Theses of doctoral (PhD) dissertation

CRISIS AND REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES: RE-CLUSTERING

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1. Preliminaries and Motivation of the Dissertation

It is quite difficult to define welfare states but we may summarise the notion as welfare states ‘are committed to the material and intellectual »well-being« (good state of health, modern education and employability in the modern economy, work capacity, and adequate housing and food) of their citizens, and for this purpose, they actively intervene in the economic processes’ (Szabó [2000] p. 209). In this paper I use the term ‘welfare state’ primarily for the developed industrial economies. This geographic limitation is appropriate for two reasons: first, the term ‘welfare state’ is used to apply for that group of countries, and on the other hand, the literature of state intervention aimed at the welfare area is also mainly related to them (Csaba – Tóth [1999] p. 7). The paper primarily examines the Western European welfare states in the group of developed countries. Nevertheless, the discussed theories – with taking into consideration the system specific differences – can be applied to the other regions, and in some cases, it is necessary to include countries from other regions into the analysis.

Views on the role, extensiveness, and ideal size of welfare states flare up time after time in both the public opinion and the politics and the literature, and provoke intense debates. Mainstream standpoints about this issue have transformed significantly during the last half-century.

After World War II, welfare spending has expanded due to the economic boom. This expansion continued until the recession after the oil crises when governments incrementally adopted the monetarist doctrines and cut back public spendings, especially social benefits. After that time, contradictions of the welfare state have gradually emerged, and the sustainability of the welfare state has become the most pressing question in the post-industrial and ageing societies in the era of globalisation. Despite these challenges, welfare state has survived, although different countries have shown changes of different sizes and directions. However, the question is in what form, size and institutional composition the welfare state can be sustained in the long run.

European welfare regimes show significant differences. Each country goes along different ways of development that leaves a mark on today’s politics, too. Yet, the large number of literature on the models (regimes, types) of welfare states confirm the fact that

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1 See among others: Titmuss [1958], Wilensky – Lebeaux [1965], Esping-Andersen [1990] and [1999]. Some authors tried to identify the ideal typology of welfare states, e.g. Ragin [1994], Kangas [1994], Obinger –
certain countries are different from each other at a less extent. In fact, they possess numerous institutional components that are linked systematically, and have resulted in different 'logics' of development, and this way, similar range of reforms are in focus in countries classified into one type (Ferrera – Hemerijck – Rhodes [2006]).

Welfare states of different type have reacted to the same challenges of globalisation and ageing differently. One aim of the dissertation is to examine if different types show a convergence as a result of these challenges or not. For this examination as a startpoint I use the typology of European welfare states confirmed by the most of the authors (see among others: Abrahamson [1991], Leibfried [1992], Ferrera [1996], Bonoli [1997], Boeri [2002], Sapir [2005], Pabst [2009]) that works with four types instead of the classical three types by Esping-Andersen, dividing the Corporatist-statist group into two types:

a) Nordic (or Scandinavian) states (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway) have the highest level of social spendings and universal welfare benefits (majority of the benefits is based on citizenship). These governments intervene in the labour market by extensive fiscal measures, based on 'active' labour market policies (they try to channel back the unemployed people to the labour market by trainings and other programmes). They have a high level of public employment, and due to the strong labour unions dispersion of wages is low. Social spendings to GDP ratio is relatively high and it is financed primarily by taxes. This group is corresponding to the Social-democratic group by Esping-Andersen.

b) Anglo-Saxon (or British) countries (Ireland, United Kingdom) stand the closest to the Beveradgean tradition, majority of social assistance works only as the last resort. Financial transfers primarily target people of working age. Activation measures are as important as the regular work which provides conditional access to the benefits. This model is characterised by weak labour unions, relatively high and increasing wage differences, and the occurrence of the

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2 This typology is used in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.

3 Although a lot of typology occurred in the 1990s (see e.g. Arts – Gelissen [2002]), as Abrahamson [2002] notes, in some cases the authors only denominated the regimes that had been identified previously.

