarie pergant vel cogantur invite ad partes Turcharum vel aliorum infidelium poficisci, et ad hoc nos et

prefatus imperator mutuam fecimus unionem. Igitur cum tantum tamque pium et necessarium negocium civitatem vestram Florentinensem non parum contingat tam nos quam idem imperator

scribimus dilecto filio Andrayno tt. sancti Marcelli presbytero cardinali apostolice sedis legato, quod nos et alios nobiles communia civitatum ac magnates et gubernatores terrarum partium Ita-

lie, ex parte utriusque nostrum requirat, ad certum super hoc habendum in civitate Bononiensi colloquium, in quo per rpm legatum, nomine ecclesie, ac per nuncios vestros, et aliorum

requirendorum ad hoc mandatum habentes, fiat colligatio contra societates easdem, idemque [im]perator in hoc negotio, presertim si dicte comitive ire voluerint extra mare, tale obtu

lit auxilium, quod congruum extimamus. Quare sinceritatem vestram requirimus et roga[mus] attente quatinus cum per dictum legatum ad hoc fueritis requisiti, vestros nuntios, cum

sufficienti mandato, ad huiusmodi colloquium, pro dicta facienda colligatione transmittere
[facia]atis. Datum Avinioni V Idus Junii pontificatus nostri anno tertio

Archivio di Stato di Firenze Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera Uscita 13 f. 33v

Niccholo Chimenti, unghero, chonostabile d'otto chavalieri, la sua persona computata, condotto al soldo del chomune per quattro mesi inchominciati di XXIII di marzo prossimo passato per suo salaro e pagha e de detti chavalieri del primo mese della detta sua condotta a ragione di flor(ini) XVI d'oro al mese per lo detto chonostabile e flor(ini) VIII d'oro il mese per ciaschuno de detti chavalieri monta al detto mese in som(m)a flor(ini) LXXII d'oro (*segue d(enari) Il depennato*) a ragione di f(iorini) III soldi VIII denari I al flor(ino) d'oro monta

Archivio di Stato di Firenze Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera Uscita 18 f. 45v

Dandragio da Sala, unghero, conostabole de X cavalieri ungheri la sua persona computata condotto al soldo del comune per IIII mesi incominciati a dì IIII del presente mese di dicembre per suo salario e paga e de detti cavalieri del primo mese della sua condotta Sincominciato a dì detto a ragione di fior(ini) XVI d'oro per lo conostabole e fiorini otto d'oro per ciaschuno de detti altri cavalieri il mese ebbe in somma fior(ini) LXXXVIII d'oro de moneta vaglono l(i)b(re) III, soldi VI il fiorino

Abbreviations

- Monumenta Militaria Hungariae database: MMH
- Archives départementales de l'Aube: ADA
- Archives municipales de Colmar: AMC
- Archives départementales de Côte d'Or: ADCO
- Archivio di Stato di Firenze: ASF
- Archives municipales de Haguenau: AMH
- Archives municipales de Lyon: AML
- Archivio di Stato di Mantova: ASM
- Archives municipales de Metz: AMM
- Archives départementales de la Meuse: ADM
- Archives municipales de Nancy: AMN
- Archivo Real y General de Navarra: ARGN
- Archives départementales du Nord: ADN
- Archivio di Stato di Pisa: ASP
- Archives départementales du Rhône et de la métropole de Lyon: ADRML
- Archives municipales et communautaires de Reims: AMCR
- Archives de la Ville et l'Eurométropole de Strasbourg: AVES
- Archives départementales du Tarn: ADT
- Archivio di Stato di Torino: AST
- Archivio Apostolico Vaticano: AAV
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