Értekezés a doktori (Ph.D.) fokozat megszerzése érdekében
Az angol nyelvészet tudományában

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valamint általános és alkalmazott nyelvész

Készült a Debreceni Egyetem
Szinkrón és diakrón nyelvészet doktori programja
(Angol nyelvészet alprogramja) keretében

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Debrecen

2001
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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to all those who have helped me in preparing this dissertation, professionally or otherwise.

I am especially thankful for the help that I received from my supervisor, László Imre Komlósi. I would also like to thank Olga Bársony, Pál Heltai, Péter Pelyvás and Csaba Czeglédi for reading my various papers and the first version of the dissertation and for offering helpful comments and suggestions.

I also feel indebted to all the people, friends and family, who for years patiently tolerated my preoccupation with this work and encouraged me to continue.

But first and foremost, I cannot be grateful enough, for everything, to my parents, to whom this dissertation is dedicated.
Abstract

The primary thesis of the dissertation is that, contrary to popular views, the translation of proper names is a non-trivial question, closely related to the problem of the meaning of the proper name. The aim of this study is to show what happens to proper names in the process of translation, particularly from English into Hungarian, and to systematise and, within the frames of a suitable theory, explain the phenomena in question.

After a presentation in Chapter One of a selection of the literature on the translation of proper names, followed by a discussion of the main points of the research, Chapter Two offers a detailed overview of the major issues in translation and, through analysing the shortcomings of the various traditional approaches, comes to offer support for the claim that translation is best studied within the frames of a general theory of communication.

Chapter Three, in turn, introduces the general cognitive and communicative theoretical framework, mainly on the basis of Anderson (1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1986), in which it becomes possible to explain translation not as an isolated phenomenon but as a special form of communication.

Chapter Four proceeds to present, based on Gutt (1991), how translation can be characterised within this general framework as an interpretive form of communication.

With the theoretical foundations laid, Chapter Five takes up again the specific issue of how proper names behave in translation. First it examines questions of definition, identification, and meaning. It then moves on to consider what problems proper names pose in translation and proposes a set of translation operations, explained in relevance-theoretic terms.
The case studies presented in Chapter Six attempt to prove that proper names, like any other expression, behave in a more or less predictable way in translation and that this behaviour can be related not so much with which traditional class the name belongs to as with what it contributes to the communication in the particular context.

Chapter Seven sums up the major findings of the study and briefly discusses some implications of the results concerning translator education and the use of translation in teacher training.
Az értekezés alapvető állítása az, hogy a például Vendler (1975) által megfogalmazott nézettel szemben a tulajdonnevek fordítása egy nem-triviális kérdés, amely szorosan összefügg a tulajdonnév jelentésének problémájával. A dolgozat célja, hogy bemutassa, mi történik a tulajdonnevekkel a fordítás folyamatában, különös tekintettel az angol-magyar fordításirányra, valamint hogy rendszerezze és megfelelő elméleti keretbe helyezve megmagyarázza a feltárt jelenségeket.

Ennek érdekében sorrendben a következő kérdések vizsgálatát végzi el. A szakirodalmi előzményeket és a tanulmány főbb állításait bemutató első fejezet után a második fejezet áttekinti a fordításelmélet legfontosabb problémáit és ezek hagyományos megközelítéseit, s ennek alapján támogatja azt a nézetet, mely szerint a fordítás jelenségei legmegfelelőbben egy kommunikáció-elmélet keretein belül vizsgálhatók.

A harmadik és negyedik fejezet bevezeti a kutatás általános kognitív és kommunikatív elméleti keretét, amelynek révén lehetővé válik a fordításnak sajátos jellegzetességekkel bíró, de nem elszigetelt kommunikációs folyamatként való leírása és magyarázata.

Ezt követően az ötödik fejezet kísérletet tesz a vizsgálat tárgyát képező kategóriája, a tulajdonnév fogalmának pontosítására, és részletesen vizsgálja a tulajdonnév jelentésének a kutatás alapvető kérdésével közvetlenül összefüggő problémáját.

Számos példán keresztül bemutatja a tulajdonnevekkel kapcsolatban a fordítás során felmerülő problémákat és a fordítók által alkalmazott megoldásokat, és javaslatot tesz ezen megoldások rendszerbe foglalására. Az adott elméleti
keretre támaszkodva négy különböző fordítási műveletet azonosít, és világosan definiálja azokat.

Ezen műveleti meghatározásokat alkalmazva a hatodik fejezet két konkrét mű fordításának elemzésével megkísérli bizonyítani, hogy a tulajdonnevek látszólag rendszertelen viselkedése a fordításban valójában a kommunikációs folyamat törvényszerűségei által diktált, szisztematikus jelenség, és az adott elméleti keretben nagy pontossággal előrejelezhető és magyarázható.

Végezetül a hetedik fejezet összefoglalja a tanulmány lényegesebb megállapításait, majd röviden kifejti az eredményeknek a fordítók képzésével, illetve a fordításnak a nyelvtanár-képzésben való alkalmazásával kapcsolatos legfontosabb implikációit.
Chapter One
Introduction

1.1. The purpose of the study
When people ask me about the topic of my research, most of them are surprised at the answer: “the problem of proper names in translation”. “Is that a problem?” they normally ask, which makes one ponder a little. This reaction, I think, reflects the popular view that proper names do not need to be translated into foreign languages. Even more interestingly, the point is maintained not only by ordinary people but by some scholars of language as well, such as, among others, Vendler (1975), who writes that since proper names lack meaning, they are not translated but simply carried over to the foreign language during translation.

Naturally, in this question much depends on (a) what we regard as a proper name, (b) how we understand the meaning of a proper name or, in general, of a linguistic expression, and (c) what we call translation. Consequently, the general aim of this study will be to shed some light on these three points in order that we may subsequently attempt a more precise characterisation of our initial question, which is what happens to proper names in translation, and especially in translation into Hungarian.

In accordance with the general methodological requirements of scientific research (cf., for example, Ambarcumjan 1980:116, writing about the methodology of cosmological research, and Hempel 1967:1) and, in particular, with the requirements of adequacy as formulated by Chomsky (1965) for linguistics, our study aims at an adequate account of the problem on three levels:
(1) Observational adequacy, which means that the phenomena to be accounted for are properly identified;

(2) Descriptive adequacy, which means that the phenomena in question are properly described, characterised, and classified;

(3) Explanatory adequacy, which means that the findings are explicated in a general, economic, and universal theoretical framework, which enables us to make predictive statements.

Consequently, my specific aims are, first of all, to be able to accurately identify proper names as they occur in specific texts; second, to describe what translators do with them in particular cases and to provide an account of how in general translators tackle proper names, that is, what procedures or operations are used; and finally, to explain which operation is selected in what situations and why.

It is hoped that, apart from the theoretical interest that these questions hold, the study will yield results which can be utilised in the actual practice of translation and of translator education as well.

1.2. The preliminaries

This section presents, in chronological order, a selection of the precursors of this present study which have attempted to describe the behaviour of proper names in translation. One general remark that can be made about these attempts is that while they are all undoubtedly valuable either for the wealth of examples they bring in, for the elaborateness of the description, or for the practical utility of the odd piece of advice they provide for the translator, none of them is consistently systematic or complete, and they fail (or, as a matter of fact, simply do not go as far as to aspire) to place
the question within the frames of a suitable theory that could provide motivation, and explanation, for the procedures described.

In the following discussion I shall focus most of my attention on J. Soltész’s 1967 article, a remarkably detailed investigation of the area, for two main reasons. The first is that she is mostly concerned with the translation of proper names into Hungarian as the receptor language, which is my specific concern, too; and the second is that she formulates some interesting claims which I would like to challenge.

1.2.1. Tarnóczi (1966)

With reference to personal names and names of locations, according to Tarnóczi, the translator may be faced with a preliminary question concerning the transliteration of names in a text. He distinguishes between the transliteration of letters and of phonemic values, suggesting that between different scripts only the former should be applied and that the latter is also best avoided between languages using the same script. Whatever the translator’s decision is, he calls attention to the importance of being consistent throughout a translation.

Tarnóczi maintains that although personal names can theoretically be translated, the most appropriate solution is to mirror them into the target text, that is, preserve them in the original form. This advice also applies to geographical names and titles of works of art.

Proper names in the translation may also need to be explicated (e.g. Hungarian ‘az észak-franciaországi Haute-Marne megye’ for French ‘Haute-Marne’) or, in other cases, modulated, which Tarnóczi defines as a modification of content (‘Pablo Ruiz’ for ‘Picasso’).
1.2.2. J. Soltész (1967)

She begins with defining proper names as expressions denoting unique entities and states that they are part of the linguistic system of the community to which the denotation of the name belongs. When the significance of this denotation, that is, the possessor of the name, stretches over the boundaries of the given linguistic community, foreign languages are faced with the dilemma whether to incorporate the name into their own contexts unchanged or to attempt to translate it, using their own means to preserve the meaning of the name. Translating a proper name, she writes, is nothing but signalling the same unique denotation by the means of another language.

Without going here into matters concerning the use of the term denotation, it is interesting to see that for J. Soltész, contrary to many others, it seems evident that proper names (may) have meanings.

She then goes on to distinguish between three main types of proper names with respect to their meaning. The first (type A) includes so-called *sign names*, like ‘János’, ‘Duna’, etc., which have no meaning in the way that a common name does and are non-descriptive, non-connotative (although later on, on page 284, she herself remarks that since the frequency of use of related names in different languages may be dissimilar, their stylistic values may be different, too), and unmotivated.

The second type (type B), curiously enough, she calls *word names* and characterises them as motivated, connotative, and mostly descriptive. Examples are names like ‘Kreml’, ‘Lánchíd’, ‘Mont Blanc’. It is noted here that with the passing of time many of these names have lost their descriptive character and have become opaque in this respect. For example, most family names, which originally directly reflected the qualities of their bearers, like ‘Kovács’
(Blacksmith), ‘Veres’ (Red), or ‘Nagy’ (Big), are not motivated any more in this sense.

The third type includes names which are combinations of sign names and elements from the common word classes (type AB). These elements may be adjectives, suffixes or, most frequently, words naming a higher-level conceptual category. Examples are names like ‘Újpest’, ‘Ormánság’, ‘Erzsébet-híd’.

For the different types of names J. Soltész offers the following translation procedures: Names of type A may be substituted by a corresponding name in the foreign language or left unchanged, names of type B and type AB may be partly or wholly translated or substituted (in her use the term translation includes, in a wider sense, substitution, too). She maintains that the choice of operation is conditional upon which category of entities the denotation of the name belongs to: whether it is a person, a geographical place, an institution, a work of art, etc. and consequently proceeds with her overview on the basis of traditional proper name classes.

She presents examples from a wide variety of classes, ranging from personal names through geographical names, names of heavenly bodies, names of town districts, streets, buildings, names of ships, animals and institutions to titles of works of art and newspapers. She is mainly concerned with translation into Hungarian but provides some examples for other languages as well.

Finally, turning to the question of the regularities of the translatability of proper names, she states that there are so many contradictions and exceptions that it is hardly possible to talk about regularity or systematicity here. The reason for contradictions, in her opinion, is a clash between two opposing principles: the unalterability of names, which is connected with their identifying function (for details, see section 5.2) and, on the other hand, the requirement of
intelligibility. Since the two principles cannot be satisfied simultaneously, one of them has to be sacrificed in any particular case. Which one of them is sacrificed is dependent on whether the requirement of identification (as with personal names) or the requirement of intelligibility (as with geographical and institution names, or titles, which, as they are common syntagms, she calls peripheral names) is more important in the given case. As for the large number of exceptions, she notes that these arise as a result of conventions, traditions, and changes in ideals of linguistic purity.

J. Soltész’s final conclusion is that all the linguist can do is record the facts, but beyond that he/she can give very little practical advice in this area. However, so much can be stated at least that it is appropriate and necessary to include proper names in bilingual dictionaries.

1.2.3. Elman (1986)
This study is another rich source of examples from a variety of languages, other than Hungarian, in this case. Through the examination of these examples Elman comes to reckon that translators can choose from among three techniques when they tackle proper names: they can transfer, that is, carry over the name into the receptor language in the original form, they can translate the name (in the ordinary sense of the term), or they can alter, or modify, the name, which means substituting the name by a receptor language expression which is not in direct correspondence with it.

1.2.4. Newmark (1988)
Newmark devotes one short section of a chapter to proper names in his excellent textbook. He takes his examples from three classes of proper names: people’s names, names of objects, and geographical terms.
People’s first and surnames, he writes, are normally transferred (on the assumption that these have no connotations in the text), whereby their nationality is preserved. In some exceptional cases, however, a personal name may be translated, as with monarchs, popes, or saints, or with names which have connotations in imaginative literature. Yet other, mainly classical, names are naturalised, that is, converted to normal target language spelling or pronunciation (referred to by other authors as transliteration): English ‘Horace’ for Latin ‘Horatius’, for instance. Where both nationality and connotations are significant, translation and naturalising back into the original language may be coupled, as Michael Holman did in Tolstoy’s Resurrection, where the name ‘Nabatov’ (alluding to a state of alarm) is turned into ‘Alarmov’.

Names of objects, including trademarks, brands and proprietaries, are normally transferred. Geographical names, on the other hand, need to be checked for an existing correspondent in an atlas or a similar source. Finally he remarks that we have to distinguish between two kinds of contexts in which toponyms occur: as items in an address they will be transferred, but as cultural scenery in a brochure, for instance, they will be translated, partly at least.

1.2.5. Schultze (1991)
This paper is concerned with the translation in plays of personal names and titles functioning as parts of personal names. Based on historical-descriptive studies, it offers five different modes of rendering personal names. (1) Direct transfer, where the source language form is kept in the translation, also including the transliteration of names between different scripts; (2) adaptation, where the name is adjusted to the spelling and pronunciation rules of the target language (an operation more commonly referred to in the literature as a form of transliteration between languages
using the same script); (3) substitution, where the translation uses the target language equivalent of the name (German ‘Hans’ for English ‘John’, for example); (4) semantic translation, where the denotative meaning and perhaps some connotative meanings of the original are rendered in a target language form, including cases of partial translation, in which only one specific aspect of the meaning of the name is translated; and (5) transfer of an artistic device, where the translator imitates the device by which the original name was formed (a telling name, for example). To me, this latter operation seems more like an instance of combining the other operations, as Newmark (1988) has shown with the ‘Nabatov’ to ‘Alarmov’ example.

With regard to titles, this list is supplemented by three further operations: (6) omission, (7) addition, and (8) replacement, meaning the use in the translation of a title completely different from the original one.

This variety of solutions, in Schultze’s opinion, reflects the norm conflicts that translators are faced with in drama translation. These conflicts are due to a number of factors, ranging from meaning (denotative as well as connotative) through function in the dramatic text and poetic qualities to coherence within the context of the given play or within the context of a group of plays (e.g. a playwright’s collected works). She stresses that the choice between the various operations is closely connected to the translator’s understanding of cultural transfer and cultural identity (the given cultural and intercultural context).

1.2.6. Heltai and Pinczés (1993)

Heltai and Pinczés emphasise that as the main rule in the translation of proper names the accepted practice, or tradition, of the receptor language (Hungarian in this case,
since this is a book written for Hungarian candidates of the state language exam) is to be followed.

The names of streets and squares (with some exceptions) are not translated, they write, nor are the names of institutions, newspapers and magazines, companies, schools, and universities, in general. Occasionally, however, transparent names may be translated (‘Nemzeti Galéria’ for ‘National Gallery’). One major factor in the decision whether to translate or not to translate a name is the aim of the translation: who it is for and for what purpose it is done. In this light, the translator has several options. With names combining proper nouns and common nouns, for instance, the following operations may be carried out. The proper noun-part may be kept in the original form, while the common noun-part may be kept, translated or left out (‘Salt Lake City’ both in English and in Hungarian, ‘Mexikóváros’ for ‘Mexico City’, ‘a Niagara’ for ‘Niagara Falls’). On the other hand, a name may also be supplemented in the translation by an added element (‘a Severn folyó’ for ‘the Severn’), or even explained in a parenthetical note or otherwise (‘a Farmers’ Weekly című mezőgazdasági hetilap’ for ‘Farmers’ Weekly’).

1.2.7. Klaudy (1994)
Klaudy in the second, practical, part of her excellent book offers an elaborate system for classifying translational operations. Her classification is based on the technical properties of the operations described, that is, on how they are carried out and not on, for instance, the reason behind them or the purpose they serve, or on the linguistic level at which they occur (although she does make a distinction between lexical and grammatical operations). Since I am concerned with lexical elements, names, I shall restrict my presentation to lexical operations here.
Eleven main types of these are described: (1) concretisation of meaning, (2) generalisation of meaning, (3) contraction of meaning, (4) splitting of meaning, (5) lexical omissions, (6) lexical additions, (7) transposition of meaning, (8) substitution of meaning, (9) antonymous translation, (10) total transformation of meaning, and (11) compensation for losses in translation.

Proper names, in her understanding, are part of a culture’s realia (in the wide interpretation of the term), the lore of culture-specific expressions, which are alien to other cultures. She provides a wealth of examples for all the different operations. Proper names (as a particular kind of realia) are treated under the following headings: generalisation, omission, addition, and total transformation of meaning.

Generalisations (and concretisations) in translation occur, according to Klaudy, because any two languages will segment reality in different ways (this observation reminds us, of course, of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). For example, ‘Oreo crumbs’ in Hungarian translation may be generalised as ‘csoki’.

Similarly, omissions and additions in translation happen as a result of the differences between the systems of background knowledge that source language readers and target language readers possess. Thus, ‘Belgravia house’ may, in Hungarian translation, become ‘nagy ház’ (omission) and ‘Malteser’ may be turned into ‘Máltai cukorka’ (addition).

Total transformations, in Klaudy’s opinion, arise, likewise, because of extra-linguistic differences. She defines total transformation as an operation whereby a source language meaning is substituted by a target language meaning which, aside from not being the dictionary equivalent of the original, is seemingly completely unrelated to it in terms of its logical import. For example, ‘Boxer’ and ‘Clover’ in
Orwell’s famous *Animal Farm* are translated into Hungarian by Szíjgyártó as ‘Bandi’ and ‘Rózsi’.

One of the major shortcomings of this otherwise outstanding work seems to be that although its author “hopes to serve one of the main objects of translation studies, the discovery of rules governing the seemingly subjective decisions of translators” (p. 383), which is a very agreeable aspiration for a book of this kind, it does not actually offer a systematic and explicit explanation for the use of the above-described operations.

1.2.8. Tellinger (1996)

In this article, the author analyses a German translation of a novel by Sándor Márai, which depicts the “old Hungary” of the times before the Communist regime. This book abounds in the cultural realia of those days, familiar to Hungarian readers but completely alien to an average German reader, which proved a constant problem for the translator throughout the novel.

Tellinger identifies three operations that the translator used in tackling proper names. Personal names and some geographical names are preserved in the original form (interestingly, he also refers to this operation as transcription), other geographical names, where possible, along with the names of cafes, restaurants, streets, squares, bridges and cemeteries are translated, while in the case of titles of newspapers and works of art the translator had to check for an existing German translation and, if he found one, he had to use this in the target text.

1.3. The main issues of contention

First of all, contrary to claims such as Vendler’s (1975), it appears that all the above-introduced authors regard (implicitly at least, if not expressly) the question of the translation of proper names a non-trivial issue. As J. Soltész
points out (p. 281), it is related to the question of the meaning of proper names; therefore one of the aims of this study will be to examine this question more closely.

Secondly, despite the recognition of the significance of meaning in this issue, all of these authors, with the exception of Klaudy (who is not primarily concerned with proper names), approach the problem on the basis of the traditional classification of proper names, in which the structure of their meaning has no (direct) relevance. My claim is that this kind of approach does not have much practical utility and only serves to complicate matters.

Thirdly, the eight authors offer us eight sets of operations, which are only partly convergent, with shared as well as partly overlapping categories, occurring in various combinations (summarised in section 5.6). Naturally, the same set of facts can be classified in different ways, thus the divergence of these descriptions should not surprise us. What is more important here is that all of them seem to be either lacking in certain categories (with the exception of Schultze, whose classification, I think, covers all possible cases) or, otherwise, some of their definitions are inconsistent. Why should we regard, for instance, Schultze’s transliteration (between different scripts) essentially different from what she calls adaptation (to a target culture’s rules of spelling and pronunciation)? Catford (1965) defines transliteration as the replacement of SL graphological units by TL graphological units, and describes three steps in the process: (1) SL letters are replaced by SL phonological units, (2) SL phonological units are translated into TL phonological units, and (3) TL phonological units are converted into TL letters (p. 66). Clearly, this covers both of Schultze’s operations.

My task, then, will be to provide a non-complicated (that is, general enough), and (hopefully) transparent system of
operations, which are precisely defined, and are defined in terms of meaning import.

Fourthly, it has to be seen that while any system of operations may be useful as a tool of description and, primarily, for purposes of instruction, it cannot be an end in itself, since any classificatory scheme is fragmentary in the sense that it is by necessity a Procrustean bed for phenomena: no classification can be so sophisticated as to be able to exhaustively cover all phenomena.

Fifthly, if it was true that, as J. Soltész states, in this question it is hardly possible to talk about regularity or systematicity, there would be no point in making a descriptive classification. Then, as she suggests, all the linguist can do is record the facts and stop at this point, not being able to provide explanation or advice. I would, however, like to say that the linguist can and must go beyond that, for eventually any description is merely a prerequisite for an explanation.

Therefore, sixthly, if it is not to be an ad hoc collection of odd operations but a guide for principled solutions, revealing the regularities underlying the surface, this system needs to be framed within a general theory of translation, as part of the descriptive component of the theory.

Seventhly, and finally, as for the form of such a theory, the following needs to be considered. According to J. Soltész the lack of regularity is mainly due to a clash between two principles: the principle of identification and the principle of intelligibility. In other words, since with proper names the two cannot be satisfied at the same time, one of them has to overcome the other in any particular case - but which of them is mostly unpredictable. To complicate the situation, great numbers of exceptional cases arise as a result of conventions and traditions in a language. I would like to
claim, however, that on a more general level, there is no clash here between these two principles, rather (if we insist on the existence of such principles), they are two complementary aspects of a more general principle of communication, which can account for the seeming irregularities and exceptions, too. What we are after, then, is a theory of communication which can bring order into the apparent chaos.

1.4. The structure of this study

Chapter Two offers a detailed overview of the major issues in translation and, through analysing the shortcomings of the various traditional equivalence-based and more recent functional approaches, comes to offer support for the claim that translation is best studied within the frames of a general theory of communication.

Chapter Three, in turn, introduces the general cognitive and communicative theoretical framework, mainly on the basis of Anderson (1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1986), in which it becomes possible to explain translation not as an isolated phenomenon but as a special form of communication.

Chapter Four proceeds to present, based on Gutt (1991), how translation can be characterised within this general framework as an interpretive form of communication.

With the theoretical foundations laid, Chapter Five takes up again the specific issue of how proper names behave in translation. First it examines questions of definition, identification, and meaning. It then moves on to consider what problems proper names pose in translation and proposes a set of translation operations, explained in relevance-theoretic terms.

The case studies presented in Chapter Six attempt to prove that proper names, like any other expression, behave in a largely predictable way in translation and that this behaviour
can be related not so much with which traditional class the name belongs to as with what it contributes to the communication in the particular context.

Chapter Seven sums up the major findings of the study and briefly discusses some implications of the results concerning translator education and the use of translation in teacher training.
Chapter Two
Approaches to Translation

This chapter introduces some basic notions and discusses some of the pivotal problems that have been the concern of translation scholars since ancient times, and proposes that the study of translation is best carried out in a general communicative framework. The question of the specific form of this framework is left to Chapters Three and Four.

2.1. General questions
In this section I shall try to tackle three questions that are at the heart of any thinking about translation. The first is an existential one concerning the often-bemoaned impossibility of translation, the second is a qualitative one concerning the need for assessing translational decisions, and the third one regards the form and range of a theory of translation.

2.1.1. The (im)possibility of translation: translation, language and culture
Traduttore traditore, the translator is a traitor, says the Italian proverb and, evidently, there is some truth in it. Anybody who has ever tried their hand at translation will remember the painful experience of not being able to render some word or expression in a ‘perfect’ way. There are always elements in a text which defy the translator and, in the end, get more or less lost in the process. This is what makes some people think that translation, in this sense, is an impossible endeavour, even though people have actually practised it for thousands of years.

According to Nida (1959) the main source of problems in translation is the mismatches between the grammatical and lexical categories of the languages involved. Some information is necessarily lost in the translation, for instance, when the
original’s language obligatorily expresses something that the translation’s language does not. This is the case, for example, with English and Hungarian third person singular pronouns, where there is a gender contrast in English which does not exist in Hungarian. But allowing for a more dynamic view of translatability, such problems can be solved by, among others, a paraphrasing procedure since, as Roman Jakobson so aptly writes, “languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not in what they can convey” (Jakobson 1959:234).