4 The approach of Mediterranean countries as a particular regime type is disagreed by Esping-Andersen [1999] and Katrougalos [1996]. They think that these countries can only be seen as a sub-category or variant of the Conservative regime as these relatively lower developed countries are only common in their immature social security systems and some similar social and family structures (Katrougalos [1996] p. 43).
relatively low-wage employment. Social spending to GDP ratio is relatively low, and it is financed mainly by taxes. This type corresponds to the Liberal type by Esping-Andersen.

c) Continental (or Bismarckian) countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands\(^5\) and Luxembourg) increasingly rely on insurance-based benefits not tied to employment, and on old-age pensions. Employment protection here is stronger than in the Nordics so dismissal is more costly. Benefits are financed by contributions paid after work income, in accordance with the Bismarckian traditions. Labour unions are strong in these countries despite their decreasing membership as the scope of the collective bargainings is also extended to non union issues. Corporatism (i.e. tripartit negotiations between the government, the representation of interests of employers, and the labour unions) is an important part of the institutional framework of social dialogue. Social spending to GDP ratio is relatively high, and spending is primarily financed by contributions. This group – with the next, Mediterranean type – gives the Corporatist-statist type by Esping-Andersen.

d) Mediterranean (or Southern or Latin) countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) concentrate their social spendings on pensions, and they allow the high level segmentation of the entitlements and status. Welfare system aims at the protection of employment and the early retirement (and this leads to the low level of employment) in order to support the group of working age to participate in the labour market. Influence of labour unions has been preserved by the artificially extended scope of collective bargainings. Wage structure (at least in the formal sector) is determined by collective bargainings, and wage differentials are low. Social system is mainly financed by contributions, and social spendings to GDP ratio is relatively low.

One direction of challenges facing welfare states is the globalisation accelerating in the last decades. The other aim of the paper is to explore the role of globalisation in the transformation of welfare states. Views on the relationship between globalisation and welfare state can be classified into three schools. The first is often referred to as the globalist school (representatives are among others Scholte [1997], Rodrik [1998], Scharpf [2000], Genschel [2004]) which holds that internationalisation of the economy threatens the welfare state. According to this school welfare state intervenes where market fails but this can only be done if it is not exposed to the pressure of the market forces itself. However, globalisation circumvents this condition because welfare state increasingly has to face international

\(^5\) According to some authors The Netherlands is an intermediate between the Scandinavian and the Continental models and has recently moved to the direction of Nordics.
competition and this is why globalisation inevitably undermines its viability and efficiency. The predicted result will be the rollback of the welfare state and international convergence around minimalist competition state structures (Genschel [2004] p. 615). In contrast to the minority 'hyperglobalists' (Ohmae [1995], Horsman – Marshall [1994]) who predict the end of the national state, according to the 'moderate globalists' (or 'constraint' school) globalisation definitely impose a restrictive constraint on the state and even if it will not cease, eventually it will be transformed.

The approach of globalisation as a constraint began to attract criticism from a second school, the globalisation sceptics\(^6\). According to them globalisation is not as intense as the globalist school states. National economies are much more dependent on each other than in the recent past (but not necessarily more than a century ago). They see neither theoretical reason nor empirical evidence to believe that an increase in international economic interdependence restricts national policy autonomy: the welfare state has not shrunk in size (Genschel [2004] pp. 615-616). So sceptics state that globalisation has only limited impact on the welfare state (Weiss [2003] pp. 13-14).

The third stream, the revisionist school has claimed that the troubles of the welfare state are largely self-inflicted. In the last decades generous social programmes has reached their maturity: they are characterised by high replacement ratios and they cover the vast majority of the population. This way they constantly put pressure on the public budgets (Ferrera – Rhodes [2000] p. 259). Globalisation, far from causing these troubles, is one of their consequences and part of their solution. The disciplinary power of international markets helps governments to check the vicious dynamics of welfare policy and thus contributes towards saving the welfare state from itself (Genschel 2004:616).

2. Structure and Methodology of the Dissertation

The introductory chapter of the dissertation presents the basic problem, the resulting research questions and hypotheses which are answered in the following chapters. In order to clarify the conceptual apparatus, the next chapter reviews the emergence, the definition and types of the welfare state. Typologies introduced here form the basis of the subsequent chapter about the first research questions. Chapter 3 empirically analyses the convergence of the different welfare state types, i.e. it looks for the answer for the first, main research question. As an actuality, this chapter includes an outlook to the impact of the crisis beginning in 2008 on the welfare states. In chapter 4 I address the basic contradiction of the welfare state by study the relevant literature, including the theories about the relationship between the welfare state and the globalisation. In the following chapter I examine the second research question, i.e. the views on the relationship between the globalisation and the welfare state using the example of two welfare states (Sweden and France) of different types. The dissertation is ended with some conclusions; the last chapter includes the answers for the research questions and the main statements. The appendix of the dissertation contains the statistical data related to the empirical research.

