Delimiting and Classifying Metonymy: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges in Cognitive Metonymy Research

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Delimiting and Classifying Metonymy: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges in Cognitive Metonymy Research

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Én, Tóth Máté teljes felelősségem tudatában kijelentem, hogy a benyújtott értekezés önálló munka, a szerzői jog nemzetközi normáinak tiszteletben tartásával készült, a benne található irodalmi hivatkozások egyértelműek és teljesek. Nem állok doktori fokozat visszavonására irányuló eljárás alatt, illetve 5 éven belül nem vontak vissza tőlem odaítélt doktori fokozatot. Jelen értekezést korábban más intézményben nem nyújtottam be, és azt nem utasították el.

_____________________
Tóth Máté
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 The pre-cognitive linguistic tradition

For centuries, metonymy and metaphor have been studied as tropes and as figures of speech, and as such they used to be studied primarily within the context of rhetoric. Their position, function, and importance within the system of tropes have been in constant transition. Aristotle, in his Poetics, uses the term ‘metaphor’ as an umbrella term for everything that is not named by its own name (1457b1-1458a17). In his Rhetoric, he distinguishes four types of metaphor. Among these it is analogy-based metaphor that comes closest to current definitions of metaphor (1410b-1412b). Traditional rhetoric has set up numerous subclasses of Aristotle’s notion of metaphor. As Benczik (2005) points out, Cornificius distinguishes ten, and Quintilian fourteen, tropes. Based on classic works of rhetoric, Lausberg (1990) lists nine tropes. The aim of traditional rhetoric in creating these refined distinctions was practical: it served the purpose of educating rhetors.

The plurality of sub-types of tropes was reduced by Burke (1945), based on the relationship between them, to four major types: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Synecdoche is often considered to be a subtype of metonymy, whereas according to Lausberg, irony can be traced back to metaphor:1 “Die Ironie ist eine contrarium-Grad der Metapher” (Lausberg 1990: 303 cited in Benczik 2005). Consequently, the two remaining major types of tropes were metaphor and metonymy.2

Structural linguistics was the first school of linguistics which focused on the linguistically oriented study of metaphor and metonymy. In Jakobson’s view (2002), the two phenomena are completely distinct from each other. Metaphor is based on similarity, i.e. on intrinsic properties, whereas metonymy on contiguity, i.e. on extrinsic properties. According to Jakobson, metaphor is a phenomenon of the paradigmatic pole of language which involves the operation of selection, unlike metonymy, which is to be located on the syntagmatic pole of language involving the operation of combination.

Unlike structural approaches to metaphor and metonymy, which draw sharp boundaries between the two phenomena, later theories emphasize the relation between

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1 It is important to note that some cognitive linguists have pointed out that irony can also be looked upon as a metonymically motivated phenomenon (see for example Radden 2002: 416-417).
2 For more detailed overviews of the evolution of both notions within traditional rhetoric, see Lausberg (1990) and Benczik (2005); for a compact summary of approaches to metonymy, see Kocsány (2006).
them, primarily the metonymic motivation and basis of metaphor (e.g. Eco 1971, Kemény 2002, and Benczik 2005). However, the linguistic study of metonymy and metaphor, and the relation between them, was revolutionized by the appearance of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work Metaphors We Live By in 1980, marking the beginnings of the holistic cognitive linguistic study of metonymy and metaphor. Influenced by the state of the art results of cognitive psychology, the most important claim of their theory is that metonymy and metaphor are not merely linguistic ornaments, or figures of speech, but are fundamental operations in human cognition, i.e. they are figures of thought.3

1.2 From the poor sister to ubiquity

In the holistic cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy, it is a very common observation that the interest devoted to metonymy shrinks into insignificance beside the attention directed towards metaphor. For a long time, metonymy was looked upon as “metaphor’s poor sister”4 and metaphor was thought of as “metonymy’s rich relative”5. A closer inspection of holistic cognitive linguistic works on conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy does indeed show that the contemporary research on metonymy has been developing in the shadow of the research on metaphor. As a result of this asymmetric interest, the holistic cognitive linguistic research on metonymy lags behind the intensive investigations into metaphor, while the cognitive investigations into metonymy generally run in the same direction.

The relatively late and initially modest interest in metonymy is also indicated by the fact that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) devote merely a single chapter to metonymy (Chapter 9), whereas the first collection of papers primarily concerned with metonymy only appeared almost twenty years later in Günter Radden and Klaus-Uwe Panther’s work (1999).

During these initial two decades of holistic cognitive linguistics, metonymy had suffered from a relative lack of interest and had fallen behind in comparison with the results of metaphor research. For instance, in the case of metonymy it is rather difficult to outline a relatively unified standard theory and its later improved, developed, or more elaborate versions, as can be done with metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, 1993,

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3 For an overview of the evolutionary history of metonymy from structuralism to cognitive linguistics, see Steen (2005).

4 The metaphor is taken from Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014).

5 The metaphor is taken from Ruiz de Mendoza (1999), cited in Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014: 315).
Lakoff and Johnson 1999; the theory of primary metaphors by Grady 1997a and 1997b; or the neural theory of metaphor as proposed by Lakoff 2008 or Feldman 2006). Furthermore, elaborate rival theories of metonymy outside the framework of holistic cognitive linguistics hardly exist, while in metaphor research they are clearly present, as for instance Glucksberg’s and his colleagues’ property attribution theory of metaphor (e.g. Glucksberg and Keysar 1990, 1993, Glucksberg, McGlone and Manfredi 1997, Glucksberg 2001, 2003), Gentner and her colleagues’ structure mapping theory of metaphor (e.g. Gentner 1983, Gentner and Toupin 1986, Bowdle and Gentner 2005, Gentner and Bowdle 2001, 2008, Gentner et al. 2001 etc.), or relevance theoretic approaches to metaphor (e.g. Wilson and Carston 2006, Carston 2010, Sperber and Wilson 2008, Wilson and Sperber 2012).6

Moreover, cognitive research on metonymy also shows a deficit of empirical foundations when compared to the massive amount of empirical data accumulated in the cognitive research on metaphor. Generally accepted and practiced corpus linguistic methods of metonymy research are lacking; though broad cross-linguistic investigations into metonymy seem to be a promising and fruitful venture, they are still in their infancy; and finally, the experimental examination of metonymy is almost completely absent. Whereas metaphor is nowadays often examined with the help of cutting-edge methods such as eye-trackers, functional neuroimaging procedures (fMRI), and event-related brain potentials (ERPs) (e.g. Forgács et al. 2012, Forgács et al. 2014, Forgács 2014 and the literature reviewed there, or Forgács et al. 2015), metonymy is predominantly investigated by intuitive-introspective and manual, small-scale corpus methods.

Another facet of cognitive metonymy research as it developed in the shadow of cognitive metaphor research is that initially, the primary concern of metonymy researchers was the problems of metaphor-metonymy distinction and the cognitive and linguistic interaction between the two phenomena (e.g. Barcelona 2000a, Dirven and Pörings 2002), while since then, the main objective of metonymy research has gradually become to point out and to support the ubiquity of conceptual metonymy and its primacy relative to conceptual metaphor in human thinking and reasoning and in natural language (e.g. Panther and Radden 1999a, Panther and Thornburg 2003a).

As a result of these endeavors, in holistic cognitive linguistics metonymy is now generally considered as a general cognitive mechanism that plays a central and even more fundamental role in every field of conceptual and linguistic organization than metaphor.

6 For a critical overview of cognitive metaphor research from a metalinguistic perspective, see Kertész, Rákosi and Csatár (2012).
Accordingly, the study of metonymy as a linguistically manifest phenomenon has been pushed into the background, something which is clearly indicated by the lack of a generally accepted and functional distinction between conceptual metonymy and metonymically motivated expressions, and by the fact the relationships between these are rather vaguely formulated. Metonymic expressions are most often considered to be simply the manifestations of conceptual metonyms on the level of linguistic units. However, if we accept the ubiquity view of conceptual metonymy in its broadest form, this implies that language is essentially metonymic, which in turn leads to the conclusion that each and every linguistic expression is metonymic. This conclusion may well result in the unfortunate situation that the notion of ‘metonymy’ and especially that of ‘metonymic expression’ might become entirely limitless unless it is defined with the help of linguistically manifest properties in addition to their general conceptual metonymic motivation.

1.3 Problems under scrutiny

As a result of metonymy’s evolution from metaphor’s poor sister to a ubiquitous conceptual phenomenon, the notion of ‘metonymy’ as it is generally accepted within holistic cognitive linguistics runs the risk of becoming indefinite and unlimited. This risk can be best grasped in the form of two interrelated problems, whose solution may contribute to its elimination. First, the range of metonymic phenomena is hard to distinguish from, and to delimit against, other related and similar phenomena, such as metaphor and so called active zone phenomena. Here we face a definitional and distinction problem, which can be formulated as follows:

The problem of delimitation (PDEL):
On the basis of what criteria can metonymy be delimited against related phenomena?

Second, the notion of metonymy embraces such a broad range of heterogeneous phenomena that the possibility of formulating generalizations which are valid for the whole set of metonymic phenomena becomes very limited. In other words, the second problem is of a classificatory nature:

The problem of classification (PCLASS):
How can metonymy be classified into relatively homogeneous classes?
Due to these unresolved issues surrounding the holistic cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy, the possibility of its empirical study becomes problematic, and so what emerges is an empirical deficit of metonymy research. Empirical deficits in cognitive metonymy research are not only due to a lack of generally accepted and practiced methods and procedures, but also to the problem that an all-encompassing set of the most diverse phenomena is very difficult to examine systematically with empirical methods. Thus, the solution of (P_{DEL}) and (P_{CLASS}) does not only contribute to eliminating the risk that the category of ‘metonymy’ will ‘burst’ but also takes us a step closer to enhancing the empirical study of metonymic phenomena.

1.4 Metonymy in holistic cognitive linguistics

Before outlining my approach to (P_{DEL}) and (P_{CLASS}) it is worth taking a brief look at what is understood generally by metonymy in holistic cognitive linguistics. The most reasonable starting point to illustrate the holistic cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy is to quote one of the broadest and most generally accepted definitions, that proposed by Günter Radden and Zoltán Kövecses, who laid down the foundations of a theory of conceptual metonymy (Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Kövecses 1999: 21): “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle [source], provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model.”

To gain a better understanding of the definition, we need to consider what it means to provide mental access and what idealized cognitive models are. In Langacker’s approach (1993, 1999) metonymic expressions function as reference or access points to mental content. They open up a chunk of structured knowledge, within which the reference point (or source) makes the target mentally available for meaning construction purposes: “The entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target (that is, the entity actually being referred to)” (Langacker 1993: 30).

The knowledge structure to which both the explicitly expressed source concept serving as a reference point and the implicit target concept to be accessed belong, has been conceived of in various ways and referred to with a series of terms, such as conceptual domains, dominions, scripts, frames, image schemas, mental spaces, or idealized cognitive...
models. The notion of idealized cognitive models was coined by Lakoff (1987), who defines them as ordered chunks of our knowledge about the world.7

According to what has been summarized so far, in the following example (1) the metonymic expression Lemonade (and the concept ‘LEMONADE’ designated by it) serves as a metonymic reference point or source:

(1) Go on, Lemonade.

The example is taken from Season 2 Episode 4 of BBC America’s television series Ripper Street (set in the London of 1890s). It is uttered by a female bartender to an undercover detective constable during their conversation in a pub full of customers. The expression Lemonade (also called the vehicle) opens up an idealized cognitive model (PUB), and activates one of the elements of the model (the source), namely the DRINK ORDERED. This entity in turn functions as a reference point to the target concept, i.e. to another element of the model (CUSTOMER) (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Lemonade/LEMONADE as a metonymic reference point

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7 This concise dissection of Radden and Kövecses’ (1999) definition clearly shows that their approach to defining metonymy is genuinely rooted in the theoretical background of holistic cognitive linguistics (for a more detailed description of the holistic approach to language, see the relevant section of Chapter 2), more particularly in the work of George Lakoff and Ronald W. Langacker. However, it also becomes clear that the differences between Lakoff’s and Langacker’s approach to language are of less importance to metonymy researchers, since both conceptions seem to have influenced the cognitive approach to metonymy substantially. For instance, considering their terminological choices, Radden and Kövecses make use of the notions of both researchers. For cognitively oriented metonymy researchers, the compatible elements of Lakoff’s and Langacker’s approaches seem to be more central than their differences; accordingly, I will not be concerned with a detailed comparison of these two major directions in holistic cognitive linguistics.
In more general terms, the metonymic source provides **indirect mental access** to a related concept within the same knowledge structure.

The **motivation** for a certain expression/concept serving as a metonymic source or a metonymic reference point to the target can be of a cognitive and of a communicative nature, or a combination of these (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 48-52). Here, the motivation for *Lemonade/LEMONADE* serving as a metonymic reference point to the *CUSTOMER* comes from our **general knowledge** about PUBS and BARTENDERS, our **specific knowledge of the situation**, and its **communicative factors**.

The detective constable is ordering glasses of lemonade in a 19th century Whitechapel pub full of customers consuming alcoholic beverages. The particular situation, i.e. ordering a non-alcoholic beverage, is surprising in the light of our general knowledge about such localities; hence, it is an especially striking or **salient** aspect\(^8\) of the detective constable in the situation at hand. Furthermore, an idealized or stereotypical female bartender is pleasant and talkative with customers, calling them nicknames and inquiring about their well-being, the fictive bartender in the example being no exception. She intends to engage in friendly conversation with the detective constable, i.e. her communicative aim is to start a conversation with an ice-breaker but she does not know the name of the lonely customer. From both a cognitive and a communicative perspective, *Lemonade/LEMONADE* serves as an excellent reference point to the unknown customer since it is cognitively salient, bridges the problem of not knowing the customer’s name, and its friendly tone invites further conversation.

**1.5 (P\(_{DEL}\))**: Delimiting metonymy

The **prototypical** and most often discussed cases of metonymy are **non-conventionalized referential metonymies** (like the one analyzed above) appearing in the form of noun phrases referring to, or singling out, an entity for predication. One of the recurrent questions in holistic cognitive linguistic metonymy research is whether metonymy is necessarily connected to an **act of reference** (e.g. Barcelona 2002 and 2011a).

At the initial stage of holistic cognitive semantics, **referentiality** was taken to be a definitional aspect of metonymy (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35), but later on it was

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\(^8\) Salient aspects of an entity or a situation catch the eye, i.e. they stand out perceptually or conceptually. They are easy to perceive and bear meaning and importance from the perspective of the conceptualizer, i.e. the person making sense of the entity or the situation.
considered merely to be the primary function of metonymy, alongside others. Non-conventional referential metonymies are now looked upon as the prototypical members of the category, though most authors are of the view that the phenomenon of conceptual metonymy cannot be reduced to referential cases (e.g. Barcelona 2002 and 2011a, Thornburg and Panther 1997, or Panther and Thornburg 2007). In this approach, metonymy is an essentially conceptual phenomenon exerting its influence at every level and in every field of conceptual organization and linguistic description.

In my view, this general rejection of the exclusively referential nature of metonymy can be traced back to an overly narrow interpretation of the notion of referentiality, which nevertheless usually remains un-elucidated. According to this narrow interpretation, an act of reference marks out a piece of the extra-linguistic reality, a thing, with the purpose of making statements about this thing, i.e. to assign predications to it. I will argue that this conception of reference is too narrow for the holistic cognitive linguistic framework and is not in accordance with its major tenets, for the obvious reason that in an act of reference it is not a piece of the extra-linguistic reality which is made available for predication, i.e. referred to, but a piece of a perceived and mentally construed representation of the extra-linguistic reality. Furthermore, this piece cannot be limited exclusively to a thing, but can be any kind of mental content, such as an event, a property, or even a proposition.

Later, I will argue for a view of referentiality that equates an act of reference with the activation of mental content of any type with the help of linguistic units serving as reference points, whose purpose is to make the accessed mental content available as input for further processes of meaning construction (e.g. predication, elaboration of propositions, or drawing inferences). Accordingly, in my approach the purpose of the use of most linguistic expressions is to activate a certain mental content, i.e. most linguistic expressions are of a referential nature, including linguistically manifest conceptual metonymies, which I will call linguistic metonymies.

Trying to define linguistic metonymy by considering its linguistically manifest properties and understanding it – at least partially – as independent of its conceptual metonymic motivation is an initial step towards delimiting the notion. However, stating that linguistic metonymy is by necessity referential results in a conception of the phenomenon that is extremely broad. Because of the insufficiency of referentiality as a distinctive feature of linguistic metonymies, the consideration of further criteria is indispensable.

In my view, an ideal candidate for such a criterion is provided by the implicit nature of linguistic metonymy: the target content of a metonymic expression always remains
implicit and cannot appear together with the source expression within the same linguistic construal of a situation. As will be shown, another fundamental property of linguistic metonymy is that it co-activates the source content, the target content, and the conceptual relation holding between them, thus forming a referential complex. These two criteria in combination will turn out to be capable of delimiting metonymy against non-metonymic cases and against two related phenomena: zone activation and linguistic metaphor; furthermore, they pave the way for a possible line of investigation into the differences and common features of metonymy on the one hand, and reference point constructions and blending on the other.

1.6 (PCLASS): Classifying metonymy

The most often applied criterion in the classification of metonymy is the relationship between source and target (e.g. Norrick 1981, Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Köveces 1999, Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006a). Other classifications focus on the pragmatic function of metonymy (e.g. Warren 1999, 2002, Panther and Thornburg 1999 and 2003b). Interestingly enough, no classification of metonymy has so far been proposed that takes into consideration the type of mental contents participating in the metonymic process, i.e. the type of the target and the source content. I will hypothesize that metonymies can be divided into homogeneous groups based on the type of the implicit target content, and further subdivided on the basis of the types of conceptual content and linguistic unit which serve as reference points to the target content. Based on types of conceptual contents proposed in the literature (e.g. Radden and Dirven 2007) and earlier classifications of metonymy (especially Thornburg and Panther 1997, or Panther and Thornburg 2007), I will argue that five main metonymy classes can be set up along these lines.

The prototypical class of metonymy is represented by THING-metonymies, i.e. metonymies whose target content is a THING. Indirect mental access can be provided to a THING with the help of another related THING, one of its PROPERTIES, or its function within a given ICM. THING-metonymies are generally realized linguistically by noun phrases or adjectives (used as nouns). EVENT-metonymies are metonymies whose target content is an EVENT. The term EVENT will be used very loosely; for instance, it also embraces ACTIONS or CHANGES OF STATE. An EVENT can be accessed via its participants, i.e. via a THING, via its circumstances, i.e. via its MODE or PROPERTIES, or even via one of its SUB-EVENTS, or its PRECONDITIONS or CONSEQUENCES. EVENT-metonymies can be manifested in various
linguistic forms due to the extreme variety of their possible cognitive reference points. The target content of PROPERTY-metonymies is a PROPERTY, more precisely a SCALE against which a PROPERTY is measured, or a part of this SCALE. These metonymies are usually realized linguistically in the form of adjectives. In PROPOSITION-metonymies, the implicitly accessed target content is a PROPOSITION, in other words, their target content is more complex and specified than a schematic EVENT activated by a mere verb. PROPOSITIONS can be accessed above all by other related PROPOSITIONS, but a whole PROPOSITION can also be activated metonymically by its PARTS or PARTIAL PROPOSITIONS. Finally, speech act metonymies activate communicational intentions through a form traditionally associated with another communicational intention. In other words, seeming intentions co-activate other intentions.

1.7 The relevance of (PDEL) and (PCCLASS) for the empirical study of metonymy

A major consequence of an unbounded notion of metonymy in holistic cognitive linguistics is that its empirical study is limited and has obvious deficits. The reason metonymy is difficult to investigate by empirical methods is threefold. First, in its current holistic cognitive linguistic conception, metonymy embraces such a wide range of phenomena that it is unclear what is under investigation. Second, although the wide range of phenomena subsumed under the very broad notion of metonymy has some common features – above all regarding their conceptual background – these phenomena are somewhat heterogeneous. Consequently, not only do they resist generalizations, but the empirical methods with the help of which they can be examined, and based on which these generalizations could be set up, are also very different, i.e. the study of different sub-classes of metonymy about which generalizations are to be formulated requires different empirical methods. And finally, the development of these sub-class-specific empirical methods is only at its very early stage.

The solutions of (PDEL) and (PCCLASS) not only contribute to coming to terms with the unlimited use of the notion ‘metonymy’, but are closely related to issues complicating the empirical study of metonymy. The third factor, the lack of generally accepted and applied empirical methods, will be touched upon in the form of two case studies concerned with EVENT- and PROPERTY-metonymies. The reason I direct my attention to these two classes is that cognitive linguistic studies have devoted far less attention to them than to more prototypical THING-metonymies. In Case study 1 I conduct a cross-linguistic analysis to examine how a range of languages conceptualizes and verbalizes a complex EVENT
(PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS), whereas in Case study 2 I employ corpus linguistic procedures to argue that a substantial portion of color-smell synesthetic expressions in German are not metaphors but eventually PROPERTY-metonymies.

1.8 Structure of the thesis

The structure of the thesis follows the argumentation outlined above. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the basic commitments and tenets of holistic cognitive linguistics, as well as of the notion of metonymy, and shows how (PDEL) and (PCLASS) arise from the view that metonymy is a ubiquitous conceptual phenomenon. In Chapter 3, I discuss the problems of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor, an area where (PDEL) is most emphatically manifested, and I will conclude that the issue cannot be resolved on the level of conceptual notions. The aim of Chapter 4 is to provide a definition of linguistic metonymy in terms of referentiality, implicitness, and co-activation, which may distinguish it from non-metonymic expressions and related phenomena such as metaphor and active zones. In Chapter 5, I propose a content-based classification of metonymy. And finally, after reviewing the empirical methods currently applied in metonymy research the two case studies are presented in Chapter 6. My concluding results are summarized in the closing Chapter 7.
Chapter 2 – Metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics

This chapter attempts to give an overview of the holistic cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy and tries to point out the factors playing a role in the emergence of \((P_{DEL})\) and \((P_{CLASS})\). To draw a picture of what metonymy in CL is, it is indispensable to take a brief look at Cognitive Linguistics (CL) as a theoretical framework. Section 2.1 highlights those basic assumptions of CL as a school of linguistics which influence its notion of metonymy in a definitive manner. Essentially, in the cognitive view of metonymy (Section 2.2) conceptual metonymy is a fundamental cognitive process which has an omnipresent role in human conceptualization and language. However, the notion of conceptual metonymy as a ubiquitous and primary conceptual process runs the risk of becoming too broad, even limitless (Section 2.3).

Another facet of this terminological problem is that (i) the notion of linguistic metonymy, or more often, metonymic expression, is only vaguely defined; (ii) the relation between the notions of conceptual and linguistic metonymy is unclear and consequently, (iii) the latter becomes an all-encompassing category which resists generalizations (Section 2.4). These problems do not go unnoticed in the literature, but they are hardly ever addressed explicitly, which can be traced back to two major conflicting endeavors in cognitive linguistic metonymy research: (i) the tendency to emphasize the ubiquity of conceptual metonymy in human conceptualization and language and (ii) the tendency to try to come to grips with the unlimitedness of the notion of metonymy (Section 2.5).

In the summary of this chapter (Section 2.6), I argue for a way out of this conflicted terminological situation. On the one hand, I argue for a more narrowly defined notion of linguistic metonymy based on the linguistically manifest properties of the phenomena covered by the notion. On the other, I do not call into question the notion of conceptual metonymy as a fundamental principle of cognitive and linguistic organization.

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9 Since the chapter is concerned with Cognitive Linguistics, instead of the complicated term ‘holistic cognitive linguistics’ I will use, henceforth and throughout my thesis, the capitalized version ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ or CL for the sake of brevity. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this terminological decision is only motivated inasmuch as it is a convenient way of referring to holistic approaches to language in the tradition of Lakoff and Langacker. I do not intend to enter the debate on the modular vs. holistic view of the human mind, and I do not wish to imply that holistic cognitive linguistic approaches are the only cognitively oriented approaches to language (as it is often the case in works on CL, cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 27).
2.1 Cognitive Linguistics: Basic tenets, goals, and commitments

Cognitive Linguistics is a relatively new school of linguistics, which emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to formal linguistic approaches; in this sense, it should be accommodated among functional approaches to language. In their seminal works the representatives of this new approach (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and 1999, Lakoff 1987, Fauconnier 1985, Langacker 1987a, 1991a, and 1991b, Gibbs 1994 etc.) seriously challenged ‘the mind as a machine or computer’ metaphor of the structuralist and generativist tradition (Lakoff 1987: xii-xiii).

The cognitive linguistic conception of the mind is radically different from the COMPUTER-metaphor. The theoretical roots of this different view of the mind are to be found among others, in the results of cognitive psychology (especially in the works of Rosch and her colleagues), in cognitive science, and in Gestalt-psychology. Accordingly, CL defines itself as a branch of cognitive science. Its object of study is the workings of the human mind. On the one hand, language as a product of the mind is often metaphorically seen within CL as a window which provides us with insights into the hidden complexities of the mind’s functioning. On the other, CL attempts to relate the workings of language to our perception and (bodily, social, and cultural) experience.

However, CL is not a unified theoretical framework, but it is better looked upon as a collection of approaches to language which share some basic assumptions. Due the lack of rigor which would result from a unified theoretical background, CL avoids clear-cut categories and sharp dichotomies and prefers flexible categories with fuzzy boundaries arranged along continua. The treatment of categories in this flexible manner is, of course, also motivated by the insights of cognitive psychology regarding the nature of human categorization, and by the assumption that scientific categories do not function fundamentally differently from everyday categorization (see for example Lakoff 1987 or Taylor 1995). Its categorical flexibility and its aim to relate linguistic phenomena to general cognitive mechanisms and human experience allows CL to make its object of study

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phenomena which earlier were set aside as exceptional. CL treats the idiosyncratic and the arbitrary (e.g. ambiguity, indeterminacy, under-determination, or polysemy) as central and motivated, unlike those approaches where they are ruled out as performance phenomena or put aside for closer inspection at an improved stage of theory formation.

Another consequence of CL being a collection of approaches is that authors often interpret and analyze certain phenomena differently, and they often provide rather different explanations for them. Despite this object theoretical plurality, they all share some common principles, assumptions, goals, and commitments. CL assumes that language reflects the fundamental properties and structure of the human mind (‘language as a window to the mind’). This common assumption is formulated by Lakoff (1990: 40) in two key commitments: According to the generalization commitment the cognitive linguistic community is committed “to characterizing the general principles governing all aspects of human language” (Lakoff 1990: 40). The second, cognitive commitment – which is also generally accepted by the cognitive linguistic community –, is “to make one’s account of human language accord with what is generally known about the mind and brain, from other disciplines as well as our own” (Lakoff 1990: 40).¹¹

The generalization commitment implies a strong non-modular or holistic view of cognition and language. The idea behind this commitment is the rejection of a postulated autonomous language faculty with well-defined sub-modules such as syntax, morphology, and phonology, and the rejection of the assumption that these modules or sub-modules of human language would be organized in a fundamentally different way. In other words, in CL language is assumed to be governed by general cognitive principles that are at work at every level of linguistic description. All these levels work in accordance with common organizing principles, such as the fuzziness of our categories (not excluding scientific categories), polysemy, conceptual metaphor, or conceptual metonymy. Furthermore, although the sub-modules might function very well as theory internally useful constructs or can be viewed as a principle on which the traditional division of labor between linguistic research interests is based, they are thought to possess no psychological reality. Consequently, in CL the boundaries and interfaces between phonology, morphology, syntax,

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¹¹ For a later formulation of these two key commitments, see Lakoff (1993). For their methodological relevance, see Gibbs (2006). For a specified formulation of the cognitive commitment as a general methodological principle of empirical research in cognitive metaphor research, see Csatár (2010, 2011a, 2011b and 2014: Chapter 3).
semantics, and pragmatics are blurred and they form continua instead of autonomous systems with exclusively characteristic principles.

The cognitive commitment suggests that cognitive linguists are in search of principles that are responsible for governing language in general, and are in accordance with our knowledge about human cognition. For instance, linguistic theories developed within CL cannot include structures or processes that violate known properties of the human cognitive system. Thus, CL embraces and facilitates interdisciplinary approaches that are able to deliver converging evidence12 from relevant research areas, such as cognitive and brain sciences, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, or even literary studies and philosophy.

Although CL does not draw clear boundaries between lexicon and grammar, it can be divided into two major strands: cognitive approaches to grammar (with Ronald W. Langacker as the most prominent representative) and cognitive semantics (with George Lakoff as a major figure).13 The former approach includes several research directions, such as Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987a, 1991a, 1991b, 1999, 2008, and 2009a), Construction Grammars14 (e.g. Fillmore 1988, Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor 1988, Kay and Fillmore 1999, Goldberg 1995), their specific explications, such as Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar (Croft 2001) or Embodied Construction Grammar (Bergen and Chang 2013), as well as cognitively oriented approaches to grammaticalization processes (e.g. Heine 1993, Heine and Kuteva 2002, 2007, Hopper and Traugott 2003, Traugott and Heine 1991). Although all these have in common that they take a cognitive approach to grammar and share some general principles, from the perspective of metonymy research Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (CG) has the highest relevance, hence when outlining these shared principles, I will refer to his works.

The most important function of language is to express and communicate our thoughts. In Langacker’s view, the coding and the interpretation of human thought take place with the help of symbolic assemblies (or constructions), i.e. form-meaning pairs with a phonological and a semantic/conceptual pole (Langacker 1987a) and construal processes (such as scanning, zone activation, reference point constructions, metonymy, or metaphor).

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12 For the desideratum of delivering diverging evidence in CL and its challenges, see Steen (2007).
13 Since cognitive research on metonymy has been influenced equally by both these strands of CL, their evaluation against each other and the discussion of their differences and common features are of lesser relevance for my argumentation.
14 For a comprehensive overview of constructionist approaches to grammar, see Hoffmann and Trousdale (2013).
According to the symbolic thesis, the basic unit of grammar is the symbolic assembly. The meaning pole of a symbolic assembly is the mental representation of an object or a relation. The mental representation is thus a concept that is formed out of our perception of the world through the process of conceptualization. The sum of our concepts of the world is called by Jackendoff (1983) our projected reality. A central facet of CG is its usage-based nature, according to which the symbolic units of grammar are abstracted from actual uses in situated usage events, i.e. CG does not distinguish between competence and performance phenomena.

**Cognitive semantics** (e.g. Talmy 2000, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, etc.) is often labeled as the semantics of understanding. The object of study in cognitive semantics is how we understand, and how we make sense of our experiences and interaction with the world. The main concern of cognitive semantics is how we get from perceptual experience to concepts (selection, profile-background, embodiment, category formation, categorization, the formation of structured knowledge, relating categories with each other within complex knowledge structures, processes of conceptualization, etc.). Cognitive semantics is thus concerned with the exploration of the relationship between our experience, our conceptual system, and our semantic structures coded in language. Cognitive semanticists investigate how our knowledge is represented mentally (conceptual structure) and how meaning is constructed (conceptualization). Hence, cognitive semantics offers simultaneously models of both linguistic meaning and human cognition.

At the heart of the cognitive linguistic investigation of the path from perception to abstract thought is the hypothesis of embodied experience and its consequence, the hypothesis of embodied cognition (e.g. Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987, 1990, and 1993). These hypotheses represent the empirical insight that human experience is embodied, in the sense that our perception of reality is defined by our anatomy and by the disposition of our brains. Our concepts based on embodied experience are in turn indirectly embodied: our perception of reality is specifically human due to the physicality of our body, which implies that our mind is predisposed by embodied experience. Consequently, CL asserts that human cognition and language cannot be examined independently of the biological disposition of the human body and of our general cognitive abilities.

The philosophical implication of the embodied experience hypothesis is that CL represents an experiential or experiential realist stance which does not deny that there is an objective reality, but strongly emphasizes that this reality can only be known and understood through embodied experience in a specifically human way, and that our
knowledge and understanding are also affected by individual factors (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987). In Lakoff and Johnson’s view, experiential realism is able to offer a way out of the objectivism-subjectivism dichotomy in Western thought. Nevertheless, it must be noted that experientialism takes into account not only embodied experience but also considers our social, cultural, individual and linguistic experiences to play an essentially formative role in human thought and language (see especially Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006).

A crucial step from experience to thought is the categorization and labeling of our experience, i.e. the ordering of our experience. In this respect, CL relies heavily on the results of cognitive psychology in the 1970s (for instance Rosch 1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1977, and 1978, Rosch and Mervis 1975, and Rosch et al. 1976). These results led to the rejection of the classical view of categorization based on sufficient and necessary criteria. Instead, they indicated the importance of prototypes, saliency, best examples, and basic level categories in category formation and in the everyday use of categories. They also made it empirically plausible that our categories are not “God-given”, but are the products of human perception and cognition. Furthermore, categories seem to be vague, with fleeting or fuzzy boundaries on the one hand, while at the same time they are extremely flexible, in order to be able to fulfill their functional role in human thought and meaning construction.

When we interact with the world, categories do not occur in isolation but in relation to other categories in certain situative frames, which implies that when we categorize we do so against a certain conceptual background. This conceptual background is a structured chunk of our knowledge and has been captured by several authors in different ways and given different names, such as image schemata (Johnson 1987), domains, frames (e.g. Fillmore 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1982, and 1985), scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977), idealized cognitive models (Lakoff 1987), or mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985).15 Although these notions are all explicated differently with respect to their complexity, their level of abstraction, and their role in and relation to abstract thought, what they all have in common is that they are structured chunks of knowledge which form networks with each other. Among these, let me consider image schemas in some detail, since they closely relate to the hypothesis of embodiment and they illuminate two major tenets of CL.

15 Since my thesis will not contribute any novel theoretical or empirical insights to questions and issues regarding the nature, the differences, the common features, and the relationship of these notions, I refer the reader to Andor (1985) for an overview of frames, and to Cienki (2007) for the interrelated notions of frame, idealized cognitive model, and domain.
In Johnson’s view (1987), on the level of cognition embodied experience is manifested in the form of so called **image schemata** (for example **OBJECT, CONTAINMENT, PATH, BALANCE, etc.**). Image schemata are fundamental schematic knowledge structures that are directly rooted in and related to our pre-conceptual experience: “A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape and regularity [...]” or “[...] structures for organizing our experience and comprehension” (Johnson 1987: 29). Image schemata are dynamic structures. During concept formation and conceptualization, they are extended and elaborated through multiple conceptual processes, as a result of which our abstract concepts and conceptual domains are constructed. Within CL, metaphor and metonymy are taken to be two instances of the conceptual processes that result in the creation of more abstract concepts and conceptual domains from image schemata.

This brief overview shows two major tenets of CL that need to be addressed at this point. First, CL is concerned with knowledge formation and structure in general, i.e. it does not distinguish strictly between world knowledge and linguistic knowledge, since the two are inseparable. With reference to a well-known metaphor, CL represents an **encyclopedic view of general knowledge** as opposed to a lexicon view of linguistic knowledge. Second, the term ‘image schema’ itself emphasizes that a great majority of our knowledge is not propositional but **imaginative**, due to its indirectly embodied nature (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, or Gibbs 1994). In other words, our thought is inherently based on schematic images and figuration. In this view, among other cognitive processes, conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor, and conceptual integration/blending are assigned a fundamental role in thought and meaning construction, i.e. in making sense of our realities.

As a closing remark, it must be noted that CL has had to face serious challenges. At the center of the **critique**, we can find the charge of circularity (e.g. Hacer 2005\(^1\)), which calls for the inclusion of independent evidence (from neighboring disciplines) in theory formation. A closely related critical point of cognitive linguistic theories is their non-pluralistic and weak empirical foundations. This challenge has been recognized by cognitively oriented researchers and, with the upsurge in debates surrounding data and evidence in linguistics in general, they are actively searching for ways to work with and combine data from various data sources (corpus methods, questionnaires, experiments, eye-movement tracking, brain scanning, discourse analytic approaches, cross-linguistic and

\(^{16}\) For the circular and cyclic aspects of argumentation in conceptual metaphor theory, see Kertész and Rákosi (2009).
typological investigations). And finally, cognitive linguistic theories are often criticized for their loose and vague use of extremely broad categories that run the risk of becoming vacuous.

These problems are also manifested in particular forms in cognitive metonymy research (such as \( \text{P}_{\text{DEL}} \) and \( \text{P}_{\text{CLASS}} \)). The cognitive theory of metonymy is obviously in need of further empirical underpinnings. The empirical investigation of metonymy presupposes in turn that the notion itself is defined more narrowly and the phenomena covered by it are classified into homogeneous groups. Furthermore, empirically founded object theoretical case studies are needed to arrive at generally applicable methodological procedures. These issues will be addressed in the following sections and chapters, but first and foremost, it is indispensable to outline what metonymy is within CL and what problems surround the notion.

2.2 The cognitive view of metonymy

In the last few decades, metonymy has received a relatively greater degree of attention. Thanks to this increased interest, our knowledge about metonymic thinking and language has proliferated. This proliferation has resulted in a multitude of theoretical approaches to metonymy, in which it is hard to find aspects where there is a widely-shared consensus. Two such aspects of metonymy may be highlighted. First, it is unequivocally accepted by any contemporary metonymy researcher that (a) metonymy is – like metaphor – an everyday \textbf{phenomenon} of language and/or thought. As a result, it has moved to the center of attention and is not dismissed as marginal or idiosyncratic as was the case in earlier approaches (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 37, Bredin 1984: 56, Lakoff 1987: 77, Gibbs 1994: 1, Taylor 1995: 123, Papafragou 1995, 1996a: 170). Another widely accepted feature of metonymic language is that (b) it has been suggested that \textbf{conceptual-psychological mechanisms} are at work in the background (see the above cited works); i.e. figurative language is governed by cognitive principles.

\footnote{See for example Panther and Radden (1999a), Barcelona (2000a), Dirven and Pörings (2002), Panther and Thornburg (2003a), Panther, Thornburg and Barcelona (2009) and Benczes, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Barcelona (2011a). The list is, of course, far from comprehensive. When compiling it, I did not even aim at exhaustivity, nor does it reflect any value judgments; it merely tries to show the increased linguistic interest in metonymy. Works and authors not included in these edited volumes are not inferior in any way (i.e. regarding their originality or importance) to the cited works; they had to be omitted simply due to limitations of space.}
The two assumptions, that metonymy is an everyday phenomenon, and that it has a cognitive background, are even shared by linguistic approaches that are based on such different theoretical conceptions of language as holistic CL and modular Relevance Theory (RT) (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 2012, or Carston 2002). However, regarding other questions related to metonymy, we can encounter a variety of approaches lacking any widely-held consensus. For instance, it is questionable whether metonymy is of a conceptual or a linguistic nature. How can it be defined? What semiotic/semantic/cognitive relationships underlie metonymic language? What is the nature of the knowledge structures within/between which the metonymic relationship is active? What is the function of metonymy in categorizing, reasoning, and language (in communication, grammar, or language change)? What are the factors that play a role in triggering the metonymic source/vehicle? What determines the choice of the target that is activated by metonymy? What is the relationship between metaphor and metonymy?

In order to motivate the problems, I posed in Chapter 1 (especially P\textsubscript{DEL}), it is essential to look at what is understood by the notion ‘metonymy’ in CL. The choice I made by narrowing down the scope of my overview to CL approaches to metonymy is supported by the fact that probably no other current linguistic approach has devoted more attention and appreciation to the phenomenon of metonymy and, with a few exceptions, the theoretical framework against which contemporary metonymy research is conducted is provided by CL.

One of the most important insights of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is that “Metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 153). They come to the same conclusion regarding metonymy: “It is also like metaphor in that it is not just a poetic or rhetorical device. Nor is it just a matter of language. Metonymic concepts (like THE PART FOR THE WHOLE) are part of the ordinary, everyday way we think and act as well as talk” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 37).

Later on, Lakoff stresses the role of metonymy in human cognition even more emphatically: “Metonymy is one of the basic characteristics of cognition” (1987: 77). In his conception, the human mind represents the real world surrounding us in the form of idealized cognitive models (cf. Lakoff 1987: 68-76). A great many of these models are of metonymic

\textsuperscript{18} It is important to emphasize that there are fundamental differences between CL and RT with respect to their views on the nature of the cognitive background underlying metonymic language.

\textsuperscript{19} A detailed overview of the questions in current research on metonymy is offered in Barcelona, Benczes and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2011) and Barcelona (2002, 2011a). The last question pertaining to the possibilities of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor will be addressed in detail in Chapter 3, and I provide a partial solution to the problem in Chapter 4.
nature (Lakoff 1987: 77-90), that is, we understand the model itself with the help of a concept belonging to that model, or vice versa, we understand a concept of the model with the help of the whole model or one of its other concepts, i.e. a certain concept (the source or vehicle) is more readily available to us because of experiential, perceptual, cognitive, or even pragmatic reasons (saliency) and, as a result, it can metonymically stand for a less easily graspable, related concept. Thus, in the standard theory of conceptual metonymy it is a **cognitive mechanism** or a **conceptual operation**. This approach is well evidenced by the metonymy **definition** of Kövecses and Radden cited in Chapter 1 (1999: 21).

If we do not take into consideration the approach of modern rhetoric to metonymy and the pragmatic approaches to figurative language (mainly Neo-Gricean theories and RT), and we remain within the framework of CL, metonymy is held to be primarily a matter of thought and not of language. On the one hand, the **conceptual view** of metonymy is naturally in line with the theoretical orientation of CL, whose ultimate research object is our cognitive system and its mechanisms rather than purely linguistic phenomena. On the other hand, the theory of conceptual metonymy has at first sight trivial, but on deeper inspection far-reaching, terminological consequences, which may lead to serious terminological challenges.

As implied by the increased linguistic interest in metonymy, the literature abounds in **definitions of metonymy**. As will be seen in the following paragraphs, the essence of these definitions – bereft of every particular element dependent on the theoretical framework of their conception – can be encapsulated in the following over-simplified, schematized form:

Metonymy is a connection made between A and B, which are otherwise somehow related to or associated with each other, as a result of which A is fore-grounded (e.g. appears explicitly on the level of verbal expressions) and B is pushed to the background (e.g. it remains linguistically unexpressed or implicit), but at the same time B becomes accessible through A.

This over-simplistic schema cannot even be considered a proper definition since the expressions constituting it do not acquire any specified content: the nature of A and B, their relationship, and the result of this foreground-background shift are left unexplained. The aim of this schematic definition is simply to grasp and show the common features of the abundance of metonymy definitions (which can be so divergent that they cannot even be
brought together at a lower level of abstraction) and to highlight those aspects of metonymy that are most often applied in various definitions.

The schematic definition attempts to capture three major aspects of metonymy that are usually taken into consideration with special weight by the metonymy definitions found in the literature:

i. What is the nature of A and B? (For example, are they linguistic signs, real world entities, conceptual entities, concepts, conceptual domains, or domain matrices and sub-domains?)

ii. What is the relationship between A and B? (Is there a semantic or conceptual proximity, contiguity, or a functional relationship between them?)

iii. What is the result of connecting A and B metonymically, i.e. what is the function of the metonymic connection? (Is the essence of metonymy substitution, referential shift, conceptual highlighting, economy etc.)

Let us consider an example that would be unequivocally analyzed by any researcher as a metonymy:

(1) Room 126 is out having lunch. [the people living/working in room 126]

In terms of the schematized definition above, A is ROOM 126 and B is the PEOPLE LIVING/WORKING IN THE ROOM, they are connected in the form of the metonymic expression room 126. They are related, namely room 126 is the place where the people live or work, i.e. this relation is based on a relationship provided by the image schema of CONTAINMENT. ROOM 126 is fore-grounded and appears linguistically, whereas the PEOPLE LIVING/WORKING IN THE ROOM are pushed to the background (they remain implicit), but the latter are accessed with the help of the former.

In terms of the above-mentioned definition by Radden and Kövecses (1999), in the cognitive process of metonymy, ROOM 126 (the source conceptual entity) provides mental access to the target conceptual entity (the PEOPLE LIVING/WORKING IN THE ROOM) within the same idealized cognitive model. According to Radden and Kövecses, (i) A and B are
conceptual entities; (ii) they are connected by being within the same idealized cognitive model, and (iii) the function of the metonymic connection is the provision of mental access.

Croft’s definition of metonymy (2002) is lexical semantically oriented and is based on Lakoff and Turner’s (1989) argument that metonymy operates within a single conceptual domain (as opposed to the cross-domain mapping of metaphor). Croft points out that concepts are usually profiled against complex structures, which is also true of metonymically conceptualized concepts: “a metonymic mapping occurs within a single domain matrix, not across domains (or domain matrices)” (Croft 2002: 177). To put it simply, a domain matrix is the sum of the domains forming the background for the understanding of a concept. Furthermore, he argues that metonymy involves a process of domain highlighting, i.e. an otherwise secondary domain of a domain matrix is given primacy. However, he notes that domain highlighting is only a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for the definition of metonymy since other lexical phenomena also have this property. Accordingly, in (1), during the metonymic mapping within a complex domain matrix that includes the domains ROOM, PEOPLE and possibly a series of further domains necessary for the understanding of ROOM, the otherwise secondary domain of PEOPLE is highlighted and becomes primary. Thus, in Croft’s definition, (i) A and B are conceptual domains, which are (ii) parts of a complex domain matrix and, (iii) one of the functions of the metonymic mapping is to highlight an otherwise secondary domain.

One of the broadest definitions of metonymy is provided by Antonio Barcelona (e.g. 2002, 2003a, and 2011a). He defines the prototypically structured category of metonymy in schematic terms as follows:

Metonymy is an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated. (Barcelona 2011a: 52)

In this definition’s terms, the source domain (ROOM) is asymmetrically mapped onto the target domain (PEOPLE). These two are in the same functional domain and they are linked by the pragmatic function that the people work or live in the room. As a result of this mapping, the target domain is mentally activated. In Barcelona’s definition (i) A and B are again conceptual domains (ii) within the same functional domain, and there is a pragmatic function linking them and (iii) as a result of the metonymic mapping, B is mentally activated. Though the definition is very broad, it contains major refinements in comparison
with Kövecses and Radden’s, mainly in order to enable a distinction between metonymy and metaphor:

Metaphor is a symmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source onto another domain, the target. Source and target are either in different taxonomic domains and not linked by a pragmatic function, or they are in different functional domains. (Barcelona 2011a: 53)

Barcelona specifies the conceptual process of metonymy as a mapping, as in the case of metaphor, but he emphasizes that it is an asymmetrical mapping, unlike metaphor. Instead of labeling the knowledge structure that contains both A and B as idealized cognitive models or domain matrices, he distinguishes between taxonomically and functionally structured domains and considers the functional relationship between A and B as a definitive property of conceptual metonymy.\(^{20}\)

One of the most elaborate CL definitions of metonymy has been put forward by Panther and Thornburg (2003c, 2004 and 2007):

[…] an adequate definition of conceptual metonymy should contain at least the following components:

a. Conceptual metonymy is a cognitive process where a source content provides access to a target content within one cognitive domain.

b. The relation between source content and target content is contingent (conceptually non-necessary), i.e., in principle defeasible.

c. The target content is foregrounded, and the source content is backgrounded.

d. The strength of the metonymic link between source and target content may vary depending, among other things, on the conceptual distance between source and target and the salience of the metonymic source. (Panther and Thornburg 2007: 242)

According to this definition, in (1) the ROOM and the PEOPLE are within the same cognitive domain. The relationship between them is contingent, i.e. the existential presupposition ‘There is a particular room 126’ does not logically entail ‘There are people working/living in room 126’ (see Panther and Thornburg 2004: 98-99, Panther 2005a: 360-361, or Panther 2005b: 17-18). From a meaning constructional point of view, the target content PEOPLE is foregrounded, whereas the source content ROOM is conceptually backgrounded. And finally, the metonymic link between the two contents is relatively strong since they are conceptually close and the room is relatively salient, since rooms are bounded physical spaces that can be

\(^{20}\) For a more detailed comparison of metaphor and metonymy in terms of Barcelona’s definition, see Chapter 3.
easily referred to (hence the possibility of numbering them). In summary, in Panther and Thornburg’s definition, (i) A and B are contents (ii) within one cognitive domain linked by a contingent relation whose strength in turn depends on the conceptual proximity vs. distance between A and B and on the salience of A, (iii) and the result of the metonymic provision of access to B is that it is fore-grounded, whereas A is back-grounded.

All the definitions discussed so far had the knowledge structure (idealized cognitive model, domain matrix, functional domain, cognitive domain) containing both target and content as one of their central components. These approaches are often grouped together under the label of the one-domain approach to metonymy. Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) summarize the problems of this approach stemming from the unclear and fuzzy notion of domain, and convincingly argue that it is possible to provide a non-unitary definition of metonymy in terms of a prototypically structured notion of contiguity, considered a distinctive property of metonymy from Aristotle’s Rhetoric until the rise of the one-domain approach. In other words, they focus on question (ii) and argue that the relationship between A and B is that of a more or less prototypical contiguity relation. If we consider (1) in terms of Peirsman and Geeraerts’ proposal, the connection between the ROOM and the PEOPLE working there is a relatively prototypical contiguity relation, LOCATION FOR LOCATED, since both are bounded entities in relatively close contact in the domain of physical entities.

My aim in this section was not to provide an all-encompassing overview of every aspect of metonymy investigated by cognitive linguists in the past three decades, but to find the core elements of the CL view of metonymy. A glimpse at the above listed definitions shows that the views of cognitive linguists often diverge on the particulars, and their refinements and elaborations revolve around questions (i)-(iii). It is not unusual that proponents of different views or focuses have serious differences of opinion. For instance, Croft (2006) criticizes Peirsman and Geeraerts’ contiguity-based approach and argues for a domain-based (more precisely for a domain highlighting) approach on the basis that the contiguity-based approach cannot account entirely for why certain metonymic shifts do not occur.

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21 For a more detailed overview of Peirsman and Geeraerts’ approach and its relevance for the classification of metonymy, see Chapter 5.
2.3 The ubiquity and primacy of metonymy

As Gibbs (1999: 64) puts it, before the upsurge of CL interest in metonymy the phenomenon was treated as relatively rare and insignificant: “One problem with most discussions of metonymy is that metonymy is too often seen as simply one kind of linguistic phenomenon. But metonymy is quite diverse and exhibits itself in a variety of forms in language.” The insight of CL regarding the conceptual nature of metonymy has cleared the way for a strand of fruitful research, which has revealed the cognitive background and the conceptual metonymic motivation of a series of linguistic phenomena.

In order to illustrate this heterogeneity of the linguistic realizations of metonymy, let us consider a collection of well-known examples taken from the literature that have been analyzed in terms of conceptual metonymy.22 The superficial analyses of these expressions may strike one as randomly chosen instances which have nothing in common. For instance, on the basis of what semantic, morphologic, syntactic, or pragmatic criteria could we discover common traits between a nominalising suffix and an indirect speech act? However, their detailed examination by the authors cited has convincingly shown that each of the following examples (2-16) are linguistic expressions motivated (at least to some extent) by conceptual metonymy.

Example (2), the now classic ham sandwich, is an instance of non-conventionalized referential metonymy (singling out individuals):

(2) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35)

Most authors use similar expressions to illustrate and explain the phenomenon of metonymy. It may be safely stated that most linguists consider (or at least have considered for a long time) this type of metonymic expressions to be the prototypical case of metonymy (see for example Warren 2006 and Barcelona 2011b: 13-14).

Koch’s examples (1999: 143 and 2004:13-14) show that conceptual metonymy plays an important and active role in both synchronic polysemy (3) and diachronic semantic change (4). Jäkel (1999: 215) has claimed that conceptual metonymy is an important motivational factor in the etymology of German family names (5).

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22 These examples do not stand here simply as isolated expressions but are intended to represent relatively frequent linguistic phenomena. The original source where they are mentioned and analyzed as being metonymically motivated is given in brackets.
(3) French: *Ma voiture est au garage.*
   English: ‘My car is in the garage/at the service station.’ (Koch 2004: 13-14)

(4) *la prison*
   Old French: ‘act of seizing’ → ‘captivity’ → ‘prison’
   Middle French: ‘penalty of imprisonment’ (Koch 1999: 143)

(5) German: *Klein* ‘short’ (Jäkel 1999: 215) [as a family name]

(6) is another famous example from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 37), often used to support the claim that metonymy is not necessarily referential, but can also be used in predicative functions (predicative metonymies, e.g. Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999):

(6) *She is just a pretty face.*

Example (7) by Radden and Kövecses (1999: 22) indicates that a verb, even a complex VP can be used metonymically, i.e. the polysemous meanings of a whole construction may be organized around a prototypical meaning with its extensions motivated by conceptual metonymy (cf. the similar Hungarian expressions: *lefekszík* (valakivel) ‘to lie down’ and ‘to sleep with somebody’; *elmegy lefeküdni* ‘to go to lie down’ and ‘to go to sleep’; *ágyba bújik* (valakivel) ‘to go to bed (with somebody)’ and ‘to sleep with somebody’ etc.).