Catford (1965) distinguishes two reasons for the untranslatability of some element: one linguistic and one cultural. In his view, something may be untranslatable because of the differences between the language of the original text and that of the translation, or because of differences in the concepts that are used in the two cultures to which these languages belong. Linguistic and cultural untranslatability, however, seem to be two aspects of the same thing, given the intricate relationship between language and culture, where culture is understood in a wide, anthropological sense, explained in Tomalin and Stempelski (1993), as including its members’ ideas, beliefs, customs, language, and material as well as non-material products. The best-known (and most controversial) formulation of this relationship is the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, named after the linguists, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, from whom it is originated. According to this hypothesis, also known by the name of linguistic determinism, the language we speak effectively determines the way we make sense of the world of phenomena, the way in which we understand reality. Whorf, writing in 1940, in his article ‘Science and linguistics’, expounded this idea in the following words:

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they
stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our mind. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it this way - an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees (Whorf 1997:213f).

One year later, in ‘Language, mind, and reality’, he returned to this question and argued again that every language is a pattern-system with its own forms and categories, ordained by the culture of which it is part and, by using the language, the individual not only communicates, but also perceives and analyses phenomena, channels his reasoning, and “builds the house of his consciousness” (Whorf 1997:252).

The hypothesis in this form, often referred to as linguistic determinism, entails that speakers of different languages dwell in different ‘houses of consciousness’ and are thus prevented from understanding each other, to a level proportionate to the degree of the differences between their languages. And this would, of course, amount to accepting the claim that translation is, depending on the level of relatedness between the languages involved, impossible.

However, the extreme form of the hypothesis has been rejected by most, on the ground of empirical observations to the effect that the mutual understanding of people from different cultures is far from hopeless, even if made difficult in certain cases by conceptual differences. One
specific form of this process of understanding is the learning of foreign languages, the very existence of which serves as a proof of the possibility of conceptualising in terms of languages other than one’s own. In Hungary, for instance, we do not have the kind of beer that the English call ‘stout’, we can nevertheless grasp the meaning of the concept by explanation or demonstration.

Thus the general view has come to be that whereas translation may be made difficult by linguistic and cultural differences, it is never as difficult as to be utterly impossible. As Mounin writes, “translation can never be completely finished, which also demonstrates that it is never wholly impossible either” (Mounin 1963:279). There are even scholars, like Pym, who take the possibility of translation as given, and use the notion of translation in defining culture: “It is enough to define the limits of a culture as the points where transferred texts have had to be (intralingually or interlingually) translated” (Pym 1992:26). Naturally, at this point much depends on what we think translation is, but as long as we regard translation as some form of mediation between languages, and cultures, this point seems acceptable.

One could argue, of course, that such petty commonplace examples as the one above do not invalidate the thesis as a whole and, as a matter of fact, there is still an assumption present in translation circles that cultural differences do cause ‘losses’ or ‘mistranslations’. This view is voiced in the following lines from an essay on the translations of the epistles of Juan de Avila.

If Spanish literature is indeed firmly rooted in the wider European tradition, one would expect it to translate more or less seamlessly into other European languages. If, on the other hand, translations from the Spanish alter or misrepresent the source material, this may be evidence
that the translator is not simply rendering the text from one language into another, but transplanting it from one cultural context to another (Yamamoto-Wilson 2000:25).

In fact, here it is assumed that mistranslations may be used as evidence for ascertaining cultural non-compatibility. This position crucially depends on the notion of ‘mistranslation’ which, in turn, presupposes that we have at our disposal a reliable tool for measuring the quality of translations. This point is examined in the following section.

2.1.2. Translation quality assessment

"Translation criticism is an essential link between translation theory and its practice" (Newmark 1988:184). Essential, writes Newmark, and rightly so, since criticism is connected to three activities which are doubtless among the chief practical concerns of the study of translation: the evaluation of existing translations, the search for grips in making decisions during the translation process, and the improvement of translator educating practices. Holmes also names translation criticism as one of the crucial areas of the applied branch of translation studies (Holmes 1988a:78).

One major question regarding quality assessment is whether it is possible to carry it out with the necessary degree of objectivity - otherwise it will amount to no more than a mere list of subjective impressions. Translation scholars have not been fully optimistic in this respect. House, for instance, is sure that "translation quality assessment is not likely to become objectified in the manner of natural sciences" (House 1981:64). The same scepticism characterises Holmes’s (1988a) and Newmark’s (1988) thinking, who, however, claim that "a small element of uncertainty and subjectivity eliminates neither the necessity nor the usefulness of translation criticism, as an aid for raising translation standards"
and that the aim of translation scholars and critics should be “to reduce the intuitive element to a more acceptable level” (Holmes 1988a:78). This can only be achieved if quality assessment is based on explicit and systematic criteria. As to the nature of these criteria, two questions arise: (1) should they be prescriptive or descriptive, rather?; and (2) should they include only the translation or, rather, a comparison of the translation with the original? In general, it could be said that the majority of translation scholars today prefer a descriptive and comparative approach, although the usefulness of comparing the translation to the original has recently been brought into question. Toury, for example, is afraid that it may lead to a mere enumeration of translation errors and an undue reverence for the original (Toury 1978:26). Such an approach, scholars like him would argue, fails to acknowledge the fact that the translation is bound not only to the original text but also to the conditions of the situation in which it is created. Therefore, the quality assessment of a translation can be done in at least two ways: in terms of its closeness, or equivalence, to the original and in terms of its appropriateness, or adequacy, in the context of the receiving culture. As Shveitser writes, if the notion of equivalence answers the question whether the translated text corresponds to the original, “adequacy answers the question whether a given translation, as a process, meets the requirements of given communicative conditions” (Shveitser 1993:51). This distinction, in this form, originating, to the best of my knowledge, from Komissarov (1980), entails that equivalence and adequacy are not necessarily linked with each other: a translation can be (to some degree) equivalent to the original and not adequate in the given situation or, vice versa, it can be adequately performed while not at the same time equivalent
to its source. The questions of equivalence and adequacy are given a more detailed treatment in sections 2.2 and 2.3.

2.1.3. Translation theory
The criteria for translation quality assessment should be provided by a theory of translation. In this respect we are first faced with a meta-theoretical question: what should this theory be like? Holmes (1988a) argues that the study of translation is an empirical discipline and, as such, has two major objectives: “to describe particular phenomena in the world of our experience and to establish general principles by means of which they can be explained and predicted” (Hempel 1967:1, cited in Holmes 1988a:71). In other words, the basic requirements are that its statements should be (1) empirically testable, (2) predictive, and (3) general.

Accordingly, Translation Studies, as the discipline has come to be known after Holmes (1988a), aims at (1) describing the phenomena of translating (the process) and translations (the result of the process), and (2) establishing general principles by means of which the above-mentioned phenomena can be explained and predicted. These two branches of the discipline are called by Holmes descriptive translation studies and theoretical translation studies (Holmes 1988a:71). He also distinguishes an applied branch including four areas: translator training, translation aids, translation policy, and the one that has been discussed in the previous section, translation criticism.

Holmes also points out that a comprehensive theory of translation must be “the product of teamwork between specialists in a variety of fields – text studies, linguistics (particularly psycho- and socio-linguistics), literary studies, psychology, and sociology” (Holmes 1988b:101). This view of an interdisciplinary translation theory is shared by many, for instance Bell (1991) and Bassnett-McGuire (1991),
but has also come under criticism in the past years, most notably by Gutt (1991), whose arguments will be presented in the concluding section of this chapter.

What is certain, however, regardless of the dispute referred to above, is that a theory of translation should be an attempt to answer two basic questions. Firstly, what is translation?; and secondly, how does translation happen, or as Bell reformulates it, for reasons that will become clear in a moment: what is a translator (Bell 1991:2)?

2.1.3.1. What is translation?
Naturally, a theory of translation must be able to delimit its domain of interest: it must be able to say what translation is. First of all, to avoid confusion, we need to clearly separate three meanings of the term: translation as a process (translating), the product of the process (a translation), and translation as an abstract concept, encompassing both of the above (Bell 1991:13).

Jakobson in his famous 1959 article distinguishes three types of the translation process: (1) intralingual translation (rewording a text within the same language), (2) interlingual translation or translation proper (rendering a text into another language), and (3) intersemiotic translation (the interpretation of signs by means of signs of another sign system). Examples of the third type are reading the time off a watch or turning a sentence into a Morse signal. (For the sake of simplicity, let us here disregard the problem of how to distinguish one language from another, Serb from Croat, for example. A “working hypothesis” could be the following formulation, attributed to Stalin, whereby a language is defined as a dialect which has an army.)

According to the medium of the process we also distinguish between oral translation, or interpreting, and written translation, which will be referred to, from now on, as
translation proper. These two, although not essentially unlike, are sufficiently different in a number of ways and have consequently been the subject of two different sub-branches of the discipline. This study will mostly be concerned with written translation of the second type: translation between different languages.

What we have to do now, then, is explicate the nature of the process - but as will turn out, this is not as trivial a problem as it might seem at first glimpse. The question of the nature of translation (as a process as well as the product of this process) is discussed in more detail in sections 2.2 and 2.3, and in Chapter Four.

2.1.3.2. How does translation happen?
On the face of it, what happens is that the translator receives the original text, or source text (ST), written by the source author in the source language (SL) and turns it into a translation, or target text (TT), written for a target reader in the target language (TL). The translator’s role, then, is that of a mediator between the writer of the ST and the reader of the TT. More specifically, a translator is a “bilingual mediating agent between monolingual communication participants in two different language communities” (House 1981:1). The translator’s role is different from that of a monolingual communicator in that whereas the latter’s task is to produce a text within the given SL circumstances (the primary communicative situation), the translator first has to make sense of the ST and then produce a TT, based on the ST, within the bounds of the given TL circumstances (the secondary communicative situation). We can thus divide the process into two stages: the analysis of the ST and the synthesis of the TT, both of which are mental processes taking place in the mind of the translator.
A first approximation of these mental processes is found in Robinson’s ‘shuttle model’ (1997), according to which translation is not, as has been commonly assumed, primarily a conscious analytical process but one that involves two equally important mental states: a subliminal ‘flow’ state and a conscious analytical state, between which the translator shuttles back and forth, as required by the specific circumstances arising during the translation process.

‘Flow’ is understood in the sense of Csikszentmihalyi (1995), as a state of mind in which an activity is performed solely for the sake of the pleasure of doing it. This sort of autotelic, or self-rewarding, experience “produces a very specific experiential state, so desirable that one wishes to replicate it as often as possible” (Csikszentmihalyi 1995:29).

In this model, the professional translator spends most of the time during work in the subliminal state of mind, doing translation in a rapid and mostly unconscious, or subconscious, manner. Her actions in this mental state are guided by habit which is the result of the sublimation of recurring experience sifted through highly conscious analytical thinking. Work in this subliminal mental state involves the use of procedural memory, which is that part of memory specialised in performing habitualised activities (Robinson 1997:95).

When the translator is baffled by a problem that cannot be solved in this rapid, unconscious processing mode, her mind will switch over to the analytical state, employing conceptual memory for working out a solution to the problem at hand by checking and examining things through painstakingly conscious analysis. The particular solution chosen may be the result of intuitive guesswork or may be based on analogy with earlier experiences of a similar kind, which through recurring several times have begun to form into an inductive pattern in the translator’s mind.
Thus a vital element of this model is the view of the translator as a life-long learner, where learning takes place as the result of repeated exposure to novel problems. Constant learning is seen as a necessary condition for sustaining the translator’s long-term interest in her work. In Csikszentmihalyi’s terms, to maintain the flow experience “one must increase the complexity of the activity by developing new skills and taking on new challenges” (Csikszentmihalyi 1995:30).

Learning comes about as the outcome of a cyclic movement, in conscious and unconscious ways, through the stages of instinct (an intuitive readiness for the task), experience (engagement with real-world challenges) and habit (internalised, or sublimated, modes of reacting to challenges). This view of learning draws on the ideas of Peirce, as explicated in his *Collected Papers* (Peirce 1931–66:5.477–5.480). In these terms the translation process is seen as one where the translator brings in an unfocused aptitude for working with language and translating, which is then tested and polished by a countless variety of experiences with linguistic and other translational problems and, over time, this experience with specific problems is turned into subliminal behavioural patterns, that is habits, which enable the translator to work in very fast, subliminal, largely unconscious ways until a novel problem arises that falls outside of the range of habitualised solutions. A crucial part of the translator’s professional skill or competence is the ability to switch from subliminal processing to conscious analytical processing in such situations, which is also one of the habits that the translator has to internalise.

In Peirce’s terms, inductive pattern building begins with an intuitive leap from a heap of unordered data to a hypothesis. This initial intuitive leap he calls abduction. The hypothesis is then tested inductively through recurring
experience and is subsequently turned into a generalisation by deduction. It is this deductive generalisation which finally becomes sublimated by the translator as a habitual action and out of the network of such internalised habits emerges the translator’s own theory of translation. This personal translation theory may remain partly, or even largely, unconscious but in the end this is what is responsible for what we call *translational competence* (Robinson 1997:105).

The shuttle model of translation also builds on Weick’s idea of the enactment - selection - retention cycle in learning. In translation, the enactment stage corresponds to making specific translational decisions, selection corresponds to editing the translation and reflecting on these decisions, while retention corresponds to sublimating the results of the previous stages. Translating, editing and sublimating work in a cyclic manner: new experiences can always change old habits and in turn these modified habits will give rise to new solutions. The main point is that the translator’s competence is not a stable, unchanging construct but an ever-evolving, dynamic system of knowledge which, with every new cycle in the learning process, reaches higher and higher degrees of complexity, thereby making possible the sustainance of ‘flow’ in the translator’s mind.

What a theory of translation needs to explain then is exactly what cognitive mechanisms are at work in the human mind during the above-described processes; in particular, during textual comprehension and in using the results of the textual analysis process in synthesising a text in a different language. The possible form of such a theory will receive its shape during the discussions that follow in the rest of this chapter and in Chapters Three and Four.
2.2. Equivalence-based approaches

2.2.1. Equivalence

Translation, as the etymological source of the word, the Latin expression ‘tanslatio linguarum’ (transfer of language) suggests, is a transfer operation and, as such, must involve the preservation of certain elements: these elements, remaining unaltered, are called the invariants of the process. This notion is, in turn, bound up with the notion of equivalence, which “presupposes a relationship between text A and text B, or segments thereof, in which a given invariance has been preserved” (Shveitser 1993:50). All throughout the history of thinking about translation, the notion of equivalence has been used as a device for explaining the phenomenon of translation. This has been done in two characteristically different ways. In the one, it is used as a definitive condition, in a normative manner: for a text to classify as a translation it has to be characterised by some form of equivalence to the original. Examples of this type of definition are not difficult to find in the literature. Here I shall cite just a few of the more typical of them.

Translation [is] the replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent textual material in another language (TL) (Catford 1965:20).

Translation [is] the transformation of a text originally in one language into an equivalent text in a different language retaining, as far as possible, the content of the message and the formal features and functional roles of the original text (Bell 1991:XV).

Translation is the expression in another language (or target language) of what has been expressed in another,

Translation is the replacement of a representation of a text in one language by a representation of an equivalent text in a second language (Hartman and Stork 1972: 713, cited in Bell 1991:6).

In the other way, equivalence between the source and target texts is not looked upon as a prerequisite but as a result to be discovered after the translation has taken place. Thus Toury, one of the first translation scholars to defy the prescriptive paradigm, distinguished between two uses of the term ‘equivalence’: a descriptive, denoting the relationship between two actual texts (or utterances, in the wide sense), and a theoretical use, denoting an ideal relationship between the source text and the target text to be constructed (Toury 1980:39). In the first sense, equivalence is an evaluative measure to be established after the translation has been produced and the question is what kinds and degrees of equivalence can be observed to exist between the two texts. In the second sense it is a definitional category: a target text is said to be a translation of the source text only if it is equivalent to the original in some previously specified way. As Barkhudarov writes: “The translator’s goal is always to achieve equivalence, no matter what type of text is translated” (Barkhudarov 1993:46).

In either case, equivalence implies an assumed relationship between the source and the target texts, a relationship which is either to be reconstructed (by approaching as closely as possible an assumed ideal) or constructed during the translation process. This dichotomy is observed by several scholars - cf., for instance, what Levy
writes about the double nature of translation as a process involving constructive and reconstructive elements at the same time (Levy 1969:72).

What is important to stress here is that equivalence is looked upon as a relation between two actual texts rather than between two languages, since the (partial) incompatibility of linguistic systems has long been recognised by linguists as well as by translation scholars. That is, in Saussure’s terms, it is a matter of parole rather than of langue. Catford (1965), for instance, uses the terms textual equivalence and formal correspondence to distinguish between the two types of relation. In his formulation, a textual equivalent is a target language text or expression which, on a particular occasion of use, is observed to be the equivalent of a given source language text or expression, whereas a formal correspondent is any target language category “which can be said to occupy, as nearly as possible, the same ‘place’ in the ‘economy’ of the TL as the given SL category occupies in the SL” (Catford 1965:27). However, his model of translation is actually more concerned with structural differences between languages than with communication between languages and his examples are sentences without a context instead of real contextualised utterances. These shortcomings are rightly criticised by Hatim and Mason, who note that in this way translation theory becomes a branch of contrastive linguistics and translation problems are reduced to a matter of non-correspondence between formal categories in different languages (Hatim and Mason 1990:26).

2.2.2. Normative approaches

Since the time of Cicero and Horace (1st c. BC) there has been in the Western tradition of thinking about translation a strong emphasis on prescribing to translators how to and how not to translate. In the Classical Roman tradition there was a
difference made between two kinds of translation: faithful and free, which is basically a difference between rendering the text slavishly word-by-word or in a less rigid form, which is truer to the spirit of the original. The latter form is the one advocated by both Cicero and Horace and, as a matter of fact, Cicero used the expression 'to write like a translator' (that is, in a word-for-word fashion) in a pejorative sense. Later in the 4th century AD, St. Jerome introduced the notion of sense-for-sense translation, which defines a middle-ground between the two extremes, placing free translation outside of the boundaries of translation proper. This trichotomy has survived in translation theory up to the present day in various forms, such as the one between, for instance, literal translation, communicative translation and adaptation (cf., e.g., Newmark 1988). Advocates of this school share the common view of translation equivalence as a notion which is basically built upon the notion of meaning, although they may differ in the question of what kind or kinds of meaning. (The chief theoretical concern then, of course, is to define what meaning is.) This view is expressed in the following definitions of translation:

Translation is a process by which a spoken or written utterance takes place in one language which is intended and presumed to convey the same meaning as a previously existing utterance in another language (Rabin 1958:123).

Translation [is] rendering the meaning of a text into another language in the way that the author intended the text (Newmark 1988:5).

A different route of thought is taken by scholars who try to characterise equivalence in terms of function of some sort. Nida (1964), for example, concerned primarily with Bible
translation, considers the linguistic sign, contrary to Chomsky (1957), not as a carrier of linguistic meaning in the first place but as an entity fulfilling a certain function in a given society. In this respect his approach draws on Wittgenstein, who writes: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein 1958: par 43). He puts the emphasis on there being a dynamic equivalence between the translation and the original, by which he means that the manner in which the target reader responds to the target text must be the same as that in which the source reader responded to the source text (principle of equivalent effect). We find the antecedent of this in Tytler’s definition of a good translation:

That in which the merit of the original work is so completely transfused into another language, as to be as distinctly apprehended, and as strongly felt, by a native of the country to which that language belongs, as it is by those who speak the language of the original work (Tytler 1791:8f, cited in Bell 1991:11).

What is important to Nida, as a result of his religious concerns with the transmission of the word of God, is that the target text should function in the same way as the source text, and consequently the more formal aspects of the text (lexical and grammatical meaning) are relegated to a secondary rank of significance. Equivalence is thus treated here as a functional rather than a formal category but, as is clear from the above formulation, is still used as a defining, that is normative, condition, focused on the source text and source reader. The main problem with this formulation is that there are no guidelines along which the reader’s reaction could be determined since “every reading of a text is a unique, unrepeatable act and a text is bound to evoke differing
responses in different receivers” (Hatim and Mason 1990:24). This is especially true of creative literature, as “a literary work of art is always open-ended, and the bigger the degree of this openness, the better it is for that work itself” (Eco 1975:12, my translation). In the light of this, the translator can actually be expected “to preserve, as far as possible, the range of possible responses; in other words, not to reduce the dynamic role of the reader” (Hatim and Mason 1990:11).

Alexieva (1993a) suggests that the solution lies in a more rigorous, cognitive definition of the concept of dynamic equivalence by the help of cognitive and experiential models that operate in specific languages. In her formulation, two texts are equivalent if the functional content of the source text is rendered in the target text in such a way as to fit the cognitive and experiential models (types of cognitive mapping) typical of target language usage, thereby ensuring “a reception by the target language receiver of the functional content of the source text that is the same, or approximately the same, as the source text receiver’s reception of that functional content” (Alexieva 1993a:109). It is not difficult to see, however, that this definition runs into the same problem of the indeterminate quality of receptor response. Moreover, she talks about typical usage and, accepting Widdowson’s distinction between usage and use, where the former is a “projection of the language system” and the latter is meant as the actual use of language in a particular situation (Widdowson 1979:8), this means that her definition relates again more to language systems, that is, linguistic competence, than to actual utterances, that is, linguistic performance.

In House’s (1981) model, on the other hand, the basic requirement of a translation is that it should be characterised by an overall functional equivalence to the original, where function means the “use which the text has in
the particular context of situation” (House 1981:37) and the quality of the translation is measured by the degree to which its function and textual profile correspond to those of the source text. The textual profile of a text includes eight linguistic characteristics: geographical origin, social class, time, medium, participation, social role relationship, social attitude and province (field of knowledge), and these determine the norm against which the profile of the target text is compared. House suggests that the adequacy of the translation can be measured in terms of the number and degree of mismatches on these parameters, but even she recognises that, because of the complexity of possible matrices of mismatches, a hierarchy of errors needs to be set up, which, however, in any individual case will depend on the objective of the evaluation (House 1981:209), and thus, as Gutt points out, “House’s model for quality assessment provides a basis only for systematic comparison – but not for value judgements”, which will follow from the objective of the evaluation (Gutt 1991:13, italics as in original).

2.2.3. Descriptive approaches
Breaking away from the restrictions that a normative approach imposes on the study of translation, a broadly descriptive paradigm was formed in Germany in the 1970s under the name of Übersetzungswissenschaft, that is, the science of translation. While obviously influenced by Nida’s ideas, this school reveals a shift of focus from normativism to descriptivism and empiricism. The leading figure of the school was Wilss, who worked within a basically Chomskyan framework where translation is supposed to be carried out by the creation of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic equivalence, made possible by the existence of universal categories in deep structure. Wilss (1977) aims to construct a general science of translation in which descriptive studies of empirical
phenomena may be carried out. This theory was also meant to provide a framework for translation criticism and quality assessment, and for the training of translators, the applied branches of the study of translation.

Based on the recognition that theorising often involves unnecessary subjective judgements and attitudes, the Translation Studies approach of the 70’s and 80’s, initiated by Holmes in Holland, reverses the order of theory building and empirical research. As Holmes argues in his programmatic paper, ‘The Name and Nature of Translation Studies’, first presented at the Third International Congress of Applied Linguistics, 1972, Translation Studies has two main objectives: “(1) to describe the phenomena of translating and translation(s) […], and (2) to establish general principles by means of which these phenomena can be explained and predicted” (Holmes 1988a:71). The third, applied branch of the discipline, in his view, tackles four areas: translator training, translation aids, translation policy and translation criticism. He also voiced the need to include several levels of focus, from the product of translation (the target text) through its function (in the context of the target culture) to the process of translation (as a mental operation taking place in the mind of the translator) itself. This, of course, entailed a very complex multidisciplinary effort, involving linguists, literary scholars, sociologists, psychologists, etc. As a result, the very complexity of the task has become a major stumbling block in the way of creating a unified theory.

Although Holmes insisted that the focus of investigation should be the translation process, in time Translation Studies became identified, as Gentzler (1993:93) writes, mostly with the product-oriented branch, focused on the empirical description of translated texts. Researchers were intent on establishing one-to-one relationships between source and target text segments, based on functional notions of
equivalence. The general belief was that translators possess a subjective capacity enabling them to produce an equivalent of the source text in the target language, and that the target text, as a result, exerts some influence on the cultural and social conventions of the target culture (Gentzler 1993:107).

2.2.4. Problems with the notion of equivalence
In recent years, the notion of equivalence has come under criticism on basically two grounds: problems with defining it properly and with its use as an evaluative device. The first has partly to do with the circularity of the concept: it is used to define translation but then its very existence and nature is dependent on the translation process (Pym 1992:37). But even if equivalence is thought to be given in the sense of Toury’s equivalence postulate (Toury 1980:113), which states that the existence of equivalence between the ST and the TT is a corollary of the very existence of the TT, based on his definition of a translation as any text that is considered as such in the target culture, there remains the second problem of how to characterise the nature of this relationship holding between the two texts. Basically, discussions centre around two oppositions: that of form versus content, and of meaning versus function.

As for the latter, several proposals have been put forward by different authors, some of them based on a conception of linguistic meaning of some sort (e.g., Fyodorov 1958, Catford 1965, Kade 1968), all failing to account for the totality of meanings that a given text may be intended to convey, while others building on some conception of function (e.g., Nida 1964, Levy 1969, Koller 1972, House 1981), disregarding the fact that the same text may fulfil several functions at the same time; and yet others experimenting with a mixture of the previous two approaches (e.g. Popović 1970, Komissarov 1980, Klaudy 1994). Thus, because of the immense complexity of
textual meanings and functions, it seems almost impossible to provide a sound definition of equivalence along these lines, either prescriptive or descriptive.