It arises from the above that the dissertation is basically built on three methods. The first research question is examined by literature analysis and with a quantitative statistical method. I use agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis with the empirically most reliable and most common Ward method. To answer the second research question beside the analysis of the literature, I prepared and present two case studies about the two chosen countries.
3. Research Questions and Hypotheses of the Dissertation

As it was mentioned before, European welfare states from different types have reacted differently to the same challenges. This results in the first, main research question:

*Research Question 1: Do the different welfare regimes converge and can be expected the emergence of a unified welfare state?*

Hypothesis: In case of certain welfare state types we can observe the convergence to some extent but the differences survive in the long run.

Some of the literature identifies the globalisation as one of the challenges facing welfare states, while others are sceptic about this point of view. This contradiction results in the second research question of the dissertation:

*Research Question 2: What is the role of the globalisation in the crisis and reforms of the Western European welfare states?*

Hypothesis: Globalisation has been one underlying cause of the reforms in Western Europe, it appears as a constraint to which welfare states have to adopt.
4. Empirical Research

To examine the main research question let’s accept Esping-Andersen’s [1990] three classic welfare state types (Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Continental) with the complement made by Abrahamson [1991], Leibfried [1992], Ferrera [1996] and Bonoli [1997] and adopted by Boeri [2002], Sapir [2005] and Pabst [2009], i.e. they use a fourth type (South-European). This typology can be expressively introduced if we put the welfare states in a coordinate system with the two dimensions of efficiency and equity. According to Sapir [2005] a model can be regarded as efficient if it provides enough incentives to work and hence shows relatively high employment rates; while it can be equitable if it keeps the risk of poverty at a low level.

The situation before the economic crisis (in the early 2000s) fits fully to this quadripartite typology (see Figure 1). Both Nordic and Continental states are above average according to the likelihood of avoiding poverty, while all Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries are under the average. According to the efficiency Nordic and Anglo-Saxon states performed well, while Continental and Southern countries operated with low efficiency.

![Figure 1](Typology of the four models)


Figure 1 also shows the sustainability of the models. Non effective models are not sustainable because of the increasing tension between the expenditure and the revenue side of the government budget that originates from globalization, technological changes and ageing of the population. There are several signs that the least efficient Continental and

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7 Probability of escaping poverty can be measured by 1 – poverty rate, where poverty rate is the share of persons in the population living under 60% of the national median disposable income.
Mediterranean states have faced several sustainability barriers. One of these barriers is the government debt to GDP ratio that was much higher in the Continental and Mediterranean states (79% and 81%) than in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic ones (36% and 49%). On the other side, the models that are not equitable can be perfectly sustainable if they are efficient. The reason behind this is that the equity of a social model shows a viable political choice (Sapir [2005]).

This suggests that both the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon models were sustainable, while the Continental and the Mediterranean ones were not and need reforms to increase their efficiency via the reduction of counter incentives to work and growth. At the same time we have no reason to assume a priori that these kinds of reforms go hand in hand with changes in equity. As we will see soon, it is entirely possible (and in fact it has occurred – however, in the later case it is in the opposite direction than expected) that the Continental model becomes similar to the Nordic and the Mediterranean becomes similar to the Anglo-Saxon type. Yet, we can not reject the possibility that the reform can cause changes in equity if the move in the direction of efficiency affects the previous political balance.

Regarding the actual efficiency/equity data we can conclude that Nordic and Southern models have kept their previous position: the former is still both efficient and equitable, while the later does not show either efficiency or equity. But the other two types are much more interesting: the position of Anglo-Saxon countries has worsened and they have moved near the Southern countries (however, they show a more advantageous position than the Mediterranean states in both of the two dimensions). Continental states have approached the Nordic countries, they have not stepped fully, however, to the most advantageous cell. Regarding only the efficiency dimension, the two types (i.e. the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental) have approached each other; moreover, they have reversed: Continental countries are more effective than Anglo-Saxon ones (see Figure 2). We also have to note that the standard deviation within the different types is much greater, and between the types is much lesser now than one decade ago.