(7) *to go to bed* ‘to have sex’ (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 22)

Based on examples (8-10) it can be stated that the combination of two linguistic units is very often motivated by conceptual metonymies:

(8) *dishwasher* (Panther and Thornburg 2002: 298)

(9) *office-park dad* ‘a married suburban father who works in a white-collar job’ (Benczes 2006a: 142)
(10) high temperature (Radden 2002: 409)

Panther and Thornburg (2002) argued for the prototypically structured polysemous category of the English nominalising suffix –er, in which the core meaning is metonymically and metaphorically expanded, leading to connected meanings. Benczes (2006a) mentions metonymically motivated compounds while investigating the conceptual motivation of English noun + noun compounds (9). Radden (2002) has demonstrated the metonymic motivation of the adjective + noun combination in (10).

Categorizing examples (11-16) as metonymic expressions may seem to be the most unusual, which many readers may find dubious. This may be due to the widespread conception of metonymy as a primarily lexical phenomenon, which has been refuted by many cognitive linguists (e.g. Panther and Thornburg 1999 and 2003b, Radden 2005, Barcelona 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2009, 2011b, and 2012, or Langacker 2009a etc.). As Barcelona (2011b: 16) puts it: “Metonymy is above all a conceptual connecting device between elements in our experience, which are often, but not necessarily, coded lexically in language, and it is often not confined to one particular grammatical level or even to grammar.”

The analyses by the quoted authors have all pointed out that the linguistic manifestations of conceptual metonymy may easily exceed the level of lexical units and in fact, they very frequently do so. In this sense – as a playful reference to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) claim about metaphor, namely that metaphor is not a matter of words23 – it can be stated that neither is metonymy. It may well be realized by larger or even by smaller linguistic units. Going one step further, it is also claimed that a metonymy is very often a matter of larger informational units, namely whole propositions24 (cf. Panther 2005b: 17 or Barcelona 2011b, or 2012). Strictly speaking, these metonymies are primarily not of a linguistic nature, but are rather phenomena of metonymic thinking and reasoning since they do not operate on units of language but on units of information (cf. Gibbs 1994 and 1999).

Panther and Thornburg (1999) have conducted a cross-linguistic investigation of the potentiality for actuality conceptual metonymy in English and Hungarian. They have shown that the aforementioned conceptual metonymy is manifested far more often on the

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23 “The most important claim we have made so far is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 6).
level of predications (11) (predicational metonymy), or even on the level of illocutionary acts (12) (speech act or illocutionary metonymies) than on the level of lexical units (referential metonymy) (for these notions see Thornburg and Panther 1997 and Panther and Thornburg 2003b and 2003c). The answer in Lakoff’s example (13) would be a standard instance of propositional metonymy according to the classification of Warren (1999 and 2002), in which two propositions are connected metonymically.  

(11) She was able to finish her dissertation. (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 334)  

(12) Can you pass the salt? (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 346)  


With the help of Langacker’s examples (14) and (15) I wish merely to touch upon the role conceptual metonymy plays in grammar:  

(14) He came at precisely 7:45 PM. (Langacker 2008: 70)  

The verb come – a temporally stretched event – is in apparent dissonance with the point-like temporal expression 7.45 PM. The verb come is used in the sense of ‘arrive’, an interpretation triggered by the cue provided by the point-like temporal expression. According to Langacker’s analysis (2008: 70) the verb is polysemous, and in (14) it refers to the closing sub-structure ARRIVAL of the event COMING. The relationship between an EVENT and its SUB-EVENT can be taken to be metonymic and among the sub-events of COMING – besides DEPARTURE – ARRIVAL has a special role because of its cognitive salience/prominence, which helps the hearer interpret non-literal expressions like (14) with ease.  

Langacker’s analysis of (15) shows how a phenomenon that has traditionally been treated in purely syntactic terms, namely Subject-to-Subject Raising, may be accounted for.

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25 Warren (1999: 121 and 2002: 114) illustrates the notion of propositional metonymy (see Sub-section 3.7.1) with the help of the following example taken from Gibbs (1994: 327) (the parallel between Lakoff’s and Gibbs’ examples is obvious):  

A: How did you get to the airport?  
B: I waved down a taxi. [A taxi took me there]  

26 It is important to note that in Langacker’s view polysemy is an everyday and omnipresent phenomenon, and it is rather the rule, not the exception: “Moreover, I take it as established that polysemy is the normal state of affairs for common lexical items” (Langacker 1984: 181).
with the help of conceptual metonymy: the raised noun phrase (Jones) serves as a metonymic reference point to the clausal event (Jones sues us), which can in turn participate directly in the relationship expressed in the main clause (is unlikely).\footnote{For the cognitive linguistic treatment of raising constructions – in which active zones play a particularly important role – see one of Langacker’s earlier and shorter analyses (1984) and one of his more detailed accounts (1999: Chapter 11).}

\begin{align*}
(15) & \textit{Jones would be unlikely to sue us.} \quad (\text{Langacker 1999: 200)} \\
\end{align*}

The last example illustrates the conceptual metonymic motivation of metaphoric expressions:

\begin{align*}
(16) & \textit{My pride was wounded.} \quad (\text{Radden 2002: 425-426)} \\
\end{align*}

According to Radden, in (16) the source and target domains of the \texttt{PHYSICAL INJURY conceptual metaphor} can be traced back to a common experiential ground: psychic harm and physical injury are very often experienced together, and there is often a hypothesized or real cause-and-effect relationship between them; furthermore, both can be looked upon as members of the same category (\texttt{INJURY} as a hyperonymic category label, \texttt{PSYCHIC HARM} and \texttt{PHYSICAL INJURY} as hyponymic sub-category labels). Based on these facts, it is a reasonable assumption to consider the conceptual metaphor at hand to be motivated by conceptual metonymy. In the light of linguistic expressions like the one represented here, Radden introduces the notion of \textit{metonymy-based metaphor} (2002: 412) designating conceptual metonymies where the source and target domains have a \textit{common experiential basis}.\footnote{The question may naturally arise as to what makes these expressions metaphorlic, in other words, why are they not classified as metonymies? The recalcitrant problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor is addressed in more detail in Chapter 3.}

It has been suggested that conceptual metonymy is also at work behind a series of linguistic phenomena we have not even taken into consideration here: for example in \texttt{phonology} (cf. Taylor 1995: Chapter 12, Barcelona 2011b, Radden 2005), in \texttt{grammar} (cf. the contributions in Panther, Thornburg and Barcelona 2009 and many more), in \texttt{pragmatic meaning construction} (cf. the contributions in Panther and Thornburg 2003 and many more), in \texttt{grammaticalization} processes (e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002, Fu 2012), or in \texttt{discourse structuring} (e.g. Barcelona 2005a, 2005b, 2007 and 2011b, Fu 2012); not to
mention non-linguistic metonymies. In the light of the growing number of results indicating the conceptual metonymic motivation of an abundance of linguistic phenomena, more and more authors have claimed that metonymy is an omnipresent process in human thinking and language (e.g. Radden 2005, Barcelona 2010, 2011b, 2012, Panther 2005a, 2005b, Panther and Thornburg 2007). In Kövecses and Radden’s (1999) view, language itself is fundamentally metonymic. Langacker (2009a: Chapter 2, 2009b) posits the same claim about grammar. Fu (2012) goes as far as to claim that metonymy is not merely a conceptual process that relates parts and wholes but plays an essential role in the conceptual formation of wholes and parts. These authors all argue for the view of the ubiquity of metonymy in language and thought.

As mentioned, metonymy research developed for a long time in the shadow of metaphor research. An increasing number of authors pointed out that metonymy plays just as important a role in our cognition as metaphor. Regarding the relationship between metaphor and metonymy, many have argued that metonymy also lies at the heart of metaphor. Radden (2002) has pointed out that a great number of our conceptual metaphors are motivated (at least at some very prior phase of conceptualization) by metonymy. Barcelona (2000b and 2011b) has argued that essentially every metaphor could be traced back to conceptual metonymic roots. Panther (2013) is of the view that so called primary metaphors (Grady 1997a, 1997b, Lakoff and Johnson 1999), i.e. the fundamental building blocks of complex metaphors, are in fact metonymies. Fu (2008, 2012) shows that many fundamental conceptual metaphors such as TIME IS SPACE are actually the results of underlying metonymic conceptualization processes. As a reaction to the relative neglect of conceptual metonymy, a major strand of conceptual metonymy research has been established that proposes the primacy of conceptual metonymy in comparison with metaphor.

In sum, the most significant achievement of cognitive metonymy researchers is a view of metonymy that considers it to be a ubiquitous and primary conceptual process. In line with the basic commitments of CL, this notion of conceptual metonymy can possibly function as a very general principle that plays an essential role in every field of human thinking and language. In the light of CL literature on metonymy, it has indeed turned out to be an extremely useful tool to describe and explain a series of diverse linguistic phenomena. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that this extremely broad notion of metonymy is accompanied by certain risks and posits some terminological problems.

Some authors (e.g. more recently Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014) have warned against the overuse of the term, since the undesired result may be that it becomes vacuous. In other
words, the ubiquity and primacy view of metonymy may lead to the unfortunate situation that ultimately every linguistic phenomenon is metonymic, i.e. the unrestricted use of the notion in linguistic analyses may render it limitless, making it unable to capture generalizable properties of the phenomena under scrutiny. Furthermore, the focus on metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon has pushed the exploration of its linguistically manifest properties to the background in metonymy research. In the following section, I address this latter problem, i.e. that there is no working definition of linguistic metonymy on the basis of which empirical research could be conducted with the aim of exploring the linguistically manifest properties of the phenomenon.

2.4 Relating conceptual and linguistic metonymy

As pointed out in the previous section, the ubiquity view has had some serious terminological consequences. The term ‘metonymy’ has become extremely polysemous. The diversity of its senses occurs in two main directions: it designates a rather heterogeneous group of conceptual phenomena and an extremely broad scale of diverse linguistic phenomena. Its usage is fairly inconsequent in both senses. On the level of conceptual phenomena, we encounter the following notions: “metonymic concept”, “metonymic ICM”, “metonymic relationship”, “metonymy producing relationship”, “metonymic mapping”, “metonymic pattern or schema” or even “metonymic reasoning”. The term ‘metonymy’ seems to designate a conceptual relationship, a conceptual process, and the result of this process at the same time. In schematic terms, ‘metonymy’ refers to the conceptual relationship between A and B, to the connection that is made between A and B, to the process of making the connection, and to the concept or model construed as a result of making the connection between A and B.

Consequently, it is far from being unequivocal whether ‘metonymy’ refers to a conceptual operation or to a conceptual schema created by the operation. For instance, it is

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29 The status of these phenomena is far from undisputed. In fact, it is questionable whether they are ‘phenomena’ at all. In the sense of Lehmann’s definition (2004) they can be hardly accepted as epistemic objects. Their existence can only be inferred indirectly from data of other ontological standing: for instance, the existence of a cognitive principle, in this case a metonymic schema or pattern, can only be inferred from the linguistic expressions motivated by it, or from its visual manifestations or from experimental results. For example, the AUTHOR FOR WORK conceptual metonymy can only be examined on the basis of linguistic expressions such as They are playing Mozart tonight (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 39). Therefore, in linguistic analyses conceived in the spirit of the theory of conceptual metonymy it is not always entirely clear exactly what the epistemic object of the research is: a conceptual operation or a group of linguistic expressions. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be pursued any further within the confines of the thesis; I use the notion ‘phenomenon’ in a pre-theoretic sense.
hard to decide whether the conceptual metonymy PART FOR WHOLE refers to the conceptual process during which mental access is secured to the WHOLE through the PART or to the conceptual schema or ICM resulting from this process. A more precise terminological distinction would be beneficial, especially in investigating the production, comprehension, and interpretation of metonymic expressions in discourse, since in this field it is far from being of no consequence whether we understand ‘metonymy’ to be a more or less fixed and constant knowledge structure or a permanently on-line activated conceptual process.\(^{30}\)

It is not a new insight for cognitive linguists that the notion of metonymy refers to conceptual and linguistic phenomena simultaneously. This duality is quite usual in research practice. It seems to come naturally, and for this very reason it is hardly perceived as problematic. The explanation for the lack of interest in this terminological problem is twofold. Firstly, the sharp distinction between the two uses does not seem to play a significant role in many cognitively oriented research fields; accordingly, its absence does not cause problems. And secondly, the problem is considered by many to have already been solved by the introduction of the terminological pair ‘conceptual metonymy’ and ‘metonymic expression’ (or more precisely: metonymically motivated expression). See for example: “The use of metonymic expressions in language is primarily a reflection of general conceptual metonymies and is motivated by general cognitive principles” (Kövecses and Radden 1999: 18). According to this definition, ‘conceptual metonymy’ and ‘metonymic expression’ are not to be confused: the former is a conceptual process, the latter is the linguistic realization of this conceptual process. Panther and Thornburg (2007: 240) use the term ‘linguistic metonymy’ instead of metonymic expression and specify the distinction between conceptual and linguistic metonymies:

The source content and the target content of a metonymy are linked by conceptual contiguity (see Dirven 1993). Metonymies that satisfy this criterion are henceforth called conceptual metonymies. ‘Content’ should be understood in its broadest sense, including lexical concepts (words) but also thoughts (propositional contents). When the source content is expressed by a linguistic sign (a lexeme or a syntagmatic combination of lexemes), one can speak of a linguistic metonymy. (Panther and Thornburg 2007: 240)

\(^{30}\) The terminological problems I describe here are equally or even more relevant to the discussion of metaphor, but these problems would require a thesis of their own. All I can do at this point is to note that everything stated here applies to metaphor as well.
In other words, they claim that in a linguistic metonymy the source content is manifested in the form of a linguistic sign; accordingly, they make a consistent distinction between the terms ‘source’ and ‘vehicle’, where the source is of conceptual nature, while the vehicle is of linguistic nature: “In a linguistically manifest metonymic relation, a source meaning is related to a target meaning by means of a linguistic form (e.g. morpheme, word, phrase, sentence) that we call the linguistic vehicle” (Panther and Thornburg 2004: 96-97).

For instance, the metonymically motivated expression in (17) is the linguistic realization of the specific conceptual metonymy WOODBURY FOR THE EVENTS WHICH HAPPENED IN WOODBURY, or on one level of abstraction higher it is the verbal manifestation of the conceptual metonymy PLACE FOR EVENT:

(17) Rick, I get it, you don’t want to risk another Woodbury.31

The example is from a comic book, which clearly shows that at an appropriately abstract level the PLACE FOR EVENT conceptual metonymy is so pervasive, and at the level of specific conceptual metonymies and metonymic expressions so productive, that even an event in a fictive world is mentally accessible through a fictive place.32 In Panther and Thornburg’s terms, the source content is WOODBURY, or a PLACE, which is expressed by the linguistic vehicle, or linguistic metonymy Woodbury.

Both distinctions relate conceptual and linguistic metonymy by positing that the latter is motivated by the former and the latter in turn expresses the former on the level of linguistic signs. However, the correspondence between conceptual metonymic motivation and metonymic expressions is far more complex than the one-to-one correspondence sketched above. One of the reasons for this complexity is the well-documented phenomenon of multiple motivation (e.g. Fass 1988: 179; Benczes 2005a; Dobrovol’skij 2007): a given linguistic expression can be motivated by different conceptual metonymies, by a metonymic chain (Reddy 1979/1993; Fass 1991, 1997: 120; Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández 2003a: 38-40), or even by the intricate interaction of conceptual metaphors and metonymies (e.g. Fass 1997: 120; Geeraerts 2002; Goossens 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza & Diez Velasco 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández 2003: 40-45).

Another problem surrounding the terminological pair ‘metonymically motivated expression’ and ‘conceptual metonymy’ may be traced back to the ubiquity view of

32 For the abstraction levels of conceptual metonymies, see Ruiz de Mendoza & Diez Velasco (2003a).
metonymy. As the examples under (2-16) and the discussion in Section 2.3 illustrate, the term ‘conceptual metonymy’ designates a very broadly understood cognitive principle, or an ability, which is considered by several cognitive linguists to be omnipresent in language and thought. This cognitive process, as evidenced by the examples mentioned and their analyses, has become – in cognitively oriented works – an analytic and heuristic tool, a theoretical construct. As such it has proved to be very efficient in analyzing numerous – in fact almost an endless series of – different linguistic expressions and in exploring their conceptual motivation. On the other hand, the examples represented here have shed some light on the fact that the correspondence between conceptual metonymy and metonymic expressions is far from straightforward (as in 16). Consequently, the category of ‘metonymic expression’ does not reveal anything about the expression at hand but merely that its production and interpretation is motivated at least to some extent by conceptual metonymy, i.e. the term is rather uninformative.

This situation can be captured in the form of two interconnected problems which can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, the notion ‘conceptual metonymy’ runs the risk of becoming vacuous. On the other, the notion ‘metonymic expression’ may become simply inadequate to designate a more or less homogeneous group of linguistic expressions. The problem is very similar to that expressed by Langacker in connection with reference point phenomena:

It is legitimate to ask whether we might not have cast our nets too broadly, bringing together – on the basis of the most tenuous fancied similarity – linguistic phenomena that really have very little to do with one another. […] I would not, of course, claim that the phenomena are all alike, only that they resemble one another in a certain respect. (Langacker 1999: 201)

In my view, the problem is not whether metonymy is a phenomenon of a conceptual or a linguistic nature. ‘Conceptual metonymy’ is a very broadly interpreted term designating a cognitive process, which in turn is manifested in various linguistic expressions. In this sense, I share the assumption that linguistic phenomena are basically some sort of reflection or projection of our cognitive abilities, processes, and operations; consequently, language and cognition cannot be examined in isolation from each other; they are not independent

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33 For the sake of brevity, we cannot consider here the discussions surrounding the psychological reality of this theoretical construct.
autonomous modules.\textsuperscript{34} Hence, the problem posed is not a problem of linguistic theory regarding the ontological status of metonymy; it is rather a \textbf{terminological problem}.

The dilemma we face is whether to reserve the term ‘metonymy’ for designating exclusively linguistic or exclusively cognitive phenomena. The problem cannot be fully resolved by merely positing the consistent terminological distinction between a metonymically motivated expression and a conceptual metonymy. The reason for the failure of this distinction is twofold. On the one hand, except for conceptual metonymic motivation we are missing any well-defined criteria on the basis of which we could categorize a figurative expression as an instance of metonymic expression. This is because by stretching this category – merely based on it being motivated to some extent by a conceptual metonymy – a little further, it would embrace all linguistic expressions and consequently lead to the risk that their differences may be blurred. On the other hand, if we reserve the term ‘metonymy’ exclusively for conceptual operations – as is often the case in cognitive metonymy research – we may face the problem that the term results in a too broadly defined category. Furthermore, the set of notions capturing conceptual phenomena which are used for the definition of this extremely broad category is so fuzzy that it may no longer be able to define it in a unitary way.\textsuperscript{35} If we follow this path, we may very well lose a linguistic category which may be very helpful in setting up generalizations about groups of linguistic phenomena and could contribute to a more powerful empirical underpinning of theoretical categories.

In summary, the terms ‘conceptual metonymy’ and ‘metonymic expression’ should be sharply distinguished, since both terms are warranted in the sense that metonymy is present in cognition as well as in language. On a conceptual level, metonymy could be defined with the help of a set of notions that designate very general cognitive phenomena in accordance with the theoretical commitments of CL. As opposed to this notion of metonymy, defining metonymy on the level of linguistic expressions requires more than an unveiling of the conceptual motivation of a certain expression. It requires the consideration of factors that are manifested on the level of linguistic expressions. Accordingly, later on when I use the term ‘\textit{linguistic factors}’ when defining and classifying metonymy, what I mean are the characteristics of metonymy which are manifested on the level of linguistic expressions.

\textsuperscript{34} I do not intend to elaborate further on the debates between modular and holistic perspectives; my aim is merely to emphasize that the approach presented in my thesis is basically in line with the fundamental assumptions of CL.

\textsuperscript{35} For a brief overview of these conceptual phenomena used as theoretical tools in the definition of metonymy and metaphor, see Chapter 3.
Before concluding the chapter and summarizing the problems uncovered, it is worth taking a look at how different strands in metonymy research cope with the terminological situation outlined in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.

2.5 Tendencies in research on metonymy

Fu (2008, 2012) mentions four major approaches to metonymy within CL: the cognitive domain approach, the reference point/mental access approach, the blending theory, and the contingent indexical approach. The cognitive domain approach emphasizes that metonymy is an intra-domain mapping as opposed to the inter-domain mapping of metaphor, i.e. metonymy involves a single knowledge structure. The reference point/mental access approach goes back to Langacker (1993) and considers metonymy to be a reference point phenomenon in which the source provides mental access to the target. As a theory of general on-line meaning construction, blending theory (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 1999, Turner and Fauconnier 2002) accommodates metonymy as a special type of blending, or space building. And finally, in the contingent indexical approach (e.g. Warren 1998, 1999, and 2002) metonymy is a type of meaning elaboration based on a contingent indexical relation between source and target which is not arbitrary but motivated. Fu also points out that none of these approaches is without problems.

These approaches often overlap and authors use elements from more than one of them. For instance, though Fu mentions the definition of Radden and Kövecses (1999) among reference point approaches, they clearly incorporate the cognitive domain approach as well. Or, he labels Panther (2006) as a representative of the contingent indexical approach; however, Panther also considers providing mental access and the involvement of a single domain to be crucial elements of a definition of metonymy (see the definition in Section 2.2). The approaches differ merely in the emphasis they lay on certain aspects of metonymy, i.e. the extent to which they focus on questions (i)-(iii) posed in Section 2.2.

If we take a closer look at the definitions of cognitively oriented research into metonymy and abstract away from the different answers they give to questions (i)-(iii), two opposing tendencies can be outlined. On the one hand, metonymy is defined as broadly as possible (ubiquity view). This definition results in a conception of metonymy according to which it is a ubiquitous, extremely frequent cognitive principle of utmost importance in conceptualizing and verbalizing our experiences. Representative examples of this very broad definition of metonymy are those of Radden and Kövecses (Kövecses and Radden 1998,

The **broad definition** of metonymy has its undisputed merits. As a result of treating metonymy as a general and basic cognitive process, cognitive linguistically oriented research gained a powerful analytic tool – besides metaphor, conceptual integration, and other cognitive processes. Metonymy as a cognitive principle, governing conceptualization and verbalization of experience, comes in handy when analyzing an incredibly broad range of linguistic and non-linguistic data, many of which had formerly been explained away or excluded from investigations as peripheral and idiosyncratic. Metonymy has become a way of uncovering the cognitive motivation of linguistic phenomena and providing a plausible explanation for their behavior. Apart from its importance in linguistic analyses, thanks to the broader conception of metonymy we have gained insights into the workings of the human mind. However, this gain comes with a drawback. Let us demonstrate this with the help of some of the earlier examples in Section 2.3, with special emphasis on less prototypical instances of metonymy (3-5 and 7-16).

As already pointed out, all these expressions have been analyzed as being conceptually motivated by metonymy in one way or another. The result is an extremely **heterogeneous** class of linguistic expressions which can hardly be subsumed under the same linguistic category metonymy, or to be more precise metonymic expression.

The problem can be summarized as follows: the term ‘metonymy’ may well have become too vacuous to designate any class of linguistic or conceptual phenomena. If in every single linguistic expression there is a “pinch” of metonymy, no linguistic expression can be characterized as an instance of metonymy. In other words, if language is generally motivated by conceptual metonymy, the term ‘metonymic expression’ loses its status as a category label of linguistics and will designate nothing (or everything, depending on our perspective). This situation may lead to terminological and classification disputes and may result in difficulties in forming valid generalizations and in the empirical underpinning of the cognitive theory of metonymy, which may further weaken its claims and may provoke the charge of circularity (e.g. Haser 2005).

The **opposing tendency** within cognitive metonymy research subsumes attempts to come to grips with this problem, either by defining metonymy more narrowly or by proposing more easily graspable **subclasses of metonymy**. Attempts can be grouped
according to the strategy they involve and according to the levels of description on which they are carried out. There are approaches which try to delineate metonymy against other related phenomena (e.g. Seto (1999) from synecdoche, or from metaphor, though this latter distinction has turned out to be utterly problematic\textsuperscript{36}) or at least accommodate it among even more general cognitive phenomena (cf. Langacker’s active zones (1984) and reference point constructions (1993, 1999)). Others attempt to set up more or less homogeneous subclasses of metonymy (cf. Warren’s distinction between propositional and referential metonymies (1999, 2002, 2006), Panther and Thornburg’s distinction between propositional (referential and predicational) and illocutionary metonymies (Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999).

These two strategies can basically be carried out on three descriptive levels: metonymy as a cognitive phenomenon, metonymy as a linguistic phenomenon and finally metonymy as a pragmatic phenomenon. A good example of defining metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon against other conceptual phenomena is Paradis (2004, 2011), who investigates the relationship between facets, active zones, and metonymy, or Ruiz de Mendoza (2011) who situates metonymy among other construal phenomena, or to mention a now classic approach, Croft’s (2002) conception of metonymy as domain highlighting, as opposed to metaphor which is domain mapping. Barcelona’s tripartite prototype-based continuum of metonymicity with schematic, typical, and prototypical metonymies can also be considered as a cognitively based typology of metonymy (2002, 2011a), as can Peirsman and Geeraerts’ (2006a) extensive prototype-structured typology based on the metaphorical extension of the notion of conceptual contiguity.\textsuperscript{37} Among these attempts, there is a very insightful classification of metonymies as conceptual phenomena by Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco (2003a) that draws a parallel between the types of conceptual metonymies according to their level of abstraction and the linguistic expressions and structures they motivate.

There are some attempts which direct their attention toward the linguistic features of metonymy without disclaiming its pervasive conceptual nature. In other words, they focus on the features of metonymic expressions rather than on the conceptual metonymies that motivate them. For instance, Waltereit (1999) focuses on the prominent role of direct objects in metonymic transfers. A further example would be Warren’s approach, to be discussed

\textsuperscript{36} See Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{37} Although it must be noted that these latter two typologies strive to set up as broad a category as possible by extending its limits radially around a prototypical core.
later in more detail: she sets up two subclasses of metonymy (referential and propositional) (1999), and based on this classification, distinguishes (referential) metonymy from metaphor (2002).

**Pragmatic approaches** to metonymy are very different in terms of their basic theoretical assumptions. Although Panther and Thornburg (Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999) classify metonymies according to the pragmatic function of their linguistic manifestations, they clearly view metonymy primarily as a cognitive process. As opposed to the views of the conceptual theory of metonymy, representatives of RT do not consider metonymy as a pervasive cognitive principle. They rather subsume it under other pragmatic phenomena accounted for by the general principle of relevance (cf. Papafragou 1995 and 1996a, according to whom metonymy is a kind of “echoic use” of language).

Table 2.1 summarizes the major paths taken by cognitive linguists towards a **narrowing down of the notion of metonymy**. The square brackets indicate that the works mentioned do not entirely fit the table. Papafragou (1995 and 1996a) is not a representative of holistic CL; accordingly, in her approach the conceptual importance of metonymy is downplayed. Although they set up classes of metonymy, Barcelona (2002 and 2011a) and Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a) are representatives of a broad, prototypically organized notion of metonymy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of description</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Defining against other phenomena</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ruiz de Mendoza (2011)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Croft’s (2002)</td>
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Table 2.1 Strategies of narrowing the cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy
Some further remarks need to be made to supplement this outline of the tendencies in the field. First, it is admittedly over-simplistic and schematized. Second, many excellent approaches to defining and classifying metonymy have been left out because of the limits of this section (e.g. Koch 1999 or Blank 1999), i.e. my survey is anything but comprehensive. Third, there are overlaps. The labels I have used only indicate a certain orientation of the works cited. My final remark is also concerned with the notions used for labeling these tendencies, especially those indicating the levels of description. I would like to emphasize that in my view conceptual-semantic, lexical-syntactic (linguistic), and pragmatic-discourse factors are not clearly separable. In other words, I share the assumptions of CL, in that I do not view these factors as the result of the modularized structure of the mind; they are not clearly distinguishable, but rather form a continuum. These terms merely reflect a useful division of labor among different interests and focuses in studying language, cognition, and communication.

The tension between the two opposing tendencies in cognitive metonymy research, i.e. defining it broadly as a ubiquitous conceptual process on the one hand, and attempting to narrow down the notion in order to avoid its becoming vacuous on the other, is also attested in the most recent literature on metonymy. In a 2014 issue of *Cognitive Linguists*, a debate developed on what we can and cannot consider a metonymy. In my view, the origin of the debate between the two sides can be traced back to the tension between the broad and narrow definitions of metonymy, which is apparently far from being resolved.

The prelude to the debate is provided by Janda (2011). She offers a systematic and comprehensive classification of suffixal word-formation in Russian, Czech, and Norwegian in terms of metonymy. The basis of her cross-linguistic investigation is the argument that suffixal word-formation is basically of a metonymic nature: “In word-formation, the source corresponds to the source word that the derivation is based on, the context for the metonymic relationship is the affix, and the target is the concept associated with the derived word” (Janda 2011: 360). Later on, she applies Peirsman and Geeraerts’ contiguity-based classification of metonymies (2006a) to suffixal word-formation and arrives at a system that may yield fruitful results in cross-linguistic investigations both into lexical and grammatical metonymy. In my view, Janda (2011) actually argues for the conceptual metonymic motivation of word-formation in general by relying on a very broad conception of metonymy; hence what she achieves is to add further arguments for the ubiquity view of metonymy.
In a paper commenting on Janda (2011), Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014: 314) warn that the “claim about metonymy being involved in word-formation phenomena such as suffixation would lead to an unconstrained use of the notion of ‘metonymy’, rendering it virtually vacuous”. At the heart of their criticism is the refutation of Janda’s claim cited above, based on a close inspection of Panther’s notion of the basic metonymic relation (2005a: 358 and 2005b: 15). Among their arguments, I would highlight that they point out that according to this basic relation, the implicitness of the target is a definitional property of metonymy, and this criterion does not hold for word-formation, since in Janda’s account both the target (derived word) and the source (base or source word) are linguistically expressed. According to their final remark, Janda (2011) equates contiguity relations on the conceptual level with metonymicity, and they claim that contiguity relations are not necessarily expressed in the form of metonymies on the linguistic level (for instance, word-formation as a phenomenon of the syntagmatic axis of language does not qualify as metonymic). As can be seen, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó argue against an excessively broad notion of metonymy and define it more narrowly – interestingly enough and relatively unusually – based on linguistic criteria.

Focusing on the points in Janda’s answer (2014) which are relevant to the terminological issue at hand in this section, I would highlight one of her major claims and one of her counter-criticisms. On the one hand, she argues for a broad notion of metonymy since it “facilitates more insightful generalizations” (Janda 2014: 341); on the other, she points out that Brdar and Brdar-Szabó do not provide an explicitly formulated definition of metonymy. This latter counter argument – it has to be admitted – is true: they use definitional criteria of metonymicity that have been suggested in the literature, but they do not integrate them into an explicit, narrower definition of metonymy.

The terminological tension at the heart of the debate remains unsolved. Representatives of a broad notion of metonymy emphasize the theoretical gain provided by such a notion (e.g. generalizability, conceptual motivation, a useful analytic tool etc.), whereas representatives of a narrower definition warn against the unrestricted use of the term, since eventually it renders the term empty and prevents any meaningful generalizations, not to mention the impossibility of the empirical study of an omnipresent phenomenon. Whichever stance is taken, it comes at a price. If the notion is defined narrowly, we might end up disregarding the results of CL. If it is defined broadly, we might lose a useful category of linguistic description and analysis, about which we could formulate generalizations or which could be investigated empirically.
A possible way out of this terminological dilemma is to make a **careful distinction between conceptual and linguistic metonymy**, which involves **linguistically manifest criteria** for the latter, not merely conceptual metonymic motivation or the linguistic expression of a conceptual metonymic relationship. Following Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014), I attempt to explicate a **narrower definition of linguistic metonymy** in Chapter 4. As a result of this distinction, conceptual metonymy would preserve its explanatory potential as a **broadly defined, ubiquitous conceptual phenomenon**, whereas the narrow definition of linguistic metonymy would provide a term for a **range of linguistic phenomena that is relatively well-delineated and homogeneous**, making generalizations and their empirical study possible.

### 2.6 Summary

Instead of giving a detailed overview of the state of the art in current metonymy research, I have taken the following argumentative path: I have outlined those **basic assumptions of CL** that bear direct relevance for the cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy, above all generalization and cognitive commitment. I have tried to capture those elements of the **CL definitions of metonymy** that are generally agreed upon, and pointed out that approaches diverge mainly on questions (i)-(iii). Despite the plurality of the answers provided to these questions, it can be safely stated that metonymy is considered to be a fundamental cognitive process by all cognitive metonymy researchers, some of whom propose the **ubiquity and primacy** of metonymy.

Based on the literature, we can observe **two major tendencies** in defining metonymy, which point in opposite directions. Works representing the first tendency attempt to define metonymy as broadly as possible. The result of the **broad definition** is the conception of metonymy as a ubiquitous and frequently occurring conceptual process of the utmost importance. Opposed to these endeavors, representatives of the reverse tendency try to **delimit metonymy** in order to prevent the term from possibly becoming completely devoid of any content.

The **tension between the two tendencies** can be grasped as a paradox of desiderata. It is desirable to expand the notion of metonymy in order to arrive at a very general cognitive principle that has already proved to be extremely useful in describing linguistic phenomena and in uncovering their conceptual motivation. At the same time, it is also desirable to prevent the danger of expanding the notion too far, resulting in its deflation and to have a
more narrowly defined notion which is capable of designating more or less homogeneous groups of linguistic phenomena which can be investigated empirically in a systematic fashion, i.e. the unresolved tension makes the empirical study of metonymy extremely difficult.

In Section 2.4 I identified the **unclear relationship between the notions ‘conceptual metonymy’ and ‘linguistic metonymy’** as one of the major terminological problems surrounding the notion of metonymy within CL. Even if they cannot be defined independently of each other, their definition should be supported by independent criteria. Both notions are justified in the light of the results of the cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy. The theoretical and analytic utility of neither a very **broadly defined notion of conceptual metonymy**, nor a **narrow definition of linguistic metonymy** can be disregarded. A very general principle with considerable explanatory force on the level of conceptual phenomena and a clearly defined category describing a more or less homogeneous group of linguistic phenomena are both required simultaneously. Adequate definitions for the pair of notions ‘conceptual’ and ‘linguistic metonymy’ would provide us with both.

Before turning to (PDEL) and (PCLASS), in the following section I address in some detail the problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor. The reason for doing so is threefold. First, cognitive metonymy research developed in the shadow of metaphor research for a considerable time, hence the CL notion of metonymy can hardly be studied without reflecting on its relation to that of metaphor. Second, some of the problems uncovered in the present chapter can be better illuminated by taking a look at the possibilities of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor. And finally, later on in Chapter 4 I will offer two properties of linguistic metonymy which contribute to the solution of the problematic distinction of the two phenomena.
Chapter 3 – Metonymy and metaphor

3.1 The relationship between metonymy and metaphor in CL

The problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor has been puzzling the cognitive linguistic literature for years. Despite the numerous differences between the two phenomena, their similarities and interconnectedness are constantly pointed out and subjected to thorough examinations. Independently of each other, metaphor and metonymy research play a central role in the CL study of figurative language. It is often emphasized that they differ from each other in several respects; however, more recently attention has shifted to an investigation of their links. It has been pointed out that metaphor and metonymy often interact, and the result of this interaction is a series of linguistic phenomena that resist an unambiguous classification as metaphors and metonymies.

One of the first authors to confront this classification problem in a terminological sense as well, was Louis Goossens (2002). The close relation and interrelatedness between metonymy and metaphor led him to introduce the notion of metaphtonymy, to label phenomena that are the product of the interaction between the two. Moreover, some studies from the previous decade – above all Barcelona (2000b or 2002) – argued that metaphoric mappings have a metonymic basis, i.e. there is a hierarchical relationship between the two phenomena. From this view, it follows that metonymy is a more basic or fundamental mental operation than metaphor.

Before I set out to address the problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor, let us briefly consider what are understood in CL to be clear cases of metonymy and metaphor, with the aid of two examples.

(1) If clubs have to close down because they do not have the money for the changes deemed necessary to avoid another Hillsborough, then so be it.

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38 Substantial parts of Chapter 3 have been published as Tóth (2011a) and (2011b).
39 More recently, Fu (2008, 2012) has argued in favor of the same claim, based on results from developmental psychology, i.e. for the primacy of metonymy over metaphor.
The highlighted expression realizes the conceptual metonymy PLACE FOR EVENT. In terms of a standard cognitive linguistic definition, conceptual metonymy\textsuperscript{41} is a cognitive process whereby an element of a conceptual domain (target) is made accessible with the help of another element of the same domain or by the whole domain itself (source). As a result of the metonymic process an aspect of the target domain is highlighted.

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{(2)}
\begin{description}
\item[Hungarian:] – A házasság mindig hazárdjáték – szólt a penzionált ezredes. – A legbolondabb hazárdjáték. A játékos azt se tudja, mire játszik. Mert hiszen nem ismeri a nőt, akit elvesz: csak annyit ismer belőle, amennyit a nő mutat. Van annyi esze minden nőnek, hogy nem a hibáit mutogatja.
\item S legyintett.
\item – Hazárdjáték.
\item – És a tétel mindig egy életsors. – fűzte tovább a bankigazgató. – Ha csak egy lehetőség van is a vesztésre, nem játszom.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{description}
\begin{description}
\item[English:] – Marriage is always a gamble – said the pensioned colonel. – The most foolish gamble. The gambler doesn’t even know what he is gambling on. Since he doesn’t know the woman he is marrying: all he knows is what she shows. Every woman has enough wit not to show her flaws.
\item And he waved his hand.
\item – A gamble.
\item – And the stake is always one’s fate. – added the bank manager. – If there is even a slight possibility of losing, I’m not playing.
\end{description}
\end{enumerate}

All the highlighted expressions in (2) realize linguistically the conceptual metaphor MARRIAGE IS A GAMBLE. In its cognitive linguistic conception, metaphor is a conceptual

\textsuperscript{41}At this initial point of my argumentation, I do not use a particular definition of a particular author. What I present here is merely a working definition that incorporates generally accepted aspects of metonymy and metaphor. For definitions of metonymy, see Chapter 2 Section 2.1, for definitions of metaphor within and beyond CL, see, for instance, Kövecses (2002), Lakoff (1993), Rolf (2005), Ortony (1993) or Gibbs (2008).

\textsuperscript{42}Gárdonyi (2013a: 8). The English translation is mine, M.T.
operation that connects the elements of two distinct conceptual domains based on systematic correlations between them.

However, we encounter several linguistic expressions that are hard to categorize clearly as metaphors or metonymies; consider for instance (3):

(3a) I should rather have bitten my tongue.
(3b) German: Ich hätte mir lieber in die Zunge beißen sollen.
(3c) Hungarian: Inkább haraptam volna el a nyelvem.

Does the word tongue/Zunge/nyelv in (3) stand metonymically for speaking, or is the whole expression a metaphor for ‘rather not speak/rather not say a word”? In this chapter I am concerned with similar figurative linguistic expressions whose assignment to the categories of metaphor and metonymy appears to be problematic.

In the following, I examine what makes the distinction between metonymy and metaphor intriguing: the problematic nature of their distinctive properties and their interaction. I conduct analyses of selected examples of borderline cases in terms of three partially concurring theoretical approaches (Radden 2002, Barcelona 2002, and Warren 2002, 2004, and 2006). Two of these apply a broad definition of metonymy based on properties of a primarily conceptual nature, and the third applies a narrow definition of metonymy based on linguistically manifest properties.

My purpose is to examine the descriptive force of the three approaches to uncover how they can describe borderline cases and what criteria of distinction they offer. I do not intend to provide an all-encompassing evaluation of the approaches under scrutiny, nor an ultimate solution to the distinction problem. My analyses rather aim at the formulation of questions that need to be addressed within an approach that intends to distinguish metonymy from metaphor, i.e. intends to define metonymy more narrowly. By gathering these questions and pointing out the answers provided by the three approaches at hand, it is not only their differences that will be illuminated, but also their strengths and possible flaws. The results may provide us with some insights regarding the possibility of a narrower definition of metonymy in terms of linguistically explicit properties.
3.2 Definitional problems

The distinction between metonymy and metaphor can be traced back to the problematic nature of the elements of their definitions. Since CL considers both as primarily cognitive processes, their properties – on the basis of which they are defined – are also primarily of a conceptual nature. Accordingly, metonymic and metaphoric expressions are categorized as such based on the cognitive processes that motivate them. Among the problematic elements of the cognitive definitions of metonymy and metaphor I would like to highlight three: the notion of conceptual domains, conceptual contiguity, and domain highlighting.

Metaphor is generally understood as an inter-domain conceptual mapping: the source domain is mapped onto the target domain based on a certain relation (primarily on an analogous or a similarity relation), whereby the source and the target conceptual domain are distinct. In other words, we conceptualize, interpret, and verbalize the target with the help of the source. Formally, conceptual metaphors are labeled by the X IS Y schema, for example LOVE IS A JOURNEY, which is linguistically realized in expressions such as (4) and (5).

(4) Look, how far we have come! (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 44)

(5) Where are we (in our relationship)? (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 45)

Metonymy is generally understood as an intra-domain operation, i.e. it connects an element of a conceptual domain with another element of the same domain or with the whole domain (or vice versa) based on a contiguity relationship. This connection provides mental access through the source to the target, whereas the target domain is highlighted (see Croft 2002). Formally, conceptual metonymies are designated by the X FOR Y or X STANDS FOR Y schema, such as PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION, BODY PART FOR THE PERSON, or INSTRUMENT FOR THE PERSON, which can be realized linguistically in a form similar to the expressions in (6-8).

(6) Moscow denies the involvement of the Russian army in East-Ukraine.
(7a)
Hungarian:
A nyaralóból kurta kocsma lett.
Járt oda mindenféle gége. S a gazda, akinek Milciádész volt a keresztneve, orgazdasággal is gyarapította jövedelmét.\(^\text{43}\)

(7b)
English:
The summer residence had become a wayside inn.
All kinds of throats frequented it. And the owner, whose first name was Miltiades, supplemented his income by dealing in stolen goods.\(^\text{44}\)

(8) The violins of the orchestra are playing the melody of a waltz.

3.2.1 Intra-domain vs. inter-domain mappings

The most frequently emphasized difference between the two notions is that metaphor involves two distinct domains, whereas metonymy only one single domain (cognitive domain approach). This approach has turned out to be utterly problematic and has received much criticism (among others Barcelona 2002: 232-239, Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006a, Barnden 2010, or Fu 2012). The major difficulty is that the notion ‘conceptual domain’ itself cannot be defined satisfactorily. We do not know exactly how domains are formed, how they are structured, and how boundaries can be drawn between them. Domains often overlap and contain each other, i.e. their relationship relative to each other can be very complicated. Furthermore, it is not clear whether they are relatively fixed chunks of knowledge or their boundaries change flexibly during understanding and meaning construction.

If it is assumed that domains are chunks of knowledge and that metaphor connects elements of two distinct chunks of knowledge and maps certain elements from one to certain

\(^{\text{43}}\) Gárdonyi (1959: 277-278).
\(^{\text{44}}\) I slightly modified George F. Cushing’s translation so that the metonymy also appears in the English version. Original translation by Cushing: “The summer residence had become a wayside inn. All kinds of riff-raff frequented it. And the owner, whose first name was Miltiades, supplemented his income by dealing in stolen goods” (Gárdonyi 2013b: 267). Interestingly enough, Mirza von Schüching’s German translation also omits the original Hungarian metonymy and uses a literal expression: “Aus dem Sommerhaus war eine Schenke geworden. Alle möglichen Menschen löschten dort ihren Durst. Und der Wirt, der mit dem Vornamen Miltiades hieß, mehrte seine Einkünfte auch noch durch Hehlerei” (Gárdonyi 2009: 307).
elements of the other based on some analogous or similar properties, these analogous or similar properties can be viewed as elements of an abstract, super-ordinate domain.\footnote{My claim here is reminiscent of blending theory, especially of the concept of generic spaces (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 1999 or Turner and Fauconnier 2002).} In other words, there can be a third conceptual domain within which the distinct elements of source and target appear to belong together, and this situation would be a metonymic one. For instance, let us consider the metaphor \textsc{seeing is knowing}, as expressed in (9):

\begin{equation}
\text{(9) I see what you mean.}
\end{equation}

As the common super-ordinate domain we can posit \textsc{cognition}. The \textsc{cognition} domain includes \textsc{perception}, \textsc{processing} of perceived information, systematic \textsc{organization} of information, and \textsc{understanding} or \textsc{knowing} itself. If our concept of \textsc{cognition} is organized as modelled here, it is easy to see that the metaphor at hand is a metonymy (cf. Radden 2002). In (10) the conceptual distance between the two modes of perception, \textsc{seeing} and \textsc{touching} is smaller; hence the expression is more readily classified as a metonymy: \textsc{looking for touching}, or in a more abstract form \textsc{one mode of perception for another mode of perception}. Or in (11) where \textsc{looking}, \textsc{paying attention}, and \textsc{understanding} form parts of a scenario of \textsc{understanding}, the metonymy at hand would be \textsc{looking for paying attention}.

\begin{equation}
\text{(10) Look, how wet these clothes are!}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\text{(11) Look, I am explaining it again.}
\end{equation}

What makes the problems pertaining to conceptual domains all the more intriguing is that they are entities of a \textit{conceptual nature}; hence they cannot be studied directly in an empirical fashion, at least not by methods at the disposal of linguists; i.e. these questions cannot be investigated convincingly with the inventory of methods traditionally applied in linguistics, but would require rigorous experimentation and the application of imaging procedures from cognitive neurosciences. However, this is not to say that the notion of domain should be exiled from linguistic analyses. On the contrary, it seems indispensable in analyzing and describing meaning construction in general, since our concepts can only be
understood against some background of knowledge. Conceptual domains are thus involved in understanding in general, not only in metaphor and metonymy. On the other hand, the application of the notion of domain as a sole distinctive criterion between metaphor and metonymy is not sufficient.

### 3.2.2 Contiguity vs. similarity

Another major difference between the cognitive processes of metonymy and metaphor is that the former is based on a **contiguity** relation, i.e. it connects contents that are somehow conceptually close, whereas the latter is based on an **analogous** or **similarity** relation between otherwise distant contents. However, the notion of contiguity and its relation to similarity is not without problems. First, conceptual proximity is a matter of degree, and second, there are cases where similar entities are contiguous or they belong together at least at some very abstract level.

Regarding the first problem, conceptual proximity is very difficult to measure objectively. As mentioned in the previous section, two otherwise distant entities can be looked upon as belonging together. Furthermore, otherwise unrelated entities can become conceptually contiguous, especially in online meaning construction, which is very often exploited in ad hoc metonymies; such is the case with BEER and CLUE in the following excerpt.

(12)

Raj: Great, everyone’s a Byomkesh Bakshi. Now, here are some secret facts about each of you, including whether you are the murderer. Throughout the game, feel free to ask each other questions to uncover clues.

Penny: Got it. Hey, who is the murderer?

Raj: Any question but that.

Penny: Sorry. Hey, who’s not the murderer? […]

Bernadette: So, what happens next?

Raj: I can’t tell you that. But perhaps the killer dropped a fun and imaginative clue somewhere in the apartment.

Penny: Ooh, I’m gonna check the fridge, and see if there are any clues inside a beer. […]

Penny: I’m gonna need another clue.\(^{46}\)

---

\(^{46}\) *The Big Bang Theory* Season 7 Episode 18.
The conversation is taken from a television series. The scene is the following: A group of friends are sitting in their living room, one of them, Raj, is acting as the narrator of a murder mystery game. The others should pose questions and look for clues to find out who the murderer is in Raj’s fictive “detective story” but they are not very keen on playing, especially Penny. In the last quoted line, she metonymically accesses the target BEER with the help of the source CLUE. BEER and CLUES clearly belong to distant domains, yet their connection in (12) is metonymic. This short dialogue illustrates that otherwise conceptually distant entities can become contiguous in certain contexts during online meaning construction. In other words, it is highly context dependent whether two entities are contiguous.

A further problem of the notion of contiguity regarding its context-dependency is pointed out by Croft (2006), namely that conceptual contiguity relations are not always exploited metonymically; for instance, fridge cannot stand metonymically for KITCHEN in (13).

(13) *I painted the fridge. [=kitchen, the kitchen is the location of the fridge] (Croft 2006: 318)

Croft’s claim is that not every conceptual contiguity relation can be exploited metonymically and whether one can or cannot be exploited in this way is highly dependent on the knowledge structure against which it is understood. In other words, the choice of a metonymic source is not only determined by its contiguity to the target but by the domain or frame in which they are embedded. For instance, in (13), within the frame of PAINTING the contiguity relation between the LOCATED and the LOCATION, i.e. the FRIDGE and the KITCHEN cannot be used as a path for mentally accessing the target through the source metonymically. Nevertheless, if the narrower co-text and the general frame or the ICM against which an expression is interpreted allows for it, the same relation can be exploited metonymically, as in my following constructed – and admittedly marginal and somewhat unnatural – example under (14).

(14)
A: We have just moved in; our kitchen is practically the fridge. / Our kitchen is tiny, it’s practically the fridge. / The heat is down in the kitchen, it’s practically a fridge.
B: Then could you fetch me the bread from the fridge? [= your unfurnished or unequipped/tiny/cold kitchen]
B’s request illustrates that in unusual contexts otherwise metonymically unexploited contiguity relations can also be realized as metonymies, provided that the source becomes \textit{salient} for some reason or other. A’s expressions further complicate the problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor based solely on contiguity, since intuitively in all three versions the \textit{KITCHEN} is metaphorized as a \textit{FRIDGE} based on a certain property (being unfurnished or unequipped/tiny/cold) but \textit{KITCHENS} and \textit{FRIDGES} are by default conceptually contiguous entities, i.e. it seems that contiguous concepts can also enter metaphoric relations.\footnote{On the one hand, if we accept that A’s utterances are metaphoric, it makes it questionable whether the highlighted vehicle \textit{fridge} in B’s request is metonymic, but if it is, this contradicts the primacy view of metonymy since in order for \textit{fridge} to be able to function as a metonymic vehicle, first the \textit{KITCHEN} needs to be metaphorically understood as a \textit{FRIDGE}. On the other hand, it is far from being unambiguous that A’s utterances are metaphoric since if examples like \textit{She is more than just a pretty face} are generally considered to be metonymic in the literature, there would be no reason to assume that \textit{We have just moved in, our kitchen is practically the fridge}. / \textit{Our kitchen is tiny, it’s practically the fridge}. / \textit{The heat is down in the kitchen, it’s practically a fridge} are metaphoric. As this brief discussion shows the situation is rather complicated and it cannot be resolved satisfactorily merely by applying contiguity as a decisive factor.}

The second problem with the notion of contiguity is that it is \textbf{not clearly distinguishable from similarity}. This is shown by metonymies where a \textit{CATEGORY MEMBER STANDS FOR A WHOLE CATEGORY}, or \textit{THE WHOLE CATEGORY STANDS FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY} and, in the case of \textit{representational metonymies} (for discussion of the latter and further examples, see Warren 1995, 1998, 2006, Fass 1997, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000 and Barnden 2010), where \textit{A REPRESENTATION OF AN ENTITY STANDS FOR THE ENTITY}, or vice versa.

Let us first consider some examples of \textit{CATEGORY FOR MEMBER} and \textit{MEMBER FOR CATEGORY} metonymies:

\begin{enumerate}
\item She stopped taking \textit{the pill} six months ago, and they are already expecting a baby.
\item If you happen to experience pain, take an \textit{aspirin}.
\end{enumerate}

Both examples are taken from Radden and Kővecses (1999: 34) in a modified form. In (15), the category \textit{PILL} stands for one of its members, \textit{CONTRACEPTIVE PILL}. In (16), the direction is reversed: \textit{ASPIRIN} as a member stands for the category \textit{PAINKILLER}. Entities are grouped together as members of the same category in general, based on some perceived similarity,
i.e. what constitute categories are the family resemblances or similarities between their members.\textsuperscript{48}

In the representational metonymies in (17) and (18) the personal pronoun \textit{I} stands for a representation of the speaker: in (17) for his/her name and number and in (18) for a visual representation:

(17) How come that \textit{I}’m not in your phonebook?

(18) Look how skinny \textit{I} am in that photo!

These representations and the things they represent obviously belong together, i.e. they are somehow contiguous but in (18) the representation and the person represented are also similar to each other.

As can be seen, contiguity is a rather fuzzy and flexible notion and it cannot always be clearly distinguished from similarity. This can turn out to be especially problematic when distinguishing metonymy from so called \textit{one-correspondence metaphors} (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2000), which are based on a single similar aspect of the target and the source.\textsuperscript{49}

(19)
Leonard: I’ve seen old pictures of you. You were never a fat kid.
Raj: No, I was svelte as a gazelle. A gazelle blessed with a flair for storytelling.
[…]
Leonard: Does the gazelle with a flair for story telling know he’s just ripping off Terminator?
Raj: Does the smart-ass know that Terminator was actually ripped off from an Outer Limits script called Demon with a Glass Hand, by Harlan Ellison?