As regards the question of content versus form, it is an unfortunate fact that Tytler’s (1791) requirements of a translation, namely that (1) it should be a complete transcript of the ideas of the original, (2) its style and manner of writing should be the same as those of the original, and that (3) it should preserve the ease of the original composition, cannot be satisfied because the different requirements are often in conflict with one another. The correspondence of the target text to the source text in any respect is necessarily less than perfect – as Bell notes, “the ideal of total equivalence is a chimera” (Bell 1991:6) – and this entails that something is always lost in the translation. One may try to be faithful to the content as well as to the form of the original in the translation but the often conflicting nature of the two will generally exclude the possibility of paying complete homage to both. Moreover, since the style is also part of the message, when a formal element is lost, an element of content will get lost along with it too. Alexieva (1993a) suggests that the term equivalence should be taken to mean, instead of ‘complete identity’, something like ‘optimum degree of approximation’ but then, again, the vagueness of the expression ‘optimum degree’ raises doubts as to the usefulness of this formulation as a tool for evaluation.

Thus it seems that equivalence is a comparative rather than a classificatory concept, in Carnap’s (1950) sense, where a classificatory concept provides a necessary and sufficient condition for class membership and a comparative concept is one that is used to make comparative judgements. While these allow statements about sameness and degrees of difference, as Gutt notes, they “do not in and of themselves constitute value
judgements: they can be turned into value judgements — but only on the further assumption that the more ‘equivalent’ a translation is, the better it is” (Gutt 1991:14, italics as in original). Obviously, if it happens that I take after Ernest Hemingway more closely than another person, it still does not mean that I am a better writer than he is, or that I am better than he is, in any sense. A closer correspondence of my facial features to those of Hemingway’s makes me better only if closeness of correspondence is regarded valuable for some reason — for example because we are participants of a look-alike contest. That is, equivalence is not a concept that can in itself be used to evaluate translations — it needs to be placed within a larger frame of values. The question, then, is what this frame should be.

In Nida’s (1959) view, already discussed briefly in section 2.1 above, the source of information loss in translation is the non-correspondence of lexical and grammatical categories between different languages but this view obviously misses the point that linguistic items need to be considered in actual contexts, not in isolation. In other words, we need to look at, first and foremost, the communicative value they have in a context, rather than at the abstract value they have in the linguistic system. Consequently, a text, for our purposes, is to be considered primarily as a communicative act, which takes place in a social and cultural context, coming about as the result of the writer’s intention to fulfil a particular communicative purpose. In the process of translating, two such intentions may be identified: that of the original writer’s and that of the translator’s. Since any text is the function of the socio-cultural context in which it is born, a translated text, too, is to be viewed as a communicative transaction in context. Thus the question of evaluating a translation is clearly relatable to the communicative factors that condition the
a good translation is one that is successful in achieving its communicative purpose in the given circumstances. This is the approach that will be looked at more closely in the following section.

2.3. Communicative-functional approaches

In the past twenty or so years, as a reaction to the above-outlined problems with using the notion of equivalence to the original text as the basic concept in translation, the whole idea has been abandoned by some theorists in favour of an approach that lays the emphasis on the communicative purpose or function of the target text in the given target situation. The view of translation as a communicative event entails that the translator is seen as a bilingual communicator in an intercultural situation, who needs to be competent not only in two languages, in the Chomskyan sense, but also in two cultures, in Hymes’s (1972) sense, who defines communicative competence as the language user’s ability to produce utterances which, apart from being grammatical, are also appropriate in the given socio-cultural circumstances.

Probably the most notable theories of this sort are Even-Zohar’s (1978) polysystem theory, several aspects of which were adopted later by Translation Studies scholars, Holz-Mänttäri’s (1984) theory of translatorial action and Reiss and Vermeer’s (1984) skopos theory. All of them view translation primarily as a process of intercultural communication, in which the translator’s foremost task is not to reproduce the original along some notion of equivalence but to produce a target text which functions in an adequate, or appropriate, way in the given target situation. Thus the concept of functional adequacy replaces equivalence here as a result of a shift of attention from the source text as the standard of
comparison to the role of the target text in the target-culture situation.

2.3.1. Polysystem theory
The opposite of the views of the Translation Studies approach of the 70’s occurs in the ideas of Polysystem Theory, inasmuch as it holds that it is the norms and conventions of the target culture that crucially influence the presuppositions and thus the decisions of the translator. The term *polysystem* was coined by Even-Zohar, an Israeli scholar, who used it to refer to the hierarchical system of subsystems within a culture. One of the components of this all-encompassing socio-cultural polysystem is the polysystem of literature, which is characterised by a constant competition between the central and peripheral genres for the dominant, or canonical, positions, thus bringing about what we call literary evolution (Even-Zohar 1990:91). Even-Zohar stresses the necessity of including translated literature in the literary polysystem for the apparent reason that translations may exert a significant impact on the evolution of the polysystem in the appropriate circumstances (Even-Zohar 1978:15). The placing of translation within this wider cultural context entails that it is viewed as a dynamic process controlled by the norms of the target polysystem and that the adequacy of a target text is a function of the existing cultural situation.

Toury (1978) defines a translation in a rather wide sense as any text that is accepted as such in the target culture. It was he who introduced the notion of *norms* in his model, based on Even-Zohar’s polysystem approach to literature. The expression ‘norm’ here is not meant in an evaluative sense but is used to refer to the constraints that regulate translation behaviour within a given socio-cultural context. Toury’s norms are thus descriptive generalisations about what translators typically do in particular circumstances. The translator’s
role is seen not as a mere rendering of linguistic expressions into another language but as involving the fulfilment of a social function, the norms of which are specified by the community in which the translation takes place. Consequently, the translator has to acquire these norms in order to be able to function in an appropriate manner, and thus the acquisition of these norms is a prerequisite to becoming a competent translator, capable of producing adequate translations.

According to Toury, a translation can never be completely equivalent to the original since it is the product of a different cultural context, nor can it be entirely acceptable to the target system since it will necessarily contain informative and formal elements which are unfamiliar to the receiving culture. Thus the translator is torn between two opposing points of reference and the translation can never conform to both perfectly. To be able to determine the position of the translation between the two extremes we need, in Toury’s words, an “invariant of comparison”, which he describes, strangely enough, as Gentzler notes (1993:132), as a universal literary and linguistic form and not, as would be expected within a theory of this sort, as something that is culturally conditioned. This position seems somewhat self-contradictory since one cannot at the same time adopt the view that each literary culture is different in its structure and norms from every other and that behind each culture we find the same structural universal. Even so, polysystem theory cannot be denied the merit of directing attention, instead of the earlier exclusive focus on the source text, to the cultural context of the translation and, consequently, of redefining the role of the source text as that of “a stimulus or source of information”, in Baker’s (1993:238) words (which, as will turn out later, is a major point in the theory of translation advocated in this study).
2.3.2. Skopos theory

One of the factors in this context is the function which the translation is expected to perform in the target culture, and it is exactly this function which is in the focus of Reiss and Vermeer’s (1984) theory of skopos, according to which translation, as a form of human action, is determined by its purpose, referred to technically by the Greek term skopos. So the translation is determined not by the source text, or circumstances of the source situation, but by the skopos of the target text in the target situation. Translation, then, is defined here as the process of producing a target text which is functionally adequate in the given target situation.

As the skopos of the target text is partly a function of the target reader, it follows that (1) the skopos of the target text may be different from that of the source text, and (2) one and the same source text may be translated in various ways, according to the needs and circumstances of the target reader. A corollary of the first observation is that equivalence between the source and target texts is only a limiting case of the more general case of adequacy to the skopos of the translation. The second one, in turn, entails that before the translation process can begin, it is necessary that the skopos of the translation, based partly on a consideration of the target reader, is clearly specified.

It is this latter point which gave rise to some of the more serious objections to the theory, especially as it relates to literary translation. A commonplace of literary theory now is that a work of literature is always open-ended, in Eco’s (1975) sense, that is, it has a very complex hierarchy of functions and to specify the skopos of a literary text would amount to limiting the number of its possible interpretations. Therefore a similarly complex hierarchy of purposes would need to be set up for the translation but, as Gutt points out, this raises “the question of what that
further dimension or principle is that determines the hierarchical ordering of purposes” (Gutt 1991:17), and this question is left open by skopos theory.

2.3.3. The theory of translatorial action

An approach of similar vein is Holz-Mänttäri’s (1984) theory of translatorial action. In this model, drawing on action theory and communication theory, translation is regarded as part of a wider translatorial action, which involves the translator in various purposeful activities, ranging from negotiating with clients through researching to producing the translation: a text which can function appropriately in the specific target situation. Translatorial action, in turn, is part of a more complex communicative action that is to take place in a transcultural situation. Thus, eventually, translation is conceived of as an action whose purpose is to enable the achievement of functionally adequate communication between cultures.

The main aim of the model is to provide a specification of the different factors that have a bearing on translatorial action and thereby helping the translator, an expert in transcultural communication, in making appropriate decisions. Since, as is also emphasised by skopos theory, an action is determined primarily by its purpose, the result of the action, the target text, must also be evaluated in terms of its adequacy for this purpose: its functional adequacy. The source text has no, or very little, part in the evaluation process: it merely serves as source material for the action, which can be radically modified if the purpose of the action requires so. This is because the translator is committed not to the source text but to the overall aim of producing an adequate target text within the superordinate process of transcultural communication. Unfortunately, while this requirement is clear enough, the model fails to explicate the notion of adequacy
properly, and thus cannot provide the grips it promises: the translator is presumed to be an expert who has the requisite expertise enabling him or her to make the decisions leading to the desired result.

2.3.4. Problems with the communicative-functional approaches

The polysystem approach defines translation in a loosely empirical manner as anything that is accepted as such in the target culture. This is a culture-specific notion which could in itself be accepted if it was not contradicted by the way in which Toury formulates his measure of evaluation as a universal linguistic/literary form.

Skopos theory, on the other hand, relies on a notion of textual functions, which are ordered in hierarchical complexes, but fails to make clear the criteria by which such an ordering could be carried out and consequently falls short of providing a useful evaluative device.

The action theory of translation avoids this problem by positing that the translator is committed to the purpose of the communicative interaction and the task is to produce a text which adequately meets that purpose – however, it is left to the intuition of the translator to decide what adequacy means in this frame and thus the subjective element remains as sadly emphatic as before.

One further common problem with these theories is that while they very appropriately direct attention to the target situation and the target reader, they relegate the source text to a secondary rank of source of information and seem to undervalue its importance in the process of translation. It is dangerous, I believe, to separate the target side from the source text to such an extent. Undoubtedly, any act of communication is carried out with a goal in mind and the way this goal is achieved is conditioned by the circumstances of the communication (the secondary context), but translation is
a special case in that the translation is tied not only to the target situation but also to the original text. One may question extreme views on the measure of required source text bias such as Nabokov’s, according to whom in (poetry) translation only the strictest form of literalism is acceptable (cited in Steiner 1975/92:254), but one would never want to deny that some degree of linkage must necessarily be present between the source text and the target text for it to qualify as a translation. The difficulty lies in determining the necessary degree of this bond. And it is here, in my opinion, where these theories are not explicit enough.

2.4. Conclusions

We have seen that both the equivalence-based (that is source text-oriented) and communicative function-based (that is process-oriented) theories fail on more or less the same two grounds: their definition of translation either runs into circularity or is left open at one point and they do not provide explicit evaluative criteria which could be used during the decision making process and in the assessment of translation quality.

These problems can be traced back, as Gutt (1991) points out, to the fact that the theories outlined in the above sections are all based on a descriptive-classificatory approach, which can categorise phenomena (be it textual features or communicative functions), make statements about the correspondences between phenomena in terms of these categories, but beyond that “it has no other principle to offer,” because “the value, significance, importance etc. of a phenomenon do not lie in its inherent properties, but in its relation to human beings” (Gutt 1991:20). What is needed, then, is a shift away from this paradigm towards an explanatory theory which avoids the pitfalls of classification.
As in recent years it has become generally accepted that translation is best conceived of as a process of (intercultural) communication, it seems that the theory of translation we need is a theory of communication. This is not a new contention, even if its truth has been the subject of debates until very recently, for reasons of the inadequacy of particular communicative theories to translation. As far back as 1975, Steiner wrote: “Any model of communication is at the same time a model of translation, of a vertical or horizontal transfer of significance” (Steiner 1975/92:47), since “inside or between languages, human communication equals translation” (Steiner 1975/92:49). Consequently, if the phenomenon of translation can be explained within the bounds of a general communication theory, there is no need for a separate theory of translation. As for the above-cited objection in relation to specific theories, “the fact that a particular approach to communication is inadequate does not necessarily mean that any communicative approach is inadequate” (Gutt 1991:22). The real question is, which theory of communication is the one that is most suitable for our purposes. This question will be attended to in Chapters Three and Four.

This theory, in accordance with the requirements on scientific theories in general, will possess predictive power and will be testable by empirical observations. Thus, as Holmes expounded, it will have to be complemented, as part of the general study of translation, by a descriptive component, which must focus its attention on discovering specific translation procedures (or norms, in Toury’s words), based on comparative empirical studies of source and target texts. This study, along these lines, attempts to describe translation procedures relating to proper names (Chapter Five) and then use these as a testing ground for the particular theory of translation advocated (Chapter Six).
3.1. The translator’s mind

3.1.1. The case of a linguistic savant

In my discussions I will assume that the human mind is structured in a way that is outlined in Smith and Tsimpli (1995). This model is the result of their investigation of the case of a uniquely untypical autistic person, Christopher, whom they group with those referred to in the psychological literature as idiot-savants or, less pejoratively, simply as savants. These people are characterised by some serious intellectual (and often physical) impairment accompanied by a surprising talent in mathematics, arts or music. Christopher’s case can be said to be unique in that in spite of his general impairment he has extraordinary linguistic abilities – he claims to be conversant with some fifteen to twenty languages. Cases like his illustrate what is called double dissociation: a person with impaired intelligence may none the less have normal (or even enhanced) linguistic abilities and, conversely, someone with otherwise unaffected intelligence can exhibit language impairment (like some deaf people or aphasics) (Smith and Tsimpli 1995:3). However, whereas Christopher’s native language competence is not essentially unlike that of any normal individual, some areas of language use are beyond his capabilities. His vocabulary and morphology
seem to be intact but he has difficulty in processing other aspects of linguistic input. This is clearly manifest in his translations, which, although remarkably prompt, reveal a significant lack of sensitivity to contextual and linguistic constraints: he has difficulty in integrating formal linguistic with contextual information. This gap between lexical and morphological processing, on the one hand, and grammatical and pragmatic processing, on the other, occasions interesting implications as to the place of the linguistic faculty within the architecture of the mind.

3.1.2. Smith and Tsimpli’s theory of the mind

Smith and Tsimpli’s cognitive theory rests on three pillars: Fodor’s (1983) modularity hypothesis, Anderson’s (1992) theory of intelligence, and Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) theory of relevance. The modularity hypothesis assumes that the human mind has a compartmental structure, in which the different components are distinguished by their functional properties. Basically, there are two types of such components: perceptual input systems and central cognitive systems, the former being responsible for providing environmental (in the wide sense of the word) information for the latter, which is responsible for thought and storing knowledge in, at least partly, propositional form in the memory. The modular (input) systems are genetically determined, domain-specific and informationally incapsulated, that is, the operations carried out in the modules are not subject to central control, the flow of information is only from the modules toward the central systems, which are assumed to be non-modular in nature.

One such input system is responsible for language. The language module carries out phonological, syntactic and semantic operations, and provides, as its output, input for pragmatic interpretation done by the central systems, which
integrate the given linguistic representation with contextual and general information.

Anderson’s (1992) model (see Figure 1) was conceived of in this Fodorian framework, attempting to spell out the properties of the central systems in some more detail and ascribing to them a quasi-modular structure. In this model, input from the modules is either stored in the memory (or Knowledge Base) or is processed by the Basic Processing Mechanism (BPM), which is the faculty that implements thinking, and is held to be responsible for differences of intelligence, due to differences in its speed between individuals. Before any information reaches the Knowledge Base, however, it has to be evaluated for its relevance. This process of evaluation is done by mechanisms that Anderson calls specific processors (SP), having Turing machine power, that is, universal problem-solving capacity. Two such mechanisms are proposed: a visuo-spatial and a verbal-
propositional one, the former devoted mainly to simultaneous, while the latter to successive processing. These are responsible for producing problem solving algorithms, which are implemented by the BPM. Thus the speed of thinking is crucially dependent on the speed of the BPM, whatever the efficiency of the SPs.

Anderson’s model in addition contains some further non-Fodorian (non-encapsulated) modules called modules Mark II, which execute fetch-and-carry operations (e.g. retrieval from memory) and over-learnt routines (skills).

Smith and Tsimipli (1995) take Anderson’s model as a point of departure but propose some significant revisions (see Figure 2). The most important of these are the following (Smith and Tsimipli 1995:188). (1) They ascribe a range of linguistic
functions to the verbal-propositional specific processor, which was left implicit in Anderson (1992). (2) They postulate an Executive and see the BPM as a faculty crossing content-domains and acting as a constraint on the operation of the other systems. (3) They propose that the language module intersects with the central system, with the morphology component acting as an interface, which is in line with what Chomsky writes about the non-input nature of language (Chomsky 1986:14). (4) Whereas in Anderson’s model the Theory of Mind is an input system, they claim that it is a so-called central module.

Linguistic processing in this model takes place in the following way. In comprehension, linguistic input from the Vision or Audition module is analysed by the language module and turned into the language of thought (LoT) at the interface via the verbal-propositional specific processor and is then integrated into the knowledge base in the way suggested by Relevance Theory (see 3.4). The specific processor is connected with the language module via the BPM, to make possible the interaction that is needed for the pragmatic augmentation of the output of the language module (enrichment, disambiguation, strengthening, reference assignment, etc.).

The interface is constituted by the morphological component between the grammar and the conceptual lexicon, which is part of the central system. The mapping of concepts and conceptual structure onto words and argument structure is carried out by the morphological component, which is accessible to both functional and substantive categories. The nature of the interface may be further specified on the basis of a relevance-theoretic treatment of concepts (see 5.2).

Speech production happens in the inverse direction: first a representation in the language of thought is generated via a specific processor from the knowledge base and is then transformed into a language representation via the interface
and the BPM. Thus the initiation of thought comes from outside the specific processors, which have the task of encoding this stimulus by generating an algorithm to be implemented by the BPM. This is what, for Anderson, thinking consists in (Anderson 1992:17-8). This process implies an Executive function, which may be located either between the knowledge base and the specific processor or in the BPM (as suggested in Smith and Tsimpli 1993:327). The Executive is a horizontal faculty (in the sense of Fodor 1983): the flow of information through it is not unidirectional. Its function is to check representations in the BPM and to pass them on to the output procedures.

3.1.3. Translation

Normally, translation as a communicative effort involves the interaction of lexical, linguistic and central processes. Christopher’s translation is remarkable in that, for him, it seems to be a purely linguistic exercise, independent of central control. He is characterised by outstanding lexical and morphological prowess but his syntactic and pragmatic abilities are severely limited by problems of processing load (Smith and Tsimpli 1995:188). The most obvious difference between him and normal individuals is that he is unable to integrate his lexical abilities into his sentence structure processing, which is aggravated by his ignorance of contextual relevance. In other words, he stops at the word recognition stage and does not proceed to the integration stage, which involves the use of contextual information and inferencing (Smith and Tsimpli 1995:85-6, 163).

In the present model, Christopher’s flawed translation may be explained in the following manner. The vision module inputs a signal, which is transformed and transported via the verbal-propositional specific processor into the language module. The lexicon is partly multi-dimensional: “the entries in the
conceptual part are paired/tripled, or whatever, in parallel, with cat associated with chat, Katze, billi,” (Smith and Tsimpli 1995:171) etc. Similarly, some morphemes corresponding to functional categories may have multi-dimensional entries. However, Christopher’s translation is “partially insulated from the normal monitoring function of the executive, on the one hand, and of access to the rest of the syntax of the language module on the other” (Smith and Tsimpli 1995:171). What we find behind his translation problems, in the end, is a dissociation of the various components of his mind, preventing the successful performance, beyond the lexical level, of translation as a communicative activity.

3.2. Communication: basic definitions

Communication may be defined as a process involving two information-processing devices, where one of them modifies the physical environment of the other, which as a result constructs representations similar to those stored in the first device (Sperber and Wilson 1986:1). Communication can thus be seen as the transfer of information between the two devices. Since we are mainly interested here in human communication, from now on we shall identify these devices with individuals, using the terms communicator and audience. Information is meant in the broad sense, relating not only to facts (true descriptions of the actual world) but to all kinds of assumptions presented by the communicator as factual. An assumption is a thought treated by the individual as a representation of the real world. When an assumption is entertained by the individual as a true description of the world, without explicitly represented as such, we call it a factual assumption. A thought, in turn, is a conceptual representation (as opposed to other forms of representation such as sensory or emotional) (Sperber and Wilson 1986:2).
As we have seen in 3.1.2, in the model of the mind that we are building on (Fodor 1983, Anderson 1992, Smith and Tsimpli 1995), the mind consists of various specialised systems, which are of two basic types. The input systems process perceptual information (or, to be more precise, stimuli), turning sensory representations into conceptual representations of a uniform format. These are then processed by the central systems, which integrate information from the input systems and from memory, and carry out inferential tasks (Sperber and Wilson 1986:71-2).

Since conceptual representations are subject to inferential processing, they must possess logical properties (apart from other, non-logical ones). These logical properties of a conceptual representation will be called its logical form. To take part in logical operations it is sufficient that the logical form should be well-formed; it is not necessary, however, that it should be semantically complete. When it is semantically complete, and can thus be assigned a truth value, we will call it propositional, otherwise it is non-propositional (Sperber and Wilson 1986:72).

Non-propositional logical forms can be used in inferential operations. Consider, for instance, sentence (1) below.

(1) He likes chocolate.

It contains a pronoun which, until bound by a definite entity in the world, makes the sentence semantically incomplete. Yet it can be used to deduce at least the following implications:

(2) He likes something.
(3) Somebody likes chocolate.
(4) Somebody likes something.
The fact that (1) can logically imply sentences (2-4) follows from the very notion of *logical implication*, which is a logical-syntactic, that is purely formal, relation between assumptions. In this sense, logical implication may be considered a *deductive rule*, that is, one that applies to assumptions in virtue of their logical forms. However, a deductive rule is different from other formal computations in that it is also a truth-preserving operation: the conclusion stands in a *semantic entailment* relation with the premise. Thus, an assumption that is logically implied by another is also necessarily semantically entailed by it, whereas the reverse relation is not necessarily true (Sperber and Wilson 1986:84).

We see then that incomplete logical forms can be of use in information processing at the intermediate stages. They can be used to derive valid inferences and can be stored in memory as *assumption schemas*. However, only fully propositional forms can represent an actual state of affairs in the world and thus assumption schemas must be completed, on the basis of contextual information, into full-fledged assumptions before they can be said to contribute to the individual’s knowledge of the world (Sperber and Wilson 1986:73).

An individual’s encyclopaedic memory contains propositional as well as non-propositional representations and, moreover, these are associated with various attitudes. How might these propositional attitudes be represented in memory? When an assumption is entertained as a true description of the world, we call it a factual assumption. For instance, the memory may contain the following assumption, treated as a fact:

(5) The Earth is round.
In turn, this assumption may be embedded in another, second-order representation such as (6) below:

(6) I know that the Earth is round.

Likewise, any assumption P with a certain propositional attitude may be represented through a more basic first-order factual assumption as, for instance, in (7-9):

(7) I desire that P.
(8) I promise that P.
(9) I regret that P.

It can be assumed, then, that the individual’s representation of the world consists of a stock of factual assumptions, some of which are basic, others of the second order, representing attitudes to embedded propositional or non-propositional forms (Sperber and Wilson 1986:74-5).

The adequacy of the individual’s representation of the world, however, is only partly dependent on what assumptions he holds: it is also, in part, a function of how confident he is in the truth (or likelihood) of these assumptions: “Improvements in our representation of the world can be achieved not only by adding justified new assumptions to it, but also by appropriately raising or lowering our degree of confidence in them, the degree to which we take them to be confirmed” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:76). This degree of confidence is a non-logical property of assumptions and is metaphorically called their strength. The strength of an assumption comes about as a by-product of its processing history and is comparable to its accessibility from memory.

The easier an assumption is to recall from memory, the more likely that it will be used in the individual’s efforts to better his understanding of the world. In this sense, some
assumptions can be said to be more manifest to the individual than others. This notion can be extended to include not only assumptions in memory but facts in general. Sperber and Wilson (1986) define manifestness as follows: “A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true” (p. 39). On this notion of manifestness is based the definition of cognitive environment, which is the set of facts that are manifest to the individual. If a fact is manifest to an individual, it is perceptible or inferable by him. Thus, his total cognitive environment is a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities, including his perceptual, linguistic and inferential abilities along with information that he has memorised. It contains not only the facts that he is aware of at the given moment but also the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of.

It follows that since the physical and cognitive abilities of two people are never entirely identical, they can never share their total cognitive environments; they can, however, share a subset of them. A shared cognitive environment of two people is the intersection of their individual cognitive environments. A shared cognitive environment in which it is manifest which people share it is called a mutual cognitive environment. In this cognitive environment every manifest assumption is, by definition, mutually manifest (Sperber and Wilson 1986:41-2).

Mutual manifestness is of course a much weaker condition than mutual knowledge, which, as Sperber and Wilson (1986) have shown, cannot exist (p. 15-21). It is not strong enough to guarantee a symmetrical co-ordination in the choice of the code and context of communication between the communicator and the audience. This problem can, however, be avoided by assuming that it is the responsibility of the communicator to
make correct assumptions about the appropriate codes and contextual information the audience will have at their disposal in the comprehension process and that break-downs in communication are likely to occur when the communicator fails to make the correct assumptions (Sperber and Wilson 1986:43).

Eventually, communication means that the communicator provides a stimulus (verbal or non-verbal), whereby she alters the physical environment and, consequently, the cognitive environment of the audience. (For the sake of ease of wording, I will throughout the study refer to the communicator as ‘she’ and to the audience as ‘he’, except where otherwise indicated.) A stimulus is a phenomenon (a perceptible object or event) which is to have some cognitive effect in the audience. The communicator provides the stimulus with the intention that it will make manifest to the audience certain assumptions that she would like to share with him, thereby altering his cognitive environment and, at the same time, extending their mutual cognitive environment, which is of crucial importance in bettering their possibilities of future interaction. If she fails to achieve this aim, it is either because she has made the wrong assumptions about what assumptions are manifest to the audience and, further, what assumptions he is actually making or because she has failed to provide an adequate stimulus. Communication is a risky enterprise. As Sperber and Wilson (1986) put it: “failures in communication are to be expected: what is mysterious and requires explanation is not failure but success” (p. 45).

3.3. Coded communication and ostensive-inferential communication

3.3.1. Coded communication
Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest that humans use two different modes of communication: coded communication and
ostensive-inferential communication. In coded communication, as described by Shannon and Weaver (1949), the communicator (or source) encodes her message, which is a representation internal to information-processing devices, into a signal, which is sent through a channel to the audience (or destination), who receives the message by decoding the signal. Unless the signal is seriously distorted by noise along the channel, the success of communication is guaranteed on condition that the source and the destination share the same code. A code is defined as a system which pairs messages with signals. In this model, which is often referred to as the semiotic model of communication, communication is made possible by the existence of an underlying shared code, without which the audience would have no way of deciphering the meaning of the signal.

Traditionally, it has been assumed that linguistic communication, like any other form of communication, can be explained in terms of the semiotic model. Saussure, for example, believed that semiotics (in his formulation, semiology) will come up with such general laws that will prove applicable to language as well. He describes language as “a system of signs expressing ideas” (Saussure 1995:15), that is, as a code.

Now while it is true that language is a code pairing phonetic representations (signals) with semantic representations, it is easy to see that the latter cannot be equated with the messages that are actually intended to be communicated. Consider the following example:

(10) Gerwyn: Shall we go out for a drink?
(11) Jean: It’s raining.

It is clear that Jean’s message is not simply that the weather is bad but rather that in these meteorological conditions she
does not feel like going out. Could it be said that (11) somehow encodes this message? Not in any reasonable way; what it does encode, more or less, is merely that there is rain falling. How then will Gerwyn be able to understand that Jean does not want to go out? Sperber and Wilson (1986) maintain, in line with the Gricean tradition, that the gap between the semantic representation that the utterance encodes and the actual message is bridged by “a process of inferential recognition of the communicator’s intentions” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:9). In this, they say nothing more or less than what Grice and his followers did. However, they go further than that and offer an ostensive-inferential model of communication that not only makes it explicit what happens when the gap is bridged by the audience but, most importantly, also explains how it is done. The next section will give an overview of this model.

3.3.2. Ostensive-inferential communication

The terms ostensive and inferential describe two complementary aspects of the same process of communication. It is an ostensive process because it involves the communicator in producing a stimulus that points toward her intentions, and inferential because the audience uses the stimulus in an inferential process of comprehension as evidence for what those intentions may be. Ostension, then, means making manifest to the audience an intention to make something manifest (Sperber and Wilson 1986:49), whereas an inferential process is one which “starts from a set of premises and results in a set of conclusions which follow from, or are at least warranted by, the premises” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:12-3).

This mode of communication can thus be defined in the following terms:
Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions \{I\} (Sperber and Wilson 1986:63, italics as in original).

3.3.2.1. Ostension

Ostension, as can be seen from this definition, provides two layers of information. First there is an upper layer of information, which is the information that the communicator wants to communicate something and, second, there is a lower, basic, layer of information: the one that the communicator actually intends to communicate to the audience. As will be seen, the upper layer has just as important a role in the communication process as the basic one. This basic layer of information, which is “to make manifest or more manifest a set of assumptions \{I\}” is called the informative intention of the communicator. The upper layer of information, “which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience” that the communicator has this informative intention, is referred to as the communicative intention of the communicator. In other words, the communicative intention is a second-order informative intention, which is fulfilled as soon as the informative intention is recognised, even if it is itself not fulfilled (Sperber and Wilson 1986:29-30).

Eventually, what makes true communication different from other forms of information transfer is exactly the presence of this communicative intention: here we have a means of distinguishing, in the technical sense, between informing, where the communicative intention is missing or is covert (not mutually manifest) and communication, where this intention is overt (mutually manifest). As Sperber and Wilson (1986) put it: informing modifies the cognitive environment of the
audience, while communication modifies the mutual cognitive environment of the communicator and audience (p. 61).

This can be important in a number of ways. First, in certain situations the communicative intention may provide the clue to unlocking the informative intention. Such cases are discussed in, for instance, Grice (1975), where the notion of conversational implicature crucially rests on the requirement that the communication is done overtly. Second, by extending the mutual cognitive environment of the communicator and her audience the communicative intention also fulfils a social function: it opens up new possibilities of further communication.

But most importantly, ostensive behaviour provides the audience with evidence to the effect that it will be rewarding for him to engage in the communication process. Information processing, as any other cognitive process, involves a certain amount of effort that the individual is bound to invest in the hope of gains. Based on the assumption that the human mind is an efficient information processing device, it seems that any reasonable individual will take part in an act of communication only if he can expect that the gains of the process will be worth the effort he makes. Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest that ostensive behaviour provides evidence of this in the form of a guarantee of relevance. It implies this guarantee because humans naturally look for information that seems relevant to them, that is, information that will improve their overall representation of the world. Their main thesis is that “an act of ostention carries a guarantee of relevance, and that this fact [...] makes manifest the intention behind the ostention” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:50). They call this the principle of relevance and maintain that it is the key to explaining how inferential communication works.
3.3.2.2. Inference

Inference can be defined as the process of validating an assumption on the basis of other assumptions. It contributes to the fixation of belief, just as for example perception does. Sperber and Wilson (1986) maintain that inferential comprehension is a central thought process with free access to conceptual memory. This implies that comprehension is a global process in the sense that “any conceptually represented information available to the addressee can be used as a premise in this inference process” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:65). They also assume that inferential comprehension is non-demonstrative: the audience has no way of decoding or deducing what the communicator’s intentions are; all he can do is construct a hypothesis about them and then confirm this hypothesis on the basis of the ostensive evidence that the communicator provides. Spontaneous non-demonstrative inference, they suggest, is not, overall, as much a logical process as a suitably constrained heuristic one. “Hypothesis formation involves the use of deductive rules, but is not totally governed by them; hypothesis confirmation is a non-logical cognitive phenomenon: it is a by-product of the way assumptions are processed, deductively or otherwise” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:69). Moreover, in non-demonstrative inference no logical rules other than deductive rules are used, that is such rules that apply to assumptions purely in virtue of their logical form and “take account of the semantic properties of assumptions only insofar as these are reflected in their form” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:85).

Comprehension involves explicating (analysing) the content of assumptions and thus the deductive rules used in this process must be interpretive in this sense. Therefore, Sperber and Wilson (1986) hypothesise that in spontaneous deductive processing the mind only has access to so-called elimination rules, which yield conclusions from which a specified concept
that is part of the premises is erased. Two examples, taken from Sperber and Wilson (1986:86–7), are given below:

(12) **And-elimination**

(a) **Input:** \((P \text{ and } Q)\)

**Output:** \(P\)

(b) **Input:** \((P \text{ and } Q)\)

**Output:** \(Q\)

(13) **Modus ponendo ponens**

**Input:**

(i) \(P\)

(ii) *(If \(P\) then \(Q\))*

**Output:** \(Q\)

The conclusions that these rules yield are called *non-trivial*, exactly because they are explications of the content of the premises, and these are the only kind of conclusions that the mind generates when processing a set of input assumptions.

As can be seen above in examples (12) and (13), elimination rules are of two formal types. (12) is an **analytic** rule, which takes one single assumption as input; (13) is a **synthetic** rule, taking two separate assumptions as input. A set of input assumptions is said to **analytically imply** an assumption when it is one of the conclusions in a deduction which only involves the use of analytic rules. A set of input assumptions is said to **synthetically imply** an assumption when it is not an analytic implication of the premises. Then, computing all the analytic implications of a set of premises is a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding the content of the premises, whereas the synthetic implications of the premises offer inferential information that is the result of a combination of the input assumptions but could not have been generated separately from the individual premises. In other words: when the deductive device draws the analytic
implications of an assumption, it computes the intrinsic meaning of it; when the device computes the synthetic implications of the assumption in combination with other assumptions, it gains an understanding of what that assumption means in the context of other assumptions that it already has access to. This process is called the *contextualisation* of an assumption and the resulting synthetic implications are referred to as *contextual implications*. As Sperber and Wilson (1986) put it:

A central function of the deductive device is thus to derive, spontaneously, automatically and unconsciously, the contextual implications of any newly presented information in a context of old information. Other things being equal, the more contextual implications it yields, the more this new information will improve the individual’s existing representation of the world (Sperber and Wilson 1986:108).

But contextual implications are not the only way to improve a representation of the world. A given set of old assumptions can also be modified by providing further evidence for, and thus strengthening, some assumptions or by providing contradictory evidence against, and consequently erasing, other assumptions from the context. These effects are called *contextual strengthening* and *contextual elimination*, respectively.

We have thus described three ways in which the contextualisation of new assumptions in a context of old assumptions may achieve some contextual effect: by adding new assumptions to the context in the form of contextual implications, by strengthening some old assumptions or by erasing others. Otherwise, if a contextualisation does not modify the context (because the new assumptions are found too
weak and are consequently erased) or all it does is simply add some new assumptions to it, it will have failed to achieve any contextual effect (Sperber and Wilson 1986:117).

In an intuitive sense, an assumption which does not provide any contextual effect in a given context of other assumptions may be said to be irrelevant in that context. In the next section we shall take a closer look at the notion of relevance, which has a central role in the theory of ostensive-inferential communication under discussion here.

3.3.2.3. Relevance
We have informally said that an assumption (or, in general, an ostensive stimulus) is relevant inasmuch as it leads to an improvement of an existing representation of the world. But, as we have seen, any such improvement comes at the cost of a certain amount of effort that the individual has to exert in the inferential process of comprehension. An efficient information-processing device (such as a human being) will embark on this enterprise only when the gains (the contextual effects) can be hoped to come about at a reasonable cost (processing effort). This can be thought of as a manifestation of the principle that game theory calls the mini-max strategy: participants in an exchange will naturally strive to achieve a maximum of gains at a minimum of costs. Otherwise, when the gains seem too small or the cost too large, the device will disrupt the process and the communication breaks down. These two aspects of the process can be built into a comparative definition of relevance in the following manner:

Relevance

Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects in this context are large.
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it in this context is small.

(Sperber and Wilson 1986:125, italics as in original)

The effort required to process a stimulus in a context is the function of several factors. Wilson (1992:174) explicates the three most important of these: the complexity of the stimulus, the accessibility of the context, and the inferential effort needed to compute the contextual effects of the stimulus in that context.

The human mind is assumed to have the ability to assess the relevance of assumptions through monitoring the physico-chemical changes that are caused by the mental processes involved in comprehension. Since mental effects and mental effort are non-representational properties of these processes, relevance must be non-representational, too: it arises as a by-product of mental processes and if it is ever represented, it is represented in the form not of quantitative, but rather of comparative judgements (Sperber and Wilson 1986:132).

An individual will only pay attention to a stimulus when he can expect that it will prove relevant to him. Thus, when a communicator produces a stimulus with the intention to convey a certain set of assumptions, she will have to, in a way, implicitly promise the audience that, on the one hand, the stimulus will lead to the desired effects and, on the other, it will not take more effort than is necessary for achieving these effects. This requirement is at the heart of ostensive-inferential communication and is called the principle of relevance:

Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986:158).
By *optimal relevance* we shall mean that the processing of a stimulus leads to contextual effects that are worth the audience’s attention and, moreover, that it puts the audience to no unnecessary processing effort in achieving those effects.

Importantly, the principle of relevance is not something that participants of a communicative act must be aware of and must ‘obey’ in the way that Grice’s co-operative principle and maxims are mutually acknowledged and observed (or flouted) by them – it is a general characteristic that automatically applies to every act of ostensive-inferential communication, without exception.

The task of the audience, looking for the informative intention of the communicator, is to make hypotheses about it and pick the one that the communicator can be thought to have believed that it would confirm the presumption of optimal relevance. Such an interpretation is called *consistent with the principle of relevance* (Sperber of Wilson 1986:166).

Now, since the order in which the interpretive hypotheses are processed also affects their relevance, the principle of relevance has the very important consequence that the audience is entitled to accept as correct the first interpretation which is tested and found consistent with the principle of relevance.

There is still one open question here. The success of the communication process crucially depends on whether the stimulus is sought to achieve relevance in the context envisaged by the communicator. How the audience is able to choose the proper context is the topic of the next section.

### 3.3.2.4. Context

The addressee of a communication will naturally aim at maximising the relevance of the ostensive stimulus (and any assumption that it makes manifest to him) by trying to strike
a balance between the effects it yields and the effort it takes to process. When such a balance is achieved, the stimulus is said to have been optimally processed (Sperber and Wilson 1986:144). A stimulus can be optimally processed only if the audience is able to construct the context in which the communicator intended her stimulus to achieve relevance.

The construction of this context can be imagined in the following way (Sperber and Wilson 1986:139-42). It is assumed that the initial context is made up of assumptions left over in the memory of the deductive device from the immediately preceding deduction. These are assumptions which have arisen as synthetic implications or have been used as premises of these implications, or have been strengthened in the process. All the other assumptions are erased and transferred to some short-term memory store. This immediately given context can be extended in different ways.

First, the context may be extended by adding to it assumptions derived or used in previous deductions, which can still be retrieved from short-term memory. Second, the extension may be made by adding the encyclopaedic entries (or parts of them) of concepts already in the context or in the assumption that is being processed. This means retrieving information from encyclopaedic memory. Third, it is also possible to add to the context information about the directly observable physical environment through the perceptual faculties. These possibilities together determine a maximal context but it would be absurd to think that all these extensions necessarily and automatically take place. What this would entail is a major increase of processing effort and, consequently, a substantial decrease in relevance.

How, then, is the actual context of the deductive process determined? It is selected in accordance with the principle of relevance. When the audience presumes that the ostensive stimulus is consistent with the principle of relevance, he
will look for a context that will support this presumption: a context that enables him to maximise the relevance of the given stimulus. Obviously, since context selection also involves mental effort, optimal relevance can be achieved when this effort is smallest: with a minimal context. Thus, the context of the deductive process is not seen as given, or predetermined; it is constructed during the process as a result of the audience’s natural search for relevance. It may be interesting to note here that the idea of gradual context construction is not new at all: it is expressed, for example, by the principle of local interpretation, which instructs the addressee of an utterance not to build a context any larger than necessary to arrive at an interpretation (Brown and Yule 1983:59); what is new is that the process of context construction is explained as a natural consequence of a general principle of communication.

3.4. Linguistic communication

3.4.1. Language and inferential communication

A grammar, in the Chomskyan sense, is a code pairing phonetic representations with semantic representations. A language, then, can be seen as a set of well-formed formulas, made up of combinations of items drawn from the lexicon of the language, which are generated by this code, or grammar. In other words, a language is a code-governed representational system.

In our cognitive framework, linguistic information is processed by a specialised input system: the language module, which automatically decodes any linguistic stimulus perceived by the individual, producing as output mental formulas that we call semantic representations. These representations, however, are still too abstract in the sense that they are, normally, semantically incomplete: they are not full-fledged assumptions but rather assumption schemas, which need to be inferentially
developed before they can represent a definite state of affairs in some (actual or possible) world.

Linguistic communication thus involves two layers: a coding/decoding process and an ostensive/inferential process. The former is subservient to the latter in that the output of linguistic processing serves as the input for the central process of inferencing, in which the audience uses semantic representations as a source of hypotheses and evidence about the communicator’s communicative intentions.

The audience of a linguistic communication has a very complex inferential task. First, he has to assign a unique propositional form to the utterance. This may involve disambiguation, that is selecting one of the semantic representations assigned to the sentence by the grammar, reference assignment and the specification of vague terms. An utterance, however, does not merely express a proposition: it expresses it in a certain mood. The second (but by no means the last) task of the audience is thus to identify the communicator’s propositional attitude on the basis of the linguistically encoded mood of the utterance.

The commonplace case when an utterance communicates its own propositional form, that is when this propositional form is part of the intended interpretation, is called an ordinary assertion. In such a case, when an assumption communicated by the utterance is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance, we call this assumption an explicature. The situation is different, of course, with figurative or non-assertive utterances: here the propositional form of the utterance is not an explicature because it is not part of the intended interpretation. When an assumption is communicated otherwise, we call it an implicature (Sperber and Wilson 1986:182). Then, all the intended analytic implications of a logical form encoded by the utterance are explicatures, and all the intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises)
with all the intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions) of that logical form are implicatures. What an utterance communicates consists, thus, in its explicatures and implicatures.

3.4.2. Descriptive and interpretive language use

In an ordinary assertion, all the analytic and contextual implications of the proposition expressed by the utterance are exactly the same as those that the communicator actually intended to communicate: this proposition is a literal interpretation of a thought of the communicator’s. The resemblance between a proposition and a thought, of course, is normally less than literal. A proposition expressed by an utterance will normally be only a partial interpretation of a thought, where they will share some, but not all, of their analytic and/or contextual implications. We will say that a propositional form and a thought or more generally, since a thought is a mental representation with a propositional form, two propositional forms interpretively resemble one another in a context to the extent that they share their analytic and contextual implications in that context (Wilson and Sperber 1988:138).

Compare, for instance, the following two propositions (supposing that they are about the same person).

(14) James is a father.
(15) James has a daughter.

Clearly, both (14) and (15) analytically imply, among other things, (16a and b), whereas (16c) is only implied by (15):

(16) (a) James is a parent.
     (b) James has a child.
     (c) James has a female child.
Thus, we can say that the two propositions interpretively resemble each other, while this resemblance is less than complete. An important point here is that interpretive resemblance is a matter of degree: it may range from the case of complete, or literal, resemblance through partial to marginal resemblance.

This notion of interpretive resemblance can be extended to cover resemblance between utterances, but certain problems need to be considered, as Gutt (1991:39-44) points out. To begin with, some utterances (greetings like ‘hello’ or proper nouns like ‘James’) have no logical forms and thus cannot be developed into full-fledged propositions. They can, however, still resemble each other in their interpretations. If James says hello to me, I can interpret his utterance through a description of it in the form of ‘James has greeted me informally’, which does have a propositional form.

Secondly, two utterances with identical propositional forms (active-passive pairs, for instance) may communicate different things because the form of the utterance can also constrain the way in which it is interpreted in the given context. Conversely, the same utterance may convey different interpretations because interpretations are relevance-dependent and relevance is itself dependent on the context, and thus the interpretation of an utterance is a function of the context in which it arises.

These problems are avoided if we generalise the definition of interpretive resemblance in the following way: “two utterances, or even more generally, two ostensive stimuli, interpretively resemble one another to the extent that they share their explicatures and implicatures (Gutt 1991:44)”. This definition allows for stimuli that either have a propositional form or do not and it is also context-sensitive inasmuch as explicatures and implicatures arise in context.
Now an utterance is a public representation of a thought of the speaker’s. A representation with a propositional form can represent things in two ways: either in virtue of its propositional form being true of a state of affairs, that is descriptively, or in virtue of a resemblance between its propositional form and the propositional form of some other representation, that is interpretively (Sperber and Wilson 1986:228-9). Thus, in a strict sense, every utterance is an interpretation of a thought (which, in turn, may be a descriptive representation of a state of affairs). It does not necessarily have to be a literal interpretation — and in most cases it is not. The audience can judge the closeness of the interpretation on the basis of the principle of relevance. A thought, in turn, may be in an interpretive relationship with another thought or in a descriptive relationship with some state of affairs. Sperber and Wilson (1986:231) argue that all the basic tropes and illocutionary forces can be explained in this way: metaphor involves an interpretive relation between the propositional form of an utterance and a thought; irony involves an interpretive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and thoughts or utterances attributed to others; interrogatives and exclamatives involve an interpretive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and desirable thoughts; assertion involves a descriptive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and a state of affairs; and requesting and advising involve a descriptive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and a desirable state of affairs. Sperber and Wilson (1986:233) claim that since a communicator aims at optimal relevance and since there is no reason to assume that the optimally relevant expression is always the most literal interpretation of a thought, literal language use is to be considered a limiting case rather than the norm. Very often, for example, it is in the interest of the speaker to intentionally avoid literalness and in this way
extend the range of possible implicatures of her utterance, thereby reducing the amount of responsibility she has to take for what she says. Poetic effects, like metaphor, are also explained in this framework as the result of a wide range of relatively weak implicatures: the richer the variety of weak contextual effects and the greater the audience’s responsibility for constructing them, the more beautiful, surprising and effective a poetic expression is. Poetry builds on weak impressions, while scientific language, for instance, tends to build on the use of explicatures. Differences in style can thus be explained, at least partly, as differences in the way that relevance is achieved: by greater or lesser reliance on implicature (Sperber and Wilson 1986:224).
Chapter Four
Translation as Interpretation

In Chapter Two I argued that neither the equivalence-based nor the communicative function-based approaches can provide a complete and consistent answer to the question of what translation really is. While we obviously have an intuitive knowledge of what makes a translation a translation, if we want to be able to provide a systematic and explicit characterisation of the nature of the translation process, it will have to be done, I argued along with Steiner (1975/92) and Gutt (1991), in terms of a suitable theory of communication. Such a theory, Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory, was outlined in Chapter Three. This chapter, then, will show how the nature of translation can be explicated within the bounds of this theory, as presented in Gutt (1991).

4.1. Translation as interpretation: a first approximation

Today it is commonly accepted that translation is more than just mere manipulation of language or linguistic utterances – it is a form of interlingual or, in a wider sense, intercultural communication. The essential question here is how translation is different from other forms of communication.

One specific characteristic of communication through translation is, of course, that it involves, apart from the original or source communicator, an extra communicator who mediates between the source communicator and the target of the translation process, the target audience. In this respect, translation seems similar to the situation where in a noisy place somebody has to render the words of the person standing on his right side to the one standing on the left (even though they may all share a common language). What makes the rendering of the message necessary here is the noise that
blocks the channel of communication between the source communicator and the target audience.

There are then other situations in which the signal, even if familiar to the audience, does not seem to make sense. This reminds us of the case of sophisticated texts on elaborate topics (linguistics or communication, for instance), where the reader, although familiar with the language, will be puzzled at what the language conveys and will ask for the help of somebody who can explain or interpret the text for him.

Translation, however, is different from these cases in that the interference of a mediator is necessitated not simply because the signal needs to be amplified or because the audience cannot make sense of it but mainly because the signal itself is unintelligible to the audience. Thus translation may be seen as a form of communication where the translator, a mediator, interprets the source communicator’s message for the target audience, as the audience is incapable of interpreting it for himself, either because for some reason he cannot identify the source signals or because he does not possess the necessary background information for making sense of them.

Unfortunately, this definition of translation as an interpretive communicative process is still too wide and imprecise in that it allows for the inclusion within its bounds of phenomena which are not normally thought of as instances of translation, such as hermeneutic interpretation or reading to a child. However, it puts into focus the notion of interpretation, which may serve as the starting point of the quest for a more rigorous definition of translation.

4.2. Interpretation

We saw in Chapter Three that interpretation is an inferential process whereby the audience infers from the stimulus the intended meaning of the communicator. For this to happen, the audience must use the set of contextual assumptions envisaged
by the communicator, otherwise the communication may fail. Let us call the situation when this condition is fulfilled a *primary communication situation*, and the second where the audience uses a more or less different set of contextual assumptions a *secondary communication situation* (Gutt 1991:73). These notions are more explicit formulations of the ones introduced in section 2.1.3.2.

A secondary communication situation will often result in a misinterpretation. An observation to this effect appears in Seleskovich (1977), where she notes that problems in the process of interpretation arise when the translator lacks the necessary knowledge of the world and/or of the *cognitive context* (of the text) which can enable her to work out the *non-verbal sense* of the text on the basis of its *linguistic meaning*. Gutt (1991) lists four kinds of misinterpretations which may arise when a linguistic utterance is interpreted against a context different from the one that was actually intended by the communicator:

- The use of wrong contextual assumptions can lead to the choice of the wrong semantic representation;
- A wrong context may lead to the derivation of a wrong propositional form;
- Wrong contextual assumptions can prevent the identification of a propositional form as an intended explication or as only a source of implicatures;
- A wrong context can also lead to the derivation of implicatures not intended or, vice versa, to the loss of implicatures actually intended by the communicator (p. 73).

Translation, of course, often occurs in secondary communication situations. An important question here is whether a given message (set of assumptions intended by the
communicator) can be communicated in such a situation and to what extent.

According to relevance theory an act of communication can only be successful if it achieves relevance in a given set of contextual assumptions, and relevance is defined in terms of contextual effects and processing effort. Now relevance is clearly context-dependent: a given set of assumptions to be communicated that yields an appropriate number of contextual effects may fail to do so in a different context and thus the communication may break down. Alternatively, it can break down because the effort needed to work out these contextual effects in a secondary context may be gratuitously great, leading to a loss of interest in the communication on the part of the audience. As Bell (1991) writes, this is the point, the threshold of termination, “where the reader has got enough out of the text and/or feels that, in cost-benefit terms, there is little point in continuing” (p. 213).

It is then a gross oversimplification of matters to say that a given message can always be communicated through translation: it is only possible if the secondary context makes it possible to communicate that message. And this is exactly what Steiner says when he writes “not everything can be translated now” (Steiner 1975/92:262, italics as in original). Some things may defy translation at a given moment but through changes of context and language may become translatable in the future.

Translators, too, have long been (even if only intuitively) aware of this fact. This is manifest in translations which are addressed to an audience essentially different from the original one, for instance when a great classic of American literature like The Last of the Mohicans by James Fennimore Cooper was rendered into Hungarian by Ádám Réz in such a way that long politico-historical descriptive passages were eliminated for the obvious reason that the
translation was done for children, who would not be interested in these or, rather, would not be prepared to interpret such descriptions, all of which might result in the child reader losing interest and putting the book down. Thus in such a case it may be a wise decision on the part of the translator to leave out these parts, in order to ensure that the communication as a whole would be successful.

In sum, the primary question in translation is not in what way a given message can be communicated in the target language but whether it is communicable at all in the context of the receiving culture, in the given communicative situation, in consistency with the principle of relevance; all other considerations follow from the answer given to this fundamental question. Thus, as Gutt (1991) writes, the translator, first of all, needs to clarify for herself whether the original informative intention is communicable in the given circumstances or it needs to be modified, and only then can she start thinking about the question of exactly how her communicative intention may be formulated (p. 180).

4.3. Translation as interlingual interpretive use
If, as is most often the case, the same informative intention cannot be conveyed in the secondary context, then it will need to be altered in order to make it communicable, while ensuring at the same time that only such changes are effected as absolutely necessary to achieve this purpose. Translation can then be seen as the act of communicating in the secondary context an informative intention that interpretively resembles the original one as closely as possible under the given conditions. This entails that the principle of relevance in translation is manifested as a presumption of optimal resemblance: the translation is "(a) presumed to interpretively resemble the original [...]

and (b) the resemblance it shows is to be consistent with the presumption
of optimal relevance” (Gutt 1991:101). In other words: the translation should resemble the original in such a way that it provides adequate contextual effects and it should be formulated in such a manner that the intended interpretation can be recovered by the audience without undue processing effort.

The following example, taken from Péter Esterházy’s Hrabal könyve (Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1990, p. 10) and its English translation by Judith Sollosy (Quartet Books, London, 1993, p. 4) will perhaps elucidate what optimal resemblance means in translation.

(17) Volt cukrászda, két konkurens kocsma, melyet mindenki a régi nevén hívott, a Serház meg a Kondász...

(18) There was a café of sorts and two rival taverns, which everyone called by their old names, the Beerhall and the Kondász...

The problem here is that the encyclopaedic entry of the Hungarian word ‘ser’ contains an assumption to the effect that the expression is old-fashioned, it is not used any longer, and evokes the atmosphere of “the golden days” of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Since in this part of the book the writer describes the layering upon each other of the past and present, this assumption definitely has some contextual importance here. However, the English word ‘beer’ does not carry a comparable assumption and this part of the context is thus lost in the translation. On the other hand, it has a near synonym in English, ‘ale’, which does contain in its encyclopaedic entry the assumption, waking images of the past, that this drink is brewed in the traditional way, without adding hops. Moreover, the related compound ‘alehouse’ is further loaded with the encyclopaedic assumption that the expression is outdated, old-fashioned, and its use in the
translation would thus have resulted in the closest possible interpretive resemblance to the original. Here, in my opinion, the translator committed a mistake: she let part of the context be lost without a good reason, since the preservation of the encyclopaedic assumption in question would not have caused a considerable increase of processing effort.

We have arrived at, then, a definition of translation which seems to provide all the necessary conditions to guide the translator:

They determine in what respects the translation should resemble the original - only in those respects that can be expected to make it adequately relevant to the receptor language audience. They determine also that the translation should be clear and natural in expression in the sense that it should not be unnecessarily difficult to understand (Gutt 1991:102).

These conditions, among other things, seem to explain why it is preferred that the translator translate into her mother tongue (or her “language of habitual use”, as is sometimes allowed). The translator, on the one hand, has to be able to predict what assumptions might be present in the audience’s cognitive environment and this is most likely when they share a common culture. And, on the other hand, she has to possess an ease of expression in the target language which is normally possible only in the mother tongue. That is, in most cases the translator will be familiar with the cultural context and also with the language to an extent sufficient to enable her to satisfy the above conditions only in her mother tongue and very rarely in a foreign language.

The above definition also accounts for another interesting problem, namely that although the degree of resemblance between translation and original can always be increased, for
some reason it often seems undesirable. We can now explain why this is so: exactly because the increase in resemblance may be accompanied by an increase of processing effort which might outweigh the gains in contextual effects. The two factors, contextual effects and processing effort need to be carefully balanced by the translator, who has to accept the fact that losses in contextual effects are sometimes unavoidable in order to keep the processing effort at a reasonable level, thereby ensuring the overall success of the communication. Relevance, it needs to be kept in mind, is always a joint function of contextual effects and processing effort.

Having defined translation as an act of communication aimed at optimal resemblance to the original, it seems in order that I clarify certain points here. First of all, how should we understand the phrase “the translation optimally resembles the original”? The terms “translation” and “original” are certainly not meant here as the translated and the original text (a text, in the narrow sense, is a collection of printed marks) but as the set of assumptions they give rise to in the secondary and the primary contexts, respectively.

Second, what is the specificity of translation (as a form of interpretive language use) compared to monolingual communication? In monolingual communication the communicator communicates (that is, provides evidence, for the audience, for) her own thoughts, whereas a translator communicates (provides evidence for) the assumptions conveyed by the source text, which she has worked out in a different context and language, built on a conceptual system which is likely to be, at least partially, different from that of the secondary context (including the target language). Thus the uniqueness and the difficulty of translation lies partly in the fact that it involves second-order interpretation and partly in that it
may (and most often does) necessitate a shift between conceptual systems.

4.3.1. Direct and indirect translation

A limiting case of translation as interpretive use is when the interpretive resemblance between the translation and the original is purportedly complete: that is, when the translation “purports to allow the recovery of the originally intended interpretation interlingually” (Gutt 1991:163). In a way, this is similar to direct quotations, which may be employed to allow the recovery of the original interpretation intralingually, on condition that they are processed in the original context. Generally speaking, two stimuli may give rise to the same interpretation if and only if they are processed in the same context, because any interpretation is causally dependent on the interplay between stimulus and context.

This kind of direct translation, consequently, is only possible if the translation is processed in the original, or primary, context, otherwise the contextual differences will result in differences in contextual effects. Technically, the following definition can be adopted:

A receptor language utterance is a direct translation of a source language utterance if and only if it purports to interpretively resemble the original completely in the context envisaged for the original (Gutt 1991:163).

Naturally, in interlingual (intercultural) situations it is very rare that the original context should be available in the target culture. It is possible perhaps in circumstances where different language communities have shared the same geographical, political, and economic environment for a long enough time to eliminate major cultural differences but in
most cases the secondary communication situation will be substantially different to exclude the possibility of direct translation. This, then, implies that the default case is not direct but indirect translation, which covers various grades of interpretive resemblance.

Consider, for an illustration of the exposition above, example 19, taken from an interview with Clint Eastwood by Ginny Dougarry (The Times Magazine, 28 March 1998, p. 19):

(19) In the early Fifties, during his two-year stint in the US Army, he had a casual relationship with a schoolteacher in Carmel. When he attempted to end the affair, she turned violent. Did it frighten him? “Yeah, it gave me the spooks,” he says. “It wasn’t a homicide — someone trying to kill me. But it was someone stalking me and threatening to kill themself.”

What is interesting here is the use of the pronominal form ‘themself’, when the referent is clearly a female person. Naturally, anyone familiar with the present-day American cultural context will realise that this is probably the result of a somewhat exaggerated effort to comply with expectations of political correctness. Thus (19) conveys the following implicature:

(20) Clint is trying to be PC.

Now what could a Hungarian translator do with the last sentence? Let us first suppose she assumes that her average Hungarian reader knows nothing about what PC means in America and she does not consider it possible to introduce this notion within the limits of the given translation task. In this case, assumption (20) will, most probably, be completely lost, and the result will be an instance of indirect translation, since
Let us now suppose that the translator assumes her reader to be familiar with the concept of PC, that is, she assumes that the translation operates in the same context as the original does. Then she could try to look for a solution that will convey assumption (20) in the Hungarian text, thereby achieving complete interpretive resemblance, in this respect at least, between (19) and the translation, which can thus said to be an instance of direct translation.

Parenthetically, my guess is that in this particular case the assumption is likely to be lost because the difference concerning pronominal gender contrast between the two languages would probably make the preservation of the assumption too effort-consuming and would thus threaten the optimal relevance of the translation.

Therefore, it seems that here the translation is doomed to be somewhat indirect but, regarding that (20) is a relatively weak implicature, no serious damage occurs — unless, of course, (20) will later be needed as part of the context.

4.3.2. Conditions and corollaries of direct translation

The notion of direct translation, however, sheds light on some important points. First of all, complete interpretive resemblance can only be aimed at if the translator herself is capable of performing a thorough interpretation of the original (Gutt 1991:164). If this condition is not fulfilled, then the translation cannot even purport to be direct, in the true sense of the term. What this entails is the requirement for the translator to be thoroughly familiar with not only the two languages but also with the two cultures (cultural contexts) in question.

Second, direct translation may serve as a useful means of familiarising the target audience with the source culture by
communicating to him the original informative intention. On the other hand, the originally intended interpretation, as we have seen, is only communicable in the original context, which entails that the target audience needs to have, or seek, access to all of this contextual background information. This means that the translator has to look for ways to provide such information and it also points to the fact that direct translation in many cases requires some extra effort on the part of the audience as well, in the hope of gaining a full understanding of the original message.

Thirdly, as Gutt (1991) points out, in such circumstances a crucial requirement, in order that the communication does not fail, is that the audience be explicitly made aware by the translator of the intended degree of resemblance between the original and the translation in a translator's foreword or otherwise (p. 183).

Finally, the translator, as any communicator, has to make sure that her communicative intentions are in accordance with the expectations of the audience. If she thinks that the intended target audience will not be able or willing to exert the extra effort demanded by a direct translation then she will be bound to choose another approach to the given translation task, in order to ensure the success of the communication (Gutt 1991:185).

4.4. Conclusions
The notion of translation as interpretive language use is based on the view that translation is a form of communication and, as such, can be accounted for in terms of the relevance theory of communication. This implies that the theory of translation is a natural part of the theory of communication and that any translation principle, rule or guideline is an application of the principle of relevance and "all the aspects of translation [...]", including matters of evaluation, are
explicable in terms of the interaction of context, stimulus and interpretation” through this principle (Gutt 1991:188).

Of course, the importance of the context had already been realised by the communicative-functional approaches to translation as well. Polysystem theory, skopos theory, and the action theory of translation all pointed out that a translation is always the product of a specific context, including various factors such as cultural conventions, the circumstances and expectations of the target reader, or the intended purpose of the translation and thus the content of the translation is effectively determined by these factors. As a consequence, in these theories the source text is relegated, from the status of the absolute measure of evaluation, to that of a mere stimulus or source material and the success of the translation is measured by its functional adequacy in the target context. In this, these approaches can be regarded as the forerunners of relevance theory. What I see as a major advantage of relevance theory is that, contrary to them, it actually explicates what adequacy means in a context: a text is adequate in a context inasmuch as it achieves optimal resemblance in it. (We could even redefine the notion of equivalence, as a limiting case of adequacy, as the instance of complete interpretive resemblance of the translation to the original - in the primary communicative context, of course.) This sort of explicitness is not offered by any of the previous three theories.

As for the objection to the application of relevance theory to translation, voiced among others by Tirkkonen-Condit (1992), concerning the vagueness of the criteria by which the translator can decide what is relevant in a context, the answer is that, on the one hand, no other theory has ever come close to providing nearly as explicit a definition of what relevance means in communication and, on the other hand, eventually the success of an act of translation, as of all
communication, is the responsibility of the translator-communicator – it depends on how well she assesses the cognitive environment of the assumed target reader.

Another critical observation concerning Gutt’s theory is that he does not try to link his statements to the notions and categories of earlier, more traditional, theories of translation. This, I believe, is not a shortcoming but the natural result of his intention to break away from the descriptive-classificatory approach. Gutt’s theory is not a translation theory in the traditional sense but, rather, the application of a general communication theory to translation. As such, it is not in the strict sense part of what we may call the traditional literature on translation since, instead of using concepts worked out specifically for describing translation, it attempts to refine an already existing conceptual apparatus in order to make it more general in scope, enabling it to handle an even wider range of communication phenomena.

Having now established the general theoretical framework, I shall move on, in Chapter Five, to provide on the basis of the theory a descriptive account of the processes at work in the translation of proper names. The chief concern of this chapter will be to show that the handling of proper names in translation is not in any way special: it is governed basically by the principle of relevance, just like that of any other linguistic expression. Chapter Six, in turn, will present two empirical studies, which will serve as a testing ground for, in particular, the findings of Chapter Five and, in general, the claims of the theory of relevance as it relates to translation.
5.0. Introduction and outline

In this chapter I shall look at some of the typical problems that the translator is likely to face when encountering proper names in the text she is working on. At first glance it may seem that nothing is easier than finding a satisfactory solution to these problems, or that, in fact, there is no real problem here to resolve at all.

The translation of proper names has often been considered a simple automatic process of transference from one language into another, due to the view that proper names are nothing but mere labels used to identify a person or a thing. This is exactly what Zeno Vendler purports when he writes that “proper names have no meaning (in the sense of ‘sense’ and not of ‘reference’), which is borne out by the fact that they do not require translation into another language” (Vendler 1975:117). To reinforce this statement he argues that we do not find proper names listed in dictionaries, which also shows that they are not part of our knowledge of the language. In his view, then, proper names are to be treated as labels, which are attached to persons or objects and the only task of the translator is to carry them over, or transfer them (I will return to this concept later in Section 5.6), from the source language text to the target language text. Basically the same is maintained by Sciarone (1967), who argues, in a much similar vein, that the view that proper names have no meaning (from the point of view of the language system) is corroborated by the general practice of leaving them unchanged in translation (p. 86).

It has been shown, however, by authors like Searle (1975) or Strawson (1975) that this view is mistaken: proper names, beyond their identifying function, may also carry ‘senses’.
The fallacy of this view thus lies in the incorrectness of the background assumption: not all proper names are mere identifying labels - in fact, most of them turn out to carry meaning of one sort or another. This will entail, then, that the translation of proper names is not a trivial issue but, on the contrary, may involve a rather delicate decision-making process, requiring on the part of the translator careful consideration of the function the proper name fulfills in the context of the source language text and culture and, also, of the function that it is to fulfill in the context of the target language text and culture. In relevance-theoretic terms we would say that the translator needs to carefully consider the contextual implications of the meanings the name has before she can decide how best to render the name in the target language.

After it has been clarified, in section 5.1, what we mean by the term proper name, in section 5.2 I will show that the view of names as mere labels is based on faulty assumptions, as will become clear from contrasting Vendler’s observations with those of Strawson and Searle. We shall see that proper names are not simple identifying labels but may also have some sort of meaning, or meanings, of their own, which will, of course, have significant consequences in the process of translation.

These consequences, following a discussion of the meaning of proper names in a relevance-theoretic framework in section 5.3 and issues concerning the traditional classification and recognition of proper names in section 5.4, are examined in section 5.5. Examples from the different classes of proper names will be drawn to demonstrate the various kinds of problems that the translator has to face with regard to proper names.

Section 5.6 provides a summary of the possible techniques that can be applied to solve the various problems. It is
suggested that in translating a proper name the translator has four basic operations at her disposal: transference, translation proper, substitution and modification, which are here systematically defined and explained in relevance-theoretic terms.

In the final section I shall conclude that the translation of proper names is not at all a matter of course, but that it is a subtle decision-making process involving a number of factors ranging from elements of the primary communicative situation, including the SL culture and language, to the secondary communicative situation, including the TL culture and language, and requires careful consideration of all of these factors on the part of the translator.

5.1. What is a proper name?

Before I turn to the question of meaning, I will have to clarify first what a proper name is. So far I have been content with an implicit understanding of the concept but a detailed characterisation of the problem as a whole requires that the definition is made more or less explicit.

Let us begin our search for a suitable elucidation of the term by quoting some definitions from various English and Hungarian sources.

When we use proper names we utilize words for the denotation of specific objects (Sciarone 1967:81).

Proper nouns are basically names, by which we understand the designation of specific people, places and institutions [...]. Moreover, the concept of name extends to some markers of time and to seasons that are also festivals (Monday, March, Easter, Passover, Ramadan) (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990:86–7).
A proper noun (sometimes called a ‘proper name’) is used for a particular person, place, thing or idea which is, or is imagined to be, unique (Alexander 1988:38). Nouns that are really names are called proper nouns. Proper nouns usually refer to a particular, named person or thing (Hardie 1992:122).

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Later on they give the following types of proper names: personal names, animal names, geographical names, names of institutions and organisations, titles of pieces of art, periodicals and newspapers, and brand names. This list is probably not meant to be exhaustive – it is still interesting to note that while in the English-speaking tradition the concept is generally supposed to include the names of days,
months, and seasons, it is not so in the Hungarian linguistics tradition.

There seem to be some inconsistencies in these definitions. First, they do not make clear the difference between a proper noun and a proper name. Proper nouns like ‘Michael’ or ‘Exeter’ form a subclass of the grammatical class of nouns, whereas proper names are simple or composite expressions formed with words from any of the common word classes. In Huddleston’s terms, a proper name is “the institutionalized name of some specific person, place, organization, etc. - institutionalized by some formal act of naming and/or registration” (Huddleston 1988:96). A proper name may of course be constituted of a single proper noun, but it can also be formed with the help of words from any other word class. For instance, an adjective like ‘Fluffy’ would make a good name for a dog, or a noun phrase like ‘The Green Dragon’ might well be used for a pub name.

Then, it is also somewhat unclear what these definitions mean by saying that proper names denote, designate, name, are used for, refer to, or identify particular entities. It appears that these sources base their definitions on the typical function of these linguistic expressions, which is to refer to, or single out, a unique object or class of objects in the act of communication. However, as we shall see later in the next section, a name need not always be used to refer to particular objects. Just to give one example here, it is absolutely acceptable to utter something like “I’ve never known anybody called Donald in my life”, where the name is not in a unique relationship with any individual but is rather used to attribute a property to a group of entities. In the next section I now turn to the question of the ‘senses’ and functions of proper names.
5.2. Do proper names have senses?

When we hear the word ‘flower’, it immediately conjures up in our minds certain sensual images: we think of an attractive, fresh, colourful, and nice-smelling thing. When, on the other hand, we hear a proper name like ‘Stewart’, very probably no such sensual images are awakened – we merely think of some person we know whose name is Stewart (if there is anybody at all whom we know by this name). Thus it would seem that, as Vendler put it, proper names lack ‘meaning’ in the sense that they do not have connotations, in contrast with common names, for example, which do.

What happens, however, when you happen to hear about some person whose name is ‘Flower’? In this case, you will perhaps think, even though you may not know that person, that such a nice name must belong to a nice woman too. (Or, as was pointed out to me, that her parents must have belonged to the flower-power generation of the 60’s.) In this example, then, the mentioning of the name has invited some expectation on your part as to the personality of the bearer of that name (or to the personality of her parents, for that matter). In other words, it has evoked certain connotations. You might argue that the proper name ‘Flower’ coincides in form with the common name ‘flower’ and it is only by virtue of this coincidence that the proper name has a ‘meaning’. Let us not go further with the example now, I will return to it later in section 5.5.

Nevertheless, this example shows that the question posed as the heading for this section may not be as simple as it first seemed. It may not be enough to say that proper names simply denote a person or an object, or that they refer to, or identify, that person or object without having anything else to do with it. In order to be able to answer this question we must first have a look at the various other types of referring
expressions which are used to identify objects in the world around us.

As we read in Strawson,

The language contains expressions of several celebrated kinds which are peculiarly well adapted, in different ways, for use with this [identifying] purpose. These include proper names, definite and possessive and demonstrative descriptions, demonstrative and personal pronouns (1975:88).

We can thus distinguish three classes of such expressions: proper names, identifying descriptions, and pronouns. As to this latter class, it contains grammatical words, which are clearly only tools for referring and thus bear no relevance to the problem. But what can be said about identifying descriptions and proper names? To be more precise, what relationship holds between these two classes of expressions? If we can establish that proper names are in some way similar to identifying descriptions, this will prove that they do not merely refer to, but also provide some sort of description about the referent, which amounts to saying that they do have 'senses'. Searle puts the problem the following way:

‘Do proper names have senses?’ What this question asks, as a start, is what, if any, similarity is there between the way a definite description picks out its referent and the way a proper name picks out its referent. Is a proper name really a shorthand description (1975:134)?

As a first step to answer this question we must introduce the principle of identification, which may be formulated as follows:
A necessary condition for the successful performance of a definite reference in the utterance of a description is that the description must be an identifying description or the speaker must be able to produce an identifying description on demand (Searle 1975:134).

In accordance with this principle, Searle argues, when somebody uses a proper name, he must be able to substitute an identifying description of the referent of the proper name, otherwise he would violate the principle of identification and, consequently, would fail to perform a definite reference. These considerations lead Searle to say that “a proper name must have a sense, and that the identifying description constitutes that sense” (1975:138). This is very much like what Frege proposed when he identified the meaning (sense) of a proper name with a description of what it designates (its denominatum) (Frege 1990:191).

Searle’s conclusion, then, is that even though proper names are not descriptions themselves, they are in a “loose sort of way” connected with the characteristics of the referent (1975:139). Thus a proper name can be said to have a sense, but this sense is radically different from that of definite descriptions insofar as in the latter case the sense is definite and precise, whereas in the case of proper names it is imprecise. Moreover, this imprecision of sense is a necessary criterion for proper names, otherwise they would be nothing more than shorthand descriptions and would consequently lose their pragmatic convenience in enabling us to avoid having to provide a precise description of the characteristics of the object we are referring to when we do not want to. He finishes:

They function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions. The looseness of the criteria of proper
names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language (1975:140).

This point is also made by Balázs (1963), stating that, of necessity, every proper name may be associated with a definition-like synonym. Moreover, a name can also have a particular stylistic value (p. 51).

It can be said, then, that proper names are not empty marks for reference, but they may also carry certain added meanings and that although these meanings may be imprecise, they are nonetheless an important and inalienable property of the proper name. To quote Searle again, the “utterance of the name communicates a proposition to the hearer” (1975:140). This has to be kept in mind during translation, because this will have a bearing on the decisions concerning the treatment of proper names. These consequences will be examined in detail in section 5.5.

Another related point concerns the possible uses of proper names. A question arises here with regard to the specificity, or uniqueness, of the entity that bears the name. What do we do with stock names like ‘Emma’? There may be thousands of people with this name at any particular time in history. For a solution, we have to clarify what it means that a name refers to an entity. The term reference is commonly taken to characterise the relationship between a variable in a propositional representation and the value which is assigned to it on a particular occasion of use. Thus the referents of the name ‘Emma’ on two different occasions of utterance may well be two different persons. Words, as such, “do not have reference, but may be used as referring expressions or, more commonly, as components of referring expressions in particular contexts of utterance” (Lyons 1995:79). Reference as a variable, context-dependent relationship is then to be
differentiated from *denotation*, which is not utterance-dependent but invariant within the language system. (It will be interesting to note that some authors, such as J. Soltész (1979), use the term denotation when they mean reference. J. Soltész actually identifies the meaning of a proper name with its ‘denotation’ (p. 32), which is definitely not a fruitful approach.) Thus we find that while the denotation of an expression is part of the semantics of a language, reference belongs to the realm of pragmatics. A name, on a particular occasion, may refer to an entity without denoting it.

This is in correspondence with what Donellan (1975) writes about the *attributive* and *referential uses* of definite descriptions: “In the attributive use, the attributive of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential use” (p. 102). In effect, here he is making a distinction between describing something as such-and-such and referring to something by using a certain description, in the act of which “the speaker may say something true even though the description correctly applies to nothing” (Donellan 1975:110). For example, we may successfully refer to somebody at a party as ‘the man drinking Martini’, even if the person in question is in fact drinking something else. The interesting thing, then, is that proper names and definite descriptions are not essentially different with respect to reference: both can be used to refer successfully without providing a truthful description (Donellan 1975:113).

Probably the only difference between these two kinds of expression is that proper names are used primarily (though by no means exclusively) for referring, while other definite descriptions may just as often be used attributively, in Donellan’s terms. However, a name can also be used attributively, less often but entirely legitimately. Consider the following example. In an utterance of the sentence “That boy is a real Pele”, the name ‘Pele’ is used not to refer to
any unique entity (the world famous footballer) but to attribute certain flattering qualities to the referent of ‘that boy’, concerning his skills in football. This use of proper names is normally signalled by the presence of either a definite or indefinite determiner.

5.3. The meaning of a proper name

We have seen that a proper name can be used referentially and attributively, and in both cases some meaning has to be assigned to it. The question is, what sort of meaning, or meanings? Lyons’s (1995) view is that names have no descriptive content (denotation) but may have shared associations (connotations) (p. 295). My position is that this view is too simplistic. It may be true of stock names but it is certainly insufficient, for instance, with names which are based on descriptions. This seems to be supported by the fact that a descriptive name might be changed when the underlying description is no longer appropriate. Along these lines Lehrer (1992) argues that it is difficult to draw a dividing line between descriptive names and pure descriptions and, further, that most names provide some sort of information about the referent, that is, they may serve as the basis for making reasonable inferences about it (p. 127).

Let us first take a look at what the meaning of a word in general may be. A word is the name of not an object in the real world but of a concept. (Is the word ‘werewolf’ related to an object in the world? Most people today would probably agree that it is not.) The descriptive content of the concept may be broken down, in the analytical view, into its intension and extension, which are recognised by Lyons (1995) as two complementary aspects of the denotation of the concept. By its extension he means the group of entities the concept signifies, whereas its intension, as the classical theory of categorisation goes, is thought to be the set of defining
properties that delimit this group. The concept may also be loaded with various kinds of expressive (non-descriptive) content, which will be referred to as the connnotations of the concept.

This seems quite straightforward with categories like ‘circle’. A circle is a continuous line on the plane whose points are at the same distance from the centre. If this holds of a line, it is a circle; if not, it is not. (Although, even here we might wonder whether a circle has to be a continuous line or could perhaps also be broken.) But let us take another seemingly simple case: the category of ‘dog’. Everybody knows what a dog is. It is a domesticated four-legged furry animal. But then, is a poor creature that has lost a leg in some accident not worthy of the name any longer? Most would probably say it still is. Can a dog living in the wild not be called so any more? Most would probably say it can. Then maybe something is wrong with our definition. We could look one up in a dictionary. For instance, The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary gives us the following: “any four-legged flesh-eating animal of the genus Canis, of many breeds domesticated and wild, kept as pets or for work or sport”. But this is not much help, either. We see that this definition runs into the same problem concerning the denotation of the concept: the list of defining properties is not complete and, consequently, the class of entities it signifies is not clearly delimited. The definition could be amended to include more and more specific properties - there would still be an odd dog somewhere that would escape being caught up in that definition.

An ideal definition would be one that breaks down the descriptive meaning of the word into a finite set of more basic, or primitive, components that would together account for all the logical properties of the concept. This sort of componential analysis (Katz and Fodor 1963) may work well with
certain types of concepts but is notoriously problematic with others, including natural kinds like dogs, because while they may well have logical properties, these do not amount to a proper definition.

One possible solution could be to say that there is no need at all for such a definition. Instead, we might assume with Wittgenstein that membership of an entity in a specific category is determined on the basis of a partial resemblance to other members of the same category. Thus there is no need for a set of common properties that all members of the category would have to share: they are tied together by what Wittgenstein (1958) calls family resemblances.

This idea was taken further by Rosch and her co-workers who observed that in every category there are certain members which are somehow felt to be better examples than others. They found that humans have in their minds a model of what, for instance, a typical dog is like and that particular entities are assigned to the category on the basis of resemblance to this prototype, serving as a cognitive reference point (see, for instance, Rosch at al. 1976). It is important to note, however, that Rosch’s prototype theory is not, in the strict sense, a theory of meaning. As she herself writes:

Prototypes do not constitute any particular processing model for categories. [...] What facts about prototypicality do contribute to processing models is a constraint - processing models should not be inconsistent with the known facts about prototypes. [...] As with processing models, the facts about prototypes can only constrain, but do not determine, models of representation (1978:40-1).

Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest a model of conceptual structure that can accommodate examples underpinning both the
classical theory and the theory of prototype effects. In certain cases a purely logical definition can be given in terms of primitive sense components while in other cases, in the lack of such a definition, a mental model, for instance a prototype may do the job. These, however, are only two extremes of a whole spectrum of possibilities including various degrees of logical and prototypical (or other image schematic) specifications. In this relevance-theoretic framework the meaning of the concept is made up of a (truth-functional) logical entry, which may be empty, partially filled or fully definitional and an encyclopaedic entry, containing various kinds of (propositional and non-propositional) representational information about the denotation and, as I understand it, possible connotations of the concept (e.g. cultural or personal beliefs), stored in memory. The concept may also be associated with a lexical entry, which contains linguistic (phonological, morphological, semantic and categorial) information about the natural language item related to it (Sperber and Wilson 1986:83-93).

In relevance theory, then, the meaning of a name, like that of any lexical item, consists in a logical entry and an encyclopaedic entry. The three different types of information (lexical, logical and encyclopaedic) are stored in different places in memory. The logical entry contains a set of deductive rules making up, in Lyons’s terms, the intension (logical properties) of the lexical item, while the encyclopaedic entry contains information about the extension of the item (the group of entities it stands for) in the form of assumptions about it, among which we also find culturally shared and personal associations. The major difference between the logical and the encyclopaedic entries is that the former is finite and holds computational information, whereas the latter is open-ended and holds representational information (Sperber and Wilson 1986:86-9).
In this model, understanding a linguistic utterance, or in fact any other kind of assumption (defined as a structured set of concepts), involves the use of a set of deductive rules as part of a process of non-demonstrative inferencing (Sperber and Wilson 1986:65-71). It is suggested that the content of an assumption is the function of the logical entries of the concepts that it contains and the context in which it is processed is, at least partly, drawn from the encyclopaedic entries of these concepts (Sperber and Wilson 1986:89).

Prototypical proper names (that is names without a descriptive content) are handled by associating with them empty logical entries. In other (less prototypical) cases a name may also have a logical entry (or, in the case of a composite name, it may include several logical entries which combine to make up the logical content of the name) which is partly or fully definitional (Sperber and Wilson 1986:91-2). Thus names seem to be not essentially unlike any other kinds of expression in terms of the structure of their meaning. Rather, what we find here is a continuum of various sorts of proper names, ranging from the prototypical (with a primary referential function) to the non-prototypical (with a stressed attributive function), which are practically indistinguishable from other non-referring definite descriptions. The fact that I here use the terms prototypical and non-prototypical, however, is not meant to imply that prototypical names are more frequent than non-prototypical ones.

To sum up, in my understanding the category of proper names includes a wide range of expressions - in fact, the difficult thing would be to tell where the list of members in the class ends. At one end of the scale we find the most prototypical names, proper nouns, which supposedly lack any logical content but may carry several assumptions in their encyclopaedic entries. At the other extreme we have composite names made up of words from any of the lexical and grammatical
word classes: nouns, adjectives, adverbs, even verbs, prepositions, articles, auxiliaries, and so on. These names, which I call *phrasal names*, are no different in terms of logical content from any ordinary phrasal expression. What makes them names, eventually, is that they are used as such in the given context. It turns out, then, that a name is more of a pragmatic category than a semantic (or grammatical) one.

### 5.4. Classification and identification of proper names

One further question that remains unclear about our initial definitions is what sort of entities may be referred to by a proper name. Here, of course, there seems to be no reason to exclude any possible class of referents, living or inanimate, concrete or abstract, real or imaginary. The point is that a name, in a given utterance and context, singles out one unique entity or one unique class of entities which is to bind the variable represented by the name in the propositional representation of the utterance. In theory, we may distinguish as many types of proper name as many classes of entities we can discern in the world. For instance, at first glance it may seem weird that computers should have names but in actual fact they do, since the dawn of computer networks (not to mention that in the days when the first digital computers were constructed, each of those huge machines was ‘christened’). Thus, if we find it necessary, why not set up a category for the names of computers?

The classification of proper names, then, seems to be not so much of a theoretical as an empirical matter and, as such, a function of the particular task at hand. As for the use of such classification schemes in the study of translation, it would appear that it has some relevance only inasmuch as this kind of classification may be shown to reveal systematic correspondence with the meaning structure of names. Lehrer (1992) argues that in some way it does: “speakers of any
language make judgements about the appropriateness of names for things that are analogous to judgements of grammaticality, semantic well-formedness, and pragmatic acceptability” (p. 126). Such judgements are made on the basis of rule-schemes, which are characterised as different from linguistic rules “in being less complete, less permanently a part of language, and more discretionary from a speaker’s point of view” (Carrol 1985:16, cited in Lehrer 1992:127). Eventually, it seems that if traditional name classes bear some relevance in translation, it is only inconsistently and indirectly, through meaning structure, that they do and thus they can be excluded from a theoretical account.

A more interesting question for us is how we can recognise proper names in a running text. The distinction between common names and proper names is normally signalled in English orthography by the use of initial capital letters in the case of proper names. As Greenbaum and Quirk (1990) note:

Names reflect their uniqueness of reference in writing by our use of initial capitals. This device enables us, if we so wish, to raise to the uniqueness of proper name status such concepts as Fate and Heaven, including generics such as Nature, Truth, and Man (p. 86).

In this fashion, I will regard in my study (of translation from English into Hungarian) as proper names any expressions which are capitalised in a running English text (with the obvious exception of the first word of a sentence – unless it turns out to be a uniquely referring expression at the same time). As for the classification of these names (solely for descriptive reasons), I will follow a purely practical path: I will set up as many classes of them as seems necessary and reasonable for my purposes.
5.5. Problems in translating proper names

In this section we shall see that the fact that proper names may carry various meanings will pose a number of non-trivial and interesting problems for the translator, and that these problems require a lot of attention and consideration from her in order to be able to find a good solution. I shall select some typical examples from three different classes of proper names (without claiming that the list is in any way complete). The traditional classification scheme is used here as a starting point only, unlike in more conventional approaches, to make the demonstration easy to follow for the reader, but it will have no role in the systematic account of the facts.

Let us begin with the names of persons. Four cases stand out here as possible sources of problems: (1) names of famous historical figures; (2) markers concerning the gender of the person; (3) markers of family relations; and (4) names in imaginative literature.

Some famous historical personages have a constant epithet attached to their names, e.g. ‘Richard the Lionheart’, or ‘James the Lackland’. Here the epithet is clearly a description of some characteristic of the person and is to be treated as such: it needs to be translated into the TL. (Let us, for the time being, use the term translation, in a general sense, with the meaning ‘a translational operation of some sort’.) Accordingly, in Hungarian we talk about ‘Oroszlánszívű Richárd’ and ‘Földnélküli János’. Conventionally, these kings’ first names are also substituted by their closest Hungarian correspondents.

Another case is when a historical figure is so well-known in the TL culture that his name has become naturalised: ‘Martin Luther’ must be translated into Hungarian as ‘Luther Márton’, because this variant has established itself as the standard form; but Martin Luther King is never referred to in Hungarian as ‘Király Luther Márton’.
In certain languages the gender of the person is represented in the name by a particle. For example, in Vietnamese ‘Nguyen-van-An’ is the name of a man, whereas ‘Nguyen-thi-Tuet’ is the name of a woman. The infixes -van- and -thi- are markers for the male and female sexes, respectively (examples taken from Elman 1986:27). Thus, in a way, they are similar to the personal pronouns of languages like English, where these are marked for gender. When these pronouns are rendered into a language like Hungarian, which lacks gender distinction in the pronoun system, translators usually do not bother to preserve the reference to gender, unless it is made necessary by the context. Similarly, the most reasonable solution in the case of such names would appear to be to leave them as they are, since the context will probably provide clues as to whether the person in question is male or female. Alternatively, as Heltai and Pinczés (1993) suggest, the translator may remark in a footnote or otherwise on the structure of names in Vietnamese if she feels that an explanation is in order.

An endless number of examples could be drawn of markers of family relationships in the different languages. Here, however, we will be satisfied with two of them. In the Icelandic language, ‘Olaf Hilmarson’ is the name of Olaf, who is the son of Hilmar. The father, Hilmar, is the son of Vigus, so his name is ‘Hilmar Vigusson’ (examples from Elman 1986:27). The consequences of this case are very much like those of the above mentioned Vietnamese example. Here, too, it is up to the translator to choose from among the possible solutions, depending on what information seems relevant in the given context.

Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that in most (if not all) Indo-European languages the given name comes before the family name. In some other languages, however, this order is reversed, as in Hungarian or Japanese. The translator has to
be aware of this in order to avoid the misinterpretation of some situation.

It could be suggested here that most of the examples mentioned above have more to do with reference than with denotation. I would argue, however, that knowing the gender of the person, or knowing what sort of relationship that person has with others is more than just knowing that he or she is the referent of a certain name. In fact, it is stating something or communicating something about that person: it is giving a description of some characteristic of that person. We are certainly not claiming that this sort of information about a person is relevant in all contexts; there may, however, be cases when disregarding such information would lead to unnecessary losses in the TL text.

And we have not yet touched on the field of imaginative literature. This is an area where the translator can really exhibit his creative abilities. Telling names offer themselves as the most obvious example. Now we can return to the example given in section 5.2. If somebody in a work of art bears the name ‘Flower’, it may well be that it is not by pure chance, but that the author intentionally chose this name for that figure because he wanted to communicate something about this character, and the translator has to consider this possibility.

A very good example of this is found in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream. The craftsmen’s names in this play all make reference to the bearers’ profession or to their personal characteristics, or to both at the same time (Nádasdy 1994:38). Here the translator had to face a rather difficult problem: in some cases he had to make a choice as to which segment of the connotations of the name he should preserve. The name of Bottom, the weaver, for instance, is a double-bottomed reference to a part of the loom and to a part of the human body (with obvious implications). In this case Nádasdy
translated the name as ‘Tompor’, which makes reference to the aforementioned body-part but not to the tool of the trade. The tinsmith's name, ‘Snout’, is again a simultaneous allusion to the spout of a can and to the size of the character's nose. Here the name is rendered as ‘Lavór’, which simply means ‘washbasin’.

In this play, then, names are not mere tools of reference (in the technical sense of the term), they also convey information about the referents' characteristic features. In a non-imaginative text, of course, the chances for this state of affairs would obviously be far fewer. All this goes to show, then, that the type or function of the text is also an important factor in making decisions about the rendering of proper names into the TL.

Another example, which is probably one of the most famous ones in the Hungarian literary tradition, is the name of the teddy bear protagonist of Milne’s classic children’s book, ‘Winnie-the-Pooh’, which was translated by Frigyes Karinthy as ‘Micimackó’. In the technical sense of the word, it is not a translation of the original at all. What the translator did here was change the original SL name into a TL name which is not a literal equivalent of the SL item, but evokes the image of a funny and loveable teddy bear just as the SL name does in the SL text. Furthermore, the translation also preserves the contradiction which arises from the fact that although Pooh is a male teddy (or, at least, considered as such by Christopher Robin), the names he bears (‘Winnie’ and ‘Mici’) are girls’ names in both languages.

I shall now move on to consider a few problems in connection with geographical names. One is that they are subject to alterations due to the ever-changing political and social situations, and therefore the translator has to be extremely careful in selecting the appropriate TL item. It is (or at least it used to be) very much a matter of taking a
political stand, for instance, whether a translator chooses to render the Slovak name ‘Košice’ into Hungarian as ‘Kassa’ (the original Hungarian name, which is burdened with allusions concerning the past) or decides to leave it in its original SL form. Or, to take another infamous example, it is not the same if we write ‘Auschwitz’ or ‘Oświęcim’ (example taken from Newmark 1988:216), although both refer to the same location in Poland, since the two words are loaded with very different connotations. Then there are also geographical names which have become naturalised in the TL, like ‘Bécs’, the Hungarian equivalent of the German name ‘Wien’. Here the translator has usually no choice, unless for some very good reason concerning the socio-cultural halo of the word, but use the form that is conventional in the TL.

Finally, let us consider the names of objects. These include names of institutions, periodicals, proprietaries, etc. These, according to Newmark (1988), are generally left in their original SL forms. Occasional exceptions can be justified on the ground of the connotations a particular SL word may evoke in the TL culture if left unchanged. Newmark mentions the interesting case of ‘Mist’ hairspray (p. 215), the name of which translates into German as ‘filth’. Not a really lucky name for a hairspray, one would think. In this case, therefore, it would seem desirable to change the name when introducing the product in Germany. The irony of the example is that in actual fact the hairspray was introduced in Germany with the original name ‘Mist’ and yet it is alleged to have been a success. In another case, however, failure to realise the unfavourable connotations of the original name in the TL culture did lead to financial loss. In the 70’s, the Chevrolet Nova was a successful car in the United States. It came as a surprise, therefore, that it did not sell nearly as well when it was introduced into the Mexican market. The reason was simple: ‘va’ is a form of the Spanish equivalent of
the English word ‘go’, and thus ‘no-va’ would suggest that the car does not go (or is ‘no go’), which is not what is normally expected of a car.

Parenthetically, another interesting situation arises when a brand name is turned into a common name by means of a metonymic process, or when this same name further comes to be used as a verb by the process of conversion. This is the case in English with names like ‘Hoover’, ‘Xerox’ or ‘Kleenex’. The problem is that in the TL, for reasons of cultural differences, the same process(es) may not have taken place. So, for instance, whereas it is possible ‘to hoover the carpet’ in English, it is impossible to ‘kihúverozni a szőnyeget’ in Hungarian.

Many more examples could be listed, of course, but the few mentioned here will suffice to illustrate the vast range of potential problems with regard to the rendering of proper names into another language. The next section will give a short account of the techniques, or operations, that translators employ in dealing with these problems.

5.6. Operations for the translator

The authors introduced in section 1.2 offer, altogether, eight different operations (although some of those which are given under the same heading here are actually only partly overlapping). These are briefly summarised below.

(1) Transference, that is leaving the name unchanged (all, except Klaudy);

(2) Substitution of a conventional TL name (J. Soltész, Newmark, Schultze, and Tellinger);

(3) Transliteration, or naturalisation (Tarnóczi, Newmark, and Schultze);

(4) Translation (all, except Klaudy);
Modification, or total transformation (Tarnóczi, Elman, Schultze, and Klaudy);

Leaving out the name or part of it, or omission (Schultze, Heltai and Pinczés, and Klaudy);

Supplementing the name by an added element, or addition (Tarnóczi, Schultze, Heltai and Pinczés, and Klaudy); and

Generalising the meaning of the name (Klaudy).

Transference, as Newmark (1988) puts it, is “the process of transferring a SL word to a TL text as a translation procedure” (p. 81). This is essentially the same as Catford’s definition: “an operation in which the TL text, or, rather, parts of the TL text, do have values set up in the SL: in other words, have SL meanings” (1965:43, italics as in original). In simple words, this is when we decide to incorporate the SL proper name unchanged into the TL text; either because it only contributes its referent to the meaning of the utterance, or because any change would make the processing of the utterance too costly, in a relevance-theoretic sense. For example, if a translator decided that in a particular case ‘New York’ should be rendered in a Hungarian translation as ‘Újváros’, this would probably make the reader stop and think hard where this city is (probably in Hungary?) or, if the location is clear from the context, what is the relevance of the translation. It can be imagined, of course, that this translation achieves relevance in some way in a specific context but normally, I think, one would refrain from selecting such a solution here.

By substitution I will refer to those cases when the source language name has a conventional correspondent in the TL, which replaces the SL item in the translation. As we have seen, this applies to a large number of geographical names, for example. In such a case when there is a conventional correspondent available in the TL, this would seem to be the
translator’s first and natural choice: the one that comes to mind almost subconsciously, and I could almost say that the translator (in an ordinary translation situation) is more or less obliged to use this conventional correspondent in the translation (Hungarian ‘Anglia’ for English ‘England’).

This does not mean, however, that no other solution is ever possible, but any digression from the most obvious solution would need to be supported by serious reasons. In a relevance-theoretic framework we would say that a translation using a conventional correspondent is the one that requires the least processing effort and any digression, increasing the amount of processing effort, would need to be justified by a substantial gain in contextual effects.

Substitution, in my understanding, also subsumes cases where the graphological units of the SL name are replaced by TL graphological units, based on conventionally established correspondences (Hungarian ‘Moszkva’ for Russian ‘Mockba’ or Hungarian ‘Csingacsguk’ for English ‘Chingachgook’), where the TL form makes explicit the phonological value of the original expression). The inclusion of graphological substitution, traditionally called transliteration (cf., e.g., Catford 1965:66), within this operation is justified, I think, partly by the conventional nature of the correspondence between graphological units and partly by the fact that its application is motivated mainly by considerations of processing effort.

Translation, in turn, will mean “rendering the meaning of a text into another language in the way that the author intended the text” (Newmark 1988:5). In relevance-theoretic terms this means rendering the SL name, or at least part of it, by a TL expression which gives rise to the same, or approximately the same analytic implications in the target text as the original name did in the source text. This was the
case, for example, with the epithets attached to the names of historical personages.

Modification I understand as the process of choosing for the SL name a TL substitute which is logically, or conventionally, unrelated, or only partly related to the original. Or again, in a relevance-theoretic framework this means replacing the original name with a TL name which involves a substantial alteration in the translation of the form and of the analytic implications (if any) that the name effects. One example for this was the case of ‘Winnie-the-Pooh’ and ‘Micimackó’. Another is when a low-prestige Christian name in the SL is not rendered by its immediate TL equivalent but by another name which has similarly low social prestige in the TL. For example, the diminutive form ‘Maris’ in Hungarian is commonly associated with maids. In the English translation of a short story by Géza Csáth this name is rendered by Kessler as ‘Rosie’, which is not the closest equivalent, but probably gives rise to similar associations (that is, similar contextual implications) in the reader of the TL text (example from Klaudy 1994:144).

Formulated in such a way, modification seems to be an umbrella term which covers the meanings of omission, addition, and generalisation, too; therefore, these will be taken as sub-cases of modification and will not be treated separately.

We thus have a relatively simple set of four clearly defined operations, which are defined generally enough to allow for (hopefully) any possible cases. By way of a quick test, I will bring some examples from a Hungarian translation of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream by Ádám Nádasdy, discussed in Nádasdy (1994). In this play, the craftsmen all have telling names, alluding to the character’s craft and/or to some characteristic of his, at the same time. In every case (except for ‘Snug’ who does not have a first name) the first names are substituted by a corresponding Hungarian first name
(and consequently, in Hungarian style, the family name is placed before the first name). The family names, in turn, are treated in the following manner: ‘Bottom’ is simply translated into ‘Tompor’; ‘Quince’, originally meaning ‘carpenter’s wedge’ is modified into ‘Tetőfi’, playfully mixing the allusion to the craft with the hint at the character’s poetical aspirations. ‘Flute’, ‘Snout’, and ‘Snug’ are likewise modified into ‘Sipák’, ‘Lavór’, and ‘Vinkli’, respectively. ‘Starveling’ provides the most interesting case. It is rendered in the Hungarian by combining the operation of translation into ‘Éhenkórász’ with the modification of this form into ‘Kórász’. We also find instances of transference in the translation, with some classical Greek names like ‘Hermia’, while other classical names, ‘Pyramus’ and ‘Thisbe’ for example, are (graphologically) substituted by ‘Pyramusz’ and ‘Thiszbe’.

In general, the use of the first two operations, transference and substitution, seems to be motivated mainly by considerations of processing effort, while the second two, translation and modification, seem to occur mainly for reasons of ensuring adequate contextual effects in the target text. This is remarkably in line with Sperber and Wilson’s definition (introduced in section 3.3.2.3), whereby an assumption is said to be relevant in a context, on the one hand, to the extent that it has adequate contextual effects in this context and, on the other hand, to the extent that the effort required to process it in this context is not unnecessarily great (Sperber and Wilson 1986:125), insofar as both processing effort and contextual effects are taken into account by our operations.

Obviously, which of the four operations the translator employs in a particular translation situation will depend primarily on what meanings the proper name has in the given target language context (in other words, what contextual
effects it gives rise to in this context) and which of these meanings she thinks important (and cost-effective) to retain in the TL text in consistency with the principle of optimal resemblance.

5.7. Conclusions

In the light of all that has been demonstrated in this chapter, I can now assert that the translation of proper names cannot in all cases be regarded as a simple automatic process of transference, as was suggested by Vendler (1975). On the contrary, it is a subtle decision-making process, which is influenced by a complex array of factors. The first, and foremost, of these to take into consideration is, of course, the role (the meanings, referential as well as conceptual) of the proper name in the SL culture, and in the SL text. The translator has to examine which of these meanings are relevant in the context of the SL culture and the SL text and then she has to decide which of them will have to be preserved in the context of the TL culture and the TL text. In this, the treatment of proper names in translation is not in any way different from the treatment of any other linguistic expression: it is governed by the presumption of optimal resemblance, which is the manifestation of the principle of relevance in translation.

Then, based on the above considerations, the translator has to make a decision as to which of the possible devices at her disposal will be the most suitable for her purposes; in other words, she has to decide whether she will use a conventional TL correspondent (substitution), keep the name in its original form (transference), provide an ‘equivalent’ TL form (translation), or modify the original SL form in order to ensure that it fulfils its function in the TL text in an appropriate way.
In this process there are no automatic solutions, in the sense that each translation situation requires an individual solution, which is always the outcome of a (conscious or unconscious) decision, necessitated by a non-trivial need for choice. The decisions made are the result of a careful weighing of the circumstances, needs and expectations of the three individuals co-operating inside the translator’s mind: the author of the SL text, the reader of the TL text, and the mediator between them, the translator herself.
Chapter Six
Proper names in translation. Two case studies

This chapter presents two case studies, which are an attempt at explaining the treatment of proper names in the Hungarian translations of Kurt Vonnegut’s *Slaughterhouse-Five* and J. F. Cooper’s *The Last of the Mohicans*. The analysis is carried out in a relevance-theoretic framework, based on the assumption that translation is a special form of communication, aimed at establishing interpretive resemblance between the source text and the target text, governed by the principle of optimal resemblance (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986, and Gutt 1991). The findings seem to confirm the view that proper names behave in a largely predictable way in translation: the particular operations chosen to deal with them are, to a great extent, a function of the semantic content they are loaded with in the primary context and of considerations of how this content may be preserved in the secondary context in consistency with the principle of relevance.

6.1. Case Study 1
The first case study is aimed at showing that the treatment of proper names in translation reveals certain regularities. This is certainly not a new contention, as is clear from the discussions of earlier analyses by various scholars in section 1.2; the novelty of this attempt is that it tries to provide explanation for these regularities, along with the exceptions, and it does so in a theoretically grounded manner. Additionally, I hope that the data and the exposition will lend support to my claim that the four operations identified in section 5.6 are well-defined and are sufficient to describe what translators do with proper names.
6.1.1. The hypothesis
It is expected that names with an empty logical entry (stock names like ‘John’, for instance) are normally simply transferred, unless the encyclopaedic entry contains some assumptions that may be needed as part of the context, in which case the name is likely to be modified, depending on the options available in the secondary communicative situation.

Names with a filled-in logical entry would normally undergo translation, unless the encyclopaedic entry again contains some assumptions that may be needed as part of the context, which would make necessary the modification of the name in the TL.

The existence of an established conventional TL correspondent will, for reasons of optimal processing effort, generally pre-empt any other option, requiring the substitution of this correspondent for the SL name, but may be overridden by the other processes if the translator considers it inadequate in the given context.

6.1.2. Materials and method
In this study I used a recent British edition of Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five and a Hungarian translation by László Nemes (see Primary sources). First all the different proper names were looked up in the original text and matched with the corresponding expressions in the translation. For each name, only the first occurrence in the text was recorded.

The original names were then sorted out into four groups according to the operation the translator used in dealing with them. The four operations distinguished (as explained in Chapter Five) are: transference, substitution, translation and modification. By transference we shall mean the process of rendering the name in the TL in the original form. Substitution is replacing the SL name by a conventional TL correspondent. Translation means rendering the SL name, or at
least part of it, by a TL expression which gives rise to the same, or approximately the same analytic implications (explicatures) in the target text. Finally, modification consists in replacing the original name with a TL one which involves a substantial alteration in the translation of the form and of the analytic implications (if any) that the name effects. For further clarification the reader is referred back to section 5.6.

Subsequently, the names in each group were assigned to various traditional classes. The classes used are the following: names of persons; geographical names; names of institutions and organisations; titles of paintings, books, periodicals, newspapers, etc.; brand names; names of nationalities; names of events; names of temporal units and festivals; names of abstract ideas; names of animals; names of species; and the remaining few were collapsed under the heading other names. A full list is given in Appendix 1, with the names presumably having an at least partially filled-in logical entry italicised.

The validity of the hypothesis was checked by examining under each operation the occurrences of names with or without a filled-in logical entry (Table 1).

Then, under each operation, the number of occurrences in each class was weighed against the total number of occurrences in the given class. This was done to determine whether there are characteristic differences in the treatment of the various classes of proper names (Table 2).

Then the data were rearranged under each operation in descending order of the percentages in the different classes of names to check the extent to which the different operations apply to the various classes (Table 3).

Finally, individual cases which seem in some sense exceptional were considered with the aim of finding an
explanation for the seeming idiosyncrasies within a relevance-theoretic framework.

6.1.3. Results and discussion

6.1.3.1. Implications of the numerical results

The numerical findings are summed up in Table 1. The results seem to confirm the validity of the hypothesis: names with an empty logical entry are mainly transferred, while those with at least some logical content are to a great extent translated. The large number of substituted items in both groups should come as no surprise: it is simply due to the fact that several SL names have their established correspondents in the TL, any departure from which would result in an increase in the effort required to process the given utterance. According to the requirement of optimal relevance, this could only be done in special cases when the gains on the effects side would be greater than the losses on the efforts side.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOGICAL ENTRY</th>
<th>TRANSFER No.:%</th>
<th>SUBST. No.:%</th>
<th>TRANSL. No.:%</th>
<th>MOD. No.:%</th>
<th>TOTAL No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMPTY</td>
<td>109:61.6</td>
<td>46:26</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>22:12.4</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILLED-IN</td>
<td>34:21.2</td>
<td>59:36.9</td>
<td>55:34.4</td>
<td>12:7.5</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Primary numerical findings

What needs some further consideration is, on the one hand, the relatively high number of transferred items in the group with filled-in logical entries (21%) and, on the other hand, the causes for the modification of 22 and 12 items in the two groups, respectively, since modification apparently does not depend solely on the presence or absence of a filled-in logical entry.
6.1.3.2. Discussion of the transferred items

Among the 28 transferred cases in the second group we find 14 personal names. Of these, some (‘Stephen Crane’, ‘Harry S. Truman’, and ‘Norman Mailer’) belong to real persons and would not therefore be normally translated in the target language (Hungarian), mainly because over time such family names, as J. Soltész writes, have become opaque in terms of their descriptive meaning (p. 282) and today they only serve as tools of reference.

Among the others, belonging to fictitious persons, we can distinguish between those (like ‘Maggie White’) that have no obvious connotations (contextual implications) in the context of the story and those (like ‘Billy Pilgrim’) with rather obvious connotations evoked in the given context by the logical or encyclopaedic entry of the expression. What seems surprising, then, is that the names in this latter subgroup are transferred and not translated (or modified), since these are telling names in the most apparent manner, which do contribute some assumptions to the context of the story. For instance, Billy Pilgrim really is making a pilgrimage in the story through time and space, Roland Weary really is a nuisance to everybody around him, Kilgore Trout is an unpleasant person (cf. the English idiom ‘an old trout’), and Montana Wildhack is a porno star (one meaning of ‘hack’ is ‘a horse let out for hire’). In such cases, as Goretity (1997:491) notes, the translator finds herself in a particularly problematic situation. If the name is translated, it may produce an effect which is inconsistent with the basic concept of the work. On the other hand, if it is not translated, the meaning of the name is lost.

The translator’s decision not to translate these names can be explained here in the following way. Vonnegut creates his unique artistic world by mixing real and imaginary events and persons. In the context of the story (in this particular
fictitious world), however, all the persons are thought of as real. Therefore, translating a name like 'Billy Pilgrim' as 'Zarándok Billy', for instance, would be inconsistent with the practice of transferring the great majority of the other personal names and would probably cause an unwarranted increase of processing effort that would not be justified by the achieved contextual effect, which is rendering more perspicuous by the name the role of the character in the story. Additionally, the names thus translated, while preserving the assumptions implicated by their originals, would be markedly different in that the original names, exactly because they are in line with the other names in the story, implicate these assumptions in a relatively weak manner, whereas the translations would result in more manifest implicatures, as a result of their deviation from the pattern exhibited by the rest of the personal names. Consequently, the translated names would generate a different stylistic value since, as Sperber and Wilson (1986:217-224) show, stylistic value is partly a function of the range and strength of the assumptions implicated by an utterance.

We could argue in a similar way in the case of 'Eliot Rosewater' and 'Kilgore Trout', adding that the possibility of a desired measure of contextual effects is lessened further by the fact that these characters play no significant role in the book. Moreover, they also appear in other novels by Kurt Vonnegut, in the Hungarian translations of which their names are transferred and thus translating them here would be inconsistent with the general translation practice in this extended fictitious world, resulting in an additional increase of processing effort with readers who are familiar with it.

Thus the translator's move seems to be justified here on the following grounds. Believing that the loss of the assumptions carried by these names is not vital in the story (because they are relatively weak) he decided to transfer the
names, and thus he avoided putting the TL reader to extra processing effort by being consistent both within the world of the given text and within a wider universe of discourse including this and related texts. This then goes to show that calculations of contextual effect and processing effort involve, apart from the immediate context, considerations of the wider context, including textual and intertextual factors as well, extending as far as prevailing translation practices in the TL (or norms, in Toury’s sense), since these, too, may have a role in the interaction of stimulus and context as possible components of the context of interpretation.

The other transferred names in the second group (with a filled-in logical entry) include 12 geographical, 3 institutional and 1 brand name, 1 title, and 2 animal names. These are transferred, in the lack of a conventional Hungarian correspondent, because neither their logical nor the encyclopaedic entries contain information relevant in the context. For example, the two animal names, ‘Princess’ and ‘Spot’, are probably not translated in order to avoid incongruity (an increase in processing effort) with a fictitious world predominantly containing English names in the Hungarian translation, which is all the more logical since the two dogs do not have any significant role to play in the story.

6.1.3.3. Discussion of the modified items
Now let us turn our attention toward the modified items. 22 of them have an empty logical entry, and 12 an at least partly filled-in one, which suggests that the translator’s decision to modify the expressions could not have been based on the presence or absence of some logical content alone. We find four personal names here. ‘Mutt’ and ‘Jeff’ are rendered in the TT as ‘Zoro’ and ‘Huru’. The reason is obvious: in the SL ‘Mutt’ and ‘Jeff’ have in the encyclopaedic entries associated
with them the assumption that they form a comic couple and since it is not present in the TL, the names had to be changed for ones that will carry a comparable assumption. A similar explanation would go for ‘Joe College’, rendered as ‘Tudósjános’ (that is, Scholarly John) and possibly for ‘Wild Bob’, rendered as ‘Félelmetes Bob’ (Frightful Bob), because the literal Hungarian correspondent, ‘vad’, was not felt to be ‘loaded’ enough with relevant encyclopaedic assumptions.

Of the nine geographical names, ‘Stamboul’ occurs in a small poem and is turned into ‘Törökhon’ (Turkey) simply to make two lines rhyme, under the assumption that the change does not cause any noticeable loss in contextual effects. A similar example is the nationality expression ‘Polack’, which is explicated in the TL as ‘lengyel nő’ (a Polishwoman). It appears in the last line of a ditty, cited in the book, and is probably used instead of the literal translation ‘lengyel’ purely because of reasons of rhyme and rhythm, again. Another geographical term, ‘Russia’, becomes ‘az orosz front’ (the Russian front) in the translation, explicating in the logical entry what was part of the encyclopaedic entry of the original. Why this change had to take place is not entirely clear. On the one hand, the TL expression makes it explicit what was implicit as part of the context in the SL, thereby reducing the inferential effort required; however, it does this at the cost of increasing the effort needed to process the linguistically more complex phrasal expression in the TL. Thus it would appear that what is gained at one end is lost at the other. The only obvious justification for this move would be if it was difficult for a Hungarian reader to evoke from encyclopaedic memory, as part of the context, that Russia was one of the major scenes of the Second World War, which it is not. Eventually, we could resort for a possible explanation to the idea that translation (as communication in general or, in fact, any human activity) is also to a certain extent a matter.
of subjective judgement and personal taste: when two alternatives seem to be identical in efficiency the translator will make the decision on the basis of her (or his) personal preferences. For this reason, some degree of unsystematicity in translation is not only not surprising but even to be expected; however, I do not believe, with J. Soltész (1967), that this fact makes futile any attempt at explanation.

The rest of the modified geographical expressions, with the exception of 'New York City', ('Ohio', 'New York', 'New Jersey', 'Wyoming', 'Illinois', and 'Massachusetts') are all names of American states. This fact is explicated in the translation by supplementing the name with the word 'állam', clearly for the reason that the translator thought his Hungarian reader was not likely to have this assumption available in his encyclopaedic memory. Interestingly, 'New York City' is modified into 'New York' possibly on the basis of a similar underlying assumption to the effect that, since the Hungarian target reader is not familiar with the fact that 'New York', besides being the name of a city, of which he is most likely to be aware, is also the name of a state, and thus the change will not lead to confusion while it does save some processing effort by introducing a more familiar and linguistically less complex form.

Among the institutional names we find one ('Department of Anthropology') where the translation ('antropológiai fakultás') modifies the original for no apparent reason: the English name does not carry any culturally bound assumption which might necessitate the change and nor does the translation provide any additional assumption that would seem relevant in this context. In my view, then, the modification here is unnecessary and unjustified – it seems to be a mistake, although with no serious consequences.

Among the other institutional names we see two different cases. In the one an acronym is turned into the full
expression: ‘AP’ becomes ‘Associated Press’ in the TL, ‘UP’ is changed into ‘United Press’, and the ‘Ilium Y.M.C.A.’ into ‘iliumi Keresztény Ifjak Egyesülete’. The reason in all the three instances is the same: the acronym has no meaning whatsoever in the TL and would consequently make the processing unbearably costly (or even impossible) if left unchanged. The explication in the third example is rather self-evident but how could the first two cases be justified? Probably the translator thought the full name is more likely to “ring the bell” in the TL reader than the acronym – that is, it would put the reader to less processing effort. However, there seems to be a better solution to this problem, which is applied in the following three examples: ‘Holiday Inn’ is rendered as ‘Holiday Inn-szálló’, ‘Harvard’ as ‘Harvard egyetem’, and ‘Holt, Reinhart and Wilson’ as ‘Holt, Reinhart és Wilson kiadó’. Here, for reasons of cultural differences, the SL expression does not give rise to the same encyclopaedic assumptions in the TL as in the SL and therefore this part of the context needs to be explicated in the logical entry of the TL name. The procedure is similar to what happened to ‘Russia’, explained in the previous paragraph, the difference being that here the explications seem to be better motivated than in the Russia-example.

Exactly the same takes place in the case of the four brand names, the temporal expression ‘Gay Nineties’, in the case of ‘Georgian’ and ‘Ferris wheel’ in the other names group, the species name ‘Doberman pinscher’, and with one of the titles, the ‘Ilium News Leader’. The other title, ‘Gideon Bible’ is similar in that it contains encyclopaedic information not available in the TL, but here the explication of this content would have been very costly since it should have included an explanation of what the Gideon Society was and why a Bible was placed in the writer’s motel room, and therefore the translator decided to cancel this part. This results in the
loss of some encyclopaedic assumptions but, since these are not essential for processing the utterance in which the name occurs, this loss is not fatal and is completely justifiable.

We still have two nationality names to discuss and one name in the other names group. 'The British' is rendered in the translation as 'angolok' (the English), instead of the logically closer 'britek'. Why? The reason is very simple: the word 'brit' does not have wide currency in Hungarian, except in a historico-political context. By using this term the translator would have deviated from standard Hungarian usage, thereby increasing the processing cost of the utterance, which he wisely avoided, applying the admittedly less precise but more commonly used term 'angol'. A somewhat different case, the slang expression 'Jerry' is used in English, especially in a military context, to refer to Germans and since in such a context in Hungarian, with a similar derogative overtone as part of the encyclopaedic assumptions attached to the name, the word 'Fritz' is normally used, the translator's decision to apply this form here can be explained basically along the same lines.

Finally, 'The Febs' is the name of an amateur vocal quartet of men in the book and is turned into 'a NŐK' (The WOMEN). It is difficult to see what encyclopaedic assumptions the translator sought to preserve here; the only one that seems apparent is that the name was meant to be jocular in some way.

In summary, it appears that the modification of an item is generally made necessary by the absence of some encyclopaedic assumptions in the TL which the name carries with it in the SL, and the absence of which from the target text would result in the loss of some relevant contextual implications in the given context. We have also seen two exceptional cases where the modification takes place for prosodic reasons.
6.1.3.4. Frequency of use of the four operations with the various classes of names and explanations

Finally we shall check out whether there are any characteristic differences in the frequencies of use of the four techniques with the various name classes, with the aim of establishing whether and how the traditional classes have an effect on the selection of an operation in particular situations. The relevant numbers and percentages are given in Tables 2 and 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>TRANSFER</th>
<th>SUBSTITUT.</th>
<th>TRANSLAT.</th>
<th>MODIFICAT.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUMBER : %</td>
<td>NUMBER : %</td>
<td>NUMBER : %</td>
<td>NUMBER : %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGR. 102</td>
<td>52 : 51</td>
<td>39 : 38.2</td>
<td>2 : 2</td>
<td>9 : 8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL 97</td>
<td>71 : 73.2</td>
<td>19 : 19.6</td>
<td>3 : 3.1</td>
<td>4 : 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIT. 48</td>
<td>9 : 18.8</td>
<td>11 : 22.9</td>
<td>21 : 43.7</td>
<td>7 : 14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE 31</td>
<td>2 : 6.45</td>
<td>8 : 25.8</td>
<td>19 : 61.3</td>
<td>2 : 6.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAND 18</td>
<td>7 : 38.9</td>
<td>2 : 11.1</td>
<td>5 : 27.8</td>
<td>4 : 22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL. 9</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>6 : 66.7</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>3 : 33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 8</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>7 : 87.5</td>
<td>1 : 12.5</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMPORAL 7</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>6 : 85.7</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER 7</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>4 : 57.1</td>
<td>3 : 42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT 6</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>6 : 100</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANIMAL 2</td>
<td>2 : 100</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIES 2</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 50</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 337</td>
<td>143 : 42.4</td>
<td>105 : 31.2</td>
<td>55 : 16.3</td>
<td>34 : 10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The data are arranged in descending order of the number of occurrences of the different classes. This number is taken as 100% in each case; the percentages in each line under the various operations are relative to this.

Table 3 shows the same data arranged under each operation in descending order of the percentages relating to the frequency of use of the operation with the given class of name.
Table 3. The data, taken from Table 2, are presented in descending order of the percentages under each operation.

We find that while, for instance, personal names are mostly transferred and geographical names characteristically substituted or transferred, institutional names are predominantly translated. These findings are easily explicable on the basis of what has been said above. Personal names in most cases lack any logical content and are therefore transferred, geographical names are either without an identifiable or relevant logical content and are transferred or have established translations in the TL and are thus substituted, whereas institutional names characteristically contain elements with some logical information relating to the function of the institution or organisation and are consequently translated. Titles are mostly translated, obviously, because a title is normally descriptive of its referent and must therefore carry logical information. Brand names are of two major types: either they are fanciful names...
with no relevant logical content or they are in some way
descriptive of the product they stand for: in the former case
they will be transferred, in the latter, translated. (I must
note here, however, that in 'real life' this picture may be
complicated by several other factors like assonance, cultural
dominance, etc.) Nationalities have their established names in
every culture, so these names are normally substituted. The
same is true with major events, temporal units or festivals,
abstract ideas and species. The other names group includes
names of objects ('the Iron Maiden of Nuremburg'), a style
('Georgian') and a vocal quartet ('The Febs'). They either
contain some descriptive information in the logical entry, in
which case they are translated or build on associated
assumptions contained in the encyclopaedic entry, not present
in the TL, in which case they get modified. The two animal
names are transferred in this book because neither the logical
nor the encyclopaedic entries contain any relevant information
in the present context.

Finally, it must be noted here that while the statistical
data are characteristic of this particular translation, they
may be substantially different with others, since the choice
of operation in any particular case is dependent on the
context (of the text as well as of the communicative
situation) and the intentions of the translator. My
explanations of individual cases above hold only as far as
they seem to be systematic and consistent in the context of
this translation, while it is not unlikely that in other
contexts very different solutions may have been picked. This
question is examined in the next section.

6.2. Case Study 2

Data collection was carried out here applying the same
procedure as in Case Study 1. A full list of the data is given
in Appendix 2, with the names having an at least partially filled-in logical entry italicised.

Comparing the primary numerical results (summed up in Table 4) with those of Case Study 1 (Table 1), we find here a surprising proliferation of modified items, which make up more than half of the total number of cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOGICAL ENTRY</th>
<th>TRANSFER No.:%</th>
<th>SUBST. No.:%</th>
<th>TRANSL. No.:%</th>
<th>MOD. No.:%</th>
<th>TOTAL No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMPTY</td>
<td>26:21.5</td>
<td>27:22.3</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>68:56.2</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILLED-IN</td>
<td>2:4.1</td>
<td>6:12.2</td>
<td>16:32.7</td>
<td>25:51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Primary numerical findings

With regard to the various individual name classes, we also find that modification is the operation that applies to the majority of items in almost every case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS NUMBER</th>
<th>TRANSFER NUMBER : %</th>
<th>SUBSTITUT. NUMBER : %</th>
<th>TRANSLAT. NUMBER : %</th>
<th>MODIFICAT. NUMBER : %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17 : 25.7</td>
<td>11 : 16.7</td>
<td>11 : 16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGR.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8 : 16.7</td>
<td>9 : 18.7</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATION.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3 : 9.1</td>
<td>10 : 30.3</td>
<td>1 : 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>2 : 20</td>
<td>1 : 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTIT.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMPORAL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>1 : 50</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAND</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
<td>0 : 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>28 : 16.5</td>
<td>32 : 18.8</td>
<td>17 : 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. The data are arranged in descending order of the number of occurrences of the different classes.
What may be the explanation for the stunning difference between the two translations? The answer has to do, in great measure, I think, with the question of the communicability of some informative intention (message) in particular contexts.

As we have seen in Chapter Three, an act of communication can only be successful if it achieves relevance in a given set of contextual assumptions, and relevance is context-dependent: a given set of assumptions to be communicated that provide an appropriate number of contextual effects in one context may not do so in a different context and thus the communication process may fail. Alternatively, it can fail because the effort needed to work out these contextual effects in a secondary context may be gratuitously great, causing a loss of interest in the communication on the part of the audience.

Therefore, when The Last of the Mohicans, this great classic of American literature, a dramatic depiction of the conflicts of early American history, was rendered into Hungarian by Ádám Réz, long politico-historical descriptive passages, containing several proper names (for instance, ‘Sir William’, ‘Horican’, and ‘Hudson’ on page 156), were eliminated for the obvious reason that the translation was done for children, who lack the necessary background assumptions that would enable them to interpret such descriptions, which might result in the child reader losing interest and putting the book down. In such a case it seems a wise decision on the part of the translator to leave out these parts, in order to ensure that the communication as a whole should be successful.

Other names (like ‘Apollo’, left out in the translation) are modified in the target text, similarly, because the encyclopaedic assumptions that the name carries (that Apollo, in ancient Greece, was the patron god of music and poetry) are not likely to be present in the encyclopaedic memory of the young reader of the translation and thus the inclusion of the
name could have caused an unnecessary increase of the amount of processing effort needed to work out the interpretation of the utterance in which the name occurs.

Yet other modifications in the translation may be justified on the basis of considerations of the limited processing capacity of children. For instance, several characters appear in the original under various names, which in the translation are rendered in a (more or less) uniform way to make it easier for the reader to retrieve from memory the character, or other entity, that the name refers to in the given context. (For example, ‘the Nimble Deer’, ‘Bounding Elk’, and ‘Le Cerf Agile’ are all translated as ‘Fürge Szarvas’; ‘Iroquois’, Maquas’, ‘Mingo’, and ‘Huron’ all become ‘irokéz’.) In other cases, some names are left out in the translation (e.g. ‘Montcalm’, ‘Sir William Johnson’, ‘Canada’, and ‘Six Nations’ on page 113) because the translator wanted to simplify a description, again for the very reason of making the processing of the text less effort-consuming for the assumed young target reader.

One might raise here the question whether such a rendering as this one is still to be thought of as a translation or, rather, as something that is outside of the boundaries of this concept - an adaptation, perhaps. My position is that, as long as we accept a definition of translation as interpretive language use where the interpretation is consistent with the principle of optimal resemblance (see section 4.3), there is no reason to say that such renderings are beyond what we call, in this sense, a translation. This, of course, is quite a wide concept but I think the difficult thing would be to narrow down its boundaries in such a way that cases like this one, representing a relatively extreme degree of indirect translation, could clearly be delineated from cases representing a less extreme degree. Eventually, one would be forced to claim that only direct translation is to be called
translation, which is a possible but, in my view, not very attractive standpoint, in view of the fact that contextual identity between cultures, at the present stage of history at least, is the exception rather than the rule.

Accepting this, it becomes clear that the first question a translator has to answer is not how a given message can be communicated in the target language but whether it is communicable at all in the secondary communicative situation, in consistency with the principle of relevance; all other questions concerning the details of how to formulate a translation are consequent on the answer given to this fundamental question.

6.3. Conclusions

One of the interesting results of these case studies is the confirmation of the fact that contrary to what Vendler said, namely that proper names do not require translation into another language (Vendler 1975:117), they often do or, in several other cases, they get modified. This is not surprising in view of our assumption that proper names have basically the same semantic structure as any other kinds of expression, composed of a logical and an encyclopaedic entry, which may be filled to various degrees.

As regards the choice of the appropriate operation in dealing with a particular name, several factors may contribute to the final decision. One, of course, is the semantic contents of the name. My hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the statistical results: names with an empty logical entry are mostly transferred, whereas those with an at least partly filled-in logical entry are largely translated – unless a conventional TL correspondent pre-empts these options or the encyclopaedic entry of the name contains some relevant assumptions which necessitate the modification of the name in the TL.
These findings are easily explained on the basis of our initial assumption that translation is a communicative process, governed by the principle of optimal resemblance. On this assumption, the choice of a particular translation operation in a given situation is made in line with the need to preserve, as far as possible, the range of contextual effects that the semantic contents of the name contribute to in the source text. Thus, when the logical entry contains relevant information, it is preserved by applying the operation of translation proper; when the encyclopaedic entry contains some relevant information, it may be preserved by modifying the name in the translation. On the other hand, the relatively large number of substitutions is explicable by evoking the notion of processing effort: the use of a conventional correspondent is clearly the solution that requires the least amount of effort from the audience. Therefore, a reasonable translator will consider a different solution only when the gains in effects would probably outweigh the losses caused by the increase of processing effort.

How (and whether) this balance is achieved depends, of course, on what the translator-communicator presumes to be relevant for her audience. This requires that she make the right assumptions about the audience’s cognitive environment, that is, about what facts are manifest to him and, furthermore, about what is mutually manifest to both of them. At this point an element of subjectivity inevitably occurs: since one can never be certain about what exactly another person’s cognitive environment contains, there is always some risk involved in communication. Thus, I think, to say that the translator’s decisions are, to a certain degree, subjective is simply to accept the fact that inferential communication is a risky enterprise, where the possibility of failure cannot be excluded.
Another factor in the decision to apply a particular operation, as we have seen in several examples, is the need to maintain consistency in the translation on three different planes: with prevailing practices (standard usage, norms) in the TL, with characteristic solutions across texts and with solutions within the given text. This train of thought, again, leads us straight to considerations of the balance between contextual effects and processing effort.

One further observation we can make is that although the traditional proper name classes (personal names, geographical names, etc.) are in fact treated differently, in statistical terms, as regards the operations which are characteristically applied to them, the traditional classes are relevant in this question only as intermediary categories, since the differences in treatment boil down, in the end, to differences in semantic structure - and the traditional classes may be seen as categories encompassing typical semantic structure configurations (cf. the notion of rule-schemes, Carrol 1985:16, introduced in section 5.4).

In summary, I would maintain that the pragmatic theory I have chosen to couch my examinations in, relevance theory, appears completely adequate for the given purpose: it has enabled me, I believe, to explain in lucid terms how and why the particular operations were applied in particular cases.
Chapter Seven
Conclusions

7.1. The main results of the study
In Chapter Two I have shown, through a discussion of the cardiac issues in translation (of translatability, quality assessment, definition, and the nature of the translation process), that the various descriptive-classificatory approaches all fall short of providing a complete and consistent account of translation phenomena, either because they fail to recognise that translation is primarily a communicative process, taking place in an inter-lingual and intercultural situation, or because they fail to make explicit the characteristics of this process.

Chapter Three has introduced a theory of communication, relevance theory, which overcomes these shortcomings by explicating the principle which governs the communication process (the principle of relevance), and is moreover consistent with recent developments in the cognitive theory of the human mind (Fodor 1983, Anderson 1992, Smith and Tsimpli 1995).

In Chapter Four I have demonstrated, on the basis of Gutt (1991), how translation can be accounted for within the bounds of relevance theory. Translation theory thus becomes an integral part of a universal theory of communication, and constituents of translation theory are applications of more general principles of communication. The process of translation is explained in this framework in terms of a presumption of optimal resemblance, which is the application to the specific circumstances of translation of the principle of relevance. What I see as the major advantage of relevance theory over other communicative approaches to translation is that, contrary to these, it is able to clearly and unambiguously define the nature of the relationship between
the source text and the target text (which is nothing else than the ancient question of what equivalence means in translation): the translator’s aim is to achieve the optimal resemblance of the translation to the original in the secondary communicative situation.

Beyond this, however, it seems that translation theory cannot be of much help in providing precise rules for the translator (in this, I must to some extent agree with J. Soltész (1967), who rather pessimistically writes that the linguist can hardly do more than record the facts); what it can do, however, is offer guidelines along which translators may decide what to do in particular situations, by way of facilitating a description of translation operations, that is, possible solutions, and explaining why a particular operation was picked in a particular case by a particular translator — on the basis of the principle of relevance.

Chapter Five has been concerned mainly with proving that proper names in translation behave in a non-trivial way, not unlike any other kinds of expression. Since this question is linked with the question of meaning, it had to be shown, first of all, that proper names, like other linguistic expressions, have various meanings and that the structure of their meaning is essentially the same as that of other types of expressions. I have found that proper names can be seen as forming a continuum of cases, ranging from ‘prototypical’ proper nouns, which lack a logical content but may be endowed with various associative meanings, to ‘non-prototypical’ phrasal names, which are no different, in terms of meaning import, from other composite expressions. What does make them different is the fact that in the given context they are used as names — that is, their status as proper name is a function of the context, a matter of pragmatics, and not of semantics. Seen in this light, it is of no surprise that the treatment of proper names
in translation is just as complex an issue as that of other expressions.

I then identified four operations which are applied to proper names: apart from transference, they are also subject to substitution, translation, and modification. These operations have been defined in relation to the meaning import the name contributes to the given utterance, and their use has been explained in terms of the principle of relevance.

The first empirical study in Chapter Six, in turn, has been carried out to test the predictions, made on theoretical grounds, concerning the predictability of the handling of proper names in translation. I have found that they are in fact treated in a regular manner, and that this regularity is related primarily to the structure of their meaning; traditional proper name classes are pertinent here only indirectly, inasmuch as they reflect meaning structure through semi-regular patterns, or rule-schemes in Carrol’s (1985) terms.

The second empirical study provides further evidence for the claim that the decisions made by the translator in particular cases are a function of considerations of relevance, and considerations of relevance are conditioned, on given occasions, apart from calculations of contextual effects, by considerations of processing effort, which are partly related to questions of consistency with various factors, ranging from target culture context (including language), through conventions of translation in the given target culture (or norms, in the sense of Toury (1978)), inter-textual relations, and textual function (intentions) to textual context.
7.2. Some thoughts on questions of education

In this section I would like to briefly touch on two partly related areas: translator education and the use of translation in the training of language teachers.

As for the first one, probably the most important point is that would-be translators need to be made aware that translation is not merely a linguistic exercise: first and foremost it is an act of communication and, consequently, they need to acquire thorough insight into the nature and working of communication.

As a communicative process, translation involves the translator in a multi-faceted transaction of information, which extends from the source author to the target reader. One of the most important things a translator must never forget is that any act of communication is aimed at a receiver, and that the circumstances, needs and expectations of the receiver will crucially influence the form and outcome of the process. This, in a way, is common sense but my study has perhaps been able to spell out how assumptions about the receiver, or in fact any other participant or factor in the communication process, exert their influence as elements of the secondary communicative situation, through the interaction of stimulus and context.

As regards the training of language teachers, the significance of translation, in my view, lies primarily in the fact that translation, as a communicative exercise, can be used to raise the level of not only linguistic but also of pragmatic and cultural consciousness in teacher trainees. During translation we do not simply reproduce the ideas of the source text but, in a way, re-produce them: first we internalise them and then communicate them, almost as if they were our own, in the context of a different language and culture. We can only claim to understand a language really well if we are able to translate it. "Translation [...] is an
indispensable form of understanding” (Hell 1996:65, my translation).

The linguistic consciousness of teacher trainees, of course, is also developed by courses in theoretical and practical linguistics; these, however, are primarily aimed at the system of language and are less concerned with the consciousness relating to the circumstances of language use, the pragmatics of the language. And it is exactly this area where translation possesses unrivalled merits. What is translation, after all? On the one hand, you have to be able to make sense of the source language utterance and, on the other hand, you have to be able to transmit this sense (inasmuch as it is possible) in the medium of the other culture. This is only possible if the translator is in command of the pragmatics of both the source and the target language and is, moreover, aware of the differences between them. Practice in translation, therefore, provides the trainees with a kind of bilingual pragmatic consciousness, which is not offered by other subjects in the curriculum.
Appendix 1

Transference

PERSONAL NAME

Guggenheim 1:9
Bernard V. O’Hare 1:9
Gerhard Müller 1:9
Yon Yonson 2:10
Harrison Starr 3:11
Edgar Derby 4:12
Paul Lazaro 5:14
Sandy 6:15
Nancy 9:17
Nanny 10:19
Allison Mitchell 10:19
Mary O’Hare 11:20
Frank Sinatra 12:22
John Wayne 12:22
Charles Mackay 14:23
Mary Endell 15:24
Francia 15:25
George Washington 16:25
Walt Disney 16:25
Seymour Lawrence 16:26
Theodore Roethke 18:28
Erika Ostrovsky 18:28
Céline 18:28
Billy Pilgrim 19:29
Barbara 21:31
Robert 21:31
Montana Wildhack 22:32
Johann Sebastian Bach 27:37
Roland Weary 29:39
Louis J. M. Daguerre 35:45
André Le Févre 35:45
William Bradford Huie 39:49
Eddie D. Slovik 39:49
Valencia 40:50
William 40:51
Earl Warren 49:61
Jean Thiriart 50:61
Mona Lisa 50:62
Hitler 64:77
Sir Isaac Newton 69:82
Jacqueline Susann 75:89
Stephen Crane 85:100
Eliot Rosewater 87:101
Kilgore Trout 87:101
William Blake 90:105
Valencia Merble 92:108
Lance Rumford 104:121
Cynthia Landry 104:121
John F. Kennedy 104:121
Bertram Copeland Rumford 104:121
Howard W. Campbell 111:127
Margaret 128:145
Lionel Merble 133:150
Mike 134:151
Werner Gluck 136:153
Resi North 142:160
Maggie White 146:165
Reagan 157:176
Lily 158:178
Theodore Roosevelt 159:178
Harry S. Truman 159:179
David Irving 161:180
C. Eaker 161:180
Sir Robert Saundby 161:181
Lucretia A. Mott 171:192
George Jean Nathan 172:193
Lance Corwin 176:197
Norman Mailer 178:200
Robert Kennedy 182:202
Charles Darwin 182:202
Adolph Menjou 183:203

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME

Dayton 1:9
Wisconsin 2:11
Cape Cod 3:12
Pennsylvania 3:12
Halle 5:13
Boston 7:15
New York 7:15
Schenectady 9:18
Alplaus 9:18
Baltimore 9:18
Delaware 10:19
Hudson 10:19
London 14:23
Königstein 15:24
Glatz 15:25
Hamburg 17:27
Salzburg 17:27
Helsinki 17:27
Frankfurt 17:27
Philadelphia 18:27
Ilium 20:30
Vietnam 21:31
Montreal 21:31
Vermont 21:31
Tralfamadore 21:31
Camden 27:36
Pittsburgh 30:40
Pennsylvania 30:40
Santa Fé 33:43
Pine Knoll 38:48
Mississippi 55:67
Cody 58:70
Cicero 72:86
Bright Angel Point 76:90
Grand Canyon 76:90
Gloucester 102:118
Cape Ann 102:118
Newport 104:121
Rhode Island 104:121
Hyannis Port 104:121
Palm Springs 111:132
Dakto 117:134
Chicago 123:139
Chemnitz 129:146
Plauen 129:146
Pearl Harbor 159:179
Buchenwald 161:181
Coventry 161:181
Times Square 172:193
Zircon-212 174:195
Appomatox 178:199
Tobruk 184:205

NAME OF INSTITUTION OR ORGANISATION

Luftwaffe 5:14
General Electric 9:18
Kreuzkirche 15:25
Frauenkirche 15:25
General Motors 16:26
Lufthansa 17:27
Lions Club 43:54
Sears & Roebuck 66:79
Schlachthof-fünf 132:150

TITLE

Ilium Gazette 142:161
‘Ivanhoe’ 146:165
BRAND NAME

Coca-Cola 12:20
Cadillac El Dorado Coupe de Ville 49:60
Leica 50:61
Taste-Freeze 53:65
Buick Riviera 54:66
Buick Roadmaster 103:119
Mercedes 157:176

ANIMAL NAME

Princess 45:56
Spot 53:65

Substitution

PERSONAL NAME

Pope Innocent the Third: III. Ince pápa 14:23
Friedrich: Frigyes 15:25
Lot: Lót 19:28
Zo-ar: Coár 19:28
Lord: Úr 19:29
Martin Luther: Luter Márton 27:37
God Almighty: Mindenható Úristen 30:40
Jesus: Jézus 41:53
Three Musketeers: Három Testőr 42:53
Adam: Ádám 46:57
Eve: Éva 46:57
Croesus: Krózus 53:65
Cinderella: Hamupipőke 83:98
Feodor Dostoevsky: Fjodor Dosztojevszkij 87:102
Christ: Krisztus 94:109
Scheherezade: Seherezádé 104:121
Blue Fairy Godmother: Jóságos Tündér 110:126
Oz: Óz, a csodák csodája 129:146
Abraham Lincoln: Lincoln Ábrahám 139:157

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME

Drezden: Drezda 1:9
Elbe: Elba 5:13
Europe: Európa 5:13
France: Franciaország 6:14
Lake Michigan: Michigan-tó 7:16
Hiroshima: Hirosima 9:17
Germany: Németország 14:23
North Africa: Észak-Afrika 14:23
Palestine: Paleștina 14:23
Genoa: Genova 15:24
Silesia: Szilézia 16:25
West Berlin: Nyugat-Berlin 17:27
East Berlin: Kelet-Berlin 17:27
Vienna: Bécs 17:27
Leningrad: Leningrád 17:27
Earth: föld 19:28
Sodom: Szodoma 19:29
Gomorrah: Gomora 19:29
Lake Placid: Placid-tó 21:30
Sugarbush Mountain: Sugarbush-hegy 21:31
South Carolina: Dél-Karolina 26:36
Luxembourg: Luxemburg 27:37
the Tuileires Gardens: a Tuileriák kertje 35:45
Ausable Chasm: Ausable-szakadék 49:60
North Vietnam: Észak-Vietnam 52:63
England: angliai 63:76
United States of America: Amerika 64:77
Pacific: csendes-óceáni 72:85
West: Nyugat 77:91
Carlsbad Caverns: Carlsbad-barlangok 77:91
Lake George: George-tó 90:105
Dunkirk: Dunkerque 91:106
California: Kalifornia 115:132
Golgotha: Golgota 119:135
Switzerland: Svájc 140:158
Far East: Távol-Kelet 160:180
Forty-fourth Street: Negyvennegyedik utca 172:192
San Pedro Bay: San Pedro-öböl 177:198
The Big Apple: a Nagy Alma 179:200

NAME OF INSTITUTION OR ORGANISATION

University of Chicago: chicagói egyetem 7:15
Fire Department: tűzoltóság 7:16
Coast Guard: parti őrség 7:16
Air Force: légierők 10:18
University of Iowa: Iowai Egyetem 16:26
Green Berets: Zöldsapkások 21:31
the French Academy: a Francia Akadémia 35:45
National Guard: nemzeti gárda 51:62
the Marines: tengerészgyalogság 51:63
International Red Cross: Nemzetközi Vöröskereszt 79:93
United States Air Force: az Egyesült Államok Légierője 104:121

TITLE

'Baptism of Christ': Krisztus megkeresztelése 15:25
Bible: biblia 47:58
'The Red Badge of Courage': A bátorság vörös kokárdája 85:100
'The Brothers Karamazov': Karamazov testvérek 87:102
New Testament: Újtestamentum 94:110
Gospel: Evangélium 94:110
Statue of Liberty: Szabadság-szobor 173:193
‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’: Tamás bátya kunyhója 178:200

BRAND NAME

Coke: Coca-Cola 12:21
Colt .45 automatic: 45-ös automata colt 28:38

NATIONALITY NAME

Americans: amerikaiak 51:63
Yank: Jenki 82:96
Jews: zsidók 83:97
Gypsies: cigányok 83:97
Chinamen: kínaiak 123:140
Maori: maori 184:205

NAME OF EVENT

Second World War: második világháború 2:10
Battle of the Bulge: ardennes-i csata 28:37
the Great Depression: a nagy gazdasági világválság 33:43
World War Three: harmadik világháború 50:61
World War Two: második világháború 50:61
World War One: első világháború 168:189

NAME OF TEMPORAL UNIT OR FESTIVAL

Stone Age: kőkorszak 52:63
December: december 60:73
May: május 60:73
Christmas: karácsony 61:74
February: február 123:139
Fathers’ Day: Apák Napja 150:169

NAME OF ABSTRACT IDEA

Communists: kommunisták 51:63
Third Law of Motion: a dinamika harmadik alaptörvénye 69:82
Christianity: kereszténység 94:109
Heaven: Mennyország 129:146
Nazism: nácizmus 141:159
Providence: Gondviselés 160:180

NAME OF SPECIES

Earthlings: földlakók 92:106
**Translation**

**PERSONAL NAME**

Captain Finn: Finn kapitány 8:17
The Son of the Most Powerful Being in the Universe: a Világegyetem Leghatalmasabb Lényének a Fia 94:109
The Son of the Creator of the Universe: a Világegyetem Teremtőjének Fia 95:110

**GEOGRAPHICAL NAME**

Peace Lagoon: Békeliget 51:63
Hill 875: a 875-ös magaslat 117:135

**NAME OF INSTITUTION OR ORGANISATION**

Bell Telephone Company: Bell Telefon Társaság 3:12
Chicago City News Bureau: Chicago Városi Hírszolgálati Iroda 7:16
The Committee on Social Thought: Társadalmi Lelkiismeret Bizottsága 9:17
Dutch Reformed Church: Holland Reformegyház 9:18
United World Federalists: Egyesült Világ Államszövetsége 10:18
Ford Motor Car Company: Ford Gépkocsi Társaság 16:25
Writers Workshop: Író Műhely 16:26
General Forge and Foundry Company: Általános Vasöntő és Vasgyár Részvénytársaság 21:30
Ilium School of Optometry: iliumi optometriai főiskola 21:30
John Birch Society: John Birch Társaság 49:61
The National Union of Belgian Opticians: Belga Optikusok Nemzeti Szövetsége 50:61
European Optometry Society: Európai Optometriai Társaság 50:61
Ilium Government Center: Ilium közigazgatási központja 51:63
Pavilion of the Arts: műcsarnok 51:63
Better Business Bureau: Virágzóbb Üzleti Élet Iroda 54:66
Four-fifty-first: négyszázötvenegyesek 57:70
German Association of Prison Officials: Német Fegyőr Tisztek Társasága 111:127
Ilium Merchants National Bank and Trust: iliumi Nemzeti Kereskedelmi Bank és Hitelintézet 123:139
The Free American Corps: Szabad Amerikai Hadtest 139:156
Royalton Hotel: Royalton-szálló 172:192
Population Reference Bureau: Népességügyi Hivatal 184:204

**TITLE**

‘The Children’s Crusade’: A gyermek keresztes hadjárata 13:22
‘Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds’: Különleges népámítások és a tömegőrület 13:23
'Dresden, History, Stage and Gallery': Drezda története, színházi élete és képtára 15:24
'Words for the Wind': Beszéd a szélhez 18:28
'Céline and his Vision': Céline és látomása 18:28
'Death on the Installment Plan': Halál hitelre 19:28
'The Execution of Private Eddie D. Slovik': Eddie D. Slovik közlegény kivégzése 39:49
The Review of Optometry: Optometriai Magazin 49:61
'Contemporary Problems in Western Civilization': A nyugati civilizáció mai problémái 72:85
'Valley of the Dolls': A babák völgye 75:89
Pirates of Penzance: A penzance-i kalózok 80:94
'Maniacs in the Fourth Dimension': Őrültek a negyedik dimenzióban 90:105
'The Gospel from Outer Space': Evangélium a távoli világúrból 93:109
'The Spirit of '76': "'76 szelleme" 129:141
'Wait Till the Sun Shines, Nelly': Várj, míg kisüt a nap, Nelly 134:152
'The Destruction of Dresden': Drezda pusztulása 161:180
'Official History of the Army Air Force in World War Two': A légierők hivatalos története a második világháborúban 165:185
'The Big Board': A nagy jelzőtábla 173:194
'Midnight Pussycats': Éjféli Cicababák 177:198

BRAND NAME

"Magic Fingers": "Varázsujjak" 53:66
Milky Way: Tejút 95:110
Royal Danish: Dán királyi 96:112
Rambler Rose: Futórózsa 96:112
Colonial Moonlight: Gyarmati holdvilág 96:112

NAME OF EVENT

'National Prayer Week': Nemzeti Imádság Hete 174:195

OTHER NAME

Iron Maiden of Nuremburg: "Nürnbergi Vasszűz" 31:41
Purple Heart: Bíbor szív 163:183
Silver Star: Ezüst csillag 163:183
Bronze Star: Bronz érdemérem 163:183

Modification

PERSONAL NAME

Mutt and Jeff: Zoro és Huru 4:12
Joe College: Tudósjános 32:43

151
Wild Bob: Félelmetes Bob 57:70

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME

Ohio: Ohio állam 1:9
Stamboul: Török hon 2:10
New York: New York állam 9:18
New Jersey: New Jersey állam 27:36
Wyoming: Wyoming állam 58:70
Illinois: Illinois állam 72:86
Massachusetts: Massachusetts állam 102:118
Russia: az orosz front 129:147
New York City: New York 171:192

NAME OF INSTITUTION OR ORGANISATION

Department of Anthropology: antropológiai fakultás 7:15
AP: Associated Press 7:16
UP: United Press 7:16
Ilium Y. M. C. A.: iliumi Keresztyén Ifjak Egyesülete 37:48
Holiday Inn: Holiday Inn szálló 53:65
Harvard: Harvard egyetem 104:121
Holt, Reinhart and Wilson: Holt, Reinhart és Wilson kiadó 161:180

TITLE

Gideon Bible: Biblia 19:28
Ilium News Leader: iliumi News Leader című lap 27:32

BRAND NAME

Pall Mall: Pall Mall cigaretta 2:10
Three Musketeers Candy Bar: Három testőr nevű csokoládészelet 8:17
7-Up: híg limonádé 65:77
Xerox: fénymásológépen készült példány 159:179

NATIONALITY NAME

Jerry: Fritz 83:96
British: angolok 125:142
Polack: lengyel nő 134:151

NAME OF TEMPORAL UNIT OR FESTIVAL

Gay Nineties: a múlt század boldog kilencvenes évei 97:113

NAME OF SPECIES

Doberman pinscher: doberman kutya 146:165
OTHER NAME

Georgian: georgiai stílusú 53:65
Ferris wheel: a vursli óriáskereke 65:78
“The Febs”: a “NŐK” 148:167
Appendix 2

Transference

PERSONAL NAME

Montcalm 10:9
Webb 11:9
Heyward 17:14
Cora 17:14
Duncan 17:15
Alice 17:15
Effingham 40:35
Magua 43:37
Le Renard Subtil 43:37
David Gamut 63:53
David 112:95
Munro 148:124
Cora Munro 183:150
Duncan Heyward 184:151
Alice Graham 184:151
Tamenund 345:265
Nathaniel 347:267

GEOGRAPHICAL NAME

New York 8:5
Jamaica: Jamaica 14:12
Boston 24:20
London 37:31
Quebec 179:148
Abraham 209:173
Hudson 247:200
Mohawk 247:200

NATIONALITY NAME

Mohawk 37:32
Huron 39:32
Oneida 228:186

Substitution

PERSONAL NAME

David: Dávid 23:20
Handel: Händel 25:22
Chingachgook: Csingacsguk 28:24
Uncas: Unkasz 32:27
Chingach: Csingacs 49:43
Menowgua: Menovgua 123:105
Wassawattimie: Vasszavittimi 123:105
The Lord: az Úr 168:139
St. Louis: Szent Lajos 196:161
Manitou: Manitu 355:272
Goliath: Góliát 382:288

GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES

North-America: észak-amerikai 7:5
France: Franciaország 7:5
England: Anglia 7:5
Europe: Európa 7:5
Canada: Kanada 8:5
Horican: Horikán 8:6
the West Indies: nyugat-indiai szigetek 184:151
the Canadas: Kanada 215:177
Arabia: Arábia 247:200

NATIONALITY NAME

Mohican: mohikán 30:25
Delaware: delavár 32:27
Iroquois: irokézek 33:29
Indian: indián 33:28
Frenchman: francia 192:159
British: angol 194:160
English: angol 197:163
French: francia 201:166
Frencher: francia 238:194
Dutchmanne: hollandusok 357:273

NAME OF TEMPORAL UNIT OR FESTIVAL

July: július 26:23

NAME OF ABSTRACT IDEA

Jesuit: jezsuita 8:6
Providence: Gondviselés 94:81

Translation

PERSONAL NAME

Hawkeye: Sólyomszem 28:24
Big Sarpent: Nagy Kígyó 63:54
Serpent: Nagy Kígyó 110:93
Great Snake: Nagy Kígyó 89:76
Killdeer: Szarvasölő 134:113
The Long Rifle: Hosszú Puska 105:87
The Nimble Deer: Fürge Szarvas 106:88
Bounding Elk: Fürge Szarvas 106:88
Open Hand: Nyitott Kéz 232:189
Reed-that-bends: Hajló Nád 284:224
Hard Heart: Kemény Szív 339:262

TITLE

Holy Book: Szent Könyv 14:12

NATIONALITY NAME

Englishman: angol ember 192:159

NAME OF INSTITUTION OR ORGANISATION

Fort Edward: Edward-erőd 11:9

NAME OF EVENT


NAME OF ABSTRACT IDEA

Great Spirit: Nagy Szellem 31:26

Modification

PERSONAL NAME

Apollo: -- 22:19
Heyward: Duncan 22:19
Le Renard Subtil: Ravasz Róka 43:37
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