At the same time, changes can be explained in two ways. One of them is the previous logic: we assume that the previous Sapirian typology is still valid, only the types have changed during time. However, there is another possible explanation: borders of the types have loosened, the previous types are not held any more – or they are only held partly, and we should think about the welfare states in the efficiency/equity coordinate system in another
typology. This can be assumed even more as a regrouping can increase within group homogeneity and between group heterogeneity\(^8\).

**Figure 2**

**Revised typology**

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*Notes: Direction of the arrows show the direction of the moves, and their relative size shows the relative size of the moves.*

The quadripartite typology introduced above was originally based on the qualitative examination of social security policies but its validity was quantitatively proved by several authors\(^9\), among others by *Saint-Arnaud and Bernard* [2003] for the years 1980s and 1990s. The authors made cluster analysis with variables of social situation, public policies and political participation to validate the previous qualitative typology and the ‘resilience’ of welfare regimes (i.e. their persistence for a long period of time). Their model proved to be stable; the analysis made with the full set and with each groups of variables resulted in the same typology.

By repeating the analysis with newer data we can answer the question above: *is the quadripartite typology valid yet? Can the same countries be classified into the same type?*

To decide this dilemma hierarchical cluster analysis is the most appropriate quantitative analytical tool because it allows us to classify similar countries according to several variables. This method can be agglomerative, when first each case forms one unique cluster and in each step we aggregate the nearest clusters; or it can be divisive, where first all cases are in one cluster which is divided until each case forms a unique cluster.

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\(^8\) As it was mentioned before, standard variation within the different types is much greater, and between the types is much lesser now than one decade ago that means that within group heterogeneity and between group homogeneity has increased.

\(^9\) See e.g. *Obinger – Wagschal* [2001].
At the beginning I used the same 20 countries and the same variables as Saint-Arnaud – Bernard [2003] to be able to compare my results to theirs\textsuperscript{10}. Because of the scales with different magnitude, variables had to be standardized\textsuperscript{11}. I made agglomerative cluster analysis, and I used the most widely accepted Ward method which proved to be the most reliable empirically. This method measures the similarity of clusters with the square of the Euclidian distance and within the cluster it minimizes this distance so maximizes the homogeneity of the clusters (Sajtos – Mitev [2007]).

The dendrogram in Figure 3 shows the created clusters. It is worth to stop after step 16 when 3 clusters are formed (if we stopped before this step, one or more clusters would contain only one element). One of the three clusters is fully identical to the social-democratic type (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland). However, the other two clusters do not exactly corresponds to Esping-Andersen’s other two types. The Netherlands and Belgium exited corporatist-statist type and entered the liberal type. Therefore the former group contains Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, while the later includes Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, the USA, and Australia.

To use the results of cluster analysis for rethinking the original classification, I have also made a second analysis. In this second cluster analysis I excluded states outside Europe as the original efficiency/equity coordinate system contained only European welfare states. Because of the same reason I excluded Iceland, too. I used the same variables in this analysis as in the previous one\textsuperscript{12}.

\textsuperscript{10} I excluded the variable which showed very strong (higher than 0.9) correlation with another one (correlation between female labour participation rate and overall participation rate is 0.976 at 1% significance level) because without this exclusion one given factor could enter the analysis with double weigh. Furthermore because of the missing data in case of some countries I had to omit the variables of subsidies and investments as % of total government outlays, public expenditure on training as % of GDP, daily newspaper read per 1000 people, and number of years since the first law on family allowances. However, because Saint-Arnaud – Bernard [2003] proved the robust characteristic of their model in case of any randomly omitted variable, this reduction do not affect the final result of the analysis. For the rest of variables (30 pieces) see Appendix 1 of the dissertation. This table includes all of the variables from the original model; the italic variables are used in this analysis.

\textsuperscript{11} For standardization I used Z scores: \( Z = \frac{x - \mu}{\sigma} \).

\textsuperscript{12} Again, I had to exclude female labour participation rate (correlation between female labour participation rate and overall participation rate is 0.974 at 1% significance level), but due to the broader availability of data for European states, I only had to exclude the variable of public expenditure on training as % of GDP, and daily
Dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis (20 countries, 30 variables)

![Dendrogram](image)

The dendrogram in Figure 4 shows the created clusters. It is worth to stop after step 11 when 4 clusters are formed (if we stopped before this step, some clusters with 2-3 elements theoretically difficult to support would be created). If we went on by one step, we would get three clusters, and interestingly Continental (supplemented by Italy) and Anglo-Saxon type would form one cluster. So we can see that the approach of these two types demonstrated in the previous simple efficiency/equity model exists examining a broader set of variables, too.