\textsuperscript{48} The primacy view of metonymy is called into question here, as well. If we accept that categories are held together by similarity relations between their members and we follow Radden and Kövecses (1999) and consider \textit{pill} and \textit{aspirin} as metonymic vehicles, then it must follow that the category must be formed first on the basis of metaphoric relations before they can enter into a metonymic process with their members. A way out for the primacy view of metonymy would be to give up similarity as the conceptual relation behind metaphor, or at least the assumption that it is exclusively behind metaphor, but not in the background of metonymy.

\textsuperscript{49} In my view, there are no one-correspondence metaphors in the strict sense. They may be based on a single similarity relation but they trigger, or at least open up the possibility of triggering, a series of weak implicatures, which is not the case with metonymies.
Leonard: Oh, does the gazelle know that according to Harlan Ellison, it was not ripped off from Demon with a Glass Hand, but was ripped off from another Outer Limits script he wrote, The Soldier?50

In (19), Raj identifies himself metaphorically with a gazelle, based on a single similarity correspondence, i.e. he was svelte as a gazelle. In the later course of the dialogue Leonard repeatedly refers to him metaphorically as a gazelle. The following question may well arise: if the metaphor at hand is based on a single similarity relation, which in turn can be considered a type of contiguity relation, what makes it a metaphor?

3.2.3 Domain highlighting vs. domain mapping

A possible answer would be that the conceptual processes involved in metaphor and metonymy are of a different nature, i.e. their function – or to use a relevance theoretic term, their cognitive effect – is different. It is reasonable to assume that the conceptual processes involved in the metonymic expressions (1) and (6-8), and in the metaphoric expressions in (2) and (4-5) differ substantially. Metonymy provides mental access to the target by mentioning the source; as a result, some aspects of the domain matrix at hand are highlighted. This is what Croft (2002) terms domain highlighting. Whereas metaphor projects elements of the source domain onto corresponding elements of the target domain, i.e. the target domain and its structure, and complexity is understood in terms of the source domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), in Croft’s terms metaphor involves domain mapping.51

In (1), Hillsborough appears as the location of a tragic disaster,52 whereas in (6) the aspect of MOSCOW as the location where political decisions are made by the Russian government is highlighted. In (7), against the ICM of INNS, among the body parts of a person the THROAT is highlighted since it is one that is primarily active in the action of DRINKING. And finally, in (8) against the ICM of PLAYING MUSIC, the INSTRUMENT is highlighted since it is one of the most salient elements of the frame: it produces the sound.

50 The Big Bang Theory Season 7 Episode 18.
51 It is important to note that many scholars consider metonymy to involve conceptual mapping as well (for instance, Lakoff and Turner 1989). Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) argues that metonymy is a mapping but also involves activation and highlighting. Barcelona (2002 and 2011a) is of the same view and claims that the mapping in metaphor is symmetrical (i.e. the mapped elements of the source have their corresponding counter-elements in the target) while the mapping in metonymy is asymmetrical (i.e. there is no structural match between source and target).
52 On 15 April 1989 96 fans lost their lives and several hundreds were injured in a human crush in Hillsborough Stadium.
The expressions in (2) provide us with an example of domain mapping. In the metaphor MARRIAGE IS A GAMBLE, the structural elements of the source domain (GAMBLE) are mapped onto the corresponding structural elements of the target domain (MARRIAGE). Table 3.1 summarizes the structural correspondences between source and target exploited in (2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: GAMBLE</th>
<th>Target: MARRIAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gambler</td>
<td>man before marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prize</td>
<td>future wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stake</td>
<td>one’s fate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>losing</td>
<td>choosing poorly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staying out of the game</td>
<td>remaining a bachelor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 A domain mapping: Correspondences between source and target in MARRIAGE IS A GAMBLE

As the relatively high number of correspondences indicates, the metaphor MARRIAGE IS A GAMBLE is rather elaborately exploited in the excerpt (2), yet not all correspondences are active. In some cases conceptual metaphors are manifested in the form of a great variety of linguistic expressions based on a complex system of metaphoric correspondences. For instance, Gorbachev’s metaphor EUROPE IS A COMMON HOUSE (Chilton and Lakoff 1989 and 1995) has been widely used in the discourse on the process of European integration in the 1990s, and almost all correspondences between source and target have become active (for examples, see Mussolff 2001, cited in Kövecses and Benczes 2010: 129-130). However, most metaphoric mappings are partial, i.e. not every element of the source domain is mapped onto an element of the target domain (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 52-53, especially their analysis of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS).

The reasons for the partial metaphoric structuring of the target in terms of the source are manifold. First, both the target and the source can contain elements whose counterparts

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53 In fact, the metaphor in the context of (2) and of Gárdonyi’s work concentrates on the perspective of men before marriage, consequently the metaphor can be formulated as CHOOSING ONE’S FUTURE WIFE IS GAMBLING.

54 And some others are questioned in the dialogue.
are missing from the other, since no two domains have an identical conceptual structure.\textsuperscript{55} In other cases, a correspondence may not be perceptually and conceptually salient enough to be involved in the metaphoric mapping, or some correspondences are simply not relevant for the meaning constructional purposes at hand. Furthermore, if all aspects of the source were mapped onto the target and involved in the metaphoric mapping this could lead to inconsistencies and incongruities in the metaphoric conceptualization of the target and the metaphor could simply “burst” and become nonsense.

Although \textit{MARRIAGE IS A GAMBLE} is a relatively elaborate metaphor, some elements of the source are not mapped onto the target, for example no \textsc{dealers}, \textsc{cards}, \textsc{croupiers}, \textsc{casinos}, or \textsc{bets} appear in (2). On the other hand, the target also contains elements that have no counterparts in the source, e.g. \textsc{children}, \textsc{divorce}, \textsc{wedding ceremony} etc. Some of these are irrelevant from the point of view of the discourse participants, hence they are not mapped. The partial nature of domain mapping also suggests that it involves highlighting as well, since the elements that are actually mapped highlight certain aspects of the target. In the case of the metaphor at hand, the most prominent aspect of \textsc{marriage} that is highlighted by mapping \textsc{gamble} onto it is its contingency, or its being driven by blind luck. Highlighting by domain mapping is even more apparent in one-correspondence metaphors such as (19). Here, the only aspect of the target that is highlighted by the metaphor \textsc{raj is a gazelle} is \textsc{svelte}, none of the other possible correspondences partake actively in the mapping, and accordingly, in this case it would be implausible to assume that the target would be understood with the help of mapping the source domain onto it.\textsuperscript{56}

In conclusion, many authors consider metonymy to involve a conceptual mapping on the one hand, and many metaphors involve the component of highlighting, especially so-called one-correspondence metaphors. Hence, Croft’s distinction of domain mapping and domain highlighting may not be elaborate enough to capture the intricate differences between the function and cognitive effect of metonymy and metaphor.

\subsection*{3.3 The interaction of metonymy and metaphor}

Metonymy and metaphor are often connected and interact with each other in complicated patterns of mental processes (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Goossens 2002, Gibbs 1994, Geeraerts 2002, Urios-Aparisi 2009, Ding 2012, Kuczok 2011, Lifang 2008 and

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Lakoff’s Invariance Hypothesis (1990 and 1993).
\textsuperscript{56} In this respect one-correspondence metaphors are reminiscent of similes.
many more). Their interaction in turn results in expressions that are hard to interpret and classify as purely metaphoric or metonymic, which further complicates the issue of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor. Furthermore, the metaphor-metonymy interaction needs to be considered here in some detail since – as a large body of literature suggests – the phenomenon is very common.

One of the first authors to confront the issue of interaction between metaphor and metonymy in a systematic manner and also terminologically, was Louis Goossens (2002), who coined the term metaphtonymy to capture it. In his view, the interaction can take place on the conceptual level and the linguistic level. So far, CL has focused on the first.

Basically, two patterns can be distinguished: (i) a metonymic relation motivates a conceptual metaphor, and the reverse: (ii) a metaphoric relation motivates a conceptual metonymy.

In (20), we encounter the first conceptual pattern:

(20a) Don’t be so hot-headed/hot-blooded!
(20b) German: Sei nicht so heißspornig/hitzig/hitzköpfig!
(20c) Hungarian: Ne légy olyan forrófejű!

The conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS HEAT can be traced back to the conceptual metonymy BODY TEMPERATURE FOR THE EMOTION, or in a more general form EFFECT FOR CAUSE as a motivational factor.

Example (3) can be analyzed in terms of the second conceptual interactional pattern (repeated here for the sake of convenience):

(3a) I should (rather) have bitten my tongue.
(3b) German: Ich hätte mir lieber in die Zunge beißen sollen.
(3c) Hungarian: Inkább haraptam volna el a nyelvem.

The approximate metaphorical meaning of the whole expression in (3) is ‘I should (rather) have said nothing’, within which tongue as an organ of speech stands metonymically for speaking. In this case, the conceptual metonymy works within the conceptual metaphor. Actually, it is the metaphoric interpretation that makes it possible for tongue to be interpreted

57 As pointed out in Chapter 2, this former interactional pattern has become the default in the primacy view of metonymy.
metonymically since in the literal interpretation of the same expression this metonymic interpretation would be excluded:

(21) I was eating so hastily that I bit my tongue.

In the case of metaphor-metonymy interaction on the linguistic level, a metonymic expression can appear within a metaphoric expression. Let us consider the title of Carson McCullers’ novel:

(22) The Heart is a Lonely Hunter

Here, the conceptual metonymy and metaphor in the background of the expression are independent of each other, but they are compatible, i.e. it is neither the metonymic interpretation of heart, nor the metaphoric interpretation of the whole expression that makes it possible for the other to occur. The metonymic source HEART as a body part stands for the metonymic target PERSON (to be exact, the emotional side of a person) onto which HUNTER is mapped as a metaphoric source. In other words, the two operations are conceptually independent, yet compatible and combinable.

Nevertheless, it is their conceptual interaction that poses serious challenges for the distinction of metonymy from metaphor. As has been suggested in Section 3.2, metaphor and metonymy are hard to delimit against each other based on criteria of a conceptual nature, and as a consequence of their conceptual interaction the resulting expressions are hard to classify as linguistic metaphors and metonymies, mainly due to the fact that their motivation and the interactional patterns behind them can only be uncovered by post hoc interpretations.

3.4 The metonymic motivation of metaphor and the metonymy-metaphor continuum

In this section, I focus on Günter Radden’s notion of metonymy-based metaphor and his proposal for a continuum between metonymy and metaphor (Radden 2002). The reason for a detailed overview of his approach is that he is the earliest and one of the most prominent proponents of the broad view of metonymy, whose work has substantially contributed to the emergence of the ubiquity and primacy view.
Radden proposes a continuum\textsuperscript{58} ranging from literal meaning through metonymy to metaphor. At these three points of the continuum, we find clear cases, which can be classified without problems. Nevertheless, the continuum does not discard the possibility of problematic cases but embraces them. Radden’s position can be summed up as follows: (i) metaphor and metonymy are not clearly distinguishable categories, but have rather fuzzy boundaries shading into each other, and (ii) the continuum can be looked upon as a flowchart that represents different stages of conceptualization which result in metonymies, metaphors, and metonymy-based metaphors.

In his view, the interaction of metaphor and metonymy is a sequential process, metonymy being the primary or more fundamental stage. He analyses adjective-noun collocations with the underlying concepts of UP and MORE and shows how the conceptual metonymy involving these domains shades into the metaphor mapping UP onto MORE. There are five conceptual stages involving the domains of UP and MORE, exemplified in Table 3.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Conceptual relations</th>
<th>Linguistic expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal meaning</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>high tower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial metonymy</td>
<td>UP + MORE</td>
<td>high tide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wasserstand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full metonymy</td>
<td>UP FOR MORE</td>
<td>high temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Temperatur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metonymy-based metaphor</td>
<td>UP FOR MORE / MORE IS UP</td>
<td>high prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>MORE IS UP</td>
<td>high quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Literalness-metonymy-metaphor continuum (based on Radden 2002: 409)

In the literal meaning, HEIGHT stands for itself, whereas the meaning of partial metonymies is somewhat richer, here HEIGHT stands for HEIGHT and QUANTITY (in Grady’s terms (1997b))

\textsuperscript{58} It must be noted that the idea of a metonymy-metaphor continuum has also been put forward by other scholars, for instance, Dirven (1993), Croft (2002), or Geeraerts (2002).
conflation takes place, cited in Radden 2002: 410). In full metonymies, HEIGHT stands for QUANTITY and in metaphors HEIGHT is QUANTITY.

Radden devotes particular attention to the stage in the continuum where the concepts of HEIGHT and QUANTITY are deconflated (again, Grady’s term (1997b) cited ibid.) and so-called metonymy-based metaphors and metaphoric expressions like high prices emerge. This is the section of the continuum where distinguishing metonymy and metaphor seems to be the most problematic. In Radden’s definition, a metonymy-based metaphor is “a mapping involving two conceptual domains which are grounded in, or can be traced back to one conceptual domain” (Radden 200059: 93). For instance, in the case of high prices the conceptual relationship between UP and MORE is not evident but it can be traced back to a common experiential basis (for example, if we represent prices as numbers on a co-ordinate axis or in diagrams60). Radden (2002) lists four sources of metonymic motivation for metaphors, i.e. so-called metonymy producing relationships (Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Kövecses 1999): (i) common experiential basis, (ii) conversational implicatures, (iii) the taxonomic hierarchy of categories, and (iv) our cultural models of the world.

The analysis of some examples may shed more light on Radden’s approach. In his terms, the expression in (20) is the linguistic realization of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, which qualifies as a metonymy-based metaphor, where the metonymic motivation can be traced back to a common experiential basis, namely to a relationship of correlation. The correlation between ANGER and HEAT is captured by the conceptual metonymy ELEVATED BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR ANGER. Emotions often go hand in hand with certain bodily reactions, in this case, anger with the elevation of body temperature, i.e. the latter is an epiphenomenon of the former. Furthermore, there is an implicit causal relationship between the two: the elevation of body temperature is caused by feeling angry. In our conceptual system, these two are so closely related that we do not even perceive anger as heat but the concept of ANGER is understood in terms of HEAT (for further examples, see Kövecses 1986, 1990, 2000, 2002, or 2006). Many expressions similar to those involving emotion concepts and the bodily reactions accompanying them can be traced back to a common experiential basis, in this sense the two partaking concepts are conceptually close to each other; however, this contiguity is a substantial property of metonymy. In other words, metaphors of this kind are metonymically motivated.

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59 Radden (2002) is a considerably revised version of Radden (2000).
60 In this sense, the expression high prices seems to be motivated by a representational metonymy.
Following Radden’s approach, (3) can be analyzed as a metonymy-based metaphor. A verbal action (‘rather saying nothing/remaining silent’) appears here as a physical action (‘biting one’s tongue’). The source of the metonymic motivation is a conversational implicature, since the maxims of relevance and quality are violated. The literal meaning of A’s utterance and its implicated meaning⁶¹ belong to the same domain, and can be looked upon as being contiguous; hence the relationship between them can be interpreted as metonymic. The cause of not saying anything stands for not saying anything, since if one bites his/her tongue he/she cannot utter anything (at least for the time being, and gives him/herself the time to decide whether to say anything); in other words, if the tongue as a speech organ cannot function (as a result of having been bitten) we cannot speak. The implicated, metaphoric interpretation ‘rather saying nothing/remaining silent’ is motivated by the metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT.

In sum, it can be stated that in Radden’s approach metaphor and metonymy are conceptual processes which should not be distinguished clearly from each other, since they form a continuum. This continuum leaves space for their interaction on the conceptual level. The default case of metaphor-metonymy interaction is metaphor being motivated by metonymy. Consequently, metonymy seems to be more fundamental than metaphor (primacy view) underlying not only metonymic expressions in the traditional sense and metaphors, but also language itself in its entirety (ubiquity view). A closer inspection of Radden’s approach also illuminates how problematic the notions “conceptual domain” and “conceptual contiguity” can turn out to be when they are applied as criteria for classifying linguistic expressions as metonymic or metaphoric; furthermore, the task of classification is complicated by the conceptual interaction of metonymy and metaphor.

3.5 Barcelona’s schematic, unitary definition of metonymy

Antonio Barcelona is one of the most prominent and prolific scholars in contemporary metonymy research; there is hardly an aspect of conceptual metonymy theory his works are not concerned with. Like Radden, he is a major proponent of the ubiquity view (cf. Barcelona 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2011b, or 2012). He argues for a general metonymic motivation of metaphor (Barcelona 2000b) which makes him an important representative of the primacy view. He has offered a unitary definition of metonymy in schematic terms (Barcelona 2002,

⁶¹ At this point I use the term ‘meaning’ in a pre-theoretic sense.
2011a), which has been presented in Chapter 2, and I have claimed that this definition is a broad approach to metonymy par excellence. In the same papers, he also takes up the issue of how to distinguish metonymy from metaphor. He offers a possible solution by refining the notion of cognitive domain (distinguishing functionally and taxonomically structured domains) and elaborates on the relationship between source and target (there is a pragmatic function linking them). Interestingly enough, we encounter the two opposing tendencies in metonymy research – broadening and narrowing the notion – in Barcelona’s works, as well: he argues for the ubiquity of metonymy and the general metonymic motivation of metaphor, yet he offers a distinction between metaphor and metonymy.

3.5.1 Degrees of metonymicity

Barcelona (2002 and 2011a) mentions three degrees of metonymicity forming a continuum: **schematic**, **typical**, and **prototypical metonymies** (see Table 3.3\(^62\)). His continuum is reminiscent of that of Radden but it concentrates on the area ranging from the literal to the metonymic: Barcelona considers a great majority of meanings previously taken to be literal to be metonymic. Based on his analyses of schematic metonymies, he views metonymicity or metonymic motivation as a fundamental property of language and linguistic units in general.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Linguistic expressions</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>schematic</td>
<td>high tower</td>
<td>This book is very large.</td>
<td>ein hoher Turm \ Diezes Buch ist sehr groß.</td>
<td>magas torony \ vaskos könyv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>typical</td>
<td>high tide</td>
<td>This book is a history of Iraq.</td>
<td>hoher Wasserstand \ Dieses Buch ist die Geschichte des Iraks.</td>
<td>magas vizállás \ Ez a könyv Irak története.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prototypical</td>
<td>high temperature</td>
<td>Washington is insensitive to the needs of the people.</td>
<td>hohe Temperatur \ Brüssel und Washington sprechen von einem Handelskrieg.</td>
<td>magas \ hőmérséklet \ Az ötös asztal főzet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Degrees of metonymicity (based on Barcelona 2002 and 2011a)

\(^62\) I have expanded Table 3.3 with Radden’s (2002) examples and their German and Hungarian equivalents. The remaining English examples are from Barcelona (2002 and 2011a); the German and Hungarian examples are either their equivalents (the first two lines) or my examples (last line).
Schematic metonymy represents the simplest mental operation of the three degrees. In expressions like *This book is very large*, the vehicle (*book*) stands for a primary sub-domain of the domain BOOK, namely for BOOK AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT. Typical metonymies are schematic metonymies whose target domain can be clearly distinguished from their source domain, the target being a secondary sub-domain. In *This book is a history of Iraq*, the vehicle (*book*) stands for a secondary sub-domain (CONTENT) of the domain BOOK. And finally, prototypical metonymies are the classical instances of metonymy where target and source are not sub-domains of a domain but rather entities belonging to the same larger knowledge structure.63

### 3.5.2 Refinement of the notions of domain and contiguity

In Radden’s approach (2002) metonymy-motivated metaphors are based on a “metonymy producing relationship” (Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Kövecses 1999), such as common experiential basis, conversational implicatures, the taxonomic hierarchy of categories, and our cultural models. In my view, what all these relationships have in common is that if a metaphor can be traced back to one of them, it follows that its source and target are elements of the same domain and are contiguous (at least on an abstract or general level), which makes them metonymic to some extent; consequently, these two notions cannot be applied to the distinction of metonymy from metaphor in a satisfying manner.

Barcelona (2002, 2011a) also points out various challenges which the domain view and the contiguity view must confront, and proposes a refinement of these notions, making them applicable to the distinction of metonymy and metaphor. First, he argues that functional domains or frames64 should be distinguished from taxonomic domains, and second, he proposes that the contiguity relation between source and target is a pragmatic functional link. Accordingly, in his view the source and target of a conceptual metonymy belong to the same functional domain or frame and are linked by a pragmatic function,

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63 Since Radden’s examples obviously fit Barcelona’s model, we can dispense with their more detailed analyses and state that the two models are compatible.

64 A terminological remark should be made here on Barcelona’s use of the terms ‘functional domain’ and ‘frame’. In general, Barcelona refers to the source and target of metonymy as ‘domains’ located within a ‘frame’ or ‘idealized cognitive model’. Within ‘domains’, he distinguishes between taxonomically and functionally structured ones. Based on his earlier works, it seems that a ‘domain’ is functionally structured if it is functionally or pragmatically linked to another ‘domain’ within the same ‘frame’ (e.g. Barcelona 2002: 237). This suggests that in Barcelona’s approach, ‘frames’ are larger knowledge structures with ‘domains’ as their parts. However, in his later works, it is clearly suggested that he uses Fillmore’s ‘frames’, Lakoff’s ‘idealized cognitive models’, and his ‘functional domains’ as near synonyms (Barcelona 2011:12).
whereas the source and target of a conceptual metaphor belong either to different functional domains or they may belong to the same taxonomic domain but are not linked by a pragmatic function. As a result of this refinement, metaphors as the one in (23) are no longer problematic:

(23) *John is a lion.* (Barcelona 2002: 236)

*John* and the *lion* belong to the same taxonomic domain of *living things* but there is no pragmatic function linking them, hence the expression is clearly metaphoric.

The introduction of the criterion for metonymy that its target and source are linked by a pragmatic function also explains why certain contiguity relations are not exploited metonymically. Barcelona (2002: 238) uses the example of *mouth* and *nose*. Both are parts of the functional domain *face* but since there is no pragmatic function between them, neither of them can serve as a metonymic source for the other. He also points out that whether two entities are linked by a pragmatic function is highly context-dependent, which leads towards the view that whether an expression is classified as metaphoric or metonymic is also influenced by the larger context:

(24) *He fell* in the war. (Barcelona 2002: 240)

In Barcelona’s analyses, if the soldier was in fact shot, fell, and died, the expression is to be interpreted as a metonymy since there is a pragmatic function between *falling* and *dying*. However, if he died, for instance, in his sleep during a bombing, the expression is metaphoric because of the missing pragmatic function. In other words, *falling* and *dying* belong to the same functional domain only in a hypothetical or prototypical model, i.e. they belong together because in an idealized model we assume a causal relationship between the two.

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65 For his exact definitions, see Chapter 2 Section 2.2. A further difference has been proposed by Barcelona, namely that metonymy is an asymmetrical, whereas metaphor is a symmetrical mapping (see fn. 51).
66 For a more detailed look at the problem, see Sub-section 3.3.2, especially Croft’s critical remark on the contiguity view.
67 At this point I use the term ‘larger context’ in a pre-theoretic sense and I refer to those elements of a situation which are not necessarily coded linguistically.
3.5.3 Further examples

The following analyses are aimed at illustrating how Barcelona’s distinction works, how it can be applied to some more complex cases, and also at showing that it is compatible with Radden’s approach.

In terms of Radden’s approach, the expressions in (25) are linguistic realizations of a metonymy-motivated metaphor (SAD IS DOWN):

(25) She walked with drooping shoulders/downcast eyes after the news of her child’s death.68 (Barcelona 2002: 234)

The source of the metonymic motivation is a common experiential basis, namely correlation. In our conceptual system, a drooping posture and downcast eyes are signs of being sad; accordingly, the conceptual metonymy underlying the metaphor at hand can be labeled as follows: BODILY SYMPTOMS FOR THE EMOTION CAUSING THE SYMPTOMS. An emotion and its bodily symptoms belong to the same functional domain and they are linked by the pragmatic function of causality. However, Barcelona (2002: 234-236) points out that the expression is metaphoric. If the conceptual metaphor is captured at an abstract level (SAD IS DOWN), it is hard to consider an EMOTION belongs to the same domain as VERTICALITY, especially if the larger context excludes a pragmatic link. In other words, if the idealized or hypothetic causal relationship between SADNESS and DOWN is missing from the actual larger context, the expression is metaphoric (see the analysis of (24) above). Barcelona argues that the emotion can in fact be independent of the bodily symptom, and vice versa: someone who is sad does not necessarily walk with drooping shoulders.69 Though SADNESS and VERTICALITY can seemingly belong to the same idealized model, it is still possible that there is no pragmatic function connecting them; accordingly, the expression would be metaphoric.

Let us take a brief look at example (20) again and analyze it in terms of Barcelona’s distinction. Here, as pointed out above, the ELEVATED BODY TEMPERATURE stands for ANGER.

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68 Some similar examples in German: den Kopf hängen lassen; den Kopf senken; den Kopf sinken lassen; den Blick senken; die Wimper senken; zur Erde sehen/blicken; die Augen zu Boden schlagen; die Augen niederschlagen; die Lippen hängen lassen; kopfhängischer; niedergeschlagen sein; Kopfhänger, etc. and in Hungarian: lehorgasztott fejjel, lesütött szemmel, csíggedt vállakkal; lógtja az orrát; bunak ereszti a fejét, etc.

69 At this point, I would like to note that the situation becomes even more complicated if we take into consideration the contingent relationship between the two. Since if we follow Panther and Thornburg (e.g. Panther and Thornburg 2003c, 2007, or Panther 2005a), who consider contingency as a fundamental property of metonymy, the expression would be clearly metonymic.
Along the lines of the analysis of (24) above, it can be stated that ELEVATED TEMPERATURE and ANGER can belong to the same idealized model, if we take the former to be a symptom caused by the latter. Yet, if Barceloana’s remark quoted above also applies here, it is conceivable that there is no actual pragmatic function between ANGER and TEMPERATURE, in which case the expression is metaphoric.

Finally, the analysis of (3) in Barceloana’s approach is also revealing. ‘Rather not saying anything/remaining silent’ and ‘biting on one’s tongue’ can belong to the same domain but there is not necessarily a pragmatic function linking them. Someone who bites his/her tongue does not necessarily stop speaking, and someone who remains silent has not necessarily bitten his/her tongue. The interpretation of the expression as metaphoric or metonymic is decided by the larger context. When there is an actual pragmatic link between source and target, the expression should be classified as metonymic; when no such link is present, or it is only hypothetical, it should be classified as metaphoric.

In conclusion, it can be ascertained that Barceloana’s and Radden’s approach are in accordance. Barceloana (2002 and 2011a) considers both metonymy and metaphor to be general processes of human cognition. In his view, metaphor is always motivated by metonymy on the conceptual level (primacy view) (Barceloana 2000b). He points out that the application of the purely conceptually defined notions of ‘domain’ and ‘contiguity’ are, in many cases, not sufficient to distinguish metonymy from metaphor, and proposes pragmatic functional criteria, which, it must be noted, are highly context-dependent. Due to the close conceptual interrelatedness of metonymy and metaphor, the linguistic expressions motivated by them can only be classified as linguistic metonymies and metaphors if their context is considered. This corroborates my claim that linguistic metonymy should be defined with consideration for its context and linguistic properties.

3.6 A narrow approach: Warren’s alternative

Beatrice Warren’s approach to the distinction of metonymy from metaphor (Warren 2002) can be considered an alternative to those of Radden (2002) and Barceloana (2002), at least in two respects. First, Warren (1999) distinguishes between referential and propositional metonymies and defines referential metonymy more narrowly. And second, when distinguishing between metonymy and metaphor she concentrates on differences on the level of linguistic expressions, i.e. she distinguishes linguistic metonymy from linguistic metaphor. She represents an approach that is not typical within CL: “the direction of the
approach is reversed, i.e. from linguistic evidence to assumed mental processing” (Warren 2006: 4). Her primary concern is not how we conceptualize and make sense of the world surrounding us but rather how we process and make sense of metonymic and metaphoric expressions. This reverse approach is also reflected in her terminology: instead of using the terms of source and target (domains) she prefers the notions ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit element’. Further, she distinguishes terminologically between conceptual processes and their linguistic realizations, in that for the former she uses metonymy and for the latter metonym (i.e. a metonym is the explicit element in an expression motivated by metonymy). Finally, and most importantly, unlike Radden and Barcelona, she emphasizes that a clear distinction between metonymy and metaphor is possible and desirable, and she scrutinizes differences between the two to which CL has not paid proper attention.

3.6.1 Referential and propositional metonymy

Warren’s alternative approach presupposes the division of metonymy into two major groups: referential and propositional metonymies (Warren 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006). In her view, a propositional metonymy is an expression that contains a metonymic relationship between two propositions, whereas a referential metonymy is an expression that refers to a metonymic relationship between two entities. According to Warren (1999), one of the most apparent differences is that propositional metonymies do not result in utterances that are not true literally (for instance 26), whereas referential metonymies (such as 27) violate (at least superficially) truth conditions.\(^\text{71}\)

(26)

A: How did you get to the airport?
B: \textit{I waved down a taxi}. [A taxi took me there]

\hspace{1cm} (Gibbs 1994: 327, cited in Warren 2002: 114)

(27) Give me a \textit{hand} with this. [help] (Warren 2002: 115)

\[^{70}\] I would like to express my gratitude to Beatrice Warren for her valuable comments and clarifications in relation to Tóth (2011a), which helped me understand her distinction better.

\[^{71}\] It will be shown in Chapter 4 that this is not necessarily true, consider for instance: \textit{Brussels is not Moscow}.  

- 68 -
By making this distinction, the set of the phenomena under scrutiny is narrowed down and homogenized, and thus the distinction between metaphor and metonymy becomes clearer. However, Warren herself admits that this decision may seem too restrictive (especially to proponents of the ubiquity view): “[…] a number of linguists will consider such an approach too reductionistic, threatening to obscure different manifestations of one and the same cognitive process. What we will possibly gain in precision, we will lose in comprehensiveness” (Warren 2002: 116) – a remark that clearly manifests the two opposing tendencies in cognitive metonymy research.

Warren’s distinction between referential and propositional metonymy also shows that conceptual metonymy can result in rather different kinds of expressions on the linguistic level. Some of these cannot even be considered linguistic metonymies or metonyms in Warren’s terms, i.e. a conceptual metonymy is not necessarily manifested in the form of linguistic metonymies. This is not to deny the conceptual role or importance of metonymy – and indeed Warren does not do so. In her view, conceptual metonymic relations underlie a series of expressions that are not linguistic metonymies, for instance, polysemous expressions, compounds, or possessive constructions: “I do not maintain that the associations commonly involved in metonymy are restricted to metonymy” (Warren 2002: 124). In other words, what Warren argues is that labeling an expression based on a conceptual contiguity relation as a metonymy would result in terminological uncertainties and ultimately make the term vacuous.

In this approach, expressions on the first half of Radden’s continuum and schematic and typical metonymies in Barcelona’s approach cannot be considered linguistic metonymies.

(28) The book with the red cover is unreadable. (Warren 2006: 55)

According to Warren, the expression in (28) is literal: “[it] is quite natural and does not qualify as metonymic” (2006: 55) since in the case of the domain BOOK the aspects PHYSICAL ENTITY and CONTENT are both equally central, i.e. none of them can be considered as primary or secondary sub-domains in Barcelona’s terms. As counterexamples of actual metonymies Warren gives the following:

(29) to send out invitations [that which contains invitations]

(30) **menu** (originally “list of items of a meal”) [that which contains the menu]

(31) This **book** describes the problems of father-son relations. [the one who produced
    the book] (Warren 2006: 45)

In (29) and (30), the **CONTENT** aspect is primary, therefore **invitation** and **menu** are accepted
as metonyms in the sense of **PSYCHICAL ENTITY**. In (31), **book** qualifies as a referential
metonymy (as opposed to, for instance **This book is a history of Iraq**), since it does not stand
for the **CONTENT** aspect but for the **AUTHOR**. Interestingly, the following two analogous
examples go unnoticed by Warren in this regard:

(32) The **book** got **good press**. [that which is in the press, i.e. good reviews] (Warren
    1995: 140)

(33) You can’t **read the history** of the United States, my friends, without learning the
great story of the thousands of unnamed women. And if it’s ever told straight, you’ll
know it’s **the sunbonnet** and not **the sombrero** that has settled the country.
    (E. Ferber, originally cited in Corbett 1971: 481-482, then in Papafragou 1996b: 188,
    and in Warren 2006: 38)

Regarding (32), Warren’s analysis is concerned only with **good press** as a referential
metonym. It remains undecided whether in this case **book** stands for **CONTENT** or for the
**AUTHOR**. As to (33), Warren focuses on the linguistic realizations of the conceptual
metonymy **CLOTHING FOR THE WEARER**. It is not clear how **history** should be analyzed. In its
metonymic interpretation, it stands for the **CONTENT** of a book or a number of books; in its
metaphoric interpretation **HISTORY** appears in the form of a **BOOK** (**HISTORY IS A BOOK**),
which in turn would be a metonymy-based metaphor since history is generally captured in
writing in the form of books.

Finally, it must be noted that Warren (2006) considers referential metonymy to be
the **prototypical case** of metonymy. She has gathered a comprehensive collection of
examples studied in the literature on metonymy (1018 examples from 53 sources) and points
out that 62.5% of these qualify as referential metonymies, whereas only 57% belongs to the
category of propositional metonymy (Warren 2006: 85). In her interpretation, the numbers suggest that metonymy research had concentrated primarily on referential metonymies. Furthermore, they are in accordance with a view which posits referential metonymy as the more prototypical sub-group of the category. Consequently, when distinguishing between metonymy and metaphor her focus is on referential metonymy, leaving propositional metonymies out of consideration.\textsuperscript{72}

### 3.6.2 Differences between metonymy and metaphor on the level of linguistic expressions

Warren’s distinction of metonymy from metaphor is based on the consideration of differences between the two on the level of linguistic expressions. She lists seven semantic, syntactic, and functional differences between metaphor and referential metonymy, which had been pointed out in the literature but have not been explained in a satisfying way (Warren 2002: 116-118):

(i) Metaphor is hypothetical in nature as opposed to metonymy.
(ii) Metaphor is a rhetorical device as well as a device for extending the lexicon which is not necessarily true of metonymy.
(iii) Metaphor can and often does step over the phrase-level which metonymy cannot do.
(iv) The metaphoric mapping is based on several correspondences between source and target domain, while metonymy is based on a single correspondence between two entities.
(v) A conceptual metaphor can weave through a whole text in the form of various linguistic expressions often resulting in a recurrent theme or motive which is not possible in the case of metonymy.
(vi) An expression can be interpreted as metonymic without leading to a zeugma, unlike a metaphoric interpretation.\textsuperscript{73}
(vii) Metaphor and metonymy differ regarding their syntactic interactions, for instance, in the congruence between verb and subject or the choice of anaphoric pronouns (Warren 2004).

\textsuperscript{72} A remark should be made here, namely that examples of metonymy-based metaphors traced back to conversational implicatures by Radden would be considered propositional metonymies by Warren.

\textsuperscript{73} For example, the metonymic interpretation of \textit{Caedmon} in \textit{Caedmon is a poet and difficult to read} does not lead to a zeugmatic effect, as opposed to the metaphoric interpretation of \textit{mouse} in \textit{The mouse is the favorite food of cats and a practical cursor controller}, where it does (Warren 2002: 117-118).
3.6.3 Referential metonymy and metaphor

Warren’s focus on these differences also shows that she is concerned primarily with linguistic expressions and not with cognitive or mental processes. She argues that purely cognitive definitions of metaphor and metonymy cannot grasp these differences adequately; she therefore attempts to give an alternative account:

[…] the theory that metaphor involves seeing similarity between dissimilar phenomena or mapping across domain structures whereas metonymy is based on contiguity or involves mapping within a domain structure does not predict or explain the differences enumerated above. (Warren 2002: 118)

In her approach, metaphor is not a primarily cognitive but a linguistic, semantic operation that transfers properties (metaphor as property transfer). In contrast, she considers metonymy to be a syntagmatic construction, i.e. the combination of a head and a modifier. More precisely, in her definition metonymy is a shortened noun phrase whose head remains implicit and where the modifier appears explicitly and can assume a topic role (cf. Warren 2004), as in (34):

(34) The kettle is boiling. [water: that which is in the kettle] (Warren 2002: 116)

This means that referential metonyms can be paraphrased in the form of modified noun phrases: ‘that, which is…’. In this sense, metonymy can be described syntactically; accordingly, the relationship between the explicit and implicit element is predictable. By way of contrast, metaphor is a semantic operation; accordingly, the relationship between source and target is not predictable.

The traditional definition of metonymy which holds that the name of an entity stands for the name of another entity appears to be misleading in Warren’s view. She emphasizes that metonymy is not merely substitution or replacement. In this regard, she agrees with the mental access approach (e.g. Langacker 1993: 30). The interpretation of a referential metonymic expression is made possible by the source being a restrictive complement that forms a referential unit with the implicit head (i.e. the target is only a part of the referential unit). The purpose of the metonymic operation is to highlight a certain semantic property of the implicit head that specifies its referent. This hypothesis is also in accordance with Langacker’s position on the highlighting function of metonymy: “a well-chosen metonymic
expression lets us mention one entity that is salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke – essentially automatically – a target that is either of lesser importance or harder to name” (Langacker, ibid.). In the case of metaphor, the source domain possesses some properties that also characterize the target domain. The source domain provides access to properties, some of which we choose and map onto the target. The purpose of the metaphoric operation is thus property transfer.

Warren emphasizes that her approach also accords with Jakobson’s structural theory according to which metaphor is of a paradigmatic (involving selection), whereas metonymy is of a syntagmatic nature (involving combination). She points out that although it incorporates some elements of the traditional notion in which metonymy is based on a contiguity relationship and metaphor on one of similarity, in her approach they are not distinguished on the basis of these properties since similarity is not restricted to metaphor (see Section 3.3.2). The distinction is rather made on the basis of the function of the source domain: in metaphor, it makes properties available for transfer, in metonymy it forms a referential unit with the target.

Warren’s definitions are capable of explaining the differences between metonymy and metaphor listed in the previous section. Metonymy cannot be hypothetical since the explicit element highlights or specifies an already existing property of the target with the help of the explicit element. Further, it can of course occur without a rhetorical or naming function since its primary function is that it focuses on the explicit modifier instead of the implicit head in such a way that both are available for the hearer for meaning construction. As metonymy is considered to be a shortened noun phrase, it cannot exceed the phrase-level. Moreover, it can be described in syntactic terms, which makes the metonymic relationship predictable, as opposed to the unpredictable semantic operation of metaphor, where it is the task of the hearer to uncover the relationship between source and target. This explains why there are numerous correspondences between source and target in metaphor, and why these can be exploited in the form of various linguistic variants, which in turn can pervade a whole text. The sixth difference, namely that unlike metaphor, metonymy cannot lead to zeugma, is explained by the hypothesis that the referent of the metonymic expression is the same in the literal as well as in the figurative interpretation.74 As to the last difference, Warren argues

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74 However, it must be noted that some of these differences can also be explained within the framework provided by Radden and Barcelona. For instance, in Barcelona’s definition metonymy cannot be hypothetical since the target is linked to the source by a pragmatic function. In metaphor, this pragmatic function is missing, which makes it hypothetical. Although only implicitly, we also find an explanation for the second difference in broad approaches since they are also of the view that most metonymies are non-conventionalized and form
that in metaphor the anaphoric pronoun and the predicate is always congruous with the figurative meaning in number and genus, whereas in referential metonymies the situation is more complex, although their behavior can be explained in terms of metonymy as a syntagmatic construction with a focusing and topicalization function.\textsuperscript{75}

In summary, Warren (1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006) defines referential metonymy narrowly as a syntagmatic construction with a focusing function. During the interpretation of metonymic expressions, both the implicit target and the explicit source are active since they form a referential unit, as opposed to metaphor where “the target domain annihilates the source domain” (Warren 2004: 107). Referential metonymy takes the linguistic shape of a compact noun phrase, whose function is more than mere substitution. They occur because the speaker focuses on a certain aspect of an entity, not merely on the entity itself, i.e. the referent of a metonymic expression is not merely the target, but its unit with the source. On the level of linguistic expressions, the highlighted aspect is coded by the explicit element (the modifier of the noun phrase) and the entity is the implicit head. Simultaneously with highlighting, a topicalization process may take place, during which an otherwise non-referential element (the modifier) acts anomalously as the topic. As can be seen, Warren’s approach diverges from the standard view of cognitive metonymy theory, especially from the ubiquity view. In her account, she concentrates on metaphor and metonymy primarily as linguistic phenomena whose conceptual background and role she does not dispute. She argues that as linguistic phenomena a clear distinction of metonymy from metaphor is possible based on their linguistically manifest properties.

3.6.4 A new look at earlier examples

Although Warren does not give a detailed treatment of propositional metonymies and an account of how they can be distinguished from metaphors, her approach may have some new insights to offer on the expressions analyzed in Radden’s and Barcelona’s approach. In Warren’s view, there are three factors influencing the interpretation of metonymic

\textsuperscript{75} In a nutshell, according to Warren (2004: 113), if the predicate can be interpreted as a comment on the explicit element, the explicit element will be the antecedent of the pronoun or the predicate will agree with it, otherwise the pronoun or the predicate is congruent with the implicit element.
expressions: the semantic and linguistic information contained in the expression, the context of the expression, and the world or encyclopedic knowledge of the hearer (Warren 2006: 70). The semantic information alone does not offer a sufficient basis for interpretation but it determines which part of the context and of their world knowledge recipients have to activate in order to construct the meaning of a metonymic expression: “semantic information contained in linguistic items influences the formation of metonyms and guide[s] or confirm[s] but do[es] not fully determine interpretations” (ibid.). Later on, she argues that the default semantic patterns activated by linguistic items function in this sense only “as pointers as to what kind of world knowledge should be activated, filling the templates with further semantic content” (Warren 2006: 71-72).

Let us take a brief look again at examples (20), (25), and (3’) from the perspective of Warren’s approach. I repeat them here for the sake of convenience:

(20) Don’t be so hot-headed/hot-blooded!

(25) She walked with drooping shoulders/downcast eyes after the news of her child’s death. (Barcelona 2002: 234)

(3’)
A: Have you told her that her new shoes look awful?!  
B: Unfortunately, I did, I should have bitten my tongue.

The expression in (20) seems to exhibit many of the properties that distinguish referential metonymy from metaphor. The emotion ANGER appears here as if it was HEAT, thus the expression is hypothetical. The rhetorical effect is still perceivable, though the expression is highly conventionalized, i.e. the words hot-headed and hot-blooded are parts of the mental lexicon as a result of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT acting as a device for extending the lexicon. The same metaphor can be exploited in the form of a series of various expressions (cf. Kövecses 2000: 21-23 and 2002: 81). Based on the diversity of the expressions mentioned and analyzed in the works by Kövecses previously cited, it is reasonable to assume that there are several correspondences linking the source and the target, and these correspondences could very well be exploited as a recurrent motive in whole texts. Consequently, there can be expressions motivated by the same conceptual metaphor that
could exceed the phrase-level. Moreover, the expression cannot be paraphrased as a referential metonymy:

(20) Don’t be so **hot-headed/hot-blooded**! [that which is ??]

Based on these properties, it can be stated with relative certainty that the expressions in (20) are not referential metonymies and seem to be instances of metaphor. Nevertheless, in Warren’s view metonymies are based on certain semantic patterns, among which we find causation (Warren 2006),\(^{76}\) and causation seems to be an implicit component of (20):

(20) Don’t be so **hot-headed/hot-blooded**! [‘You are hot-headed/hot-blooded, because you are angry.’]

If we take into account this aspect of (20), the expression can be interpreted as a propositional metonymy: the proposition that contains the effect stands for the proposition that contains the cause. If we categorize (20) as a propositional metonymy, that means that the boundaries between propositional metonymy and metaphor are not as clear as those between referential metonymy and metaphor. Following Barcelona, the context would be decisive in the question.

We encounter the same problem in the case of (25). Warren (2006: 7) classifies the example clearly as a propositional metonymy.\(^{77}\) Furthermore, she also illuminates with her analysis the importance of the context in the interpretation of the expression: the addition of *after the news of her child’s death* states the reason of SADNESS, which in turn is the reason for the BODILY POSTURE, from which we can infer back to SADNESS. Based on the criteria listed in sub-section 3.6.2, what can be stated with certainty is merely that the expression in (25) is not an instance of referential metonymy. SADNESS appears as if it were DOWN (hypothetical). The rhetorical force of the expression is unquestioned; it certainly has a stronger effect than the literal version in (25’).

\(^{76}\) She lists five such patterns, which are quite similar to so-called metonymy-producing relationships (Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Kövecses 1999): causation, location (in space and time), possession, composition, and representation. She mentions these patterns in connection with referential metonymies, but it is reasonable to assume that they link not only entities but also propositions; hence these patterns can also underlie propositional metonymies.

\(^{77}\) To be precise, Warren cites and analyzes a slightly different version of (25) from Barcelona (2000c: 4): *He walked with drooping shoulders: He lost his wife.*
(25’) He was sad after the news of her child’s death.

The mental operation behind the expression has clearly contributed to the extension of the lexicon (e.g. low spirits etc.). The same mental operation (SADNESS IS DOWN) is based on several correspondences and can be realized in various linguistic forms (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 15, Barcelona 1986, Li 2008, Moradi and Mashak 2013), which can appear together in a text to contribute to the formation of a recurrent motive. Some of these expressions may cross the phrasal level. And finally, similarly to (20) it cannot be paraphrased as referential metonymies can be, and it does contain an element of causation:

(25) She walked with drooping shoulders/downcast eyes after the news of her child’s death. [that which is ???]

(25) She walked with drooping shoulders/downcast eyes after the news of her child’s death. [‘She walked with drooping shoulders/downcast eyes, because she was sad.’]

As can be seen, the expression is clearly not a referential metonymy; nevertheless, it is unclear whether it is a propositional metonymy or a metaphor.

In (3’), the word tongue can be looked upon as a referential metonym which stands for SPEECH or SPEAKING, paraphrased in terms of Warren: ‘that which the tongue produces’. Here, we also encounter a special case of causation between the source and target: A BODY PART STANDS FOR ITS FUNCTION, i.e. TONGUE FOR SPEAKING. However, it is still possible to interpret the expression as a propositional metonymy: A proposition (‘I bit my tongue’) implicates another proposition (‘I said nothing/I remained silent’). Something similar happens in the cited propositional metonymy (26), where a proposition containing the initial phase of a process implicates a proposition containing the whole process: ‘I waved down a taxi’ stands for ‘A taxi took me there’. 

In sum, Warren’s distinction of referential metonymy from metaphor may seem to work but the question remains unanswered where to draw the line between propositional metonymies and metaphors.

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78 For the sake of convenience, and since it has no bearing on the analysis, I disregard the past unreality of the utterance and the contribution of the modal verb to the propositions.
3.7 Summary

Any approach to metonymy that wishes to prevent the risk that the notion becomes vacuous needs to define it more narrowly, and any approach that wishes to define metonymy more narrowly has to be able to distinguish it from other related phenomena, among others, from metaphor. This chapter intended to give an overview of how different theoretical approaches have tried to come to grips with the challenging task of distinguishing metonymy and metaphor. In the broad view, metonymy has become a conceptual process on a par with metaphor regarding its importance in human cognition and language. In the primacy view, it is considered to be even more fundamental than metaphor. However, this view increases the risk of the notion’s becoming unlimited. Broad approaches focus on metonymy as a phenomenon of a primarily conceptual nature; accordingly, they define it against metaphor with the help of theoretical constructs that are also of a conceptual nature. It has been shown that these constructs (‘conceptual domain’, ‘conceptual contiguity’, ‘domain highlighting’, ‘domain mapping’, ‘primary and secondary domains’ etc.) are not able to distinguish metonymy from metaphor since they are themselves vaguely defined, fuzzy categories, which are very hard to examine empirically due to their conceptual nature, except with the method of intuitive-introspective post hoc analyses of linguistic expressions. The problem is further complicated by the complex interactional patterns of metonymy and metaphor on the conceptual level.

Broad approaches suggest that metonymy and metaphor cannot be distinguished clearly from each other; they represent fuzzy categories forming a continuum. In my view, this is a natural consequence of the fuzziness of the notions used to describe both phenomena. Furthermore, the primacy view also argues for a general metonymic motivation of metaphor. The analyzed examples show that in these frameworks it is extremely difficult to categorize figurative expressions as instances of metonymy or metaphor. This uncertainty has serious consequences for the possibility of the systematic empirical study of metonymy and metaphor and their relationship. For instance, researchers using corpus methods have to confront the problems of what to look for and how to categorize the data found. These decisions remain strongly intuition- and approach-dependent. Finally, if we follow the ubiquity and primacy view and accept the metonymic motivation of metaphor, then a serious problem may arise: everything becomes a metonymy.

In Warren’s narrow approach, the conceptual nature of metaphor and metonymy remains unquestioned but she argues for a clear distinction between the two on the level of
linguistic expressions. However, this approach brings its own challenges. The narrow definition of referential metonymy as a special noun phrase and its distinction against metaphor seems to work; on the other hand, it may be too constrained in two respects. First, it excludes some clear cases of metonymy from the object of study, for instance, verbal and adjectival metonymies (which cannot be subsumed under the category of propositional metonymy). And second, as the analyses in sub-section 3.6.4 show, there are some persistent uncertainties regarding the distinction of propositional metonymy from metaphor.

The problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor remains unsolved; as John A. Barnden puts it: “no combination of the alleged differences addressed can serve cleanly to categorize source/target associations into metaphorical and metonymic ones” (Barnden 2010:1). In my view, this situation is a partly a consequence of the unresolved tension between the two opposing tendencies in metonymy research, which are also manifested in a particular form in research on the relationship between metaphor and metonymy.

The aim of investigating the problem is twofold. On the one hand, it is to set up clearly defined categories that cover as broad a range of figurative expressions as possible and make their empirical study possible. On the other, the study of borderline cases opens up the possibility of acquiring an insight into how our conceptual systems works, i.e. how conceptualization processes (such as metonymy and metaphor) work and interact. However, there is a tension between these aims. The more precise the categories we set up, the smaller the range of the phenomena under scrutiny will be, although these categories may be able to capture homogeneous classes of phenomena open to empirical study. And vice versa; if we aim to uncover general principles of human conceptualization, then the more fundamental and general we consider them to be, the broader our categories will become and, as a consequence, they may run the risk of becoming vacuous. In this particular case, the broadest cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy covers an almost all-encompassing range of linguistic phenomena which are accordingly hard to make generalizations about and study empirically. In contrast, Warren’s definitions based on linguistically manifest properties are tighter but they concentrate exclusively on referential metonymy and leave out of consideration certain relevant phenomena (above all, propositional metonymies).

Barnden (2010) argues that it would be more profitable if differences between metonymy and metaphor were not studied and described on a higher, abstract conceptual level, but on their own descriptive level. In my approach, this means that metonymy and metaphor cannot be distinguished from each other as conceptual phenomena by relying
exclusively on conceptual constructs; thus, their study as linguistic phenomena may turn out to be fruitful.

With respect to the starting point of my thesis, i.e. how the unboundedness of the notion of metonymy can be reduced within CL, this means that metonymy needs to be defined more narrowly on the basis of linguistic properties so that it becomes distinguishable from other related phenomena, which brings us to (PDEL). My suggestion will follow Warren’s narrow approach in many respects. I argue that conceptual and linguistic metonymy needs to be distinguished by considering the linguistically manifest properties of the latter. This suggestion relies on the assumption that conceptual metonymy does not always manifest itself in the form of linguistic metonymies; this is also to say that whether an expression is a linguistic metonymy is highly context-, but also language-dependent.

This distinction narrows down the notion of metonymy to some extent, but more importantly it contributes to the resolution of the opposing tendencies in cognitive metonymy research. As in Warren’s approach, the conceptual nature, i.e. the ontological status, of metonymy will not be called into question, it will merely be terminologically differentiated. In this view, conceptual metonymy is taken to be a fundamental cognitive process, i.e. it retains its status as a general motivational and descriptive principle. On the other hand, by defining linguistic metonymy by considering criteria other than its conceptual metonymic motivation, the extremely broad range of linguistic phenomena in whose production and interpretation conceptual metonymy plays an important role is narrowed down. I address this proposal in more detail in the next chapter, where I attempt to find properties of linguistic metonymy that can be considered to be relatively independent from and additional to its conceptual metonymic motivation and the conceptual background provided by the notions for the description of conceptual metonymy (such as domain or contiguity).
Chapter 4 – Linguistic metonymy as implicit co-activation of mental content

4.1 Introduction

As has been pointed out in the previous chapters the broad notion of metonymy carries the risk that it becomes vacuous. Basically, there are two strategies to approach this problem: (i) distinguishing the phenomena covered by the notion from other related phenomena and (ii) setting up homogeneous sub-classes of the phenomena covered by the notion. Furthermore, I argued that an initial step towards preventing the CL notion of metonymy becoming too unrestricted is distinguishing conceptual metonymy from linguistic metonymy by considering criteria that are independent of each other.

The present chapter sets out to investigate (P_{DEL}):

(P_{DEL}) On the basis of what criteria can metonymy be delimited against related phenomena?

Since the notions on the basis of which conceptual metonymy is defined turn out to be rather vague, fuzzy, and empirically hard to study, I argue that the best way to delimit the phenomena covered by the notion of metonymy is to consider their linguistically manifest properties. Accordingly, Chapter 4 attempts to define linguistic metonymy and show in what ways it is a special manifestation of conceptual metonymy.

My major hypothesis is that linguistic metonymy is the implicit co-activation of mental content of any type. This view rests on the assumption that linguistic metonymy involves a special act of reference which activates complex referential units – formed by the source, the target, and the relationship between them – implicitly, i.e. only the source appears on the linguistic level, with meaning constructional purposes.

My argumentation is structured as follows. The above hypothesis seems to be contrary to the generally accepted claim of cognitive metonymy research that metonymy does not necessarily involve an act of reference (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, after pointing out the problems of the traditional view of reference, I argue for an extended notion of referentiality, which basically equates reference with activating mental content with the purpose of meaning construction. Section 4.4 is concerned with the complex referential unit activated by a linguistic metonymy, whereas Section 4.5 focuses on the implicitness of the metonymic activation. Nevertheless, as with every property, implicitness is also a matter
of degree, thus in this section some linguistic metonymies are arranged according to the degree of implicitness they display. In the next section of the chapter I examine the difference between linguistic metonymy, active zone phenomena (4.6.1) and linguistic metaphor (4.6.2) respectively, in terms of the activated mental content and their implicitness. After considering some possibilities for future research (4.7), the chapter concludes in Section 4.8 by providing an answer to (PDEL).

4.2 On the referential nature of metonymy in CL

In his comprehensive survey of the ongoing discussions within cognitive metonymy research, Barcelona (2002, 2011a, or Barcelona et al. 2011) lists the question concerning the referential nature of metonymy as among the most contested and relevant problems surrounding metonymy in the following formulation: “Is metonymy necessarily connected to an act of reference?” (Barcelona et al. 2011: 2).

Lakoff and Johnson define metonymy as “using one entity to refer to another that is related to it” (1980: 35, my italics T. M.) and later on they claim that metonymy “has primarily a referential function” (1980: 36). In the light of Lakoff (1987: 78), it can be stated that the referring function assigned to metonymy is best understood as a stands for relation: “Given an ICM [idealized cognitive model] with some background condition […], there is a stands for relation that may hold between two elements A and B, such that one element of the ICM, B, may stand for another element A. […] We will refer to such ICMs containing stands-for relations as metonymic models.”

Let us briefly return to the ham sandwich example:

(1) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35)

The highlighted expression in (1) exemplifies a linguistically manifest instance of this stands for relation: the meal ordered stands for the person who ordered it. A concept (HAMSANDWICH) is used to refer to another concept (COSTUMER), whereby the two are related to each other within the RESTAURANT ICM or frame79. Similar examples are easy to find in the

79 At this point, a remark should be made on a terminological uncertainty within cognitive metonymy research. The use of the notions ‘domain’ and ‘frame’ shows divergences and often leads to debates. Some authors prefer the term ‘domain’ (e.g. Croft 1993, Barcelona 2011, or Benczes 2011), others point out that the notion of ‘frame’ would be more adequate for the purposes of metonymy research (e.g. Koch 1999, Blank 1999), and again, there are some researchers who do not address the issue (myself included). An often-cited point of
literature (2-3), easy to produce (4a-b), and also easily encountered in ordinary conversations (5), suggesting that the ‘stands for’ pattern within an ICM is extremely productive and prevalent:

(2) I’m the tiramisu. (Langacker 2008: 69)

(3) The first violin has the flu. (Panther and Radden 1999b: 9)

(4a) Hungarian: A 126-os szoba épp ebédel.
(4b) Room 126 is out having lunch.

(5) I’m your gunshot.80

It is important to note that these examples all contain referring expressions in the traditional sense, i.e. they single out particular individuals. These expressions are all instances of non-conventionalized referential metonymy.81 Based on the literature, it may be stated that cognitive linguists consider this kind of metonymic expression the prototypical case of metonymy (e.g. Warren 2006: 85, Barcelona 2011b: 13-14, Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández 2003a: 35).

Later works of cognitive semantics define metonymy more broadly than precognitive linguistic approaches, and it has often been explicitly stated and argued that metonymy is not necessarily connected to an act of reference:

This character suggests a rather broader understanding of metonymy than that given by traditional rhetoric. The entities need not be contiguous, in any spatial sense. Neither is metonymy restricted to the act of reference. (Taylor 1995: 124, my italics T.M.)

In addition to the claim that metonymy is not necessarily referential, it has also been pointed out that non-referential cases of metonymy may be even more pervasive than had been

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80 Nurse Jackie Season 2, Episode 8.
81 It must be noted that in Panther and Thornburg’s (e.g. Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2003b) and Ruiz de Mendoza’s (2000) approach, (2) and (5) are so-called predicational or predicative metonymies.

These two seemingly opposing trends, namely, seeing metonymy as a primarily referential phenomenon (a view represented by traditional and contemporary rhetoricians, structural linguists, pre-cognitive linguists, and early cognitive linguists such as Nunberg 1979, Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36, Warren 1999, 2002, 2006, or Croft 2002) as opposed to the more recent findings of cognitive metonymy researchers that referential metonymy is only a salient – but comparatively rare – linguistic manifestation of a basic and widespread conceptual phenomenon (e.g. Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999, Barcelona 2002, 2011a, 2011b, Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Kövecses 1999, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000 or Sweep 2009) are obviously in contrast with each other.

Warren’s (1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006) approach, discussed in the previous chapter, defines metonymy based on the traditional notion of reference. She argues that in metonyms, the implicit head and the explicit modifier together comprise the intended referent of an act of reference, i.e. they form a referential unit.

(6) The kettle is boiling. [*the water that is in the kettle*] (Warren 2002: 116)

(7) “As a little girl, I fell in love with Albert because he played Mozart so beautifully on the violin,” she once wrote.82 [*‘music that is composed by Mozart’]*

In (6), the head of the noun phrase ‘water’ remains implicit, the modifier (or at least a part of the modifier) kettle appears explicitly. Together they form a referential unit, i.e. the intended referent of the kettle – as Warren argues – is neither a kettle, because the literal

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82 Foster (2005) quotes Einstein’s second wife.
interpretation would not result in a truth-conditionally true proposition, nor merely water, but the water that is in the kettle. According to Warren, the intended referent of every referential metonymy can be paraphrased in the form of a ‘that which is’ expression. Analogously, in (7) the head ‘music’ remains implicit, the modifier Mozart becomes explicit, and they form a referential unit ‘music composed by Mozart’.

Warren’s approach unquestionably has its merits. First, it argues for a narrow definition of metonymy, which makes the phenomenon distinguishable from other related or similar phenomena, for instance: onomatopoeic words, eponyms, adjective-noun combinations, noun-noun compounds, denominal verbs, genitive constructions, and metaphor (Warren 1995, 1999, 2002). Second, it defines metonymy independently from its cognitive background and partially independently from the relationship between source and target. And third, Warren points out that source and target form a referential unit together, i.e. metonymy is more than mere substitution or a ‘stand for’ relation.

Though I share the theoretical aims of Warren’s endeavors, I consider her notion of metonymy to be too restrictive: “I insist that (referential) metonymy must (i) be non-literal and (ii) allow a paraphrase that has the structure of a noun phrase in which the head is implicit” (Warren 2002: 124). Regarding Warren’s first claim, it can be safely stated – based on her earlier remark that they “give rise to (superficial violations) of truth conditions” (2002: 115) – that by “non-literal” she eventually means violating truth-conditions. On the one hand, in certain cases this claim turns out to be problematic, on the other, a notion of literalness based on truth-conditions is not readily compatible with the general assumptions of CL.

There are cases where it is hard to decide whether a referential metonymy violates truth conditions or not, and whether a literal or a non-literal interpretation is preferable. For instance, so called twice-true metonymies pose a problem for the non-literalness claim (for the notion see Fass 1997: 71). Twice-true referential metonymies are expressions which can be interpreted both literally and metonymically in the same context. Obvious examples are the metonymies taking the form $X$ is not $Y$ as in (8), but there are other twice-true metonymies without a fixed form as in (9) and (10):

(8) Hungarian: Brüsszel nem Moszkva.83

English: Brussels is not Moscow.

(9) Hungarian: *Magyarország megverte Horvátországot.*

English: *Hungary beat Croatia.*

(10) I don’t like the *piano.* [the sound/the instrument/the player?]

With respect to the second part of Warren’s claim, she considers referential metonymy to be a linguistic phenomenon which manifests itself on the lexical level; more specifically it is restricted to the nominal realm. In my view, the fact that Warren restricts referential metonymy to *nominal cases* is due to her implicit acceptance of a traditional notion of reference, according to which a referent can only be a thing referred to with the help of noun phrases. In her definition, Warren (1999: 123) mentions that referential metonyms “should have a referent”, consequently that a referent must be a THING and metonyms should take the linguistic form of special noun-modifier constructions. This approach has a major drawback: it excludes numerous metonymic expressions from the category ‘referential metonymy’. Warren sets up the category of propositional metonymy for cases above the phrase-level, but this twofold sub-categorization (referential and propositional) discards the possibility that, for example, verbal and adjectival metonyms may occur. In fact, the opposite is true; for instance, metonymy does take the form of verbs (for a detailed analysis of verbal metonymies see Stoeva-Holm 2010).

As opposed to Warren’s approach, Langacker belongs to the major representatives of CL who define metonymy as broadly as possible, based on its cognitive background. In Langacker’s notion the term metonymy designates a very general cognitive ability which can be accommodated among cognitive reference point phenomena (1993, 1999) but also has very much in common with active zone phenomena (Langacker 1984) and in general, it is a structuring principle of grammar (Langacker 2009a, 2009b).

Let us consider briefly example (4b) again:

(4b) *Room 126* is out having lunch.

The concept of ROOM 126 serves as a *cognitive reference point* which provides mental access to the concept of PEOPLE LIVING/WORKING IN THE ROOM as shown schematically in Figure 4.1. In Langacker’s view, the expression *room 126* opens up a dominion, i.e. a larger chunk of structured knowledge (for the lack of a more adequate label, ROOM in the figure).
Within this dominion, the concept ROOM serves as a cognitive reference point to the collection of PEOPLE LIVING/WORKING THERE.\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{ROOM_diagram.png}
\caption{ROOM 126 as a metonymic cognitive reference point}
\end{figure}

It is important to note that Langacker – in accordance with Rosch (1975a) – considers reference points to be of cognitive nature. However, taking into consideration the fact that cognitive reference points are very general phenomena and also considering metonymy a cognitive reference point phenomenon would lead to an unrestricted view of the notion; therefore, it may be beneficial to distinguish between cognitive and linguistic reference points.

In the case of cognitive reference point phenomena, a concept is accessed via another concept, while linguistic reference point phenomena seem to be more complex: a linguistic sign (be it atomic or complex) activates some mental content, through which the conceptual domain (or dominion, Langacker 1993; or frame, Fillmore 1982, 1985) of the content is opened up, within which we can access the target. Reference points in general are cognitive in nature, what I suggest here is that they can be distinguished on the basis of the input they are activated by. Cognitive reference points can be activated by any kind of input, linguistic or non-linguistic (e.g. perceptual information, thoughts, other concepts etc.). What I mean by a linguistic reference point is simply a cognitive reference point that is activated by a linguistic sign, i.e. that the input that triggers the cognitive reference point is of a linguistic nature.

\textsuperscript{84} For the sake of brevity and simplicity, and since it is irrelevant at this point, I do not consider how the accessed schematic content participates in the relationship of ‘being out having lunch’, and how the schemas of the constituting elements are integrated into a construal of the situation.
In the light of this distinction between linguistic and cognitive reference points, example (4b) needs some reconsideration. The expression *room 126* serves as a linguistic reference point accessing the mental content ROOM within the dominion ROOM, which in turn functions as a cognitive reference point providing access to the metonymic target content PEOPLE WORKING/LIVING IN THE ROOM, as shown in a slightly modified form in Figure 4.2.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4.2 room 126 as a linguistic reference point**

A further example of cognitive reference points is provided by Lakoff’s famous analysis of the category MOTHER (Lakoff 1987: 79-84). In this case, a whole category (MOTHER) is accessed through one of its (prototypical and culturally most embedded) sub-categories (HOUSEWIFE MOTHER). In Lakoff’s phrasing, the sub-category HOUSEWIFE MOTHER metonymically stands for the whole category MOTHER. The sub-category HOUSEWIFE MOTHER provides mental access to the whole category based on the culturally-rooted stereotypical relationship between them. In other words, a culturally-rooted stereotype serves as a cognitive reference point for the whole category, i.e. when we talk about MOTHERS what we have in mind is the stereotypical sub-category HOUSEWIFE MOTHER (Figure 4.3).
However, it must be noted that the notion of a stands for relation and the lack of a distinction between cognitive and linguistic reference points may turn out to be problematic in this case, and may lead to confusion regarding what stands for what. According to Lakoff, a sub-category (HOUSEWIFE MOTHER) stands for a whole category (MOTHER) based on the culturally stereotypical relationship between them. In this case ‘stands for’ is difficult to interpret. In what sense does HOUSEWIFE MOTHER stand for MOTHER? It is true (or may have been true in the US of the 1980s) that when we reason about MOTHERS we actually think of members of the stereotypical sub-category HOUSEWIFE MOTHERS. In this sense, the sub-category HOUSEWIFE MOTHER serves as a cognitive reference point to the category MOTHER. Nevertheless, when we talk about MOTHERS we refer to them as mothers, and definitely not as housewife mothers, in other words housewife mother is not a linguistic reference point for the whole category MOTHER. The problem is that if a concept A serves as a cognitive reference point to concept B, why do we not refer linguistically to B with the help of a linguistic sign conventionally referring to concept A, i.e. if, when we talk about MOTHERS having HOUSEWIFE MOTHERS in mind, why do we not refer to MOTHERS in general as housewife mothers?

Figure 4.3 is admittedly oversimplified. Since they bear no relevance for my argumentation, the figure does not take into consideration the radial structure of categories and intra-categorial relationships between category members.
It seems that the advantage of Lakoff’s above mentioned terminological shift from reference to stands for relation in the case of metonymy (Lakoff 1987) is that it makes it possible to assume a metonymic relationship between a concept A and another concept B without also assuming that the linguistic sign conventionally associated with concept A linguistically refers to concept B; hence cases similar to the example at hand can be explained by the phenomenon of conceptual metonymy. But unfortunately, it does not make the notion ‘stands for’ any less problematic. The distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic reference points proposed here offers a solution: The sub-category HOUSEWIFE MOTHER functions as a cognitive reference point for the category MOTHER but its sub-category label (the noun phrase housewife mother) does not function as a linguistic reference point to the concept MOTHER. Consequently, Lakoff’s example is an instance of conceptual metonymy which does not manifest itself as a linguistic metonymy.

In sum, it can be stated that in spite of its merits, Warren’s notion of metonymy is too restrictive, while Langacker’s definition runs the risk of being too all-embracing, resulting in blurred boundaries between otherwise distinct phenomena. Despite their major differences, it must be noted that both approaches do have some elements in common. Both Langacker and Warren emphasize the importance of the recurrent relations between conceptual entities which are exploited by metonymy. The same semantic/cognitive patterns can be detected, for instance in the case of nominal metonymies, adjective-noun combinations, noun-noun compounds, denominal verbs or genitive constructions (many of which Langacker analyzes as reference point constructions). The difference is that Warren, relying on a traditional notion of reference, distinguishes metonymy from these linguistic phenomena based on the various manifestations of the patterns on the level of linguistic expressions, while Langacker focuses on the similarity of the conceptual patterns behind them and proposes a notion of metonymy that embraces them all, making metonymy an omnipresent cognitive principle playing an active role in grammar in general.

4.3 Linguistic metonymy and a broad view of reference

As has become clear from this brief overview, there seems to be a general consensus among contemporary cognitive metonymy scholars that metonymy is not necessarily of a referential nature: “it is undeniable that metonymy is not necessarily referential” (Barcelona 2011a: 10). This currently dominant stand-point can be traced back to two underlying assumptions.

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The first one is explicitly stated in the literature; namely, in the broad or ubiquity view metonymy is a phenomenon primarily of a conceptual and only derivatively of a linguistic nature, and cognitive metonymy scholars tend to focus purely on the conceptual features of metonymy. In the light of this theoretical disposition, it is not surprising that referentiality is discarded as an integral part of metonymicity, since conceptual metonymies are not necessarily realized on the linguistic level: “Metaphors and metonymies are often not verbalised, but can be expressed through gestures (McNeill 1992) or other non-verbal communicative devices, or not be communicated at all and simply motivate our behaviour (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 156-159)” (citations in the original, Barcelona 2002: 216). Later on, Barcelona argues that “some of the most cognitively powerful metonymies he [Lakoff 1987] explores are not necessarily used for reference” (Barcelona 2002: 223), and he illustrates his argument with Lakoff’s metonymic model of the category HOUSEWIFE-MOTHER and stresses that the primary function of metonymy is inference. For such conceptual processes or mechanisms that are not exploited linguistically but only metonymically guide our reasoning, it would indeed be too restrictive to link them by necessity to an act of reference. On the other hand, if linguistic metonymy – as a special linguistic manifestation of conceptual metonymy – is distinguished from conceptual metonymy, it is not unreasonable to assume that referentiality is an essential feature of the former, at least in a broader sense of the notion.

The second assumption behind the rejection of referentiality as an integral feature of metonymy, though mainly implicit, is a traditional, narrow view of reference, in which reference is the relationship between linguistic signs and extra-linguistic entities, i.e. noun phrases singling out individuals of the extra-linguistic reality for the purpose of predication.

Traditionally, reference is taken to be the relation between a linguistic sign and an extra-linguistic entity denoted by that sign, and an act of reference is the act during which a piece of the extra-linguistic world is singled out with the help of a linguistic sign in order to predicate something about that piece of the extra-linguistic world. Though generally they do not explicitly define reference or explicate what they mean by reference when rejecting the referentiality of metonymy, cognitive metonymy researchers seem to have this traditional notion of reference in mind. One of the few exceptions is provided by Panther and Thornburg (2007: 246) who explicitly refer to Searle’s (1969, 1975) speech act theory when setting up the sub-categories of referential, predicational, and illocutionary metonymies.

86 See also Barcelona 2000c: 13.
If it is assumed that cognitive metonymy researchers implicitly rely on Searle’s (or a similar) notion of a **referring expression** and that of an **act of reference**, it is understandable that they reject referentiality as a definitive property of metonymy, since on the one hand, this traditional notion of reference would restrict metonymy to nominal cases, but more importantly, it would restrict metonymy to being active only in an initial phase of meaning construction, i.e. in fixing referents. Both of these consequences for metonymy have been refuted by the results of cognitive metonymy research in the past two decades (e.g. Barcelona 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, Radden 2005, Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 2003b, 2003c, 2007, or the contributions in Panther and Thornburg 2003a). When I argue for the referentiality of linguistic metonymy, I do not call into question these results concerning metonymy, but rather reject the traditional, narrow understanding of reference.

According to this generally accepted notion of reference, the prototypical instances of referential expressions are those noun phrases or pronouns that designate individuals. Consider the following example in which A is sweeping the horizon with a telescope and perceives three men armed with rifles.

(11)

A: I count **three rifles**. [three men armed with rifles]
B: Those **our rifles**?[^87]

The noun phrase *three rifles* in A’s utterance is an instance of a twice-true metonymy: If A sees three men armed with rifles (metonymic interpretation), it is also true that he sees three rifles (literal interpretation). The example clearly shows that referential metonymy does not necessarily violate truth conditions; it is more a matter of construing what should be focused on than simply truth conditions. Example (11) also illustrates the difference between non-linguistic and linguistic reference points: for A it is perceptual information that triggers the selection of the rifles to function as a reference point through which the armed men become accessible (non-linguistic reference point), but for B A’s expression *three rifles* functions as a linguistic reference point. With the help of the noun phrase *three rifles* A singles out three individuals from the extra-linguistic reality. In this case, the act of reference is indirect, i.e. metonymical: the men are singled out with the help of a comment on their weapons.

[^87]: *Hell on Wheels*, Season 2, Episode 6.
My claim here is that the traditional notion of reference is too narrowly defined for the purposes of CL, especially if we take a closer look at B’s response in (11). If we try to reconstruct what the expression *our rifles* refers to, certain problems of the traditional view of reference become apparent. For the viewer, A’s expression *three rifles* clearly refers to a piece of the extra-linguistic reality. We see what A sees, hence it is easy to decipher the shifted reference of the metonymic expression. Unlike A, B does not have a telescope and is not offered the view we have. For him, the referents of the noun phrase *three rifles* do not constitute a piece of the extra-linguistic reality, they are rather a piece of his construal of what A’s meaning (A’s construal of the extra-linguistic reality) could be. The intended referents of A’s expression are part of B’s mental representation of the situation conveyed by A’s utterance, i.e. a linguistically conveyed representation of the situation, as it is described by A.

Deciphering the referent of B’s expression *our rifles* is further complicated by the fact that it is a twice-true metonymy. For the viewers, it is clear that only the metonymic interpretation is available because they are provided with the same image of three armed men that A is supposed to see, hence it is a piece of our common “reality”. For B, the expression is ambiguous: it may literally refer to three rifles independent of the number of men (it would be odd for him to assume that A sees three rifles without men, but the interpretation ‘three rifles and an indefinitely populous group of men’ is readily available).

The fact that the intended referent of A’s expression is not part of B’s reality is clearly shown by this twofold interpretability. Consequently, it requires an even more complicated process to arrive at the intended referents of B’s expression *our rifles*. It may well simply refer to rifles, in which case they are part of the common reality of A and B;\footnote{At this point it would be helpful to provide more detailed information about the scene for a clearer understanding of the analysis. A and B are members of a group. Some of their guns have been stolen and they are probably under attack by the same people who have stolen them. A and B are out on a recon when the quoted dialogue takes place. It would be interesting to complete the analysis with more background information and with more co-text but I have to omit these for lack of space. Hopefully my points will be clear nevertheless.} it can also refer to men belonging to A and B’s own group with their rifles, or to the enemy armed with the stolen rifles. In all cases, the intended referents are part of B’s mental representation of the situation based on A’s words, but it is doubtful whether they are part of A’s reality. The viewer knows that the last interpretation is true; it can be assumed that these referents are part of A’s reality but for A the referents of B’s *our rifles* belong to B’s mental construal of the situation.
In the light of this analysis, it becomes clear that the intended referent of B’s expression is not necessarily a piece of the extra-linguistic reality but rather a piece of his construal of this reality (the same applies also for A). It is reasonable to assume that what we actually refer to is not a piece of the extra-linguistic reality but a **piece of a construal of that reality**. Construal as assumed by CL has less to do with reality than with the language users’ perspective, attention, and representation of this reality, hence the elements of a construal are not necessarily elements of the extra-linguistic reality and the relations holding among them are not subject to truth conditions. If we assume that this view of meaning construal has some psychological validity, it may very well explain why A and B in the episode presented understand each other without any difficulty and why the viewers can follow and understand their conversation with ease.

It is somewhat surprising that cognitive linguists implicitly accept a narrow notion of referentiality when they claim that metonymy is not restricted to an act of reference, because otherwise CL emphasizes the importance of meaning construal. In the light of one of its most basic tenets, namely that meaning cannot be examined separately from the user of the sign, since meaning is construed with the help of his general cognitive abilities, cognitive metonymy researchers would need a more broadly defined notion of referentiality.

My proposal is a broader notion of referentiality that may be more adaptable to cognitive linguistic purposes, in which the linguistic sign does not refer to things from the extra-linguistic reality, but to mental representations of things, i.e. concepts, mental contents. Furthermore, I claim that reference is not restricted to **THINGs**, i.e. the **object of an act of reference can be any kind of conceptual content**. In this sense, an act of reference is the **mental activation** of a certain conceptual content, in that the content becomes mentally accessible for a certain purpose (finding the intended referent, triggering inference etc.).

My broader notion of reference departs from that of the traditional view in two major respects. First, reference is not a direct relation between entities of the extra-linguistic reality and linguistic signs, but a relation between the mental representations of extra-linguistic entities (evolving during on-line meaning construction) and linguistic signs. Second, in an act of reference it is not only mental representations of **THINGs** which can be referred to, but
any type of conceptual content. An act of reference where mental representations of things are accessed through a noun phrase is merely a prototypical case.

This broader view is in accordance with the notions of joint reference and joint attention developed within approaches labeled here for the sake of convenience as functional cognitive pragmatics (e.g. Givón 1989, Langacker 1987a, Sihna 1999).

Regarding my first argument, as Givón puts it:

In matters of reference, it seems, the grammar of human language, or rather the grammar—using mind behind it, marches to a different drum. Rather than ground linguistic referents in the RW [Real World], we ground them in some verbally-constructed Universe of Discourse. Or, in the framework pursued here, we ground linguistic referents in the current discourse as represented in either (fleetingly) working memory/attention or in (more lastingly) episodic memory. (Emphases added by me, M.T. Givón 2005: 127)

As to my second argument, Tolcsvai Nagy states that “Linguistic units, morphemes, words, sentences, text passages all direct the attention of the speaker and the hearer through their meaning structures to certain mental representations” (Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 136), and that the object of reference can be “things and a series of processes and events named or evoked during discourse” (Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 23).

My proposal also relies on Langacker’s claims about reference point phenomena (Langacker 1993, 1999). Reference points are access points to mental content, i.e. they serve as inlets to certain knowledge structures providing mental access to certain concepts within a knowledge structure. The conceptualizer – the one who construes the meaning – can activate a whole knowledge structure (the dominion of the reference point in Langacker’s terms) through the reference point, and within this structure she can access a concept through a certain mental route. However, unlike Langacker I emphasize a clear distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic reference points.

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89 This latter claim is also supported by the fact that we very often conceptualize NON-THINGS as THINGS, for instance in the case of ontological metaphors or in that of the different construals behind nominalization and verbalization.

90 At this point two remarks should be made. First, I would like to avoid making the impression that the broad view of reference I propose here would be a new full-fledged theory of reference. I must emphasize that it is merely an attempt to broaden the term relative to its current use by cognitive metonymy researchers by highlighting two aspects in which I diverge from the traditional view substantially, although admittedly only in a rudimentary fashion, in order to show that linguistic metonymy can in fact be considered referential. Second, the approaches referred to here all emphasize the inter-subjective, joint, or social aspect of meaning construction, I fully share this theoretic approach, although since it is of lesser relevance to my argumentation, I somewhat neglect it.

91 My English translation, M.T. Original: “A nyelvi egységek, morfémák, szavak, mondatok, szövegrészletek jelentésszerkezetük révén mind meghatározott reprezentációikra irányítják a beszélő és a hallgató figyelmét.”

92 My translation, M.T. Original: “A referencia (a vonatkoztatás) tárgya a beszéd tárgya, a beszélgetésben megnevezett vagy előhívott dolgok és folyamatok, események sora.”

- 95 -
The broader notion of reference as put forward here implies that any type of conceptual content can be mentally activated by linguistic means, i.e. most linguistic expressions function as linguistic reference points to certain conceptual contents which contribute to meaning construction and function as input for inferences. If we define the notion of reference as the activation of mental content by linguistic means, any type of conceptual content can be the object of an act of reference, i.e. a referent. As briefly mentioned above, the fact that certain conceptual contents can be construed in different ways also argues in favor of this approach. Depending on the mode of mental scanning, conceptualization can provide mental access to a situation in multiple ways: for example, we can refer to a situation as a THING or as an EVENT (nominalization vs. verbalization). Another example would be the case of so called ontological metaphors whose function is essentially that they make contents available for a more prototypical act of reference that are otherwise less prototypical referents. If we assume that the broad category of referents is radially structured around a prototype (an INDIVIDUUM or a THING) within these categories ontological metaphors function as a cohesive force pushing the more peripheral referents towards the center (for example abstract concepts, EVENTS, or even whole PROPOSITIONS or other NON-THINGS may be, and in fact often are, conceptualized as THINGS).

As a consequence, it can be stated that linguistic metonymy is a special case of providing mental access to conceptual content; in other words conceptual metonymy is a sub-category of cognitive reference points, and linguistic metonymies are a sub-category of linguistic reference points. Both have their own characteristics which define them against other reference point phenomena, and both seem to be instances of a general human cognitive ability.

4.4 Linguistic metonymy as co-activation of mental content

So far, I have argued on the basis of a broad notion of reference that linguistic metonymy is of a referential nature. This is not to say that instances of metonymy generally considered to be non-referential should be discarded as non-metonymic expressions. On the contrary, if we assume that an act of reference is the mental activation of any type of content with the purpose of meaning construction, it follows that linguistic expressions used in discourse are referential by nature and accordingly, this notion of referentiality cannot serve as the only definitional property of the category of linguistic metonymy, i.e. further criteria of linguistic metonymicity need to be sought.
In this section, I argue that one way in which linguistic metonymy can be distinguished from other instances of mental activation by linguistic means is that a linguistic metonymy activates complex mental contents: the source, the target, and the mental path leading from one to the other simultaneously. By activation I mean that an active content is not merely accessed during the meaning construction process but becomes an integral part of an expression’s interpretation.

This argument is rooted in the rejection of the traditional view that metonymy is the substitution of the name of an entity by that of another contiguous entity. The substitution view has been seriously challenged by cognitive linguists on many grounds. First and foremost, in cognitively oriented approaches metonymy is a cognitive process connecting conceptual entities, i.e. it does not merely involve words, but concepts (e.g. Panther and Radden 1999b: 9, Radden and Kövecses 1999: 18). Many others have also pointed out (often with reference to Radden and Kövecses 1999) that on the one hand, the essence of metonymy is not merely substitution, and on the other, not all metonymies involve a substitution (e.g. Barcelona 2002: 220, Dirven 2002: 102, Panther and Thornburg 1999: 334, Benczes 2011: 209 and most notably Warren 1999: 128, 2002: 120). Nevertheless, the substitution view is still pervasive in metonymy research (at least on the level of terminology, for example in the form of the terms X FOR Y, ‘stands for’ relationship, metonymic shift etc.).

When defining referential metonymy, Warren explicitly rejects the substitution view (e.g. 1999: 128 or 2002: 120) since in her approach the explicit modifier (source) and the implicit head (target) form a referential unit (see examples (6) and (7) above). In a similar vein, Panther and Thornburg emphasizes that “both the vehicle and the target are conceptually present when a metonymy is used” (1999: 334) or “the source meaning is not obliterated by the target meaning, but still conceptually present (»salient«), or activated” (Panther and Thornburg 2004: 97), however they reject the substitution view on somewhat different grounds, namely they point out that it concentrates only on referential cases and they emphasize that metonymic expressions carry more content than the source and the target itself and the substitution of the latter by the former (2007: 238).

I fully share both views in that the essence of metonymy is not substitution, i.e. the source is not merely a point of entry while accessing the target content but is very much active during meaning construction and contributes to the interpretation of linguistic metonymies to a large extent. The source content, the target content, and the conceptual path leading from one to the other are co-activated during meaning construction, forming a referential complex. This applies to all linguistic metonymies regardless of whether they
are referential or propositional, since in my broad view every linguistic metonymy is referential. For instance, in (6) the KETTLE and the WATER form a referential complex by being in a CONTAINER-CONTENT relationship, i.e. two related THING-type contents are co-activated, whereas in propositional metonymies such as (12), two propositions and the relationship holding between them are co-activated. In this respect, all linguistic metonymies function similarly, independently of the type of the contents activated.

(12)\textsuperscript{93}
A: How did you get to the airport?
B: \textit{I waved down a taxi.} [A taxi took me there]


It is rather obvious why the target content needs to remain active. Otherwise (6) would be nonsensical and the answer in (12) simply irrelevant. The same applies to the relationship between source and target. Without activating the CONTAINER-CONTENT relationship between the KETTLE and the WATER and the relationship holding between the propositions ‘I waved down a taxi’ and ‘I got there by taxi’, there would be no mental path leading to the activation of the target, and consequently the expressions would again be nonsensical or irrelevant.\textsuperscript{94}

It may be less obvious why I should claim that the source content also remains activated. The source content is not merely a point of access to the target that is discarded as irrelevant during meaning construction; on the contrary, it contributes to the overall meaning of the expression. It modifies the target content, or it brings additional content. For instance, in (6) it specifies that the water is boiling in a kettle, hence the metonymic expression delivers more content than if it merely substituted the target, and more than the literal expression \textit{the water} (see Warren 1999 and 2002). However, the same applies to propositional metonymies; the linguistic metonymy \textit{I waved down a taxi} provides more

\textsuperscript{93} Example (26) from Chapter 3 is repeated here as (12) for the sake of convenience.

\textsuperscript{94} Two remarks should be made at this point. First, frames, domain, ICMs, or bases do play a significant role in meaning construction, although I omit them from the analysis here, since they are generally applied; accordingly, they are not specific to the use and interpretation of linguistic metonymy. Second, the view I present here does not contradict Panther and Thornburg’s view of conceptual metonymy as a natural inference schema. These schemata or mental paths are activated, regardless of the type of content they represent (as opposed to the target and the source content being part of our declarative knowledge, they are to be thought of as part of our procedural knowledge). A similar proposal is put forth by Tendahl (2009) when he models conceptual metaphor and metonymy as empty slots on lexical concepts opening up possible connections to other concepts or other domains, as pointed out by Csatár (2014).
information than the target proposition ‘I got there by taxi’ if it is conveyed in the form *I got there by taxi* (since the speaker might equally called for a cab), i.e. in the case of the literal expression, the initial stage of the process of ‘getting there’ would remain completely non-active.

Further support for the activation of the source in linguistic metonymy is provided by cases where the linguistic metonymy receives an attribute:

(13) *The ham sandwich with the weird moustache* is waiting for his check.

(14) *The ham sandwich with mayonnaise* is waiting for his check.

(15) *The kettle I bought you* is boiling.

In (13), the attribute *with the weird moustache* seems to modify only the meaning of the target since it is incompatible with the meaning *HAM SANDWICH*; however, to be precise, it modifies the meaning of the whole referential complex comprised by the target and the source, i.e. *THE PERSON WITH THE WEIRD MOUSTACHE WHO ORDERED A HAM SANDWICH*. In (14), where the attribute *with mayonnaise* seemingly modifies only the source, it actually modifies the whole referential complex, i.e. the activated meaning complex *THE PERSON WHO ORDERED A HAM SANDWICH WITH MAYONNAISE*. In a similar vein, in (15) *I bought you* is a modifier of the whole referential complex *THE WATER IN THE KETTLE*. The examples show that although attributes seem to be compatible only with either the target or the source, they actually modify a referential complex where both the target and the source are active.

Nevertheless, examples (13-15) are constructed and admittedly somewhat artificial. They sound unnatural and their occurrence is restricted to rather specific contexts. For instance, (13) and (14) would occur in contexts where there are several customers who ordered a ham sandwich, and (15) would be relevant only in a situation where there are several kettles containing boiling water. Especially in the case of (13) and (14) in the context described above, due to their saliency and higher relevance *MAYONNAISE* and *WEIRD MOUSTACHE* would serve as better sources for the linguistic metonymy, i.e. what distinguishes the customer at hand is his moustache or the mayonnaise in his ham sandwich.

Furthermore, if the source content were inactive, it would mean that the same expression could appear within the construal of the same situation as a metonymic source and in its literal meaning. In fact, the very opposite is true. For instance, as Warren (2002)
points out, metonymic expressions do not yield zeugmatic effects because in metonymy target and source form a referential unit. In my terms, they are co-activated. Or consider (16):

(16) *I waved down a taxi and then I waved down a taxi.

If in (16) the first clause activated the proposition ‘I waved down a taxi’ and the second were a metonymic expression activating only the target proposition ‘I got to the airport by taxi’, their combination would be acceptable and relevant. However, (16) would never occur in actual conversation since it is redundant and one of the clauses is irrelevant. In my view, the redundancy of (16) is caused by the activation of the source content in the metonymic expression. Due to the economy principle governing language and verbal communication, no content is activated twice within the construal of the same situation. Accordingly, the reason (16) is highly unlikely to occur is not simply to avoid the repetition of the form, but since the source content is also activated by the linguistic metonymy, it conforms to the cognitive principle of avoiding double activation of the same content within the construal of the same situation.

Finally, the claim that the source content of a metonymic expression remains active is further supported by the defeasibility of metonymy (as pointed out by Panther and Thornburg 2003b or 2003c: 7) and by the fact that speakers sometimes resolve their own linguistic metonymies:

(17)
A: How did you get to the airport?
B: I waved down a taxi.
A: How much did it cost?
B: Oh, I immediately realized that I had no cash, so I decided to walk.

(18) 4D fetal ultrasounds are fabulous. You can take the child home on a DVD. I mean a video of the child, like a movie.

95 However, the double activation of the same content may carry additional cognitive effect and would be sanctioned by, for example, adding emphasis or other rhetorical effects. However, the use of double activation seems to be marginal in everyday communication.
If the source content were inactive, the resolution would not be meaningful, either. If only the target (VIDEO IMAGE OF THE CHILD) were active, the resolution of the metonymic expression *I mean a video of the child* would be redundant.

By claiming that a linguistic metonymy co-activates the target and the source content and the mental path between them I do not exclude the possibility that they are not active to the same extent in every linguistic metonymy, since activation is a matter a degree (cf. Chafe 1994 cited in Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 136). For instance, in highly conventionalized and frequent metonymies, or in dead metonymies, the source content may have been blurred, or the target may have been so strongly established that the source remains rather inactive and the mental path between source and target may become so automated and entrenched that it is barely active.

Apart from highly conventionalized cases, most metonymies involve a *shift in attention*, i.e. either the source or the target content is *fore-grounded* or *back-grounded* relative to the each other. As Kocsány (2006) points out with reference to Langacker (1993), in (19) the target (SAXOPHONE) remains in the background and the target (SAXOPHONE PLAYER) is fore-grounded, whereas in (20) the saliency relations are reversed: the source (MY EX-HUSBAND) being fore-grounded, and the target (MY EX-HUSBAND’S CAR) back-grounded.

(19) *The saxophone* is always late.

(20) *My ex-husband* is parked on the top level. (Kocsány 2006: 100)

Later on, by applying Langacker’s notions of foreground and background to the analysis of literary examples, Kocsány (2006: 101-102) shows that these notions are rather speculative and intuitive. In numerous cases involving linguistic metonymy, it is questionable whether it is possible to decide what the attention is focused on in a plausible, inter-subjective, and rigorous manner. According to her argumentation, this question is highly dependent on a series of factors, such as world knowledge or subjective and cultural preferences. Although most linguistic metonymies seem to involve focusing on some part of the activated

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96 The same remarks would apply to other related notions. There are cases where it is hard to decide what is highlighted by metonymy (Croft 2002), or whether the source is in the target or the target is in the source (for the distinction between source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies, see Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco 2002).
referential complex, i.e. there is some asymmetry between the activation of the source and the target, I fully share Kocsány’s view that this phenomenon is hard to grasp and is influenced by a variety of factors. Accordingly, my approach emphasizes that the essence of linguistic metonymy is that the target, the source, and the mental path between them are all active at some level during meaning construction and the question of what is highlighted or fore-grounded (asymmetries in activation) in a particular linguistic metonymy remains to be clarified by further empirical research.

4.5 The implicitness of linguistic metonymy

The second fundamental property of linguistic metonymy that distinguishes it from other ways of providing mental access by linguistic means is its implicitness. By stating that linguistic metonymy is implicit, I mean that although a linguistic metonymy co-activates the target, the source, and the relationship holding between them, only the source is expressed linguistically. The target and the relationship holding between source and target do not appear together with the source in a linguistically expressed form in the same linguistic construal of a situation. If they do, the expression ceases to be metonymic, as in (21) or (22).

(21) The water in the kettle is boiling.

(22) I waved down a taxi and I got to the airport by taxi.

In example (21), both concepts KETTLE and WATER and their relationship (CONTAINMENT) are expressed linguistically in the form of the water, the kettle and in, respectively, whereas in (22), both propositions (‘I waved down a taxi’ and ‘I got to the airport by taxi’) are explicit linguistically. Hence neither of them is a linguistic metonymy, even though they involve the same concepts/propositions within the same frame, and with the same conceptual relationships between them, as their metonymic counterparts in examples (6) and (12).

Some linguistic metonymies may contradict the implicitness thesis superficially, especially metonymies taking the form X is (not) Y, where an entity is metonymically equated with another entity, such as in (23):

(23) The water in the kettle is boiling.

Beside the factors mentioned by Kocsány (2006), asymmetries in activation or highlighting/fore-grounding are fundamentally influenced by the co-text and the broader context (for the importance of the frame within which metonymy is applied, see Croft 2002, 2006).
(23) She’s just a pretty face. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 37)

The appearance of SHE (an entity) and PRETTY FACE (a part of that entity) within the same construal would suggest that the expression is not implicit. However, Panther and Thornburg (2007) point out that the target of PRETTY FACE is not SHE, but a PERSON, and the metonymic expression pretty face conveys more meaning than simply ‘a person whose face is pretty’. In my analysis, this additional meaning comes about by the target remaining implicit, in turn emphasizing that the person at hand is reduced to one of her body parts. Here, the target seems to be back-grounded, and there is a strong asymmetry between the degree of activation of the source and that of the target. In outspokenly sexist language and thinking, it very often happens that a PERSON is metonymically reduced to one of her BODY PARTS to such an extent that the target content PERSON is hardly active anymore and becomes fully objectified.

By implicitly co-activating complex mental contents, linguistic metonymy provides an especially effective and economic tool for conveying complex meanings, often with emergent meaning aspects. In relevance theoretic terms, linguistic metonymy has the potential to reach a relatively high cognitive effect with relatively low cognitive effort. For instance, in its onomasiological function, linguistic metonymy enables us to talk and think about contents that are rather hard to grasp and name due to their complexity, their vagueness, their ad hoc nature, or their obscurity, by activating them implicitly. In two recent papers, Twardzisz (2014a, 2014b) points out how problematic it is to identify metonymic targets in political and legal contexts. He shows, for instance, that the following have been proposed as the target of the expression the White House in metonymic contexts: (i) the executive branch of the US government, (ii) the US government, (iii) the American government and (iv) some officials working in the White House (Twardzisz 2014a: 108-109). Elsewhere, he argues that this indeterminacy or under-determination of the implicit metonymic target content is often deliberately exploited in political discourse (Twardzisz 2014b). For instance, the indeterminancy of metonymic targets in subject position may be an effective way of avoiding assigning responsibility for certain decisions and actions, as in (24). The choice of the subject represents different construals of the same situation; however, they substantially differ from each other in the way they assign the responsibility for an action.
(24)

a. **Bush** attacked Iraq.
b. **The President** attacked Iraq.
c. **The US** army attacked Iraq.
d. **The White House** attacked Iraq.
e. **The US government** attacked Iraq.
f. **The US** attacked Iraq.
g. **America** attacked Iraq.
h. **American soldiers** attacked Iraq.

However, the labeling of metonymic targets only poses a problem for the linguist trying to uncover the conceptual metonymy behind the linguistic metonymy. Linguistic metonymies seem to be produced and interpreted with ease in actual conversation. As Twardzisz puts it:

> The need to bring in more precision and to refine the reference point arises when extra circumstances are created for the deliberate pursuit of target identification. In typical speech scenarios, there is no need to further elaborate the entity named in a given expression. People directly involved in a speech act hardly ever pursue more precise targets when communicating their messages. (Twardzisz 2014b: 89)

In my approach, metonymic targets are easily processed, since they are activated from a meaning construction point of view even if they are linguistically implicit and not precisely elaborated. This is achieved by linguistic metonymy’s ability to implicitly co-activate complex contents.

Implicitness as an essential property of linguistic metonymy has been proposed by some researchers (e.g. Barcelona 2011a: 19-20, implicitly by Panther and Thornburg 2004, Panther 2005a and Warren 1999, 2002, 2006, and more recently and most articulately Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014), however, these approaches either leave this feature out of consideration or unarticulated (as is the case with Barcelona and Panther and Thornburg), since their primary concern is conceptual metonymy and not its linguistic manifestation; alternatively they emphasize it only with relation to referential metonymy, as is the case in Warren’s approach. In my approach, the distinction between conceptual and linguistic metonymy acquires importance, hence implicitness is a definitional property of linguistic
metonymy. Linguistic metonymy as the implicit co-activation of mental content becomes distinguishable from other related phenomena (see Section 4.6). Furthermore, a clearer definition of linguistic metonymy is necessitated by the fact that conceptual metonymy can be investigated only through its linguistic manifestations; accordingly, the empirical study of metonymy must rely on some notion of linguistic metonymy. As will be shown in Chapter 6, emphasizing the implicitness of linguistic metonymy has consequences, for instance, when studying it using corpus-linguistic methods.

Nevertheless, before examining these advantages, it must be noted that implicitness – similarly to activation – is a matter of degree. For instance, the highlighted propositional metonymies in the following conversation display different degrees of implicitness, something which is also recognized by the participants of the conversation. A is a Chicago PD Sergeant, known for his notoriously violent methods, B is his subordinate. During a briefing, A instructs his subordinates that they should deliver a cop-killer named Pulpo to him personally, if caught. Knowing his history of vengefulness and violence, he is implicating that he is going to kill Pulpo.

(25)
A: Listen up. What Pulpo did downstairs was an attack on our family. [...] So let me be clear. Forget warrants. Forget the rules. It’s on us to catch him. And when we do, he’s to be handed off to me and Alvin.
B: Hey, Sarge. I’m just looking for a little clarification on what you just said.
A: Pulpo ain’t making it back to a jail cell. That clear enough for you?99

The target meaning of both propositional metonymies is that ‘We are going to kill Pulpo’; in both cases, this target content remains implicit, but in the first it is perceived as being more implicit than in the second. The reason for this difference in implicitness may lie in the directness/indirectness of the mental path leading from the source to the target.

Another major source of differing degrees of implicitness across linguistic metonymies is the amount and explicitness of the contextual support which guides the interpreter to a metonymic interpretation, i.e. how strongly the context triggers the co-activation of the implicit relationship between source and target and the target content. If the

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99 Chicago P.D. Season 1, Episode 14.
implicitness of a linguistic metonymy is defined as above, i.e. only the source is linguistically explicit, and the target and the mental path leading from source to target remain implicit within the same construal of a situation, this means that linguistic metonymies differ with respect to their implicitness in the amount and strength of contextual cues supporting the activation of the implicit elements of the co-activated complex content.

In this respect, **illocutionary, propositional, and twice-true metonymies** seem to display the highest degree of implicitness since they do not violate truth conditions, are not incompatible with their narrow context, and their metonymic interpretation is triggered only in the light of their **broad context**

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or the whole conversation/text. For instance, in (12) *I waved down a taxi* is interpreted as a metonymy only as B’s answer to A’s question. The twice true metonymy in (8) – a newspaper headline – receives its specific metonymic interpretation after the text itself has been read. This is a feature of twice-true metonymies in general that makes them ideal for headlines and titles, since their ambiguity without the knowledge of the rest of the text catches the reader’s attention and calls for disambiguation; to be more precise, it calls for a metonymic interpretation.

A relatively lesser degree of implicitness is displayed by **prototypical referential, verbal, and adjectival metonymies** (metonymies at the lexical level). Their interpretation is triggered by their **incompatibility with their immediate context**; in this respect, they resemble phenomena Pustejovsky (1991, 1995) labels as type coercion, i.e. their metonymic interpretation is coerced by the linguistic environment in which they occur. However, their implicitness may be further reduced by elements of the broader context, for instance by anaphoric pronouns indicating a referential shift of attention (the anaphoric pronoun explicitly refers to the implicit target content); or by making the target content explicit at a later point of the text or conversation, as is the case with the representational metonymy in (26), or in (27), where the speaker makes the target content of the twice true metonymy gradually more explicit.

(26) ‘That would be *me*’ he said. And he put a **business card** on the table in front of me.
‘How is the mill at Wighleigh?’ Elizabeth asked.

‘Finished, and rolling,’ Merthin said proudly. ‘Caris has been fulling cloth there for a week.’

Elizabeth raised her eyebrows. ‘Herself?’

‘No that was a figure of speech. As a matter of fact, Mark Webber is running the mill, though he is training some of the village men to take over.’

The role of conceptual metonymy (and metaphor) in **compounding** has been extensively studied in CL (e.g. Barcelona 2008, 2009, 2011c, Yoon 2013, and especially Benczes 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2011, and 2013 etc.). Conceptual metonymically motivated compounds are quite heterogeneous with respect to their implicitness. For instance, the verb + noun compound sell-sword ‘a person who fights with a sword and whose services can be bought’ is highly implicit since the target content and for the most part the relationship between source and target remain implicit, whereas the noun + noun compound swordsman is less implicit since both concepts SWORD and MAN are linguistically manifest; what remains implicit is merely the relationship holding between them, which excludes the compound from the set of linguistic metonymies.

Another field where the motivational role of conceptual metonymy has been intensively studied is **derivation** (among others Panther and Thornburg 2002, Radden 2005, Barcelona 2009, Basilio 2006, 2009, Kuczok 2011, Rubio 2014, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2013, 2014, Janda 2011, 2014). Even if we accept that many derivational word-formation processes involve conceptual metonymy, or at least some similar cognitive mechanisms, or involve similar conceptual relations, lexical items resulting from them (zero-derivation or affixation) display the least degree of implicitness, hence they are the least implicit linguistic metonymies. They instantiate marginal cases of linguistic metonymy at the most, or cannot be considered as such at all. In this respect, zero-derivation, or **conversion**, on the one hand and **derivational affixation**, on the other, differ from each other substantially. Lexical items resulting from conversion can be considered linguistic metonymies displaying a relatively

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101 Follett (2007: 528). I have highlighted the twice-true linguistic metonymy by bold italics and indicated those parts where the metonymy is resolved step by step by the speaker in underscored lettering.

102 It must be noted that the conceptual metonymic and metaphoric processes and their interaction underlying compounding are far more complicated and pose complex problems (see the literature cited above). I used the above examples merely to illustrate in an over-simplistic manner that compounds often display lower degrees of implicitness and that despite their conceptual metonymic motivation some of them cannot be classified as linguistic metonymies.
low degree of implicitness. Let us consider a very simple English example, the verb *to butter* derived from the noun *butter* by zero derivation.

(28) Go ahead, *butter* your toast!

(29) Right after he *buttered* his toast, he dropped it, and as always it landed facing down.

In (28) the verb *butter* is a linguistic metonymy with a high degree of implicitness which instantiates the conceptual metonymy SUBSTANCE APPLIED IN THE ACTION FOR THE ACTION. The expression activates both the target (SPREAD BUTTER ON STH.) and the source (BUTTER) and the relationship holding between them (SUBSTANCE APPLIED IN THE ACTION). Interestingly enough, in English there is no verb that would be able to capture and convey the target action, other than the linguistic metonymy *to butter*. In this case the application of metonymy to the naming of an action is indispensable; hence the target remains implicit by necessity (as opposed to the literal expression *Go ahead, spread some butter on your toast!*). However, as a result of the metonymic conversion process the grammatical category of the base noun is changed, resulting in a denominative verb. This categorical shift is overtly marked morphologically by verbal inflectional suffixes, such as in (29). Hence, when the metonymic denominative verb is inflected, the conceptual metonymic process underlying its derivation is explicitly marked. Although the target remains implicit, inflectional changes induced by the categorical shift function as overt cues for a metonymic interpretation and they decrease the degree of implicitness.

Similar grammatical changes can also occur when the word class of the linguistic source remains untouched by its use as a metonymic reference point.

(30) There was a *Rembrandt* hanging on the wall of his office.

(31) *Two Manets* went mysteriously missing from the museum.

The linguistic metonymies in (30) and (31) realize the conceptual metonymy ARTIST FOR HIS WORK, i.e. *a Rembrandt* activates the complex content ‘a painting by Rembrandt’ and *two Manets* ‘two paintings by Manet’. Although the word class of the proper names is not changed, the use of the proper names as linguistic metonymic reference points is marked.
Their grammatical properties apply to the target, in general to common nouns: in this case the use of the indefinite article and the plural marker –s. These elements also support the metonymic interpretation; accordingly, they decrease the implicitness of the linguistic metonymy.

If we accept implicitness – as proposed here – as a fundamental property of linguistic metonymy, word-formation by suffixation does not yield linguistic metonymies. Let us consider again a very simple English example, the deverbative noun baker from the verb to bake derived by the suffix –er. Even if we accept that the suffixation process underlying the noun baker involves the conceptual metonymy AGENT FOR ACTION, baker cannot be considered to be implicit. First, the complex lexical item baker activates the target directly, i.e. it explicitly activates the target content BAKER, and in this respect, it would instantiate a dead metonymy at best. Second, the suffix –er explicitly expresses the conceptual relationship between the contents BAKE and BAKER. The linguistically explicit marking of the relationship between the two concepts holds, even if – and as is the case here – the suffix –er itself is polysemous and in its different meanings it activates different relationships, and its meanings are related by conceptual metonymy and metaphor to its core meaning (as pointed out by Panther and Thornburg 2002). What baker has in common with linguistic metonymies par excellence is that it is based on a relationship often also exploited by conceptual metonymy, and that in naming the concept BAKER it highlights or activates emphatically a certain aspect of the concept, namely that bakers bake, and the combination of the verb and the suffix carry emergent meanings, i.e. bakers bake professionally. Finally, the last argument against considering lexical items yielded by derivative suffixation as linguistic metonymies involves the possibility of the linguistic expression’s appearance in its literal sense and as a metonymic linguistic reference point within the same construal of a situation. In the previous section, I argued that this does not happen in the case of linguistic metonymy due to the avoidance of double activation of the same content. Example (32) shows that this does not hold for lexical items such as baker.