One of the re-created four clusters is fully identical to the Nordic type (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark). Italy exited the Southern type (Portugal, Spain, and Greece remained there) and moved into the Continental type (beside Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium). Finally, Netherlands moved into the Anglo-Saxon type from the Continental type (beside Great Britain and Ireland).

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newspaper read per 1000 people because of missing data. Variables involved in the analysis can be found in Appendix 6 of the dissertation in italic.
After identifying the new clusters, let’s return to the question of efficiency-equity in case of the different types. We can notice that the position of the Nordic and the Southern type have remained intact (the former group contains the same countries as the Nordic type of the original typology), while the other two groups have not. Both of them have remained in their original Sapirian quadrant, however, they have approached each other according to both of the two dimensions compared to their position one decade ago. This indicates that regrouping of the countries is relevant: Italy shows Continental, while Netherlands shows Anglo-Saxon characteristics. At the same time, however, after the reclassification we also experience a kind of move in case of these two types: the Anglo-Saxon type has relatively lower while the Continental type has relatively higher poverty rates than a decade ago; and employment has decreased in the Anglo-Saxon, and increased in the Continental type.

Based on these findings, we can modify the efficiency/equity matrix (see Figure 5) upon which we can conclude again that the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon type have approached each other in regard of both efficiency and equity. Regarding efficiency before the regrouping, the Continental type has surpassed the Anglo-Saxon type that was dampened by the relocation of two countries. This way Anglo-Saxon type has remained more efficient than Continental type but the difference is not so high than a decade ago. Contrary, in regard
of equity the approach was totally caused by the regrouping as according to the original classification differences in equity has remained intact.

Figure 5

Revised typology 2

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Notes: Direction of the arrows show the direction of the moves, and their relative size shows the relative size of the moves.

The economic crisis can affect the results discussed above so it is worth to filter out this special – and likely temporary – effect to identify the more permanent tendencies. This is why I repeated the previously introduced analyses with data before the crisis (for 2007). The question is: is the quadripartite typology still valid and do the same countries belong to the same type regardless of the crisis?

Figure 6 shows the efficiency / equity matrix of the European welfare states before the crisis. This figure clearly demonstrates that Sapir’s [2005] typology is still valid; in case of Continental and Anglo-Saxon types, however, we can see significant moves regarding efficiency. In sum, in case of the Continental model the improvements of efficiency, in case of the Anglo-Saxon model the efficiency deterioration is not only the effect of the economic crisis but are more lasting tendencies.

It is also an interesting question again that to what extent these moves could be affected by the possible rearrangement of the countries. To answer this question I made a cluster analysis again. First I involved 20 countries into the analysis to be able to compare the results to those of Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003). I made agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis again with standardized data, using Ward method with the same 30 variables as previously13.

13 Variables involved in the analysis can be found in Appendix 13 of the dissertation in italic.
Typology of the four models before the crisis

Efficiency

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Notes: Direction of the arrows show the direction of the moves, and their relative size shows the relative size of the moves.

Dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis before the crisis

(20 countries, 30 variables)

The dendrogram in Figure 7 shows the created clusters. Again, it is worth to stop after step 16 when 3 clusters are formed (if we stopped before this step, one or more clusters would contain only one element). One of the three clusters is fully identical to the social democratic type again (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland). The other two clusters do not
exactly corresponds to Esping-Andersen’s other two types this time, too, and also shows some kind of difference compared to their states in the late 2000s and early 2010s. **Great Britain and Ireland exited Esping-Andersen’s liberal group and entered corporatist-statist type.** So the former group contains Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA; while the later includes Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Great Britain, and Ireland.

To compare the results of cluster analysis to the original classification, I have also made a narrower analysis including the previous 15 countries with data before the economic crisis. I made agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis again with standardized data, using Ward method with the same 33 variables as in the previous analysis with 15 countries\(^\text{14}\).