(32) When I called the bakery, the baker had just finished baking bread.

However odd they may sound, such expressions do occur. Their oddity may be attributed to the fact that baker does activate the content BAKING to some degree, which leads to an over-activation of the content within the construal at hand, but certainly not to the extent to which proper linguistic metonymies activate the source content. In sum, it can be stated that
although they may be motivated by conceptual metonymic mechanisms, lexical items yielded by derivational suffixation cannot be considered linguistic metonymies, or at most they represent marginal cases with a rather low degree of implicitness.

Before concluding this section let me revisit briefly the debate between Janda (2011, 2014) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014) outlined in Chapter 2. At the heart of the debate there is a tension between broad and narrower views of metonomy, and this general problem manifests itself as the question of whether word-formation by suffixation can be considered metonymic. On the one hand, Janda represent the stance of the broad view and emphasizes that analyzing word-formation by suffixation as involving metonymy opens up the possibility of formulating generalizations about the phenomenon. On the other, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó warn against the overuse of the notion ‘metonymy’ and claim that if it is accepted that word-formation by suffixation is metonymic as is proposed by Janda, it would contribute to the unconstrained use of the notion of metonymy and would lead to its becoming vacuous (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014: 314). Clearly, the problem seems to be a question of how to define metonymy.

What I have argued for in the previous and present sections is completely in accordance with, and in support of, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó’s stance. They represent the same views as presented here in rejecting derivation by suffixation as metonymic, for instance: “metonymic source and target cannot be metonymic for each other at the same time” (ibid. 333), and they also point out that the target in metonymy is per definition implicit (ibid. 327). More importantly, they also argue that conceptual metonymy does not necessarily yield a linguistic metonymy: “it does not follow that if the cognitive reference-point ability as a general principle permeates grammar it must necessarily be realized as metonymy” (ibid. 319). Janda herself admits that lexical items resulting from conversion and derivation are less implicit, since “the affix serves as an »overt cue to the presence of metonymy«” (with reference to Janda 2011: 388 in Janda 2014: 346, citation in the original), and relying on Paduceva (2004), she points out that due to cross-linguistic differences in affixation, the same conceptual metonymic relationship can be realized in a certain language as a lexical metonymy, and in others as a word-formation metonymy (Janda 2011: 364). However, since she concentrates on metonymy as a ubiquitous conceptual phenomenon and due to the lack of an explicit definition of linguistic metonymy, these insights do not lead her to discard lexical items resulting from derivation as metonymies. In her reply to Brdar and Brdar-Szabó’s comments, she points out that they “do not offer an explicit definition of metonymy,
however they clearly hold to a definition that eschews morphological marking within a word” (Janda 2014: 344).

My approach may be able to contribute to the debate at this point by emphasizing the clear distinction between conceptual and linguistic metonymy and by offering a definition of metonymy that contains elements that exclude or at least marginalize lexical units resulting from derivation as linguistic metonymies. If we consider conceptual metonymy as a general cognitive principle and we define linguistic metonymy as (i) an expression that is motivated by conceptual metonymic processes in that it (ii) co-activates any type of mental contents (the source, the target, and the relation holding between them) in a way reminiscent of reference point constructions, – with the linguistic property that (iii) the target content and the relationship between source and target are not expressed explicitly or are only expressed marginally or schematically on the linguistic level, it may be said that the strategies used in derivational word-formation are in fact metonymic, or at least are based on conceptual relations that are often exploited in metonymy, but that the linguistic units resulting from these processes are not necessarily linguistic metonymies, or they are marginal cases displaying low degrees of implicitness. This may of course imply that whether an expression is a linguistic metonymy is highly language and culture dependent. This approach is in accordance with Brdar and Brdar-Szabó’s arguments and would still allow some space for Janda’s claims. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the broad notion of metonymy stills carries the danger of becoming too unrestricted and encompassing everything. Since, if everything involving a specific instantiation of a PART-WHOLE relation were a metonymy, it would mean that the relations holding between mental representations of entities are equated with metonymy. In turn, metonymy would not be a conceptual mechanism anymore, but a fundamental disposition of our conceptual system, which would render the notion completely vacuous.

4.6 Linguistic metonymy and related phenomena

So far I have argued that linguistic metonymy is essentially referential, in the sense that it activates mental contents with the purpose of meaning construction. Linguistic metonymy is distinguished from other types of activation by two fundamental features. First, it co-activates mental contents, i.e. the source, the target, and the conceptual relationship between them. And second, it is always implicit, in the sense that only the source content appears explicitly. Furthermore, I have tackled the issue of lexical items produced by derivational
affixation and argued that these cannot be considered proper linguistic metonymies. These two distinctive features seem to be able to yield a narrower definition of the notion ‘linguistic metonymy’, which in turn is capable of narrowing down the set of phenomena it covers. In this section, I take a brief look at how two related and similar phenomena – active zone phenomena and linguistic metaphor – differ from linguistic metonymy with respect to the activation of mental contents and their implicitness.

4.6.1 Linguistic metonymy and active zone phenomena

The notion of ‘active zone’ or ‘zone activation’ has been introduced by Langacker (1984, 1991b: Chapter 7, 1999: 62-66, 2009a: 41-45, 2009b). He defines the notion as follows:

An entity’s active zone, with respect to a profiled relationship, is that facet of it which most directly and crucially participates in that relationship. The reason for defining this notion is that the entity that most directly participates in a relationship is often not precisely the same as the one profiled by the nominal expressing its trajector or landmark. (Langacker 2009b: 48)

A more easily accessible definition is offered by Radden and Dirven (2007: 335, emphasis in the original): “The active zone of an entity is that part within a frame that is crucially involved in a given situation.”

(33) So tall, he seems an unlikely rabbit, but the breadth of white face, the pallor of his blue irises, and a nervous flutter under his brief nose as he stabs a cigarette into his mouth partially explain the nickname, which was given to him when he was a boy.103

For instance, in (33) the active zone of the lexical concept CIGARETTE accessed by the noun cigarette is ‘the tip of cigarette containing the filter’ and that of MOUTH is ‘the lips’ with respect to the relationship profiled by the verb stab into, or in Radden and Dirven’s terminology the frame of SMOKING evoked by cigarette. As can be seen, in this case the active zone does not coincide with the entity expressed by the noun. This phenomenon is so common in language, that it can be considered the default case, and eventually, the opposite is rather seldom encountered, and often yields poetic or rhetoric effects as is the case with

103 Updike (2006: 3).
the choice of the expression *his blue irises* instead of *his blue eyes*, where the active zone with respect to the relationship profiled by the adjective *blue* coincides with the entity profiled by the noun *iris*. In the following, I will refer to phenomena similar to *cigarette* and *mouth* in (33) as active zone phenomena or zone activation, interchangeably.

It is not always clear in the literature how active zone phenomena and metonymy relate to each other, but in the broad view of metonymy active zone phenomena seem to be cases of metonymy (c.f. for instance, Langacker 2009a and 2009b, Barcelona 2002 and 2011a). However, noteworthy approaches have been developed recently by researchers working in the frame of a narrower view of metonymy to distinguish between different types of active zone phenomena and metonymy (most notably Paradis 2004 and 2011, Geeraerts and Peirsman 2011).

As has been discussed in Chapter 3, Barcelona (2002, 2011a) assumes active zone phenomena under schematic (34) and typical metonymies (35).

(34) **This book** is very large. (Barcelona 2011a: 18)

(35) **This book** is a history of Iraq. (Barcelona 2011a: 16)

In his analysis, the concept of BOOK stands metonymically for BOOK AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT in (34), whereas in (35) it stands metonymically for the BOOK’S CONTENT. In the schematic metonymy, the target is a primary, while in the typical one it is a secondary, domain of the BOOK. It is easy to see that this analysis would also apply to *cigarette* and *mouth* in (33), where CIGARETTE stands for THE TIP OF THE CIGARETTE WITH THE FILTER, and MOUTH stands for THE LIPS. In all probability, they both instantiate a schematic metonymy; however, it must be noted that it is far from obvious which part of the concept CIGARETTE and MOUTH would be primary or secondary relative to other sub-domains, since whether a sub-domain is primary or secondary is basically dependent on the relationship or situation they are involved in.

If we take into consideration the mental contents activated by these expressions and their implicitness, it turns out that they cannot be considered linguistic metonymies. It is indisputable that the target content of the expressions above are active; however, what is considered by Barcelona to be their metonymic source content is not. The notion of active

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104 In fact, this coincidence is not perfectly accurate, either, since the human iris is not of a homogenous color; however, it is more accurate than it is in the case of *his blue eyes*.
zone by definition implies that a certain zone of an entity is active in a relationship relative to its other zones, which in turn must be inactive. In other words, the expressions book, cigarette, and mouth above do not activate those parts of the concepts designated by them that are active in the relationships ‘being large’, ‘being a history of Iraq’, and ‘stabbing a cigarette into the mouth’. Furthermore, intuitively it is hardly tenable that the relationship between the whole concept BOOK and its physical or content aspect would be activated during the interpretation of the utterances in (34) and (35). Neither are these expressions implicit. The target content, or at least a part of it – even though not in an accurate way – is still expressed explicitly. Although it does so imprecisely, the noun book does express the contents ‘book as a physical object’ and ‘the content of a book’, as do cigarette and mouth the concepts ‘the tip of the cigarette with the filter’ and ‘the lips’. This can be explained by the fact that these linguistic units are conventionally associated with conceptual regions that contain all these meaning aspects.

The claim that active zone phenomena should be distinguished from linguistic metonymies is further supported by the claim that the source of a linguistic metonymy cannot appear in its literal and metonymic sense in the same expression (c.f. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014: 333), which is possible in the case of active zone phenomena, as in (36) and (37).

(36) I am reading a bulky book.

(37) The blue book is unreadable.

It would be counter-intuitive to assume that the noun book in (36) and (37) realizes two metonymies simultaneously: a schematic metonymy with the target content BOOK AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT and a typical metonymy with the target content THE CONTENT OF THE BOOK. These examples are rather instances of zone activation where two zones are activated in two different relationships (one in ‘being bulky’ and ‘being blue’ and the other in ‘being read’ and in ‘being unreadable’ respectively).

105 I use the notion of ‘conceptual region’ in the sense proposed by Tendahl (2009: 199-200): “[…] the first thing we do upon perceiving a word is access a conceptual region. […] A conceptual region is a context-independent unit related to a particular word”. Later on, he points out that among other types of information, conceptual regions contain lexical concepts, i.e. lexically encoded “context-invariant pieces of information”. In my view, it is context-invariant information about books that they are physical objects and have content, or about cigarettes that they have two tips (one with a filter, one without). It is this sense in which the nouns discussed are necessarily explicit.
In sum, it can be stated that what active zone phenomena have in common with linguistic metonymies is that they activate contents that are hard to name precisely; however, the two phenomena differ from each other substantially. Firstly, active zone phenomena do not co-activate complex mental contents simultaneously, as linguistic metonymies co-activate the source and target content and their relationship, since in active zone phenomena it is only the imprecisely expressed content that is active from a meaning constructional point of view. And secondly, active zone phenomena are not implicit, since the non-activated zones of the conceptual region associated with the linguistic unit at hand do indeed appear in the form of the linguistic unit, unlike linguistic metonymies where only the source content is expressed linguistically.

4.6.2 Linguistic metonymy and metaphor

The problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor has already been discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. I presented two approaches to the problem that emphasize the conceptual apparatus behind figurative expressions, both arguing for a broad notion of metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon and against the possibility of a clear delimitation of the notions. An alternative I considered was Warren’s narrower approach which concentrates on linguistic features of metonymy. In conclusion to Chapter 3, it can be stated that conceptual metonymy and metaphor form a continuum rather than clear-cut categories.

The continuum view can be traced back to the way broad approaches to metonymy focus on its conceptual nature. These approaches define metaphor and metonymy on the basis of a number of purely conceptual structures and processes such as domains, frames, mappings, contiguity and similarity relations, etc. These concepts are in turn fuzzy themselves and cannot be subjected to direct study, hence they cannot be defined precisely by examining linguistic expressions, in whose formation and interpretation they are involved, by intuitive-introspective methods. A new angle on the problem is offered by situating it on a different level of description, and taking a look at the distinction between linguistic metonymies and metaphors. This approach presupposes finding the differences in the characteristic properties of linguistic metonymy and linguistic metaphor. In the present chapter, I proposed implicitness and co-activation of mental content as fundamental properties of linguistic metonymy; we must now consider how linguistic metaphor differs in these respects.
The shift of attention from conceptual to linguistic properties in distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy is not unprecedented. Haser (2005) is a fierce critique of Lakoffian CL, and in general she rejects the postulation of conceptual metaphors and metonymies. She represents a far narrower approach by stating that what cognitive semanticists consider to be metonymies and metaphors on the conceptual and linguistic level do not qualify as such (2005: 212). In a chapter devoted to the relationship between metaphor and metonymy, Haser provides a critical overview of the major differences between the two phenomena provided by cognitive linguists. Although the problems she points out are serious (such as the problematic nature of domains, contiguity, similarity, etc.) and her criticism is often on target, the solution she offers is not without problems.

In her approach, the major difference between metaphor and metonymy is that in the case of metaphor, “knowledge of the target concept does not imply knowledge of the source concept” (italics in the original) and “the source meaning plays no constitutive role in the target meaning, at least once the source and target meaning are considered apart from each other” (Haser 2005: 47). Whereas in the metonymic transfer, “knowing the source meaning is indispensable in principle for grasping the target meaning” (italics in the original, ibid.), i.e. “source and target are inseparable” (ibid.). Based on her analysis of the expression *He has brains*, it seems that what she means by “indispensable” is that the metonymic target meaning presupposes the source meaning (Haser 2005: 46).

Haser’s view is problematic at least on three grounds. First, when she sets up properties of metaphor and metonymy, she relies on clear cases from the literature on the two phenomena. Relying on cases traditionally analyzed as metonymic and metaphoric may be a good starting point for finding their definitive properties; however, the possibility cannot be excluded that other phenomena not considered in traditional literature are in fact metonymic or metaphoric in the light of CL research. In other words, further cases cannot be excluded as non-metonymic or non-metaphoric just because they have not been considered as such earlier. The narrow notions of traditional approaches alone do not provide sufficient ground to reject broad notions proposed by cognitivists; from a methodological point of view, this would be clearly problematic.

Second, deciding whether two concepts or meanings are separable from each other or not, and whether one implies or presupposes the other or not is not as straightforward as Haser suggests. Basically, what she does by proposing these criteria is to translate the one

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106 If I understand Haser correctly, when using the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘meaning’ she refers to linguistic knowledge (lexicon view), as opposed to encyclopedic knowledge.
domain versus two domains approach into her own terms, which she herself finds problematic; accordingly, she rejects the role of ICMs in interpreting figurative expressions. It is also problematic that what Haser means by “target meaning” is in fact not the target but the complex content activated by the metonymic expression, i.e. it also contains the source and the relationship between source and target. For instance, in analyzing the famous ham sandwich example, she argues that “In order to grasp the target meaning 'ham sandwich eating customer' one has to know the meaning ham sandwich” (italics in the original, Haser 2005: 47). The target concept in the expression is the CUSTOMER, not the CUSTOMER EATING A HAM SANDWICH, which is in fact the whole complex content activated by the metonymic expression. Haser seems to equate the information conveyed by the metonymic expression with the target. Furthermore, it is hard for me to see how the understanding of the concept CUSTOMER presupposes the knowledge of the HAM SANDWICH, if we do not take into consideration that they are part of the same ICM or frame, i.e. RESTAURANT, since it is questionable that CUSTOMER as a lexical meaning would be dependent on the lexical meaning HAM SANDWICH.

And finally, if we accept that the metonymic target always presupposes or implies the knowledge of the source target, it would be hard to account for non-conventionalized, innovative, or ad hoc metonymies. Take for instance example (12) from Chapter 3, where the concepts of CLUE (source) and BEER (target) are connected metonymically. It is hard to argue that in this case the target knowledge could not be understood without the source knowledge, that the target would anyhow presuppose the source or implies the source, or even that they would not be separable. The example clearly shows that the knowledge of the source concept is clearly dispensable if one wants to know the target concept. What is indispensable in order to understand the meaning conveyed by an ad hoc linguistic metonymy is the co-activation of the relationship between source and target within the frame or ICM.

Another approach to the problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor which concentrates on linguistically manifest features of both is offered by Deignan (2005: Chapter 3). Deignan attempts to come to grips with the problem by acknowledging the fuzzy boundaries between the categories linguistic metonymy and linguistic metaphor, and by setting up criteria for intermediate categories where conceptual metonymy and metaphor seem to interact, based on properties of linguistic phenomena delivered by corpus analyses. Drawing on Goossens’ interactional patterns between metaphor and metonymy (2002) and supplementing these by differences in their frequency and the context in which they occur,
she sets up intermediate categories (metonymy within metaphor, metonymy from metaphor and metonymy-based metaphor). In this respect, her approach is reminiscent of Radden’s (2002); however, Deignan’s approach represents a substantial advance, namely her reliance on additional criteria of distinction stemming from the close inspection of naturally occurring linguistic expressions.

In Deignan’s view clear categorization is not possible; accordingly, on occasion she herself classifies rather similar expressions differently, for instance the expression bite one’s tongue off exemplifies metonymy within metaphor (Deignan 2005: 70), while elsewhere she lists the expression bite one’s lips as metaphor from metonymy (Deignan 2005: 66). Setting aside uncertainties, Deignan’s achievement must be acknowledged on at least two fronts. On the one hand, she applies criteria derived from the qualitative corpus analysis of naturally occurring figurative expressions in order to locate them along a continuum. In addition to the methodological innovation in addressing the problem, these criteria are capable of grasping fine-grained differences between expressions located at different points on the continuum. On the other, to a certain extent she does justice to the importance of conceptual metonymy emphasized by many metonymy researchers, by pointing out and incorporating into her classification the insight that “much of what was earlier described as “metaphor” has at least an element of metonymy, if not a substantial component” (Deignan 2005: 53).

However, it remains unclear what properties intermediate cases have in common with clear cases of metaphor and what properties they do not share with clear cases of metonymy, which eventually makes them metaphors, since all the labels Deignan uses contain an element of metonymy, even though the expressions are still classified as metaphors: metonymy within metaphor, metaphor from metonymy, metonymy-based metaphor. In other words, the question of what justifies the classification of all expressions representing intermediate cases as linguistic metaphors remains unanswered. All Deignan offers is that reclassifying intermediate expressions as metonymy is counter-intuitive and not helpful (2005: 60). It seems that in Deignan’s approach metonymy remains “metaphor’s poor sister” (the metaphor is taken from Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014) and metaphor is still “metonymy’s rich relative” (the metaphor is taken from Ruiz de Mendoza 1999, cited in Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014: 315). Metaphorically speaking, although the poor sister’s help and contribution in the rich relative’s family business is appreciated, her name is still not on a par with her partner’s.

What my approach has in common with Haser’s and Deignan’s is that it concentrates on linguistic metonymy; however, it differs substantially from Haser’s and – in its focus –
from Deignan’s. Unlike Haser, I do not refute the postulation of conceptual metonymies and metaphors as underlying mechanisms behind linguistic metonymies and metaphors (notwithstanding that the labeling of the source and target domains can turn out to be problematic). In contrast to Deignan, my focus is on properties of prototypical cases of linguistic metonymy and metaphor, whereas she is concerned with fine-grained distinctive properties between intermediate cases on a continuum ranging from linguistic metonymy to linguistic metaphor.

Prototypical cases of linguistic metonymy and linguistic metaphor differ from each other to a large extent in terms of the implicitness of their target content and the activation of their source content. As I have argued so far, metonymic targets always remain linguistically implicit and the metonymic source content is always active, i.e. source and target content and their connection form a complex actively contributing to meaning construction. Linguistic metaphors diverge significantly in these two respects.

In linguistic metaphors, linguistic elements referring to target and source content are very often co-present, especially if a broader context of the linguistic metaphor is taken into consideration (context beyond their direct syntactic environment). In a detailed overview of types of metaphor according to their form of linguistic realization, Skirl and Schwarz-Friesel regularly point out which element of a construction belongs to the source content and which to the target (2013: Chapter 2). Their classification clearly shows that it is possible for the metaphoric target to appear together with the source in a great number of linguistic constructions, even in the same construal of a situation. Though it is obviously well-known in metaphor research that target and source often appear together (most corpus-linguistic methods exploit this feature), let us briefly consider some examples:

(38) She was playful, innocent and kittenish. (Deignan 2005: 153)\(^{107}\)

(39a) Germ. Denkgebäude (Haser 2005: 47) / Eng. intellectual edifice
(39b) Germ. Wüsten Schiff / Eng. ship of the desert, ‘camel’

(40) Rodriguez’ leg wasn’t trembling, he was a confident executioner.\(^{108}\)

\(^{107}\) For kittenish in particular and derived forms as metaphors in general, see Deignan (2005: 49).
\(^{108}\) Hungarian sports commentator upon Colombian James Rodriguez scoring from a penalty against Brazil in the World Cup, 2014. Original: Rodriguez lába nem remegett, magabiztos itélétvégrehajtó volt.
Leonard: When did my idea become our idea?
Sheldon: When I mixed it with Sheldony goodness and cooked it in the Easy-Bake Oven of my mind.
Leonard: This is good. Our idea’s really good.
Sheldon: Well, the light-bulb in this oven is ridiculously bright.\textsuperscript{109}

As opposed to metonymically motivated derived forms and compounds which display a low degree of implicitness, if they can be considered linguistic metonymies at all, in metaphoric derived forms source and target elements appear together in the linguistic metaphor, as can be seen in (38) and compounds as in the German examples in (39a) and (39b), but also in adjective + noun combinations as in the English version of (39a) and in possessive constructions as in the English version of (39b).\textsuperscript{110} The same applies to metaphors taking the form X is Y, as in (40) and especially to larger chunks of context as in the dialogue under (41), where we find a rather creative and unconventional extension of the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD.

In my definition, a linguistic metonymy co-activates the source and the target content and the conceptual connection between them. Linguistic metaphors seem to behave in this regard rather differently, as well. Obviously, at the end of the meaning construction process the target content of metaphoric expressions becomes active once a linguistic metaphor has been interpreted as such, otherwise the expression would not be interpreted at all, or simply as nonsensical or irrelevant, at best. As has been pointed out, the same applies to linguistic metonymy. The major difference between linguistic metaphor and metonymy lies in the activation of the source content and the conceptual connection between target and source content.

In the case of linguistic metaphor, the source content becomes non-active after the interpretation of the expression. Similar proposals can be found in the literature. Dirven argues that in the case of metaphor we often encounter a full substitution of the source domain by the target domain, since “the source domain loses its existence when mapped onto the target domain” (2002: 100), or as Warren puts it “in metaphor the target domain annihilates the source domain” (2004: 107). In other words, the metaphoric source content is not active; it only lends some of its properties to the target domain, i.e. only those aspects that

\textsuperscript{109} The Big Bang Theory, Season 8, Episode 14.
\textsuperscript{110} Throughout the examples at hand source items are in bold italics, whereas target items are underlined.
of the source content are active that are mapped onto the target content (cf. Lakoff’s Invariance Hypothesis).

A telling example of the source content being inactive after a linguistic metaphor has been recognized and interpreted as such can be found in (42):

(42)
A: You’re looking at me, at us, but we don’t exist, not legally, not officially, because German intelligence needs a job to be done that German law won’t let it do, so me and my people we stay small. We stay on the streets. We make the weather. Our sources don’t come to us, we find them. We become their friends. Their brothers, their fathers, their lovers, if we have to. When they’re ours, and only then, we direct them at bigger targets. *It takes a minnow to catch a barracuda. A barracuda to catch a shark.*
B: *I don’t fish,* Herr Bachmann.
C: *It’s a metaphor,* Erhardt. *Just a metaphor.*

A: We take our time. We watch. We wait. We see what Allah provides. Well, this time Allah has provided Issa Karpov and his ill-gotten millions.

[…]
B: *If this Abdullah, if this barracuda, if I’ve understood the metaphor, takes the bait,* with what leverage will you secure his cooperation?

[…][111]

Günther Bachmann (A), a German intelligence officer is explaining to B how their operations work, i.e. how he plans to capture a bigger target, Abdullah, by getting close to him through a man named Issa Karpov. In his explanation, he uses a metaphor where the target content, i.e. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, is understood in terms of the source content FISHING. B’s reply shows that he does not understand or is not willing to understand the metaphor used in A’s first turn. For B at this point only the literal meanings of minnow, barracuda, shark, catch and fish, i.e. the source FISHING, appear to be active as is indicated by his impatient response *I don’t fish, Herr Bachmann.* The target content is activated only

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[111] The dialogue is taken from the movie *A Most Wanted Man*, a cinematic adaptation of John le Carré’s novel with the same title (screenplay by Andrew Bovell). Though the screenplay follows le Carré’s text, I chose it as an example over the novel due to its purely dialogical form. I have highlighted the parts of the dialogue particularly relevant to my analysis.
after C has pointed out explicitly that Bachmann is speaking metaphorically, i.e. he guides or pushes B towards a metaphoric interpretation. However, once the linguistic metaphor is interpreted as such and the target content is activated, the source content disappears, and in B’s second utterance *barracuda* and *bait* lose their literal source meaning and become active only as elements describing the activated target.

Stating that in linguistic metaphors the source content is not activated is not to say that it would not play a role in meaning construction. As the dialogue in (42) illustrates, the level of activation of a particular content changes over time during communication and meaning construction processes. Furthermore, as Tolcsvai Nagy (2013: 136) points out with reference to Chafe (1994), there are different degrees or levels of activation. It seems that at the initial stage of meaning construction only the source content is active; as meaning construction progresses some of its aspects – those that are relevant to the metaphoric understanding of the target content – are activated, and finally once the metaphoric mapping has taken place and the metaphoric interpretation is established, the source loses its activation as a whole domain.

Regarding the activation of the conceptual link which connects source and target content, or the conceptual path leading from one to the other, linguistic metonymies and metaphors seem to differ from each other substantially. Linguistic metonymies activate one prominent link between source and target, such as CONTAINER-CONTENT, PART-WHOLE, AUTHOR-WORK, PLACE-INSTITUTION etc., whereas linguistic metaphors open up or even create an array of correspondences between source and target, some of which are more active than others, i.e. they highlight some aspects and background others. As a result, metaphors can be extended and specified in creative ways by triggering a series of metaphoric inferences. This is how CREATIVE THINKING becomes COOKING, the MIND an OVEN, and INTELLIGENCE a LIGHT-BULB in (41).

However, it must be admitted that there can be no sharp distinction drawn between metonymies and metaphors based on the activation of the conceptual links between source and target content. On the one hand, there are metaphors that seem to activate only a small number of links or a single link between source and target content. Ruiz de Mendoza emphasizes that there are fundamental differences between so called one-correspondence and many-correspondence metaphors (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza 1997: 168-171, 2000: 112). In

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112 In Baldauf’s classification such cases are instantiated by so called attribute metaphors (Attributsmetaphern), where only one attribute of the source is projected onto the other (for example: LACK OF EMOTIONS IS COLD) (1997: 83).
terms of the number of the active links between source and target, metonymy and one-
correspondence metaphors seem to be reminiscent of each other.\footnote{It must be noted that in my view there are no one-correspondence metaphors in the strict sense, or metaphors that would not be able to trigger further metaphoric inferences beyond the transfer of a single attribute to another domain. Take for instance *Achilles is a lion*. In Ruiz de Mendoza’s analysis (2000: 111-112) the expression relies on a single correspondence between the domains *ACHILLES* and *LION*, namely the feature of COURAGE. This correspondence may be at the very heart of the metaphor, yet other correspondences and further inferences are also possible (even if they may be less prominent), such as STRONG, QUICK, DANGEROUS, ROARING LIKE A LION, MAJESTIC etc. Such connecting links are hard to find in the case of metonymies. Furthermore, in my view these “weaker” correspondences distinguish linguistic metaphors from non-metaphoric language (e.g. *Achilles is courageous*).}

On the other hand, it is also possible to extend metonymy, in the sense that once the conceptual/pragmatic connection between source and target content is activated, the target content may become eligible for description in terms of properties stemming from the source content.\footnote{Admittedly, this process seems to occur rather rarely. For instance, it would be odd (though not impossible) to describe WATER in the terms of properties belonging to the domain KETTLE.} A possible candidate for this process is found in (43).

\begin{quote}
I hope that my jollity does not wake any suspicions in your worship, but how it could have escaped my attention, that the *German language* is so dear to your worship, that you adore her/it even before having mastered her/it? Nevertheless, I beg you to bear in mind that the *German language* is going to be here even in a week’s time upon your return from Saint-Germain, waiting for you faithfully with her/its loveable “die”-s, “der”-s and “das”-es, with her/its charming conjugation, sweet compounds, and genteel verbs at the end of a sentence.\footnote{The passage is taken from the seventh book (La volte des vertugadins) of Robert Merle’s historical novel series *Fortune de France* (2011: 307, translated from French to Hungarian by Zsófia Mihancsik). Under (43), I present my own translation from Hungarian to English since, as far as I know, the series has not yet been translated into English. The literary quality of my translation may be dubious, of course, but it serves the purposes of the analysis adequately. Furthermore, a note must be made on the use of English personal and possessive pronouns *her/it(s)*. In French, *langue* is a feminine substantive, however, French possessive pronouns do not mark the nominal gender of the possessor (I am thankful to Andrea Horváth for her help with French grammar; however, any mistakes in the analysis, of course, remain mine). I decided not to opt for either solution here, with the remark that the *her* form would strengthen the metonymic interpretation whereas *it(s)* would display a higher degree of implicitness of the metonymic target. For the problems surrounding pronominal anaphora of metonymic expressions, see for instance Markert and Hahn (1997), Ruiz de Mendoza (2000), Warren (2004) and, more recently, Zhang (2014).}
\end{quote}

The passage is addressed to a young knight, Pierre-Emmanuel de Siorac by an old family friend, La Surie. At first sight, the passage and the highlighted expressions might suggest that the German language is metaphorically conceptualized and verbalized here as a beautiful lady of high birth, with the language learner as her lover or admirer. However, the
knowledge of the broad context provides the reader with background information that supports a reading in which all these expressions can be traced back to a metonymy, where the language functions as explicit source content, whereas the implicit target is Madame de Lichtenberg, Siorac’s German tutor, with whom he is overtly affectionate. On the one hand, the attributes *faithful, loveable, charming, sweet, and genteel* are properties of the target and are active as such. On the other hand, they are transferred to implicit properties of the langue taught by Madame, which in turn is also active. The resulting oxymora (learners of German would describe the system of nominal genus, person and number marking verbal suffixes, complex multiple compounds, and verb-last positioning in subordinate-clauses as anything but loveable) contribute to the ironic-humorous effect of the passage. Nevertheless, in the case of the metonymy at hand the target (MADAM), the source (GERMAN), and the link connecting them (to put it simply, LANGUAGE FOR TUTOR) are all equally active, as opposed to metaphors where the source is non-active after the interpretation and there is more than one link connecting source and target, each operating with a different degree of activation.

Finally, let us take a brief look at what implicitness and co-activation proposed here as criteria for the distinction of linguistic metonymy and metaphor have to offer in the discussion of intermediate cases. The example in (44) contains an authentic occurrence of (3a) from Chapter 3.

(44)
The fact that there was some justice in this remark did not make it any easier for Philip to swallow. Total ownership was what he had agreed with Lady Regan, but she had cheated him out of it at the last minute. He was tempted to say that he had got the best deal he could, and he would like to see Remigius do any better in the treacherous maze of the royal court; *but he bit his tongue*, for he was, after all, the prior, and he had to take responsibility when things went wrong.\textsuperscript{116}

The target content (approximately ‘he changed his mind suddenly and did not say anything’) is obviously active and implicit; hence, it is hard to decide whether to classify the highlighted expression as metonymic or metaphoric. What can be of help is the level of activation of the source content and of the conceptual link between source and target. The problem is that the low degree of activation of these may be due to the metaphoricity of the expression, or to

\textsuperscript{116} Follett (2007: 440).
the high conventionality of its metonymicity. The example shows that the criteria I have proposed in this chapter are not a novel alternative to earlier approaches focusing on conceptual aspects of metaphor and metonymy, but a complement to them. To me, the example seems to be metonymic rather than metaphoric, since the source and target can be clearly united in a single idealized frame as sub-events of the same complex event. The metonymic classification may be further supported by the fact that the conceptual link between wanting to speak, biting one’s tongue, and suddenly not saying anything seems to be active in the interpretation of the expression (this is not an active complex of target + source + conceptual link, as in the case of WATER IN THE KETTLE or MUSIC COMPOSED BY MOZART). However, the source content is not active in the sense that he actually bit his tongue and did not say anything, which would speak for the expression’s metaphoricity.

These contradicting arguments suggest that the question of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor remains a challenging line of investigation, despite the contribution of the criteria proposed here, criteria which may not in fact be readily applicable to conventionalized or idiomatic expressions, a category requiring a treatment of its own.

4.6.3 Linguistic metonymy in comparison and contrast

In sum, linguistic metonymy is an expression that functions as a linguistic reference point providing access to and co-activating the source, the target, and the conceptual link connecting them, whereas on the linguistic level only the source is explicit, schematically as in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 Linguistic metonymy: implicitness and activation
The figure shows that the source (S) and the target (T) content (bold circles) and their relation (bold line connecting the circles) are all active. The line leading from the metonymic expression (in italics) represents a referential relation between the linguistic metonymy (linguistic reference-point) and the activated complex: it enters the frame/ICM that contains both source and target, and through the source content (conceptual reference-point) it co-activates the target and their relation, i.e. the latter two are indirectly accessed and activated while remaining linguistically unexpressed.117

Unlike linguistic metonymy, active zone phenomena do not activate a complex of conceptual contents and they are linguistically explicit. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, two entities (the circles) enter a relationship (the bold line connecting the circles) within a frame/ICM. This relationship is obviously active from a meaning construction point of view, i.e. it defines which zones of the entities are to be activated and which remain non-active (hence the bold line). However, it must be noted that all contents are related to a linguistic unit by a referential relationship, i.e. none of them are implicit. The bold arches represent the active zones of the conceptual content (in the absence of a more suitable notion and for the sake of easier comparability, T and S stand for target and source, respectively), whereas the non-bold parts are the non-active zones.

![Figure 4.5 Active zone phenomena: implicitness and activation](image)

117 Unfortunately, the figures cannot capture processes and are only able to represent the state once an expression is interpreted.
A schematic sketch of the implicitness and activation of linguistic metaphors is offered in Figure 4.6. Since metaphors cut-across frames/ICMs, the figure is not situated in an oval rectangle. In the case of linguistic metaphor, the target can and in fact often does appear explicitly on the linguistic level (hence the brackets); on the other hand, once an expression has been interpreted as a linguistic metaphor the source content is not active any more (hence the non-bold circle of the source) as opposed to the active target (bold circle). The varying degrees of activation of the correspondences between source and target are represented by a bold line, two jagged lines, and two dotted lines; however, this does not mean, of course, that the number of correspondences with varying degrees is pre-defined. Just the opposite is the case – the number of connecting links between metaphoric sources and targets and the number of metaphoric inferences triggered by the mapping of the source onto the target are in principle open-ended, only constrained by human creative imagination, the embodied nature of human cognition, and the cognitive effort their elaboration requires.

Figure 4.6 Linguistic metaphor: implicitness and activation

The differences between active zone phenomena, linguistic metonymy, and linguistic metaphor in terms of their implicitness and the conceptual content they activate are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Active zone phenomena, linguistic metonymy, and metaphor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Implicitness</th>
<th>Activation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active zone phenomena</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic metonymy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic metaphor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Active zone phenomena are explicit and activate a certain part of a conceptual content (labeled here as target). The source of linguistic metonymy is always explicit, whereas its target is always implicit, but they are both active. In the case of metaphor, the target content is very often explicit, whereas the source content is non-active. However, it must be noted that the table might suggest that these oppositions are binary and delineate clear-cut categories. This is not the case. As has been pointed out, both implicitness and activation are gradual, hence the categories based on them display them to different degrees. The lines of the table should thus be considered as clear points on a continuum.

4.7 Some questions for future research\textsuperscript{118}

Before concluding this chapter, it is worth considering some possible lines of further investigations related to linguistic metonymy as the implicit co-activation of mental content. My definition of linguistic metonymy may offer some new insights regarding three issues: the gradualness and language-specificity of linguistic metonymy, the relation of linguistic metonymy to conceptual integration/blending, and the relation of linguistic metonymy to reference point constructions.

In my definition of linguistic metonymy, the target content and the conceptual relationship between source and target content remain linguistically unmarked. However, as I pointed out in section 4.5, implicitness is a gradual notion. On the one hand, the introduction of this criterion narrows down the range of phenomena that can be considered linguistic metonymies; on the other, it may pose the problem that the relevant linguistic phenomena can be extremely heterogeneous due to the gradual nature of their implicitness. This heterogeneity may be manifested in a variety of intra-lingual alternative construals and

\textsuperscript{118} I am indebted to Péter Pelyvás for calling my attention to these possible directions of future research.
in considerable cross-linguistic divergences. Admittedly, this may have a negative impact on the empirical investigation of the relevant phenomena.

The heterogeneity and language-specificity caused by varying degrees of implicitness do pose challenges for cognitive metonymy research. However, these might be overcome by a shift in focus. The satisfying treatment of these challenges requires contrastive and cross-linguistic investigations into metonymy to put more emphasis on linguistically manifest differences – in addition to their conceptual and cultural background – and to consider these in relation to the structural features of specific languages (cf. Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2012: 744). If future investigations were able to integrate insights regarding the cognitive-functional background of metonymy with the variety of its linguistically realized forms (even by pointing out that certain phenomena cannot be considered linguistic metonymies), that would contribute to our understanding of conceptual and linguistic metonymy to a considerable degree.

The claim that linguistic metonymy co-activates mental contents not only allows us to contrast and compare certain aspects of metonymy and metaphor from a new perspective, but it can also be fruitfully extended to conceptual integration or blending theory (e.g. Fauconnier 1985, Fauconnier and Turner 1999, Turner and Fauconnier 2002). Blending theory is a complex and comprehensive general theory of online meaning construction. It has the undoubted advantage that it can treat expressions where multiple conceptual metaphors and/or metonymies are simultaneously at work because it leaves space for multiple input spaces and multi-directional projections and mappings across them, as opposed to the standard theory of conceptual metonymy and metaphor working with single domains or pairs of domains and unidirectional mappings. Furthermore, it considers meaning construction as an interactive process with a time-course.

What blends or integrated spaces share with the referential complex of linguistic metonymy is that they contain co-activated mental content from the input spaces and the generic space. However, the relation between metonymy and blending in terms of the co-activation of mental content is a relatively less investigated research topic. Though metonymy has been analysed in terms of blending theory (e.g. Alač and Coulson 2004, Coulson and Oakley 2003, Turner and Fauconnier 2002), a series of issues regarding the exact relation between metonymy and blending is still awaiting resolution. For instance, Fu (2012: 30-32) points out that analysing metonymy in a blending framework runs the risk of circularity, since the analysis of metonymy in terms of blending presupposes metonymy itself. Although Fu’s criticism might be a little too strict, it is on target, in the sense that it is
unclear whether conceptual metonymy and metaphor are sub-processes of conceptual integration or the result of it. A consideration of blending, metonymy, and their relation from the point of view of the co-activation of mental content may contribute to solving these uninvestigated problems.

If we focus on implicitness and co-activation, metonymy also shows some resemblances with reference point constructions (especially with modifier-head and head compliment constructions). In CL, the modifier-head relation is described as a structure where the head elaborates a salient sub-structure of the modifier. In other words, the head gives specific content to a schematic substructure of the modifier: “a modifier is a component structure a salient substructure of which is elaborated by the head. With problems is thus a modifier of people in people with problems: the head is people, which elaborates the schematic trajector of the relationship profiled by the prepositional phrase” (Langacker 1999: 21). These structures seem to be strangely asymmetrical, with syntactic and semantic relations pointing in opposing directions: the syntactic head determines the profile of the expression, but semantically it is subordinated. Whereas in head-complement structures, the semantic and syntactic features coincide: in the PP with problems, the head with determines the profile of the expression and the complement problems elaborates the head’s landmark. The question is how these relations behave in the case of metonymic expressions and how they relate to implicitness and activation. Considering the differences and similarities between linguistic metonymy and reference point constructions in these terms would be a promising line of investigation.

4.8 Summary

Chapter 4 has attempted to delimit the phenomena covered by the notion of metonymy so that they can be distinguished from other related phenomena (PDEL). The starting point of my argumentation was that an initial step towards a narrow definition of metonymy is to focus on its linguistic realization, i.e. linguistic metonymy and its linguistically manifest properties.

After reviewing the CL stance on the referentiality of metonymy, it became plausible that the general rejection of the idea that metonymy would be referential can be traced back to two generally accepted tenets. Firstly, since metonymy is primarily a conceptual phenomenon, often not even realized on the linguistic level, it cannot – by its nature or ontological status – be restricted to referential cases. And secondly, CL research
relies on a traditional, narrow notion of referentiality, which is restricted to the act of referring to thing-like entities by nominal expressions. I suggest that if we narrow down our focus to linguistic metonymy and broaden our view of referentiality, the latter becomes an essential property of the former. In this very broad approach to referentiality, an act of reference is equated with providing access to conceptual content by linguistic means, i.e. linguistic units which contribute to meaning construction by activating mental content are referential.

It is easy to see that this view in and of itself would not be useful for solving (P\_DEL); on the contrary, it would result an unlimited notion of metonymy. My hypothesis is that linguistic metonymy is a special way of activating mental content in at least two senses. First, a linguistic metonymy co-activates a complex of conceptual contents consisting of the source content, the target content, and the conceptual link connecting the two. Second, a linguistic metonymy activates this complex implicitly, in such a way that only the source content appears explicitly on the linguistic level.

Based on these two criteria, my answer to (P\_DEL) can be formulated as the following definition of linguistic metonymy:

Linguistic metonymy is

(i) an expression motivated by conceptual metonymic processes
(ii) in that it co-activates a complex of mental contents (the source, the target, and the relation holding between them) in a way reminiscent of reference point constructions,
(iii) with the linguistic property that the target content and the relationship between source and target are not expressed explicitly, or are only expressed marginally or schematically on the linguistic level.

The definition shows that this answer does not challenge what CL research has uncovered with respect to conceptual metonymy, nor does it offer a whole new alternative; it merely complements it by focusing on linguistically manifest properties. By co-activation of conceptual content I mean that once an expression is interpreted as metonymic, the source, the target, and their conceptual link are simultaneously active from a meaning constructional point of view. And finally, what is meant here by implicitness is that the target content and the conceptual link between target and source remain implicit, i.e. they cannot appear linguistically together with the source within the same metonymic construal of a situation.
In this way, a great deal of similar non-implicit phenomena involving a “pinch” of conceptual metonymy are excluded from the category of linguistic metonymy. Related phenomena, such as zone activation and linguistic metaphor, turn out to be rather different from linguistic metonymy. Active zone phenomena are not implicit and do not activate complex contents, whereas in the case of linguistic metaphor, target items regularly appear together linguistically with source items in the same metaphorical construal of a situation.

An integral part of my argumentation was that I argued that linguistic metonymy is referential. By this I mean that different types of linguistic metonymy do not activate mental content differently: where the metonymies earlier analyzed as referential and non-referential cases differ is actually in the type of mental content they activate. This hypothesis will serve as the basis for the establishment of relatively homogeneous sub-classes of metonymy within a content-based framework offered in the following chapter.
Chapter 5 - A content-based classification of metonymy

5.1 Introduction

As pointed out so far, the broad notion of metonymy (the ubiquity and primacy view) and the primary concern of contemporary cognitive metonymy research to establish metonymy as a fundamental cognitive operation may run the risk that the notion becomes almost all-encompassing, covering an extremely broad range of linguistic and cognitive phenomena. Beside defining linguistic metonymy more narrowly (as in Chapter 4), another possible strategy to avoid the risk of its becoming so broad that hardly any generalizations can be made about the diverse phenomena it describes, is to classify instances of metonymy so that relatively homogeneous classes are formed that can be accounted for in generalizable terms. The present chapter sets out to investigate the problem of classifying metonymy:

(P_CLASS) How can metonymy be classified into relatively homogeneous classes?

The CL and pre-CL literature on metonymy is at least as abundant in classifications of metonymy as in metonymy definitions. The most widely used basis for setting up a typology of metonymy is the relationship between the source and the target (e.g. Norrick 1981, Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden and Kövecses 1999, Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006a). Classifications conceived in this tradition can never be exhaustive. Due to their very nature, there are always borderline cases; the labels used for different classes and sub-classes and their taxonomies often alternate; the boundaries between sub-classes are fuzzy, and sometimes even minor inconsistencies arise. These flaws arise naturally, if we keep in mind the fact that these classifications eventually attempt to list, describe, and classify all existing and conceivable relationships between two concepts within the same knowledge structure.

Other classifications are concerned with the pragmatic function of metonymy (e.g. Warren 1999, 2002, Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2007). These approaches emphasize that metonymy is not necessarily connected to an act of reference (cf. Barcelona 2005a, 2005b, 2009, 2011a, 2011b) and they treat referential metonymy as an – albeit prototypical and very common – sub-class of metonymy and point

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119 An earlier version of the present chapter has appeared as Tóth (2015a). I would like to express my gratitude to Csilla Rákosi, András Kertész, and my supervisor, Péter Csatár for reading earlier drafts of the paper and providing me with their helpful comments.
out that non-referential cases of metonymy are far from being exceptional (cf. Section 4.2). Warren (1999, 2002, and 2006) distinguishes between referential and propositional metonymies, based on their linguistic features and truth-conditionality. Thornburg and Panther (1997) and Panther and Thornburg (1999) divide metonymies into classes based on their pragmatic characteristics; they speak of propositional metonymies with referential and predicational sub-classes and illocutionary or speech act metonymies. Radden (2012) makes a distinction between REFERENTIAL and EVENT metonymies.

Interestingly enough, no typology of metonymy has been set up that is based on the conceptual content involved in the metonymic process, i.e. on the conceptual nature of the target content activated and that of the cognitive reference point which serves as the metonymic source content. In this chapter, I set out to propose a classification of metonymy that focuses on the type of the target and the source content. I investigate (P_CLASS) in the form of the question of how metonymy can be classified on the basis of the type of conceptual contents involved in the metonymic process. My hypothesis is that well-defined and homogeneous classes of metonymy can be set up based on the type of the conceptual content accessed, which can be divided into sub-classes based on the type of their metonymic reference points (i.e. source content).

Chapter 5 is structured as follows. In section 5.2, I briefly recapitulate the notion of linguistic metonymy proposed in the previous chapter, in which it is connected to an act of reference. The section also provides a brief outline of the types of conceptual content that can be referred to or activated, and hence can be targeted by metonymy (target content) and those that can serve as metonymic cognitive and linguistic reference points (source content). In section 5.3, I propose the following classes of metonymy based on the type of the target content: THING- (5.3.1), EVENT- (5.3.2), PROPERTY- (5.3.3), PROPOSITION- (5.3.4) and speech act metonymies (5.3.5). In section 5.4, I argue that my classification is compatible with and can complement a contiguity-based classification (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006a, 2006b) and that it is in accordance with some of the above mentioned pragmatically oriented classifications of metonymy (Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2003b). My results are summarized in Section 5.5.

5.2 Linguistic metonymy and the conceptual content activated

It is a widely-held view among cognitive metonymy researchers that metonymy cannot be reduced to acts of reference (among others Barcelona 2011a, Sweep 2009, Panther and
Thornburg 2004, Panther 2005a, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000). As a consequence, they consider referential metonymy to be only a sub-class, and distinguish it from non-referential cases. This sub-class embraces almost exclusively nominal metonymies or metonymies whose target is a THING (the only possible referent in the traditional view). In the previous chapter, I argued that the reason for this almost consensual view\(^\text{120}\) concerning the referentiality of metonymy is that these approaches implicitly accept a traditional notion of reference\(^\text{121}\) that is too narrowly conceived for cognitive linguistic purposes.

I proposed a broader notion of reference that is more in line with the aims of CL; specifically, I equated the act of reference with the mental activation of certain contents with the help of linguistic reference points, with the aim of achieving further types of meaning construction (e.g. combining them into larger units of conceptual content, arriving at propositions, drawing further inferences). According to this notion, referents are not elements of the extra-linguistic reality but of a construal of this reality, and they are not restricted to THINGS (cf. section 4.3). In other words, I argued that mental access can be provided to any type of mental content, i.e. we do not only refer to our concepts of THINGS; accordingly, in my approach every linguistic metonymy is considered to be referential.\(^\text{122}\)

The referential view of linguistic metonymy outlined above still conceives metonymy very broadly; as a result, homogeneous classes of metonymy need to be established about which certain generalizations can be made. The type of conceptual content accessed by the metonymic source expression or linguistic reference point (the intended referent or target) offers itself as a basis for this classification, while the type of conceptual content that serves as the cognitive reference point (the source content) can serve as a criterion to set up sub-classes within each class.

This proposal calls for the consideration of the question of what types of conceptual content can be distinguished. The referents of different linguistic units are different types of conceptual content, and vice versa, different linguistic units provide mental access to

\(^{120}\) A minority of cognitive linguists maintains that metonymy is (primarily) of referential nature; see for example Croft (2002).

\(^{121}\) Although this ‘traditional’ view of reference is almost never described explicitly in cognitive semantic research on metonymy, it seems to me that it is even more conservative than that of Searle (1969).

\(^{122}\) It is important to note that the view that the target of a metonymy is not restricted to THINGS, and the class of metonymic expressions cannot be narrowed down to nominal cases, is widely shared in CL. My approach differs in the notion of reference it relies on. I do not see a difference in the mode through which different types of mental content are accessed for further inferential purposes; hence I regard the mental activation of any type of content to be an act of reference. This is not to say that I would deny that there are differences regarding the purpose of this mental activation, for example, arriving at an implicitly intended referent, singling out a THING for predication, singling out an EVENT to be predicated of THINGS, constructing PROPOSITIONS, arriving at conversational implicatures, or figuring out illocutionary purposes.
different types of conceptual content.\textsuperscript{123} Noun phrases usually activate THINGS or abstract entities that are very often construed as THINGS with the assistance of ontological metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) or as a result of reification. THINGS can be organized into taxonomically built categories or can belong to functionally structured DOMAINS, FRAMES, or SITUATIONS. These can also be made available by noun phrases, but can also be accessed through verbs. THINGS can have certain PROPERTIES, usually accessed through adjectives serving as linguistically manifest reference points. The referents of adjectives are SCALES, against which certain PROPERTIES of THINGS or EVENTS are measured.

THINGS can interact with each other, can be related to each other, and can be involved in various relationships. They are very often parts of EVENTS, are in certain STATES, can go through CHANGE, and participate in SITUATIONS. These contents are made available most readily with the help of verbs. Accordingly, verbs provide mental access to contents in which THINGS can be embedded or in which they are related to each other, for instance EVENTS, ACTIONS, or STATES. These can be further characterized by certain circumstances or PROPERTIES, for example MANNER, PLACE, or TIME, to which we refer with the help of adverbs and various morphologic and syntactic tools.

Along these lines, it is not unreasonable to assume that linguistic signs that have traditionally been assigned an exclusively functional role, in fact mentally activate some kind of conceptual content. This is in line with the assumptions of CL that we do have concepts of, for example, PERSON, NUMBER, TENSE, ASPECT, POSSIBILITY, ACTUALITY, GENERICITY etc. Although these concepts are usually expressed by grammatical elements, although only in a relational sense, and are organized very differently from more easily graspable concepts (for instance THINGS), they are still made available or accessed during meaning construction and contribute to the overall construal of a situation. Similarly, complex expressions provide mental access to complex contents; in this sense, even PROPOSITIONS and relations between PROPOSITIONS (e.g. with the help of connectives) can also be referred to.

\textsuperscript{123} A similar view is proposed by Mihatsh (2009), who points out the correlation between nouns and THINGS. See also Langacker (1987b). The following enumeration is in need of elaboration. My claims here are based on intuition rather than empirical evidence. The types of conceptual content require further research in CL, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. It is even questionable whether it is justified to gather these contents under the umbrella term ‘conceptual’; it is, for instance, hard to draw the line between conceptual and propositional content. What I outline here is mainly in accordance with Langacker’s (1987a) and Radden and Dirven’s (2007) findings and with the types of conceptual content they name, but I do not follow their terminology strictly. I claim here merely that any kind of mental content can be made available through reference points. This is the only common feature of the listed types of content I argue for; the specifics of their structure and characterization are left out of consideration. I do not claim that they could be listed, characterized, and classified exhaustively.
5.3 A content-based classification of metonymy

The major metonymy-types I propose here (without making any claim to exhaustivity) based on the conceptual content involved in the metonymic relationship, form a continuum ranging from classes displaying more prototypical features of referentiality and metonymicity\(^{124}\) (THING-metonymies) through ones displaying less prototypical features (PROPERTY- and EVENT-metonymies) to almost marginal cases (PROPOSITION-metonymies). The prototypical structure of the category ‘metonymy’ is due to the organization of the category ‘act of reference’ on which it is based. At its core, there are instances where nominal linguistic expressions access individual THINGS, and at the periphery, cases where a PROPOSITION provides access to another PROPOSITION.

5.3.1 THING-metonymies

The expressions I label as THING-metonymies are basically cases called referential metonymies in other approaches.\(^{125}\) The reason I start establishing classes of metonymy with THING-metonymies is twofold. First, they seem to be the prototypical type of metonymy (cf. Barcelona 2002, 2005a, 2005b, and 2009, or Warren 2006). And second, they are applied at an initial stage of meaning construction,\(^{126}\) i.e. they are used as a mechanism of reference-fixing; in other words, these metonymies are used to target and to find conceptual content of which something is predicated or said.

THING-metonymies are metonymies whose target (or intended referent) is a THING, which is accessed with the help of a reference point content that is related to it within the same frame or ICM.\(^{127}\) Indirect mental access can be provided to a THING through other THINGS, through a PROPERTY of the THING, or through its role or function in a situation or frame. Accordingly, THING-metonymies can be divided into sub-classes based on the

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\(^{124}\) For the degrees of metonymicity, see Barcelona (2002, 2011a) and 3.6.1.

\(^{125}\) For various distinctions between referential metonymy and other metonymic phenomena, see Stallard (1993), Panther and Thornburg (1999), and Warren (1999 and 2002).

\(^{126}\) For the role of metonymy in meaning construction, see Panther and Thornburg (2004) and Panther (2005a); for the role of metonymy at different layers of conceptual, linguistic, and communicative organization, see Radden (2005) and Barcelona (2005a, 2005b, and 2010).

\(^{127}\) The nature of the relation between target and source has been extensively studied both in rhetoric and cognitive linguistic approaches to metonymy and has often been selected as the basis of classifications of metonymy (see the works cited in 5.1). According to Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a), it is a contiguity relation, while Barcelona (2002 and 2011a) calls it a pragmatic function. The relationship between target and source and the knowledge structure they belong to also serve as criteria to distinguish metaphor from metonymy in most approaches (cf. Chapter 3).
conceptual type of the source through which they are accessed. THING-THING-metonymies are exemplified by the following expressions:

(1) *The ham sandwich* is waiting for his check. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35)

(2) *The first violin* has the flu. (Panther and Radden 1999b: 9)

(3) *The kettle is boiling*. (Warren 2002: 116)

(4) *He played Mozart.*

(5a) Hungarian *A 126-os szoba éppen ebédel.*

(5b) *Room 126 is out having lunch.*

Examples (1-4) are well-know and often analyzed in the literature. In (1) the meal (HAM SANDWICH) ordered by the costumer provides mental access to the CUSTOMER who ordered it within the frame/ ICM of a RESTAURANT. In (2) the musical instrument (FIRST VIOLIN) serves as a cognitive reference point to the person who plays the first violin (VIOLINIST). In (3) the CONTAINER of the water (KETTLE) mentally accesses the CONTENT of the kettle (WATER) within a culturally entrenched model of TEA-MAKING, embedded in Anglo-Saxon tradition. It is important to note that this frame is highly culture dependent. In other cultures, WATER and KETTLE do not constitute such closely related entities within the TEA-MAKING frame as in the Anglo-Saxon model. This could be the reason that, for example, the German and Hungarian word-for-word translations would sound odd: Ger. *Die Kanne kocht* and Hun. *Forg a kanna*, though the most natural Hungarian translation that would come closest to the English version would also be metonymic: Hun. *Forg a tea*. ‘The tea is boiling’, where the TEA to be made from the boiling water provides access to the WATER, whereas the literal version (Hun. *Forg a víz.* ‘The water is boiling’) would not convey that the frame against which the sentence is interpreted is the frame of TEA-MAKING. Example (4) is an instance of the well-known AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymy, in which the composer (MOZART) refers to a piece of music composed by him (MUSIC BY MOZART). The selection of these expressions may give a glimpse of how diverse the relationship between a metonymic target and source can be, but what they all have in common is that they involve THINGS connected by a relationship that is relevant within a given frame or ICM.
The Hungarian example in (5), where the place (ROOM 126) stands for its INHABITANTS or the people working there, and the fact that it can readily be translated with the help of the same metonymy into English, indicate that THING-metonymies are widely applied among typologically otherwise unrelated languages. Brdar (2009) argues, based on his and Brdar-Szabó’s earlier extensive cross-linguistic investigations into specific metonymies (e.g. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2003, 2009a, 2009b, Brdar-Szabó 2002, 2009, Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2003a, 2003b), that referential metonymies tend to be more widely spread among languages than non-referential ones. The same might well apply for THING-metonymies. These results point towards the idea that THING-metonymies are indeed the prototypical cases of metonymy. In my approach, the prototypicality of THING-metonymies can be traced back to the conceptual properties of THINGS (being relatively stable, autonomous, and salient) as the most ideal referents. This view is also supported by the findings of Mihatsch (2009) and the psychological experimental results cited there.

As opposed to the examples discussed so far, THINGS can be accessed not just via other related THINGS, but also by their relevant PROPERTIES as in (6), where the German family name Klein is motivated by a PROPERTY-THING-metonymy:


A slightly more complex example is provided in (7):

(7) Secretary on the intercom, introducing a visitor: Mayor, that’s your ten o’clock.

The target of the metonymy at hand is a person; hence it is a THING-metonymy. The way the target is accessed is a little more complicated than the rest of the examples. Ten o’clock can be considered a PROPERTY of the target only if first the EVENT content of the frame MEETING is activated. Within this frame, the TIME of the MEETING is singled out to serve as a reference point for a PARTICIPANT of the MEETING, consequently it may be classified as a ROLE IN A FRAME for a THING metonymic chain. In a more traditional classification, the expression would be classified as a PART-FOR-PART metonymy, where a part of the MEETING frame (PARTICIPANT) is accessed through another part of it (TIME).128

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128 Some authors deny that there are PART-FOR-PART metonymies. For instance, Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2002) distinguish only source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies and leave space in their classification only for PART-FOR-WHOLE and WHOLE-FOR-PART metonymies, ruling out PART-FOR-PART metonymies.
As already pointed out, the class of THING-metonymies in my classification mostly coincides with the class of referential metonymies in earlier classifications, though it must be noted that this is not always the case. Let us consider the following expressions.

(8) *I’m your gunshot.*\(^{129}\)

(9) *She is just a pretty face.* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 37)

(10) *I’m the tiramisu.* (Langacker 2008: 69)

These metonymies would qualify as predicational metonymies in pragmatically oriented classifications of metonymy (e.g. Barcelona 2009 and Panther and Thornburg 1999 and 2003b), since they are part of the predication. In my interpretation, in these cases a THING-type content is metonymically identified with another THING-type content, i.e. the target is reduced to, or metonymically identified with, one of its salient aspects which is especially relevant in a given frame or ICM. In (8) a PATIENT is accessed through her INJURY within an EMERGENCY ROOM frame, in (9) a PERSON is somewhat pejoratively reduced to one of her BODY PARTS and in (10) the same relationship applies within the same frame as in (1), the only difference being that here the CUSTOMER is reduced to and identified with one of its salient aspects (the MEAL she ordered) which is particularly relevant in the RESTAURANT frame. As to the mode, the mental access is provided with the help of the reference point, and as to the contents involved, these expressions do not differ from those in (1-5); they are all THING-metonymies, only differing in the role they play during meaning construction, i.e. they are applied when the propositional meaning is being constructed.

Finally, a closing remark should be made on the linguistic nature of the reference points of THING-metonymies. A brief glance at the expressions analyzed suggests that the linguistic manifestations of THING-metonymies are overwhelmingly noun phrases or, in a relatively smaller number of cases, adjectives, leaving a few exceptions of other linguistic expressions (for instance *ten o’clock* in (7)).

\(^{129}\) The example is from Showtime’s television-series *Nurse Jackie* (Season 2 Episode 8), where it is uttered by a patient with a gun-shot wound to a doctor who is looking for a patient she cannot find.
5.3.2 Event-metonymies

Event-metonymies are metonymies whose target (or intended referent) is an event which is accessed with the help of a cognitive reference point that is related to it within the same ICM or situation. The category label event is used here very broadly; a more fine-grained analysis would require its differentiation. I do not make a distinction between actions, changes, events etc. and subsume all these under the umbrella term ‘event’. An event can be accessed through one of its participants (thing), through its properties (i.e. its circumstances, manner etc.), through one of its sub-events (event) or through its pre-conditions or consequences (with these also usually being events).

In the following examples an event is accessed by a thing that describes either a circumstance (11-12) or a participant of the event (13), hence they can be considered thing-event-metonymies.

(11) Rick, I get it, you don’t want to risk another Woodbury.

(12) Hun. Az őszi nyárban nagyon élveztem a vízpartot.

‘In the autumnal summer I enjoyed the waterside very much’

In (11) and (12) the place where an event (or series of events) occurred refers metonymically to the event (or series of events), the only difference being that in the first case the event must be known to the hearer and does not need to be described any more specifically, while in (12) the events that took place at the waterside need not be specified since it is deducible from our world knowledge that they are probably events (activities) typically associated with the place.

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130 Up to these two classes Radden’s classification (2012) is reminiscent of mine, with the difference that he does not consider event metonymies to be referential and due to the low number of his major classes (only referential and event) they form larger and more heterogeneous groups than mine.

131 It should be noted that in the view of Radden and Dirven (2007), events are conceptually represented by so called event-schemas which include the necessary participants and elements of the event at hand. They form the conceptual core of a situation which they constitute together with so called peripheral elements (non-necessary elements describing an event). Although I do not follow their terminology strictly, since in my view the metonymic targeting of certain peripheral elements of an event such as its actuality or potentiality tends to result in proposition-metonymies, my points are basically in line with their approach. For the difficulty of distinguishing event- and proposition-metonymies see 5.3.4.

132 The Walking Dead (Issue 68, p. 13).
Example (13) is a somewhat more complex case. In the first sentence, the EVENT of GOING TO THE DENTIST is accessed by the GOAL of the GOING EVENT-schema, namely the DENTIST (a THING), which serves as an ideal metonymic reference point, since people are more readily activated as the object of the feeling HATE than EVENTS. It must also be noted that in the second sentence the event of GOING TO THE DENTIST (a SUB-EVENT in a larger frame) provides mental access to another SUB-EVENT of the frame, namely the procedures a patient has to suffer at a dentist. The two metonymies form a metonymic chain. What makes the example all the more interesting is that after using a THING-EVENT-metonymy the speaker tries to provide a resolution of the metonymy she has just used, but in doing so she uses another metonymy, namely one of the EVENT-EVENT type. Without this remark in which she corrects herself, her first THING-EVENT-metonymy would probably be interpreted as meaning that she actually hates the procedures she has to suffer at the dentist, based on our knowledge of the DENTIST frame which includes the idea that the most painful part of the scenario is the procedure done by the dentist (i.e. it may be interpreted as an AGENT-FOR-ACTION metonymy). In other words, the interpretation of the first metonymy would not require a chain of metonymies, but the second metonymy is inserted as an attempt at resolving the first metonymy. What the speaker wants to achieve is probably to make sure that she does not hate the dentist as a person, but the event that takes place at the dentist, i.e. it is enough to shift from a THING-EVENT metonymy to an EVENT-EVENT metonymy, and she does not have to correct herself in the form of a literal expression.

As can be seen from the analysis of (13), complex EVENTS can be referred to with their SUB-EVENTS which serve as reference points (EVENT-EVENT-metonymies). The initial SUB-EVENT of a complex EVENT is very often picked as a reference point for the whole EVENT:

(14) *to go to bed* ‘to have sex’ (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 22)


‘I haven’t lit up for a long time’ i.e. ‘I haven’t lit a cigarette for a long time.’
The expression in (14) shows that the initial SUB-EVENT (GOING TO BED) for an EVENT (HAVING SEX) metonymy can be lexicalized. In (15) the initial SUB-EVENT of LIGHTING A CIGARETTE metonymically accesses the complex EVENT of SMOKING. The Hungarian sentence is a perfectly natural expression of the content that the speaker has not smoked for a long time, i.e. the initial and cognitively most salient SUB-EVENT (LIGHTING A CIGARETTE) refers to the whole EVENT of SMOKING.

The reverse path of providing access to EVENTS is also possible, i.e. SUB-EVENTS can be accessed through whole EVENTS:

(16) *He came at precisely 7:45 PM.* (Langacker 2008: 70)

(17) Hun. *Pontosan mikor mentek Debrecenbe?*  
‘When exactly are you going to Debrecen?’

In Langacker’s example, the complex EVENT of COMING provides access to one of its SUB-EVENTS, namely to its terminal component of ARRIVAL (the metonymic shift is indicated by the use of the point-like temporal expression *7:45 PM*, which facilitates the metonymic interpretation). In other words, COMING refers to the relatively prominent SUB-EVENT of ARRIVAL; the expression is a linguistic manifestation of the conceptual metonymy EVENT FOR ITS SUB-EVENT. The Hungarian example (17) is similar, with the only difference that here GOING stands for another prominent SUB-EVENT, namely DEPARTURE.

Other peripheral elements of an EVENT may also serve as a metonymic reference point to an EVENT:

(18) *She was able to finish her dissertation.* (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 334)

Panther and Thornburg analyze (18) in terms of the very abstract POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy. Here the subject’s ability to finish her dissertation (a PRE-CONDITION) refers to the actual accomplishment of finishing it.

As the variety of the examples discussed indicates, EVENT-metonymies are manifested on the level of linguistic expressions in an extreme heterogeneity of forms due to the immense variety of the cognitive reference points which can provide mental access to EVENTS. EVENTS are very complex conceptual structures in the sense that they are influenced by a large number of factors (participants, location, time, manner, intent etc.), they can be
broken down into a theoretically infinite number of sub-events and they are connected to a principally infinite number of other EVENTS (among others, their conceivable causes and effects). Their complexity opens up a wide range of choices between the possible cognitive reference points for providing mental access, which in turn increases their variety regarding their linguistic manifestations.133

5.3.3 Property-metonymies

The target of PROPERTY-metonymies is a PROPERTY, or more precisely a SCALE against which a PROPERTY can be measured or a part of a PROPERTY-SCALE. A good example is provided in (19):

(19) high temperature (Radden 2002: 409)

A PROPERTY of a scale measuring temperature (the vertical extension of the mercury in the thermometer) provides mental access to a PROPERTY of the temperature measured. In this case, mental access is provided to the PROPERTY of a THING by another PROPERTY of another, though related, THING.134 A case in which a PROPERTY of a THING provides mental access to another PROPERTY of the same THING would be the use of tall in (20), where the quantity of the whiskey is accessed through its vertical extension in a glass:

(20) Pour me a nice tall whiskey.

Other well-known examples can be analyzed along these lines:

(21a) How tall are you? [vertical extension of the body]
(21b) Hun. Milyen magas vagy?

133 Their formal diversity is also indicated by the results reported in the literature dealing with the role of conceptual metonymy in grammar. The grammatical phenomena examined are very often based on conceptual metonymies that would be candidates for EVENT-metonymies in my classification, or are at least based on EVENT-schemas (see, for example, Radden and Dirven 2007 and the contributions in Panther, Thornburg and Barcelona 2009).

134 The expression in (19) may well be analyzed as a so called representational metonymy (for this notion, see Warren 2006 or Barnden 2010): a property of the representation of temperature provides mental access to a property of the temperature.
(22a) (body) **height**

(22b) Hun. *testmagasság*

(23a) *How old is your brother?* [age]

(23b) Hun. *Milyen idős a testvéred?*

(24) Germ. *Wie spät ist es?* [time]

   Literally: ‘How late is it?’

   ‘What time is it?’

In (21-24) one end of a **SCALE** serves as cognitive reference point to the whole **SCALE**. In (21) and (22) the upper end of the vertical extension scale (tall, height) refers to the whole scale. The same applies to (23), where instead of inquiring neutrally about one’s age, the upper end of the **SCALE** is exploited metonymically.\(^\text{135}\) The German example (24) can be analyzed in a similar fashion: asking about time is performed with the help of a reference to the upper **SCALE** of time measurement (*late*).

Based on the account of Radden and Kövecses (1999: 31-32) concerning the metonymic exploitation of the **SCALE** ICM, it can be safely stated that not only the **PROPERTIES** of **THINGS** but also the **PROPERTIES** of **EVENTS** may be accessed with the help of one end of the **SCALE**:

(25) *Henry is speeding again.*

In (25) the verb *to speed* expresses **MOTION** by verbalizing it in terms of the **MANNER-OF-MOTION**. The conceptual motivation of the noun-verb conversion may be considered a special case of a conceptual metonymy, namely an **EVENT-metonymy** where a **PROPERTY** serves as cognitive reference point. The expression is, furthermore, based on a **PROPERTY** metonymy, in which the **UPPER-END-OF-THE-SCALE** is picked out as reference point for the **WHOLE-SCALE**. Radden and Kövecses accommodate the metonymy at hand as a case of

\(^\text{135}\) The fact that two typologically unrelated languages (Hungarian and English) use the same strategy of conceptualizing a **PROPERTY** may indicate that **THE UPPER END OF A SCALE** is widely used by languages to refer to whole **SCALES**, and that it is preferred to **THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE** as a reference point for the whole **SCALE**.
PART-WHOLE metonymy. They argue as follows: “Scales are a special class of things and the scalar units are parts of them” (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 31-32).

Finally, I would like to point out that it is also possible to provide mental access to a PROPERTY with the help of its opposite, and since a PROPERTY and its opposite are part of the same SCALE (ICM), this shift can also be considered metonymic. According to this view, verbal irony motivated by conceptual metonymy can be considered a sub-case of PROPERTY-metonymies:

(26a) That’s great news! [bad news]
(26b) Hun. Ez nagyszerű hír!

(27) That’s terrific news! [good news]

In (26) a positive PROPERTY accesses its negative counterpart. The reverse of the direction of the shift from positive to negative is also possible, especially in colloquial language, where they can be lexicalized as in (27). In both cases, we can talk about PROPERTY-PROPERTY-metonymies.

Though their research is somewhat neglected in cognitive semantics and the data and analyses are rather scarce, the examples discussed here suggest that PROPERTY-metonymies are overwhelmingly manifested in the form of adjectives or adverbs on the level of linguistic expressions.

5.3.4 PROPOSITION-metonymies

In my definition, PROPOSITION-metonymies are metonymies whose target is a PROPOSITION, i.e. in these metonymies a PROPOSITION is being referred to. I use the term ‘proposition’ here in a very broad, pre-theoretic sense: I define a PROPOSITION as a type of conceptual content that is more complex and specific than the more general and schematic content of an EVENT, hence my notion has less to do with truth-values, or the possibility of assigning a truth value to a proposition, than with the elaborate construal of a specific situation. PROPOSITIONS can be accessed through other PROPOSITIONS and through their own PARTS (partial PROPOSITIONS or PARTICIPANTS of a PROPOSITION):

136 For a proposal for assigning (at least partial) metonymic motivation to ironic expressions, see Radden (2002: 416); for an approach that argues for a compatible but more complex treatment of irony, see Voßhagen (1999).
(28) [How did you get to the party?] I hopped on a bus. (Lakoff 1987: 79)

(29) A: How did you get to the airport?
    B: I waved down a taxi. (Gibbs 1999: 66)

Both examples (28-29) are instances of PROPOSITION-metonymies in which a PROPOSITION is used as a cognitive reference point in order to mentally access another related PROPOSITION. In (28) ‘I got to the party by bus’ (proposition B) is accessed through the proposition ‘I hopped on a bus’ (proposition A), where proposition A is a pre-condition of proposition B, which leads to the realization of B with a high probability. The same applies to (29), where proposition A ‘I waved down a taxi’ leads to a probable realization of proposition B ‘I got to the airport by taxi’.

It has also been pointed out by Warren (1999, 2002, and especially 2006: 7-11) that the propositions in a propositional metonymy are linked by a weak if-then relation, i.e. proposition A does not necessarily lead to proposition B. However, if proposition B holds, proposition A is so to say presupposed by proposition B, and the link between them is strong enough that mentioning proposition A allows us to mentally access proposition B with ease. Warren traces the strength of the relation between A and B to conceptual and communicative/pragmatic factors.

The production and processing of expressions like (28) and (29) are made possible, according to Warren, on the one hand, because the two propositions are conceptualized as being contiguous, and on the other, because the context makes the interpretation B more relevant than A. The first prerequisite is clearly in accordance with my view that PROPOSITIONS as conceptual content are not completely different from THINGS as conceptual contents. If PROPOSITIONS can be conceptualized as being contiguous (although I suppose in a metaphorically extended sense), it may not be too far-fetched to claim that they can also be referred to. Consideration of the second prerequisite may be very fruitful. The role of relevance in the choice of the target and the source in metonymy has already been pointed out (e.g. Radden and Kövecses 1999: 50-51 or Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco 2002),

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137 This claim is in accordance with Panther and Thornburg’s view on the contingent nature of metonymy (e.g. Panther and Thornburg 2004 and 2007, Panther 2005a).
138 For the metaphorical extension of the category ‘contiguity’, see Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) and the brief discussion of their approach in 5.4.
and further research into the question may contribute to the systematic integration of aspects of RT and of CL, which may in turn bring new insights.¹³⁹

Examples (30) and (31) are cases where it can be assumed that a PROPOSITION is accessed through one of its elements (hence the highlights):

(30) I don’t want to end up with a bullet in my brain.

(31) Jones would be unlikely to sue us. (Langacker 1999: 200)

In (30) a proposition (‘I have a bullet in my brain’) provides mental access to a larger proposition (‘I die as a result of having a bullet in my brain’). The Subject-to-Subject raising construction in (31) has been analyzed in terms of metonymy by Langacker (1999: 200), and his analysis strongly supports my claims regarding the possibility of referring to NON-THINGS: “the “raised” nominal (Jones) stands metonymically for the clausal event (Jones sue us) that participates directly in the main-clause relationship (be unlikely). Its referent is a kind of local topic for purposes of construing the infinitival complement [...]” [my emphasis, M.T.]. In other words, a proposition (‘Jones sues us’) is accessed through one of its elements (Jones).

Finally, two comments should be made on PROPOSITION-metonymies. First, some EVENT-metonymies – especially those where an EVENT serves as a metonymic reference point to a related EVENT – are hard to distinguish from PROPOSITION-metonymies (consider for example Langacker’s wording “for the clausal event” and my classification of (31) as a PROPOSITION-metonymy). The boundaries between the two categories are rather fuzzy. Until we have further psychological or neurological evidence which distinguishes between these two types of cognitive content the distinction remains only intuitive.

Secondly, although these expressions are motivated by conceptual metonymies and trigger metonymic inferential processes, they cannot readily be considered linguistic metonymies. A piece of propositional information may serve as input for further inferences in any form (not even expressed linguistically). For instance, let us consider (29) again briefly: Speaker A makes a metonymy guided inference based on what Speaker B expresses

¹³⁹ Serious attempts have been made to integrate elements of RT and CL into a hybrid theory in the field of metaphor research (Tendahl and Gibbs 2008, Tendahl 2009). For a critical analysis and evaluation of these attempts see Csatár (2014: Chapter 4). A similar integrative framework regarding metonymy could also prove to be profitable.
with linguistic means in the form of a proposition (‘I waved down a taxi’) and arrives at B’s intended proposition (‘I got to the party in a taxi’). In another situation, A may very well draw the same conclusion with the help of the same inference schema based on the same information coming from a non-linguistic source; for example, she sees B waving down a taxi, and later, on meeting B at the party, she may conclude that B arrived in a taxi. Note that the only difference is the linguistic vs. non-linguistic nature of the input information of the inference. In the first case, it is a linguistically expressed proposition (a linguistic reference point) and in the second, it is a piece of perceptual information (serving as a cognitive reference point for mentally accessing another proposition).

Accordingly, these cases, assuming that they are analyzed as being motivated by conceptual metonymy, may be instances of metonymic inferences and metonymic thinking, rather than metonymic language. Not considering these cases as linguistic metonymies is further supported by the fact stated by Warren (1999, 2002 and 2006) that propositional metonymies do not violate truth conditions, hence they can be taken literally, in which case they do not trigger further inferences, i.e. they do not provide indirect access to other conceptual contents, unlike referential metonymies. In other words, in the case of proposition-metonymies there are no linguistic clues that would lead the hearer to elaborate a metonymic interpretation, unlike the majority of referential metonymies, where linguistic clues – for instance phenomena similar to Pustejovsky’s type coercion (Pustejovsky 1991, 1995) – indicate that a metonymic interpretation is called for. What triggers the metonymic interpretation in cases like (29) is information from our world knowledge and general pragmatic principles such as the principle of relevance.140

5.3.5 Speech act metonymies

The last type of metonymy I am concerned with in this section is so called speech act or illocutionary metonymy (Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1998, 1999 and 2003b). In this type a certain communicative intention is accessed with the help of a linguistic form otherwise associated with a different communicative intention; i.e. they make it possible for the hearer to infer an implicit intention of the speaker disguised in the form of

140 It is important to note that I do not deny that the possibility of metonymic interpretation is also dependent on language-specific factors, i.e. the degree of conventionality and the applicability of some metonymic paths (or natural inference schemas) can differ from language to language to a considerable extent (e.g. Panther and Thornburg 1999, Brdar 2009, or Radden and Seto 2003).
another intention, or in other words, seeming intentions provide mental access to other intentions. In Panther and Thornburg’s (1999: 346) analyses, (32) – as an instance of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy – qualifies as an example:

(32) *Can you pass the salt?* (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 346)

The question form seemingly indicates the intention of the speaker to get information about the ability of the hearer to do something, but with the help of the context and a metonymic inference schema the speaker’s implicit intention to make a request is accessed indirectly.\(^\text{141}\)

It is important to note that my second comment on PROPOSITION-metonymies also applies to speech act metonymies; in that they are not exclusively connected to linguistic forms (it is enough to mention gesticulation, facial expressions, or simply situations in which intentions are expressed by and inferred on the basis of methods other than speech acts).

5.4 The content-based approach in comparison and contrast

Before concluding this chapter, it is worth comparing and contrasting my approach with other CL approaches to the classification of metonymy. In this section I compare my approach based on the type of the conceptual content involved in metonymy with a contiguity-based typology of metonymy (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006a, 2006b) and with a pragmatically oriented classification (Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2007).

The classification of Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) is based on an insight formulated by John R. Taylor as follows: “This character suggests a rather broader understanding of metonymy than that given by traditional rhetoric. The entities need not be contiguous, in any spatial sense. Neither is metonymy restricted to the act of reference.” (Taylor 1995: 124, my emphasis, M. T.). Peirsman and Geeraerts examine the relationship between contiguity and metonymy and have elaborated on the notion of contiguity. Namely, they systematically consider cases of conceptual contiguity in its spatial and non-spatial senses. The essence of their approach is that they define contiguity on a conceptual level, i.e. their notion of contiguity is not restricted to a spatial sense, although they consider it the

\(^{141}\) The ‘Can you/Could you X’ construction is conventionalized in English as a construction associated with making requests, which seems to indicate that the speech act metonymy described here has become a conventionalized part of the pragmatic meaning of the construction at hand.
central case of the prototypically organized category of contiguous relationships. They extend the core of the category along three dimensions (strength of contact, boundedness, and domain) which deploy different degrees of prototypicality, often using metaphoric strategies of category extension.

Accordingly, in their approach, the prototypical contiguity relationship between two conceptual entities is a part-whole relationship (i.e. the absolute proximity on the strength of contact scale) between two bounded entities in a spatial domain. Less prototypical cases are located further away from the core along the three above mentioned continua (weaker contact between less bounded entities in non-spatial domains). Peirsman and Geeraerts argue that this notion of contiguity as a prototypically organized category accounts for a great majority of metonymic patterns within the framework of CL; i.e. in the analytic sections of their paper they define and classify metonymy in terms of their extended notion of contiguity.

As can be seen, Taylor points out that two notions traditionally considered to be definitional properties of metonymy (contiguity and referentiality) cannot be applied without any further reflection to the notion of metonymy in the light of the results of the CL research done in the field. The idea that the application of the notion of contiguity as it had been used in traditional approaches to metonymy (in a strictly spatial sense) is not adequate to describe the conceptual processes assumed to be metonymic by cognitive linguists is clearly reflected by his adding the remark “in any spatial sense”. What Peirsman and Geeraerts’ work achieves is a cognitive linguistically more applicable notion of contiguity, which can be used for a systematic account of earlier uncovered metonymic patterns.

In the previous chapter, I have attempted to do the same with the notion of referentiality. In its present form, I cannot readily agree with Taylor’s observation that metonymy cannot be restricted to an act of reference. As pointed out in section 5.2, in my view the formulation would require the same remark as “in any spatial sense” in the case of contiguity. Accordingly, I accept the observation above in a slightly modified form; namely I share the assumption that metonymy cannot be restricted to an act of reference in the traditional sense of the term ‘reference’ and I argue that an act of reference cannot be restricted to cases where a nominal expression singles out a piece of the extra-linguistic world, or more precisely a THING-type conceptual content.

My approach and that of Peirsman and Geeraerts are in accordance, but they consider different aspects of metonymy. They need not be measured against each other; they are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. What they have in common is that both
approaches consider metonymy as a prototypically structured category whose prototypicality is a natural consequence of the prototypical organization of the categories with the help of which they are defined, i.e. a prototypically organized category of contiguity in Peirsman and Geeraerts’ approach and a prototypically organized category of referentiality in my approach, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the category ‘metonymy’ may be organized along multiple axes regarding its properties which show prototype effects.

The differences lie in the perspective the two approaches take on the aspects of metonymy. Peirsman and Geeraerts concentrate on the relationship between the conceptual contents connected by metonymy, whereas I have focused on the nature of the conceptual content connected by the metonymic relationship. In this latter respect, it is important to note that the prototypical case of the zero contiguity relation (part-whole) between two bounded conceptual entities in the spatial domain is compatible with the prototypical case of reference where a prototypical THING is used to provide mental access to another prototypical THING.

Peirsman and Geeraerts’ classification also makes use of the type of the conceptual content connected by a contiguity relation, since the ‘boundedness’ of a conceptual entity is defined by the type of conceptual content it belongs to.

The major difference between their approach and mine lies in the aspect of the metonymical relationship which is emphasized: Peirsman and Geeraerts concentrate on the contiguity-based relationship which connects conceptual contents, whereas my approach concentrates on the nature of the conceptual content connected by the metonymic relationship. The fact pointed out by Peirsman and Geeraerts that NON-THINGS can also stand in a contiguity relationship (a property traditionally associated with spatial objects) also indicates that THING-like and NON-THING-like conceptual contents are not completely different in certain respects, which in turn further supports my claim that basically any type of conceptual content can be mentally accessed, i.e. referred to.

Among the pragmatic classifications of metonymy, the most widely held and applied is Panther and Thornburg’s (Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2007). In their view, conceptual metonymies serve as natural inference schemas, i.e. more or less conventionalized paths leading from source to target, which facilitate inferences drawn at every level or phase of meaning construction. They classify metonymies based on their pragmatic function, i.e. according to which level of the meaning construction a certain metonymy is applied.
Referential metonymies such as in (1) are cases of indirect reference; their function is to refer to things (in the traditional sense) and make them available for predications. Predicational metonymies as in (8-10) are employed in the interpretation of metonymic predicates. These two types are labeled by Panther and Thornburg as propositional metonymies, since they are applied during the construction of propositions. The third group of metonymies consists of so called illocutionary metonymies which are inference schemas that guide us by arriving at explicatures and implicatures. Panther and Thornburg also point out that metonymies with different functions can co-occur in the interpretation of the same expression and that “conceptual metonymies often cut across the pragmatic types” (2007: 247).

Despite the different notions of reference they rely on, the content-based approach proposed here and Panther and Thornburg’s classification are not incompatible, but focus on different aspects of metonymy. If we set aside what is understood by reference, it still remains a fact that at different levels of the pragmatic meaning construction process different types of conceptual content are accessed. During reference-fixing (in the traditional sense) we mentally activate THINGS; when we interpret predications, usually EVENTS are accessed; the construction of propositions calls for the combination of THINGS, EVENTS, and PROPERTIES; and in order to arrive at explicatures and implicatures we access PROPOSITIONS or parts of PROPOSITIONS.

5.5 Summary

My argumentation has been founded on the assumption that any type of conceptual content can be accessed by a reference point; hence the target of an act of reference cannot be reduced to THINGS. Consequently, any type of conceptual content can be activated metonymically, and conceptual metonymies can be classified based on the type of the target and source content. The preliminaries of such a classification were outlined in section 5.3. I have tried to show that the notion of referentiality proposed in section 5.1 can provide us with the basis of a typology of metonymy according to what type of conceptual content is accessed.

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142 It must be noted that their use of the term differs from that of Warren (see 5.3.4 and Warren 1999, 2002 and 2006).
143 What I have outlined here is far from a fully-fledged model of pragmatic meaning construction that can accommodate conceptual metonymy as one of its general principles. My aim was simply to show that the two approaches are compatible and that the question of how conceptual metonymy can be accommodated within, or reconciled with, current theories of general pragmatic meaning construction is a promising line of investigation.
indirectly through what type of cognitive and linguistic reference points. My classification suggests that the prototypicality of metonymies depends heavily on the type of conceptual content accessed and the type of conceptual content that serves as the reference point.

The content-based approach to the classification of metonymy offered as a solution to (PCLASS) turns out to be compatible with already established classifications based on the relationship between source and target and those based on their pragmatic function. My aim was not to challenge pre-existing classifications of metonymy but to show that the consideration of a somewhat neglected aspect of conceptual metonymy (the content involved) is a promising line of investigation. It seems that the different aspects focused on by the different classifications (relationship between source and target, content type of source and target, and pragmatic function) are interrelated and heavily interdependent. Different types of contents can be related by different contiguity-based connections, and certain types of content are accessed during certain phases of pragmatic meaning construction.

It must be admitted that my content-based approach does not suffice to describe all aspects of conceptual metonymy; systematic case studies should be conducted in an integrative way, taking into consideration (i) the type of the conceptual content accessed by the metonymic reference point; (ii) the type of the conceptual content serving as the reference point; (iii) the relationship between the target and the source content, and (iv) the role the metonymic activation of a certain content plays in pragmatic meaning construction, i.e. the pragmatic function of the metonymy. These integrative investigations may shed light on the ways in which these aspects are interrelated and depend on each other, which in turn may contribute to a better understanding of metonymy as a conceptual mechanism, as a meaning construction device, and as a linguistic phenomenon.

Finally, it must be noted that my classification is somewhat preliminary and, of course, in need of further refinements and stronger empirical foundations. As can be seen, the data on which my argumentation has been built come from three sources. The majority of the examples discussed are well-know from the literature (most of them constructed or cited by other authors), some of them have been constructed and analyzed based on my own intuition and introspection, and a minority of them have come to my attention sporadically. Further systematic, empirically founded case studies applying a content-based classification would shed more light on the general applicability, deficiencies, and possible benefits of the approach. The question of how CL metonymy research gathers and handles data is discussed and exemplified by two case studies in the following chapter.
Chapter 6 – Empirical methods in cognitive metonymy research

6.1 Introduction

The present chapter gives a brief overview of how metonymy is studied empirically and how empirical research into metonymy relates to (P_{DEL}) and (P_{CLASS}), as well as to the solutions I outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. On the one hand, an almost unbounded notion of metonymy may lead to empirical deficits. In the broad view, metonymy embraces such a wide range of phenomena that it may become unclear what is under investigation. Thus, the solution of (P_{DEL}) may contribute to the successful empirical study of metonymy by delimiting the object of study. On the other hand, if we subsume under the notion of metonymy all phenomena that seem to have common features regarding their conceptual background (i.e. motivated by conceptual relationships that also yield linguistic metonymies), these phenomena will be extremely heterogeneous. Their heterogeneity in turn means that they resist generalizations and that the empirical methods of their investigation must be varied, too. Since the study of different classes of metonymic phenomena requires different empirical methods, the empirical study of metonymy presupposes the solution of (P_{CLASS}). In other words, the empirical study of metonymy presupposes that the range of phenomena under scrutiny is narrowed down and homogenized.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the relation between the theoretical issues of (P_{DEL}) and (P_{CLASS}) and the empirical study of metonymy is not straightforwardly unidirectional: the empirical study of metonymic phenomena may yield information that changes earlier stances taken on (P_{DEL}) and (P_{CLASS}). Thus, the relationship between theorizing and empirical work within cognitive metonymy research seems to be cyclic and prismatic (for these notions, see Kertész and Rákosi 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). The cyclic nature of argumentation within cognitive metonymy research has been convincingly shown by Brdar-Szabó and Brdar (2012) with special regard to cross-linguistic data. As they express it, in CL metonymy research introspection-driven and authentic-data driven argumentation cycles are in rotation with a varying degree of dominancy at given stages (Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2012: 744). My thesis, especially Chapters 4 and 5, represents a dominantly introspection-driven theorizing argumentation cycle, whereas Chapter 6 is located at an intermediary stage, shifting towards the authentic-data driven, empirical direction.
Beyond the complex interrelation of theoretical and empirical questions, the empirical study of metonymy is further complicated by the lack of generally accepted and applied empirical methods. In the field of cognitive metaphor research methodological reflections have come to be the focus of attention (cf. Gibbs 2006, Steen 1999, 2007, Stefanowitsch and Gries 2006, Kövecses 2011, Kertész, Rákosi and Csatár 2012, Csatár 2014). Many of the problems tackled in research on methodological problems pertaining to cognitive metaphor research also apply to the research on metonymy. However, the systematic study of these questions with particular focus on metonymy is lacking.

From a methodological perspective, the empirical study of metonymy is extremely complex. Beyond the theoretical question of what metonymy is (and what it is not), it involves a series of questions including, for instance, how metonymy is to be identified (both on the linguistic and the conceptual level), what role intuition plays in this process, whether this process can be explicitly operationalized, which data sources can be regarded as reliable (corpus data, experimental results, etc.), how data from different sources can be integrated, and what function is assigned to them in theory formation (cf. the questions addressed in Csatár 2014 with respect to metaphor research). Very few of these questions have been answered, or even addressed systematically and explicitly in the field of metonymy research.

The present chapter can only start to tackle these issues and offer some initial methodological reflections on empirical work in metonymy research. In section 6.2, I give a brief overview of the data sources and methods generally applied in cognitive metonymy research. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 offer two quasi-empirical, illustrative pilot studies on an EVENT-metonymy (PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS) and a PROPERTY-metonymy (color-smell synesthetic expressions) respectively. The reason for directing the attention of the case studies to these two classes is that CL studies have devoted far less attention to them than to the more prototypical class of THING-metonymies. Both case studies yielded some hypotheses whose plausibility is rather weak but which seem worth pursuing with the integration of systematic empirical methods.

6.2 Data and methods in cognitive metonymy research

The data-sources, procedures, and empirical methods applied in cognitive metonymy research can be grouped as follows: (i) intuitive-introspective methods, (ii) contrastive and cross-linguistic investigations, (iii) corpus-linguistic procedures, (iv) and experimental
methods. As is also reflected by these labels, cognitive metonymy research is characterized by a **plurality of data-sources and methods** in which no data-source or method seems to take precedence over the others. The order of their presentation here may suggest there is a degree of reliability assigned to them; however, this is not the case. I subscribe to the view that no data-source or empirical method is inherently better or worse than others, thus the order of presentation merely reflects the linear order in which they have appeared and become widespread in cognitive metonymy research over the last couple of decades.

Beyond the plurality of data-sources and methods, empirical research on metonymy is also characterized by the **combination or integration of different data-sources and methods** in a cyclic manner. Brdar-Szabó and Brdar’s paper (2012) on cross-linguistic features of metonymy is a case in point in that it integrates introspective, corpus-linguistic, and cross-linguistic elements. The fact that there have not been debates on the contested degree of the reliability of data and the plausibility of evidence stemming from different data sources and data gathering methods (as has been the case with metaphor research; see, for instance Csatár 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2014), and the lack of methodological reflections on empirical research on metonymy also indicates that the field handles various data-sources and methods and their integration in a tolerant manner. However, this may be explained by the relative youth of the field, i.e. it has relatively few theoretical assumptions with an axiomatic strength, and there is a lack of both a rigorously fixed theoretical framework, and of a generally accepted and applied methodology. Accordingly, there have been relatively few cases where there have been contradicting results whose resolution would turn out to be particularly problematic. In my view, this rather democratic disposition makes the field of metonymy research ideal for developing its own theoretical framework and methodology in a cyclic fashion. Due to the tendency to rely on several types of data at the same time, the division into sections which I adopt in order to present the major methods used does not exclude the possibility that these methods are co-present and overlap.

**6.2.1 Intuition and introspection**

As is the case with cognitive metaphor research, investigations into metonymy have been primarily dominated by intuitive-introspective methods, especially in the beginning. These methods have remained the most widespread and generally applied until the present day. This may be due to the relative youth of the line of investigation and the relatively large number of problems that need to be addressed theoretically. A case in point would be the
problem of distinguishing metonymy from metaphor, or the delimitation of the notion itself. A further point where the researcher needs to rely on her intuitions is the identification of linguistic and conceptual metonymies. Thus, metonymy research does not discard intuition and introspection as unreliable data sources. Acknowledging the problems that they may give rise to, Csatár (2005, 2014: 25-26) convincingly argues that intuition cannot be discarded as a data source in cognitive metaphor research, and along the same lines posits the possibility that the identification of linguistic metonymies as such is guided by metonymy intuition. In cognitive metaphor research, there have been serious attempts to explicate and operationalize the process of metaphor identification (Steen 1999, 2007, cf. Csatár 2009, 2014). Though metonymy research relies heavily on intuition, no explicit procedures, such as Steen’s five-step model, or MIP, have been proposed for metonymy identification.

Despite the lack of an explicit procedure for the identification of linguistic and conceptual metonymies, cognitive metonymy research has achieved significant results by broadening the scope of data-sources to which intuitive and introspective methods are applied. Initially, metonymy research was characterized by the overwhelming use of de-contextualized (and often constructed) examples. This situation has changed significantly. The analysis of authentic examples in context in terms of metonymy has become general, though the collection of these is very often still sporadic and un-systematic, i.e. the researcher encounters them by chance (note that in previous chapters I also predominantly employed this methodology). The major challenge for empirical metonymy research is to find ways of increasing the systematicity of data gathering and broadening the pool of authentic data under investigation. These methods include dictionaries, the qualitative analysis of smaller sections of discourse (both written and spoken), and of particular fields of discourse (for instance jokes and anecdotes as in Barcelona 2003b, narrative texts as in Barcelona 2007, or literature as in Pankhurst 1999), the use of smaller-scale corpora, and finally the use of large, automated corpora.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that this introspection-driven phase of metonymy research is best regarded as an argumentation-cycle which is constantly being complemented by data-driven cycles. As a relatively young research field, cognitive metonymy research needs to address theoretical questions that are best approached initially by introspective-intuitive methods. Nor must we forget that this phase has been extremely intensive and fruitful and has provided significant results. Brdar-Szabó and Brdar use two very adequate metaphors to describe this situation:
Metaphorically speaking, cognitive linguistics has advanced steadily and quickly in the last three decades or so; expanding, gaining new territory, and pushing the boundaries of its interest. But, as it happens in military campaigns, achieving quick advances means that an army often moves forward leaving behind actual or potential pockets of resistance. To use a more peaceful metaphor, in geographical explorations, great discoverers have often made inroads into new territories, while leaving behind certain unexplored gray areas. (Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2012: 729)

In other words, by using intuitive-introspective methods cognitive metonymy research has uncovered a substantial amount of knowledge pertaining to metonymy in language and thought and opened up an extremely interesting and challenging line of investigation. However, there remains much to be solved and reconsidered in further argumentation-cycles, working with and integrating different data-sources and methods. Two of the most promising lines of empirical investigation into metonymy are offered by cross-linguistic and corpus-linguistic studies.

6.2.2 Contrastive and cross-linguistic investigations

Though researchers mainly report on their results in cognitive metonymy research in English, research itself has never been characterized by the hegemony of English data. Since conceptual metonymy is considered to be a universal phenomenon based on embodiment, researchers have always been open to data from a large number of languages. To name but a few – in addition to the cross-linguistic studies cited below – Feyaerts (1999) examines the metonymic conceptualization of stupidity in German idioms; Jäkel (1999) is concerned with conceptual patterns in German surnames from an etymological perspective; Köpcke and Zubin (2003) give a conceptual metonymic account of the motivation of German neutral nominals referring to females; and Okomato (2003) investigates the role of conceptual metonymy in the reanalysis of grammatical morphemes in Japanese.

On the other hand, since embodiment is understood by most metonymy researchers in the broadest sense – also encompassing social and cultural experience – it is no wonder that they have been curious since the early days about cultural, intra-, and inter-linguistic variation in metonymy. The reason behind this interest is the insight that “The cognitive processes human beings use are universal, but their applications are not” (Kövecses 2005: 293). Cross-linguistic investigation into the universality and variation of metonymic conceptualization and expression seems to be a promising research program which is,
however, still moving towards an elaboration of its own procedures and methodology (e.g. Panther 2015: 207).

Regarding their focus of interest, cross-linguistic studies of metonymy can be assigned to three major groups: source-, target-, and metonymy-driven studies. **Source-driven studies** investigate how particular concepts are exploited to serve as metonymic reference points in different languages. For instance, Barcelona (2003c) investigates the metonymic use of proper names (more precisely paragon names) in English, French, Spanish, German and Italian. Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2003b) examine two high-level metonymies in the domain of ACTIONS (ACTION FOR PROCESS and ACTION FOR RESULT), i.e. how ACTIONS can provide mental access to other elements of the ACTION-frame in English and Spanish. Hilpert (2007) takes a look at cross-linguistic variation in the use of body part terms in so called chained metonymies.

**Target-driven investigations** are concerned with the metonymic conceptualization of particular target domains across languages. Radden (2004) investigates how the target domain of LANGUAGE is conceptualized across cultures and languages. Although it is a highly abstract concept they are concerned with, Panther and Thornburg’s paper (2003d) on the role played by conceptual metonymy in the coding of VERBAL ASPECT in French and English also belongs to this group. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2003) devote a paper to the metonymic construal of LINGUISTIC ACTION in English, Hungarian and Croatian. In a later paper (Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2012), they present a case study of how different languages formulate INSTRUCTIONS with the help of (non-)metonymic strategies. Radden and Seto (2003) take a look at the metonymic strategies with the help of which shopping requests are formulated in a number of languages.

And finally, **metonymy-driven research** aims to study conceptual metonymies proposed earlier in the literature from a cross-linguistic perspective. Among metonymy-driven approaches, we may mention Panther and Thornburg’s study of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy in English and Hungarian (1999). Brdar-Szabó and Brdar (2003a) take a cross-linguistic view on the MANNER FOR ACTIVITY metonymy in English, German, Flemish, Croatian, Polish, Russian, and Hungarian. Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández (2003b) study two high-level metonymies in the domain of MODALITY in an English-Spanish contrast (OBLIGATION FOR DESIRE and POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY). Panther (2015) offers two case studies of the ABILITY OF PERCEPTION FOR PERCEPTION and the RESULT FOR ACTION metonymy in German and English. One of the most systematic cross-linguistic studies of a particular metonymy is offered by Brdar and Brdar-Szabó in a series
of papers in which they are concerned with the metonymy CAPITAL FOR GOVERNMENT (e.g. Brdar-Szabó 2002, Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2003b, 2012, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2009a, Brdar 2006).

In all three strands of cross-linguistic research on metonymy researchers are concerned with the presence/absence of a metonymic source/target or a conceptual metonymy, with the language-specific variation in the source/target of particular metonymies, or the symmetries/asymmetries in the frequency of their occurrence. The ultimate goal of all cross-linguistic research into metonymy is to find the motivation and explanation behind universality and variation (i.e. cognitive, conceptual, cultural, pragmatic, social, functional or structural factors causing variation and universality). In sum, it can therefore be stated that the empirical study of metonymy through cross-linguistic data is a promising and interesting line of investigation. In addition, this is even more the case given that it offers an insight into how a supposedly general human cognitive mechanism (conceptual metonymy) is put to use by human beings, and what social, cultural, functional and language-specific constraints influence its application.

6.2.3 Corpus-linguistic methods

The general upsurge of corpus linguistic methods has offered a way for cognitive linguists to broaden their data pool and conduct systematic large-scale empirical research. The most comprehensive overviews of corpus linguistic methods in research on metonymy and metaphor are to be found in Stefanowitsch and Gries (2006) and Deignan (2005). However, most corpus linguistic studies incorporate the investigation of metonymy and metaphor, i.e. papers devoted primarily to the corpus linguistic study of metonymy with methods elaborated specifically for this purpose are relatively scarce.

The reason for the relatively low level of corpus linguistic interest specifically devoted to the study of metonymy can be explained by multiple factors. First of all, as has been pointed out, metonymy research has always grown in the shadow of metaphor research. Second, at the time when cognitive linguists started applying corpus methods, the theoretical backgrounds of metonymy research were just being created; for instance, the distinction between metonymy and metaphor was addressed with the help of introspective and intuitive methods. A third reason might be that many problems pertaining to metonymy are primarily theoretical ones, i.e. the kind that cannot be resolved without intuition and introspection. A case in point would again be the delimitation of metonymy against metaphor, where it is
ultimately the theoretical or operational researcher who decides, based on her own intuition or introspective analysis, whether to consider an expression an instance of metonymy or metaphor. These two latter points might have seemed particularly disadvantageous to cognitive linguists working with corpus methods, since corpus linguistics had promised to eliminate intuition and introspection from linguistic theorizing.

The corpus linguistic study of metonymy is further complicated by certain properties of metonymy that are even more difficult to treat with corpus linguistic methods than those of metaphor. The major problem among them is the lack of any overt, linguistically explicit indication for the metonymic use of a linguistic unit. This property of linguistic metonymy is mainly due to the implicit nature of the target. Consequently, whether a linguistic unit is to be classified as a linguistic metonymy or as an instance of the linguistic realization of a conceptual metonymy is always an intuitive decision of the researcher, based on her theoretical disposition, i.e. however data-driven an approach to metonymy may be, it always contains theory-dependent, intuitive, and introspective elements.

A lesser difficulty, yet one which is still hard to overcome, is posed by metonymy being not a domain-specific mapping in the sense that metaphor is. Most corpus linguistic metaphor research relies on the search for linguistic items belonging to the target and/or source domain. This is not possible in most cases of metonymy, since the same or similar relations within a given frame or domain can occur and be exploited metonymically in another domain or frame. An obvious example would be the most common metonymy-producing conceptual relation between PARTS and WHOLEs, which may occur in practically any domain. If we were thus to examine the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, we would be at a loss as to what linguistic items to look for. In other words, the target and the source of most metonymies are so highly abstract that they cannot be attached to a certain lexical field (such as POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, LOCATION FOR LOCATED, RESULT FOR ACTION, etc.). Another extreme is when a metonymy is too specific. For instance, a corpus linguistic study of the metonymy THE MEAL ORDERED FOR THE CUSTOMER would require the researcher to look for lexical items belonging to the domain MEAL; needless to say, the hits would be innumerable. As a second step, she would have to decide one by one which ones might be candidates for use as a metonymic source for the CUSTOMER; the number of hits would be insignificant relative to the high number of the total hits. This problem can be handled if the conceptual metonymy under corpus linguistic investigation is specific enough to be related to a particular lexical concept (for instance, CAPITAL FOR GOVERNMENT, AUTHOR FOR WORK, BODY PART FOR PERSON, etc.), or if the domains in which a generally applied, abstract, high-
level metonymy may occur are narrowed down to one in particular (for instance MANNER FOR ACTION in the domain of VERBAL ACTION). In fact, most cross-linguistic studies applying corpus methods cited in the previous section have come to grips with the problem by applying these methods.

Corpus linguistic procedures vary from case study to case study; accordingly, the methods of corpus linguistic metonymy research are not generally applied and are in need of further elaboration. A possible starting point for the elaboration of such methods is offered by Stefanowitsch (2006: 2-6). In his overview Stefanowitsch mentions seven general procedures applied in corpus linguistic metaphor and metonymy research: (i) manual search; (ii) search for lexical items belonging to the source; (iii) search for lexical items belonging to the target; (iv) search for expressions that contain both target and source elements; (v) search based on so called “markers of metaphor”; (vi) the use of corpora annotated for semantic fields of domains, and (vii) the use of corpora annotated for conceptual mappings. However, it must be noted that although Stefanowitsch speaks of procedures applicable to both metonymy and metaphor, only some of these procedures can be eventually used for purposes of metonymy research, since most of these methods leave out of consideration the implicitness of the metonymic target.