**Figure 8**

**Dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis before the crisis**

(15 countries, 33 variables)

The dendrogram in **Figure 8** shows the created clusters. It is worth to stop after step 11 when 4 clusters are formed (if we stopped before this step, some clusters with 1-2-3 elements theoretically difficult to support would be created). If we went on by one step, we would get the same result as in the previous cluster analysis: three clusters would be created, and

\[^{14} Variables involved in the analysis can be found in Appendix 18 of the dissertation in italic.\]**
Continental (supplemented by Italy) and Anglo-Saxon type would form one cluster. So we can see that the approach of these two types demonstrated in the previous simple efficiency/equity model also exists examining a broader set of variables and regardless of the economic crisis, too.

One of the re-created four clusters is fully identical to the Nordic type again (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark). Italy and this time Spain exited the Southern type (Portugal and Greece remained there) and the former moved into the Continental type (beside Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium), while the later moved into the Anglo-Saxon type (beside Great Britain and Ireland). Finally, Netherlands moved to the Anglo-Saxon type from the Continental type.

Re-creating the efficiency/equity matrix for the period before the crisis we get the typology of Figure 9. Therefore we can notice again that the position of the Nordic and the Southern model have not changed, and the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon type have approached each other regarding efficiency; regrouping, however, has dampened this tendency already showed before the regrouping. In this way the Anglo-Saxon type has remained more efficient than the Continental type but the difference is not so significant than in the late 1990s. Contrary, regarding equity approach is fully caused by the regrouping before the crisis, too, as according to the original classification equity differences has remained at the same level.

Figure 9

Typology of the four models before the crisis with the re-created cluster

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Notes: Direction of the arrows show the direction of the moves, and their relative size shows the relative size of the moves.

Looking for the answer to the second research question with the use of case studies of Sweden and France I examined the following factors in the relation of the globalisation and the welfare state:
One important aspect of globalization is trade liberalization. The aims of governments to raise the effectiveness and their multilateral commitments have caused decrease of customs on international trade. However, it means significant revenue shortfall only for developing countries, because customs on import and export came out at less than 5 per cent of developed countries like France or Sweden (Grunberg [1998] p. 593).

Effects of trade liberalisation in relation to globalisation has occurred vigorously in Sweden because its international trade increases much quicker than its national economy due to the low trade restrictions (OECD [2007] 2. o.). The loss of revenues thanks to the falling customs is not significant, in contrary, the positive impact of successful export branches is more remarkable.

Multinationalization of production and the consequent threat of firms to outsource their production seeking higher return encourage governments to run policies that aim at the creation of advantageous business environment, including lower taxes, too, to gain capital necessary to growth (Gelleny – McCoy [2001] p. 512, Garrett [1998] pp. 792, 801, Mishra [1999] p. 7). According to this view, capital prefers states with low taxes so countries start to race to the bottom; they decrease taxes on capital and corporations that will lead to the decrease of revenues. Moreover, in the world of the free movement of capital, different tax rates lead not only to the decrease of tax revenues but to the fall of the welfare because the capital will follow the expected profit before taxes instead of the maximum profit before taxes (Grunberg [1998] p. 596). As a result of these all, monetary openness and company mobility constrain fiscal and social policy, and force the lowering of welfare spending, corporate taxes and the movement of taxes from capital to work (Weiss [2003] p. 8).

Sweden has entered this race to the bottom, since after 1990 it has gradually decreased its corporate tax rate. The missing tax revenue was not compensated by personal income taxes.

\[15\] However, some authors (e.g. Gelleny – McCoy [2001] p. 512) note that multinational corporations possess sunk and transaction costs that keep them from quick relocation of their production between countries. So the claim that grown taxes lead to reduction of revenues by necessarily can be questioned. In contrary, when relocation of plants is difficult or unacceptably costly, multinational corporations can grow their profit by global accounting (e.g. with manipulation of transfer prices), through which profits can be relocated to the parts of company that works in a country or environment with low taxes (Scholte [1997] p. 435).

\[16\] Contrarily, capital do not flow necessarily to the country with low taxes, if high taxes are accompanied by high infrastructural level, qualified workforce, research institutions and stable legal environment (Garrett – Mitchell [2001]).
because of the long-run declining trend of personal income tax rates. Moreover, tax rearrangement from mobile factors (capital) to immobile factors (labour, consumption) has not occurred, as consumption tax has remained permanently stable (since 1992 it has been 25%) (OECD [2011]). All of these have increased Sweden’s attractiveness in the light of growing capital mobility. France also confirms the effect of globalisation that it ‘chase’ the states into the tax race, because it has also decreased its corporate tax rate since the second half of the 1980s. In case of France, similarly to Sweden, the missing tax revenue was not compensated by personal income taxes because of the long-run declining trend of personal income tax rates. Moreover, tax rearrangement to consumption has not occurred, as consumption tax rate was decreased in 2000 from 20.6% to 19.6% approaching the average of the EU-15 (19.24%) (OECD [2005], OECD [2011]).