As I have argued in Chapter 4, in the case of linguistic metonymy the target content and the conceptual/pragmatic relationship connecting the source and the target cannot appear in a linguistically explicit form together with the source content (at least within the same construal of a situation). This property of linguistic metonymy excludes the application of procedures (iii) and (iv) since they include the search for target items. Procedure (v) would be fruitful, if there were “metonymy marker” elements at our disposal which appear regularly in a linguistically explicit (lexical or morphological) form, but unfortunately no such regularity has been proposed so far in the literature on metonymy. Not to mention that if such markers were identified, they might decrease the implicitness of the metonymic expression or even render it non-metonymic. Finally, procedures (vi) and (vii) are also applicable only in the case of metaphor, since it is an inter-domain mapping, whereas metonymy being an intra-domain mapping can hardly be studied with the help of such corpora. Furthermore, as is also pointed out by Stefanowitsch, these annotated corpora are very scarce, and their development requires serious information technological expertise and a stupendous amount of time and energy.

At the end of the day, all the metonymy researcher is left with are (i) and (ii). However, the drawback of procedure (i) is that it can only explore corpora of a limited size,
and draws strongly upon intuition and introspection, while with the help of procedure (ii) we can only discover systematically the metonymic meaning variants of a single lexical item; and only very specific metonymies can be examined in this way.

We can thus conclude that corpus linguistic methods developed for the purposes of research into conceptual metaphor cannot be applied without precise adjustments to the study of metonymy. The corpus linguistic study of metonymy requires the researcher to elaborate specific procedures for the specific purposes of her study. The result is a multitude of corpus linguistic procedures whose general applicability may be problematic. Hence the elaboration of corpus linguistic procedures specifically for purposes of metonymy research and the evaluation of the general or sub-type-specific applicability of these need to be addressed by the community of metonymy researchers working with corpus methods in a joint venture.

6.2.4 Experimentation

Empirical research on metonymy shows the greatest deficit in comparison with metaphor research in the field of experimentation. To exploit Brdar-Szabó and Brdar’s metaphors (2012: 729), experimentation is a “pocket of resistance” left behind in the campaign or an “unexplored gray area” in the expedition of metonymy research. This is unfortunate, since experimentation might prove to be a very productive argumentation-cycle in the theory formation within cognitive metonymy research by delivering evidence regarding the mental representation of conceptual metonymies and the mental processing and production of linguistic metonymies.

Results from experiments designed and conducted in the framework of CL and beyond on the processing of figurative language, idioms, and especially metaphor are abundant (a brief look at the works of Gibbs and his colleagues and the references cited there, e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2006, Gibbs and Tendahl 2006, Tendahl and Gibbs 2008, etc., or at the experiments reviewed by Bergen 2012 gives an impression of the abundance of experimental research in the field). In fact, the most current and vivid methodological discussions in cognitive metaphor research revolve around experimentation (e.g. Csatár 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2014: Chapter 3, Rákosi 2011a, 2011b, 2012, or Gibbs 2013). In contrast to this abundance, experiments designed specifically for the study of metonymy and conceived in the framework of cognitive metonymy research are hard to find.
Much of the experimental work on metonymy – also relatively scarce – is conducted outside the framework of CL. It is even hard to find studies that at least refer to previous theoretical work in this framework (one of the few exceptions would be Frisson and Pickering 1999). It is telling that in a series of recent publications reporting on experimental work on logical metonymy (e.g. Zarcone and Padó 2011, Zarcone and Rüd 2012, Zarcone, Utt, and Padó 2012, Zarcone, Padó and Lenci 2012, Utt et al. 2013, Zarcone et al. 2013, Zarcone et al. 2014 and Zarcone 2014) we can find only two references to works on metonymy that can be regarded as having been conceived in the CL framework. The application of more recent experimental methods from the field of neuropsychology to metonymy research is still virtually non-existent, unlike work done on metaphor (e.g. Forgács et. al 2012, 2014 or 2015 and the literature cited there).

The reasons underlying the situation of experimental research in cognitive metonymy research may be manifold and can only be guessed at. A possible explanation behind the lack of experimental work within the CL framework and that of a scientific dialogue between experimental researchers outside the framework and cognitive metonymy researchers may be that the echo of the increased CL attention directed at metonymy and the broad view of metonymy among psycholinguists and neuro-linguists may not have been as loud as that deriving from metaphor. However, both sides seem to be unaware of the other’s results.

6.2.5 Interim summary

The major points of this brief overview regarding the question of how metonymy is investigated empirically in cognitive metonymy research can be summarized as follows. Cognitive metonymy research works with various data sources and methods (primarily intuitive-introspective, cross-linguistic, and corpus linguistic methods). No primacy is assigned to any of these; none of these can be discarded as non-reliable or non-effective; however, one data-source or method may be dominant in a particular argumentation-cycle.

In the subsequent two small-scale case studies, I concentrate on two relatively neglected types of metonymy with the help of two of the most generally accepted and most widely applied methods: I take a cross-linguistic look at an EVENT-metonymy (Case study 1) and examine a PROPERTY-metonymy from a corpus linguistic perspective (Case study 2).

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144 In Zarcone’s PhD-thesis: Sweep (2012) and Gibbs’s now classic The Poetics of Mind (1994).
6.3 Case study 1: An EVENT-metonymy from a cross-linguistic perspective

The metonymic construal of EVENTS – as has also been pointed out by Radden (2012) – is a relatively less investigated area, with many uncertainties, challenges, and unsolved problems. In Case study 1, my major concern is with the question of which elements of a complex event are picked out to function as a metonymic source providing mental access to the target. Due to the possibility of alternative construal, EVENTS can be conceptualized and verbalized rather differently within a particular language. The variation in the conceptualization of EVENTS is even more apparent across cultures and languages. The present case study seeks to address the question of which elements of a particular EVENT-ICM, schema, or frame, are picked out to serve as a metonymic reference point (source) in the conceptualization and verbalization of an EVENT by different languages.

Many elements of an EVENT-ICM could be ideal metonymic reference points to an EVENT based on their conceptual properties, although this variety of conceptually possible reference points might not be exploited by languages to the same extent and in the same way. As it turns out, languages pick out only certain elements for this purpose as a default case, while they ignore others completely, and their choice varies from language to language.

In addition, the cross-linguistic study of the conceptualization of EVENTS might contribute to the solution of the problem the language-specificity of metonymy poses. Take, for instance, the case where a language has a metonymic expression at its disposal to construe an EVENT as the default conceptualization, for example, of one of its salient SUB-EVENTS. Can this be considered a linguistic metonymy even if the language at hand does not have an alternative construal, or the EVENT at hand is not even lexicalized as a whole, i.e. if a certain EVENT cannot be expressed without applying metonymy? This construal may be the default case in a language that is not even considered to be metonymic but the same metonymic relationship between source and target may be a metonymic alternative construal in another language. In other words, the metonymic exploitation of a certain conceptual relation between an EVENT and its SUB-EVENT might be metonymic in one language and non-metonymic in another.

Case study 1 is a target-driven cross-linguistic examination: its goal is to examine the variation in the construal of a particular EVENT, namely PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, across a number of languages and to see how the results relate to the problems summarized.

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145 Earlier versions of the case study appeared as Tóth (2014 and 2015b).
above. **Playing musical instruments** is an extremely complex and complicated **action/event**, whose construal in its entirety and complexity without recourse to figuration (conceptual metonymy and metaphor) seems – intuitively – very difficult. This makes the ICM of **playing musical instruments** an ideal object of cross-linguistic study when we are interested in the differences between languages with regard to their choice of metonymic (and metaphoric) sources.

### 6.3.1 The ICM of **Playing Musical Instruments**

As Figure 6.1 shows, the ICM of **playing musical instruments** (large rounded rectangle) consists of the following central elements (bold central ellipsis): the **player** (left larger circle), the **instrument** (right larger circle), the **action** of the player on the instrument (bold line connecting the central larger circles), and the product of this action (**music**, smaller right circle connected). Beyond these central elements, the ICM – like any **event** – has a temporal duration, a spatial location, a manner, etc. and contains several further peripheral elements such as an **audience**. Speakers of a language choose from these elements and focus on them differently during the conceptualization and verbalization of the ICM.

![Figure 6.1 The ICM of **Playing Musical Instruments**](image_url)

In the following, I direct my attention to the action of the player on the instruments. This activity is extremely complex: the player makes a series of complicated, coordinated, and sophisticated moves with predefined velocity and intensity. It is easy to see that **playing a musical instrument** is an **activity** that cannot be grasped or captured, i.e. mentally...
represented and linguistically expressed, in its entirety and complexity. No wonder that – as will be seen – all languages under scrutiny follow metonymic and/or metaphoric strategies in order to be able to speak and think about this activity. Thus, in the following I examine which elements of the whole ICM or which aspects of the activity itself are utilized and highlighted during its conceptualization in a number of languages. My analysis was conducted in two steps. First, I scrutinized the languages I am familiar with using intuitive and introspective methods, whereas in a second phase I gathered data from a larger pool of languages by the method of translation elicitation from native speakers, and analyzed their translations by making use of introspection.

6.3.2 Data from English, German, and Hungarian

The default case of conceptualizing the event of playing instruments does not differ significantly in English and German. As the examples show, the only point where the two languages diverge is the use of articles (definite article in English and zero article in German):

(1) He can play the piano.
(2) Ger. Er kann Klavier spielen.
he can piano play

From a formal and semantic perspective, both the English and the German expression are instances of a marginal transitive construction where the object (the musical instrument) does not possess many of the characteristics of prototypical transitive constructions (cf. Taylor 1995: 206-215). For instance, the second NP functions rather as an instrument than as an object or patient.146

Both languages use the verb play/spielen in the case of almost all instruments and in the case of the hypernym or collective term instrument/Instrument to describe the activity performed by the player. Thus, both languages consider this activity in its entirety, and push its particular details or nuances into the background of attention. No element (peripheral or central) of the EVENT is highlighted metonymically. As a result, these languages do not differentiate between the fundamentally dissimilar activities exerted by the player, for

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146 Due to lack of space and the fact that they are less relevant here, I cannot go any further into details of the marginality of (2) and (3) as transitive constructions.
instance, in the case of a guitar, a flute, or drums. Instead of highlighting, for example, the manner of the sound production and thereby distinguishing between the activities in the case of various instruments, English and German concentrate on the common elements of these activities. The default cognitive strategy followed by English and German in the conceptualization of PLAYING INSTRUMENTS seems to be rather metaphoric than metonymic (concentrating on similar aspects of two otherwise dissimilar entities).

In this default construal, the complex activity exerted by the player is understood with the help of the ICM or domain of PLAYING; as a result, those aspects are highlighted that the ICM PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS has in common with the ICM PLAYING. Playing instruments is governed by certain regularities and rules, just like in other games. These regularities and rules can be very elaborate and complex; only those who are familiar with the regularities and rules can play a game effectively; similarly, only those who are proficient in the language of music and skilled in the technique can play music (even at an amateur level). Furthermore, playing music can provide as much fun and pleasure as playing a game. The ICM of PLAYING INSTRUMENTS is characterized by a large number of properties that also characterize the domain of PLAYING, i.e. there are multiple correspondences between them, although not all properties characterize them both. For instance, there are no winners or prizes in the case of the former. In this respect, the use of the verbs play and spielen in the conceptualization of PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS can be looked upon as being the metaphorical extension of the category PLAYING or GAMES, based on family resemblances, as has been put forward by Wittgenstein (1953).

Hungarian displays significant contrasts to the English-German strategy in the default construal and expression of PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS. As is shown in (3), in the case of all instruments Hungarian uses denominatives that derive activities from the instrument.147

147 A few remarks should be made at this point. As will be mentioned later, Hungarian makes use of an alternative construction as well: hangszeren/zongorán/etc. játszik ‘play + on + instrument’. This construction seems to be preferred in cases where the product of playing (music) is also mentioned or in the case of less prototypical instruments, non-basic level category labels, and foreign instrument names, such as viola da gamba, oboà d’amore, twelve-string guitar, etc. However, it would require further targeted research to uncover the factors influencing the choice between the two possible construals. Morphologically, Hungarian instrument name + derivation suffix verbs can be divided into two major groups: instrument name + l and instrument name + zik. Since this aspect bears less relevance to my argumentation, I leave it out of consideration here.
However, the derivation suffix does not tell us anything about the complex activity of playing instruments. This strategy seems to be motivated by conceptual metonymy: Hungarian conceptualizes the complex event that is hard to grasp in its entirety by the metonymic highlighting of one of the central elements of the ICM, namely the instrument. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the resulting linguistic expression is a linguistic metonymy with a very low – if any – degree of implicitness, since the target content’s conceptual relation to the source appears explicitly with the source in the form of the derivation suffix, i.e. it overtly marks that a metonymic shift has taken place in the meaning of the lexical item from instrument to activity. Due to the fact that a denominative can be derived from a broad range of instrument names by suffixation, this metonymic strategy is capable of grasping the difference between the activities performed in the case of different instruments, yet these activities are not specified in any more detail than in terms of the instrument on which they are performed.

It must be noted at this point that the same derivation process by suffixation does not work with the super-ordinate term hangszer (‘instrument’). The derived verb hangszerel has a modified meaning ‘to score, to instrument, to orchestrate’. Hungarian uses a similar strategy to English and German in the case of the super-ordinate term to describe the activity of playing: hangszeren játszik (‘instrument-on play’). This may seem to indicate that the choice of the construal is dependent on whether the instrument at hand is a basic level category or not.

This second strategy is also applicable to all instruments as an alternative construal in Hungarian; the verb játszik (‘to play’) also has the meaning ‘to play music (on an instrument)’ even without naming the instrument. Intra-language alternation in the construal of playing instruments is not uncommon; however, the factors determining the choice between the alternatives are still to be clarified. The same applies for English and German, where the metonymy instrument for playing the instrument can also be found, as in (4):

(3) Hun. Tudsz gitározni/zongorázni/fuvolázni/dobolni?
can-2SG-Präs-Ind guitar/piano/flute/drum-verbal suff.-inf.
‘Can you play the guitar/piano/flute/drums?’
Robert de Niro was one of the first actors to learn a musical instrument when he learnt to play the saxophone for his part in *New York, New York*. Since then, actors like Nicolas Cage, Meryl Streep and Sean Penn have learnt the mandolin, the harp and the jazz guitar respectively.¹⁴⁸

The use of verbs derived from the instrument is also possible both in English and German, e.g. *to fiddle* or *to drum; posaunen, klavieren, or trommeln*. Nevertheless, these are sometimes archaic, and very often used in an extended, metaphoric sense, i.e. most often they do not refer to the actual activity of playing an instrument. Despite the intra-language alternatives, the two cognitive strategies mentioned above (playing instruments is playing in the case of English and German, and instrument for action in the case of Hungarian) seem to be the default cases.

In sum, German and English, on the one hand, and Hungarian, on the other, seem to conceptualize playing instruments with the help of different mental strategies. Both strategies have in common the fact that the instrument as a central element of the ICM appears explicitly on the linguistic level and none of them specifies the actual activity in any detail. The difference is that from the various aspects of the activity English and German highlight its complexity, regularity, and the pleasure it causes by conceptualizing it metaphorically in terms of playing, whereas the strategy applied by Hungarian leaves these aspects out of consideration and fully fore-grounds the instrument metonymically (even though the status of the expressions as linguistic metonymies is not entirely decided). The English and German strategy relies on the conceptual metaphor playing instruments is playing, while the Hungarian one on the conceptual metonymy instrument for action, or in more general, schematic terms on a thing-event-metonymy.

### 6.3.3 Further languages

Since the languages covered so far have utilized only relatively few elements of the ICM playing musical instruments and relatively few aspects of this activity – Hungarian one central element, whereas English and German more peripheral aspects – it was necessary to include examples from further languages in the investigation. In order to broaden the scope

¹⁴⁸ Harris, Mower and Sikorzyńska (2010: 82).
of the analysis I needed information from native speakers; for this purpose I applied a translation elicitation questionnaire (see Appendix A).

In the questionnaire, I asked the informants to translate the sentence *Can you play the guitar?* and a further five sentences from English to their mother tongue and to provide a literal English transcription of their translations so that various conceptualization strategies can become apparent. Finally, I inquired whether their translations would be any different if *guitar* was replaced by the following items: *instrument, flute, piano, violin, drums, horn,* and *vuvuzela.* By picking these instruments, I carefully considered that the list would include wind, string, bow, and percussion instruments, as well as more prototypical and fully marginal ones. The purpose of the question was to find out whether languages differentiate between the activities in the case of instruments of different types, and whether there is a correlation between the construal of the activity and the prototypicality of the instrument.

Translation elicitation is a generally accepted and applied method in cross-linguistic investigations working with numerous languages. However, the procedure designed and applied in the present case study in order to reach out to informants may seem unconventional to some. I created a pseudo-event on a social media website (Facebook) and I invited all my non-Hungarian speaking friends with a brief description of the task and asked them to help me with my research by inviting their own friends, who in turn would invite their acquaintances. The procedure yielded results very quickly, although after a short period answers and completed questionnaires stopped being sent back to me. Furthermore, before launching the event the procedure had seemed to be a good way of reaching out to informants later, if necessary. However, it turned out that this is not the case, especially with the friends of friends. In sum, it may be stated that the procedure can yield a relatively large amount of data relatively quickly. Such events are short lived, and reaching out to informants for further information may be problematic. All in all, people seem to help very enthusiastically when they are asked about their mother tongue but due to the ever-changing nature of social media sites they cannot be bothered with such questions for too long a period.

149 In the present analysis, I concentrate on the translations of *Can you play the guitar?* for illustrational purposes.
150 Unfortunately, my data did not provide any information that would be helpful with regard to this second question.
151 Although the method of reverse translation elicitation might not be the most reliable way of gathering data (cf. Chelliah and de Reuse 2011: 377-38), for the purposes of the present pilot study it seems an obvious and easily accessible choice.
152 I wish to express my gratitude to all my informants (known and unknown) for providing me with their invaluable translations and helping me with Case study 1.
With the help of the questionnaire I managed to gather translations from a total of seventeen languages, including Czech, Finnish, French, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese (and Brazilian Portuguese), Romanian, Japanese, Italian, Spanish (and Mexican Spanish), Thai, Lebanese Arabic, Georgian, Singhalese, Swedish, Lithuanian, and Russian. Unfortunately the Georgian and Singhalese translations had to be excluded from the analysis because the informants did not provide me with an English literal transcription of their translations and I could not contact them for further clarification. The analysis of the translations from the remaining fifteen languages can be summarized as follows.

None of the translations under scrutiny employed a strategy similar to that found in Hungarian. Dutch, Swedish, Russian and Czech informants provided me with translations that followed the same strategy as English and German. The only difference being that the Czech and the Russian informant used the expression to play on sth. (play + PP), not the marginal transitive construction as English, German, Dutch, and Swedish:

(5)
Dutch: Kun jij gitaar spelen?
Literal: Can you guitar play?\footnote{Wherever possible I use the literal version provided by the native speaker informants. As a result, they may contain linguistically imprecise information; hopefully, this will not affect my argumentation.}

(6)
Swedish: Kan du spela gitarr?
Literal: Can you play guitar?

(7)
Russian (formal): Вы можете играть на гитаре?
Russian (informal): Ты можешь играть на гитаре? (informell)
Literal: You can play on guitar?

(8)
Czech: Umíš hrát na kytaru/flétnu/klavír/housle/roh/vuvuzelu?
Literal: Can (you) play on guitar/…?

\footnote{Wherever possible I use the literal version provided by the native speaker informants. As a result, they may contain linguistically imprecise information; hopefully, this will not affect my argumentation.}
The answers of the French (‘to play of sth.’) and Polish informants (‘to play on sth.’) show a minor difference relative to the previous strategy:

(9)
French: Est-ce que tu sais jouer de la guitare?
Literal: Interrogative pronoun you know play of the guitar?

(10)
Polish: Czy potrafisz grać na gitarze?
Literal: Interrogative pronoun (you) can play on guitar?

Based on the informants’ choices, these languages seem to use the verb play as it is used in the domain of sports, but not the same verb used in the domain of children’s games. This metaphorical conceptualization of playing instruments is different from the strategy used in the analyzed English and German examples inasmuch as that here the source verb is used in the ICM of sports and playing musical instruments, but not in the case of children’s games. This difference may be traced back to cross-linguistic variation in the metaphorical extensions of the domain game or playing.

A far more interesting picture is offered by the sentences provided by speakers of languages which highlight the element of the sound within the ICM. Based on the questionnaires, to this group belong Finnish, Italian, Lebanese Arabic, and Romanian:

(11)
Finnish: Soitatko jotain soitinta?
Literal: ‘to ring’

(12)
Italian: Sai suonare la chitarra?
Literal: ‘to ring, to sound’
The translations suggest that all four languages use the same verb in the case of all instruments, consequently neither do these languages differentiate between activities performed by the player on different instruments. They conceptualize this complex process so that they fore-ground the product of this activity, i.e. the sound. However, this sound is not instrument-specific; it may not even be a musical sound. The Finnish informant used the verb *soittaa*, which means roughly to ‘to ring’ (or ‘to call someone’, which would again be a metonymic meaning, as in the English expression *Give me a ring*, or Hungarian *Csörgess meg*). The Italian informant expressed the activity of playing an instrument with the verb *suonare*, literally ‘to sound, to ring’. Interestingly enough, in Lebanese Arabic players seem to knock on their guitars, and eventually on all instruments. The strategy utilized by Romanian speakers is possibly the most interesting so far: they use the verb *a cânta*, ‘sing’. A very complex and hard to grasp way of producing musical sounds, i.e. playing an instrument, is understood with the help of another means of musical sound production, namely singing; an activity that comes most naturally to everyone. Singing is just as a complex activity as playing an instrument, yet is easier to grasp since everyone can sing, and in fact does so from time to time.

These strategies can be considered to be metaphoric since they involve elements that are not part of the ICM playing musical instruments in a strict sense. However, they all involve the production of sound, which is one of the central elements of the ICM, which in turn speaks for their classification as metonymies. All the more, if we think of different modes of sound production as elements of the same taxonomically structured ICM. To me, the metonymic classification of these strategies seems to be more plausible since these languages use easily accessible means of sound production to refer to a complex and complicated means of sound production.

154 My Lebanese Arabic informant did not provide a translation in her/his native language, only literal English transcriptions. The reason is probably the assumption that I would not be able to decipher Arabic; she/he turned out to be correct, and the literal transcription was, in fact, much more helpful.
The Portuguese and Spanish informants employed an EVENT-EVENT-metonymy in the conceptualization of PLAYING INSTRUMENTS.

(15)
Portuguese: Sabes *tocar* guitarra?
Literal: Can you touch guitar?

(16)
Spanish: Puedes *tocar* la guitarra?
Literal: Can you touch guitar?

Speakers of both these Romance languages chose a very easily accessible and physical, yet essential SUB-EVENT of the complex EVENT of PLAYING AN INSTRUMENT as a metonymic source: the TOUCHING of the instrument. They used the verb ‘touch’ in the case of all instruments. This is not surprising since touching the instrument is the very first step in a complex series of SUB-EVENTS, and without touching the instrument it would be hard to imagine how it could be played (except, maybe, for the theremin).

The Lithuanian translation uses a strange mixture of the strategy employed in English and that in Spanish. It combines the SUB-EVENT of TOUCHING the instrument with fingers and the elements of the PLAYING ICM.

(17)
Lithuanian: Ar moki *groti* gitara?\(^{155}\)
Literal: Interrogative pronoun can play (with the fingers) (with) the guitar?

The verb *groti* means ‘to play’, to be more precise ‘to play with the fingers’ or ‘to finger with sth., to fiddle with sth.’. Thus, the Lithuanian version exploits the PLAYING-metaphor and the TOUCHING-metonymy at the same time.

The remaining two languages (Japanese and Thai) seem to be the most specific in the conceptualization of PLAYING INSTRUMENTS and carefully distinguish between different activities in the case of instruments of different types. Japanese also makes a distinction in the case of the super-ordinate term *instrument*, where it uses the verb ‘to do, to make’ (18).

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\(^{155}\) The informant called my attention to the fact that the noun *guitar* in Lithuanian has the same form in the nominative and in the instrumental case.
In the case of string instruments (guitar, piano, and violin) the verb used has the specific meaning ‘to play a string instrument’ (19), whereas the verb with wind instruments is ‘to blow’ (20) and in the case of percussion instruments ‘to hit, to beat’ (21).

(18)
Japanese: Gakki ga dekiru (ka)?
Literal: Instrument topic particle can you do/make (optional interrogative pronoun)

(19)
Japanese: Gitaa wo hikeru (ka)?
Literal: Guitar object particle can you play a string instrument

(20)
Japanese: Fue wo fukeru?
Literal: Flute object particle can you blow

(21)
Japanese: Taiko wo tatakeru?
Literal: Drum object particle can you beat

The Thai informant – similarly to the Japanese – used different verbs in the case of different instruments:

(22) Thai:
Guitar and piano: คุณเล่นกีตาร์เป็นไหม
Violin: สี่ (= ‘to play the violin’)
Wind instruments: เป่า (= ‘to blow’)
Drum: ตี (= ‘to beat’)

The translations suggest that both languages highlight the MANNER or MODE of the sound production and use it as a metonymic source for the activity PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.
6.3.4 Conclusion and methodological reflections

The results of the analysis of the translations from speakers of the eighteen languages under scrutiny can be summarized in Table 6.1. The table sets up classes of the languages based on the strategy of conceptualization they use, and the metonymic and/or metaphoric source with the help of which the complex target content PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS is conceptualized and verbalized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSTRUMENT</td>
<td>metonymic (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION)</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAYING</td>
<td>metaphoric</td>
<td>English, German, Dutch, Russian, Czech, Swedish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAYING/SPORT</td>
<td>metaphoric</td>
<td>French, Polish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUND</td>
<td>metonymic (/ metaphoric)</td>
<td>Finnish, Romanian, Italian, Lebanese Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOUCHING</td>
<td>metonymic (SUB-EVENT FOR EVENT)</td>
<td>Spanish, Portuguese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAYING / TOUCHING WITH THE FINGERS</td>
<td>metaphoric + metonymic</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODE OF SOUND PRODUCTION</td>
<td>metonymic (MANNER FOR ACTION / SUB-EVENT FOR EVENT)</td>
<td>Japanese, Thai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 The conceptualization of PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS across languages

In the light of the findings of the analysis, it can be assumed that speakers of different languages think and talk about the event of playing a musical instrument rather differently. What all strategies examined in the case study have in common is that none of them can capture this complex event in its entirety and complexity; therefore, they resort without exception to metonymic and/or metaphoric processes (although the resulting expressions cannot always be considered linguistic metonymies, as in Hungarian). Despite the cross-linguistic variation of the strategies applied, they are all conceptually well-motivated – in the sense of motivation as put forward by Panther and Radden (Radden and Panther 2004, Panther and Radden 2011). The question of why certain languages prefer certain strategies remains open. In other words, the strategies uncovered so far have no predictive force, i.e. we cannot explain with certainty the choice of the cognitive strategy and that of the source content. Nevertheless, the results of my analysis seem to show that the choice of strategies
is far from random or arbitrary but is made in accordance with what we know about the embodied nature of our cognition and about the general principles of concept formation.

It must be noted that linguistic metonymy seems to be language and culture dependent to a considerable extent. Nonetheless, in the light of my results this conclusion does not go against the assumption that conceptual metonymy is a universal cognitive mechanism ultimately based on embodiment. The analysis of the various cognitive strategies picked by speakers of different languages for the purpose of construing a complex event tends to support the view that metonymy is a conceptual phenomenon whose linguistic realization is strongly language- and culture-dependent, i.e. what can be considered a linguistic metonymy varies from language to language.

Finally, it must be emphasized that my findings should be viewed as weak hypotheses due to certain problematic features of the data sources and the methodology involved in the pilot study. First and foremost, the uncertainties arising due to the deficiencies of reverse translation elicitation need to be addressed: the native language intuition of the informants may vary inter-subjectively, not to speak of their English proficiency; the results of the questionnaire might be contaminated by interference phenomena between English and the mother tongue; informants cannot always provide reliable and detailed information on various factors, such as all acceptable intra-language variants, the frequency and contextual restriction of these variants, or their acceptability; and one can never be sure that informants fully understand and strictly follow instructions, however exact their formulation is. In order to eliminate or at least reduce these sources of uncertainty which weaken the plausibility of the findings, the translations provided by the informants would need to be checked (by other informants, native speaker linguists, dictionaries) and the results of the analysis supplemented by results stemming from the use of other methods, such as corpus research or targeted elicitation experiments. Investigations in these directions represent a fruitful future endeavor, which would have a considerable impact on the weaker hypotheses based solely on my intuition and introspection in the analyses of the questionnaires. Thus, the results of the pilot study may serve as a starting point for an explicit and systematic account of the conceptualization strategies used by a variety of languages regarding the ICM PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS in particular, and of EVENTS in general.
6.4 Case study 2: A corpus study of synesthetic expressions as PROPERTY-metonymies\textsuperscript{156}

6.4.1 Introduction

Phenomena covered by the term synesthesia (co-sensation or cross-modular integration) vary considerably. In general, the literature distinguishes between synesthesia proper and verbal synesthesia, or in other words synesthesia in the brain and synesthesia in language (e.g. Cacciari 2008, Yu 2012, or Vogt 2013). Synesthesia proper (or real synesthesia) is a relatively rare neuropsychological phenomenon where a sensory stimulus from a certain perceptual module induces a perception in another sensory module,\textsuperscript{157} as in the case, for instance, of colored hearing, also known as photism, or grapheme-color associations (cf. Grossenbacher and Lovelace 2001, Cacciari 2008). Verbal synesthesia is the integration of concepts stemming from distinct perceptual domains on the linguistic level, also called synesthetic metaphor, such as loud colors, warm tones, sweet voice, etc.

These two types of ontologically different phenomena are usually studied from different perspectives, i.e. in neuropsychology and in linguistics (cf. Yu 2012). Some researchers emphasize that they should be distinguished clearly and studied independently of each other (e.g. Vogt 2013), whereas others argue that the two lines of investigation should be integrated and can profit from each other’s results considerably (e.g. Cacciari 2008). Although I share Cacciari’s view that our understanding of how metaphorical language and thinking works can be enriched by studying the neurological-psychological basis of synesthesia, in Case study 2 I will restrict my attention to phenomena labeled by Vogt (2013) as verbal perceptive-inferential metaphors and will not pursue their neuropsychological background, however promising it may be.

Vogt (2013: 24-27) offers a detailed classification of synesthetic phenomena. She subsumes verbal perceptive-inferential metaphors under the phenomenon of pseudo-synesthesia and defines them as attribute-noun constructions where both the attributive adjective and the noun refer to perceptual domains, such as sharp voice (an integration of the tactile and auditory domains). In the following corpus study, I will concentrate on

\textsuperscript{156} As earlier version of the case study appeared in German as Tóth (2016).

\textsuperscript{157} As Cacciari (2008: 430-431) points out, the question of whether our perceptual system has a strictly modular structure with clearly delineated sub-modules or specialized senses and separate mechanisms is still undecided; however, more recent evidence points in the direction that our senses form an integrated system. Settling the question is way beyond the scope of this section. I use the terms sensory modules, senses, sensory domains, or modes of perception as near synonyms.
attribute-noun constructions whose head is a noun pertaining to the olfactory domain and
whose attribute is a color term (e.g. green scent), however I will refer to these not as
synesthetic metaphors but as verbal synesthesia or synesthetic expressions.

As is reflected in Vogt’s terminology (which conforms to the general use of the term
in the literature), verbal synesthesia and synesthetic expressions are traditionally considered
to be metaphoric phenomena par excellence (e.g. Taylor 1995: 139) since they connect
distinct perceptual and conceptual domains. However, with the upsurge of conceptual
metonymy research, especially as a result of the ubiquity and primacy view, some authors
have proposed a conceptual metonymic motivation for synesthetic expressions. For
instance, Barcelona (2002: 243) argues for a metonymic motivation of expressions such as
loud colors, and claims that “most conceptual synesthesias have a metonymic motivation”.

Other researchers take a moderate stance on the question. Dirven (1985) proposes
that within a broadly conceived category of metaphor synesthesia forms an intermediate
category between metonymy and metaphor in the narrow sense. More recently, Sadamitsu
(2003) argued that synesthetic expressions are more heterogeneous regarding their
conceptual motivation than had been previously assumed.158 With reference to Ullmann
(1951: 277) and a series of papers by Japanese scholars (Komori 1993, 2000, Sadamitsu
1999, 2001, Muto 2000, and Yamaguchi 2003), he points out that synesthetic expressions
are not exclusively motivated by metaphor, but also by metonymy, or even by their
interaction.

My main argument here will be that a considerable portion of color-smell
synesthetic expressions, especially when examined in their authentic contexts, can be
analyzed as PROPERTY-metonymies. Consider the following constructed example as an
illustration:

(23) the green scent of the lawn

In my analysis, (23) contains a PROPERTY-metonymy. The color GREEN associated with the
LAWN is activated to describe the SCENT of the LAWN; in other words, a PROPERTY of a THING
is used to activate and describe another PROPERTY of the same THING. On the linguistic level,

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158 The same seems to apply to synesthesia as a neuropsychological phenomenon as pointed out by Cacciari
synaesthesia, there still is little evidence that a common underlying mechanism can account for the
heterogeneity of synaesthetic perceptions.”
this metonymic shift is realized as the transfer of the attributive adjective *green* from the noun *lawn* to the noun *scent*, which refers to a *PROPERTY* of the *lawn*. My claim here is that although in the expression *green scent* an attribute belonging to the visual perceptual domain is linked to the distinct domain of olfaction, its motivation is not metaphoric but it rather realizes a *PROPERTY*-metonymy. It is not the concept of *scent* that is understood metaphorically, as if it were a physical object that had the property of *color*, but one property of the concept *lawn*, i.e. its *color*, is used as a metonymic reference point to activate a *PROPERTY* of its *scent*, which in turn is one of its *PROPERTIES* (Figure 6.2).

![Figure 6.2 green scent as a PROPERTY-metonymy](image)

One of the most frequently discussed questions pertaining to verbal synesthesia or synesthetic metaphors is the direction of the transfer, i.e. what sensory or perceptual domains serve as a source to what target sensory or perceptual domains. Several hypotheses have been offered to capture the *directionality of the synesthetic transfer*, which aim to explain the restrictions on mappings from one domain to another. Most of these hypotheses order sensory domains in *hierarchies* based on their properties, divide them into lower and higher senses and claim that the mapping in verbal synesthesia proceeds from the lower senses (source) to higher ones (target) (e.g. Ullmann 1951, Williams 1976, Yamanashi 1988, Yu 2003, Shen 1997, 2008, and Sadamitsu 2003). Interestingly enough, none of these hypotheses would account for the occurrence of color-smell synesthetic expressions, i.e. they
would be considered clashing constructions (cf. Shen 2008), or they would contradict the general tendencies, since most hierarchies consider the visual domain to be of a higher order than the olfactory domain.\footnote{Sadamitsu’s elaborate accessibility hierarchy (2003: 117) is an exception in this regard since he classifies scent and sound as the least accessible senses: touch > taste > sight > scent/sound. Although this hierarchy allows mappings from the visual domain to the olfactory one, he explicitly argues that expressions like red/black scent are unacceptable since the color sub-category of the visual domain is not preferable as a source in the synesthetic transfer from vision to olfaction.} As will be seen, color-smell synesthetic expressions do occur, even in non-poetic and non-expert discourse. In my view, their occurrence, despite all hierarchies proposed for synesthetic metaphor, is explained by their metonymic nature, i.e. it might be the case that factors constraining the direction of the mapping in metaphoric synesthesia are overridden or are not applicable in the case of metonymic synesthesia.

### 6.4.2 Synesthetic expressions as PROPERTY-metonymies

As mentioned above, synesthetic expressions are generally considered to be of a metaphorical nature, which basically means that in synesthetic attribute-noun constructions the head belonging to a particular sensory domain is conceptualized as if it had a property in another sensory domain designated by the attribute. For instance, in the expression *loud color*, the head *color* is metaphorically construed as something that has the property of being loud in the auditory domain. Another analysis may account for such expressions in terms of the metaphorical extension of the attribute from one sensory domain to another, i.e. *LOUD* as a property of intensity in the auditory domain is extended to be a property of intensity in the domain of visual perception.

More recently, Vogt (2013: 30-36) has proposed an elaborate account of *synesthetic expressions as metaphors in terms of frames and conceptual integration*. In her analysis, the attribute and the head noun of expressions like *screaming colors* belong to distinct frames. These frames, such as *SOUND* and *COLOR* each contain a set of constitutive, frame-specific attributes, such as *PITCH*, *INTENSITY*, *QUALITY*, etc. in the case of *SOUND*, and *HUE*, *BRIGHTNESS*, *SATURATION*, *COLORFULNESS*, *EMOTIONAL EFFECT*, etc. in the case of *COLOR*. The values of some of these attributes can be described by the adjective *screaming* in both frames: in the frame of *SOUND*, these are *HIGH-PITCHED*, *HIGH INTENSITY*, *SOUND QUALITY*, and *ASPECTUAL CHARACTER*; and *HUE*, *HIGH SATURATION*, *COLORFULNESS*, *QUALITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PERCEIVER*, and *PSYCHOLOGICAL-EMOTIONAL EFFECT OF THE COLOR*.
ON THE PERCEIVER in the frame of COLOR. These common attribute values described by the adjective *screaming* are conceptually integrated in a synesthetic metaphor.

My approach challenges the accounts of verbal synesthesia in terms of metaphor outlined above, in so far as in my view there are synesthetic expressions (especially non-conventionalized ones) that function completely differently and are better analyzed as PROPERTY-metonymies. In Chapter 5, I defined PROPERTY-metonymies as metonymies whose target is a PROPERTY accessed and activated through another PROPERTY of the same THING or that of a related THING. In the case of synesthetic PROPERTY-metonymies, this relation between the THINGS is either co-occurrence or resemblance. In other words, in some synesthetic expressions a perceptual PROPERTY of a THING A is described with the help of another perceptual PROPERTY of A or with the help of a perceptual PROPERTY of another co-occurent THING B or of a THING B reminiscent of A regarding the given property. In these cases, there is no metaphorical conceptualization of the noun or extension of the attribute. The noun is not conceptualized as if it had certain perceptual properties of the attribute, neither is the attribute conceptualized as if it referred to a perceptual property in a distinct domain; or in Vogt’s terms no cross-frame conceptual integration of common attributes or values takes place.

By co-occurrence in the case of verbal synesthesia I mean the simultaneous perception of input from different senses; i.e. two sensory percepts are simultaneously present in the construal of a given situation. A most obvious case of co-occurent sensory experience is when the source of the stimulus can be described in terms of several senses, as in (23) where the source of the olfactory stimulus, i.e. *GRASS*, is also the source of the visual stimulus, i.e. *GREEN*. In this case, a visual property of the source of the stimulus, so to say, lends itself to describe the olfactory property of the same source of stimulus. A similar process takes place in the literary example (24):

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160 Co-occurrence can be considered a case of contiguity; hence it is a prototypical metonymy-producing relationship (cf. Radden 2002).

161 For a similar approach, see also Shibuya et al. (2007). They propose that there two major types of synesthesia: one based on co-occurrence, the other on emotional similarity, although they do not consider these mappings to be metonymic.

162 As Cacciari (2008: 430) points out with reference to Callan et al. (2004), it is the default case that our perception is simultaneously stimulated “through multiple sensory channels”, i.e. certain percepts go usually hand in hand, for instance taste and smell.
(24a)
Hun.
Annak a háznak ablaka előtt messze virító kecses orgonák illatoztak. Csillag Sándort elfogta a vágy, hogy egy ilyen orgonás ablakú szobában ébredhessen reggelenként, s amint ágyából feltápászkodván kitárja az ablakokat, beszívhassa a mély lila illatot.\(^{164}\)

(24b)
Eng.
In front of the window of that house blossomed delicate lilacs, visible from far away. Sándor Csillag was seized by the desire to wake up every morning in a room like this, with lilacs at the window, which as he rose and opened the window wide would fill with their deep scent.\(^{165}\)

(24c)
Eng. literal
[...]
with their deep lilac/purple scent.\(^{166}\)

In (24) the scent of lilacs is described by the color of lilacs. Similar ways of describing scents in terms of other sensory properties of the source of the olfactory stimulus can be found in the following examples:

(25) From far off comes the warmer odor of cake baking.\(^{167}\)

(26) There was the warm smell of pig blood and smoke in the backyard […].\(^{168}\)

\(^{163}\) Throughout the case study and in Appendix B, I underlie the source of the sensory stimulus, or, since it is not always explicitly mentioned, those contextual elements on the basis of which it is inferable.

\(^{164}\) Vámos (2000: 249).


\(^{166}\) It is important to note that Peter Sherwood’s English translation omits the original version’s color term lilac. In my view, the translator’s decision to omit this is not arbitrary, although it is etymologically not entirely clear how, in present day English lilac refers both to the plant itself and to the pale pinkish-purple color of its flowers. It seems, however, that modifying the head scent with the adjective lilac would have resulted in repetition on the one hand, and a double activation of the content COLOR on the other. In the original, the adjective mély (‘deep’) is ambiguous as to whether it modifies the color or the scent; for this reason I leave its analysis out of consideration.


\(^{168}\) McCullers (2005: 45).
(27) Now and then there was the smell of smoke, and the warm rich odor of the barbecue slowly cooking in the pit behind the café.\(^{169}\)

(28) It was delightful to stroll along Apácza Street, whither the crackling smell of the nearby coffee-roasters and cafés was invariably borne by the wind.\(^{170}\)

In (25-27) the temperature of the source of the olfactory stimulus metonymically co-activates or describes a property of the olfactory stimulus itself, whereas in (28) it is the sound produced by coffee-roasters in cafés that co-activates a property of the smell.

In other cases, the sensory domains connected in a synesthetic expression cannot be traced back to a common source of stimulus, i.e. they are independent of each other, yet they co-occur in a situation and its construal:

(29a) Hun. Kolbászszaga volt a zenének\(^{171}\)

(29b) Eng. The Music Had a Sausage Smell

(30a) Hun. Már nem hallja a dűbörgő várost, a kiabálást és dudasztó felváltja a belső udvarok hűvös csendje.\(^{172}\)

(30b) Eng. He doesn’t hear the rumbling city anymore, the shouting and honking is replaced by the cool silence of the inner courtyards.

Example (29) is the title of a classic concert review in which the author praises the music but complains that the gentleman sitting next to him exhaled a pungent, acidic stench of sausage seasoned with garlic, ruining the experience. In this case, MUSIC is not conceptualized as something with olfactory properties, neither is the SMELL of sausages extended metaphorically to describe certain auditory properties. We cannot find attributes in the frames of SMELL and SOUND whose values could be described by sausage smell and could be metaphorically blended. The experiential basis of the expression is the mere co-occurrence of the olfactory and auditory stimuli in a particular situation. The same applies to (30) taken from an article on an exhibition of photographs depicting inner courtyards in

\(^{169}\) McCullers (2005: 47).
\(^{170}\) Vámos (2009).
\(^{171}\) Kling (2014). My English translation, M. T.
Budapest. Everyone who has been to an inner courtyard in the Hungarian capital has experienced that they are cooler and quieter relative to the streets. In this case, COOLNESS and SILENCE, stimuli belonging to distinct sensory domains, are co-present, making COOLNESS available for the metonymic co-activation of a certain PROPERTY of SILENCE.

Finally, some metonymic synesthetic expressions are based on a resemblance relationship between a given sensory stimulus and the sensory stimulus from another source. We encounter such a case of metonymic verbal synesthesia in the excerpt under (31):

(31a)
Germ.
Auf dem Weg zur Jama, am eckigen Kühlturm lief das Wasser außen herunter, es war ein Rieselturm. Ich taufte ihn PAGODE. Unten herum war ein Bassin, das auch im Sommer nach Wintermänteln roch, nach Naphthalin. Ein runder weißer Geruch wie die Mottenkugeln zu Hause im Schrank.\textsuperscript{173}

(31b)
Eng.
On my way to the yama, I saw water running down the rectangular scrubbing tower. I christened it PAGODA. The water gathered in a tank around its base and even in summer smelled like winter coats, like naphthalene. \textit{A round white smell}, like the mothballs in the wardrobe back home.\textsuperscript{174}

Resemblance or similarity is traditionally taken to be the perceptual basis of metaphors. However, in (31) water (the source of the olfactory stimulus) is not conceptualized metaphorically as winter coats, naphthalene, or mothballs (source of a similar olfactory stimulus), i.e. it is not understood in terms of these domains as metaphoric sources; they are merely perceived as similar regarding their smell. Such similarities are very often contextually explicit in the form of similes.\textsuperscript{175} This resemblance relation reduces the conceptual distance between the two sources of stimulus, making them contiguous.\textsuperscript{176} In (31)

\textsuperscript{173} Müller (2009: 184).
\textsuperscript{174} Müller (2012), English translation by Philip Boehm.
\textsuperscript{175} For instance, in Hungarian and German it is a very common way of specifying smells to combine the source of the stimulus (or a prototypical source of stimulus) with the smell in the form of noun + smell compounds.
\textsuperscript{176} As the examples in Appendix B show, this resemblance relation is very often made linguistically explicit, i.e. the two sources of stimulus also co-occur contextually.
visual properties (SHAPE and COLOR) of an entity (MOTHBALL) are used metonymically to describe the olfactory stimulus from another source (WATER): the water smells like mothballs, mothballs are round and white, and these properties are transferred to describe the smell of the water.

In sum, my claim is that synesthetic expressions are rather heterogeneous regarding their conceptual background and underlying mechanisms. As has been argued, some of them are not metaphors at all, but PROPERTY-metonymies based on either co-occurrence or resemblance. The expressions analyzed here qualify as linguistic metonymies also on the basis of the criteria introduced in Chapter 4. On the one hand, regarding their implicitness, their target, i.e. a specifying property of a perceptual stimulus, and the relationship holding between the source and the target property remain linguistically implicit. On the other hand, the source and the target property are both active from the point of view of meaning construction, i.e. both the source and the target property (although the latter is implicit and very often hard to name) actively contribute to the overall meaning of the synesthetic construction; in other words, the source property does not simply substitute the target property. This latter claim is also in line with Cytowic and Woods’ (1982: 28) remark on synesthesia as a neuropsychological phenomenon where modes of perception are combined: “additive attributes, combining elementary percepts into complex ones, without losing the identity of the elementary percepts themselves” (cited in Dirven 1985: 99).

6.4.3 Corpus and procedure

All the examples analyzed so far are ones that have come to my attention accidentally, which necessitates the systematic gathering and analysis of further authentic examples. The realm of olfaction offers itself as an ideal candidate to study synesthetic expressions since in most languages properties describing olfactory stimuli are rather poorly lexicalized (cf. Holz 2007 or Chernigovskaya and Arshavsky 2007): When we describe smells, we tend to utilize attributes stemming from other sensory domains, thus synesthetic constructions with nouns pertaining to the domain of olfaction are likely to occur. However, according to the literature (see above) the attribute is very unlikely to be a color term. As (24) and (31) show, such expressions do occur in literary, poetic discourse.

To underpin my proposal for an analysis of at least some synesthetic expressions as PROPERTY-metonymies and in order to examine whether such expressions occur also in non-poetic discourse I conducted a corpus study on synesthetic German attribute-noun
constructions combining COLOR and SMELL. The corpora I used were Das Deutsche Referenzkorpus\textsuperscript{177} (henceforth DeReKo) with the search syntax of COSMAS II\textsubscript{web} of the Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) Mannheim and the resources of the Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache\textsuperscript{178} (henceforth DWDS, a project of the BBAW, the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften).

As a first step, I searched for adjective-noun combinations consisting of the following color terms: rot (‘red’), grün (‘green’), blau (‘blue’), gelb (‘yellow’), weiß (‘white’), schwarz (‘black’), orange (‘orange’), grau (‘grey’), braun (‘brown’), rosa (‘pink’), and lila (‘purple’)\textsuperscript{179} and the nouns Duft, Geruch, and Gestank\textsuperscript{180} in all their inflectional forms. All hits were extracted together with a relatively large context of one preceding and one subsequent paragraph.

In a second step, I excluded those hits where the color term was not an attribute of the noun (in most such cases their proximity was random, for instance, in enumerations, or they were on clause or sentence boundaries). Furthermore, I excluded those cases where the noun does not refer to an olfactory stimulus, for instance, Duft may refer to the bloom of fruit, as in (32) or to steam or air, as in (33).


\textsuperscript{177} To be precise, I used the main archive, i.e. a collection of written German with ca. 25 billion words. For further information, see http://www1.ids-mannheim.de/kl/projekte/korpora/.

\textsuperscript{178} These resources are the corpus of 20\textsuperscript{th}/21\textsuperscript{st} century German (Kernkorpus des 20./21. Jahrhunderts, ca. 100 million words), the corpus of German Text Archive, and newspaper corpora (Berliner Zeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, Potsdamer Neueste Nachrichten, Die Zeit, Bild, Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung). For further information, see http://dwds.de/.

\textsuperscript{179} These are the basic color terms discussed in Berlin and Kay (1969) and Kay and McDaniel (1978).

\textsuperscript{180} All three nouns designate olfactory stimuli. Duft refers to rather positive/pleasant and neutral smells, Geruch to neutral and rather negative/pleasant smells, and Gestank to negative/very unpleasant smells.
In a **final step**, I categorized the relevant hits into the following groups based on a qualitative analysis of their context: (i) co-occurrence-based metonymic expressions, (ii) resemblance-based metonymic expressions, and (iii) undecided/metaphoric synesthetic expressions. It is important to note that when setting up these classes, repetitions were only counted once. For instance, the expression *Der schwarze Duft der Schwermut* occurred four times and always referred to the title of a book, whereas with its 12 occurrences *Der schwarze Duft der Schönheit* was the title of an exhibition; these and similar cases were taken into consideration only once.

Another remark should be made on the third category label. I subsumed under the group ‘undecided/metaphoric’ cases where the analysis of the context did not support the metonymic analysis, nor spoke against it, i.e. there were no contextual elements in favor or against, or where an interaction of metaphor and metonymy could be supposed. For instance, in (34) there are no contextual elements referring to a co-occurrent or reminiscent source of stimulus supporting the metonymic analysis. However, such an analysis cannot be excluded; for instance, the person described here may have been associated with the color purple (e.g. her preference in clothing etc.).

(34) Es ist Elsa, die Unglaubliche, Dadas deutsche Großmutter, die kahl geschorene Baronin von Freytag-Loringhoven. [...] "Von nahem verströmte sie einen lila Geruch", bemerkte der amerikanische Arzt und Poet William Carlos Williams, der sie 1919 im Village kennen lernte, ihre sexuellen Ansprüche fürchtete und doch von ihren "kulturellen Früchtchen" kosten wollte. [DeReKo, Z03/310.07068 Die Zeit (Online-Ausgabe), 09.10.2003; Dazwischen ein Vogel, p. 91]

In other cases, such as with *Der schwarze Duft der Schwermut* (‘the black scent of melancholy’) or *Der schwarze Duft der Schönheit* (‘the black scent of beauty’) a PROPERTY-metonymy seems to interact with metaphor, and, in a rather peculiar way metaphor seems to precede metonymy. MELANCHOLY and BEAUTY are conceptualized here as physical entities or materials with the properties COLOR and SMELL. Their COLOR is used metonymically to co-activate a property of their SMELL, i.e. if MELANCHOLY and BEAUTY are conceptualized metaphorically as BLACK THINGS, their COLOR may be used metonymically to describe their SMELL. Nevertheless, analyses in this vein are post hoc and lack contextual support. They are heavily dependent on the theoretical assumptions of the researcher, thus they are intuitive
at best, if not speculative. Accordingly, I assigned similar cases to the category ‘undecided/metaphoric’.

### 6.4.4 Results of the analysis

The search procedure yielded a set of hits consisting altogether of 75 relevant tokens, all of which are listed in Appendix B with their context.\(^{181}\) The adjective + noun combinations found and the number of their occurrences are summarized in Table 6.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Duft</th>
<th>Geruch</th>
<th>Gestank</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>grün</td>
<td>26(^{182})</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>braun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blau</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schwarz</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gelb</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weiß</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orange</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rosa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2 Color-smell synesthetic expressions in German

There were no items involving the color terms *orange* and *rosa*. Their absence may be explained by their relatively low frequency in comparison with the other color terms and the fact that they are themselves metonymic: A PROTOTYPICAL THING OF COLOR X FOR THE COLOR X. The color terms most often combined with nouns referring to olfactory stimuli seem to be *grün*, *braun* and *blau*. In the following, I discuss the results and their grouping

\(^{181}\) Numbers in square brackets are used throughout the section to refer to items in Appendix B.

\(^{182}\) There was one hit where the colors blue and green appeared in combination [9]. This record is counted under *grün*. 
into the above-mentioned categories in order of the frequency of the color term involved in color-smell synesthetic combinations.

I have found 30 instances of the attributive adjective + noun combination *grün + Duft/Geruch* in my data set. It seems that unpleasant smells or stinks are not described by the color green. 12 items can be analyzed as co-occurrence-based PROPERTY-metonymies (40% of all combinations with *grün*), whereas 12 as resemblance-based PROPERTY-metonymies (40% of the items) with 6 items belonging to the undecided/metaphoric category (20%). In color-smell synesthetic adjective + noun combinations, the olfactory stimulus is described as green in the co-presence of: galbanum, parks, grass, leaves of plants and flowers such as ivy and violets, forests, colors in a painting, fir trees, and green areas. In one case, we find a possible interaction of metaphor and metonymy [11] where GREEN POLITICAL IDEAS are metaphorized as having a SMELL and this SMELL is characterized metonymically by the color GREEN. Green smells and scents seem to be reminiscent of grass, unripe olives, artichokes, green tomatoes, toilet tablets, leaves, ferns, moose, meadows, citrus fruit, cedar trees, pine trees, galbanum, and oak moss. The adjective *grün* seems to attribute olfactory stimuli perceived to be fresh, clean, and energetic. Of all color terms, it can be stated of *grün* that in specialized contexts (i.e. description of perfumes) it is on its way to becoming lexicalized in a meaning pertaining to properties in the olfactory domain.

The items with BROWN involve rather unpleasant smells, hence the adjective *braun* combines primarily with the nouns *Gestank* and *Geruch*, and only once with *Duft* out of 13 items. All 13 combinations with BROWN were classified as co-occurrence-based PROPERTY-metonymies. With the exception of [43] (where the stench of vomit is described as brown), all items occurred in political texts and involve a similar interaction of metaphor and metonymy as in [11]. In these cases, right extremist or neo-Nazi ideas and activities are conceptualized as stinking, or having a smell. On the other hand, they are associated with the color BROWN. This latter association, when its historical-cultural background is taken into consideration, turns out to be metonymic: the color of the uniforms of early fascist and national-socialistic paramilitary organizations is metonymically transferred to their ideas. This color is then again metonymically transferred to the metaphorical smell of these ideas.

The color term blau, like *grün*, seems to be primarily combined with pleasant or neutral olfactory stimuli; of the 13 occurrences, there is only one item in the data set where it describes the noun *Gestank*. Olfactory stimuli are described as blue in the co-presence of violets, cigarettes in blue packaging, blue perfume in liquid form, air, water, cigar smoke,
and exhaust fumes of racing cars (9 items, app. 70 %). In 4 cases, no contextual support was found for a metonymic interpretation.

Out of 7 combinations with schwarz, 5 are co-occurrence-based, and 2 items remain undecided or metaphoric. Black smells are co-occurrent with black shadows, coal, waste gas, and volcanic ash. All items with grey smells were found to be metonymic based on the co-occurrence of the smell with dark seas, dark rooms, grey cities, and grey fumes. The color term rot appears as an attributive adjective of a smell in 3 cases, two being co-occurrence-based (with the sunset and rusty metal), and one undecided. The smell of urine and that of rape fields are described metonymically as being yellow. Both occurrences of purple appeared as either metaphoric, or the analysis of the context does not provide any hints pointing to the metonymic direction. Finally, the single item with white was used to describe a scent containing vanilla and worn by women in daytime (as opposed to the black variant of the same perfume).

The results of the qualitative analysis of the relevant hits regarding their metonymicity is summarized in Table 6.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color-smell synesthetic adjective noun combinations</th>
<th>Metonymic</th>
<th>Undecided / metaphoric</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>grün+Duft/Geruch</td>
<td>Co-occurrence</td>
<td>Resemblance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>braun+Duft/Geruch/Gestank</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blau+Duft/Geruch/Gestank</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schwarz+Duft/Geruch/Gestank</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grau+Duft/Geruch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rot+Duft/Geruch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gelb+Geruch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lila+Duft/Geruch</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weiß+Duft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3 Metonymic and non-metonymic color-smell synesthetic expressions in German

As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of all verbal synesthetic combinations of a color term and a noun pertaining to the realm of olfaction in the analyzed examples is a PROPERTY-
metonymy (80%, with 48 items based on co-occurrence and 12 on resemblance). Nevertheless, the analysis of the undecided cases as metonymies cannot be excluded, although there was no sufficient contextual evidence in favor of such an analysis.

6.4.5 Discussion

The results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. My investigations seem to suggest that color-smell synesthetic expressions are very rare by any standards, especially if we take into consideration the size of the corpora used for the compilation of the material under scrutiny and the frequency of the head nouns themselves (Duft with 51,733, Geruch with 53,075 and Gestank with 12,402 hits in the DeReKo alone). This finding is in accordance with Szántó’s (2011) results; in collecting and analyzing 3,520 Hungarian synesthetic expressions, she found only 5 instances where visual properties were transferred to the domain of olfaction. A probable reason for the poor functioning of the visual domain as a source for the olfactory domain might be that their correlation is not typical in our experience, i.e. things of the same color usually differ substantially in their smell.\(^{183}\)

The examples found indicate that however infrequent they are, color-smell synesthetic expressions do occur, and moreover, not only in poetic and specialized discourse.\(^{184}\) When olfactory stimuli and color stimuli co-occur, the latter can be exploited metonymically. The reason behind the phenomenon may be due to the relatively poor conventionalized lexical vocabulary distinguishing different smells as compared with our lexical inventory for distinguishing colors. Our perception of smells seems to be more difficult to conceptualize and verbalize than that of colors. Hence, when a color property is co-present with an olfactory stimulus in a situation, this salient and linguistically easily captured property is used to metonymically activate an olfactory property.

In fact, my analysis suggests that a great majority of color-smell adjective + noun combinations are PROPERTY-metonymies. This suggestion is in accordance with the view that verbal synesthesia cannot be grasped simply by proposing that it is a metaphorical phenomenon. Some synesthetic expressions might be analyzed as metonymies, others as

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\(^{183}\) A far better candidate as a source for the synesthetic description of smells would be the gustatory domain since these stimuli go often hand in hand and seem to correlate more strongly than color and smell, i.e. things tasting similar do tend to have a similar smell as well.

\(^{184}\) However, the metadata of the items in Appendix B suggest that such expressions are more frequent in specialized discourse (i.e. in the description of perfumes) and literary works than in everyday language.
metaphors, whereas it might be also possible that some would resist an analysis in either vein and would constitute a third intermediary or related category.

Finally, as already pointed out, color-smell synesthetic expressions appear to go against any directionality proposed so far for the metaphorical transfer from one perceptual domain to the other. In my view, this may have to do with the heterogeneity of the phenomenon of verbal synesthesia. It may be the case that metonymic synesthetic expressions more readily override directionality hypotheses than metaphoric ones. In the case of color-smell synesthesias this clash with the directionality hypotheses may be overridden by the fact that olfaction is poorly conventionalized, and when a perceptually salient color property is present it offers itself as a metonymic source to refer to the olfactory property. Nevertheless, the relationship between the directionality of the synesthetic transfer and different kinds of verbal synesthesia requires further investigations.

6.5 Summary

The present chapter set out to consider some methodological problems pertaining to cognitive metonymy research. Their complexity, their intricate relation to theoretical questions such as (PDEL) and (PCCLASS), the lack of generally accepted methods and their metatheoretic evaluation were touched upon. As to how metonymy is studied in CL, an overview of the methods applied and reported on in the literature suggests that cognitive metonymy research is characterized by methodological plurality and cyclic argumentation. Intuitive-introspective methods, cross-linguistic explorations, corpus linguistic methods and experimentation are all part of the arsenal of metonymy researchers.

Intuition and introspection seem to be indispensable parts of this arsenal. Based on a few examples taken from cross-linguistic studies on metonymy, I distinguished source-, target- and metonymy-based lines of investigation. It has been pointed out that the corpus linguistic study of metonymy needs to adopt the methods developed for metaphor research to its own purposes, which often requires the researcher to work with specified procedures elaborated for specific purposes. Finally, experimentation turned out to be a relatively neglected area among empirical methods in cognitive metonymy research, since experiments designed specifically for research questions conceived in the framework of conceptual metonymy theory are very scarce. Among these four methodological approaches cross-linguistic and corpus linguistic methods seem to be the most widely applied and promise to be the most fruitful.
In Case study 1, I was concerned with an EVENT-metonymy. I offered a target-driven approach (PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS) working with translation questionnaires, reaching the informants through the informal channel of online social media. The result of the analysis is the hypothesis that complex EVENTS are grasped by most languages through the conceptual procedures of metonymy and metaphor. However, conceptual metonymic strategies are not exploited in all languages in the form of linguistic metonymies, i.e. in some languages the metonymic activation of the target content by the source content seems to be explicitly marked.

Case study 2 was devoted to a PROPERTY-metonymy. Based on an example I had accidentally come across, I designed a procedure for the corpus linguistic study of verbal synesthesia involving the transfer of color to the olfactory domain. I searched for attributive adjective + noun combinations where the adjective was a basic color term and the noun refers to an olfactory stimulus. The items compiled by the search procedure were subsequently qualitatively analyzed in their original context. Based on the analysis, I formulated the hypotheses that some synesthetic expressions are not metaphoric but can be analyzed as PROPERTY-metonymies. Nevertheless, since both case studies include substantial elements of intuition and introspection, my hypotheses require further empirical investigations in the form of extended corpus searches and targeted experiments.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion

The starting point of my argumentation was that the holistic cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy runs the risk of becoming limitless, hence becoming empty. The reason behind the unrestricted use of the term is to be sought in metonymy having been the “poor sister” of metaphor and having been studied in its shadow for a long time. As a reaction, and also motivated by the Generalization Commitment, several cognitive metonymy researchers have achieved significant results in pointing out the fundamental and omnipresent role of metonymy in language and thought (the ubiquity view and the primacy view). An unfortunate side-effect is that the notion has come to cover such a broad range of so heterogeneous phenomena that it seems to embrace everything, rendering the notion vacuous. The problem has been recognized by several researchers, resulting in an attempt to narrow it down. Accordingly, metonymy research is divided between two opposing tendencies which I labeled as broad and narrow approaches.

The risk of the notion of metonymy becoming overly broad manifests itself in two major problems. First, the group of phenomena to be labeled as metonymy cannot be delimited against other related phenomena (the problem of delimitation). Second, the phenomena subsumed under the category metonymy are too diverse and heterogeneous to make generalizations about them other than their being metonymic; consequently, this heterogeneous mass needs to be cut up into relatively homogeneous groups (the problem of classification). These unresolved theoretical issues have a negative impact on the empirical study of metonymy by over-extending the range of phenomena under scrutiny and blurring the differences between them, which in turn results in a lack of generally applied empirical methods. I approached these theoretical questions in the form of (P_DEL) and (P_CLASS):

(P_DEL) On the basis of what criteria can metonymy be delimited against related phenomena?

(P_CLASS) How can metonymy be classified into relatively homogeneous classes?

Two basic strategies to come to grips with the unlimitedness of a notion are (i) to define it more narrowly so that we are able to distinguish the phenomena covered by the notion from other related and similar phenomena (P_DEL); and (ii) to classify the phenomena covered by the notion into relatively homogeneous sub-classes which enables us to make
generalizations about them (PCLASS). If these two strategies are applied successfully, it may facilitate the development of empirical methods applicable to the study of the phenomena covered by the notion at hand.

By giving an overview of the problem of **distinguishing metonymy from metaphor**, it has been pointed out that delimiting metonymy against related phenomena based on an apparatus of theoretical notions pertaining to phenomena of a conceptual nature may be a slippery path (cf. Barnden 2010), since notions such as domain, contiguity, similarity, mapping, and highlighting are themselves vaguely defined and empirically difficult to access. Although the importance of these notions in the interpretation and analysis of metonymic and metaphoric phenomena is not questioned, I proposed as an alternative to approach the problem of delimitation by considering the **linguistically manifest properties of metonymy**. The hypothesis was that those properties that constitute a linguistic metonymy may be able to distinguish it from linguistic metaphor and other related phenomena.

**Linguistic metonymy**, or metonymic expression is usually defined in cognitive metonymy research merely as a linguistic manifestation or expression of a conceptual metonymy, or it is supposed to be an expression in whose motivation conceptual metonymy plays a significant role. Following a broad notion of conceptual metonymy, this leads to a situation in which any linguistic expression may turn out to be a linguistic metonymy. I hypothesized that conceptual relations exploited by conceptual metonymy do not always yield linguistic metonymies, i.e. linguistic metonymies have certain properties that distinguish them from related phenomena that are based on similar conceptual relations.

A candidate for a property that linguistic metonymies possess is being **referential**, i.e. they are connected to an act of reference. This view has been generally refuted in cognitive metonymy research. This refusal is explained by focusing on metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon and viewing reference narrowly. It is obvious that if a conceptual metonymy is not expressed linguistically, it cannot be referential; and if referentiality is restricted to noun phrases, then verbal, adjectival, or propositional metonymies are not referential. However, if we consider linguistic metonymy, and, at the same time broaden the notion of reference to other types of mental content than those designated by noun phrases, i.e. if we equate an act of reference with the provision of access to mental content of any type with the help of linguistic means with the purpose of meaning construction, then linguistic metonymies turn out to be referential. Linguistic metonymies differ from other
linguistic expressions in the way they activate mental content; and various linguistic metonymies differ from each other in the type of the mental content they activate.

Linguistic metonymies differ from other ways of activating mental content with linguistic means in two major respects: they **co-activate** mental contents and they are **implicit.** By **co-activation,** I mean that they activate the source and the target content and the relationship holding between them as a single complex. Moreover, they achieve this in such a way that only the source content appears explicitly on the linguistic level in the construal of a situation. Thus, my answer to (PDEL) can be formulated as the following definition:

Linguistic metonymy is

(iv) an expression motivated by conceptual metonymic processes
(v) in that it co-activates a complex of mental contents (the source, the target, and the relation holding between them) in a way reminiscent of reference point constructions,
(vi) with the linguistic property that the target content and the relationship between source and target are not expressed explicitly or are only expressed marginally or schematically on the linguistic level.

Both properties of linguistic metonymy are a **matter of degree.** The degree of activation of the source content seems to correlate with the degree of conventionalization of the expression. The more conventionalized a metonymic expression is, the less active the source content is from a meaning constructional point of view. This decreased level of activation makes conventional figurative expressions especially hard to classify as metonymies or metaphors.

The degree of implicitness of a metonymic expression is related to the amount of contextual support for the metonymic interpretation. The highest degree of implicitness seems to be displayed by illocutionary, propositional and twice true metonymies, which can be interpreted as such only in the light of the broader context. Prototypical lexical metonymies are less implicit, since their interpretation is triggered by the immediate context. Metonymies resulting in a change of grammatical categories (e.g. proper noun – common noun; mass-countable; or conversion) represent an even lower degree of implicitness, since the metonymic co-activation process is indicated by a change in the syntactic behavior of the source element (e.g. inflection or use of articles). Some metonymic compounds and
derivational suffixation are borderline cases, in that they either express linguistically both the source and the target, or they are simply explicitly marked.

Co-activation and implicitness distinguish linguistic metonymy from related phenomena such as **zone activation** and **linguistic metaphor**. In the case of zone activation, no complex content is activated, and non-active zones also appear explicitly. In the case of linguistic metaphor, once an expression has been interpreted as metaphoric, the source content is no longer active. Furthermore, linguistic metaphors do not activate a single relation between source and target but open up the possibility for the activation of several correspondences between the two, which can differ in the degree of their activation. Regarding their implicitness, linguistic metaphors differ from linguistic metonyms in that metaphoric targets regularly appear in a linguistically manifest form together with the source content within the same construal of a situation. Admittedly, this latter distinction does not function perfectly in all cases, especially with conventionalized figurative expressions and in borderline cases where the target remains implicit and the source is less active. Furthermore, since both implicitness and activation are gradual, intermediary cases are possible. It would be a promising line of inquiry to investigate how the intermediary categories between metaphor and metonymy proposed so far relate to the properties of implicitness and activation. Another possible direction for future research would be to consider the relation of linguistic metonymy to blending and reference point constructions in terms of co-activation and implicitness.

The category of linguistic metonymy, even if defined narrowly as above, still encompasses a very broad range of various phenomena. Metonyms have been broken up into smaller classes based on the relationship holding between source and target, on the frame or ICM that contains both source and target, and on the role they play in different phases of meaning construction. To my knowledge no **categorization of metonymy** has been proposed that takes into consideration the **type of the mental content activated**. As an answer to (P_CLASS) I argue that metonyms can be classified according to their target content and sub-classified according to the source content providing access to the target.

Based on different types of mental content, I proposed a distinction between **THING-**, **PROPERTY-**, **EVENT-**, **PROPOSITION-** and **illocutionary metonyms**. Within these classes we can further sub-categorize metonyms according to the type of their source content, for instance THING-THING- or PROPERTY-THING-metonyms within the category of THING-metonyms. The content-based classification has the advantage that particular types of mental content are usually activated by particular linguistic units, i.e. metonyms whose
source is a **THING** are usually manifested as noun phrases, where it is a **PROPERTY** as adjectives (or nominalized adjectives), or in the case of **EVENTS** in the form of verbs etc.

The major types of mental content I worked with have been proposed in the literature; however, they are set up in a rather intuitive fashion. Accordingly, the content-based classification is in need of future refinements that integrate evidence from cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics regarding how certain types of conceptual contents are represented and stored, what types of content can be distinguished, how the particular types can be broken up into sub-types, and more fundamentally, what counts as mental content.

Another major question to be addressed is the exact relationship of the content-based approach to earlier classifications. There seems to be a strong correlation between the type of the content, the relationship between particular contents and the role of a particular content in meaning construction. For instance, **THING**-metonymies tend to partake in contiguity relations in the physical domain and play a distinctive role at an initial phase of meaning construction, namely in reference fixing as a first step towards elaborating propositional meaning, whereas **PROPOSITION**-metonymies are based on more abstract contiguity relations and play a role in arriving at explicatures and implicatures. Considering these properties of metonymies in an integrative framework may offer a precise description of metonymic expressions and may shed light on interesting interrelations between the type of the source and target content, the relationship holding between them, and the pragmatic function of their co-activation.

After addressing these theoretical problems, I briefly touched upon some methodological issues. A brief look at the methodology of cognitive metonymy research shows that it is characterized by methodological pluralism and the integration of different methods, such as intuition, introspection, cross-linguistic data, corpus linguistic procedures, and though relatively infrequently, also experimentation. These methods are applied in the theory formation in a **cyclic manner** with different emphasis on a particular method at certain phases of theorizing (cf. Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2012). However, the general application of empirical methods is still in its infancy; furthermore, empirical methods for studying certain metonymic phenomena are very scarce. In fact, the development and general application of empirical methods for the specific purposes of studying metonymy and the methodological and meta-theoretical evaluation of these are the greatest challenge to future research into metonymy.

My two quasi-empirical pilot studies attempted to take an initial step towards the investigation of two relatively neglected types of metonymy. In Case study 1, I focused on
an EVENT-metonymy (PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS) in a variety of languages. My analyses indicate that complex EVENTS seem to be conceptualized by metonymic and/or metaphoric strategies in each language under scrutiny. However, conceptual metonymic strategies are not always exploited as linguistic metonyms but in more explicit constructions (such as derivation by suffixation). In Case study 2, I scrutinized a PROPERTY-metonymy with the help of a corpus linguistic procedure. The most important finding of the study is the hypothesis that the overwhelming majority of color-smell synesthetic expressions in German taking the form of attributive adjective + noun are not metaphors but PROPERTY-metonyms.

The contribution of my thesis to the problems under scrutiny can thus be summarized as follows. As a solution to (PDEL), I proposed a definition of linguistic metonymy as a linguistic expression that implicitly co-activates mental contents of any type. The definition highlights two aspects of linguistic metonymy, i.e. the target content remains always implicit and both the implicit target content and the explicit source content are activated from a meaning construction point of view, which may serve as features that in certain cases can (at least partially) distinguish linguistic metonymy from linguistic metaphor and active zone phenomena. My content-based classification of metonymy offers a so far relatively neglected aspect of metonymy which in integration with earlier contiguity-based and pragmatically oriented approaches can be very helpful in solving (PCCLASS), i.e. it is able to set up relatively homogeneous sub-classes of metonymy, which in turn can be more effectively studied empirically, and consequently, about which generalizations can be formulated. Finally, in my case studies I concentrated on metonyms which have not been focused on in cognitively oriented linguistic research. In sum, my results may hopefully contribute to prevent the cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy becoming unlimited.
References


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Source of the examples

Books, comics, articles


Movies and television series

_A Most Wanted Man._ 2014. Directed by Anton Corbijn. Screenplay by Andrew Bovell based on John le Carré’s novel with the same title.


_Hell on Wheels._ Season 2, Episode 6. “Purged Away with Blood”. AMC.


_Ripper Street._ Season 2, Episode 4. “Dynemamite and a Woman”. BBC America.


Corpora

COSMAS II-Webdienst

Available at: [https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web/](https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web/)

Das Deutsche Referenzkorpus

Available at: [http://www1.ids-mannheim.de/kl/projekte/korpora.html](http://www1.ids-mannheim.de/kl/projekte/korpora.html)

Digitales Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache

Available at: [http://dwds.de/](http://dwds.de/)
Appendix A

Translation elicitation questionnaire used in Case study 1

Mother tongue: _____________________

1. Could you please translate the following sentences in your mother tongue?

Note: If there are alternatives, please note the variant that comes most natural to you. Please also give a literal translation, so that the differences between your version and the English version become more apparent.

Example:

Yesterday afternoon he played the guitar.
Hungarian: Tegnap gitározott.
Literally: 'Yesterday he guitar-red.'
Yesterday (he) guitar-verbal-suffix-3rd person-singular -past

(You do not need to provide such a detailed description with technical terms, it is sufficient if you give a literal English translation that comes closest to your native variant.)

(1) Do you play any instruments?

(2) Can you play the guitar?

(3) Yesterday afternoon he played the guitar.

(4) He was playing a wonderful song on his guitar.

(5) Yesterday the guitarist played in front of a crowd of about 200 people.

(6) He accompanied the girl on guitar.
2. If there is variation with respect to the instrument played, please provide a translation of the above sentences with the following instruments: flute, piano, violin, drums, horn, vuvuzela.

3. If you happen to know someone who is a native speaker of a language other than Hungarian, English or German, their responses are welcomed as well.

If you submit your answers to my email: mate_toth@yahoo.com, I will be indebted you. I really appreciate the help you provide, it is of great assistance to me.

- Máté Tóth
Appendix B

Data set of Case Study 2 on color-smell synesthetic attributive adjective + noun combinations in German

grün + Duft / Geruch

Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):

(DeReKo; BRZ11/APR.12540 Braunschweiger Zeitung, 28.04.2011; Ich habe ein Feuer gerochen, bevor es loderte)

(DeReKo; HAZ07/AUG.02296 Hannoversche Allgemeine, 28.08.2007, p. 6; Arlington Park)

[3] Der Romantitel "Das Gras" erklärt sich daraus, dass Simon seine Geschichte über weite Strecken aus der Perspektive Louises erzählt, die sich im "wuchernden Gras"

(DeReKo; M05/AUG.64277 Mannheimer Morgen, 08.08.2005; Über die keuchende Zeit)


(DeReKo; N95/MAR.10008 Salzburger Nachrichten, 16.03.1995; Luciano Pavarotti)


(DeReKo; NZZ06/MAR.04769 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28.03.2006, p. 45; Mit dem Gesicht zur Wand)

(DWDS; Immermann, Karl: Münchhausen. Vol. 3. Düsseldorf, 1839.)


(DWDS; Brockes, Barthold Heinrich: Physikalische und moralische Gedanken über die drey Reiche der Natur. Vol. 9. Hamburg u. a., 1748.)


Die Künstlerin Jenny Marketou will so etwas Flüchtiges wie Düfte einfangen - und auf Papier bannen.


Zunächst liegen nun erst mal die Diagnosen vor, die, grafisch aufbereitet, die Erstellung der ersten Wiener Geruchslandkarte ermöglichten (siehe Grafiken). Insgesamt formten die Forscher vier Hauptkategorien von vorherrschenden

**Metonymic (resemblance-based):**

Carrabs: Ein hochwertiges Olivenöl enthält eine Fülle von Aromen: *grüne Düfte* wie frisch geschnittenes Gras, unreife Oliven, Artischocken oder grüne Tomaten. All diese Aromen weisen darauf hin, dass die Oliven im richtigen Zeitpunkt geerntet wurden, nicht zu unreif und nicht zu reif. (DeReKo; A07/OKT.00070 St. Galler Tagblatt, 01.10.2007, p. 26; ICH UND MEIN ARBEITSPLATZ Flüssiges Gold aus Irpinia)

Geruch: Es riecht eindeutig nach frischen Oliven. Es können aber auch *grüne Düfte* wie frisch geschnittenes Gras, Artischocken oder grüne Tomaten sein. Unerwünscht sind aber süße Fruchtnoten wie reife Bananen oder überreife Äpfel. Sie deuten auf zu spät geerntete Oliven oder vom Boden aufgelesene Früchte. Vollwertiges Olivenöl hat eine gewisse charakteristische Schärfe und kratzt zu Beginn leicht im Hals. Milde, oxidierte Öle, die nach nichts schmecken, sind oft gepanscht
(DeReKo; A08/APR.09668 St. Galler Tagblatt, 24.04.2008, p. 28; Was hinter dem Olivenöl-Skandal steckt)

[15] Designer Wolfgang Joop hält nichts von frischen Parfums. «Ich bin kein Freund von *grünen Düften*. Gewaschen hab ich mich, und nach Toilettensteinchen möchte...
ich nicht riechen», sagte der 63jährige der Zeitschrift «Bunte». «Ich will, dass ein Mann nach Mann riecht. Mit diesem flüchtigen Mann, wie er heute modern zu sein scheint, kann ich nichts anfangen.»

(DeReKo; A08/SEP.01089 St. Galler Tagblatt, 04.09.2008, p. 8)

[16] Die Voitsberger Kosmetikerin Brigitte Weß hat Empfehlungen parat, was zu wem paßt: "Ein sogenannter ,grüner Duft‘ entspricht dem sportlichen Typ. Das sind beispielsweise Parfums, bei denen der Gedanke an frisch geschnittenes Gras auftaucht, an Blätter, Farne oder Moose".

Wer sehr feminin ist, sollte sich laut Weß eher für Blumendüfte - wie Rose oder Jasmin - entscheiden. Sie wirken festlich und elegant. Der Zauber des Orients hingegen ist für sehr sinnliche und extrovertierte Frauen geeignet: Sie können sich an orientalische Düfte heranwagen.

(DeReKo; K97/SEP.72325 Kleine Zeitung, 23.09.1997, Ressort: Voitsberg; Ohne Film: Der Duft der Frauen)


Vent Vert, Balmain, 1947Mit Jasmin, Ylang Ylang und Galbanum: der Inbegriff des grünen Dufts
- Alliage Estée Lauder, 1972

(DeReKo ; FOC06/SEP.00166 FOCUS, 11.09.2006, p. 090-091; PARFÜM)

nach der Ernte verarbeitet werden. Diese Iris-Essenz ist einer der teuersten und seltensten natürlichen Parfum-Rohstoffe.

(DeReKo; NZS04/SEP.00491 NZZ am Sonntag, 19.09.2004, p. 117; Madame mag’s klassisch)


(DeReKo; NZS06/SEP.00295 NZZ am Sonntag, 10.09.2006, p. 99; Der Toxikomane)


(DeReKo; NZS07/MAI.00408 NZZ am Sonntag, 20.05.2007, p. 73; Tausendfüßler auf der Haut)


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(DeReKo; WWO11/APR.00139 Weltwoche, 20.04.2011, p. 64; 2 Duos und 25 farbige Solisten)


(DWDS; Berliner Zeitung, 14.09.1996)


(DWDS; Berliner Zeitung, 14.09.1996)


Undecided / metaphoric:


(DeReKo; BRZ08/JAN.00418 Braunschweiger Zeitung, 02.01.2008)


(DeReKo; NUN90/DEZ.00635 Nürnberger Nachrichten, 08.12.1990, p. 9; Nächste Woche beginnt vor dem Landgericht ein Prozess, bei dem Weltfirmen einen kleinen Discounter verklagen)

[27] Im Reich der grünen Düfte
VON PAULA LANFRANCONI
(DeReKo; E96/MAI.11280 Zürcher Tagesanzeiger, 15.05.1996, p. 22, Ressort: Stadt Zürich; Im Reich der grünen Düfte)


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(DWDS; Berliner Zeitung, 15.05.1998)

[30] Konkrete Formen

(DeReKo; M13/AUG.04313 Mannheimer Morgen, 15.08.2013, S. 27; Das Porträt: Die Heidelberger Künstlerin Christiane Grimm kreiert Lichtinstallationen aus buntem Glas)185

185 Grüner Duft (Green scent) is the title of a painting by Josef Albers, for more information see: http://www.museenkoeln.de/home/bild-der-woche.aspx?bdw=2010_20
**braun + Duft / Geruch / Gestank:**

**Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):**

[31] *Brauner Duft* in der Heide
Hamburger Neonazi-Netzwerke wollen heute Abend im Kreis Harburg den Geburtstag von Horst Wessel feiern
(DeReKo; T00/FEB.08800 die tageszeitung, 26.02.2000, p. 21, Ressort: Hamburg Aktuell; Brauner Duft in der Heide)

(DeReKo; BVZ12/APR.00743 Burgenländische Volkszeitung, 12.04.2012; Es wäre an der Zeit zu handeln)


[34] Für Helmut Prieß vom "Darmstädter Signal" kann damit im Kampf gegen rechtsextremistische Einflüsse auf die Truppe jedoch allenfalls ein Etappensieg errungen werden. Es muß, fordert der Oberstleutnant a.D., "in der Bundeswehr demaßen nach Demokratie stinken, daß sich der *braune Geruch* gar nicht erst entfalten kann".

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Der Passauer Kabarettgründer Walter Landshuter über die Entwicklung der Neonazis in seiner Heimat und die Angst vor dem braunen Geruch


Schüssel war zwar zweifellos bereit, den braunen Geruch seines Koalitionspartners zu akzeptieren, um seine politischen Ziele durchzusetzen, aber ich schließe aus, dass er Korruption bewusst in Kauf genommen hat.
[39] 1993 scheint uns ein besonders Jahr gewesen zu sein... Wir haben nämlich entscheidende Tage erlebt, und sie werden zählen: Zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern, in Südafrika oder in Irland hat die Kooperation einiges verwirklicht, von dem wir wünschten, es wäre unumkehrbar; an den Grenzen der Europäischen Union hört das ehemalige Jugoslawien nicht auf, sich selbst auf unerträgliche Weise zu zerreißen; im Westen stößt eine schwache Belebung der Wirtschaft, die der Gatt-Abschluß begünstigen wird, auf eine dramatische Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit; *brauner Gestank* zieht aus Rußland oder Italien her. In Frankreich verwirklicht Edouard Balladur trotz des Floatens unserer Währung einen ruhigen Durchbruch, ... die "Geschäfte" gehen weiter. Der Friede, der Krieg ebenfalls. Vor allem aber: die Hoffnung.


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[41] Wenn man auch an den meisten anderen Schauplätzen nationalsozialistischer Schandtaten den braunen Gestank wieder loswurde, der Heldenplatz blieb verseucht.

(DeReKo; U95/MAI.28639 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 02.05.1995, p. 13, Ressort: FEUILLETON; Heldenplatz)


(DeReKo; NKU07/AUG.04688 Nordkurier, 18.08.2007; "Die können sich warm anziehen")

[43] Das Ende einer Liedzeile des Lyrikers Büne Huber schwirrt in meinem Hirn umher, die da heisst: "... de isch o ds Chotze ke Schand". So kommt mir die Leserbriefseite seit Wochen vor, viel Erbrochenes. Ich danke Peter Schneider, der sich endlich überwinden konnte, einen Putzlappen wenigstens nass zu machen. Kotzen tut man, wenn wir eine Grippe bewältigen müssen oder wenn man zu lange am Stammtisch sitzen bleibt. Ich hoffe, die Leserseite wird wieder konstruktiv kritisch riechen und nicht nach diesem säuerlich braunen Gestank!

(DeReKo; E97/FEB.04190 Zürcher Tagesanzeiger, 21.02.1997, p. 30, Ressort: Leserbriehe; "Die moralische Bewertung hat sich geändert")

**blau + Duft / Geruch / Gestank**

**Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):**


(DeReKo; V00/FEB.08798 Vorarlberger Nachrichten, 19.02.2000, p. D10, Ressort: Kultur; "Zeit - Raum - 72 Stunden")


(DeReKo; NZS03/JUN.00034 NZZ am Sonntag, 01.06.2003, p. 33; Abschied von den leichten Blonden)
[46] **Blauer Duft**

Das Parfüm Wode Paint by Boudicca kann man nicht nur riechen, sondern auch sehen. Sprüht man es auf, erscheint auf der Haut und der Kleidung ein kobaltblauer Duftnebel. Wenige Sekunden später verflüchtigt er sich wie von Zauberhand. Zurück bleibt ein betörender Duft aus Tuberose, Opium, Schierling und Wacholder. 150 ml, Fr. 185.65, Parfümerie Osswald in Zürich

(DeReKo; SBL11/AUG.00229 Sonntagsblick, 21.08.2011, p. m18; Wie von Zauberhand)


(DWDS; Liliencron, Detlev von: Adjutantenritte und andere Gedichte. Leipzig, [1883].)

[48] Ich schnitzte unterdessen nach seiner Anleitung eine Anzahl hölzerner Nägel, er aber führte schon mit dem Doppelhobel die letzten Stöße über die Bretter, feine Späne lösten sich gleich zarten glänzenden Seidenbändern und mit einem hell singenden Tone, welcher unter den Bäumen ein seltsames Lied war. Die Herbstsonne schien warm und lieblich drein, glänzte frei auf dem Wasser und verlor sich im blauen Duft der Waldnacht, an deren Eingang wir uns angesiedelt.

(DWDS; Keller, Gottfried: Der grüne Heinrich. Vol. 3. Braunschweig, 1854.)


(DWDS; Keller, Gottfried: Der grüne Heinrich. Vol. 1. Braunschweig, 1854.)
[50] Er birgt wohl hinter'm Tanne sich -- Schaut nicht der Thurm wie 'ne Laterne, Verhauchend, dunstig, aus der Ferne! Wie steigt der bläue Duft im Rohr, Und rollt sich am Gesims empor! Wie seltsam blinken heut' die Sterne!
(DWDS; Droste-Hülshoff, Annette von: Gedichte. Stuttgart u. a., 1844.)

(DWDS Sudermann, Hermann, Das Bilderbuch meiner Jugend, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1922., p. 66428)

Harald Pfeiffer,
(DeReKo; NON09/MAI.06091 Niederösterreichische Nachrichten, 12.05.2009, p. 18; LESERFORUM)

Undecided / metaphoric:

(DWDS; Reventlow, Franziska Gräfin zu, Ellen Olestjerne, München: J. Marchlewsky 1903, p. 61957)
(DWDS; Kölnische Zeitung (Abend) 27.11.1900, 27.11.1900)

(DeReKo; U08/AUG.01731 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11.08.2008, p. 14; Auch in Florida ist kein Rentner eine Insel)

(DWDS; Die Zeit, 02.10.1992, Nr. 41)

**schwarz + Duft / Geruch / Gestank**

**Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):**

[57] Mittel gegen Schwermuth. Es hat der Sonnen Licht nicht nur die Kraft, Die schwarzen Schatten zu verjagen; Sie hat nicht weniger die Wunder-Eigenschaft, Wenn unsre Sinnen sich mit Schwermuth-Schatten plagen, Aus dem benebelten
Gemüth Der Grillen schwarzen Duft zu treiben, Wenn man, auch nur durch Fensterscheiben, Auf Körper, die bestralet, sieht. Es steckt zugleich ein Licht der Freuden Jm Sonnenlicht, bey heitrer Luft.
(DWDS; Brockes, Barthold Heinrich: Jrdisches Vergnügen in Gott. Vol. 6. Hamburg, 1740.)

[58] Fragmente aus Kairo (Oktober 1989)
(DeReKo; R98/FEB.12446 Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.02.1998, p. 2, Ressort: ZEIT UND BILD)

[59] Selbist die Automobilindustrie hat allem Anschein nach überhaupt nur noch das Umweltauto im Kopf.
Das steigert den Absatz. Daß viel mehr "grüne Autos" auch viel schwarzen Gestank machen können - dieser Einwand kann die neue industrielle Romantik nicht wirklich stören.
(DeReKo; K97/OKT.80583 Kleine Zeitung, 21.10.1997, Ressort: Lokal; Giftgrün)

Bändern aus Feuersteinknollen, in Vorpommern, wo die Zeichnerin aufgewachsen ist.


(DeReKo; U04/JAN.02713 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19.01.2004, S. 14; Hochzeit in Schwarz und Weiß)


(DWDS; Die Zeit, 29.11.1991)

Undecided / metaphoric:


(DeReKo; L99/OKT.69610 Berliner Morgenpost, 07.10.1999, p. 35, Ressort: FEUILLETON; Der Meister des schönen Schauderns)

[63] In eine Welt zwischen Traum und Alptraum führt der Künstler Eckart Hahn aus Freiburg die Besucher im September. „Der schwarze Duft der Schönheit“ nennt er
seine Ausstellung mit Bildern, die er selbst mit einem wackelnden Zahn vergleicht: „Man spielt daran, es tut weh und trotzdem macht man fasziniert weiter.“

(DeReKo; NUN10/DEZ.02808 Nürnberger Nachrichten, 27.12.2010, p. 18; Die Welt der Märchen und Mode - Kunst, die anspricht: Pläne der Ausstellungshäuser in der Region fürs neue Jahr)

**grau + Duft / Geruch**

**Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):**


(DeReKo; U06/JUL.01002 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.07.2006, p. 11; Band 43)

[66] "Auf dem Absatz kehrtmachen, wenn ich hier fertig bin" will Christoph Horstmann, als er an einem Herbstabend zum ersten Mal in Wismar aus dem Zug steigt. "Eine graue Stadt, ein grauer Geruch und dazu dieses düstergelbe Licht der Straßenlaternen. […]"
[67] Denn was sie da, zum Beispiel im Nachbardeutschland, beobachten, kriegen sie zu Hause schon lange nicht mehr zu sehen: eine ungehindert ergrauete, abgewetzte Dorfund Stadtbildwelt, Kopfsteinpflasterstraßen, auf denen das verwöhnte Auto (West) empört das Klappern kriegt, grau gewordene Backsteinhäuser und schwärzlich grauer Häuserputz mit Löchern, vor den Türen schwarze Haufen von Briketts; aus den Schornsteinen quillt ein schwärzlich grauer Qualm, und überall dieser seltsam graue Geruch verbrannter Braunkohle in der Luft. Aber, nicht wahr: alles alt, alles echt, vollständig unbehandelt!

(DWDS; Die Zeit, 14.10.1988, Nr. 42)

Metonymie (co-occurrence-based):

[68] Siegwart ließ sich nun von ihr feyerlich versprechen, daß sie auf den Abend länger beym Ball bleiben wolle, und sie that es gerne. So fuhren sie im rothen Duft des Winterabends nach der Stadt. Vor ihnen stieg der Rauch von den Schornsteinen säulengerad in die Höhe, und war von der, hinten untergehenden Sonne vergüldet und geröthet.

(DWDS; Miller, Johann Martin: Siegwart. Eine Klostergeschichte. Vol. 2. Leipzig, 1776.)

[69] Erzählt Adèle, letzten Sommer habe sie Tagebücher im Nachbargarten verbrannt, eine Papierquadersäule gehäuft, das oberste Buch in Flammen gesteckt: Der Stapel sei erdwärts verbrannt. Schnuppert am Nachbargemäuer, steckt die Zunge durch den Spalt des Küchenfensters, kostet das Haus, warm jedoch modrig. Drückt die Verandatür mit der Stiefelspitze auf, um keine Fingerabdrücke zu hinterlassen, schnüffelt sich zu seinem Badezimmer. Wasser pfropft durch den Spalt, pfützt auf den Parkettboden; es riecht nach Eisen, ein feiner roter Geruch aus dem Bad, ein Luftzug, der ihn ihr zuführt. Ihr Nachbar in rot marmoriertem Wasser, der Kopf auf halbem Hals, durchschnittener Kehle, taumelnd auf Tümpelwellen, das Messer an
den Tümpelgrund gesunken. Die Spiegel dampfbeschlagen, ebenso die Kacheln.
Vergessener Abschied: Papier und Bleistift unter dem gefalteten Gewand, das Weiß
unbeschmiert.
(DeReKo; DIV/KAB.00001 Kim, Anna: Die Bilderspur. - Graz, Österreich, 2004)

Undecided / metaphoric:

[70] Es steh'n mit goldnem Prangen Die Stern' auf stiller Wacht, Und machen über'm
Grunde, Wo Du verirret bist, Getreu die alte Runde -- Gelobt sei Jesus Christ! Wie
bald in allen Bäumen Geht nun die Morgenluft, Sie schütteln sich in Träumen, Und
durch den rothen Duft Eine fromme Lerche steiget, Wenn Alles still noch ist, Den
rechten Weg Dir zeigt -- Gelobt sei Jesus Christ! II.
(DWDS; Eichendorff, Joseph von: Gedichte. Berlin, 1837.)

gelb + Geruch

Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):

[71] Was für die einen eine "R(h)apsodie in Gelb" ist, ein Wunder für alle Sinne, das
ist für die anderen ganz nüchtern "nachwachsender Rohstoff", der auch für die
Werbung herhalten muß. Mit einer Raps-Fotoanzeige wirbt zum Beispiel die
chemische Industrie ("Die Ölferder, die wir am liebsten erschließen, sind gelb und
blühen zweimal im Jahr"). Wir sind hier im Hinterland der Ostseeküste, in der
Holsteinischen Schweiz. Rings um den Park von Gut Horst breiten sich Teppiche aus
wie in einem orientalischen Basar, nur daß sie aus Raps sind. Alles ist gelb, ein ganz
anderes Gelb als Löwenzahn, Butterblumen oder Schlüsselblumen hervorbringen,
denen man hier auch oft begegnen kann. Es riecht sogar gelb, ein duftiggelber
Geruch, der uns nießen läßt. Bienen umschwirren die Blütentrauben, die
Kreuzblütler sind, wie uns später bei der Treckerfahrt Fahrer Klaus erklärt.
(DeReKo; R97/MAI.35399 Frankfurter Rundschau, 10.05.1997, p. 3, Ressort:
REISE)

[72] Ich bin der letzte Mensch. Die Innenstadt ist ausgestorben. 1 Uhr morgens,
Werktag. Die letzte Straßenbahn nach Woltmershausen habe ich verpasst, ich habe
zu lange am PC im Theater gesessen. Also Taxi. Ach nee, ich habe ja gar kein Bargeld dabei. Also noch schnell was abheben bei meiner gelben Hausbank. Aber schon bevor ich versuche, die elektronischen Türen mit meiner Karte zu öffnen, fällt mir ein, da kommt man nachts ja gar nicht rein. Früher irritierte mich der schlafende Obdachlose hinter den Topfpflanzen im Eingangsbereich, störte mich sein Uringeruch, gelbe Bank, gelber Geruch, heute stört mich, dass ich mit meiner gelben Karte nicht an mein Geld komme, um unter dem gelben Taxischild nach Hause zu fahren. […]

(DeReKo; T03/APR.20679 die tageszeitung, 26.04.2003, p. 27, Ressort: Kultur; Kleine Bremer Farbenlehre)

\textit{lila + Duft / Geruch}

\textbf{Undecided / metaphorisch:}

[73] Der Ventilator fing an zu surren. Ich steckte mir eine Zigarette zwischen die Lippen und suchte Streichhölzer, als mir ein bekannter \textit{lila Duft} in die Nase stieg. » Na , starker Scheich, wie steht's? 

(DWDS; Arjouni, Jakob, Happy birthday, Türke!, Hamburg: Buntbuch 1985, p. 92)

[74] Es ist Elsa, die Unglaubliche, Dadas deutsche Großmutter, die kahl geschorene Baronin von Freytag-Loringhoven. […] "Von nahem verströmte sie einen \textit{lila Geruch}", bemerkte der amerikanische Arzt und Poet William Carlos Williams, der sie 1919 im Village kennen lernte, ihre sexuellen Ansprüche fürchtete und doch von ihren "kulturellen Früchtchen" kosten wollte.

(DeReKo; Z03/310.07068 Die Zeit (Online-Ausgabe), 09.10.2003; Dazwischen ein Vogel, p. 91)

\textit{weiß + Duft}

\textbf{Metonymic (co-occurrence-based):}

[75] Uli Schneider: Edel, schnörkellos und von höchster Qualität, so ist die Mode von Uli Schneider, die im Store an der ABC-Straße erhältlich ist. Diesen Anspruch sollen

(DeReKo; HMP09/DEZ.01371 Hamburger Morgenpost, 14.12.2009, Beilage p. 8; Rechtzeitig zum Fest gibt es von Hamburger Designern eigene Düfte)
Abstract

Delimiting and Classifying Metonymy: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges in Cognitive Metonymy Research

Máté Tóth

In holistic cognitive linguistics, metonymy is generally considered as a ubiquitous cognitive mechanism that plays a central and even more primary role in every field of conceptual and linguistic organization than metaphor. However, if we accept the ubiquity view of conceptual metonymy in its broadest form, the notion of metonymy may run the risk of becoming unlimited and vacuous. Two basic strategies to come to grips with the unlimitedness of a notion are (i) to define it more narrowly so that we are able to distinguish the phenomena covered by the notion from other related and similar phenomena; and (ii) to classify the phenomena covered by the notion into relatively homogeneous sub-classes, which enables us to make generalizations about them. Accordingly, my dissertation addresses the following two interrelated problems:

(P_DEL): On the basis of what criteria can metonymy be delimited against related phenomena?

(P_CLASS): How can metonymy be classified into relatively homogeneous classes?

My approach to (P_DEL) can be outlined as follows: In a first step, I argue for a clearer distinction between linguistic and conceptual metonymy, then revisit the general rejection of the referential view of metonymy, and finally propose two properties of linguistic metonymy that distinguish it from some related phenomena (from linguistic metaphor and active zone phenomena). In my definition, linguistic metonymy is (i) an expression motivated by conceptual metonymic processes (ii) in that it co-activates a complex of mental contents (the source, the target, and the relation holding between them) in a way reminiscent of reference point constructions, (iii) with the linguistic property that the target content and the relationship between source and target are not expressed explicitly or are only expressed marginally or schematically on the linguistic level.
The category of linguistic metonymy, even if defined narrowly as above, still encompasses a very broad range of various phenomena. Thus, as an answer to (PCLASS), I argue that metonyms can be classified according to their target content and sub-classified according to the source content providing access to the target. Based on different types of activated mental content, I propose a distinction between five major classes of metonymy: THING-, PROPERTY-, EVENT-, PROPOSITION- and illocutionary metonyms.

My theoretical findings are supplemented by two small-scale, quasi-empirical pilot studies. In Case study 1, I conduct a target-driven cross-linguistic analysis to examine how a range of languages conceptualizes and verbalizes a complex EVENT (PLAYING MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS). My analyses indicate that complex EVENTS seem to be conceptualized by metonymic and/or metaphoric strategies in each language under scrutiny. In Case study 2, I employ corpus linguistic procedures to argue that a substantial portion of color-smell synesthethic expressions are not metaphors but eventually PROPERTY-metonyms.

The unresolved theoretical issues surrounding the cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy also pose a challenge to the empirical study of the phenomenon, as a result some empirical deficits can be observed in metonymy research. These are not only due to a lack of generally accepted and practiced methods and procedures, but also to the problem that an all-encompassing set of the most diverse phenomena is very difficult to examine systematically with empirical methods. Thus, the solution of (PDEL) and (PCLASS) does not only contribute to eliminating the risk that the category of metonymy will become unlimited but also takes us a step closer to enhancing the empirical study of metonymic phenomena.
Összefoglalás

A metonímia elhatárolása és osztályozása: Elméleti és empirikus kihívások a kognitív metonímiakutatásban

(Delimiting and Classifying Metonymy: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges in Cognitive Metonymy Research)

Tóth Máté

A holisztikus kognitív nyelvészet mára általánosan elfogadott felfogásában a metonímia egy olyan kognitív mechanizmus, mely központi és még a metaforáénál is alapvetőbb szerepet játszik a fogalmi és nyelvi szerveződés minden területén. Azonban ha a fogalmi metonímia mindenütt tetten érhető szerepére vonatkozó nézetet a legtágabb értelemben fogadjuk el, akkor fennáll az a veszély, hogy a metonímia fogalma korláttalná válik és kiüresedik. Egy fogalom parttalansága alapvetően két stratégia alkalmazásával válhat kezelhetővé: (i) szűkebben definiáljuk, így az általa felölelt jelenségek elhatárolhatóvá válnak más hasonló jelenségektől, valamint (ii) homogén csoportokra osztjuk fel a fogalom által felölelt jelenségeket, így általánosításokat fogalmazhatunk meg rájuk nézve. A dolgozat ennek megfelelően az alábbi két egymással szorosan összefüggő problémával foglalkozik:

(P_{DEL}): Milyen kritériumok alapján határolható el a metonímia a hozzá kapcsolódó jelenségektől?

(P_{CLASS}): Hogyan osztható a metonímia viszonylag homogén csoportokra?

A (P_{DEL}) probléma megközelítése során első lépésben a nyelvi és fogalmi metonímia pontosabb elkülönítése mellett érvelek, majd a metonímia referencialitását elutasító nézettel szemben sorakoztatok fel új szempontokat, végül pedig a nyelvi metonímia két olyan tulajdonságára irányítom a figyelmet, melyek megkülönböztetik azt más kapcsolódó jelenségektől (elsősorban a nyelvi metaforától és az aktív zóna jelenségektől). Az általam javasolt definíció szerint a nyelvi metonímia (i) egy fogalmi metonimikus folyamatok által motivált kifejezés, (ii) mely – a referenciapont szerkezetekhez hasonlóan – együttesen aktivál komplex mentális tartalmakat (a forrást, a célt, és a kettő közötti kapcsolatot), (iii)
miközben a céltartalom, valamint a cél- és forrástartalom közötti kapcsolat nyelvi szinten nem jelenik meg explicit módon, vagy csak marginálisan vagy semantikusan jut kifejezésre.

A nyelvi metonímia kategóriája, még ha a fent vázolt módon szűkebben is definiáljuk, heterogén jelenségek rendkívül széles skáláját öleli fel. Ezért a (PCLASS) probléma megoldásaként amellett érvelek, hogy a metonímiák jól osztályozhatóak a forrástartalom típusa szerint, mely felosztás tovább finomítható a célhoz hozzáférést biztosító forrástartalom típusa szerint. Az aktivált mentális tartalom típusa alapján a következő öt fő osztályt javaslom: DOLOG-, TULAJDONSÁG-, ESEMÉNY-, PROPOZÍCIÓ- és illokúciós metonímiák.

A dolgozat elméleti eredményeit két kis léptékű, kvázi empirikus, előzetes esettanulmány egészíti ki. Az első esettanulmányban egy céltartomány-vezérelt nyelvközi összehasonlító elemzést végek el, mely azt vizsgálja, hogy adott nyelvekben miként beszélnek és gondolkodnak egy komplex ESEMÉNYRŐL, a HANGSZEREN VALÓ JÁTÉKRŐL. Elemzésein azt mutatják, hogy a HANGSZEREN VALÓ JÁTÉK komplex eseményéről valamennyi vizsgált nyelv metonimikus és/vagy metaforikus konceptualizációs stratégiák segítségével gondolkozik. A második esettanulmányban korpusznyelvészeti eljárások alkalmazásával amellett érvelek, hogy az illatingereket színekkel jellemző szinesztéziás kifejezések tekintélyes hányada valójában nem metafora, hanem ún. TULAJDONSÁG-metonímia.

A metonímia holisztikus kognitív nyelvészeti fogalmát övező megoldatlan elméleti kérdések megnehezítik a jelenség empirikus vizsgálatát is, melynek eredményeképpen deficit figyelhető meg a metonímia empirikus kutatásában. A kognitív metonímiakutatásban tapasztaltatott empiriadeficit nem pusztán az általánosan elfogadott és gyakorolt módszerek és eljárások hiányára vezethető vissza, hanem arra a problémára is, hogy a legkülönfélébb jelenségek mindent felölő halmaza meglehetősen nehezen vizsgálható szisztematikusan és empirikus módszerekkel. Ezáltal a (PDEL) és (PCCLASS) problémák megoldása nemcsak ahhoz járul hozzá, hogy a metonímia kategóriája ne váljon parttalanná, hanem egy lépéssel közelebb visz a metonimikus jelenségek empirikus tanulmányozhatóságának javításához is.
List of publications related to the dissertation

Foreign language Hungarian book chapters (1)

Hungarian scientific articles in Hungarian journals (1)
   Debr. szl. 22 (4), 394-397, 2014. ISSN: 1218-022X.

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    Seiten. Argumentum, 8, 67-72, 2012. ISSN: 1787-3605.

Foreign language scientific articles in international journals (2)
12. Tóth, M., Enikő Németh T., Károly Bibok (eds.). The Role of Data at the Semantics-Pragmatics

The Candidate's publication data submitted to the IDEa Tudósért have been validated by DEENK on the basis of Web of Science, Scopus and Journal Citation Report (Impact Factor) databases.

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