Another reason for decline of tax revenues is attached to globalization, too. Globalization and the growth of international financial transactions raised the opportunity of tax evasion by the slackening of border control, the accessibility of offshores, and the differences of legal systems (Grunberg [1998] p. 596, OECD [2001] p. 175).

Financial liberalization results in both reduction of revenues and growth of expenditures. It leads to revenue reduction because the government occasionally got profit or advantageous credits by interest rate regulations or by addressing money and credit to different sectors. At the same time, financial liberalization contributed to the depression of inflation so the decrease of seignorage revenues. Governments lost revenues by the disappearance of ‘inflation tax’, i.e. their obligations could be paid back in devaluated currency (Grunberg [1998] p. 594).

In Sweden financial liberalisation contributed to the reduction of the inflation (aside from the peaking values during the crises, inflation shows a decreasing tendency) and so the reduction of government revenues. In case of France we experience a similar result.

Trade liberalization not only adds to the decline of revenues but to the growth of demand for public expenditure because governments use a ‘new kind of protectionalism’ against its disadvantageous effects. Namely, governments often react to the sharpened international competition by offering support to the seedy domestic firms or sectors and export firms that significantly raises government expenditures (Grunberg [1998] p. 599).

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17 In addition, property tax was also abolished recently. Nevertheless total tax burden (income and consumption taxes and contributions altogether) is still quite high, approximately 70% (OECD [2008] p. 6).

18 We have to note, however, that between 1984 and 1994 the consumption tax was 18.6% (OECD [2011]).
Due to this ‘new kind of protectionism’ for instance in 1997 France provided about 130 billion franc of support to the domestic firms that approached the net corporate tax revenue that year (Le Monde [1997] p. 4). In Sweden between 1980 and the beginning of the 1990s about 1.7 billion Swedish crone supports were provided yearly to the Swedish firms on different titles (Bergström [1998] p. 3).

Moreover, different investment incentives, which are used to attract capital to sectors or regions with high unemployment and decadent activity, raise further expenses (Grunberg [1998] p. 599). In France wide range of these incentives is available for both French and foreign companies (Michallon [2013]).

Measures against disadvantageous effects of globalization on labour market raise expenses, too. In their first decades, European welfare states had similar or lower unemployment rates than other market economies. Full employment was the basic bearer of post-war welfare states. As employment meant the main source of income for persons able to work and most of their immediate family, a sort of full employment meant the primary form of income insurance. Efforts to full employment can be explained by political elements, and by the fact that with full employment, governments do not lose tax and contribution revenues, and do not have to finance costly unemployment and social programs (Mishra [1999] p. 18-19). From the 70s, industrial cutbacks caused mass unemployment, mostly in the group of young and low-educated. This high unemployment can be explained by changed economic conditions (Ljungquist – Sargent [1998] p. 519). The number of jobs that do not require any qualification has significantly dropped. This is the consequence of globalization because with new technologies, a range of traditional industries disappeared and numerous former professions desolated. Moreover, grown demand for trainings and re-trainings aiming at acquiring of abilities of flexible adaptation is a consequence of globalization, too. All of these bring a growing pressure on the budget.

Among the expense increasing items of globalisation, measures against the disadvantageous effects of globalization play a significant role in both Sweden and France.

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19 Some researchers think that it is quite questionable that mass unemployment can be explained by economic globalization. Namely, effects of introduction of new technologies are complex, and can not be simplified to the question of the number of workers that could be replaced by the new technology in a given workplace and at a given point of time. At macro level it is not important that at micro level how many workers can be replaced or employed, rather the fact that with the use of the new technology, how many jobs the beginning or expanding of production can create through its input-output relations in the whole national economy (Szentes [2002] p. 713).
In sum we can state that as the result of the globalisation the demand for public expenditures has increased, and at the same time sources of revenues have decreased. To reach budgetary balance, there is no other option than the reduction of expenditures, i.e. the implementation of reforms.
European welfare states – although they can be seen as being similar compared to those out of Europe – show a lot of differences. Each country is different; however, we can identify some similarities among them that enable us to classify them. In the literature we can find a huge number of typologies of welfare states, European welfare states or Western European Welfare states that are based on theoretical or empirical evidences. The examination of the most commonly accepted and empirically proved quadrupartite classification of the Western European welfare states based on and complementing Esping-Andersen’s types suggests us that in the late 2000s and early 2010s it has to be modified. Two types of the original classification – the Nordic and the Southern – can still be characterised by the high equity – high efficiency and low equity – low efficiency, respectively. However, the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon types show significant changes.

If we keep the original classification of the countries, the Continental type has surpassed the Anglo-Saxon one regarding efficiency, and while the former approached the Nordic type, the later approached the Mediterranean model. However, the question arises that to what extent these changes are due to the possible fact that some countries may not belong to their original group any more.

Remaking the separation based on the dimensions of equity and efficiency I experienced that, however, drastic changes in efficiency have dampened (i.e. this time the Continental type has not surpassed the Anglo-Saxon type regarding efficiency), they did not fully disappeared, and the two types have still approached each other compared to their status one decade ago. Moreover, according to the new classification we also notice a similar approach regarding equity. Although the crisis beginning in 2008 strengthened the approach of the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon type, this move can already be identified before the crisis.

In sum, we can conclude that in fact the previous quadrupartite typology does not come through fully nowadays, and we disagree with the view – expressed in the previous decades by several authors\textsuperscript{20} – that the types of welfare states survive in their previous forms in the long run.

Thesis 1: The Continental and the Anglo-Saxon type have significantly approached each other (regardless of the crisis) that can be explained partly by some countries that have picked up some characteristics of another type (i.e. they have belonged to another type than originally) and partly by the move of the whole types. Therefore the view that the types of welfare states are resistant to the changes and survive parallel in the long run is not true.

Different types of welfare states facing the same challenges have given different answers with varying degree of success. Good performance of welfare states in the 50s-60s hid instabilities inherent these systems. In the last two decades, challenges to welfare states have arrived mainly from outside: rapid restructuring from industry to service sectors, dispersion of new information technologies, and the growing international competition are the main sources of economic turbulence. Beside labour market disturbances as a consequence of globalization of new technologies, trade, and capital flow, ageing of population undermines social policy supporting conditions that existed after the War. So in fact globalization was one of the reasons behind welfare reforms in Europe. Namely, in the sharp competition problems which resided in the internal development of welfare states that arrived at the end of their performance appeared earlier. This consequence is confirmed by the case of the two examined countries.

Thesis 2: Globalization was one of the reasons behind welfare reforms in Europe by posing the constraint of expenditure reduction on welfare states.

As a result of globalization, demand for public expenditures has grown while sources of income have fallen. It seems that French and Swedish tax policy bases the globalization thesis that exit option of capital became believable implicit threat so government has to decrease tax rates. To reach budgetary equilibrium there is no other option but expenditure cuts.

In Sweden several reforms have been implemented in the previous decades resulted in the successful adoption to the challenges of the globalization. While it is one of the most competitive economies in the world, it has preserved its welfare system, however, in a transformed form.

But in democratic regimes it is quite difficult to eliminate welfare achievements, because of the strong support of welfare system; its reform is a long process as the example of
France has shown. In contrast to Sweden, in France essential reforms failed, and there are several examples for withdrawing a reform because of the social opposition. So radical reforms of welfare states can be push through only if there is a broad political coalition behind them. But it is not likely that uninformed voters make foreseeing decisions, especially if losses in short run are inevitable to the long run solutions. In addition, those measures affect a part of a tightly coherent system whose one element can not be changed without changing the others.

An optional explanation of the different changes in the two examined countries is that social policy reforms more affected state services than social security rights mainly tied to transfers. So the Swedish welfare state that offers more state services went through more radical changes than the French welfare system that focuses on the latter, however, it would be necessary to reform the latter, too. The two different reactions of the two countries – with opposite sign – support argument of globalist school that reform of welfare system is essential to the growth of every field of economy.
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7. List of Publications and Lectures Related to the Dissertation

Book Chapters and Articles:


Kiss, Marietta [2012]: Rethinking the Typology of Western European Welfare States. The Romanian Economic Journal, Vol. 15, No. 45, September, pp. 87-121, ISSN (print) 1454-4296, ISSN (online) 2286- 2056

Other publications: articles in conference-books, conference lectures:


Notes: