

DOKTORI (PhD) ÉRTEKEZÉS

**CHASING A MIRAGE:
HUNGARIAN REVISIONIST SEARCH FOR US SUPPORT TO
DISMANTLE THE TRIANON PEACE TREATY, 1920–1938**

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.....
Mathey Éva

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INTRODUCTION

The present study is the product of the work and research of the last ten years. As a History and English major at then Lajos Kossuth University, Debrecen, I came to develop a special professional interest in the study of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary during the interwar years, in large part due to the outstanding and intellectually stimulating lectures and seminars offered by the faculty of the Institute of English and American Studies, especially by Tibor Glant. It was upon his advice and encouragement and under his supervision that I started my dissertation research project. I planned to offer the first comprehensive overview of American-Hungarian diplomatic, cultural and economic relations between the world wars, but this proposal turned out to be too ambitious. Within the compass of my general research of the period in question I came to realize that the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was a fairly recurrent issue. Furthermore, I realized that, based on a complex set of historical, political and cultural tenets, Hungarians considered the United States of America to be a potential supporter of Hungarian revisionism and entertained high, yet unfounded, expectations toward her. This, in turn, generated my interest in, and turned my attention to, an important, yet hitherto neglected, topic: the question of Hungarian revisionist search for American support to revise the Trianon Peace Treaty. An inquiry with this special focus promises to be a unique academic contribution to the Trianon scholarship and the study of interwar American-Hungarian relations.

The dismemberment of historic Hungary by the Trianon Peace Treaty was a shock on the collective Hungarian consciousness and was perceived as one of the most severe national tragedies. Therefore, Trianon became an overarching national issue during the interwar period, and regardless of social, economic, and political background of the Hungarian people,

the whole nation regarded the rectification of Hungary's frontiers necessary. Trianon became a national obsession, giving rise to popular revisionist beliefs and expectations. Stemming from its extremely emotional and sensitive nature, both academic and popular discourse about the Trianon question during the interwar period often resulted in exaggerations, misinterpretations, and misrepresentations. From Jenő Horváth's *A magyar kérdés a XX. században* and the collective publication, *Justice for Hungary*, through the fairly diverse revisionist and irredentist pamphlet literature to various everyday manifestations of revisionist culture,¹ it is clear that neither the intellectual and political elite, nor people of the streets could come to terms with what they viewed as Trianon's tragedy.

Following World War II and with the coming of the Communist era it became well nigh impossible for the interwar and postwar generations to come to terms with this national trauma, since it became a taboo to talk about Trianon and its consequences. Naturally, official Marxist historiography also swept the question under the rug. Marxists held the view that to all Trianon-related problems, ethnic, minority or otherwise, international socialism would be the solution rendering the meaning of nations and their national borders irrelevant. In the 1960's, however, early signs of genuine academic interest in the history and the consequences of Trianon manifested itself in some significant works, for example, *A párizsi békekonferencia* [The Paris Peace Conference] by Zsuzsa L. Nagy, which, almost two decades later, was followed by Mária Ormos's *Padovától Trianonig* [From Padua to Trianon].²

After 1989, however, following forty years of almost total neglect, Trianon became a topical issue again in academic, political, and in public discourse. Understandably, there emerged a legitimate concern and a need to study and understand the political and historical

¹ Archimédész Szidiropulosz, *Trianon utóélete. Válogatás a magyar nyelvű irodalom bibliográfiájából. 1920-2000* n.p.: XX. Századi Intézet, 2002. Miklós Zeidler, *A magyar irredenta kultusz a két világháború között* [The Hungarian Irredentist Cult between the World Wars] (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 2002).

² For more on this see Katalin Somlai, "Trianon a marxista történetírásban" [Trianon in Marxist historiography], *Limes* (2002/2): 51-63; Ignác Romsics, "Trianon és a magyar politikai gondolkodás" [Trianon and Hungarian political thinking], *Magyar Szemle* Vol. 7, No.6 (December 1998). <http://www.magyszemle.hu/szamok/1998/6/trianon> and Balázs Ablonczy, "A történeti Trianon," In Balázs Ablonczy, *Trianon-legendák* [Trianon Legends] (Budapest: Jaffa Kiadó, 2010), 17-27.

antecedents and the political, economic and social effects of the peace treaty. After the regime change, however, the discussion of Trianon and revisionism assumed a unique feature inasmuch as it became as highly politicized as it had been during the interwar years. After forty years Trianon burst, surfacing latent and long-suppressed grievances, often providing platform for extreme political ideas and programs. In such a political-social climate the objective study of the peace conference, the peace treaty and its consequences became an important task for historians. The outstanding scholarship and works of Zsuzsa L. Nagy, András Gerő, Magda Ádám, Mária Ormos, Ignác Romsics, Miklós Zeidler, Eric Beckett Weaver and Balázs Ablonczy in Hungary and those of, for example, Peter Pastor, Thomas L. Sakmyster, Nándor Dreisziger and Josef Kalvoda abroad, are, therefore, significant contributions to the field.³

Miklós Zeidler's outstanding monographs *A revíziós gondolat* and its revised English edition *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary* offer a manifold analysis of the semi-official, unofficial and popular channels and the various forms of Hungarian revisionism and revisionist propaganda both in Hungary and abroad between the world wars.⁴ Zeidler's examination is complemented, for example, by relevant works of Magda Ádám and Gábor Bátonyi. These focus on French and English response to Hungarian revisionist policies.⁵ The present dissertation extends the scope of the study of revisionism by reviewing and analyzing

³ Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *A párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország* [The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1963); András Gerő, *Sorsdöntések* (Budapest: Göncöl, 1988); Magda Ádám, *The Versailles System and Central Europe*. (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2004) and Magda Ádám, et al. eds. *Francia diplomáciai iratok a Kárpát-medence történetéről* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2005); Ignác Romsics, *A trianoni békeszerződés* (Budapest: Osiris, 2003); Ignác Romsics, ed. *Trianon és a magyar politikai közgondolkodás, 1918-1953* [Trianon and the Hungarian Political Thought, 1918-1953] (Budapest: Osiris, 1998).

⁴ Miklós Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat* [The Revisionist Thought] (Budapest: Osiris, 2001) and Miklós, Zeidler, *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920–1945* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2007).

⁵ Magda Ádám, "France and Hungary at the Beginning of the 1920's." In Béla Király, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe. Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982): 145-182; and Gábor Bátonyi, "British Foreign Policy and the Problem of Hungarian Revisionism in the 1930's." Presented at the Conference on British-Hungarian Relations since the 1840s, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College, London on April 2004. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/socsci/staff/departamental/batonyi_g/#research (July 6, 2010).

Hungarian attempts at the revision of the Treaty of Trianon directed towards the United States of America.

At the same time, the present work offers a study of a novel aspect of interwar American-Hungarian relations that so far has not been discussed. In this respect, the dissertation wishes to contribute to the academic research carried out on interwar American-Hungarian diplomatic relations by Nándor Dreisziger, Tibor Frank, Tibor Glant, Mark Imre Major, Peter Pastor, and Steven Béla Várdy.⁶

Trianon became a common denominator, an overarching national issue for Hungarians during the period between the wars, and it provided the Horthy regime with a powerful unifying force. Revisionism was considered to be not only inevitable, but also possible. Due to the relevant provisions of the Trianon Peace Treaty and at the same time explained by Hungary's very vulnerable international position and her subsequent isolation after World War I, for long years during the interwar period the Hungarian government could not advocate revision openly and had to deal with the issue very cautiously.

Consequently, revisionist propaganda assumed great importance. Since it could not be directly part of the official political discourse, propaganda found new channels, and came to be a central issue in the popular narrative. This explains why semi-official and popular revisionist propaganda became important means to promote the rectification of Hungary's

⁶ Nándor A. F. Dreisziger, *Hungary's Way To World War II* (Astor Park, Florida: Danubian Press, 1968); Tibor Frank, ed., *Discussing Hitler. Advisers of U.S. Diplomacy in Central Europe, 1934-1941* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003); Tibor Frank, ed. *Roosevelt követe Budapesten. John F. Montgomery bizalmas politikai beszélgetései, 1934-1941* (Budapest: Corvina, 2002); Tibor Frank, *Ethnicity, Propaganda and Myth-Making, Studies on Hungarian Connections to Britain and America, 1848-1945* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2000); Tibor Glant, *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and Public Opinion during World War I* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Tibor Glant, *Kettős tükörben. Magyarország helye az amerikai közvéleményben és külpolitikában az első világháború idején* (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008); Mark Imre Major, *American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944* (Astor, Florida: Danubian Press, Inc., 1974); Peter Pastor, "The Ups and Downs in the Historiography of the Peace Treaty of Trianon." In Dennis P. Hupchick and R. William Weisberg, eds., *Hungary's Historical Legacies. Studies in Honor of Steven Béla Várdy* (Boulder: East Central European Monographs, 2000), 106-115; Peter Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three* (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, Distr. by Columbia University Press, 1976).

post-Trianon frontiers both in Hungary and abroad. Complementing the various manifestations of semi-official and popular revisionism, Hungarian history-writing between the wars also had its fair share, inasmuch as revisionism served as a major focus of inquiry in the historical narrative between the wars. Within this larger conceptual framework and context the present study offers the analysis of revisionism and revisionist propaganda directed toward the United States between 1920 and 1938.⁷

Based on some powerful criticism of the peace treaties made in Paris, (e.g. John Maynard Keynes, Francesco Nitti, and Lord Rothermere), Hungarians during the interwar years held the firm belief that a return to the frontiers of historic Hungary was possible with the support of foreign powers. As recent Trianon literature (Ádám, Bátonyi, Zeidler) also demonstrates, Hungarian revisionist policies and propaganda were primarily directed toward European powers such as France, Great Britain, and from the second half of the 1930s Italy and Germany. At the same time, the study of archival as well as secondary sources has revealed that Hungarians during the interwar period (especially in the 1920s) had high expectations toward the United States of America as a potential supporter of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Although the Hungarian government did not approach the US in the question of revision officially, as several examples will demonstrate it did not discourage revisionist propaganda directed toward America either.

The United States pursued the policy of political non-entanglement relative to the affairs of Europe after World War I, she completely withdrew from the Paris peace project and did not become a member of the League of Nations. This notwithstanding, Hungarians cherished the hope that the United States would support Hungary's search to revise the terms of the Trianon Peace Treaty.

⁷ The time frame covers the period between 1920 the year when the Trianon Peace Treaty was signed and ratified and 1938 when through the First Vienna Award Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy enforced Hungary's territorial claims and arbitrated southern Slovakia and Subcarpathia back to Hungary. With the First Vienna Award Hungarian revisionsism cast the first major, yet rather short-lived, victory.

In my dissertation I study the above phenomena and provide an answer to the question whether such Hungarian expectations were more than wishful thinking. Therefore, the present work sets out (1) to present the various manifestations of Hungarian images of the US as *arbiter mundi* during the period between the world wars to demonstrate how these perceptions reinforced Hungarian revisionist hopes toward America; (2) to study the major ideological and political tenets of the belief the United States would possibly be a potential ally of Hungary in her revisionist endeavors as reflected in the Trianon monographs of Jenő Horváth; (3) to present the various semi-official and popular manifestations of Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the United States, among them the Kossuth Pilgrimage in 1928; and (4) to answer the questions whether these expectations were well-grounded and if there was any chance that the American government would ever endorse the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

I will argue that despite the popular Hungarian perception as *arbiter mundi*, the United States of America had no intention to meet Hungarian expectations relative to the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Isolationist America consistently distanced herself from the question of Hungarian revisionism and revisionist propaganda aimed at the United States.

In chapter one, “Political and Historical Background,” a historical framework is offered and some key events of American and Hungarian history before, during and after the war are discussed. This introductory chapter provides a background to issues and questions analyzed in subsequent parts of the dissertation. Since Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the US to a large extent stemmed from certain misconceptions related to Wilson’s Habsburg policy during the war and at the time of the peace negotiations, its analysis proves inevitable. So does the discussion of the main events of Hungarian history during and after World War I to provide the political context in which the Trianon Peace Treaty had to be accepted and ratified by the Hungarian government in 1920.

Chapter two, “The Trianon Syndrome and Treaty Revision,” discusses the psychological, social, and political-diplomatic consequences and effects of the Treaty of Trianon to explain why revisionism became such a powerful and misused force in Hungary after the war. In this introductory chapter, attention is paid to the general features, means and role of revisionist propaganda between the world wars, with special emphasis on foreign advocacy of Hungarian revisionism. Chapter two sheds light on why Hungarians were so desperate to seek foreign support in their search to dismantle the Trianon Peace Treaty, therefore, it provides a background to the subsequent discussion of the American line.

Both as the cause and the effect of the revisionist expectations, America became a popular topic of discourse in Hungary during the interwar period. Besides some unfavorable perceptions, Hungarians entertained predominantly positive images of the US such as, for example, America as the land of freedom, justice and fair play. Chapter three, “Hungarian Perceptions of America between the World Wars: The US as *Arbiter Mundi*,” studies the general features and manifestations of these Hungarian images which reflected the Hungarian hope that the US would do justice and help revise the frontiers of Hungary.

The popular myth of America as a potential supporter of Hungary’s cause was also backed by other significant yet misleading ideological, historical, and political tenets, such as for example, Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918 as the basis for peace, the belief that the USA did not wish to dismember the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the Paris peace treaties, or the lack of mention of Trianon in the separate US-Hungarian peace treaty. These provided the most important building blocks of the revisionist argument and expectations toward the United States. Official Hungarian history writing between the wars, in particular the efforts of Jenő Horváth, helped create and reinforce such beliefs. Therefore, in chapter four, “Revisionist Expectations toward the USA and Hungarian History Writing: A Case Study of Jenő Horváth,” these major thematic issues in connection

with American war and peace policies relative to Hungary are presented and analyzed. Horváth's Trianon synthesis enumerates and synthesizes those themes which are recurrent in anti-Trianon pamphlet literature and echoed by semi-official and popular propaganda aimed at America.

The subsequent two chapters discuss the various manifestations of Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the United States. Since the possibilities of official, governmental revisionism were rather limited, revisionism found new, semi-official channels. Chapter five, "Semi-Official Revisionism Aimed at America," presents some important mainstream, non-governmental, yet front-line contributions to revisionist propaganda directed toward the USA, such as the efforts of Counts István Bethlen, Pál Teleki and Albert Apponyi. In addition, chapter four explains the role some high-brow journals and foreign language periodicals (such as *Külügyi Szemle*, *The Hungarian Nation* and *The Hungarian Quarterly*) played in Hungarian revisionist propaganda abroad. It is also here in this chapter that I evaluate the contributions of the official representatives of Hungary in the USA between the wars.

Besides semi-official campaigns, there are many examples of popular or individual revisionist initiatives directed toward the United States or key American decision-makers expressed in private letters, pamphlets, brochures, books and even systematic anti-Trianon propaganda campaigns, i.e. Lord Rothermere's American activities, the Kossuth Pilgrimage to New York in 1928 and the Justice for Hungary movement in 1931. Chapter six, "Revisionist Propaganda toward the USA through Popular Channels," examines these issues.

The need to address the question whether there was any chance that official America would endorse such hopes logically follows from the study of the various forms of Hungarian revisionist efforts directed at the United States. Chapter seven, "Official America and Hungarian Revisionism," offers this inquiry. In it, I analyze the official American position

toward Hungary and the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. This is done on the basis of the documents of the American State Department, including the official as well as the personal papers and/or the memoirs of American officials in charge of Hungarian affairs between the wars.

Within this context the views of Senator William Edgar Borah of Idaho on the revision of the Treaty of Trianon offer a unique case study. After 1920, Senator Borah repeatedly voiced his opinion that the postwar treaties made in Paris were morally, politically and economically wrong and should be revised. Such views obviously made him extremely popular in Hungary and gave ground to the belief that the senator could influence American decisions concerning treaty revision. An analysis of Borah's views explains to what degree this expectation was well-grounded.

Given the fact that the dissertation offers the study of a so-far neglected topic, it is important to describe the research methodology employed in writing this dissertation. The present study is both descriptive and analytical by nature. The dissertation draws on a great body of archival sources (i.e. the documents of the State Department of the United States and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Külügyminisztérium*), the personal papers and memoirs of American and Hungarians diplomats and politicians, microfilm and microfiche collections, the then un-catalogued materials of the Bethlen Collection) and secondary materials available at various archives, libraries, and research institutions both in Hungary and abroad, especially in the United States.

The focus of the present dissertation inevitably determined that, primarily, I applied the traditional research methods of history. The diversity of sources, however, necessitated the use of other approaches as well, for example, in the study of cultural images and the analysis of the related press products. Even an oral interview was conducted with Professor

August J. Molnár of the American Hungarian Foundation, New Brunswick, New Jersey.⁸ The evaluation of Jenő Horváth's Trianon works in chapter four rests on the critical reading of his Trianon monographs and also on the textual analysis of the primary quotations Horváth presented to support his argument and their comparison with the original sources in question.

The revision of the Treaty of Trianon was the most important national concern in Hungary between the world wars. While the Hungarian government's scope of action was limited in this respect and it had to resort to covert methods, Hungarian society sought any and all support to that end. Expressed at various levels of society and manifested in various forms Hungarians had high expectations toward America pertaining to the rectification of Hungary's post-World War I frontiers. In view of the fact that isolationist United States could be the least possible supporter of Hungarian aims and that American decision makers felt that Trianon was a Hungarian obsession the Trianon question represents an awkward dimension of Hungarian revisionism and of American-Hungarian bilateral relations.

⁸ Interviews with Professor August J. Molnár on 28 November, 2002 and March 10, 2003 at the American-Hungarian Foundation, 300 Somerset Street, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA.

CHAPTER ONE

Political and Historical Background

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the US was not yet considered to be an important player of international power politics. And within less than two decades the USA entered the World War I and played a key role in the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

During the period of American neutrality until April 1917 the US played the role of a mediator between the Central Powers and the Allies. President Wilson's January 22, 1917 "Peace Without Victory" address to Congress already reflected the American separation from Allied war aims. The idea of national self-determination was pronounced as the guiding principle of the "peace without victory" proposed in the president's message.⁹

That American war aims were different from those of the Allies was also demonstrated by the fact that when due to ideological, economic as well as political considerations the US finally entered the war she became a belligerent not as an allied, but as an associated power. For President Wilson US entry into the war was seen as a great chance for America to realize a post-war new world order and create just and fair peace.

The two major lines of American foreign policy with respect to the Monarchy were defined by (1) the series of secret peace negotiations between the Allies and the Monarchy mediated by the US and (2) preparations for a "scientific peace." Until the fall of 1918, when both projects failed, the official American policy toward the multi-ethnic Monarchy continued to be non-dismemberment.

⁹ Frederick C. Penfield to Robert Lansing, January 25, 1917 in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1917. Supplement. I. The World War* (Washington: the Government Printing Office, 1931), 31. Hereafter cited as *FRUS. 1917. Supplement I*.

The evolution of Wilson's Habsburg policy has already been researched in several outstanding works,¹⁰ and it is well beyond the scope of the present study to deal with it in detail. However, some events of American and Hungarian history during the war and at the time of the peace negotiations require clarification to provide a general historical background to the major issues discussed in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Wilson's Habsburg policy between January 1917 and May 1918 was characterized by the tactics of giving assurances to the Monarchy that the US intended to preserve her territorial integrity. The main consideration behind America's Habsburg policy was to secure a "sufficient guarantee of peace"¹¹ against dismemberment, and to persuade the Monarchy to conclude a separate peace and abandon its German ally. Despite the Allies' opposing views and war aims¹² the US pursued this policy until the spring of 1918.

Between the end of 1916, Charles I's accession to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and the spring of 1918 there were several official and semi-official attempts at concluding a separate peace with Vienna. From March to May 1917 the Emperor Charles and his wife also got involved in the secret peace negotiations through the two Bourbon Princes of Parma. Through American mediation parallel secret talks were also held, for example, between General Jan Christian Smuts and former Austrian Ambassador to London Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly and between Count Abel Armand of the French General Staff and Austrian diplomat Count Nicholas Revertera. These peace overtures, however, all failed due to Vienna's reluctance to agree to quit the war. As Austrian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar

¹⁰ This analysis draws extensively on the recent work of Tibor Glant, *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and Public Opinion during World War I* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998). Hereafter cited as Glant, *Through the Prism*. Also see Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918. A Study of Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Hereafter cited as Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*. Also see Lawrence E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919* (New Haven: Yale University, 1963). For more on wartime dismemberment propaganda see Joseph P. O'Grady, ed., *The Immigrants Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1967) and Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the First World War* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926).

¹¹ Robert Lansing to Walter H. Page, February 8, 1917, *FRUS, 1917, Supplement I.*, 40.

¹² See the January 10, 1917 Allied declaration of war aims and the Balfour Memorandum of May 1917.

Czernin put it: “Austria-Hungary could only enter into nego[c]iations for peace simultaneously with her allies.”¹³

At the same time, frustrated by the failure of the separate peace talks, President Wilson “raised the chips” to show Austria-Hungary what was at stake, and thereby tried to lure the Monarchy away from Germany.¹⁴ The American declaration of war on the Monarchy on December 7, 1917 was one such move. This, however, principally did not affect the official US approach toward Austria-Hungary as Wilson stated: “[...] we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”¹⁵ The official declaration of American war aims on January 8, 1918, the Fourteen Points, presented no change in this respect either.

The declaration of the Fourteen Points was necessitated by several circumstances. Russia abandoned the war at the end of 1917, preparations for the Brest-Litovsk agreement started, while negotiations for a separate peace with the Monarchy failed again. It is also important to see that the Fourteen Points was not an idealistic program of war aims, but a pragmatic and tactical move to try to increase the willingness of the Monarchy to negotiate a separate peace and win her away from Germany, which is best illustrated by how Point Ten, the most important point with respect to the Monarchy, was drafted.

Preparations for a “scientific peace” began in September 1917 when President Wilson’s private task force, the Inquiry, started to prepare policy proposals and comprehensive plans for the president concerning certain geographic units, among them the Monarchy.¹⁶ Its

¹³ Frederick C. Penfield to Robert Lansing, February 27, 1917, *FRUS. 1917. Supplement I.*, 62-63. By the spring that year Czernin realized that making peace was inevitable. By then, however, secret peace was not negotiable with the Allies and the US. See Czernin’s April Memorandum to Charles IV.

¹⁴ Glant, *Through the Prism*, 253-258.

¹⁵ Wilson cited in Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, 160.

¹⁶ Glant, *Through the Prism*, 257. The Inquiry’s Austro-Hungarian Division was headed by historian Charles Seymour, who worked with his associates Clive Day and Robert J. Kerner. In the fall of 1918 the staff was extended to include Richard B. Barrett, Florence A. Hague, Charles Sweeney and Thomas Burk. Between September and January the Inquiry prepared various plans concerning the future of Austria-Hungary. Trialism, federalism, reform dualism and even dismemberment were among its recommendations. The work of the Inquiry regarding Austria-Hungary falls into two periods, July and August of 1918, Wilson’s change of policy toward the Monarchy, being the division line. While during the first period all kinds of materials and data were collected and general policy proposals were made, the second period is marked by actual preparations for the peace

memorandum, “War Aims and Peace Terms,” threatened the Monarchy with dismemberment yet at the same time also implied that the Inquiry did not consider such action.¹⁷

Our policy must therefore consist first in the stirring up of nationalistic discontent, and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this discontent which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. By threatening the present German–Magyar combination with nationalist uprisings on the one side, and by showing it a mode of safety on the other, its resistance would be reduced to a minimum, and the motive to an independence from Berlin in foreign affairs would be enormously accelerated. Austria-Hungary is in the position where she must be good in order to survive.¹⁸

The Inquiry’s recommendation that “[t]owards Austria-Hungary the approach should consist of references to the subjection of the various nationalities, in order to keep that agitation alive, but coupled with it should go repeated assurances that no dismemberment of the Empire is intended”¹⁹ reflected Wilson’s somewhat ambiguous opinion. On the basis of the Inquiry’s report Wilson drafted Point Ten:²⁰ “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.” The principle of national self-determination formulated in Point Ten was (to be) interpreted by Austria-Hungary as the key to their independence and freedom of action to determine the future of the Monarchy after the war.

As will be discussed in subsequent parts of this dissertation, the Fourteen Points assumed a symbolic character and began to mean much more for Hungarians than it was meant to: it became synonymous with righteousness, fair play and the just peace and became almost synonymous with non-dismemberment.²¹

negotiations and recommendations for the peace terms. For more details see “Chapter Nine: The Inquiry: Preparations for Scientific Peace,” in Glant, *Through the Prism*, 205-225.

¹⁷ Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, 178.

¹⁸ Quoted in Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, 179.

¹⁹ “War Aims and Peace Terms,” Report of the Inquiry in *FRUS. 1919. The Paris Peace Conference*, Vol.1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), 48; Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement* Vol. 3 (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), 32. Hereafter cited as Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*. See also Sándor Taraszovics, “American Peace Preparations during World War I,” in Ignác Romsics, ed., *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1995), 79. Hereafter respectively cited as Romsics, ed., *Hungary and the Great Powers* and Taraszovics, “American Peace Preparations.”

²⁰ See Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, 38.

²¹ See Tibor Glant, “A 14 pont története és mítosza” [The history and myth of the Fourteen Points], *Külügyi Szemle* (2009/4): 84-99. Hereafter cited as Glant, “A 14 pont története.”

After the American declaration of war on the Monarchy and Wilson's announcement of the Fourteen Points Washington attempted again to secure a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. Parallel with other French and British peace feelers, America resumed secret peace negotiations. In late January 1918 the self-appointed American diplomat George David Herron, who was closely associated with the American Legation in Berne, Switzerland, initiated secret conversations between the Allies and Austria-Hungary.²² He approached Professor of international law Heinrich Lammasch of Vienna and got engaged in a series of confidential discussions with him during the period of time between late January and April 1918. At the beginning it seemed that peace through America was "highly probable."²³ Although the Emperor Charles also expressed his wish to remodel the Dual Monarchy based on the Wilsonian concept of self-determination²⁴ as expressed in the Fourteen Points and the Four Principles, until April 1918 he was rather reluctant to provide a definite answer and state that the Monarchy was indeed ready to sign a separate peace. Professor Lammasch tried to put pressure both on the Emperor Charles and the Austrian parliament and appealed to "choose an honorable peace" before it was too late.²⁵ This notwithstanding, these secret peace negotiations were rendered unsuccessful again.

Not only did Germany obtain information relative to the Herron-Lammasch secret talks and immediately demanded Vienna to terminate further discussions, but in April the Sixtus Affair came to light. Austrian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin indiscreetly disclosed information relative to the secret Armand-Revertera talks of the preceding few months between French and Austrian government circles. In response French Premier Georges

²² George D. Herron was an American clergyman and writer, one of the major advocates of the Social Gospel movement. He lived in a self-imposed exile in Europe, where he continued to prepare intelligence reports to the American and British governments during World War I.

²³ Hugh R. Wilson to Lansing, February 19, 1918. *Lansing Papers*. Cited in Betty Miller Unterberger, *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 108. Hereafter cited as Unterberger, *The United States*.

²⁴ Lansing, "Memorandum on Dr. Heinrich Lammasch," February 10, 1918. *Wilson Papers*. Cited in Unterberger, *The United States*, 107.

²⁵ Pleasant A. Stovall to Lansing, March 5, 1918. Cited in Unterberger, *The United States*, 113.

Clemenceau published the facsimile of the so-called Sixtus Letter written by the Emperor Charles to former French President Raymond Poincaré proposing peace and offering Charles' support for the "justified demands for the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France."²⁶ As the immediate consequence of the incident, the emperor discontinued all further negotiations with the Allied and Associated powers. Furthermore, the German-Austrian alliance was strengthened by the Treaty of Spa on May 15, 1918. Austria was forced to pledge loyalty to Berlin and accept the joint military command of the Austrian and German armies.

Following several failed attempts to win the Monarchy away from her German ally, the infamous Czernin-Clemenceau²⁷ showdown triggered frustration in the US and ended all hopes for a separate peace. Wilson's previous Habsburg policy therefore seemed more and more untenable.²⁸ By the summer of the year, President Wilson was ready to change his policy toward Austria-Hungary and eventually accept its dismemberment.

Wilson's change of policy toward the Monarchy in the fall of 1918 has been subject to several historical analyses. While some overemphasize the importance of Thomas Masaryk and immigrant movements as having been the most formative influences on President Wilson, some explain that Secretary of State Lansing contributed to Wilson's change of policy toward the Monarchy to the greatest extent. Others do not accept either claim, and maintain that Wilson made his decisions alone without any influence whatsoever.²⁹ Although Wilson's

²⁶ The Sixtus Letter. Quoted in Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 477.

²⁷ Although Lansing called Clemenceau's action "the most astounding stupidity," there is ground to think that it was a premeditated tactical move on the French Premier's part in order to cut further secret peace talks, which, in his view, would have guaranteed neither security, nor the territorial concession made to the nationalities. See Glant, *Through the Prism*, 234-235.

²⁸ Glant, *Through the Prism*, 260-261; 263.

²⁹ Victor S. Mamatey, "The United States and the Dissolution of Austria-Hungary," *Journal of Central European Affairs* 10 (1950-51): 256-270. Hereafter cited as Mamatey, "The Dissolution of Austria-Hungary." George Barany, "Wilsonian Central Europe: Lansing's Contribution," *The Historian* Vol. 28 No. 2 (1966): 224-251; Arthur J. May, *The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918*, 2 Vols. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1966); Glant, *Through the Prism*; Norman Gordon Levin, *America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy. The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of New Diplomacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); William Appleman Williams, *The*

evolving approaches are not the subject of this inquiry, it is still important to understand why Wilson changed his mind.

War expediency, military and political reasons explained Wilson's new policy toward Austria-Hungary. The November 1917 Bolshevik revolution was seen as a serious threat to Wilson's new world order concept, while the Brest-Litovsk agreement between the Central Powers and Russia on March 3, 1918 meant the collapse of the Eastern front, giving the Germans access to Russian supplies and allowing them to focus entirely on the Western front. American interests in the Far East were also endangered by Japan. These factors made international cooperation in the Far East, thus, US intervention in Siberia, in the name of collective security, necessary. Added to this the Sixtus Affair meant the breakdown of the secret peace talks with Vienna.

At the same time, in the spring of 1918, the propaganda of the nationalities was also set into motion. In April the Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities met in Rome where the representatives of the nationalities called for self-determination.

Despite these events, until May 29 Wilson did not give any sign of sympathy toward the subject peoples of the Monarchy. Finally, military events in Siberia helped Wilson resolve the dilemma inherent in the conflict between his former policy toward the Monarchy and political-military necessities.³⁰ Aiding the Czechoslovak Legion³¹ in Siberia provided grounds both for US military intervention in the Far East, and, as a consequence, "rewarding" the Czechoslovaks with independence. On the very day, May 29, when news about the Legion's first decisive battle reached the State Department, Wilson also indicated that he had decided

Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962); Arthur S. Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist, A New Look at His Major Foreign Policies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).

³⁰ Glantz, *Through the Prism*, 262.

³¹ The Czechoslovak Legion was the military force of 50,000 fully armed former POWs who were willing to fight against the Central Powers. In February 1918, they set out for Vladivostok to be shipped to the Western front, and on their way to the Far East they clashed with Bolshevik forces, among them the Hungarian Red Guard in Chelyabinsk, on May 25, 1918 for the first time. This incident provided the excuse for Wilson to intervene in Russia by aiding the Legion against German and Austrian POWs armed by the Bolshevik forces.

to reverse his Austro-Hungarian policy as there was no further hope of a separate peace.³² That notwithstanding, it was only in September that the US recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as the *de facto* belligerent government. This led to the American sanctioning of the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire, and the recognition of the rights of its subject peoples to political independence.³³

Meanwhile, the course of the war turned for the worse for the Central Powers by the fall of 1918. The Bulgarian front collapsed on September 26. In view of the grave military situation and the prospective danger of dismemberment, Foreign Minister Count István Burian tried to pick up the line of peace negotiations which was made impossible by the Sixtus Affair, and invited all belligerents to a confidential discussion of the principles of peace on September 29, 1918. He announced that the Monarchy was ready to start peace negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Washington rejected Burián's note even before it was officially delivered by Swedish Minister W. A. F. Ekengren.³⁴ On October 7 the Monarchy's official peace proposal arrived in Washington. In this: "[t]he Austro-Hungarian Monarchy [...] offer[ed] to conclude with [Wilson] and with his allies an armistice [...], and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the Fourteen Points in the Message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the Four Points contained in President Wilson's address of February 11, 1918, should serve as a foundation [...]."³⁵

That the original Fourteen Points still stood and that they provided the basis for the peace negotiations by no means was true in the fall of 1918. Wilson's official reply to the Austrian peace note on October 18 reflected this attitude, and once and for all made the American

³² President Wilson to Sir William Wiseman, May 29, 1918 in Sir Arthur Willert, *The Road to Safety* (London, 1952), 158.

³³ Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, 265. In a memorandum to Lansing on June 26 Wilson wrote: "we can no longer respect or regard the integrity of the artificial Austrian Empire. I doubt that Hungary is any more an integral part of it than Bohemia."

³⁴ Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, 319.

³⁵ Count Burián to President Wilson, October 5, 1918 in Harold W. V. Temperley, ed. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1 (London: n.p.: 1920-24), 448. Hereafter cited as Temperley, *Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1. Also see W. A. F. Ekengren to the Secretary of State, October 7, 1918, *FRUS, 1918, Vol. 1. Supplement I.*, 341.

position clear: “The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestion of the Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his Address of January 8th last, have necessarily altered the attitude and the responsibility of the Government of the United States.”³⁶

In October 1918 the US government had the Official American Commentary on the Fourteen Points prepared by Walter Lippmann and Frank I. Cobb. The document, also known as the Lippmann-Cobb Commentary, was made to clarify American war aims. The commentary put American plans for peace on a new basis and explicitly contained information regarding the readjustment of US policies toward the Monarchy, and its effect on Point Ten.³⁷ It stated that Point Ten was no longer valid.

In the fall of 1918 the Monarchy had to face insurmountable problems. The Central Powers lost the war. In the midst of the military crisis serious social and political problems emerged. The political system, and coupled with it the Dual Monarchy itself, was falling apart.³⁸ The Emperor Charles made one last desperate attempt to save the Monarchy by issuing a manifesto on October 16. In it he proclaimed the federalization of the Monarchy’s Austrian part and thereby offered autonomy for the nationalities. Such a gesture, however, came too late.

By then the Allies and Associated Powers had committed themselves to sanction the independence of the Czechs, Slovaks and South Slavs. Therefore, autonomy for the nationalities was no longer sufficient. The *de facto* Czechoslovak government had joined the

³⁶ For the full length of the message see President Wilson to Count Burián, October 18, 1918 in Temperley, *Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1, 449-450; Secretary of State to W. A. F. Ekengren, October 19, 1918, *FRUS, 1918, Vol. 1. Supplement I.*, 368.

³⁷ See the full text of the commentary in Arthur Walworth, *America’s Moment: 1918. American Diplomacy at the End of World War I* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1977), 280-281. Hereafter cited as Walworth, *America’s Moment*.

³⁸ Peter Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three* (Boulder, CO.: East European Quarterly, 1976), 28. Hereafter cited as Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*.

Allies in October, and the South Slav national council declared an independent South Slav state on October 29, 1918. Moreover, the newly emerging neighboring countries threatened Hungary with military operations to realize the territorial promises the Allies made to them during the war.

At the end of October a new political force emerged in Hungary. Count Mihály Károlyi took the political initiative. His reputation as an opposition politician on the Independence Party platform, his pacifism, and defiance of the war from its outbreak, as well as his pronounced pro-Allied sentiments suited him best for the task. On October 16 in the Budapest Parliament Károlyi called for a new political program and said: “We lost the war, now it is important that we ought not to lose the peace.”³⁹ His program was to introduce democratic reforms, win the support of the Allies, and thus secure for Hungary a favorable treatment at the conference table in Paris.

When Prime Minister Sándor Wekerle resigned on October 23, Károlyi hoped to be the successor, but the Emperor refused to appoint him. Then, two days later Károlyi became the president of the Hungarian National Council which worked as a counter-government.⁴⁰ Within a few days a revolutionary situation evolved. Drawing on the support of the masses and the young officers of the Soldier’s Council, Károlyi organized a “forceful takeover.” On October 31 the so-called “frostflower revolution” put Károlyi and the National Council into power. Within weeks the independent People’s Republic of Hungary was declared.⁴¹

Besides the implementation of important domestic reforms such as for example the suffrage law, tax and land reforms, the new government hoped to preserve Hungary’s territorial integrity.

In late October the Minister of Nationality Affairs in the Károlyi government Oszkár Jászi made public his plan of a federated Hungarian Republic. He tried to address the question of

³⁹ Károlyi cited in Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 29.

⁴⁰ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 29.

⁴¹ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*. 32-37.

the nationalities by offering them autonomy and self-determination. Jászi hoped that they would be loyal to Hungary.⁴² He envisioned a confederation of the Magyar, Polish, Czech, Croat, and Serb nations and got engaged in series of negotiations with the representatives of the nationalities to that end. These talks, however, all failed. By then the only acceptable path for the nationalities was independence.⁴³

From the beginning Károlyi followed a pro-Entente program. He strongly believed that such a course of action would secure Hungary a favorable treatment by the Allies and that territorial questions would be fairly settled in Paris on the basis of President Wilson's idea of just peace. He proved wrong on both accounts. The way the Allies related to Hungary in the event of the negotiations of the Belgrade military convention and the reluctance of the Allies to support Hungary against the military occupation carried out by the successor states demonstrated that Károlyi's Hungary was not considered to be an equal negotiating partner.

The armistice of Padua on November 3, 1918 officially ended the state of belligerency between the Monarchy and the Allies. The government also wished to reach a military agreement with the victorious powers for fear of future Allied occupation of Hungarian territories as part of their military operations against the Germans. Therefore, the Hungarian government approached the French General of the Allied Army of the Orient, Franchet d'Esperey, and on November 13 they signed the Belgrade Military Convention. It sanctioned the Allied occupation of the Bánát and all important strategic points, ordered the demobilization of all Hungarian forces with the exception of few divisions to preserve order, and the demarcation line was set to follow the upper valley of the Szamos (Somes) River.⁴⁴

⁴² Nandor F. Dreisziger, *Hungary's Way to World War II* (Astor Park, Florida: Danubian Press Inc., 1968), 17. Hereafter cited as Dreisziger, *Hungary's Way*. Jászi dealt with the question of nationalities in his *A nemzetállamok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* [The Evolution of the Nation States and the Nationality Question] (Budapest: n.p., 1912).

⁴³ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 40-41.

⁴⁴ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 62-66.

In line with the armistice agreement Allied forces began the occupation of Hungarian territories following the demarcation lines. Meanwhile, the successor states requested that the Allies advance the demarcation lines forth into Hungary, thus making the occupation of more territories possible. To act on their demands one by one the successor states began to move into Hungarian territories thus violating the armistice agreement as well as the military convention.

The successor states occupied sizable Hungarian territories. The Czechoslovaks, the South Slavs, and the Romanians justified their actions arguing that there was a need for a barrier against German aggression and the Bolshevik threat.⁴⁵ This idea of a *barrière de l'est* against Germany and a *cordon sanitaire* against Bolshevism underlined the creation of the Little Entente in 1920 and 1921. Foreign military occupation had devastating economic, political and moral consequences. Important industrial regions as well as a considerable portion of Hungarian and non-Hungarian population were lost.⁴⁶

Although the Károlyi government objected to these moves, the Allies did nothing to help Hungary. The Vix Mission, which was sent to Hungary to supervise the armistice and the Belgrade military convention and was led by the French Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Fernand Vix, did not raise its voice against the violation of the agreements. While the French tacitly approved the military occupation of Hungary by the neighboring states, Great Britain and the United States were neutral.⁴⁷ President Wilson, on whom Károlyi attached much hope, did not renounce his policy of non-involvement in East Central European affairs as expressed by one of the president's declarations on November 1, 1918.⁴⁸ Indifference continued to characterize his attitude toward Károlyi's Hungary.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 96.

⁴⁶ Dreisziger, *Hungary's Way*, 19-22.

⁴⁷ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 77-86.

⁴⁸ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 148.

⁴⁹ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 96-111.

This notwithstanding, Károlyi did not give up his belief in Wilson's just peace and was confident that the territorial questions would be justly decided at the conference table in Paris. On December 30, 1918 Károlyi stated that his foreign policy was still based on Wilsonian ideals. "We have only one ideology," he said, "Wilson, Wilson, and for the third time Wilson."⁵⁰ The territorial decisions made at Hungary's expense at the peace conference of Paris during the coming months proved how idealistic Károlyi's view was.

During the winter of 1918 and 1919 the occupation of Hungary went on. The failure of the Károlyi government to secure Allied help began to impair its strength and prestige. On January 11, 1919 Károlyi resigned as prime minister, and soon became the President of Hungary. He appointed his former Minister of Justice, Dénes Berinkey, to lead the new government. Together with the political crisis economic problems also emerged: there was a shortage of coal and food, the rate of unemployment increased, and refugees flooded Budapest from territories lost to the successor states.⁵¹

When on January 18, 1919 the peace conference in Paris was opened the state of domestic affairs in Hungary was far from being consolidated. The fact that the Károlyi regime failed to win international recognition was indicated by the fact that Hungary was not invited to Paris.⁵²

The American Delegation to Negotiate Peace arrived in Paris on December 11, 1918. President Wilson led the delegation and went to the French capital with the hope that he would be able to realize a new post-war world order based on a just and fair peace, disarmament, and collective security sanctioned by his dearest project of all, the League of

⁵⁰ Károlyi quoted in Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 90.

⁵¹ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 93-95, 102.

⁵² Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 98.

Nations. His “missionary diplomacy,”⁵³ however, was soon confronted by European *real politik*.

As was already stated above, Wilson’s private task force, the Inquiry, began to prepare for the “scientific peace” as early as the fall of 1917. By October 1918 its Austrian division submitted its final recommendation to the president. The *Epitome of Reports on Just and Practical Boundaries within Austria-Hungary for Czechoslovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Rumanians, Poles, Ruthenians, and Magyars* discussed the boundaries of the new states in light of the dissolution of the Monarchy. It drew the conclusion “that the frontiers supposed [sic] are unsatisfactory as the international boundaries of sovereign states. It has been found impossible to discover such lines, which would be at the same time just and practical.”⁵⁴

The American delegation went to Paris without any viable and specific plan for a just peace. President Wilson proposed for an umbrella treaty for the Central Powers to end the war. He believed that with the help of experts the League of Nations should have the responsibility to settle the territorial questions and draw the final boundaries in the future. Wilson’s idealistic program was not realized and the Allies made separate peace treaties with the defeated powers.⁵⁵

The future boundaries of Hungary were decided by default by the territorial committees of the peace conference in which the Americans were also represented.⁵⁶ Károlyi hoped that Wilson would represent Hungary’s interest in Paris. His expectation was fed by the fact that from January 15-20, 1919 the Americans sent the fact-finding Coolidge Mission to Hungary (led by Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge of the Inquiry) to report to the American

⁵³ Arthur Stanley Link calls Wilson’s foreign policy as “missionary diplomacy.” See Tibor Glant, “Wilson Párizsban: Trianon Amerikai háttere” [Wilson in Paris: the American Background of Trianon], in Zoltán Kovács and Levente Püski, eds. *Emlékkönyv L. Nagy Zsuzsa 80. születésnapjára* (Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézet: Debrecen, 2010): 75. Hereafter cited as Glant, “Wilson Párizsban.”

⁵⁴ Quoted by Glant, *Through the Prism*, 222.

⁵⁵ Glant, “Wilson Párizsban,” 77-79.

⁵⁶ Glant, “Wilson Párizsban,” 81. Allen Welsh Dulles was seated on the Committee on the Czechoslovak Question, while Clive Day was a member of the Committee on the Yugoslav Question. Charles Seymour was a member of both.

Peace Commission on the Hungarian situation.⁵⁷ Although the Coolidge reports shed favorable light on Hungary and were supportive in tone and content toward her, they did not influence the American recommendations for peace drafted by the Intelligence Section of the American Peace Delegation.⁵⁸

The eventual territorial recommendations for Hungary prepared by the members of the American delegation reflected a less biased, and a somewhat more objective approach than those of the Allies.⁵⁹ This notwithstanding, the final boundaries of Hungary set in the Treaty of Trianon and the ones proposed by the Americans showed only slight differences (see map on American boundary recommendations of 1919 as compared to the Trianon borders of Hungary). The ethnic principle proclaimed by President Wilson was disregarded.⁶⁰ In any case, the American proposals were not taken into consideration and failed to affect Hungary's final borders. President Wilson and the American Delegation had a lesser significance in the territorial negotiations and they went along the major line proposed by the Allies and successor states.

The new Hungarian borders were finally sanctioned by the Councils of Four and Ten in the summer of 1919. By then the American delegation was falling apart. The disintegration of the American peace commission in Paris stemmed, for example, from the lack of communication and confidence among its members and the disagreement over issues best illustrated by Wilson's request for Secretary of State Robert Lansing's resignation and President Wilson's straining relations with his most confidential friend, Colonel Edward Mandell House. Moreover, Wilson's insistence on making decisions alone, and the realization

⁵⁷ Future US Minister to Hungary Nicholas Roosevelt was also the member of the Coolidge Mission.

⁵⁸ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 100-105.

⁵⁹ "Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendations Prepared by the Intelligence Section in Accordance with Instructions, for the President and the Plenipotentiaries," January 21, 1919, popularly known as the Black Book, was prepared by the Inquiry in Paris. See David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York: Appel Printing Company, 1924) Vol. 4. Quoted in Taraszovics, "American Peace Preparations," 87. Also see Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference. The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972). Hereafter cited as Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*.

⁶⁰ Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 29.

that it was impossible against the opposition of the Allies, gradually led to his isolation in Paris. Wilson's fight for the principles of just peace ultimately came down to the fight for the League of Nations, for which he finally compromised most American boundary recommendations.⁶¹ President Wilson sailed back to the USA for good in early July after the Treaty of Versailles had been signed on June 28. The Hungarian question fell completely out of his range of interest.⁶² Following his return he devoted all of his energies to have the League accepted and ratified by the Congress of the USA.

While the new map of Hungary was being discussed and drafted in Paris at the various levels of decision-making important political changes took place in Hungary. In compliance with the February 26 decision of the Council of Ten, Lieutenant-Colonel Vix submitted a note to the Hungarian government on March 20 demanding the creation of a new demilitarized zone and thus advancing the Romanian demarcation line further west into Hungarian territory. According to the note, a huge purely Magyar-populated territory had to be evacuated by March 22 in favor of Romania. The ultimatum caused an outrage among Hungarians. Their fear was that the new lines of demarcation would be the final borders to be set by the peace conference. The Hungarian government refused to accept the Vix note. In protest Premier Károlyi resigned and handed the political power over to the social democrats who created a coalition government with the communists under the leadership of Béla Kun.⁶³

Kun was a POW in Soviet Russia where he became an ardent radical communist. He also fought in the Russian Civil War and became closely acquainted with the circles of Lenin. In November 1918, together with many of his followers, he returned to Hungary where he founded the Hungarian Communist Party which continuously carried out strikes, rallies, and demonstrations against the government.

⁶¹ For more on this see Glant, *Through the Prism*, 278-282.

⁶² Glant, "Wilson Párizsban," 80, 83.

⁶³ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 136-145.

Since Károlyi's pro-Entente diplomacy had failed, the social democrats approached Kun for help⁶⁴ because they believed that only Soviet Russia could possibly offer foreign support to Hungary in case of a military conflict. And Kun had good relations with Lenin.⁶⁵

On March 21 the Hungarian Soviet Republic was declared and Kun began to realize his radical program (immediate nationalization of private property, food requisition in rural areas by the red militia). Hungary went under Bolshevik rule. In response to the anti-communist opposition Kun launched a wave of suppression (the Red Terror) carried out by the secret police and semi-regular forces. He introduced martial law and exercised dictatorial means.

The communist takeover provided reason for the successor states to start an even greater military aggression against Hungary than before. In early April the Allies sent South African General Jan Christian Smuts to Hungary to negotiate with Kun about a new armistice line. Agreement, however, was unfeasible and Hungary soon was at war with Czechoslovakia and Romania. With the failure to negotiate with the Allies, Hungary's chance to be invited to the peace conference also vanished.⁶⁶ The Bolshevik regime affected further disadvantages for Hungary. One of the immediate economic consequences of the Bolshevik takeover was the suspension of all shipments of food relief to Hungary by the U.S. Food Administration.⁶⁷

To defend the integrity of the country the Hungarian Red Army was organized and hoped to join forces with Lenin's Red Army, which never happened. By April the Romanians were already moving toward Budapest. Although Hungarian troops scored some military successes (for example, in the case of their mission to reoccupy much of eastern Slovakia in July) the massive Romanian intervention forced Kun's regime to fall. As the Romanian army occupied

⁶⁴ At that time Kun was in prison for his involvement in a violent workers' riot in February.

⁶⁵ See Oszkár Jászi's speech delivered in Arad on November 9, 1918. In it he warned that if the Allies fail to deal with the Hungarian question in more or less satisfactory way, Hungary would turn to Soviet Russia for help. For more see Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 73, 149.

⁶⁶ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 150.

⁶⁷ For more see Tibor Glant, "Herbert Hoover magyarországi tevékenysége, 1918-1920," in János Angi and János Barta, eds., *Emlékkönyv L. Nagy Zsuzsa 70. születésnapjára* (Debrecen: Kossuth University Press, 2000): 381-99.

Budapest, on August 1, 1919 the leaders of the communist republic resigned and Kun fled to Vienna.

Soon afterwards the Supreme Council commissioned an Inter-Allied Military Mission to ensure that Hungary would meet the requirements of the armistice and to supervise the withdrawal of Romanian troops. The American member of the mission was Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz. He became a hero in the eyes of the Hungarians when on October 5 he successfully prevented the Romanians from looting the Royal Hungarian Museum.⁶⁸ The Romanians retreated from the Hungarian capital in November, but they refused to leave the rest of the country until February 1920.

Under such political circumstances the Allied powers wished to consolidate the political situation in Hungary and help into power a government which was acceptable to the Allies and could be invited to Paris to receive the Hungarian treaty. Therefore, the peace conference sent another mission to Hungary led by British diplomat Sir George Clerk.

In November the counter-revolutionary National Army organized in Szeged and led by Admiral Miklós Horthy marched on Budapest and assumed military control. During the following months counter-revolutionary forces carried out a series of violent, often anti-Semitic, actions (the White Terror) to suppress and punish communists, socialists, social democrats and their sympathizers and associates.

Following the short-lived government of the social democrat Gyula Peidl and that of István Friedrich supported by legitimist forces and the Archduke Francis Joseph, Károly Huszár's government was formed with Horthy's military help. On November 25 on behalf of the peace conference Clerk recognized the Huszár government.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ The Royal Hungarian Museum is known as the Hungarian National Museum today. For more see Harry Hill Bandholtz, *An Undiplomatic Diary. By the American Member of the Inter-Allied Military Mission to Hungary, 1919-1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933). Bandholtz's fame was a long-lasting one. See more on the efforts to unveil the Bandholtz statue in Budapest in chapter seven.

⁶⁹ Peter Pastor, "Major Trends in Hungarian Foreign Policy from the Collapse of the Monarchy to the Peace Treaty of Trianon," *Hungarian Studies* 17/1 (2003): 8-9.

Under Allied pressure and the control of the Clerk mission in January 1920 elections were held for the National Assembly, which on March 1 “elected” Admiral Horthy to be the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary and serve as head of state.⁷⁰ Although the official form of government was kingdom as proclaimed on March 23, Hungary did not have a king. In his Eckartsau proclamation issued on November 13, 1918 the Emperor Charles renounced participation in the state of affairs of Hungary, but he did not abdicate the throne. Encouraged by legitimist forces in Hungary, he sought to reclaim the throne twice in 1921. Both attempts, however, were unsuccessful, and, thus, the return of the Habsburgs to political power was impossible.

Having been officially recognized by the Allies, Hungary was sent an invitation to the peace conference not to discuss the terms of the treaty, but only to receive the conditions of peace. In the web of wartime commitments to the successor states and as a result of a complex set of political, economic, and military considerations (the containment of Germany and Soviet Russia, the economic viability of the small successor states), the Allied and Associated Powers had decided the fate of Hungary even before the Hungarian Peace Delegation led by Count Albert Apponyi arrived in Paris.

By the time the Hungarian delegation arrived in the French capital the Americans had already left Paris. All members of the American delegation were withdrawn from the commissions and went back home in December. Following this, American Ambassador to Paris Hugh C. Wallace assumed the task of representing the US at the conference and sit on the Supreme Council, but only as an observer.⁷¹ Contrary to Hungarian expectations, the presence of the American representative did not have any influence whatsoever on the outcome of the negotiations. Neither did the arguments offered by the Hungarians.

⁷⁰ Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 152.

⁷¹ Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 181, Glant, “Wilson Párizsban,” 80.

The peace conditions were first presented to the Hungarian delegation on January 15. The following day some of its leading members were offered the chance to explain Hungary's position to the Supreme Council. In February the Hungarians could even file 18 notes with annexes, maps (i.e. Teleki's famous *Carte Rouge*) and statistical tables to present Hungary's observations, criticism of, and objection to the peace terms, and offer proposals for their possible modifications. Such efforts, however, proved ultimately unsuccessful.

The final peace terms for Hungary were presented to the Hungarian Delegation on May 5, 1920, and were "practically unaltered."⁷² On June 4, 1920 the Hungarians delegates signed the Treaty of Trianon in Paris. The extremely severe and punitive conditions of the Hungarian treaty were accepted by the Hungarian government *under duress*, and the Hungarian National Assembly ratified it on November 15, 1920.⁷³ The ratification of the Treaty of Trianon marked the beginning of a new period in the history of Hungary. Following a lost war and two revolutions, historic Hungary thereby was dismembered. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Hungarian society could not overcome the loss of historic Hungary. Therefore, the revision of the terms of the treaty became the most important concern of Hungarian society during the period between the world wars.

The United States refused to ratify all of the Paris treaties. The Republican shift in US domestic policy and the Republican victory in the Congressional elections had serious consequences relative to President Wilson's peace project. The Republicans stood on a strong isolationist platform. This explained the all-out political campaign against the ratification of the Paris peace treaties (known as the "treaty fight") launched by a group of US senators, known as the Irreconcilables.⁷⁴ As a consequence, in November 1919 the US Congress

⁷² Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 282.

⁷³ Peter Pastor, "The Ups and Downs in the Historiography of the Peace Treaty of Trianon," in Dennis P. Hupchick and R. William Weisberger, eds., *Hungary's Historical Legacies. Studies in Honor of Steven Béla Várdy* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000), 106. Hereafter cited as Pastor, "The Ups and Downs."

⁷⁴ A group of US senators who bitterly attacked the treaties made at the Paris Peace Conference, and fought to defeat their ratification by the Congress.

refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty and those made with other smaller nations. The main reason for this was that the treaties, without exception, contained the League of Nations Covenant which, under Article 10, was designed to secure the *status quo* by collective security measures.⁷⁵ It would have endangered the traditional American policy of political isolation toward Europe; a policy which took root again in the US after the war.

At the same time the state of belligerency had to be terminated with Germany and Austria-Hungary, so it was necessary to sign separate peace treaties with the respective countries. In July 1921 the Senate Joint Resolution officially ended war between the US and Hungary and following a series of negotiations a separate peace treaty was signed on August 29, 1921. With this official bilateral relations resumed and a new phase of American-Hungarian relations started. Ministers were exchanged in early 1922.

⁷⁵ For more on this see Peter Buckingham, *International Normalcy. The Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-1929* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1983). Hereafter cited as Buckingham, *International Normalcy*. Also see Selig Adler, *The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941. American Foreign Policy between the Wars* (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1965), Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations. A Personal Narrative by Robert Lansing* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921) and Charles Seymour, *Geography, Justice and Politics at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (New York: The American Geographical Society, 1951).

CHAPTER TWO

The Trianon Syndrome and Treaty Revision

Having reviewed the historical background of Trianon, in this chapter we take a closer look at the treaty itself and its effects on Hungarian culture, generally referred to as the “Trianon syndrome.” Understanding the tragedy of Trianon in the context of Hungarian revisionism requires that attention be focused on three areas of inquiry. First, the psychological, social, and political impacts of the Treaty of Trianon on the Hungarians will be discussed, assessing their role in providing the basis for the formation of a national consensus on the necessity and the inevitability of the revision of the treaty. Secondly, the most important general aspects of the revisionist argument are presented, including the constitutional and pseudo-constitutional theories that were used to legitimize the revisionist claims. Since the revision of Hungary’s pre-Trianon frontiers was attainable only, if at all, with the sanction of foreign powers, the potential role of those who made the treaty in Paris, therefore, became a topical issue of revisionist propaganda. This was matched with scores of foreign opinions in favor of the revision of Trianon which nourished high revisionist expectations. Therefore, thirdly, these representative examples of foreign contributions, other than American, to revision are presented to provide background to the subsequent discussion of the American line. But, before we do that, we must briefly review the major parts of the Treaty of Trianon.

Signed on June 4, 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles, the Treaty of Trianon dismembered historic Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy became a bygone idea, and Hungary emerged as a country of little significance. The terms of the treaty

fundamentally affected the geo-political status of the new Hungarian state and defined the foreign policy of Hungary inasmuch as it limited the government's scope of action.

As a result of the territorial stipulations detailed in Part II of the treaty,⁷⁶ Hungary lost 71% of her territory (from 282,000 square kilometers the territory of Hungary was reduced to 93,000 square kilometers), and 63% of her population (18.2 million to 7.9 million). (See map on historic and post-Trianon Hungary.) Since the Great Powers who dictated the peace terms disregarded the principle of national self-determination in Hungary's case and did not draw the new borders of Hungary to follow ethnic and linguistic lines, 3.3 million ethnic Hungarians were lost to the successor states.⁷⁷ The territorial obligations of the treaty had a devastating effect on Hungary's future economic prospects, as a great share of the national wealth was moved to the successor states. Salt mines, the gold and silver resources, 58% of Hungary's railroad and 60% of her road mileage were relocated to the successor states.⁷⁸

The political measures of the treaty were equally punitive (Part III) pertaining, for example, to state succession, the transfer and division of assets, citizenship matters and regulations with respect to the protection of minorities in Hungary. It declared that Hungary had to recognize and accept the new frontiers and the full force of the peace treaties and additional conventions. At the same time the treaty nullified the former colonial interests of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Part IV). The peace treaty also ordered the partial disarmament of the Hungarian army and imposed strict limitations of its size as it set the number of Hungarian troops at 35,000 (Part V). These restraints on Hungary's military restricted her ability to use the army even in case of foreign aggression. Very important were those sections of the treaty that detailed Hungary's economic and fiscal responsibilities and

⁷⁶ The Treaty of Trianon consisted of fourteen major parts and 364 articles.

⁷⁷ Peter Pastor, "The Ups and Downs," 106.

⁷⁸ Ignác Romsics, "The Trianon Peace Treaty in Hungarian Historiography and Political Thinking," in Dennis P. Hupchick and R. William Weisberger, eds., *Hungary's Historical Legacies. Studies in Honor of Steven Béla Várdy* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000), 90. Hereafter cited as Romsics, "The Trianon Peace Treaty."

duties. The treaty governed reparations in minute detail (Part VIII) and it also set forth strict fiscal regulations and prescribed the blocking of state revenues as insurance for future payment of reparations (Part IX). Economic responsibilities of the Hungarian state and the advantages accruing therefrom of the allies and associated powers relative to customs, commercial connections, aerial, water-borne and rail transportation were clearly specified in, for example, Parts X-XII.⁷⁹

One of the popular myths about America in the context of Hungarian revisionist expectations toward her was that the separate peace signed between Hungary and the USA in August 1921 did not mention Trianon because the US did not approve of the terms of the treaty. As will be seen in chapter seven this belief was not grounded. The separate US-Hungarian peace treaty did indeed mention Trianon and contained direct and clear reference to some of its sections, namely Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and XIV. These specific sections assumed considerable significance as they secured the US certain economic and fiscal rights and advantages which the American government did not wish to renounce and, therefore, wished to pronounce in the separate peace as well.

Contemporary Hungarian public opinion reacted to the Trianon Peace Treaty with great despair and refused to accept the peace terms which were considered to be unfairly punitive. According to some contemporary opinions, however, Hungary did deserve the ‘punishment.’ The most ardent advocates of this view were Slav propagandists. Their anti-Hungarian campaign to promote the break-up of the Monarchy during the war emphasized the crimes committed by Hungarians. The century-long oppression of subject nationalities, the consequential alienation of the non-Magyar peoples, the German orientation of the Monarchy, its support for Pan-Germanism and its responsibility for the outbreak of World War I⁸⁰ were

⁷⁹ For more see Miklós Zeidler, *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920-1945* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2007), 31-32. Hereafter cited as Zeidler, *Ideas*.

⁸⁰ In this regard Prime Minister István Tisza received a great share of the blame and was viewed as a warmonger. Recent research has demonstrated that this view however was not founded. Tisza protested against the ultimatum

among the most often cited allegations.⁸¹ Some Western political circles endorsed such ideas. Arguably the most important was the British New Europe group. One of the most often mentioned examples of those who favored the dismemberment of the Monarchy is Harold Nicholson, Secretary of the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In his argument for the righteousness of the creation of new small states based on the principle of national self-determination Nicholson stated in *Peacemaking 1919*: “My feelings toward Hungary were less detached. I confess that I regarded, and still regard, that Turanian tribe with acute distaste. Like their cousins the Turks, they had destroyed much and created nothing. [...] For centuries the Magyars had oppressed their subject nationalities. The hour of liberation and retribution was at hand.”⁸²

Such preconceived notions were grounded in the belief that the Monarchy failed to deal with the more than century-old nationality question effectively and was reluctant to grant political and cultural concessions to the ethnic minorities. The leading Hungarian political elite wished to retain the political dominance of the Hungarians and refused to give the nationalities collective rights and due representation in the parliament. The assimilation of the nationalities by “forced Magyarization” (i.e. of family names and names of Slovak villages) and the introduction of new educational policies to further the Hungarian language and culture as well as to control the political and cultural organizations of the minorities (i.e. Lex

to Serbia, and repeatedly sent notes to the Ballhausplatz objecting the declaration of war. See István Diószegi, *A magyar külpolitika útjai* (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1984); and Glant, *Through the Prism*, 102; László Tókéczki, *Tisza István eszeméi, politikai arca* (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2000) and Gábor Vermes, *Tisza István* (Budapest: Osiris, 2001). For a broader treatment of the war guilt theory of the Central Powers see Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the First World War* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926).

⁸¹ See chapters on wartime propaganda in Tibor Glant, *Through the Prism*; and Stephen Borsody, “Hungary’s Road to Trianon: Peacemaking and Propaganda,” in Béla Király, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds. *War and Society in East Central Europe. Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 23-38. Hereafter cited as Borsody, “Hungary’s Road to Trianon.” For an extensive study on Slav wartime propaganda see Joseph P. O’Grady, ed., *The Immigrants Influence on Wilson’s Peace Policies* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1967).

⁸² Thomas L. Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon,” in Béla Király, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe. Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 114. Hereafter cited as Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon.” Although Nicholson supported the creation of new states based on the (selectively) applied principle of national self-determination, as early as 1915, he warned against blotting out Hungary from the map, because that would be “sowing the seeds of future conflicts.”

Apponyi in 1907) increased already existing tensions. In the long-run, it also rendered Hungarian revisionism during the interwar period rather problematic.⁸³

The Emperor Charles' federation plan offered in the fall of 1918, as well as Oszkár Jászi's idea to create an "Eastern Switzerland" (or "Danubian United States") from the nations of the Monarchy came too late. The strengthening political consciousness of the nationalities, their aspiration not only for autonomy but for political independence matched with the territorial promises of the Allies (i.e. Treaty of London and the Treaty of Bucharest) eventually contributed to the dissolution of the Monarchy.⁸⁴ The trauma of Trianon was even greater since, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the peace terms were practically dictated to Hungary.

It follows from the above that Trianon came as a "shock on Hungary's collective psyche,"⁸⁵ and created a serious emotional "dislocation" in the Hungarian mind. The trauma which Trianon inflicted was unparalleled within living memory. With the loss of war, after the turmoil of two revolutions, amidst political and military crisis, Hungary had to give up her Great Power aspirations.⁸⁶ Hungarian national consciousness and pride were shaken by the harsh and punitive peace terms. Steven Béla Várdy termed the phenomenon the Trianon syndrome,⁸⁷ which even successive generations were not able to come to terms with.

The tragedy of Trianon had long-lasting psychological, social, and political effects. On the day of the ratification of the treaty, for example, church bells tolled and all traffic and

⁸³ For more on this see Zeidler, *Ideas*, 4-8; and Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 7-20. Also see Robert W. Seton-Watson, "The Problem of Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers," in *International Affairs* (July 1933): 18. See also Robert W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1934) and Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918. A Study of Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 1-38. Hereafter cited as Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*. Also see István Bibó, *A kelet-európai kis államok nyomorúsága* [The Misery of Small Nation-States in Eastern Europe] (Kriterion: n.p., 1986).

⁸⁴ For more on this see Zeidler, *Ideas*, 4-8; and Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*, 7-20.

⁸⁵ Peter Pastor, "The Ups and Downs," 106.

⁸⁶ Zeidler, *Ideas*, 28.

⁸⁷ Steven Béla Várdy, "The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism," *Hungarian Studies Review*, Vol.10, No. 1 (Spring 1983): 23. Hereafter cited as Várdy, "The Impact of Trianon."

work stopped.⁸⁸ It was the day of national mourning. The Trianon syndrome very often took the form of self-deception and the rejection of the realities created by Trianon. That Hungarians refused to accept the new realities and escaped to the past is best demonstrated by the fact that geography in interwar Hungary was taught as if the dismemberment of historic Hungary had never taken place.⁸⁹ At all levels Hungarian education in the interwar period reflected this attitude, because the Christian nationalist ideology and the idealization of historic Hungary were fundamental principles in all classrooms regardless the subject taught.⁹⁰ The Treaty of Trianon was considered unjust, and described as a crime against the Hungarian nation;⁹¹ consequently, its revision became the number one concern. Revisionism became a psychological safety valve for interwar Hungary and an integral part of what may be designated as Hungarian Civil Religion.⁹² “The Hungarian Credo,”⁹³ a poem by Mrs. Elemér Papp-Váry, recited by all school children at the beginning and the end of each school day, best manifests that strong, exuberantly emotional and irrational belief in the “resurrection” of historic Hungary. The popular irredentist slogans such as “Nem, nem, soha!” [No, No,

⁸⁸Pastor, “The Ups and Downs,” 106.

⁸⁹Várdy, “The Impact of Trianon,” 38.

⁹⁰Mátyás Unger, *A történelmi tudat alakulása középiskolai történelemkönyveinkben a századfordulótól a felszabadulásig* (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1979). Cited in Miklós Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat* [The Revisionist Thought] (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), 176. Hereafter cited as Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*.

⁹¹Such dramatic contemporary titles as Mihály Éles, *Magyarország végnapjai* [Doomdays of Hungary] (Bécs: Pegazus Kiadó, 1933), Lajos Marschalkó, *Kik árulták el 1918-ban Magyarországot?* [Who Betrayed Hungary in 1918?] (Budapest: Budapesti Hírlap Nyomda, 1944), Attila Orbók, *Ki árulta el a hazát?* [Who Betrayed the Motherland?] (Budapest: Hunnia, 1919), and recent publications like Ernő Raffay, *Trianon titkai, avagy hogyan bántak el országunkkal* [The Secrets of Trianon, or How Hungary Has Been Thought a Lesson] (Budapest: Tornado Damenija, 1990) and József Vecseklőy, *Nemzetgyilkossági kísérlet. Trianon 1919* [Attempts at the Elimination of the Nation. Trianon 1919] (Lakitelek, Antológia Kiadó, 1993) reveal how sensitive the issue has been ever since.

⁹²For the American context of Civil Religion see Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* Vol. 96 No. 1 (Winter 1967): 1-21. This phenomenon can also be designated as “nation religion” used by András Gerő. See András Gerő, *Imagined History: Chapters from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Hungarian Symbolic Politics*. Trans. by Mario D. Fenyo (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 2006).

⁹³The “Magyar Hiszekegy,” or the “Hungarian Credo” is the first and last part of Mrs. Elemér Papp-Váry’s otherwise longish poem: “Hiszek egy Istenben/ Hiszek egy Hazában/ Hiszek egy isteni örök igazságban/ Hiszek Magyarország feltámadásában/ Ámen;” “I believe in one God/ I believe in one country/ I believe in the eternal heavenly justice/ I believe in the resurrection of Hungary.” Such practices were not widespread in Europe between the wars. Unlike in the USA, where the tradition of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America was part of the daily ritual at every public school. So much so that the U.S. Congress officially recognized it as the official national pledge in 1942.

Never!], “Mindent vissza!”[Everything back!] and “Csonka-Magyarország nem ország, egész Magyarország mennyország!” [Mutilated Hungary is no country, whole Hungary is heaven] demonstrate that Hungarians considered revision to be inevitable.

While interwar Hungarian society in general, regardless of class and status, viewed the revision of the Treaty of Trianon as the only possible solution for Hungary’s future, political, scholarly and social-popular opinion in Hungary was somewhat divided over the possible degree and method of revision. The *optimal* solution: the revision of Trianon along ethnic and linguistic lines, a view (probably) more sensitive to international power relations and political possibilities was advocated by relatively few people. The policy of *integral* revision, that is the total restoration of historic Hungary, enjoyed the most significant social and political support and it became a central notion of irredentist propaganda. The idea of “Mindent vissza!” defined the orientation of the country in the long run, and made Hungary vulnerable to her own policies.⁹⁴ To pursue revision by military means was ruled out until Hungary allied with Hitler’s Germany. Revision in a peaceful and strictly diplomatic way was considered to be the only solution in the immediate aftermath of the treaty.

A certain “legal mechanism”⁹⁵ seemed to provide a viable foundation for a peaceful and diplomatic solution, and founded belief in the future adjustment of the frontiers. The Hungarian government attached much hope to the promises of the so called Millerand Letter, one of the three documents signed by French Premier Alexandre Millerand which were handed to the Hungarian Peace Delegation on the final presentation of the peace terms.⁹⁶ The

⁹⁴ Romsics, “The Trianon Peace Treaty,” 94. Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 125-158. For further information on the various degrees of the revisionist platform see also Ignác Romsics, ed., *Trianon és a magyar politikai közgondolkodás, 1918-1953* (Budapest: Osiris, 1998). Also see L. Nagy Zsuzsa, *A párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1963).

⁹⁵ Thomas L. Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis. 1936-1939* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1980), 5. Hereafter cited as Sakmyster, *The Danubian Crisis*.

⁹⁶ The French-Hungarian rapprochement in January 1920 and the secret negotiations between the French and Hungarian political circles on the subject of securing economic concession (mainly the lease of the Hungarian State Railways and exploitation of navigation on the Danube by a French concern, the Scheider-Creusot firm, etc.) for French business and financial circles were also expected to have the desired effect on the final peace terms for Hungary. Such expectations, however, failed and only the Millerand Letter remained to hold out some

Millerand Letter seemed to have “open[ed] the door for revision of the Hungarian peace treaty.”⁹⁷ Although in the letter the Allies refused to permit any alterations of the frontiers, they admitted the possibility that the “new frontiers might not always coincide with ethnic or economic requirements, and outlined a procedure whereby adjustments could be proposed in such cases by the Frontier Delimitation Commission, to be established pursuant to the provisions of the treaty.”⁹⁸ The letter stated that “should they find that the dispositions of the Treaty in some spot create an injustice,” it would be “allowable to address a report on this subject to the League of Nations.”⁹⁹ Article 19 of the League of Nations’ Covenant also endorsed this idea by stating: “the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”¹⁰⁰ Although many Hungarian politicians considered the League to be an ineffective international body which pledged itself to preserve the *status quo*, Hungarian accession to the League of Nations in 1922 offered the country the future possibility to air the question of revision in Geneva.¹⁰¹

At the same time the Hungarian government could only deal with the issue of revision in a very circumspect way, and had limited scope of action. Such constraints are well

hope for the future in terms of the revision of the peace. For more on the Millerand Letter and Franco-Hungarian relations after the war see Magda Ádám, “France and Hungary at the Beginning of the 1920’s,” in Béla Király K., Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe. Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1982), 145-182. Hereafter cited as Király, Pastor and Sanders, eds., *Total War and Peacemaking*. Also see Magda Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe, 1920-1929* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993) and Magda Ádám, *The Versailles System and Central Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2004).

⁹⁷ Count Pál Teleki, *Political Diary*. Quoted in Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 283. See also “Address of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Nicholas Bánffy Delivered in the National Assembly Outlining the Foreign Policy of the Bethlen Government,” in Ulysses Grant-Smith’s Memorandum to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1921. Roll# 1, M708 RG59, NARA.

⁹⁸ The Millerand Letter is quoted in Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 279.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Article 19. The Covenant of the League of Nations. *The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art19 (March 15, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Miklós Zeidler, “A Nemzetek Szövetsége a magyar külpolitikai gondolkodásban.” In Pál Pritz, Balázs Sipos and Miklós Zeidler, eds., *Magyar külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században. A VI. Hungarológiai Kongresszus (Debrecen, 2006. augusztus 22-26.) szimpóziumának anyaga* (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 2006), n.p.

illustrated by the fact that it was not until 1930 that Count Albert Apponyi, Hungary's delegate to the League of Nations from 1923, felt confident enough to address an overtly revisionist note to the international community.¹⁰²

With the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy dismembered, Hungary had to establish herself in the community of nations as a politically and economically viable country. For this to happen, Hungary had to officially accept the terms of the treaty. A memorandum penned by Wallace Smith Murray to the U.S. State Department clearly emphasized the general resentment of the nation against ratification, while at the same time it also pointed out that such a step should be “the well recognized self-interest of the country.”¹⁰³

Paradoxically, internal consolidation (the restoration of economic and social stability) was both a prerequisite for and an obstacle to revision. In the second half of the 1920s Hungary successfully followed the path of economic and political consolidation. She became a member of the League of Nations in 1922, and then qualified for a League of Nations loan in 1924. These were significant signs of Hungary's way out of isolation. The diplomatic stranglehold of the Little Entente, the system of bilateral treaties among the successor states signed in 1920 and 1921, however, made the process difficult.

The successive Hungarian governments of the interwar period considered the program of revision a vital national concern and worked on it, first strictly with peaceful and diplomatic means. Such a program had to be, and indeed was, carried out very carefully and cautiously, given Hungary's fragile international status and limited scope of action due to the obligations of the peace treaty. Until the second half of the 1930s, no open governmental revisionism was possible.

Prime Minister István Bethlen, who gave his name to the era between 1921 and 1931, expressed the essence of this policy best when he said in an interview that “Hungary must

¹⁰² Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 65.

¹⁰³ Wallace Smith Murray to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1920. Roll # 1, M 708, RG 59, NARA.

adopt an attitude of watchful waiting pending the future development of international relations.”¹⁰⁴ Hungarians were increasingly impassioned over revision and generated overt irredentist propaganda which demanded the government to take concrete political steps toward territorial revision. This heated and overly emotional patriotic public opinion was not always satisfied with the policy of “sit back and look on,”¹⁰⁵ and expected Bethlen to do much more. He, in turn, always warned against premature, and therefore, irresponsible action: “Many people blame me for not having raised the question of revision before international tribunals. [...] Until the adequate international situation arises,” Bethlen said, “I am not willing to expose the nation to world wide blame for the sake of over-ardent patriots. This would be the last thing to help the nation.”¹⁰⁶

The 1927 Italian-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship¹⁰⁷ was the first diplomatic success of the Hungarian government and it secured Hungary an alliance with a European power whose aim was also to change the post-World War I status quo.¹⁰⁸ Due to the Italian rapprochement, Budapest broke out of diplomatic isolation and the opportunity for territorial revision seemed somewhat more possible. In May 1927 in Zaleegerszeg, Bethlen declared for the first time that Hungary had to admit openly its major foreign policy objective, the revision of the Treaty of Trianon and claimed that he considered it timely to announce a more active foreign policy. This notwithstanding, even after 1927 Bethlen continued to advocate a very careful revisionist

¹⁰⁴ Count István Bethlen’s interview quoted in Wright’s Memorandum on “Hungarian Affairs in August 1928,” to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1928. Roll# 10, M 708 RG 59, NARA.

¹⁰⁵ Brentano’s Memorandum on “The Political Situation in Hungary at the End of 1922,” to Secretary of State, December 31, 1922. Roll# 5, M708 RG59, NARA.

¹⁰⁶ Wright’ Memorandum to Secretary of State on Bethlen’s speech at a meeting of the United Party on January 15, 1929, January 18, 1929. Roll# 8, M708 RG59, NARA.

¹⁰⁷ The treaty was signed on April 5, 1927 in Rome by Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini. Secret articles provided for the delivery of Italian weapons to Hungary and for mutual support of the two states.

¹⁰⁸ György Réti, *Budapest-Róma Berlin árnyékában* (Budapest: Eötvös Kiadó, 1998), 11-12. See also György Réti, *Hungarian-Italian Relations in the Shadow of Hitler’s Germany, 1933-1940* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2003). Although Italy was on the side of the victors after World War I, she was disappointed by the peace because she had to renounce many of the territories otherwise promised to her in Africa, the Balkans or the Mediterranean.

program. He did not give up his cautious policy of “wait and see”¹⁰⁹ and the belief that revision would be possible to achieve only with international support and strictly by peaceful means. Since neither France, nor Great Britain backed the idea of changing the status quo¹¹⁰ Hungary ended up seeking support from other revisionist powers, Italy and Germany.

By the second half of the 1930s it became clear that revision could not be attained peacefully. The League of Nations proved incapable of resolving international conflicts arising from the Paris peace settlement. By the beginning of the 1930s the political and social achievements of the Bethlenian consolidation had disappeared and economic hard times hit Hungary. Under such difficult political, social and economic circumstances the popular demand for revision became ever greater. Following 1931 (during Gyula Gömbös’ and László Bárdossy’s premierships) the pro-Italian and pro-German orientation of Hungarian foreign policy and Hungary’s adherence to the Axis powers eventually bore fruit. With Nazi Germany’s assistance the revision of the Treaty of Trianon materialized, and the two Vienna Awards gave Hungary back territories taken away from her in 1920.¹¹¹

A telling aspect of the policies of the various Hungarian governments during the interwar period was their relation to revisionist propaganda. The Trianon syndrome spawned an outpouring of Hungarian propaganda concerning territorial revision for domestic as well as international circulation. Its main purpose was to expose the ill consequences of the treaty, explain the injustices done to Hungary, create a positive image of the country and ultimately

¹⁰⁹ “Bethlen beszéde a békerevízióról” [Bethlen’s speech on revision], *Nemzeti Újság*, May 8, 1925. Quoted in Ignác Romsics, *István Bethlen: A Great Conservative Statesman of Hungary, 1874-1946* (Highland Lakes, NJ: Social Science Monographs, 1995), 218. Hereafter cited as Romsics, *Bethlen*. Bethlen’s own concept of revision changed according to the circumstances from ethnic revision and the readjustment of independent Transylvania as the minimum of his program, to the reestablishment of historic Hungary, in the form of federalization as its maximum (without the Burgenland and Croatia).

¹¹⁰ Gábor Bátonyi, “British Foreign Policy and the Problem of Hungarian Revisionism in the 1930s.” Presented at the Conference on British-Hungarian Relations since the 1840s, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College, London on April 2004; Magda Ádám, “France and Hungary at the Beginning of the 1920’s.” In Béla Király, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe. Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982): 145-182.

¹¹¹ For more on this see Dreisziger, *Hungary’s Way*.

win support for revision. While the importance of systematic propaganda to counter anti-Hungarian efforts for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (R. W. Seton Watson and the New Europe group, André Chéradame, Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš)¹¹² was not generally recognized until the very last year of the war,¹¹³ during the period between October 1918 and May 1921 the governments of Hungary established several governmental organizations to conduct propaganda for Hungarian territorial integrity. Such were, for example, the National Propaganda Committee created by Prime Minister Mihály Károlyi's National Council, the Hungarian Ministry of Propaganda established in August 1919. The Political Intelligence Division of the Foreign Ministry in the Friedrich government, Section B of the Hungarian Peace Preparatory Office, and Division III of the Prime Minister's Office (*Miniszterelnökség*), which centralized all propaganda activities in one body were also involved in coordinating propaganda activities. These government agencies kept contact with various social organizations, and helped generate and distribute their propaganda materials both in Hungary and abroad. Finally, Prime Minister Bethlen ended direct governmental involvement, when on May 24, 1921 he required all ministries to recall their representatives from social organizations created during and after the revolutions, in order to protect Hungary's international prestige and counter the charge that "government employees were involved in irredentist propaganda."¹¹⁴ He had to follow this policy even more so, because the Treaty of Trianon prohibited revisionist and irredentist propaganda.

Bethlen emphasized the fact that the "Hungarian government has never declared that it intends to take concrete steps" towards revision, but, at the same time, "he had no personal

¹¹² See Chapter Six: "Dismemberment Propaganda" in Glant, *Through the Prism*, 141-162.

¹¹³ See Albert Apponyi's comments concerning the lack of Hungarian anti-dismemberment propaganda in Tibor Glant "Roosevelt, Apponyi és a Habsburg Monarchia" [Roosevelt, Apponyi and the Habsburg Monarchy], *Századok* Vol. 6 (1997): 1390.

¹¹⁴ Tibor Glant, "Some Facts about Hungarian Propaganda for Territorial Integrity Abroad, 1918-20," *Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1996): 43-56. Hereafter cited as Glant, "Some Facts."

objection to private organizations keeping the question alive.”¹¹⁵ While feeding the Hungarian public opinion with what it wanted to hear he also moderated revisionist expectations, and carefully reassured the great powers about Hungary’s non-revisionist stand.

Official Hungary during the Bethlen era distanced herself from publicly declared revisionism. This, however, did not mean that revisionism was generated only by the people. The Hungarian government, and Bethlen himself, implicitly accepted and supported propaganda carried out on the semi- or unofficial and popular levels. Wright’s report to the State Department reflected this: “As I have frequently pointed out in past dispatches, while the Government is scrupulously abstaining from any participation in these [propaganda] activities it is far from discouraging them.”¹¹⁶

As a result, many patriotic irredentist organizations continued their work or came to life after the war. One distinct group contained the secret, anti-Semitic societies, among which the best known were the Hungarian National Defense Association (Magyar Országos Véderő Egyesület), and the Association of Awakening Hungarians (Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete). Non-secret irredentist organizations, such as the Hungarian Territorial Integrity League/ The League for the Defense of the Territorial Integrity of Hungary (Magyarország Területi Épségének Védelmi Ligája), the National Association of Defense Leagues (Védőligák Országos Szövetsége), the Hungarian National Federation (Magyar Nemzeti Szövetség), and the Hungarian Revisionist League (Magyar Revíziós Liga) published propagandistic and semi-scholarly works to win the support of public opinion abroad.

Influential scholarly and semi-scholarly organizations such as the Hungarian Historical Association, the Hungarian Geographical Society, the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society, and some research institutes (e.g. the Institute of Sociology) also joined the

¹¹⁵ Bethlen’s speech in *Pesti Napló*, August 26, 1928. Quoted in Wright’s Memorandum to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1928. Roll#10 M708 RG59, NARA.

¹¹⁶ Wright’s Memorandum on “Hungarian Affairs in November 1928,” December 6, 1928. Roll#10 M708 RG59, NARA.

revisionist agitation.¹¹⁷ In August 1921 the government set up the Center for the Organization of Social Associations (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szervezetének Központja) to coordinate the social and secret revisionist organizations.¹¹⁸ Thus, with the tacit approval of the government, and at the same time more or less under its indirect control, dozens of patriotic irredentist organizations worked for revision between the wars.

Such societies, as well as individual writers, generated an extensive literature, including books, pamphlets, leaflets, songs and poems, in various languages.¹¹⁹ These revisionist writings contained some recurrent themes: Hungary's role in the war, and rejection of responsibility for it and the war-guilt theory; Hungary and her relations to the Wilsonian peace; the injustices of Trianon; rejection of anti-Magyar propaganda and the territorial claims of the successor states; support of some international voices for revision; the responsibility of those who treated Hungary unjustly; the political and economic necessity of treaty revision for the stability of Europe; and historic, semi-historic and constitutional theories legitimizing Hungarian territorial claims are among the most often elaborated themes.¹²⁰

The propaganda materials intended for American political and scholarly circles drew on these topics as well. In addition, they depended on popular myths involving the belief that Wilson did not wish to dismember the Monarchy. American refusal to ratify the Paris treaties and the lack of mention of the Trianon boundaries in the US-Hungarian separate peace also served as the backbone of the argumentation. These myths became building blocks of the expectation that the USA would further Hungarian revisionist hopes.

¹¹⁷ Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 88-124. See also Várdy, "The Impact of Trianon," 32-33.

¹¹⁸ Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 92.

¹¹⁹ For a detailed list of Hungarian foreign language propaganda publications see Glant, "Some Facts," 53-56; and for a bibliography of publications on Trianon in Hungarian see Archimédész Szidiropulosz, *Trianon utóélete. Válogatás a magyar nyelvű irodalom bibliográfiájából. 1920-2000* (Budapest: XX. Századi Intézet, 2002).

¹²⁰ For a detailed thematic analysis of Hungarian propaganda materials see Glant, "Some Facts," 50.

The dismemberment of historic Hungary shattered its geographical unity and required the reconceptualization of the nation and national destiny.¹²¹ Hungarians refused to face the new realities and sought refuge in the past. Emotional (or revisionist)¹²² nationalism emerged, based on the revival of a set of traditional political, historical, semi-or non-historical myths and arguments,¹²³ and two interrelated public law theories: the Saint Stephen state theory and the doctrine of the Holy Crown.

The revisionist argumentation based on the so-called “legitimation theories”¹²⁴ highlights additional aspects of the Trianon syndrome. Hungary’s historical rights and her primacy in the Carpathian Basin constituted one of the key arguments, perhaps best advocated by János Karácsonyi in *A magyar nemzet történeti joga Hazánk területéhez a Kárpáttól le az Adriáig* [The Historical Right of the Hungarian Nation to the Territory of Our Homeland from the Carpathians to the Adriatic]. Karácsonyi was the bishop of Nagyvárad (Oradea) from 1923 to 1929, as well as a historiographer and professor of canon law and medieval Hungarian history.¹²⁵ Saint Stephen’s eleven-century state was the major focus of his book. The monograph emphasized Hungary’s rights to the territory of historic Hungary, because, as the argument went, when the Hungarian tribes conquered the Carpathian Basin it was no man’s land.¹²⁶ The role of the Hungarian nation as the defender of Western Christendom

¹²¹ Péter Hanák, “Viszonylagos nemzettudat” [Relative national consciousness], *Élet és Irodalom* 25, No. 20 (July 25, 1984): 4-5. See also Várdy, “The Impact of Trianon,” 24-25.

¹²² In “The Impact of Trianon,” Várdy uses the term “emotional nationalism,” 31. Barany designates the same phenomenon as “revisionist nationalism.” In George Barany, “Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism,” in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969), 287.

¹²³ For more on the categorization see Romsics, “The Trianon Peace Treaty,” 94-95.

¹²⁴ Unlike the modern meaning of the word (the constitutionally lawful exercise of power by any kind of executive body), in the interwar political and ideological context legitimation designated at least two different meanings. First, stemming from the doctrines of the Holy Crown and the Saint Stephen’s state theory the word legitimation meant justification for the restitution of historic Hungary. Herein the word will be used in this sense. Second, legitimation or legitimism also designates the movement for the restoration of a Habsburg monarch to the throne of Hungary.

¹²⁵ János Karácsonyi, *Magyar Nagylexikon* Vol. 10 (Budapest: Magyar Nagylexikon Kiadó, 2000), 548.

¹²⁶ János Karácsonyi, *A magyar nemzet történeti joga Hazánk területéhez a Kárpáttól le az Adriáig* (Nagyvárad: Szent László, 1916) and its somewhat revised version *Történelmi jogunk hazánk területi épségéhez* (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 1921). See also Romsics, “The Trianon Peace Treaty,” 94.

against Oriental barbarism provided yet another pseudo-historical approach.¹²⁷ Another, rather unhistorical theory, which was in line with Minister of Education Kuno Klebelsberg's nationalist concepts, was the idea of the cultural superiority of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin and that of Hungary's historic mission "to spread civilization among culturally inferior peoples and organize them into a [single] state."¹²⁸ The economic and geographical unity of the Carpathian Basin also explained the necessity of the restoration of the frontiers for the economic stability and prosperity of Europe.¹²⁹

The Saint Stephen's state theory and the doctrine of the Holy Crown were two closely related (pseudo-)constitutional¹³⁰ arguments in Hungarian public law buttressing the claim for the right of the Hungarians for historic Hungary. The Saint Stephen's state theory on the one hand stressed the historical and cultural mission of the Hungarian nation in the Danubian Basin¹³¹ and the nation's special state-constituting capacity, while, on the other hand, it emphasized the "peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic groups throughout the centuries"¹³² living in Saint Stephen's state. This argument based on historical continuity was complemented by the doctrine of the Holy Crown, which further emphasized the concept of the nation as a moral, spiritual and historical category, rather than an ethnic one.¹³³

The doctrine of the Holy Crown was first formulated in István Werbőczy's *Tripartitum* (1514).¹³⁴ According to it, the Holy Crown represented the organic Hungarian state, as it was seen in the twenties, the sacred unity of the sovereign (*caput sacrae regni coronae*) and the people (*membra sacrae regni coronae*), and it stood for its legitimacy and

¹²⁷Várdy, "The Impact of Trianon," 37.

¹²⁸Kuno Klebelsberg. Quoted in Romsics, "The Trianon Peace Treaty," 95. Kuno Klebelsberg was minister of culture and religion in the Bethlen government between 1922 and 1931.

¹²⁹Várdy, "The Impact of Trianon," 37.

¹³⁰The fact that Hungary did not have a *de facto* written constitution in the interwar period explains the terminology.

¹³¹ See John Stark, "The Mission of Hungary," *The Hungarian Quarterly* Vol. 6 No. 1 (Spring 1940): 100-107.

¹³² Romsics, "The Trianon Peace Treaty," 94.

¹³³ For more on this see Tibor Joó, *A magyar nemzeteszme* [The Hungarian Nation-Concept] (Budapest: Franklin, n.d.).

¹³⁴ *Tripartitum* (1514) was Hungary's legal corpus in which István Werbőczy recorded in writing the Hungarian feudal common law.

sovereignty as well. The body of the Holy Crown, as the argument went, incorporated the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Hungarian state, namely Saint Stephen's state. Thereby, it provided a firm legitimizing ground for its existence.¹³⁵ Notwithstanding the fact that Hungary had no written constitution in the interwar period, let alone a sovereign,¹³⁶ the doctrine of the Holy Crown became one of the cornerstones of Hungarian public law theories, and was used to legitimize Hungary's claims for the dismembered territories.¹³⁷

The Saint Stephen state theory and the doctrine of the Holy Crown became official ideologies during the interwar period, served as basic tenets of the revisionist argument¹³⁸ and provided legitimacy for the semi-authoritarian Horthy regime. The above outlined arguments, ideological concepts and historical myths articulated and reaffirmed national values, strengthened the self-esteem and pride of the Hungarian nation, and helped consolidate the political and social system.¹³⁹

In revisionist literature one of the most often discussed issues was the role of the "opposing camp,"¹⁴⁰ (that is Britain, France, Italy and the United States of America) who practically made the Treaty of Trianon, in righting the injustices done to Hungary. This was

¹³⁵ For a more detailed discussion see József Kardos, *A szentkorona-tan története 1919-1944* [The History of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown 1919-1944] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985); and relevant chapters in Andor Csizmadia, Kálmán Kovács and László Asztalos, *Magyar állam- és jogtörténet* [Hungarian Constitutional and Legal History] (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1972).

¹³⁶ The obvious political danger of the legitimist attempts in terms of Hungary's international recognition ruled out interpreting the doctrine of the Holy Crown in the context of the reunification of the Monarchy under Habsburg rule. The *caput sacrae regni coronae* came to be identified with the national assembly, rather than by the king.

¹³⁷ The interwar period yielded a score of scholarly works on Hungarian constitutional and public law from the pen of legal theorists and experts, which endorsed the regime's political aims. See for example Károly Kmety, *Magyar közjog* [Hungarian Public Law] (Budapest: Grill Károly Könyvkiadó Vállalat, 1926); Kálmán Molnár, *Magyar közjog* [Hungarian Public Law] (Budapest: Danubia, 1928).

¹³⁸ László Péter, "The Holy Crown of Hungary, Visible and Invisible," *The Slavonic and East European Review* Vol. 81. No. 3 (July 2003): 492.

¹³⁹ For more information on the impact of national crises on nationalism see the relevant chapters in Sakmyster, *The Danubian Crisis* and Arno Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

¹⁴⁰ "the idea of revision [...] is not an eager daydream of the Hungarian soul, not the nightmare of a shackled nation, not the sigh of the captive but an actual possibility hinted at by the opposing camp which, after so many vows and promises, has become a first class mental concern." A *Budapesti Hírlap* editorial commented on in Wright's Memorandum to Secretary of State on "Hungarian Affairs in November 1928," December 6, 1928. Roll# 10 M708 RG59, NARA.

also underlined by the critical views concerning the Treaty of Trianon advocated by some of the representatives of the British, French and/or Italian political and intellectual elite, as well as those in American public life.

As early as 1919, there were already some indications that several influential politicians, such as David Lloyd George¹⁴¹ and Francesco Nitti, realized the problems with the peace terms for Hungary. During the interwar period the number of those who criticized the Hungarian peace treaty grew. By early 1920 an increasing number of British officials voiced their criticism. Admiral E. T. Troubridge, commander of the Allied flotilla on the Danube; Sir William Goode, director of Relief Missions; and Sir George Clerk, head of a special Allied mission to Hungary and Sir Thomas Hohler, the first British diplomatic representative in Hungary after the war, also complained about the proposed peace terms for Hungary, and, thus, prospects for central Europe. Members of the British Parliament (Lord Bryce, Sir Donald McLean, Lord Cavendish Bentinck, Lord Newton, Lord Montague, Lord Asquith, Lord Sydenham and others) also brought the question of Hungary into discussion, and both houses of the British parliament gave considerable attention to Hungary.¹⁴² Another well-known critic of the postwar system, John Maynard Keynes, in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, attacked the peace based on long-term economic considerations and explained that it would shake the “inextricably intertwined” economic bonds among the nations of central Europe and will cause the system to fall, thus “endanger[ing] the life of

¹⁴¹ In his Fontainebleau Memorandum on March 25, 1919, Lloyd George stated: “What I have said about the Germans is equally true of the Magyars. There will never be peace in South Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar *Irredenta* within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications which can usually be adjusted by other means.” Quoted in Thomas L. Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon,” in Király, Pastor and Sanders, eds., *Total War and Peacemaking*, 119.

¹⁴² For more detail see Robert Donald, *The Tragedy of Trianon: Hungary's Appeal to Humanity* (London: T. Butterworth Ltd., 1928).

Europe altogether.”¹⁴³ Although Keynes’ work focused on the repercussions of the Treaty of Versailles, the book generally criticized the peace structure and, therefore, enjoyed popularity in Hungary. Similarly to Jacques Bainville’s book titled *Les Conséquences politiques de la paix* which also pointed out the political shortcomings of the peace settlement and predicted with accuracy its political consequences.¹⁴⁴

Anything that foreigners said about the necessity of treaty revision “was, of course, seized upon eagerly.”¹⁴⁵ These opinions became represented, as well as misrepresented. These utterances underlined the Hungarian belief that the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was possible. Three representative foreign contributions to revision, other than American, also show this. A British, an Italian, and a French example demonstrate how diverse foreign criticism of the Treaty of Trianon was. The media magnate Lord Rothermere’s press campaign gave popular revisionism new energies. Former Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti’s critique reflected high-level political opinion and attracted mainly the educated public. On the other hand, Henri Pozzi’s works represented a rather radical approach to revisionism. The French author and publicist became popular with the extreme right in contemporary Hungary. At the same time the following three examples also provide a background for the subsequent analysis of the American line.

In the summer of 1927 Hungarian revisionism received a surprise boost from abroad. On June 21, 1927 British press magnate Lord Rothermere launched an all-out anti-Trianon press campaign in his newspaper, the *Daily Mail*. In his writings, of which the best-known one was “Hungary’s Place In the Sun,” Rothermere pointed out the injustices and the mistakes in the treaty and demanded the return to Hungary of the areas with clear Hungarian

¹⁴³ John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 3-26. Etienne Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace, The Economic Consequences of Mr Keynes* (Oxford University Press, 1946) was a response to and critique of Keynes’s ideas.

¹⁴⁴ Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 349-350. Jacques Bainville’s *Les Conséquences politiques de la paix* [The Political Consequences of the Peace] (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie, 1920).

Jacques Bainville was a French historian and journalist, founder of Action Française.

¹⁴⁵ Wright’s Memorandum to Secretary of State on the “Trianon Revision Agitation,” November 4, 1927. Roll# 7 M708 RG59, NARA.

irresponsible?” is an expressive and conclusive judgment of the lord’s action.¹⁵¹ On the other hand, Lord Rothermere won many prominent British politicians over to the Hungarian cause, among them Lord Newton, who became an ardent advocate of the Hungarian question in the British parliament.¹⁵²

While official circles distanced themselves from Rothermere’s campaign, ”Radomír apó,” as he was popularly called, enjoyed the respect and admiration of the Hungarian people.¹⁵³ Rothermere was seen as the “savior” of Hungary. Hungarians collected one million signatures in support of Rothermere’s action which were bound in albums, and presented to him in the summer of 1927 in a spectacular London celebration.¹⁵⁴ Songs and poems were written in tribute to him, and a memorial was erected in his honor.¹⁵⁵ He was awarded several honorary degrees and positions; for example, he became the *Doctor Honoris Causa* of Szeged University. And when Rothermere’s son, Esmond Harmsworth, visited Hungary in May 1928, he and his delegation were received as royalty.¹⁵⁶ Hungarian enthusiasm about Rothermere’s campaign reached irrational heights when he was invited to the Hungarian throne by legitimist circles in Hungary.¹⁵⁷

Less spectacular, but equally important, was Francesco Nitti’s support of revision. At the meeting of the Allied prime ministers in London the Italian Prime Minister sought “fairer treatment of Hungary than she hitherto received.” He advised the Council to consider the Hungarian counter-proposals, and stressed that the peace terms violated the ethnic

¹⁵¹ Wright to Secretary of State, July 7, 1928. Roll#10, M708 RG 59, NARA.

¹⁵² See Lord Newton’s introduction written to István Bethlen’s *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace. Four Lectures Delivered in London in November 1933* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1934), ix: “Briefly stated one of the main claims of Hungary amounts to the following: [...] all that is asked for is that all the other former Hungarian subjects should be accorded the right to declare to which State they desire to belong. Since the principle of “Self-Determination” forms the ostensible basis of the Paris Treaties, the demand can scarcely be described as unreasonable [...]”

¹⁵³ See Viscount Rothermere, *My Campaign for Hungary* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939) and Miklós Vásárhelyi, *A lord és a korona* [The Lord and the Crown] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1977). Hereafter cited as Vásárhelyi, *A lord és a korona*.

¹⁵⁴ Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 114.

¹⁵⁵ A Magyar Igazság Kútja was erected in front of the central building of Szabó Ervin Library, Budapest.

¹⁵⁶ Vásárhelyi, *A lord és a korona*, 93-106.

¹⁵⁷ Vásárhelyi, *A lord és a korona*, 107-130.

principle.¹⁵⁸ In his *The Wreck of Europe* [L'Europa senza pace, 1922] he wrote: "By stroke of irony the financial and economic clauses inflict the most serious burdens on a country [Hungary] which has lost everything [...]"¹⁵⁹ In his series of articles in the Milan newspaper *Il Secolo* in 1921 he also dealt with Hungary and the wrongs done to her in the Trianon Treaty. Nitti's opinion reinforced the belief that Italy would support Hungarian aspirations,¹⁶⁰ and, prompted Hungarians to improve relations with Italy.¹⁶¹ Such course of foreign policy was carefully but successfully pursued by Hungary after 1927. The importance of the Italian line is further demonstrated by the fact that Nitti's other works dealing with postwar Europe: *La decadenza dell' Europa: le vie della ricostruzia* (1922) and *La pace* (1925) were immediately translated into Hungarian and became popular readings of the day.¹⁶²

While anti-Trianon statements from French political circles were rare, French public journalism did its due share of criticizing the peace treaties in general, and the Hungarian peace in particular. These pro-Hungarian statements, for example, from Georges Desbons, René Dupuis, Alfred Fabre-Luce, François Jean-Desthieux, or Henri Pozzi, very often sponsored by Hungarian political circles,¹⁶³ were published to inform public opinion and persuade it about the inevitability of revising the postwar status quo. Henri Pozzi in *Századunk bűnösei* (chapter one: "A trinoni karnevál" [The Trianon carnival]) and in *A háború visszatér* (chapter four: "Közép-Európa drámája" [The drama of central Europe]) devoted long chapters to the question of Hungary.¹⁶⁴ The preface to *A háború visszatér* states that Pozzi's book became one of the most precious intellectual tools in the hands of the

¹⁵⁸ Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 239-240.

¹⁵⁹ Francesco Nitti, *The Wreck of Europe* (Indianapolis: n.p., 1922), 170-171. In Hungarian Francesco Nitti, *Nincs béke Európában* (Budapest: Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Bt., 1923).

¹⁶⁰ Halmai, *A revíziós gondolat*, 77.

¹⁶¹ Mario de Ambrosio cited in Dr. Szádeczky K. Lajos, *A békerevízió kérdése* (n. p.: n.d.,)

¹⁶² Francesco Nitti, *Európa hanyatlása. Az újjáépítés útja* (Budapest: Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Bt., 1923) and Francesco Nitti, *A béke* (Budapest: Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Bt., n.d.).

¹⁶³ Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 141.

¹⁶⁴ Henri Pozzi, *A háború visszatér* [La Guerre revient] [War Is Coming Back], tr., Dr. Frigyes Marjay (Budapest: Dr. Marjay Frigyes Kiadása, 1935); Henri Pozzi, *Századunk bűnösei* [Les Coupables] [The Guilty], tr., Dr. Frigyes Marjay (Budapest: Dr. Marjay Frigyes Kiadása, 1936). According to the catalogue of the Hungarian National Library Pozzi's *A háború visszatér* was published at least eleven times.

Hungarian elite pleading for revision whose value and significance are even more emphasized by the fact that its author is a Frenchman.¹⁶⁵ Pozzi's works helped reinforce Hungarians' belief in revision.

Obviously, these utterances were given due attention by the Hungarian press, e.g. *Budapesti Hírlap*, *Pester Lloyd* and *Az Est*. These opinions also provided a popular theme for the anti-Trianon pamphlet literature. Dr. Elemér Halmay's book, *A revíziós gondolat a világpolitikában* [The Revisionist Thought in World Politics],¹⁶⁶ provides a good example. In chapter 8, "Hódít a revíziós gondolat" [The revisionist thought is gaining ground], Halmay compiled a few dozen quotes and statements taken out of their original context, by influential politicians, historians, economists as well as journalists in Europe and the United States, all elaborating on the faults of Trianon and the need for its revision.¹⁶⁷ The volume and the content of the statements, as well as the prestige and influence of the persons having uttered them, were intended to confirm the legitimacy of the revisionist cause and at the same time to underline its feasibility.

The emergence of this group of foreign supporters for Hungary's cause partially explains why Hungarians considered the revision of Trianon an actual possibility. These sporadic, mostly individual, unofficial and rarely systematic (e.g. the Rothermere press campaign in 1927) foreign utterances in favor of Hungary acknowledged that the Paris peace treaties in general created a politically and economically instable Europe. They advocated the revision of the Treaty of Trianon along ethnic, linguistic, or economic lines. The Hungarian public took such opinions and statements for granted and understood them as the actual

¹⁶⁵ "A háború visszatér a revízióért esengő magyar nemzet szellemi fegyvertárának egyik legnagyobb kincsévé kell, hogy váljon, amelynek értékét rendkívül növeli, hogy francia toll írta." Henri Pozzi, *A háború visszatér*, 8.

¹⁶⁶ Dr. Elemér Halmay's book *A revíziós gondolat a világpolitikában* [The Revisionist Thought in World Politics] (Budapest: Kelet népe, 1927). Hereafter cited as Halmay, *A revíziós gondolat*. Elemér Halmay (1868-1935) was a teacher of History. Besides *A revíziós gondolat a világpolitikában*, he wrote several other books, for example *A nyolcvan éves Apponyi: korszerű elmélkedés* (Budapest: Kelet Népe, 1926), *Revízió, választójog, királykérdés* (Budapest: Revízió-Kelet Népe, 1931) and *Emlékezés Apponyi Albertről* (n.p.: n.p., 1933).

¹⁶⁷ Halmay, *A revíziós gondolat a világpolitikában*, 58-82. For a similar example see Jenő Erdélyi, *Mit mond rólunk az entente? Angol politikusok ítélete, francia írók impressziója, olasz államférfiak nézete, a cseh, román és szerb propaganda állításai* (Budapest: Benkő Kiadó, 1919).

intentions of the respective governments. While official Hungary could not afford to attach much significance to them and viewed these opinions less enthusiastically, Hungarian public opinion indulged itself in wishful thinking and gave excessive weight to these opinions. Such statements in favor of Hungary also underlined and boosted revisionist propaganda directed toward foreign countries.

This phenomenon demonstrates the peculiar nature of Hungarian revisionism and sheds light on the relationship between government circles and the people in general. While official Hungary had to deal with the question of revision in a very circumspect way, public opinion and revisionist propaganda at semi-official and popular channels assumed importance in keeping the cause alive. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this feature also characterized revisionist activities directed toward the United States.

CHAPTER THREE

Hungarian Perceptions of the USA between the World Wars: the USA as *Arbiter Mundi*

In order to understand the “mirage” Hungarians were chasing in their quest for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, we must also look at how Hungarians viewed the US and American culture between the world wars. Hungarian expectations toward the United States for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon were partly based on a set of Hungarian images of America. Although the US always fired the imagination of Hungarians,¹⁶⁸ after World War I, due to the special historical circumstances, the US became the focus of attention on a much larger scale and Hungarians vested even greater interest in America.¹⁶⁹

During the interwar period Hungarian culture sustained some of the old images of America, but new trends also surfaced. There was a great exposure to newly emerging American mass culture, especially film, radio, music and pulp fiction. The image of the American Indian, the figure of the cowboy, gangsters and Hollywood emerged as new American icons in the eyes of Hungarians, very often popularized by pulp fiction and cinema.¹⁷⁰

More importantly, however, the Promised Land image, as well as the image of America as the land of freedom, democracy and fair play, “the guardian of the laws and

¹⁶⁸ István Gál, *Hungary and the Anglo-Saxon World* (Budapest: Officina, 1944), 36. Hereafter cited as Gál, *Hungary and the Anglo-Saxon World*.

¹⁶⁹ The fact that the US had become a powerful symbol is demonstrated by the following somewhat far-fetched example as well. One of Theodore Brentano’s memoranda to the State Department on July 18, 1924 mentions the fact that in Hungary the American flag is used to advertise a product of the MATU Shoe Factory. See in Vol. 18. RG 84, NARA.

¹⁷⁰ For more on this see Tibor Glant, “Amerikás könyvek és Amerika-kép a két világháború közti Magyarországon” [Books about America and the images of America in Hungary between the world wars], in Tamás Magyarics, Miklós Lojkó, eds., *Emlékkönyv Frank Tibor 60. születésnapjára* (Budapest: Prime Rate Kft., 2008): 79-85.

humanity,”¹⁷¹ (a highly romanticized and idealized picture of America as the model democracy, primarily generated by Sándor Farkas Bölöni’s *Journey in North America*) also provided building blocks for revisionism. But while the first had lost its attraction, mainly due to strict immigration restriction legislation in the US, the second had become even more important and partly gave rise to popular illusions, though unfounded, that the United States, always regarded as the champion of justice, was a potential ally of Hungary in her efforts to revise the terms of the Treaty of Trianon.

Since America was also present at the Paris Peace Conference, some Hungarians considered her responsible for Trianon. From this stemmed a certain degree of anti-American sentiment as well.¹⁷² This notwithstanding, Hungarians cultivated predominantly positive images of the United States during the period between the world wars.

The USA as *arbiter mundi* became a recurrent theme of anti-Trianon propaganda and, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, it was advocated by the representatives of semi-official and popular propaganda as well, including Jenő Horváth’s historical analysis which is discussed in the next chapter.

During the interwar period travelogues remained a traditional source of information on the US. Popular titles included Dr. László Szabó’s book, *Az igazi Amerika* [The Real America], Dr. Zoltán Bíró’s *Amerika. Magyarok a modern csodák világában* [America: Hungarians in the World of Modern Wonders], and Dr. Ferencné Völgyesi’s account *Újra itthon. Tanulmányút Amerika és Európa 17 államán át a háború kitörésének izgalmai között* [At Home Again. A Study Tour through 17 States of America and Europe amidst the Excitements of the Outbreak of the War].¹⁷³ Others were Elek Máthé’s *Amerikai magyarok*

¹⁷¹ Lajos Kossuth’s speech at the Corporation Dinner at Irving House, New York, December 11, 1851. Quoted in Bakó, “Kossuth,” 128.

¹⁷² For more on the general trends of anti-Americanism see Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995).

¹⁷³ That all these three accounts were popular readings is demonstrated by the fact that all of them had been published twice in the respective period. Dr. László Szabó, *Az igazi Amerika* (1st ed. Pallas Irodalmi és

nyomában [On the Trail of American Hungarians]; and Erzsébet Kol's *Tiszaparttól Alaszkáig* [From the Banks of the Tisza to Alaska], which gives an account of the natural beauties, the flora and the fauna of the US.¹⁷⁴

Serious academic interest in America also emerged, as both the cause and effect of the images Hungarians projected of the US. Significant manifestations of such interest were many. Subjects on the US were included in the university curricula as well, such as Pál Teleki's lectures on American geography, economy and politics.¹⁷⁵ Another significant demonstration of the emerging academic interest in America was Jenő Horváth's book titled *A modern Amerika története, 1492-1920* [The History of Modern America, 1492-1920].¹⁷⁶ Horváth's book was published by the Szent István Társulat (Saint Stephen Society), a well-established, mainstream Catholic publishing house and literary association in Hungary. While on the one hand the book was to satisfy Hungarian interest in the US, on the other hand Horváth wished to make an impression on the Americans. In a letter addressed to Joshua Butler Wright, minister of the US to Hungary between 1927 and 1933, Horváth "offer[ed] the book in the interest of the Minister and to his country."¹⁷⁷

Jenő Pivány's seminal book of 1927, much of which was first published before the war, was titled *Hungarian-American Historical Connections from Pre-Columbian Times to*

Nyomdaipari Rt.: Budapest, 1925, 2nd ed. Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdaipari Rt.: Budapest, 1928). While Szabó's account reinforces images of America as the land of unlimited opportunities, the image of the self-made man, the hero of the rags-to-riches stories, the image of classless America (see for example pp.31, 55, 121, 245), it also debunks some of the myths of egalitarian, liberal and democratic America by way of describing the fate of Blacks and Indians in the US. Dr. Zoltán Bíró, *Amerika. Magyarok a modern csodák világában* (1st ed. Budapest: Hungária Könyvkiadó Vállalat, 1929, 2nd ed. Budapest: Hungária Könyvkiadó Vállalat, 1930) is an account of the 1928 Kossuth Pilgrimage to the US to unveil Kossuth's monument in New York. One basic difference which Bíró's travelogue bears in comparison to the former one is its recurrent political tone. Parts on the unveiling ceremony (pp. 48-65), "Bíró's imaginary conversation with Kossuth (pp. 65-70), etc. project political expectations toward the US fed by Kossuth's positive American image. Dr. Ferencné Völgyesi, *Újra itthon. Tanulmányút Amerika és Európa 17 államán át a háború kitörésének izgalmai között* (1st and 2nd eds. Budapest: Hornyánszky, 1939).

¹⁷⁴ Elek Máthé, *Amerikai magyarok nyomában* (Budapest: Dante, 1942), and Erzsébet Kol's *Tiszaparttól Alaszkáig* (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Természettudományi Társulat, 1940).

¹⁷⁵ Pál Teleki, *Amerika gazdaságföldrajza* [American Economic Geography] (Budapest: Centrum Kiadóvállalat Rt., 1922).

¹⁷⁶ Jenő Horváth, *A modern Amerika története, 1492-1920* (Budapest: Stephaneum, 1928). Horváth was considered one of the "official historians" of the Bethlen era.

¹⁷⁷ Eugene [Jenő] Horváth to Joshua Butler Wright, November 29, 1927. Volume 10, RG 84 NARA.

the End of the Civil War.¹⁷⁸ It reflected long-term interest in America and was particularly important in the context of post-war relations. Pivány pointed out the significance of Hungarian contributions to American history. This effort was mostly driven by problems of Hungarian loyalty in the US during World War I and, at the same time, by some identity problems of Hungarian-Americans and their search for a usable past after the war. In this respect the book was a message to Hungarian-Americans. Jenő Pivány's study, by presenting the historical connections between the US and Hungary, demonstrated and emphasized their shared sentiments and past, therefore the existence of strong historical and ideological bonds between the two nations. In the interwar period this idea became one of the cores of Hungarian expectations toward the USA.

Pivány focused on Lajos Kossuth's figure and his political legacy. Kossuth's name was not unfamiliar in America. During his six-month visit to the New World between December 1851 and June 1852, a Kossuth-fever swept the US.¹⁷⁹ The Americans had given the "nation's guest" an incomparably warm and enthusiastic welcome. Kossuth became idolized as the "Hungarian Washington."¹⁸⁰ This metaphor implies a strong resemblance between the course of American and Hungarian history. The American War of Independence against the British Crown and the Hungarian freedom fight against the Habsburgs were put into parallel, and the two nations' struggles for freedom and liberty were believed to have

¹⁷⁸ Jenő Pivány, *Hungarian-American Historical Connections from Pre-Columbian Times to the End of the Civil War* (Budapest: Royal Hungarian University Press, 1927). For a comprehensive history of American Hungarians see also Géza Kende, *Magyarok Amerikában. Az amerikai magyarság története, 1583-1926*. 3 vols. [Hungarians in America. The History of the American-Hungarians, 1583-1926] (Cleveland: Szabadság, 1927).

¹⁷⁹ Kossuth wished to secure political and military help from the American government for Hungary's cause. While his political expectations on all grounds were unfulfilled due to America's traditional policy of political isolation toward Europe and also her lack of military and naval potential at that time, the real achievement of Kossuth's American visit lies in the fact that he secured an image of democratic Hungary in the USA. Kossuth "put Hungary on the map," and due to his political significance and personal charisma his country also came to be associated with heroism and democratic ideals in the American mind. Tibor Frank, "Az emberiségnek közös sorsa van. Kossuth az Egyesült Államokban, 1851-52" [Humanity has a common fate. Kossuth in the United States, 1851-52], *Rubicon* (1992/2): 33-36. Hereafter cited as Frank, "Az emberiségnek közös sorsa van." Also see Tibor Frank, "...to fix the attention of the whole world upon Hungary." Lajos Kossuth in the United States, 1851-52," *The Hungarian Quarterly* Vol. XLIII No. 166 (Summer 2002): 85-98.

¹⁸⁰ Frank, "Az emberiségnek közös sorsa van," 35. See also John Komlos, *Louis Kossuth in America, 1851-1852* (Buffalo, NY: East European Institute, 1973) and György Szabad, *Kossuth on the Political System of the United States of America* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975).

morally bound them.¹⁸¹ In his treatise Pivány also drew these historical parallels and stated that the USA was the champion of liberty, democracy and freedom. This rhetoric underlined Hungarian expectations that the US should support treaty revision.¹⁸²

Closely related to the (allegedly) shared fate of Hungary and the United States, the figures of Kossuth and Washington also became popular with the masses during the interwar years. Kossuth's favorable image had become a sort of political 'capital' to which Hungarians could relate between the wars. The Kossuth cult enjoyed a revival and the political ideals Kossuth represented served as basic ideological underpinnings of the anti-Trianon rhetoric, expressed, for example, in 1928 on the occasion of the Kossuth Pilgrimage to America.

George Washington also continued to be popular in Hungary between the wars.¹⁸³ Hungarian images of the US were manifested in popular traditions Hungarians started to observe during the interwar period. All were cordial gestures toward America. The most spectacular was the annual celebration of Independence Day by Hungarians in the Városliget (City Park), at the statue erected by American citizens of Hungarian origin in 1906 in tribute to George Washington. Washington, just like Kossuth, became a symbolic figure; and his political career came to be viewed in the eyes of Hungarians as the apotheosis of America's

¹⁸¹ Kossuth reinforced this sentiment when he said upon disembarking the *U.S.S. Mississippi* in December 1851: The United States of America has declared by this unparalleled act their resolve to become the protectors of human rights. [...] Others spoke, you acted and I was free! [...] At this act of yours tyrants trembled, humanity shouted with joy, the Magyar nation, crushed but not broken, raised its head with resolution and with hope, and the brilliancy of your stars was greeted by Europe's oppressed millions as the morning star of liberty. Quoted in Elemer Bakó, "Louis Kossuth, 1802-1894," in Marc Pachter and Francis Wein, eds., *Abroad in America: Visitors to the New Nation, 1776-1914* (Reading, MASS.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1976), 127. Hereafter cited as Bakó, "Kossuth." See also *Dedication of a Bust of Lajos (Louis) Kossuth. Proceedings in the U. S. Capitol Rotunda. March 15, 1990. 101st Congress, 2nd Session* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1990).

¹⁸² Besides Pivány's book, accounts on the history of the American Civil War also helped to strengthen the historical bond of the two nations, especially so when Hungarian contributions to the victory of the Union was highlighted by works such as Ödön Vasváry's *Lincoln's Hungarian Heroes. The Participation of Hungarians in the Civil War, 1861-1865* (Washington, D.C., 1939). The Northern cause to get back the unlawfully seceded territories of the South came to be identified with that of Hungary's revisionist efforts. Hungarians, mainly Kossuth émigrés, served both the Northern as well as the Southern cause. A good example of the latter is Béla Estván.

¹⁸³ See Jared Sparks, *Washington élete* (Budapest: Magyar Tudós Társaság, 1845) which was published several times in the 19th-century.

grand democratic experiment. Therefore, it is not surprising that Washington enjoyed great popularity in Hungary.

State Department documents in the American National Archives detail the Independence Day celebrations in Budapest.¹⁸⁴ Three speeches delivered at different Independence Day ceremonies illustrate first the actual significance of Washington's figure and the democratic and liberal ideals he stood for in the eyes of Hungarians. They also show how these celebrations served a nationwide revisionist propaganda campaign.

The first speech explicitly expressed the revisionist cause. American Commissioner to Budapest Ulysses Grant-Smith's memorandum to the secretary of state dated July 16, 1920 called the Department's attention to a speech delivered by Field Bishop Zadravec, which he addressed to Captain James W. Pedlow, the representative of the American Red Cross in Hungary. Zadravec's tribute to Washington was "a plea [...] made to aid Hungary to regain her lost provinces: "We have been robbed, despoiled, ransacked by others," he exclaimed. "This is why we are hungry, this is why we beg. It is not for us to blush at sinful misery. Let those feel shame who have reduced Hungary to the State of the beggar of the world. A free country is here today, to celebrate its freedom." Then, after delineating Hungary's tragic condition, he made his plea. "America, classical home of Freedom," he declaimed, "the land of the most awful, most unimaginable oppression turns to thee today. [...] When you come home you will relate of the gratitude felt by Hungary [...] to your free country. But you will also relate that our gratitude to your free country would be still greater for help accorded to us to get our free Mother Country back again."¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ See M708, M709 and M710 Records of the Department of State, RG59, NARA. See also Records of Diplomatic Posts RG84, NARA. See also "The Fourth of July at Budapest: Cultural Relations," in Mark Imre Major, *American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944* (Astor, Florida: Danubian Press, Inc., 1974), 143-169.

¹⁸⁵ Bishop Zadravec's speech on July 16, 1920 at the Washington Monument in the City Park, Budapest. Attached to Ulysses Grant Smith's Memorandum to the Secretary of State, July 16, 1920. Roll# 21, M708 RG 59, NARA. For more on Zadravec see Béla Bodó, "The White Terror in Hungary, 1919-1921: The Social Worlds of Paramilitary Groups," *Austrian History Yearbook* 42 (2011): 133-163.

The eulogy by Count Albert Apponyi at the July 4, 1921 festivities, which he presented as president of the Hungarian American Society founded earlier the same day, is a perfect rhetorical representation of Hungarian images of America. Apponyi referred to basic ideals and principles which the Washington monument in Budapest represents and which America shares with Hungary: the love of freedom and independence. On this basis, says Apponyi, "Hungary bases its claim to the sympathy of America" and appeals to American benevolence. Hungary "demands no charity, but justice, and if America does justice to other nations it does justice to itself at the same time because it has remained true to its noble ideals."¹⁸⁶ Masterfully applying the art of speech, Apponyi appealed to American democratic idealism, and while doing so, covertly expressed the expectations his nation cherished toward the homeland of Washington.

George Washington's figure and ideals were merged in a peculiar way to serve the revisionist aims on still another occasion. American Minister to Budapest Joshua Butler Wright in his memorandum accounted on the speech delivered by Consul General Ernest Ludwig, one of the vice presidents of the Hungarian American Society. Wright attached the copy of Ludwig's speech to his report, in which Ludwig gave voice to the following ideas:

[...] perhaps some happy day may come when America will be in the position to throw its weight and influence into the balance in order that Hungary may again be what it was. Perhaps to some of you this may seem preposterous, but we Hungarians feel in our innermost hearts that, had George Washington lived in those fateful days of the war and the peace negotiations which led to Trianon, Hungary would never have been sacrificed on the altar of greed, wanton lust and ignorance. [...] When we, therefore, think and speak of George Washington we think of him not only for what he did to his own country, we love him not only for what he gave to mankind, but also because to us he seems to be that symbol of international world justice which we trust will some day return to Hungary what was wrongfully wrested from her. Let me ask you all to join with me in the three rousing cheers for America, the land of freedom, America, the land of ideals and America, the land that has given the world George Washington.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Count Albert Apponyi's speech at the Washington Monument, July 4, 1921. Transcribed on the basis of Ulysses Grant Smith's Memorandum to the Secretary of State, July 6, 1921. Roll# 21, M708 RG 59, NARA.

¹⁸⁷ "Approximate Text of the Speech Made by Consul General Ernest Ludwig at the Celebration before the George Washington Monument on July 3, 1927," in Joshua Butler Wright's Memorandum to Secretary of State, July 7, 1927. Roll#21, M708 RG59, NARA.

On the same occasion the Hungarian American Society read its open letter addressed to President Calvin Coolidge. Bridging the past and the present in the letter, the speech evoked President Coolidge as “the successor of that great hero [Washington] and the head of the free and therefore happy American nation” whose people “helped to liberate the national hero of Hungary, Louis Kossuth, whom the Americans called the “Washington of Hungary [...]” Reminding the president and his nation of such bonds, the letter expressed the hope that such reminiscences still had greater meaning for the Americans.¹⁸⁸ Clearly, this form of political courtesy aimed to reinforce favorable images of America and convince Washington of treaty revision.

Because the Fourth of July celebrations were cordial gestures toward the US, representatives of the US Legation were usually invited to these events. Ulysses Grant-Smith passed a comment on the Hungarian attitude displayed on one occasion reflecting the general American position toward Hungary when he said: “[i]t is perhaps characteristic of these people not to be able to refrain from injecting political matters whenever possible, even to the extent of bringing political questions on an occasion so far removed from such matters [...]”¹⁸⁹

Beyond literature, popular as well as academic, and the tradition of the Fourth of July celebrations, the press in and outside Hungary (i.e. *Pesti Napló*, *Budapesti Hírlap*, *Pester Lloyd*, *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, *Szabadság*), played an important role in projecting and reinforcing positive images of the US. Some contributions paid lip-service to the greatness of the United States. In 1928 Frank Vojnics, the Mayor of Baja and a member of the Kossuth Pilgrimage to the US in 1928, addressed a letter to President Coolidge, in which he acclaimed Coolidge, “the man who stands at the head of an immense state that marches at the head of all nations,” as the author of an article titled “Let Us Have Liberty and Peace,” which Mr.

¹⁸⁸ Quoted from “Celebration of Independence Day in Budapest,” *Pester Lloyd*, July 4, 1927. Enclosed to Joshua Butler Wright’s Memorandum to Secretary of State, July 7, 1927. Roll#21, M708 RG59, NARA.

¹⁸⁹ Ulysses-Grant Smith to Secretary of State on July 16, 1920. Roll#21, M708 RG59, NARA.

Vojnics read in Hungarian translation in the *Pesti Napló*. Vojnics acknowledged the fact that “modern America values [the ideal of liberty] higher than [...] life,” and quoted President Coolidge to have written that “America feels that it has been called upon to fight for two ideals of the civilized world: for liberty and for peace.”¹⁹⁰ When the State Department received Vojnics’ letter, William R. Castle, Jr., the West European Desk Officer in the State Department, immediately urged Joshua Butler Wright, then minister of the US in Budapest, to acknowledge receipt of the letter and more importantly to inform Mr. Vojnics that “the President is not the author of the article in question;” furthermore, that “the facsimile of his signature was secured and appended to the article without his knowledge or consent; and that the article itself is an inaccurate and misleading distortion of a passage taken from the president’s book.”¹⁹¹ It turned out that the article attributed to President Coolidge was first published in the *Berlin National Zeitung* on April 21, 1928 under the title “America’s Role in World Affairs,” and purported to be an excerpt from the president’s book, which according to Castle’s note bears the title *The Practice of Freedom*, and was published by C. Scribner’s Sons.¹⁹² *Pesti Napló* must have reprinted this article in Hungarian translation of the above mentioned title. In view of Castle’s instructions to Wright it becomes clear that the article published in *Pesti Napló* appeared as an original contribution despite the fact that according to Castle’s dispatch the president never contributed to the foreign press. Sentences were redrafted into a new and misleading context; certain ideas were “badly garbled either intentionally or by translation” and ideas were actually introduced which were not in the text at all. Castle explicitly asked Wright to express the Department’s astonishment at the

¹⁹⁰ Frank Vojnics to President Coolidge, April 23, 1928. Volume 43, RG84, NARA.

¹⁹¹ William R. Castle to Joshua Butler Wright, June 5, 1928. Volume 43, RG84, NARA.

¹⁹² Ibid. The Library of Congress Catalogue lists no such book of this title by President Calvin Coolidge. It may be suspected that the wrong title was included in Castle’s dispatch. The book that might be the one in question bears the title *The Price of Freedom*, and was published in London and New York, in 1924, and, as it was claimed in the note, by C. Scribner’s Sons.

“publication of this apocryphal article over a facsimile of the President’s signature with apparently no attempt at the verification of the authenticity of the article in question.”¹⁹³

Obviously, such an affair shed no positive light on the Hungarian press in general and *Pesti Napló* in particular. The incident demonstrated the extent to which Hungarians tended, intentionally or not, to overlook matters, in this case the credibility of information, for their purposes. Another example, with a truly amazing twist, was László Faragó’s article in *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* titled “Amerika és Magyarország” [America and Hungary], in which the author appealed to Hungarian American sentiments when he compared the United States of America and Hungary as two nations that fought for the same freedom, and shared the sacred tradition of *cum deo pro patria et libertate*.¹⁹⁴ Based on the mutually shared traditions of eternal moral, cultural and political ideals of the Hungarian and the American nations, Faragó claimed that the US, a country which hailed President Monroe’s political legacy, namely that America belongs to the Americans, should understand and support the revision of the Trianon frontiers.¹⁹⁵ To persuade America to intervene in European, more exactly in Hungarian, affairs by reasoning with the Monroe Doctrine was a unique interpretation of the American tradition of hemispheric separation.

The popular Hungarian images of the US fed unfounded expectations and gave ground to the myth that the US as the arbiter of justice would promote and support Hungary’s cause. The myth of America and, consequently, the expectations toward her were based on political, historical and ideological tenets which had become significant themes and elements of the Hungarian revisionist argument aimed at the United States. Un, or semi-official and popular

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ *Cum deo pro patria et libertate* (For the homeland and liberty with God!) was the popular slogan of the uprising against the Habsburgs (1703-1711) led by Ferenc Rákóczi II.

¹⁹⁵ László Faragó, “Amerika és Magyarország,” *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, March 20, 1928.

channels, such as pamphlets, daily papers, journals and various propaganda materials promoted these views.¹⁹⁶

Complementing these, Hungarian history writing between the wars proved to be an additional source for such convictions. Mainstream Hungarian history writing reconstructed some significant turning points and events of Hungarian history during and after the war and during the peace negotiations in Paris in the context of their relation to US war and peace policies. The result turned out to be the building blocks of Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the US, illuminating the role of mainstream Hungarian history writing reinforcing the popular myth of America as a possible supporter of Hungary in the revision of the treaty. The next chapter will deal with this subject.

¹⁹⁶ For more on this see for example Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 88-124.

CHAPTER FOUR

Revisionist Expectations toward the USA and Hungarian History Writing: A Case Study of Jenő Horváth

Hungarian history writing between the wars assumed a significant role in helping the Hungarian nation come to terms with the trauma of Trianon.¹⁹⁷ Seeking answers for the ill-fate of the Monarchy, offering explanation for what had happened, Hungarian historians between the wars made an attempt to furnish the process of ‘healing’ from the shock of defeat: they wanted to prove wrongs done to Hungary, provide evidence and justification for revision.¹⁹⁸ Trianon, and therefore revisionism, served as major focuses of their inquiry. One of the most prominent figures in this field between the wars was Jenő Horváth. In this chapter, therefore, I take a closer look at his works.

Jenő Horváth produced an extensive and voluminous body of scholarship on the problems of Trianon in particular, and on Hungarian and world history in general. At the same time he held several high-standing offices in various professional as well as social circles. His academic significance demonstrably makes him *the* “official” historian of Trianon in the interwar period.¹⁹⁹ Before we look at his *oeuvre*, we must introduce the man and his background for the sake of English audiences. Horváth received his doctorate in history and Latin from Budapest University in 1905. Having an excellent command of English, French and German, first he wished to become a career diplomat. When such ambitions failed, he

¹⁹⁷ Among the representatives of mainstream Hungarian history writing between the wars were Sándor Domanovszky, Gyula Szekfű, Elemér Mályusz, István Hajnal, Bálint Hóman, Jenő Horváth, etc. Almost every one of them wrote their Trianon works dealing with the political, social and economic effects of the treaty. The Magyar Történelmi Társulat (Hungarian Historical Society) and its journal the *Századok*, the Külügyi Társaság (Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society) and its journal, the *Külügyi Szemle* (Foreign Policy Review), the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and several Hungarian universities, etc. provided the official, institutional and academic means to these historians to pursue their profession.

¹⁹⁸ On the psychology of trauma and defeat see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat. On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003).

¹⁹⁹ Horváth Jenő was considered to be *the* diplomatic historian of the interwar period.

opted for his second love, history, which he began to teach at various Hungarian secondary schools. His academic interest in and commitment to the profession of the historian manifested themselves at a very early stage of his career. Two substantial and voluminous pieces of his early scholarship demonstrate this: *A történelem bölcsellete. Tanulmányok a történettudomány alapelveiről és az emberi művelődés irányeszméiről* [The Wisdom of History. Essays on the Basic Principles of Historiography and the Guiding Concepts of Human Culture] (1907) and *A XIX. század alapvetése. A nagyhatalmak megalakulása 1648-1715. Köztörténeti tanulmány* [The Core Principles of the 19th Century. The Formation of the Great Powers 1648-1715. A Study in Public History] (1910). Both attracted the attention and acknowledgment of professional circles. Appointed Professor of History at the Nagyvárad Law Academy in 1912, Horváth turned his attention to world and diplomatic history. The end of World War I and the crisis which set in from the fall of 1918 forced Hungarian historians to react to the events of the war. Amidst the turmoil caused by the defeat and the military collapse of the Central Powers, and in response to the Hungarian fears of the prospective unfavorable peace settlement, Horváth published his first Trianon work, *Magyarország függetlensége és területi épsége. A nagyváradai jogakadémia felhívása a nyugati egyetemekhez* [The Independence and Territorial Integrity of Hungary. The Appeal of the Nagyvárad Law Academy to the Western Universities]. Published both in Hungarian and English, the pamphlet aimed at informing the learned public about Hungarian policies toward her nationalities and Hungary's claim to her territorial integrity on the basis of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination.²⁰⁰

The end of the war and the dismemberment of historic Hungary affected Horváth's career both directly and indirectly. Since Nagyvárad (Oradea) became part of Romania, he had to give up his professorship there. Like everybody else, he was devastated by the Treaty

²⁰⁰ Jenő Horváth, *Magyarország függetlensége és területi épsége. A nagyváradai jogakadémia felhívása a nyugati egyetemekhez* (Nagyvárad: n.p., 1918).

of Trianon, which came to serve as a formative impact on his professional life after 1920. As a result, he devoted his career to the study of Hungarian history during and after the war in order to reveal the causes of the Hungarian tragedy, to answer yet unanswered questions, to set right and challenge “the apparent [...] myths, legends, [...], and lies” about Hungary’s role in and responsibility for the war.²⁰¹ Horváth could serve these ends as managing director of the Magyar Külügyi Társaság (Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs). First as editor, later as editor-in-chief of the society’s scholarly journal, *Külügyi Szemle* [Foreign Policy Review], he took active part in the organization and the promotion of Hungarian science, politics and culture at home and abroad. As professor of modern world and Hungarian history at several Hungarian universities (i.e. Pázmány University, József Nádor Technical University, the University of Economics and the Ludovika Academy) he published major essays and books on the causes and consequences of Trianon. His works drew on mainstream histories of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–20, and on the memoirs, diaries and statements of contemporary Hungarian and foreign politicians. He also relied on the contemporary press and capitalized on his professional contacts and personal relations with several mainstream Hungarian politicians, including Count Albert Apponyi.

One of his first works, *Magyarország és a nemzetiségi kérdés 1815- 1920* [Hungary and the Question of Nationalities 1815-1920],²⁰² dealt with the problems of nationalities in Hungary, while *A trianoni béke megalkotása 1915-1920. Diplomáciai történelmi tanulmány* [The Making of the Treaty of Trianon 1915-1920. A Diplomatic Historical Essay] offered a thorough analysis of the circumstances under which the peace treaty was made and presented

²⁰¹ Zoltán Major, “A trianoni vádlott megszólal. Tudományos pálya és történelmi kor Horváth Jenő magyar diplomáciatörténész munkásságában,” in Jenő Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig. Huszonöt év Magyarország történetéből 1896-1920* [From the Millenium to Trianon. Twenty-Five Years of Hungarian History] (Budapest: Nyitott Könyv Kiadó, 2004), XLVIII. Translation mine. Hereafter cited as Major, “A trianoni vádlott megszólal.”

²⁰² Jenő Horváth, *Magyarország és a nemzetiségi kérdés 1815- 1920* (Budapest: n.p., 1920).

to Hungary for signature. The book articulated the belief that the Monarchy did not fall by “her own weight,”²⁰³ but rather due to the propaganda of the nationalities abroad.²⁰⁴

Horváth’s more inclusive and more voluminous Trianon works included the almost hundred-page long essay “Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon,” in *Justice for Hungary*, published both in Hungarian and English by the Külügyi Társaság. *Justice for Hungary* was a prestigious collection of scholarly essays written by contemporary intellectuals advocating the revision of the Trianon Treaty. It was arguably the most convincing revisionist effort published both in Hungarian and English by the Külügyi Társaság, and Horváth contributed the historical summary to the volume. His Trianon monographs: *A Milleniumtól Trianonig. Huszontöt év Magyarország történetéből, 1896-1920* [From the millennium to Trianon. Twenty-five years of Hungarian history, 1896-1920]; and the two-volume *A magyar kérdés a XX. században* [The Hungarian Question in the 20th Century] were comprehensive analyses of Hungarian history before, during and after World War I.²⁰⁵

These works, which form the basis of the present survey, comprised a comprehensive account of Hungarian history during and after the war, and offer answers to the question ‘why Trianon happened?’ Horváth’s Trianon synthesis paid special attention to America’s role in and responsibility for the peace treaty. Within this context, Horváth’s works focused on several significant issues and events in Hungarian history in relation to American war and

²⁰³ Robert W. Seton-Watson, “The Problem of Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers,” in *International Affairs* (July 1933): 18.

²⁰⁴ Jenő Horváth, *A trianoni béke megalkotása 1915-1920. Diplomáciai történelmi tanulmány* (Budapest: Magyar Külpolitika, 1924), 37, 10.

²⁰⁵ Eugene Horváth, “Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon,” in *Justice for Hungary* (London, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1928), 23-121. Hereafter cited as Horváth, “Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon.” Jenő Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig. Huszontöt év Magyarország történetéből, 1896-1920* (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 1938). Hereafter cited as Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig*. Jenő Horváth, *A magyar kérdés a XX. században: Felelősség a világháborúért és a békeszerződésért* Vol. 1 [The Hungarian Question in the 20th Century: Responsibility for the World War and the Peace Treaty]; *A trianoni békeszerződés megalkotása és a revízió útja* Vol. 2. [The Creation of the Peace Treaty and the Road to Revision] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1939). Hereafter respectively cited as Horváth, *Felelősség* and Horváth, *A békeszerződés*. Translation of these sources are all mine.

peace policies. These tenets served as the major thematic cores and building blocks of the revisionist arguments and expectations toward the United States. Horváth's interpretation and synthesis of these helped create and keep alive the popular myth of the US as a possible ally of Hungary in frontier revision. The historical narrative he generated served as reference points for semi-official and popular accounts and lent authority to the revisionist narrative(s) in general.²⁰⁶

With respect to the role of the US, Horváth focused on six major themes: (1) the United States of America did not wish to dismember the Habsburg Monarchy (negotiations for separate peace, the original Fourteen Points and the Four Principles, the Inquiry's recommendations to Wilson); (2) Wilson changed his policy toward the Monarchy because he had fallen victim to the propaganda of the representatives of the would-be successor states, mainly to the influence of Thomas G. Masaryk; (3) Austria-Hungary and the US wished to end the war on the basis of the Fourteen Points; (4) American proposals for peace at the peace conference in Paris were more favorable than those of the Allies; (5) the US did not accept and approve the Trianon peace treaty (the US Congress refused to sign the post-war treaties); and (6) the separate US-Hungarian peace treaty did not mention the Trianon boundaries.

The belief that the United States of America did not wish to dismember the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was one of the major tenets in Horváth's works. He systematically tried to support his case by the citation and the interpretation of numerous statements and political manifestos by influential American politicians, above all, President Wilson.

In the context of the peace proposed by the Central Powers on December 12, 1916 through the neutral USA,²⁰⁷ and the Allied reply of January 10, 1917 demanding the dismemberment of the states of the Central Powers, Horváth discussed President Wilson's "Peace Without Victory Address" to Congress of January 22, 1917. He emphasized Wilson's

²⁰⁶ See for example Dr. Elemér Halmay, *A revíziós gondolat a világpolitikában* [The Revisionist Thought in World Politics] (Budapest: Kelet népe, 1927).

²⁰⁷ Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig*, 183; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 387.

idea of the free development of nations, the principle of nationality as the guiding principles of the “peace without victory” proposed in the president’s message.²⁰⁸ With this Horváth wished to demonstrate the American standpoint concerning the future of the Monarchy. He even cited Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s statement that

[President Wilson] is trying to avoid breaking with Austria in order to keep the channels of official intercourse with her open so that he may use her for peace. [...] It is the President’s view that the large measures of autonomy already secured for these older units is [sic] a sufficient guaranty of peace and stability in that part of Europe so far as national and racial influences are concerned [...].²⁰⁹

Horváth emphasized that even before the US had officially entered the war she stated that she did not want to dismember the Monarchy. Furthermore, he pointed out that the US “held out the prospect of keeping the empire of Chares IV intact.”²¹⁰ (The fact that the US was not a belligerent at that time, and therefore could not officially influence such decisions of the Allies, was ignored by Horváth.)

In reference to Wilson’s Message to Congress on January 22, 1917, Horváth noted that the USA was willing to enter the war provided that both groups of belligerents accepted the American principles of national self-determination as the basis for the peace settlement.²¹¹ Colonel Edward Mandel House, Wilson’s closest friend and adviser, was also quoted as recommending the preservation of the Monarchy if it were willing to break with Germany.²¹² Horváth cited Wilson’s December 4, 1917 address (US President’s call for the declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy) to buttress this point:

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their hands in all matters, great and small.²¹³

²⁰⁸ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 189; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 393. See also Frederick C. Penfield to Robert Lansing, January 25, 1917 in *FRUS. 1917. Supplement I*, 31. Quoted in Horváth, *Felelősség*, 394. Hereafter cited as *FRUS. 1917. Supplement I*.

²⁰⁹ Robert Lansing to Walter H. Page February 8, 1917. *FRUS. 1917. Supplement I*, 40. Quoted in Horváth, *Felelősség*, 395.

²¹⁰ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 189-190.

²¹¹ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 191; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 401.

²¹² Colonel Edward M. House, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (London, 1928), 157. Cited in Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 191 and Horváth, *Felelősség*, 401.

²¹³ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 191; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 401. In *Felelősség*, Horváth translated Wilson speech: “Mi semmiképen nem akarjuk Ausztia-Magyarország átalakítását. Nem a mi dolgunk annak belső életét

President Wilson's January 8, 1918 message to Congress, in which the Fourteen Points were stated as America's official war aims for the first time, became a key element in Horváth's argument. Point Ten provided the most significant building block of the revisionist expectations toward the US. By declaring that "[t]he peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development,"²¹⁴ Wilson, in Horváth's words, "saved" the Monarchy from dismemberment.²¹⁵ Thus, Wilson's doctrine of national self-determination and the principles declared in the Fourteen Points and the Four Principles turned out to be the alpha and the omega of the reasoning in Horváth's analysis and were presented as the ultimate guarantees by the USA for keeping the Monarchy intact. Even more so, Horváth said, because the USA was not bound by the secret treaties made during the war.²¹⁶

As Horváth emphasized, in Point Ten of the Fourteen Points Wilson clearly stated that the US did not wish to dismember Austria-Hungary. Horváth failed to point out, however, that the principle of national self-determination came to be considered and interpreted by the peoples and states of Central Europe as the key to their independence and freedom of action. Wilson's principle of national self-determination lent itself to various interpretations, and even the president did not formulate its exact and explicit meaning.²¹⁷ Horváth, on the other hand, did not mention important circumstances which made the first official declaration of US

gazdaságilag és politikailag elrendezni. Mi semmiképpen nem akarunk diktálni a monarchia népeinek csupán azt akarjuk, hogy kis és nagy dolgokban maguk intézzék saját ügyeiket." Horváth adds that the same decision was confirmed by Lloyd George on December 20, which, in Horváth's view, demonstrates that the USA and Britain shared their policies concerning the Monarchy and rejected the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, 401. See also Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927). Hereafter cited as Baker and Dodd, eds., *War and Peace*.

²¹⁴ Horváth, *Felelősség*, 402-403.

²¹⁵ Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig*, 202. Wilson's *Four Principles* also constitute another important core of the argument to reinforce America's favorable Habsburg policy. Horváth quotes the *Four Principles* in *Felelősség*, 423-424.

²¹⁶ Horváth, *Felelősség*, 424. See also Robert Lansing to Allied Ambassadors to Washington, February 19, 1918. Quoted in Colonel Edward Mandel House, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* Vol. 3 (London, 1928), 370-371.

²¹⁷ Glantz, *Through the Prism*, 258.

war aims necessary. As was discussed in chapter one, Soviet Russia left the war, preparations for the Brest-Litovsk agreement started, while negotiations for a separate peace with the Monarchy failed. All these contributed to Wilson's declaration of America's war aims.

As was also discussed in chapter one, American wartime policies toward the Monarchy were not motivated by altruism, but by shrewd calculation and political strategy. Consequently, the image of the US as the benevolent savior of the Monarchy, so strongly supported by Horváth, lacks evidence. Horváth failed to point out that the Fourteen Points was not an idealistic program of war aims, but a pragmatic and tactical move. In chapter one, this has already been illustrated by the analysis of how Point Ten, the most important point with respect to the future of the Monarchy, was drafted. The consideration behind Point Ten was to increase the willingness of the Monarchy to negotiate a separate peace and win her away from Germany.

Horváth's belief that with the Fourteen Points Wilson "saved" the Monarchy, therefore, was one-sided. He knew about the Inquiry's report and should have been aware of the American strategy toward the Monarchy. Still, he misrepresented this important issue. Concerning the work of the Inquiry, Horváth used Ray Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement* as his primary source. Horváth's quotation from the report that "[o]ur policy must consist in refusing to accept the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary"²¹⁸ was presented to demonstrate America's insistence on keeping the Monarchy intact. But comparing the quotation in Horváth with the original source suggests that Horváth was bent on adapting history to theory. Once the respective quotation in Baker had been checked it turned out that Horváth omitted certain and very substantial parts of the quotation as written in Baker's book. The original reads as follows:

Our policy must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this discontent which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. By threatening the present German-Magyar combination with nationalist uprisings on the one side, and

²¹⁸ Baker, *Woodrow Wilson* 28. Quoted in Horváth, *Felelősség*, 402.

by showing it a mode of safety on the other, its resistance would be reduced to a minimum, and the motive to an independence from Berlin in foreign affairs would be enormously accelerated.²¹⁹

Questions emerge. What explains such treatment of historical sources on Horváth's part? What explains Horváth's selectively presented quotation? Since Ray Stannard Baker's three-volume book was listed as a primary source in Horváth's works, the Hungarian scholar clearly had direct access to it, if not in Hungary, then abroad. It is therefore highly unlikely that he used another source that misquoted Baker. It is more likely that the "unconditional" stand of the United States on the side of the Monarchy was so important to him that he deliberately manipulated the statement. The attempt to separate the Monarchy from the German alliance just did not really fit Horváth's image of the US. Moreover, Horváth's treatment of the Baker quotation relating to the Inquiry's recommendation is not the only indication that he tended to ignore some facts and overemphasize others.

By the summer of 1918 President Wilson abandoned his policy of non-dismemberment. In his works Horváth dealt with Wilson's change of policy toward the Monarchy, and offered a unique interpretation. He contended that Wilson's change of attitude and policy toward the Monarchy in the spring of 1918 was the result of foreign pressure from British (mainly the New Europe group and Crewe House), French and associated political circles, and the propaganda against the Monarchy conducted by the representatives of the future successor states. Horváth said that Wilson was misled and made to believe that the annexation of territories of the Monarchy was the legitimate actions of the aspiring small states longing for independence on the basis of the Wilsonian logic of self-determination.²²⁰ Horváth even accused President Wilson of misjudging the Central European situation and accepting the "fictitious" secret treaties made by Masaryk during the war. Wilson's "careless

²¹⁹ Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, 28. Part of the report made in early January 1918 by the Inquiry to President Wilson regarding "War Aims and Peace Terms" was prepared by Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann. Italics mine.

²²⁰ Horváth, *Felelősség*, 404-405; Horváth, "Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon," 71-79.

mistake,” Horváth asserted, contributed to the tragedy of Hungary.²²¹ He thus created the myth of Wilson the victim, wistfully manipulated and influenced by external forces. Masaryk was presented as the arch enemy, who won “over Wilson from self-determination to annexation.”²²² “He induced the President to abandon his Fourteen Points, and entangled him in the secret stipulations of the Russian Slav plans, thus inaugurating the Wilson tragedy.”²²³

In chapter one I have explained the various reasons why President Wilson followed a new policy toward the Monarchy after the summer of 1918. The influence of nationality propaganda and especially that of Thomas Masaryk on Wilson’s change of policy was greatly exaggerated in Horváth’s works. At the same time this interpretation was a very convenient one inasmuch as such a conviction also served as an important ground on which Hungary could expect the US to right the wrongs resulting from dismemberment.

Horváth’s assumption that the Monarchy ended the war on the basis of the Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918 which, in his view, applied even after November 3 and 13, the armistice of Padua and the military convention of Belgrade, constituted another major element of the expectations toward America in fulfilling the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.²²⁴ He based his argument on the diplomatic exchanges between the Foreign Office of the Monarchy and the State Department between the middle of September and the middle of October 1918. Foreign Minister Count István Burián, Horváth said, approached Wilson and initiated peace on September 14, 1918 on the basis of the Fourteen Points.²²⁵ As was discussed in chapter one Washington rejected Burián’s note even before it was officially delivered by Swedish Minister W. A. F. Ekengren on September 16.²²⁶ Wilson’s reply of September 16, according to which the US had “stated the terms upon which [she] would

²²¹ Horváth, *Felelősség*, 411.

²²² Horváth, “Diplomatic History,” 77.

²²³ Horváth, “Diplomatic History,” 74-75. On Masaryk’s recollections of his relations to President Wilson see Thomas Masaryk, *The Making of a State, Memories and Observations, 1914-1918* (London: H. Frowde, Hodder & Stoughton Co., 1927).

²²⁴ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 5.

²²⁵ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 203-204.

²²⁶ Mamatey, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, 319.

consider peace,”²²⁷ was misinterpreted by Horváth. Horváth stated that Count Burián accepted Wilson’s reply on October 5 and argued that Austria-Hungary ended the war on the basis of Wilson’s principles.²²⁸ The documents of the State Department collectively published as *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, to which Horváth had access and used as a major primary source, proved that Burián’s letter, which arrived in Washington on October 7, did not include any acceptance of Wilson’s note. It was the Monarchy’s actual (or second) peace proposal addressed to the President.²²⁹

Horváth carried his argument further by drawing the surprising conclusion that by this diplomatic exchange a binding international agreement was endorsed between the Monarchy and the US. By blending these events, Horváth also claimed that thereby Austria-Hungary and the US mutually agreed to end the war on the basis of the principles as expressed in the Fourteen Points of January 1918²³⁰ and Austria-Hungary ended the war without any territorial losses.²³¹ These beliefs were mistaken. As a professor of international law and diplomacy Horváth should have known better, especially in light of the documents in the *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. As was explained in chapter one, the claim that the original Fourteen Points still stood and that they provided the basis for the peace negotiations by no means was true in the fall of 1918. Wilson’s official reply to the Austrian peace note on October 18 explained the American position.²³² Horváth had to be aware of Wilson’s October 18 reply to Burián’s second peace note as the document was also

²²⁷ President Wilson to Count Burián, September 16, 1918 in Harold W. V. Temperley, ed. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1 (London: n.p.: 1920-24), 448. Hereafter cited as Temperley, *Peace Conference of Paris* Vol.1. Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 204.

²²⁸ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 204; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 433. Horváth dates the Monarchy’s reply to October 5, which was actually delivered on October 7.

²²⁹ Count Burián to President Wilson, October 5, 1918 in Temperley, *Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1, 448. Also see W. A. F. Ekengren to the Secretary of State, October 7, 1918, *FRUS, 1918, Vol. 1. Supplement I.*, 341.

²³⁰ Horváth, *A Milleniumtől Trianonig*, 204; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 433; Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 241.

²³¹ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 5.

²³² “The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestion of the Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his Address of January 8th last, have necessarily altered the attitude and the responsibility of the Government of the United States.” For the full length of the message see President Wilson to Count Burián, October 18, 1918 in Temperley, *Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1, 449-450; Secretary of State to W. A. F. Ekengren, October 19, 1918, *FRUS, 1918, Vol. 1. Supplement I.*, 368.

included in the very same volume of the *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Still, he ignored this important detail.²³³

Horváth's interpretation of the events clearly reflected wishful thinking. As the "official" historian of the world war, someone who was close to government circles and the political elite, Horváth should have known that in late October Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Andrassy was officially informed that Point Ten no longer formed the basis of the armistice and the peace. Moreover, Horváth had to know about the official elaboration on the policy known as the Lippmann-Cobb Commentary, too. As was stated in chapter one, the commentary put American plans for peace on a new basis and explicitly contained the information regarding the readjustment of US policies toward the Monarchy, including its effect on Point Ten. The Germans knew about the specific interpretations of the Lippmann-Cobb commentary, as the German news service had intercepted the coded wireless message that communicated the commentary to Wilson.²³⁴ And this information had to be communicated to the Ballhausplatz. If not through the German channel, then from David Hunter Miller's book, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* Horváth could get the information that the Fourteen Points had been modified. Horváth quoted Miller saying in connection with the Monarchy's peace proposal that its "[o]nly basis is President Wilson's Fourteen Points, *as modified*."²³⁵ But Horváth apparently gave no consideration to Miller's comment at all.

Horváth's misrepresentation of Burián's peace proposal and of Wilson's October 18 reply has another noteworthy feature. Horváth emphasized that the anti-Hungarian propagandists and "annexionist agents" in general and Thomas Masaryk in particular persuaded Wilson to

²³³ In *Felelősség* at one place Horváth states that Wilson did not even reply to Count Burián's second, that is the October 5, note while few pages later in the same work he mentions Wilson's October 18 "telegram" to Burián. Horváth, *Felelősség*, 433, 436.

²³⁴ Walworth, *America's Moment*, 73.

²³⁵ David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York: n.p., 1928), 54. Cited in Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 88. Italics mine.

break his previous promise and reject the Hungarian peace initiatives.²³⁶ This helped underline the conviction that Wilson acted contrary to his personal wishes and that the US originally wished to treat Austria-Hungary in a more favorable way.

Horváth also dealt with America's role at the Paris Peace Conference and the American recommendations for peace with regard to Hungary.²³⁷ He pointed out that Wilson and the American Delegation to Negotiate Peace insisted on the peace settlement being made on Wilson's terms, and Wilson refused to endorse Allied war aims, thus, their (harsh and punitive) conditions for peace.²³⁸ American conduct at the peace conference in Paris favorable to Hungary, therefore, created another building block of Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the US.

Relying on Miller's *My Diary*, but without going into detail concerning American recommendations, Horváth presented only a few selected aspects of the American peace plan for Hungary. For example, he mentioned that the American proposals recommended a plebiscite in Transylvania for the non-Romanians and free access for Hungary to the Adriatic and the Black Sea.²³⁹ Horváth correctly emphasized that the American Delegation at Paris put forth more favorable plans regarding the future boundaries of Hungary than the Allies. This notwithstanding, the analysis in chapter one indicates that the American recommendations failed to affect Hungary's final boundaries.

Horváth's evaluation of the Paris Peace Conference in general and the work of the American commission in particular delved into the assumption that, on the one hand, the making of the peace was the work of the "agents of the governments interested in dismemberment, who forced their own idea onto Europe."²⁴⁰ On the other hand, Horváth said that Wilson's peace and principles were defeated because everybody misled and lied to

²³⁶ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 121; Horváth, *Felelősség*, 436; Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig*, 205, 228, 288.

²³⁷ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 87-137.

²³⁸ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 88.

²³⁹ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 92.

²⁴⁰ Horváth, *Felelősség*, 331.

Wilson, and he “sank in the ocean of lies.”²⁴¹ The myth of President Wilson, the lonely tragic hero of the peace conference, however, is far from being true. The relevant sections in chapter one provide the real background to this.

In connection with the defeat of the American recommendations Horváth does not fail to mention one important issue: Wilson’s pet project, the League of Nations. Horváth pointed out that despite Wilson’s defeat at Paris, the League of Nations, as stipulated in Article 19 of its Covenant, was a possible means of frontier readjustment.²⁴² Given the political-diplomatic power relations in Europe after the war, it was not likely that the League would assist any changes in the *status quo* created by the peace treaties. That the United States would have any say in the changes was even less likely, because the US Senate, which favored isolationism, refused to ratify the peace treaties drawn up in Paris including the Covenant of the League of Nations clauses. Consequently, she never became a member of the League.

The fact that the US did not approve the treaties made in Paris was yet another tenet of the belief that the US may support revision. America’s rejection of the postwar settlement was interpreted by Horváth as America’s refusal to become a party to the peace whose correction the US considered necessary.²⁴³ This Hungarian belief was an illusion and was anything but well-founded. As is well-known, a Republican turn in American politics resulted in the Senate decision concerning the peace treaties. This political change ultimately also drove the whole Wilsonian project overboard.

“The importance of the American connection” in treaty revision was founded on yet another popular misconception which Horváth kept emphasizing in his works, namely, that the separate peace the US made with Hungary (signed on August 29, 1921) did not mention the boundaries of the Treaty of Trianon because the US did not approve the frontiers of Hungary. Not mentioning the frontiers of Hungary in the US-Hungarian separate peace,

²⁴¹ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 96.

²⁴² Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 106-107; Horváth, “Diplomatic History,” 89-90, 100.

²⁴³ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 153-154.

Horváth said, created an important precedent inasmuch as it made the readjustment of the Hungarian frontiers possible in the future in which, as is implied by Horváth, the US may undertake an important role. This belief was another tenet of the revisionist expectations toward the US.²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, as the analysis of the separate US-Hungarian peace offered in chapter seven will demonstrate, this notion lacked validity. Horváth's interpretation that the separate peace represented the amicable relations between the two countries and opened the way for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was nothing short of delusional.

In conclusion, during the interwar years Hungarians sought answers for the tragedy of Trianon, and the desire for its revision provided a common ground for the whole nation. Horváth's works offered answers to the question, 'why Trianon happened.' His stated aim was to set myths, legends and lies right in connection with Hungarian history during and after the war.²⁴⁵ At the same time he created new myths and misconceptions. America's role in negotiating the secret peace with the Monarchy, the US policy of non-dismemberment, the Fourteen Points and Point Ten, Wilson's righteous peace based on them, the myth of Wilson who had fallen victim to the propaganda of the future successor states, American peace plans in Paris, America's refusal to sign the Paris peace treaties and the US-Hungarian separate peace all served to establish an otherwise unfounded belief relating to the role the United States may play in treaty revision. There is reason to believe that the creation of such myths by Horváth was intentional. His treatment of historical sources seems to support that. The question may arise whether Horváth's often selective treatment of historical facts can be explained by the lack of information. As the 'official' historian of the period he had access to important primary sources relating to the history of the war and the peace, in Hungary and abroad alike. The contemporary accounts by David Hunter Miller, Charles Seymour, Colonel

²⁴⁴ Horváth, *A békeszerződés*, 154; 230, 241; Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig*, 284.

²⁴⁵ Zoltán Major, "A trianoni vádlott megszólal," in Horváth, *A Milleniumtól Trianonig*, xlviii.

Edward M. House, Ray Stannard Baker, Harold A. Temperley, James T. Shotwell, Harold Nicholson, etc. were, indeed, all available to him. The bibliographies to his works clearly testify to this. Although not indicated in his references, Horváth had to have access to James Brown Scott's *The Official War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* as well.²⁴⁶ This publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace provides clear and specific information about US policies during the war and in Paris. For Horváth who was a close associate of key mainstream politicians, such as Apponyi and Teleki, who were both closely related to the Carnegie Endowment, access to the book would not be difficult. Even though he had the major primary sources available, Horváth's history writing did lack objectivity: he often adapted historical facts to preconceived theory, reinterpreted and rearranged them. Clearly, he was a historian with an agenda. He thus put "official" history writing to the services of Hungarian revisionist policies. Horváth's fairly biased accounts were the works of a man whose generation directly suffered the experience of defeat and the trauma caused by Trianon. Under this psychological and emotional burden, objectivity was apparently too much to ask of him.

In addition to mainstream history writing between the world wars, the intellectual and political energies of the Hungarian political elite were also channeled toward the goal of the revision of the treaty of Trianon. In the next chapter some semi-official attempts by frontline Hungarian politicians at winning the support of the US in the question of revision will be outlined.

²⁴⁶ See the relevant parts of James Brown Scott, *The Official War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918* (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 386-441.

CHAPTER FIVE

Semi-Official Revisionism Aimed at America

Between 1919 and 1921, the Hungarian government conducted large-scale official revisionist propaganda campaign home and abroad. As was discussed in chapter two, on May 24, 1921 this ended. Prime Minister Bethlen demanded the dissolution of all governmental propaganda organizations, and, in compliance with the resolutions of the Treaty of Trianon, put an end to overt governmental revisionism both in Hungary and abroad.²⁴⁷ Revisionism found new, semi-official channels through which covert propaganda campaigns were carried out. One important segment of such campaigns specifically targeted the United States. In this chapter, therefore, un- and semi-official revisionist efforts aimed at the United States will be discussed. Premier István Bethlen's essay aimed at the English-speaking community, and Counts Albert Apponyi's and Pál Teleki's political conduct and activities in the US will be presented to demonstrate how these mainstream, non-governmental, yet frontline contributors tried to serve the purposes of treaty revision. These activities, which included the use of foreign language periodicals such as *Külügyi Szemle* (Foreign Policy Review), *The Hungarian Nation* and *The Hungarian Quarterly*, were explicitly intended to promote revision while circumventing the restrictions on official advocacy of such changes.

Official Hungarian diplomatic representatives in Washington had limited scope of action with respect to revisionism. An overview of their performance will also be part of the

²⁴⁷ Tibor Glant, "Some Facts," 43-56.

discussion to illuminate whether in any way they could assist semi-official revisionist efforts aimed at America.²⁴⁸

Bethlen made a significant contribution to the American debate about Hungary's future with his article, "Hungary in the New Europe,"²⁴⁹ published in the prestigious scholarly journal, *Foreign Affairs*. In several articles prior to 1924 *Foreign Affairs* had dealt with postwar Hungary; when Hungary still carried the bad reputation as a result of the Bolshevik revolution and the revisionist, conservative and legitimist overtones of contemporary Hungarian public life. Hungary essentially remained "the question mark"²⁵⁰ of central Europe, with its ability to integrate into the community of democratic nations in Europe unclear. In "Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe," Oszkár Jászi gave a rather negative description of the Hungarian state of affairs. Jászi called Hungary the "danger zone of Europe,"²⁵¹ refused to support what he considered the conservative, oligarchic and anti-democratic political program of the Horthy regime,²⁵² and explicitly denied the success of the Bethlenian consolidation program. Within this context Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, offered Bethlen the opportunity to present the official Hungarian viewpoint.

Armstrong's first choice was Pál Teleki, who could not take such an opportunity due to his appointment to the frontier delineation committee of the League of Nations dealing with the Iraqi borders. Upon Teleki's recommendation, Premier Bethlen accepted the invitation to

²⁴⁸ The following account will partly rely on the research already carried out on the respective topics by György Litván, Tibor Frank, Ignác Romsics, Tibor Glant, Tamás Magyarics and Balázs Ablonczy. The summary of their related works, however, will be complemented by new and additional findings.

²⁴⁹ Count Stephen Bethlen, "Hungary in the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 3 (1924-1925), 445-458. Hereafter cited as Bethlen, "Hungary in the New Europe."

²⁵⁰ Isiah Bowman, *The New World-Problems in Political Geography* (Yonkers, NY: New World Press, 1921), 225-230. Cited in Gergely Romsics, "A *Foreign Affairs* és Magyarország 1922-1939" [The *Foreign Affairs* and Hungary], *Századok* Vol. 133 No. 5 (1999): 909. Hereafter cited as Romsics, "Foreign Affairs és Magyarország."

²⁵¹ Oszkár Jászi, "Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 2 (1923-1924), 270. Hereafter Jászi, "Dismembered Hungary."

²⁵² Jászi, "Dismembered Hungary," 278-279.

contribute to the journal, and wrote “Hungary in the New Europe.”²⁵³ It was imperative to counter the grim picture of Hungary in earlier publications, so Bethlen’s essay was indeed an exercise in conscious image-making.²⁵⁴ He presented the learned intellectual readership of *Foreign Affairs* with a Hungary which had the “historical mission [...] of acting as the intellectual, political and economic link between East and West,” and ready to fulfill this role.²⁵⁵ Summing up “the chief agenda on the program facing Hungary in the immediate future-the Hungary which [...] has suffered the vicissitudes of the Great War and a series of revolutions, and which is now confined within the narrow frontiers unjustly imposed on her by the Treaty of Trianon,” Bethlen pointed out four principal issues: (1) “economic and financial reconstruction, (2) a democratic reorganization on the basis of the principle of a gradual and sound evolution, (3) the organic linking up of Hungary and all Hungarians with western culture, and in connection herewith (4) the settlement of the minority question.”²⁵⁶ Appealing to US business circles the essay demonstrated that Hungarian economic vitality was soon to assert itself, and even in its present “form and structure Hungary offer[ed] the most favorable field conceivable for the investment of foreign capital. The industrial, commercial and agricultural possibilities open [t]here to foreign capital and foreign enterprise [were] practically unlimited. [...]. The guarantees in view of political and social conditions” were “Hungary’s desire and deliberate endeavor to maintain peace,”²⁵⁷ and “to attain success exclusively by peaceful development [...]” and by “the principle of democratic progress.”²⁵⁸ The fact that for a thousand years Hungary possessed a constitutional framework, and since 1848 a parliamentary form of government, Bethlen claimed, provided sufficient proof to the

²⁵³ Romsics, “A *Foreign Affairs* és Magyarország,” 919.

²⁵⁴ It can be regarded as a successful effort in light of American endorsement of the League of Nations loan for Hungary in 1924.

²⁵⁵ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 454.

²⁵⁶ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 454.

²⁵⁷ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 455, 458.

²⁵⁸ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 455.

effect that “Hungary [...] during the whole course of her history ha[d] always been an enthusiastic admirer of the great ideas of liberty.”²⁵⁹

“Hungary in the New Europe” depicted Hungary as a country following a program of peace, reform and democratization. Bethlen’s essay did not address the revision of Trianon; given the very nature and purpose of the essay such a move would have been unwise. However, he made repeated references to the “erroneous and general belief [...] of powerful statesmen exercising a decisive influence in the affairs of the world” that Hungary was only “an Austrian province,”²⁶⁰ to “the narrow frontiers unjustly imposed on [Hungary],”²⁶¹ and to the situation of Hungarian minorities “cut off from their fatherland.”²⁶² It was of utmost importance for Hungary to win America’s support. In light of the fact that Hungary applied for a League of Nations Loan in the mid-1920s, the need for such assertive attitudes toward Hungary in the West was even more obvious. This is not to say that Bethlen did not consider advocating the cause of revision abroad important. His position as prime minister, as well as Hungary’s fragile political status in the postwar power structure rendered such ventures difficult. The four lectures he delivered in England in November of 1933 prove, however, that not only did Bethlen view revision as a vital concern, but he also considered it to be vital to inform the international public about it. But that he could only do after he had resigned his premiership in 1931.²⁶³

Count Pál Teleki, one of the most significant and formative political thinkers of interwar Hungary, devoted his political and scientific career to the development of a long-

²⁵⁹ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 455-456.

²⁶⁰ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 450.

²⁶¹ Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 454.

²⁶² Bethlen, “Hungary in the New Europe,” 457.

²⁶³ István Bethlen, *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace. Four Lectures Delivered in London in November 1933*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1934. Bethlen’s four lectures (“Hungarian History and the Race Question,” “The Treaty of Trianon and the Danubian Nations,” “The Problem of Transylvania,” and “The Treaty of Trianon”) were addressed the League of Nations Union of Cambridge University, the Near and Middle Eastern Association in London, the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Balkan Committee respectively.

term, carefully formulated plan for territorial revision.²⁶⁴ In his view, the contradictions and injustices of the peace treaty made revision an obvious demand. A geographer-turned-politician, Teleki believed that the postwar settlement was not fair, and hoped for the revision of the “[en]forced peace.”²⁶⁵ At the same time he maintained that “[w]e cannot hope more than it is advisable, or as it would be expected from us to do [...]. We have to think in the long term [...]. It is not wise to live for the moment.”²⁶⁶ In this respect, realism and carefulness characterized his revisionist concept. For Teleki, revisionism did not necessarily mean *resitutio in integrum*,²⁶⁷ it was not guided by the “rigid insistence on the situation before the war, because it would be utopian.”²⁶⁸ But by taking political, social changes as well as economic necessities into account, he considered the revision of the peace to be part of a large-scale plan of European revision. As a realistic politician he knew that Hungary had to make certain sacrifices and renounce some territorial claims for the benefit of European peace and stability in the long run.²⁶⁹ Revision, Teleki argued, was not only in the interest of the defeated powers, nor was it their problem only, but it was a general European concern.²⁷⁰ If treaty revision became a possibility, he argued, it would and could only mean in a much wider

²⁶⁴ Balázs, Ablonczy, “Teleki Pál,” in Ignác Romsics, ed., *Trianon és a magyar politikai közgondolkodás 1920-1953* (Budapest: Osiris, 1998), 15. Hereafter Ablonczy, “Teleki Pál” [Paul Teleki]. Also see Balázs Ablonczy, *Pál Teleki. The Life of A Controversial Hungarian Politician* (Wayne, NJ: Hungarian Studies Publications, 2007).

²⁶⁵ Pál Teleki, “A trianoni békeszerződésről” [On the treaty of Trianon], in Ignác Romsics, ed., *Teleki Pál: Válogatott politikai írások és beszédek* (Budapest: Osiris, 2000), 68. Hereafter respectively cited as Teleki, “A trianoni békeszerződésről,” and Romsics, ed., *Válogatott írások*. Teleki, “Időszerű nemzetközi kérdések a politikaföldrajz megvilágításában” [Contemporary international question on light of political-geography], in Romsics, ed., *Válogatott írások*, 236. Hereafter cited as Teleki, “Időszerű nemzetközi kérdések.”

²⁶⁶ Teleki, “Külgymimiszteri bemutatkozó beszéd” [Acceptance speech as minister of foreign affairs], in Romsics, ed., *Válogatott írások*, 51. Hereafter cited as Teleki, “Külgymimiszteri bemutatkozó beszéd.” Teleki warned the nation against ill propaganda as well. In “Nemzeti szellem-nemzeti kultúra” he says: “propaganda is the manifestation of nationalism. It can serve good purposes ... without tact, humor and knowledge; however, we are not going to achieve any result. The stereotypical aimless wooing makes me sad.” In Romsics, ed., *Válogatott írások*, 212.

²⁶⁷ Teleki, “Időszerű nemzetközi kérdések,” 236.

²⁶⁸ Teleki, “Magyarország világpolitikai és világgazdasági helyzete a múltban és a jelenben” [Hungary’s status in world politics and world economy in the past and present], in Romsics, ed., *Válogatott írások*, 187. Hereafter cited as Teleki, “Magyarország világpolitikai és világgazdasági helyzete.”

²⁶⁹ Pál Teleki, “Magyarország és az európai politika” [Hungary and the European politics], *Fiatall Magyarorság*, May 1934. Cited in Ablonczy, *Teleki*, 241. See also Lóránt Tilkovszky, *Teleki Pál. Legenda és valóság* [Pál Teleki. Legend and Reality] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1969), 84. Hereafter cited as Tilkovszky, *Teleki Pál*.

²⁷⁰ Pál Teleki, “Időszerű nemzetközi kérdések,” 236.

European context “the revision of the European settlement and the revision of the new European balance of power. For this to happen, though, Europe should also recognize that the peace treaties are not *noli me tangere*, not unchangeable.”²⁷¹ For his plan the consent and the help of the great powers were absolutely indispensable.

To carry out such a carefully formulated program of revision Teleki emphasized the importance of civic and political education, as well as well-conducted campaigns to explain Hungary’s cause. He warned the nation against harmful propaganda, and did not consider pamphlets and postcard-campaigns effective at all, as he believed they addressed only the masses, and were absolutely incapable of enlightening and influencing the decision makers abroad.²⁷² His program focused on persuasion strictly through scientific and academic means, and addressing the learned intellectual public.²⁷³

Between April 1921, when Teleki resigned his premiership, and May 1938, when he again accepted a position in the government as minister of education and then as prime minister, Teleki returned to academic life and social work to pursue the policy of revisionism. His elitist views determined the scope of his political and social activities; and as a scientist and active member of public life Teleki became head or member of several prominent scientific and social organizations which were established, at least in part, to promote revisionism. Such societies were, for example, TESZK (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetségének Központja/Center for the Association of Social Organizations), Magyar Szociográfiai Intézet (the Institute of Sociology under the aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Arts and Sciences) and Államtudományi Intézet (the Institute of Political Science). After Count Albert Apponyi’s death Teleki served as head of the Magyar Külügyi Társaság

²⁷¹ Pál Teleki, “Európa az újonnan alakuló világban” [Europe in the newly developing world], in Pál Teleki, *Európáról és Magyarországról* (Budapest: Atheneum, 1934), 145. Originally Teleki delivered this lecture in Vienna and Berlin in December 1933.

²⁷² Balázs Ablonczy, *Teleki Pál* (Budapest: Osiris, 2005), 236. Hereinafter cited as Ablonczy, *Teleki*.

²⁷³ Béla K. Király, “Introduction,” to Paul Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European History* (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1975), xx. Hereafter cited as Király, “Introduction.” This is a reprint of the original published by The Macmillan Company in 1923.

(Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society); and of the Hungarian Territorial Integrity League, succeeding Lajos Lóczy as president. Teleki also promoted the Hungarian cause as a publicist and a contributor to *Magyar Szemle* as well as to its foreign language satellites, *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* in French and *The Hungarian Quarterly* in English, and *Külügyi Szemle* (Foreign Policy Review), which was also published in foreign languages. Teleki considered these prestigious journals to be among the best ways to inform foreign public opinion and promote the revision of the treaty abroad.

Furthermore, Teleki, as one of the most prominent members of Hungarian political life and a scientist of international fame, received many invitations to speak both in Hungary and abroad. He accepted such offers with pleasure, as good opportunities to inform the learned public about Hungary's post-war plight.

Teleki's lectures during his tour of the United States in 1921 took place in the context of this international effort. In his general views on the role of the US in future treaty revision, he often echoed some common, and, unfortunately, unrealistic popular beliefs. The American rejection of the Versailles Treaties was believed to stand for America's disapproval of the postwar European settlement and her intention to support partial revision of the treaties. As already noted, this misconception was strengthened when the separate US-Hungarian peace treaty did not mention the Trianon boundaries. Teleki underlined this premise with his mistaken belief that, e.g. Isaiah Bowman and William Christian Bullitt, members of the American Delegation to negotiate Peace, rejected the peace plan, and left Paris by way of protest.²⁷⁴ Somewhat surprisingly, he also fostered the belief that the US Senate refused to ratify the Paris Peace Treaties because of the injustices and mistakes latent therein, and

²⁷⁴ Pál Teleki, "A trianoni békeszerződésről," 66. Bowman (American geographer and one of Wilson's chief advisors on territorial questions) and Bullitt (American diplomat) left the peace negotiations in the spring of 1919 because they objected to the peace-making trends of the American delegation and got disappointed in President Wilson's personal conduct in Paris. For more on this see William Brownell and Richard N. Billings, *So Close to Greatness. A Biography of William Christian Bullitt* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 94-97.

because the treaties failed to follow “the ideals and principles according to which the treaties were hoped to be settled,”²⁷⁵ that is, President Wilson’s principles. Unlike the basic tenets of Teleki’s revisionist convictions, these ideas were not reiterated in Teleki’s American speeches.

In 1921 Teleki was invited by President Harry August Garfield of Williams College at Williamstown, Massachusetts to lecture on Hungarian geography and politics in the framework of the summer courses at the university.²⁷⁶ The series of proposed lectures were part of the institute’s general summer project to provide information to academic and scholarly circles about the state of affairs in central Europe.²⁷⁷ During his stay in the US in August and September, Teleki delivered eight lectures on various topics ranging from Hungarian constitutional history and the political evolution of the Hungarian state through geography and Hungary’s geo-political status to the problems of nationalities before and after the war. All Teleki’s American lectures were published in 1923 in New York with a preface written by Lawrence Martin, Teleki’s long-time friend and fellow-geographer, under the title *The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European History*.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ Teleki, “A trianoni békeszerződésről,” 68.

²⁷⁶ Teleki’s American lecture tour in 1921 was not his first visit to the US. In the summer of 1912, in the company of his friend and mentor, Jenő Cholnoky, Teleki served as one of the official delegates of the Hungarian Geographical Society to the Transcontinental Excursion of the American Geographical Society of New York, and for two months traveled extensively in the United States. The result of the trip was Teleki’s series of lectures on the economic geography of the US delivered first at the Commercial Normal School in 1913, and at the University of Budapest in 1922. Teleki’s lectures were published as *Amerika gazdasági földrajza* [American Economic Geography] (Budapest: Centrum Kiadóvállalat, 1922). On Teleki’s first US visit see also Dr. Jenő Cholnoky, *Utazásom Amerikában Teleki Pál gróffal* [My Journey to America with Count Pál Teleki] (Budapest: Vajdáné Wichman Gizella, 1943).

²⁷⁷ “Miért megy gróf Teleki Pál Amerikába?” [Why does Count Teleki go to America?] *Pesti Hírlap*, July 26, 1921, 1. Hereafter cited as “Miért megy gróf Teleki Pál Amerikába?”

²⁷⁸ In an interview for the *Pesti Hírlap* Teleki spoke of about six lectures, but the collection of his American essays contained eight pieces. In another interview for the same newspaper, “Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról,” which Teleki gave upon his return to Hungary, Teleki himself explained that he had more opportunities to address the American audience, which explained that instead of six, he gave eight lectures. “Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról” [On Pál Teleki’s American trip], *Pesti Hírlap*, October 8, 1921, 1. Hereafter cited as “Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról.” The eight lectures were: “Geographical Outlines;” “The Making of the State;” “The Consequences of the Turkish Invasion on the Fate of Modern Hungary;” “Pre-War Economic Situation of Hungary;” “Modern Political Evolution- from the Compromise with Austria, 1867, to Bolshevism and Restoration, 1919;” “The Racial Question and Hungarian Policy;” “The Economic Situation in East Central Europe after the War;” “The Racial or Nationality Problem As Seen by A Geographer.” Teleki considered its publication as a great service for the Hungarian cause, an opportunity to spread information about the real state of affairs in Hungary. See Pál Teleki,

This occasion created an opportunity for him to address directly a group of American and European professionals from academic and intellectual circles, an “audience of high class and keen interest,”²⁷⁹ among whom his old American friends and acquaintances as well as European diplomats could be found.²⁸⁰ Teleki emphasized that his journey to the US was strictly of a private and academic nature and his visit did not serve political ends, let alone propaganda.²⁸¹ He repeatedly pointed out that he did not go to the US as a politician, but as a scholar.²⁸² And although Teleki’s lectures were meant to serve strictly scholarly and academic purposes, the talks gave him the opportunity to speak up in favor of the revision of Trianon indirectly. “It is not my intention to plead the cause of Hungary,” he said in his first lecture. “Advocacy and pleading will avail but little to advance the work of world-regeneration imposed on us by the Great War. Only knowledge will do this, a thorough knowledge of the relations existing between different nations. This thorough knowledge was lacking at the time when peace was made.”²⁸³ His lectures were intended to provide this knowledge and enlighten his American audiences about vital issues concerning Hungary.²⁸⁴ Obviously, treaty revision could not be disregarded, even if it was addressed only in an indirect way.

Teleki’s American lectures thus reflected their author’s convictions concerning the revision of the treaty. Based upon “mutual understanding” and a “dispassionate consideration of the facts,” he called on members of the international community to settle their differences.²⁸⁵ Placing Hungarian and central European political, economic and social

The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European History (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1923).

Hereafter cited as Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary*. Teleki considered the publication of his essays as a great service for the Hungarian cause, an opportunity to spread information about the real state of affairs in Hungary.

²⁷⁹ Pál Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary*, v.

²⁸⁰ Ablonczy, *Teleki*, 215. Lawrence Martin, Isaiah Bowman, American geographer, geologist and meteorologist William M. Davis, former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomasso Tittoni, the former Russian governor of Finland, Count Sergei Alexandrovich Korff, and the Bulgarian Minister to Washington, D.C. Stefan Panaretoff.

²⁸¹ “Miért megy gróf Teleki Pál Amerikába?” 1-2.

²⁸² “Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról,” 1.

²⁸³ Pál Teleki, “Geographical Outlines,” in Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary*, 2. Hereafter cited as Teleki, “Geographical Outlines.”

²⁸⁴ “Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról,” 1-2.

²⁸⁵ Teleki, “Geographical Outlines,” 4.

problems in the international context, he argued that peaceful and gradual conflict resolution in that region was the vital interest not only of the small nations in the heart of Europe, but that of the US as well.²⁸⁶ Within this larger framework, some of Teleki's talks centered around two important issues: the Hungarian economy and its geopolitical aspects before and after the war, that is "the dismemberment of an economic unit of long standing,"²⁸⁷ and the controversial question of ethnicity.

Teleki cleverly used his American talks for covert propaganda for the Hungarian cause. In one of his lectures, "The Racial or Nationality Problem As Seen by a Geographer," he explained with firm logic how mistaken it was to settle the Central European problem without considering the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination.²⁸⁸

His carefully formulated revisionist plan reflected the idea of gradual change and respect for the principle of national self-determination. And although Teleki met President Warren G. Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, as well as Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, and obviously the Hungarian public attached great significance and much hope to meetings with such important American leaders, these visits were only cordial ones and lacked any practical result.²⁸⁹ No further official steps followed Teleki's visit and political realities in the US, which adhered to the policy of political isolationism toward Europe, did not meet his indirectly declared expectations.²⁹⁰

Teleki's lectures, due to their academic nature, attracted only a limited number of people: teachers, researchers and university students.²⁹¹ Its press coverage, to some extent, reflected

²⁸⁶ Teleki, "Geographical Outlines," 4-5.

²⁸⁷ Pál Teleki, "The Economic Situation in East Central Europe after the War," in Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary*, 188. Hereafter cited as Teleki, "The Economic Situation in East Central Europe after the War."

²⁸⁸ Pál Teleki, "The Racial or Nationality Problem As Seen by a Geographer," in Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary*, 242. Hereafter cited as Teleki, "The Racial or Nationality Problem."

²⁸⁹ Tamás Magyarics, "Count Pál Teleki's and Count Albert Apponyi's Mission in the USA in the First Half of the 1920's," in Charlotte Kretztoi, ed., *Americana Hungarica* (Budapest: ELTE, 1989), 72. Hereafter cited as Magyarics, "Count Pál Teleki's and Count Albert Apponyi's Mission in the USA."

²⁹⁰ "Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról," 1-3. Also cited in Magyarics, "Count Pál Teleki's and Count Albert Apponyi's Mission in the USA," 71-72.

²⁹¹ "Miért megy gróf Teleki Pál Amerikába?" 1.

the limited interest American audiences mustered for issues relating to Hungary. Teleki's reputation as a premier geographer never faded in the US, but this did not help yield any practical political results for Hungary.²⁹²

Teleki's revisionist efforts, simultaneously meeting the demands of Bethlen's domestic and foreign policies were conducted through unofficial channels. After the mid-1920s, however, Teleki opened a new and separate channel by contacting the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and continued to work with them in close co-operation until after the outbreak of the World War II on the survey of the effects of the Great War.²⁹³

Another Hungarian of international fame and reputation who had the opportunity to address Americans and cultivate greater understanding for Hungary's situation was Count Albert Apponyi. But on his third and final visit to the US he too failed to win any American support for revision. Within his means Apponyi worked ardently to promote the cause of revision after 1918 until the end of his life in 1933. The basic tenets of his revisionist concept, corresponding to those which most (semi-) official circles also represented, comprised the program of reconciliation in internal political and economic affairs and their wise administration in order to "command the respect and sympathy of the civilized world," and, on this basis, to realize the revision of the treaty through peaceful means only.²⁹⁴

²⁹² Magyarics, "Count Pál Teleki's and Count Albert Apponyi's Mission in the USA," 74. Teleki's debate with Romania's consul to New York, Antoine Bibescu, in *The New York Herald* and *The New York Times* indicates that some people tried to discredit Teleki both as a politician and scientists. Bibescu claimed that Teleki was sent to the US by the Hungarian government, to conduct overt propaganda, and at the same time refuted several of Teleki's statements relating to Hungary's postwar economic situation especially within the context of Hungary's losses to Romania as part of the postwar settlement. See the interview with Teleki in *Pesti Hírlap*: "Teleki Pál amerikai útjáról," 2-3.

²⁹³ The information on the correspondence between Teleki and Nicholas Murray Butler was made available to me by Dr. Tibor Glant.

²⁹⁴ For more details see Count Albert Apponyi's speech in the Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs on April 18, 1920 in Ulysses Grant Smith's Memoranda to Secretary of State on April 23, 1920. Roll#1 M708, RG59, NARA. An important aspect of this speech is that it was delivered before the Treaty of Trianon was signed by the Hungarian delegation. Apponyi as the leader of the delegation knew very well that Hungary could not receive any favorable alterations in the peace terms, therefore was aware of the fact that revision of the peace terms could only be obtained in the future.

Apponyi, aware as he was of the postwar political realities and the basic principles of contemporary US foreign policy, projected some popular expectations toward the USA in terms of America's power to secure favorable peace terms for Hungary as well as to alter the postwar settlement. In a 1919 pamphlet, "The American Peace and Hungary," seeking to appeal to the Paris peace negotiations, Apponyi courted the Americans by stating his belief, or rather his hope, that "America [was] in honor bound to uphold" the principles proclaimed by President Wilson "against the spirit of imperialism which seem[ed] to have only changed sides." "America's participation in the war," Apponyi said,

has been announced to the world as for international justice, brotherhood, permanent peace and disarmament. It is a moral impossibility tha[t] announcements of such purport should afterwards prove mere humbug, as they certainly would, should America consent to international settlements wrought with iniquity and bequeathing to future generations the legacy of hatred, unrest and permanent militarism. There are symptoms indicative of aberrations in the peace policy of the entente, which would give the lie to Wilson's principles. We trust America will not tolerate such indignity.²⁹⁵

Apponyi wrote the essay at Christmas 1918. By then the fact that Wilson's original Fourteen Points no longer provided the basis for the armistice and the peace talks in terms of Hungary's future had already been communicated to Foreign Minister Gyula Andrássy, and the dismemberment of the Monarchy was a foregone conclusion. It is very unlikely that Apponyi did not know about it.

Like Teleki, Apponyi enjoyed a good reputation in the United States. In 1904 he represented Hungary in St. Louis at the conference of the Interparliamentary Union, and seven years later, in 1911, the Civic Forum and the Peace Society invited him to America. This time he was even honored by an invitation to address the US Congress. Later, when he was President of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society and the Hungarian American Society, official Hungarian circles considered Apponyi a potentially successful spokesman for the Hungarian cause. Thus, Count László Széchenyi, the Hungarian minister to Washington, asked dr. Imre Jósika-Herczeg to arrange Apponyi's third tour (between September 28 and

²⁹⁵ Count Albert Apponyi, *The American Peace and Hungary* (Budapest: Hungarian Territorial Integrity League, 1919), 3. See also Magyarics, "Count Pál Teleki's and Count Albert Apponyi's Mission in the USA," 70.

November 13, 1923) to the US “as official circles at home deemed it very desirable that Apponyi again would turn the sympathies of the American nation toward us, the decisive influence of which on Hungary’s future has already been clearly recognized.”²⁹⁶

A committee of scholars, judges, bankers, editors, lawyers and businessmen was formed to organize Apponyi’s visit.²⁹⁷ Among the organizers one can find Robert Erskine Ely, the director of the League for Political Education and president of the Civic Forum and the Peace Society, Samuel MacCune Lindsay, professor of political science at Columbia University, Professor Stephen P. Duggan, director of the Institute of International Education, and Nicholas Murray Butler, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The letter of invitation addressed to Apponyi was posted on May 29, 1923 and requested him to deliver lectures and inform the American people about the state of affairs in central Europe.²⁹⁸

Budapest and the Hungarian Legation in Washington tacitly approved of Apponyi’s tour, but, understandably, distanced themselves from it as they “wanted to avoid giving [Apponyi’s] lectures an official character at [all] cost.”²⁹⁹ This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that Count Széchenyi did not attend Apponyi’s welcome reception. An outspokenly revisionist, semi-political lecture tour would have provoked unfavorable reactions in

²⁹⁶ Dr. Imre Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America* (New York, 1926), 76. Hereafter cited as Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*. See also Count László Széchenyi to Dr. Imre Jósika-Herczeg, November 16, 1923 in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 14. As early as January 1921 *The New York Times* dealt with Apponyi’s planned visit to the US: “Hungary to Send Apponyi Here” says that “the Hungarian government has decided to send the venerable Count Albert Apponyi to the United States to present Hungary’s wishes.” *The New York Times*, January 14, 1921, 12. The article titled “The Glorious Task” well before Apponyi’s actual arrival somewhat sarcastically comments on the impossibility of “orthodox Magyar views” and the impossibility of the “glorious task” which America must lead, that is “the revision of the peace treaties, [...] in the interest of Germany and her allies.” The article ends with saying that “[...] apparently in Budapest the young men are still seeing visions and the old men dreaming dreams.” *The New York Times*, April 22, 1921, 12.

²⁹⁷ See the list of the members of the committee in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 77-78.

²⁹⁸ Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 75-76. Regarding the subject of his lectures Apponyi knew that Hungary alone would not attract much attention in the US, so he chose Central Europe as his subject, and Hungary as his object. “My subject is Central Europe, my object is Hungary.” In Gróf Albert Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek* [Experiences and Memories] (Budapest: Atheneum, 1933), 161. Hereafter cited as Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek*. See also “Apponyi to Lecture Here” *The New York Times*, August 26, 1923, 8.

²⁹⁹ Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek*, 163.

American official circles.³⁰⁰ Count Széchenyi knew that this would not work, but Americans would welcome Apponyi on informal and unofficial occasions.

Although Apponyi pointed out repeatedly that he was not on an official mission and his tour had nothing to do with any government business,³⁰¹ the tacitly accepted aim of his visit was to gain American support for Hungary's application for a League of Nations loan which was vital for Hungarian economic stabilization. Nevertheless, within this framework, Apponyi found a good opportunity to extend the scope of his speeches to include the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. The twenty lectures and ten speeches delivered by Apponyi in six weeks at various forums and at different places in the US (and Canada)³⁰² during his stay brought large publicity for the Hungarian question, but at the same time failed to influence official America's opinion regarding treaty revision.³⁰³

Given that the direct aim of his visit was to win support for the loan, Apponyi's lectures centered on economic questions. Convinced about "the interdependent nature of the European economies,"³⁰⁴ Apponyi, like Teleki, argued that "[t]he condition of Eastern Europe [was] the key to the Continental problem and Hungary, in turn, [was] the key to Eastern Europe. A pacified, contented Hungary would do much to preserve the general atmosphere of peace, which [was] so sadly lacking in Europe."³⁰⁵ "My subject [was] Central Europe, my object

³⁰⁰ See chapter seven on official American reactions to the Kossuth Pilgrimage.

³⁰¹ See for example Apponyi's statements in "Apponyi Pleads Cause of Hungary," *The New York Times*, September 30, 1923, 4; or "From Count Apponyi," *The New York Times* October 11, 1923, 20.

³⁰² Apponyi gave lectures at Columbia University, Vassar College, Yale University, Michigan University, Amherst College, Smith College, and colleges and universities in Chicago, Cleveland, Hartford, Washington, Baltimore, Buffalo, Toronto and Montreal. Further occasions for Apponyi to speak were at the Metropolitan Club, New York State Chamber of Commerce, Vassar College, Cornell University, Ithaca, Garrett Club, Buffalo, Engineers Hall, Cleveland, University Club, Chicago, Chicago Association of Commerce, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, City College, New York, American Manufacturer's Association, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University, Yale university, Wellesley, Amherst College, Smith College, and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. He gave several lectures in Canada as well, e.g. at the University of Toronto and McGill University, Montreal.

³⁰³ Jósika-Herczeg mentions some three thousand shorter and longer articles were published in connection with Apponyi's visit in the American press. Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 79.

³⁰⁴ Count Apponyi's speech at Bailey's Hall at Cornell University on October 8, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 86.

³⁰⁵ "Apponyi Pleads Cause of Hungary" *The New York Times*, September 30, 1923, 4.

[was] Hungary,”³⁰⁶ he said in his memoirs. In his farewell address Apponyi declared that “Hungary was the main focus among the topics of my lectures, but put in the context of the problems of world politics. As my principal aim was to stress that the Hungarian problem is not a negligible, purely local one, as few of the Hungarians might suggest, but our race [...] is a decisive factor in the reconstruction of the learned world which the peace treaty failed to achieve.”³⁰⁷ And, therefore, he said, the work of peace was still to be done, and in due time the revision of the treaties would prove a necessity, for which, however, times were not yet ripe.³⁰⁸

He voiced his belief that the economic prosperity of central Europe also depended on the revision of the peace treaties.³⁰⁹ Viewing the treaty as a settlement by force, Apponyi stated that Hungary expected international public opinion to initiate rectification of the injustices done to her.³¹⁰ In this respect he considered the contribution of the US essential. Peaceful political support was badly needed to settle these problems, and the US had a historic opportunity to lend such support.³¹¹ Cleverly appealing to American political sentiments Apponyi explained that Europe was looking for “somebody or someone who can lift the rulers of nations to a higher standard of wisdom, whose influence can disentangle them from the prejudices and differences in which their better judgment is still implicated. As a Hungarian and as a European,” Apponyi continued, “I came to America to look out for that somebody, and [...] I take the liberty to say that before the greatest nation of modern times, before the nation whose existence rests on principles of right, liberty, equality and brotherhood, expands

³⁰⁶ Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek*, 161.

³⁰⁷ Apponyi’s farewell in *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, November 13, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 135.

³⁰⁸ “Count Apponyi’s Farewell Message,” *The New York Times*, November 13, 1923, 20.

³⁰⁹ Count Apponyi’s speech at the New York State Chamber of Commerce on October 4, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 82.

³¹⁰ Count Apponyi’s speech at Columbia University on November 1, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 116.

³¹¹ Count Apponyi’s speech at the Vassar College on October 5, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 83.

the most glorious mission, the greatest opportunity that ever history offered to a great nation.”³¹²

In his very last lecture for the League of Political Education, Apponyi emphasized that the Paris treaties required revision because the US entered the war to make it the very last one, and these treaties would not serve this purpose. His conclusion was that peace was yet to be made and the treaties inevitably needed revision.³¹³

As an assessment of his tour, Apponyi stated that he found understanding and attracted the sympathy of several influential members of his audience,³¹⁴ “Hungaro-phile Americans whom Hungary can always count on.”³¹⁵ But practically that was all. Count László Széchenyi and Counselor of the Legation János Pelényi organized several meetings for him with prominent politicians and influential businessmen during his stay in the US. Apponyi met President Calvin Coolidge “who to a very great extent ha[d] a say in the reparations of the injustices done in Hungary.” He also met Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, West European Desk Officer in the State Department William R. Castle and his wife, former President and Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court William H. Taft and Secretary of State Hughes. At the dinner given by Count László Széchenyi in Apponyi’s honor, the Hungarian aristocrat met almost all the other members of the incumbent cabinet.³¹⁶ Adolph S. Ochs, the owner of *The New York Times*, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, president of the Council of

³¹² Count Albert Apponyi’s speech on October 3, 1923 delivered at the New York Metropolitan Club. *Gróf Albert Apponyi Iratok*. Levél- és Kézirattár, Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár, 105-111. See also “Apponyi Sees Aims of War Unattained,” *The New York Times*, October 4, 1923, 4.

³¹³ Count Apponyi’s speech at the League of Political Education on November 12, 1923. Cited in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 116. See also Apponyi’s farewell in *The New York Times*, November 13, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 137.

³¹⁴ Apponyi’s farewell in *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, November 13, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 135.

³¹⁵ Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 140.

³¹⁶ Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 110. Apponyi remarks in his memoirs that President Coolidge did not discuss political questions with him. In Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek*, 166.

Foreign Relations, also paid a visit to see the “Grand Old Hungarian.” In Chicago Apponyi met Charles G. Dawes, “the father” of the Dawes plan.³¹⁷

Everybody welcomed the great statesman warmly, acknowledged his personal political achievements and appreciated the message he brought,³¹⁸ but these connections failed to secure any meaningful results. The only exception was winning some financial support for the medical clinics in Budapest from the Rockefeller Foundation³¹⁹ and the sympathies of American businessmen who “had taken a speculative chance in buying up the claims of Austrian and Hungarian aristocrats to landed property expropriated by the succession States at bargain-basement prices.”³²⁰

Professor Duggan designated Apponyi’s visit a “veritable triumph,”³²¹ and explained what a great advantage it was to have a man of Count Apponyi’s great ability and wide experience explain to them the problems of Europe. Duggan also stated how fortunate it was that his message was delivered mostly to a university audience, and students among whom were those who would control the destinies of the United States in years to come.³²² His cordial words, however, were only the expression of appreciation toward a great friend. In reality, official US turned a deaf ear to the Hungarian problem. For example, at the luncheon

³¹⁷ See the relevant parts of Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, and Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek*. See also Magyarics, “Count Pál Teleki’s and Count Albert Apponyi’s Mission in the USA,” 74. The Dawes plan (1924) was an economic and financial program to assist Germany and help restore and stabilize its economy. The Dawes plan was replaced by the Young plan in 1929.

³¹⁸ Professor Dr. Stephen P. Duggan, Preface to Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 19. The only exception was Dr. Michael Pupin, professor of Columbia University who, at the Council of Foreign Relations’ luncheon criticized Apponyi’s ideas. Dr. Pupin explained that he had to leave Hungary and immigrate to the US due to the humiliating conditions he had to suffer as a Serb from the Banat. See Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 126-127.

³¹⁹ Apponyi’s good relations with Professor Dr. Flexner of the Rockefeller Foundation in Baltimore helped obtain such a support. See Magyarics, “Count Pál Teleki’s and Count Albert Apponyi’s Mission in the USA,” 74.

³²⁰ “Apponyi and Central Europe,” *The New York Times*, November 18, 1923, E6. See also Apponyi’s recollections of his conversation with Mr. Lamont, banker and member of Pierpont Morgan on Hungary’s economic viability following the war. Count Albert Apponyi, *The Memoirs of Count Apponyi* (New York: MacMillan, 1935), 203-204.

³²¹ Professor Dr. Stephen P. Duggan, Preface to Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 19.

³²² Professor Dr. Stephen P. Duggan, Preface to Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 19-20. See also Professor Dr. Stephen P. Duggan to Count Albert Apponyi, November 13, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 149-150; and Robert Erskine Ely to Imre Jósika-Herczeg, December 12, 1923. Quoted in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 151.

given by Széchenyi in Washington, discussion of the treaties and the European situation took place only after the official representatives had left.³²³

Jósika-Herczeg evaluated Apponyi's tour as a roaring success, which should be understood in the context of the psychological state of contemporary Hungarian society. According to Jósika-Herczeg, the fact that the US turned toward Hungary with sympathy and trust was due to Apponyi's enlightening lectures in the States, which changed Americans' opinion about Hungary for the better. America, he argued, understood and acknowledged the "serious and absolutely inexcusable injustices done to Hungary in Trianon."³²⁴ And since "America is the centre of the world" due to her economic and political power, sooner or later she would enforce the revision of the peace treaties.³²⁵ Although during the time of his trip Apponyi himself did not judge the time right and ripe for revision, Jósika-Herczeg expressed his belief that the time was soon to come when Hungary's cause would triumph. He firmly believed that in this process "America not only would play an important role, but the US would be the country [that] would initiate revision, who due to her economic power [...] would be able to force European countries to capitulate at her will."³²⁶ Such assessment clearly demonstrated how high Hungarian hopes ran in connection with America's help. All that, however, amounted only to wishful thinking again and again.

During his visit to the US Apponyi had to face some criticism, too. His American speeches did not go unnoticed by the representatives, official and otherwise, of the successor states who openly criticized Apponyi. Dr. Ante Tresich Pavichich, Belgrade's minister to Washington, openly accused Apponyi of conducting propaganda in the US on behalf of "semi-barbaric" Hungary. Pavichich claimed that he had absolute proof that Hungary was preparing for a "war of revenge" and the loan that Apponyi was seeking in the US would be

³²³ Apponyi, *Élmények és emlékek*, 167. See also Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 111.

³²⁴ Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 144, 73.

³²⁵ Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 143.

³²⁶ Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 73.

used “in preparing for a conflict, to enable Hungary to obtain territory from her neighbors.”³²⁷

Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians were also disturbed by Apponyi’s visit. Right after Apponyi’s arrival in the US on October 2, 1923, *The New York Times* published an open letter by the Romanian Minister Antoine Bibesco, who expressed his utmost disagreement with several of Apponyi’s statements, especially the one postulating that Hungary is the farthest outpost of Western civilization and beyond its frontiers semi-barbaric countries are situated.³²⁸ A letter written by a certain Clement Hirisky to *The New York Times* also refuted Apponyi’s claims concerning the injustices of Trianon. He said that the Treaty of Trianon did a great good to nations under Magyar rule and liberated them from the rule of “the Magyar feudal oligarchy of which Count Apponyi [was] a typical representative.”³²⁹

Yet, all of the awkward incidents which Apponyi had to face the most significant one was his debate with Oszkár Jászi. Their social, political background and their political convictions regarding the future of Hungary in general and revision in particular differed to a great extent. The so-called Jászi-Apponyi debate took place in American newspapers: *The New York Times*, *The Nation* and *The New Republic*. One of Jászi’s articles, “Count Albert Apponyi,” was published in the October 10 issue of *The Nation* and depicted the count as an antidemocratic, chauvinistic politician.³³⁰ Almost simultaneously, *The New York Times* published “Jászi Says Apponyi is Habsburgh [sic] Aid,” in which Jászi attacked the political activities of Apponyi in the US and pointed out that Apponyi was a legitimist, so the economic assistance Apponyi was seeking in the US would only help restore the feudal Monarchy. Therefore, Jászi argued, the US government should only consent to the League of

³²⁷ “Declares Hungary Prepares for War. Yugoslav Minister Here Opposes Loan to Her If It Goes Into Guns,” *The New York Times*, October 28, 1923, S5.

³²⁸ Cited in Jósika-Herczeg, *Apponyi and America*, 80.

³²⁹ Clement Hirisky, “Count Apponyi’s Speech,” *The New York Times*, November 9, 1923, 16. A noteworthy contrast to these is a letter to the editor by Gabriel Wells, which, on the other hand, criticizes Apponyi on grounds of his having been “too fastidious, too reserved.” It says that had Apponyi had more of Dr. Beneš in him, he “might have turned a better account in behalf of his country.” Gabriel Wells, “Count Apponyi’s Visit,” *The New York Times*, October 21, 1923, XX8.

³³⁰ Oszkár Jászi, “Count Albert Apponyi,” *The Nation*, October 10, 1923. Cited in György Litván, *Jászi Oszkár* (Budapest: Osiris, 2003), 241. Hereafter cited as Litván, *Jászi*.

Nations loan for Hungary if “satisfactory guarantees would be provided,” if democratic reforms, the basic political freedoms and general universal suffrage would be introduced.³³¹

Although the political debate between Jászi and Apponyi could have discredited Apponyi, he remained closely connected to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which he saw as a possible semi-official political channel to address occasionally the question of revision. Until the end of his life Apponyi maintained good relations with the president of the Endowment, Nicholas Murray Butler.³³² Soon after his American visit Apponyi dropped the American line and found a new, official forum for revisionism, when after 1923-24 he became the official representative of Hungary in the League of Nations. His essay, “The Historic Mission of Hungary and the States Aggrandized to her Detriment,” in *Justice for Hungary* was among his last major contributions to advocating the Hungarian cause.³³³

All of these political and academic efforts failed to achieve the expected result. The political and economic interests of the US did not meet Hungarian expectations. These campaigns, however, given the influence and reputation of the persons involved, at least kept the Hungarian question alive abroad.

Informing learned audiences abroad, addressing audiences of scholarly, political and business communities comprised an important part of the Hungarian revisionist strategy, which as far as the US was concerned, was a signal failure. The same goal was served by foreign language periodicals, such as *Külügyi Szemle*, *The Hungarian Nation* and *The Hungarian Quarterly*. Their contribution to the revisionist effort, therefore, should also be taken into consideration.

³³¹ “Jászi Says Apponyi is Habsburgh Aid,” *The New York Times*, October 7, 1923, 21. See also Litván, *Jászi*, 241. “It is notorious that Count Apponyi is the sta[u]nchest champion of the restoration of the defunct Hapsburg [sic] monarchy, a scheme which seems to me pernicious not only from the point of view of public liberties of the Hungarian people, but also from the point of view of peace in Central Europe.”

³³² Information on the correspondence between Apponyi and Nicholas Murray Butler was made available to me by Dr. Tibor Glant.

³³³ Count Albert Apponyi, “The Historic Mission of Hungary and the States Aggrandized to Her Detriment,” *Justice for Hungary* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 3-20.

The Magyar Külügyi Társaság (The Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs) was established in 1920 to promote and realize Hungary's foreign policy interests, enhance the understanding of foreign political issues in general, and Hungarian foreign policy in particular both in Hungary and abroad, and inform foreign nations about Hungary.³³⁴ An obvious means to achieve such aims was the quarterly of the society, *Külügyi Szemle* (1920–1944). Although it was not a foreign language periodical proper, since most of the articles were written in Hungarian, every issue contained essays and reviews in English, French or German. These were translations of Hungarian articles or actual foreign contributions to the periodical. The political and economic consequences of the peace treaty, Hungary's role in international politics and the question of peaceful revision were the main topics for discussion. Indicating the orientation of Hungarian foreign policy until the mid-1930s, the English-speaking countries, especially the United States, were often in the focus of attention.³³⁵ Lajos Szádeczky-Kardos's "Külföldi kritikák a békekötésről és a revízió kérdése" [Criticism of the peace from abroad and the question of revision]³³⁶ carried detailed descriptions of some English and American opinions (of, among others, John M. Keynes, Viscount Bryce, Lord Newton and Robert Lansing) concerning the consequences of, and the problems with, the peace made at Paris. Robert Lansing's memoir, a highly critical account of Wilson's political conduct and the work of the peace conference, also received special attention in *Külügyi*

³³⁴ Minutes of the Elnöki Tanácsülés. February 8, 1923. *Külügyi Szemle* Vol. 3 No.1-2 (1923): 213-214.

³³⁵ See for example Pál Auer, "Miért nem tagja az Egyesült Államok a Nemzetek Szövetségének?" [Why isn't the United States a member of the League of Nations?] *Külügyi Szemle* Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1931): 485-491; Dr. Fritz-Konrad Kruger, "Az amerikai külpolitika alapjai" [The basic principles of American foreign policy], *Külügyi Szemle* Vol. XII, No. 1 (1935): 151-155; Dr. Domán Miklós, "Az amerikai elnökválasztás után- egy újabb New Deal küszöbén" [The United States after a presidential election-on the eve of a new New Deal], *Külügyi Szemle* Vol. XIV No. 1 (1937): 20-32; Dr. Domán Miklós, "Amerika a háború küszöbén" [America on the eve of war], *Külügyi Szemle* Vol. XVIII (1941): 362-371; or Dr. Kertész István, "Az amerikai fegyverkezés" [The American armament], *Külügyi Szemle* Vol. XVIII (1941): 142-154.

³³⁶ Dr. Lajos Szádeczky-Kardos, "Külföldi kritikák a békekötésről és a revízió kérdése" [Criticism of the peace from abroad and the question of revision], *Külügyi Szemle* Vol.V, No. 1-3 (1925): 26-47.

Szemle. Its significance in terms of the revisionist campaign is indicated by the fact that the *Szemle* published reviews in two successive issues.³³⁷

The Hungarian Nation (1920–1922) was an English language periodical published in Budapest and circulated in Europe, as well as overseas. The journal sought to educate people abroad about Hungarian history and win friends for the Hungarian cause. Current Hungarian politics and economy, the various aspects of the nationality question and Hungarian agriculture in dismembered Hungary were recurrent subjects. In 1921 the journal published the memorandum of the Hungarian Integrity League to President Harding upon his inauguration. It called on the president to “cause this injustice to cease,” and help the Hungarian nation “restore to her the means and freedom necessary to the continuation of her economic and cultural life.”³³⁸

The Hungarian Quarterly also contributed to the revisionist effort.³³⁹ The *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* (1932–1944) and *The Hungarian Quarterly* (1936–1941/44) were pseudo-academic foreign language periodicals, published in Budapest and organized around the *Magyar Szemle*. Both served as important political forums and proved to be efficient means to promote the revision of the treaty abroad. In 1931 former Prime Minister István Bethlen initiated the establishment of foreign language periodicals as “instruments to exert considerable influence both on the English-speaking world and the French intellectual elite.”³⁴⁰ In 1932 the *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* was launched, and four years later it was followed by *The Hungarian Quarterly*, just like its French counterpart, published under the

³³⁷ For details see Dr. István Czákó, “A Lansing memoár” [The Lansing memoir], *Magyar Szemle* Vol. II (1921–1922): 65–74.

³³⁸ “The Memorial of the Hungarian Territorial Integrity League to President Harding Upon His Inauguration,” *The Hungarian Nation* Vol. 2 No. 3–4 (March–April 1921): 26.

³³⁹ The political significance of *The Hungarian Quarterly* has already been dealt with by Tibor Frank in “Editing As Politics: József Balogh and *The Hungarian Quarterly*,” so the following short account is mainly the summary of his findings.

³⁴⁰ Romsics Ignác, *Bethlen István. Politikai életrajz* (Budapest: Magyarságkutató Intézet, 1991), 237–297. Cited in Tibor Frank, “Editing As Politics: József Balogh and *The Hungarian Quarterly*” in Tibor Frank, *Ethnicity, Propaganda and Myth-Making, Studies on Hungarian Connections to Britain and America, 1848–1945* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2000), 265. Hereafter cited as Frank, *Ethnicity, Propaganda, Myth-Making*.

auspices of The Society of the Hungarian Quarterly.³⁴¹ *The Hungarian Quarterly* was designed in the pattern of the British *Round Table* and the American *Foreign Affairs* to provide grounds for “the treatment, genuinely English in nature and spirit, of Hungarian themes”³⁴² from the pens of acknowledged intellectuals. The explicit aim of the periodical was to be “in the service not of vulgarizing and of cheap sensation-hunting or propaganda, but [to] speak exclusively to the most educated in the Anglo-Saxon countries: to Parliaments, universities, to the leading figures in economic and social life.”³⁴³ Its major objective was to secure the sympathy of Britain and the USA toward Hungary in the second half of 1930s.³⁴⁴ The periodical, as stated by Editor József Balogh, was not the “organ of official Hungarian foreign policy,” but a distinct “social establishment and as such a synthesis of the national foreign policy.”³⁴⁵ Yet, in light of the preferences of Hungarian foreign policy in the second half of the thirties, it proved increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible to keep up the line targeting the English-seaking world.

In the United States scholars and professors mostly of Ivy League universities were invited to contribute to the periodical and serve on the American advisory board, obviously with the aim to secure their support for the Hungarian cause. Among them there was Eldon R. James of the Harvard Law School, Philip C. Jessup of Columbia University, Philip Marshall Brown of Princeton, Edwin M. Borchard, then president of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, and head of the US Committee on Public Information in the Wilson Cabinet George Creel. Contrary to expectations, though, they did little to further the

³⁴¹ Tibor Frank, “Editing As Politics: József Balogh and *The Hungarian Quarterly*” in Frank, *Ethnicity, Propaganda, Myth-Making*, 267. Hereafter cited as Frank, “Editing As Politics.”

³⁴² Count István Bethlen at a meeting to launch *The Hungarian Quarterly* on July 3, 1934. 1/1525/13883 and 13884, Kézirat-és Levéltár, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár. Cited in Frank, “Editing As Politics,” 266.

³⁴³ Memorandum for the conference concerning *The Hungarian Quarterly* on July 3, 1934. 1/1525, Kézirat-és Levéltár, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár. Cited in Tibor Frank, “Literature Exported: Aspects of *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 1936-1944,” in Frank, *Ethnicity, Propaganda and Myth-Making*, 299. Hereafter cited as Frank, “Literature Exported.”

³⁴⁴ Frank, “Literature Exported,” 297.

³⁴⁵ József Balogh to Count István Bethlen, Budapest, March 6, 1941. 1/322, Kézirat-és Levéltár, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár. Cited in Frank, “Editing As Politics,” 271.

cause of Hungary.³⁴⁶ By late 1940, when the American line became even more important (i.e. Foreign Ministers Miklós Kállay's and István Csáky's negotiations with the West), the American editor, Ferenc Deák, and other members of the American advisory board severed their connections with the periodical, thereby closing off a potentially important semi-official channel for propaganda.³⁴⁷

Individual campaigns and foreign language journals played an important role in the policy of the Hungarian government. Official Hungary distanced herself from overt revisionism but tacitly approved and implicitly accepted and supported propaganda carried out on unofficial and popular levels. Within this context it remains to be seen to what extent Hungarian diplomatic representatives in the US supported revisionist endeavors directed toward the United States. What makes such an assessment difficult is the fact that disturbingly small amounts of information are available relating to the topic. The respective collections of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry in the Hungarian National Archives and the State Department documents relating to Hungary in Washington, as well as the respective personal papers of Ministers Count László Széchenyi and János Pelényi lack substantial information in this respect.

Some general conclusions can still be drawn about the scope and limits of the activities of Széchenyi and Pelényi. The Treaty of Trianon greatly defined the foreign policy of Hungary inasmuch as it limited the government's scope of action, and, until the second half of the 1930s, no open revisionism was possible. At the same time, a positive image of Hungary abroad had to be created and nurtured. Consequently, Hungarian representatives in the US were never in the position to promote revisionism openly. They consciously distanced themselves from outright revisionist campaigns. At the same time, they, like the majority of

³⁴⁶ Frank, "Editing As Politics," 268.

³⁴⁷ Frank, "Editing As Politics," 274.

Hungarians, shared the national consensus on the inevitability of revision. They also found the means to express their conviction indirectly, but never in their official capacity.

Count László Széchenyi was appointed Minister of Hungary to Washington on August 29, 1921, when official diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. Széchenyi was the right choice, since in his person a well-traveled and experienced diplomat came to represent Hungary. His family ties (his wife was Gladys Moore Vanderbilt) and personal connections made him an even more able representative. General expectations toward him ran very high when he took office. He was to create good relations between the two countries, and a favorable picture of Hungary in the US, to win friends for Hungary and, thus, within his means, to further Hungary's interest in the US.³⁴⁸ His often quoted statement that "Hungary wasn't yet, but will be,"³⁴⁹ suggested that he was ready to meet these expectations. Unfortunately, so far neither the official diplomatic instruction concerning his activities in the US, nor any other accounts of his political conduct in the US have come to light. Both Hungarian and American archival collections lack relevant information concerning them. It is only to be assumed that *ex officio*, for the above outlined general considerations, he distanced himself from all, even semi- and unofficial revisionist campaigns.³⁵⁰ It is safe to assume that if he had acted otherwise, it would have been challenged by some representatives of the successor states in the American press. However, no evidence to that effect has been found.

³⁴⁸ See some contemporary articles on Széchenyi's appointment, e.g. "Széchenyi chicagói látogatásához" [On Széchenyi's visit to Chicago], *Otthon*, February 12, 1922, 1 and "A magyar követ látogatása a clevelandi magyarság körében" [The Hungarian minister's visit to the Hungarians in Cleveland], *Szabadság*, February 12, 1922, 1. Both excerpts are in Fond 5 K106, *László Széchenyi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives. Hereafter cited as *Széchenyi Papers*.

³⁴⁹ "Hungary Lives," *Cleveland Press*, February 13, 1922, Fond 5 K106, *Széchenyi Papers*. This article reports about Széchenyi's first official tour in the US in the bigger cities to get familiar with the Hungarian communities, their problems, concerns, and their relations to the American society in 1922. This is a reference to and paraphrase of the proverbial last line of István Széchenyi's *Hitel* (1830). The original reads: "Sokan azt gondolják: Magyarország - volt; én azt szeretem hinni: - lesz!"

³⁵⁰ Széchenyi did not take part in Apponyi's welcome reception, for example.

János Pelényi was accredited as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States in 1933. In his instructions, characteristic of the neutral language of diplomatic exchange, it was stated that he was “to strive to promote lasting peace and mutual understanding and to solve the pressing problems of the day with wisdom and courage” between the two countries.³⁵¹ Within this framework his scope of action was limited. Pelényi’s role as a negotiator, indeed, assumed significance after he resigned his position in November 1940. Then through secret, semi-official channels Pelényi tried to further Hungary’s case during the war and help create a situation for Hungary in which her post-war position would be much better than it had been after World War I.³⁵²

It follows from the above that un- or semi-official efforts to win the support of the US for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon were not successful. Popular revisionism directed toward the USA yielded similar results.

³⁵¹ János Pelényi’s Letter of Credence, Fond 7 K 106, *János Pelényi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives. Hereafter cited as *Pelényi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives.

³⁵² On this also see Nándor F. Dreisziger, “The Atlantic Democracies and the Movements for a “Free Hungary” during World War II,” in Romsics, ed. *Hungary and the Great Powers*, 185-205. Hereafter cited as Nándor F. Dreisziger, “The Atlantic Democracies and the Movements for a “Free Hungary” during World War II.” Also see Katalin Kádár Lynn, *Tibor Eckhardt: His American Years, 1941-1972* (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs, 2007).

CHAPTER SIX

Revisionist Propaganda toward the USA through Popular Channels

Beyond the semi-official campaigns directed toward the United States, there were countless examples of popular (or private) contributions to the revisionist cause. In the abundant Trianon literature there are many pamphlets, open letters, brochures and even book-length accounts by members of the Hungarian or the Hungarian-American intelligentsia, with at most tenuous connections to Hungarian governmental circles or influential political groups. Unlike the efforts of Bethlen, Teleki and Apponyi, these contributions to revisionist propaganda directed toward the US were outside the mainstream. Such popular utterances addressed either the American people in general, or one particular segment of the American public and political life in particular, such as, for example, American educators, the US Congress and its individual members, or even the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. These revisionist statements were substantially different in terms of the social and political influence of their authors and their power of exposure. This analysis also illuminates the desperation of contemporary Hungary in its quest for any and all support for the revisionist cause. It will also demonstrate that despite the wide variety of efforts there was no indication that the US was willing to endorse revisionism.

It must also be emphasized that these mostly individual revisionist initiatives had some counterparts in the American and mainly the Hungarian-American press and in some systematic anti-Trianon propaganda campaigns, among them Lord Rothermere's activities in the US in 1927, the Kossuth pilgrimage in 1928, and the Justice for Hungary movement in 1931. These popular revisionist efforts are also discussed in this chapter.

Jenő Pivány made one of the earliest attempts at winning support for the cause of Hungary, one that was launched in September 1919, even before the treaty was signed. Although his appeal does not strictly fall within the chronological framework of the dissertation, its analysis is still important to demonstrate the general nature of popular revisionism and, at the same time, the extent to which Hungarians tended to overestimate the political weight of their revisionist efforts. Pivány presented and addressed his appeal directly to the US Congress. In early January 1919 Pivány, as member of the Territorial Integrity League, went to the United States to win support for Hungary.³⁵³ There, he revived his connections with the Hungarian American Federation, became its secretary, and worked ardently to raise his voice for Hungary. His activities mainly targeted the American and Hungarian-American press, but he also tried to arrange a meeting with President Wilson.³⁵⁴ His efforts to secure a hearing in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were fruitful,³⁵⁵ as on September 2, 1919 Pivány was invited to address the Committee. The “Statement of Eugene Pivány, National Secretary of the Hungarian American Federation” provided the basis for the Senate hearing, and the full-length version of the statement (a complete anti-Trianon pamphlet) was printed and published as part of the Senate record.³⁵⁶

Pivány’s appeal drew on the general revisionist arguments, namely that one thousand-year-old Hungary was a genuine historical, geopolitical and ethno-cultural unit, had for centuries been the defender of Christian culture and civilization, and therefore had the

³⁵³ See Pivány’s account on his mission: Jenő Pivány, *Egy amerikai küldetés története* [The Story of an American Mission] (Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Szövetség, 1943). Hereafter cited as Pivány, *Amerikai küldetés*. See also some of his English-language contributions to the anti-Trianon literature *The Case of Hungary in the Light of Statements of British and American Statesmen and Authors* (Budapest: Hungarian Territorial Integrity League, 1919; *Some Facts About the Proposed Dismemberment* (Cleveland: Hungarian-American Federation, 1919).

³⁵⁴ Jenő Pivány to Reverend Sándor Kalassay, March 6, 1919. Box 1, 1906-1966. *Papers of the American-Hungarian Federation*, Bethlen Collection, American Hungarian Foundation, New Brunswick, NJ. Hereafter cited as *Papers of the American-Hungarian Federation*.

³⁵⁵ Jenő Pivány to Reverend Sándor Kalassay, August 23, 1919. Box 1, 1906-1966. *Papers of the American-Hungarian Federation*.

³⁵⁶ “Statement of Eugene Pivány, National Secretary of the Hungarian American Federation.” *Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. 66th Congress, 1st Session. Part 18* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), 907-961. Hereafter cited as “Statement of Eugene Pivány.”

historical right to the Carpathian Basin. “[T]o prevent the United States of America from becoming an active partner to the unwarranted, unjust and arbitrary disintegration and annihilation of a country that ha[d] existed in the territorial condition now to be disturbed for over a thousand years,” Pivány explained to the members of the committee the great injustice that would be done to Hungary if the borders were ultimately defined as planned at Paris. Appealing to the American sense of justice and fair play, Pivány’s statement stressed that only the United States could help Hungary:

We feel that Hungary can be saved from destruction only by America as the United States are the only powerful country which has not been a party to the immoral secret treaties upon which the claimants of Hungarian territory are pressing their claims. In voicing our protest, therefore, against the proposed partition of Hungary as contrary to the demands of justice and incompatible with the requirements of a just and lasting peace, we respectfully ask the Senate of the United States to refuse to have our country become a party to annihilation of a civilized nation.³⁵⁷

Pivány’s initiative was acclaimed as a great success in Hungary. Not only did the Senate hear him, but as a result it “did not ratify the peace treaty mutilating Hungary, and made a separate peace with her.”³⁵⁸ What is more, even Pivány, decades after his American mission, persisted in this canard and overestimated the significance of his plea.³⁵⁹ These beliefs were unfounded. The analysis offered in chapter one provides the historical and political background against which Pivány’s activity in the US should be evaluated. Pivány’s hearing took place after October 1918 when the US already officially communicated to the Hungarian government that Wilson’s Fourteen Points no longer provided the basis for the peace negotiations. As was presented in chapter one the American peace delegation did not have much say in the decisions concerning Hungary’s future boundaries. The hope that Greater

³⁵⁷ “Statement of Eugene Pivány,” 952.

³⁵⁸ Baron Zsigmond Perényi, et al, *Magyarország tükre. A magyarok eredete és nyelve. Magyarország történelme. Földrajza. Alkotmánya. Szellemei élete és közgazdasága. Amerikai Kapcsolatai. Trianon. Kossuth Lajos New York-i szobrának leleplezése alkalmából* [A Mirror to Hungary. The Origins of the Hungarians and their Language. The History, the Geography, the Constitution, the Cultural Life and the Economy of Hungary, Hungarian-American Relations; On the Occasion of the Unveiling of Lajos Kossuth’s Statue in New York] (Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Szövetség, 1928), 272. Hereafter cited as Perényi, et al, *Magyarország tükre*.

³⁵⁹ Pivány, *Egy amerikai küldetés*, 68.

Hungary would not be dismembered due to America's influence, therefore, was ungrounded even in September 1919.

Still, for Hungarians the very fact that Pivány was allowed to address a Senate committee served to prove the worthiness of his cause. The Committee on Foreign Relations was considered a very powerful political body with the power to exert influence and change the peace terms for Hungary. Indeed, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations did have an influential role in directing American foreign policy, but, as the Senate debate over the ratification of the Paris treaties discussed in chapter one demonstrated, in 1919 the Senate considered America's interests primary and was reluctant to entangle the nation in the affairs of obscure European countries. Contrary to the popular belief according to which the US Senate did not ratify the Paris treaties, and among them the Treaty of Trianon, because the US could not come to terms with the violation of the principles of justice, the refusal to commit to collective security (Article Ten of the Covenant of the League of Nations) explained the decision of the US Senate. So, to think that the US Senate did not ratify the Treaty of Trianon due to Pivány's successful speech was self-delusion.

Another anti-Trianon plea to the US Congress was launched by Louis Kossuth Birinyi, a Hungarian-American historian who devoted his career to Hungarian revisionism.³⁶⁰ Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin presented Birinyi's petition on March 3, 1923, and its full text was also included in the records of the Senate.³⁶¹ Enumerating and explaining the general historical, economic and ethnic aspects of the revisionist argument, Birinyi's plea differed from the others in its extreme emotionalism:

³⁶⁰ Birinyi is the author of several Trianon works, among them the major English-language ones are *International Justice Memorandum. A Plea for Justice for Hungary* (Cleveland, OH: World Conference on International Justice, 1928); *The Tragedy of Hungary. An Appeal for World Peace* (Cleveland, OH: Evangelical Press, 1924); *Why the Treaty of Trianon is Void?* (Grand Rapids, MI: V. L. R. Simmons, 1938).

³⁶¹ Louis Kossuth Birinyi, *Justice for Hungary. Petition Submitted by the Executive Committee of Arrangement National Convention of American Citizens of Hungarian Decent to the Congress of the United States Relative to A Plea for Justice for Hungary and Peace for Europe. 67th Congress 4th Session* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), 1-48. Hereafter cited as Birinyi, *A Plea for Justice for Hungary*.

Mr. President and Members of the Congress of the United States of America, we beseech you to interest yourselves in the awful tragedy of the Hungarian nation. We pray you that you actively interest yourselves in an active way to help bring about peace for Europe. [...] Hungary [...] now beckoning to the American people and to Christian civilization to come to her aid, restore her mutilated parts, heal her gaping wounds, stop the copious flow of her blood, give her a chance to live, and help her bring peace to Europe. Without Hungary restored [...] there can not be peace in Europe. [...] Only the American people can save Hungary. [...] No other people has the moral and economic influence that can help making Hungary whole and restoring her to life. [...] Hungary's life depends upon the good will and helping hand of Christian America. Incidentally, the advent of peace of Europe depends upon Christian America. This responsibility stays until Hungary is saved and peace be restored to Europe.³⁶²

Writing open letters to various key members of the political elite of the US was also considered to be an important means of Hungarian revisionism. One of the most popular Americans to whom hundreds of Hungarians and Hungarian-Americans sent letters and telegrams was Senator William Edgar Borah of Idaho, considered by many 'the savior' of Hungary.³⁶³ In addition, the Reverend Francis Gross, a Hungarian American member of the Protestant church, wrote an "Open Letter to Alfred E. Smith," a senator from New York (and Democratic presidential candidate against Herbert Hoover in 1928), as an introduction to his book, *Justice to Hungary, Germany and Austria*. The letter calls upon Senator Smith to further Hungary's case and rectify Wilson's failure at Paris.³⁶⁴

*America's Mission. An Open Letter to Senator Capper*³⁶⁵ by William Borsodi, a Hungarian- American journalist, stressed America's responsibility to act ethically on behalf of Hungary. Borsodi based his argument on the often-repeated, but ungrounded concept that the US had already recognized her responsibility and acted upon it when she declined to ratify the unjust peace treaties. He carried this line of argumentation further by saying that "to this first

³⁶² Birinyi, *A Plea for Justice for Hungary*, 44-47.

³⁶³ On Borah's role in Hungarian revisionism see chapter seven.

³⁶⁴ "And Hungary, this *martyr nation*, [...] was laid on the peace table at Trianon, the operating knife was in the hands of butchers, of the Czechs, of the Roumanians and of the Serbs. The medical professor under whose direction this operation was performed was President Wilson. In a *bloody vivisection Hungary was cut into bleeding pieces*. [...] But God gave the world new leaders, in Italy, Mussolini, the Great, in Germany, Hitler, the Just; both leaders and their people are friends to Hungary [...] [and] will not rest, until the day will come, in which the world will rejoice with the news, that Hungary is once more free and integral." Reverend Francis Gross, "Open Letter to Alfred E. Smith," *Justice to Hungary, Germany and Austria* (Perth Amboy, NJ: Courageous Book, 1933), 10.

³⁶⁵ William Borsodi, *America's Mission. An Open Letter to Senator Capper* (Budapest, Berlin: n.p., 1929). Hereafter cited as Borsodi, *America's Mission*. The plea is addressed to Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas.

step toward the restoration of violated moral order she must add a new one, [t]his time a more forcible and determined line of action” in conformity with a Senate resolution in connection with the Kellogg-Briand Pact by which the US Congress stated that peace treaties may be modified in order to end unjust conditions.³⁶⁶ Thereby, Borsodi explained, the US recognized *expressis verbis* the “right to aspire toward the modification of the Peace Treaties.”³⁶⁷ The fact that the US Congress was rather reluctant to endorse the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and finally did so only with serious reservations and conditions may suggest that this time again an actual event was rather freely interpreted to serve Borsodi’s otherwise reasonable-sounding argument.³⁶⁸ In the same letter Borsodi also asked Senator Capper to endorse Lord Rothermere’s campaign and Hungary’s cause, and “proclaim what real peace ought to be like [...] to the American Congress, and through the American press, to a hundred million Americans.”³⁶⁹ Borsodi’s request was never acted upon.³⁷⁰

Another group of popular revisionist works appealed to American intellectual and/or academic circles. The Hungarian Professor Béla Krécsy’s pamphlet, *Misjudged Hungary. An Appeal from the Misinformed British and American Public to a Better Informed British and American Public Opinion in Behalf of Down-Trodden Hungary*, appealed to “American teachers, [...] the most devoted workers in the noble work of education.” By way of informing them about what truly happened to Hungary, the pamphlet asked them to endorse Hungary’s cause.³⁷¹ Another exceptional contribution came from the above mentioned Louis

³⁶⁶ Borsodi, *America’s Mission*, 10.

³⁶⁷ Borsodi, *America’s Mission*, 10.

³⁶⁸ For a more objective evaluation of US attitude toward the Kellogg-Briand pact in relation to Hungary see “Mit várhatunk a francia-amerikai szerződés szenátusi vitájától?” *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, January 8, 1928, 4.

³⁶⁹ Borsodi, *America’s Mission*, 10.

³⁷⁰ In the Congressional Records there is mention of one single instance when Senator Capper rose to speak in connection with Hungary, when on March 4, 1941 he required the consent of the Congress to have a certain Mr. A. S. Gondos’s letter printed in the Records correcting the senator’s previous remark stating that Hungary was a dictatorship. *Record of the Congress of the United States. 77th Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), A979.

³⁷¹ Professor Béla Krécsy, *Misjudged Hungary. An Appeal from the Misinformed British and American Public to a Better Informed British and American Public Opinion in Behalf of Down Trodden Hungary* (Budapest: American Hungarian Association of Budapest, 1920), 1. Béla Krécsy was a college professor of natural sciences.

Kossuth Birinyi. Published in 1924, his Ph.D. dissertation, *The Tragedy of Hungary. An Appeal for World Peace*, was an interesting example of support by a Hungarian-American historian. His attempt may have been unique, as the only book-length account of academic value up to that date, aimed at eliciting support from American academia. Moreover, it tried to shape the opinion of the Hungarian–Americans with its argument that only the American people can help Hungary:

What is then that must be done in order to save Europe, and incidentally the whole world from the threatening awful catastrophe? [...] The eyes of Hungary and of Europe are turned toward the American people. It is now the unanimous opinion of the world that only the American people can lift Europe out of her present chaotic situation.³⁷²

Though Birinyi's book was a noted Hungarian–American contribution to revisionism, there is no indication that it generated any practical results.

The Hungarian and the Hungarian–American press, for example *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* and *Szabadság*, also did its share in the popular revisionist campaign and helped project the false image of the US as the key to territorial revision. Often the articles were prompted by American political statements which were taken out of their original context. These statements were often misrepresented and used to promote the belief that revision was in the hands of America. That the argumentation for Hungary's cause and the appeals for America's help were often based on the misrepresentation of facts is further illustrated by László Faragó's article, "Amerika és Magyarország," [America and Hungary] already mentioned in chapter three.

The Commentator. A Magazine of the Truth was also a journalistic contribution to Hungarian revisionism in the US. Unlike other American and Hungarian-American press products, this monthly was specifically established to win support for Hungarian revisionist claims. The articles, letters, etc. published therein exclusively served the revisionist cause by

³⁷² Louis Kossuth Birinyi, *The Tragedy of Hungary. An Appeal for World Peace* (Cleveland, OH: Evangelical Press, 1924), 305, 318.

informing the readers about the historical, economic, cultural and ethnic aspects of the problem, and by overtly raising voice against the Treaty of Trianon.³⁷³

In addition to these significant Hungarian and Hungarian–American individual and journalistic platforms of the anti-Trianon arguments directed toward the US, there were some systematic popular contributions, too. Sir Harold Sidney Harmsworth, Viscount Rothermere’s all-out anti-Trianon press campaign in the London *Daily Mail* energized Hungarian revisionism from abroad. He made the Hungarian question the focus of attention in Britain, and the United States alike. Although Rothermere’s efforts did not yield any political results, he became the hero of the day. He won over many Americans and Hungarian-Americans after his unofficial visit to the United States in the winter of 1927–1928. While official America ignored him, Hungarian-American communities welcomed the Englishman as the savior of Hungary. He became popular with “the [Hungarian–American] man of the street and of the press.”³⁷⁴ His eloquent, enthusiastic and highly emotional argumentation stressed the responsibility of the United States in creating an unjust peace and appealed to the American liberal and democratic tradition. He had great influence on his audience by reciting popular slogans such as, for example, that “Trianon was born in the US” and made them believe that “Hungary’s future will be decided in the United States;”³⁷⁵ an argument that seemed obvious to some people, but the objective basis of such reasoning was rather unsound. The American Legation in Hungary continuously informed the State Department about issues relating to Rothermere’s campaign, as well as about the press coverage it received both in Hungary and

³⁷³ See for example “Hungary’s Death Warrant,” *The Commentator* (July 1920), 8; “Is This Peace With Hungary?” *The Commentator* (August 1920), 6; “Revision of the Peace Treaty Demanded,” *The Commentator* (August 1920), 18. Information on *The Commentator*, and its copies from the Yale University Library were made available to me by Dr. Tibor Glant.

³⁷⁴ László Széchenyi to Gyula Walkó, February 28, 1928. Doc. 95. 1928, K66, Hungarian National Archives. For Rothermere’s popularity with “the man of the street and of the press” see the relevant articles of the January 5, 1928 and February 17, 1928 issues of the *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*. I.e. “1928,” *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* January 1, 1928, 2.

³⁷⁵ “Magyarország sorsa Amerikában fog eldőlni,” *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, April 27, 1928, 2. See also “Trianon lélekharangja,” *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, April 28, 1928, 2.

abroad, with special respect to the successor states. State Department documents make it clear that Rothermere's eccentric activities were deemed unfortunate and harmful, and encouraged false hopes.³⁷⁶ (Joshua Butler Wright's somewhat harsh judgment concerning Hungarian tendencies to overestimate the significance of the Rothermere's campaign reflects the official American attitudes toward revisionism discussed in detail in chapter seven below.)

Lord Rothermere's activities in the US triggered two systematic anti-Trianon campaigns: the Kossuth pilgrimage to New York City in 1928 and the Justice for Hungary movement in 1931. The latter has received much popular and scholarly attention. Besides Miklós Vasváry's monograph, *A lord és a korona* [The Lord and the Crown] and Gábor Bencsik's pseudo-scholarly *Lord Rothermere és a magyar revízió* [Lord Rothermere and the Hungarian revision], several articles also deal with the trans-Atlantic flight that was intended to promote the Hungarian cause. The Kossuth pilgrimage, however, has received less scholarly attention. Memoirs and travel accounts written by some of the participants of the "pilgrimage" (i.e. the accounts by László Faragó, István Vásáry, Zoltán Bíró) are available. Besides them only few scholarly sources (Steven Béla Várdy, and Ferenc Fejtő) deal with the pilgrimage in very general terms. The analysis of this key revisionist event through a survey of available sources such as the publications of the contemporary press and more importantly American and Hungarian archival sources still offers ground for further research. Therefore, I will discuss the Kossuth Pilgrimage in more detail and sum up the better-known story of the Justice for Hungary flight briefly.

At the corner of the Riverside Drive and 113th Street, there stands the second statue erected in the US in commemoration of Lajos Kossuth. Hungarians, Americans and Hungarian-Americans alike supported the creation of the statue, which was unveiled on

³⁷⁶ Wright to Secretary of State, July 31, 1927. Roll#7, M708 RG 59, NARA.

March 15, 1928, during a spectacular ceremony. For the occasion, a delegation of approximately 500 Hungarians, the so-called Kossuth pilgrimage, arrived in New York, representing almost all layers and social classes of contemporary Hungarian society. The pilgrimage was explicitly declared to be a strictly unofficial social and cultural mission and any connections to government or other official or semi-official circles in Hungary were repeatedly denied.³⁷⁷ That notwithstanding, the Kossuth pilgrimage was a systematic anti-Trianon propaganda campaign in the US. With Kossuth's moral and political reputation as the basis for it, the participants of the Kossuth pilgrimage took every opportunity to speak up for the inevitability of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon

In the October 6, 1926, issue of the *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, editor Géza D. Berkó launched an appeal to the Hungarian-Americans to support the erection of a monument for Lajos Kossuth in New York.³⁷⁸ Many joined the cause, and preparations for unveiling the statue in the US started both in the United States and in Hungary. In the United States a Kossuth Statue Committee provided the management and assistance for the project. Board members included Géza D. Berkó as head, Alan Alfred Smith, the governor of the state of New York, James T. Walker, the mayor of New York, Professor Philip Marshal Brown, Adolph Zukor, and Mór Zukor.³⁷⁹ Hungarian and American political, social and religious organizations supported the effort and raised funds for the monument. Berkó with his donation of \$500 set an example with his generosity, and prominent Hungarian-Americans followed suit: the Hollywood magnate Adolf Zukor and the owner of a prominent travel agency, Emil Kiss, gave \$250 each. The famous Hungarian-born New York lawyer, Mór Zukor, contributed \$100. The banker Sándor Konta and the Magyar Segély Egylet offered

³⁷⁷ These reasons explain why it is discussed as part of popular revisionism aimed at the USA, and not in chapter five which deals with semi-official revisionist efforts.

³⁷⁸ Géza D. Berkó's article in the Golden Jubilee Album of the *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*. Quoted in Steven Béla Várdy, *Magyarok az Újvilágban. Az amerikai magyarság rendhagyó története* (Budapest: A Magyar Nyelv és Kultúra Társasága, 2000), 364. Hereafter cited as Várdy, *Magyarok az Újvilágban*.

³⁷⁹ László Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok útja Amerikába* [The Kossuth Pilgrimage to America] (Békés: Petőfi Nyomda, 1928), 77. Hereafter cited as Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*.

\$1,000 each.³⁸⁰ The City of New York must also have supported the Kossuth Statue Committee, because in the New York papers Mayor Walker got very harsh criticism for giving away some money for the Hungarians, when there were several more important issues to spend money on.³⁸¹ Due to the enthusiastic work of the committee the necessary funds were soon raised. According to different sources, it amounted to between \$36,000 and \$40,000.³⁸²

Success was not exclusively due to the work of the Hungarian-Americans. In the spring of 1927 Berkó traveled to Hungary to call the attention of Hungarians to the activities of the Kossuth Statue Committee and raise moral and financial support for the cause. He invited Regent Miklós Horthy, Prime Minister István Bethlen, and other state representatives to the unveiling ceremony to New York. Although the Hungarian government did not officially endorse the project, Berkó's invitation was welcomed in Hungarian public and political circles. With the support of the Hungarian American Society, the Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs, the Association of Tourism and the Hungarian National Association, the Kossuth Pilgrimage Committee was founded on November 9, 1927. Its task was to organize a delegation of Hungarians to the unveiling ceremony in New York. The committee appointed Count Albert Apponyi its honorary president. In his place the Baron Zsigmond Perényi, a member of the Upper House of the National Assembly, undertook the responsibility of leading the Kossuth Pilgrimage Committee and managing its actual affairs. The board of the committee invited many respectable Hungarian officials to participate in its work, and with their influence and social connections help the success of the pilgrimage. For example, the Speaker of the Upper House in the Hungarian parliament, Baron Gyula Wlassics, Dr. Lóránt

³⁸⁰ Várdy, *Magyarok az Újvilágban*, 365.

³⁸¹ "Horthy Foes Jeer Kossuth Delegation," *The New York Times*, March 14, 1928; "Protest Welcome to 525 Hungarians. Foes Here of Horthy Ask Mayor to Oppose City Fete for Delegates to Kossuth Celebration," *The New York Times*, March 13, 1928.

³⁸² Várdy, *Magyarok az Újvilágban*, 364; "The Nations Unveil the Statue of Kossuth," *The New York Times*, March 16, 1928; "Hungary Joins Americans in New Tribute to Kossuth," *Monitor*, March 16, 1928.

Hegedüs, former minister of finance, Lord Mayor of Budapest Jenő Sipőcz, journalist Dr. Andor Kun, later secretary of the committee, Bishop Béla Kapy, and Director of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society Dr. Béla Póka-Pivny helped the committee.³⁸³

At the January 16, 1928, board meeting of the Kossuth Pilgrimage Committee Baron Perényi reported that by then 528 persons had applied to join the pilgrimage.³⁸⁴ Various accounts and sources give different figures about the actual number of the pilgrims. According to László Faragó, altogether 488 people went to the United States. János Pelényi, the Hungarian minister to Washington, D.C., as Faragó recalled, reported about around 525 Hungarians visiting New York.³⁸⁵ All in all, the total number of the Kossuth pilgrims was somewhere between 475 and 510.

The participants of the pilgrimage were issued special Kossuth passports. The Hungarian Legation in Washington and the American Legation in Budapest helped arrange the official papers in time. The members of the Kossuth Pilgrimage Committee and a group of pilgrims selected by the committee from the representatives of various organizations, associations and classes of the country were granted special diplomatic visas free of charge. Those who attended the pilgrimage in private capacity were issued visitor's visas.³⁸⁶ The arrangements for transportation, tickets, food and other conveniences were taken up by the White Star Line and Cunard Line joint venture in Budapest.³⁸⁷ The total costs of the travel amounted to \$410 per person.³⁸⁸

Only László Faragó's account provides information concerning the social background of the pilgrims. He listed and described those who took part in the pilgrimage. The pilgrims

³⁸³ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 49-50.

³⁸⁴ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 51.

³⁸⁵ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 6, 46.

³⁸⁶ Wright to American Consul General in Budapest William H. Gale Esquire, December 22, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG 84, NARA; William H. Gale to Wright, December 23, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG84, NARA.

³⁸⁷ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 53.

³⁸⁸ István Vásáry, *Dr., A New York-i Kossuth-zarándoklatról. Jelentése Dr. Vásáry István polgármesterhelyettes-főjegyzőnek* (Debrecen: Debrecen Szabad Királyi Város és a Tiszántúli Református Egyházkerület Könyvnyomda Vállalata, 1928), 9. Hereafter cited as Vásáry, *A New York-i Kossuth-zarándoklatról*.

represented a colorful mixture of people from the high aristocracy to the lower strata of Hungarian society. Among them were barons, baronesses and counts, members of the high and lower clergy of all denominations, and members of the Hungarian parliament irrespective of political affiliation. The representatives of the intelligentsia included doctors, lawyers, journalists and teachers, while many from the merchant and craftsman classes joined the journey as well.³⁸⁹

The pilgrimage started on March 5, 1928 from Budapest. Thousands of people came together to wave good-bye to the travelers, who, following the Komárom-Győr-Hegyeshalom-Wien-Linz-Salzburg-Innsbruck-Buchs-Zurich-Basel-Mulhausen-Belfort-Paris itinerary, left Budapest by train at 7 a.m. and arrived in Paris the next day at the Gar de l'Estre. They continued their journey to Cherbourg the next morning where they finally boarded the *Olympic* to New York.³⁹⁰ Having struggled through the hardships of the journey, most of the participants arrived at the New York harbor on March 13, while the rest, mostly people who represented the merchant and craftsman classes, arrived a day later, on March 14, from Trieste on board the *President Wilson*. The next few days in New York were busy with programs: receptions, balls, dinners and lunches, official and non-official occasions among which the most important one was the unveiling ceremony on March 15.

The New York monument of Scotch granite depicted the heroic figure of Kossuth. The 9-foot tall sculpture stood on a 24-foot pedestal on which there are two figures of a father and his son, and the father bidding farewell to his son, who is about to go to fight for the freedom of his country.³⁹¹ The unveiling of the monument on March 15 was a spectacular event. *The*

³⁸⁹ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 7-48.

³⁹⁰ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 55-56.

³⁹¹ "Horvay, Sculptor, Here to Unveil Statue of Kossuth on Riverside Drive. Must Hurry Back to Carve Marble of Luther," *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, March 11, 1928, 139. Most of the newspaper articles cited in the present chapter are from *The English Language Press on the Unveiling of the Kossuth Monument* in Fond 80 K63 Hungarian National Archives in which the page numbers were not always indicated on the clippings.

New York Times reported about 25,000 people attending the ceremony;³⁹² while more exaggerated estimates claimed 50-60,000.³⁹³ The celebration began with a march to the Riverside Drive, with the New York Kossuth Statue Committee leading the crowd, followed by the pilgrims from Hungary, and those Hungarian–American delegations that came to the occasion from some 150 American cities.³⁹⁴ At exactly 2:30 p.m. Miss Irene Berkó, dressed in a Hungarian national costume, and Miss Margaret Vitarius, wearing clothes symbolizing Miss Liberty America, unveiled the monument.³⁹⁵

On March 18 the participants of the pilgrimage left New York and went on a tour to visit Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo and Niagara Falls. Finally, on March 31 they left the United States for home.³⁹⁶

The erection of the Kossuth statue was a symbolic act. Kossuth generated an image of Hungarians as a freedom-fighting, freedom-loving and democratic nation and it enjoyed a revival during the interwar years. Kossuth, often called “the Hungarian Washington,” came to symbolize democratic and liberal values the American and Hungarian nations were thought to have shared. Such an imagined historical-cultural bond gained special significance in the context of Trianon inasmuch as Kossuth’s political and moral legacy was used to support Hungary’s cause. As Faragó put it in the introduction of his book, Hungary was a nation that

³⁹² “The Nations Unveil Statue of Kossuth,” *The New York Times*, March 16, 1928.

³⁹³ Vászary, *A New York-i Kossuth-zarándoklatról*, 17.

³⁹⁴ The unveiling ceremony was boycotted by the activists of the anti-Horthy League and the Hatvany Defense Committee. They did not recognize the contemporary Hungarian government, and claimed that those who went to New York in the name of Kossuth are “sham patriots” and “many are traitors to American ideals just as many Hungarians today are traitors to the ideals of Kossuth.” In “Hungarian Premier Is Assailed Here. Anti-Horthy League Denounces Imprisonment of Hatvany for Political Writings,” *The New York Times*, March 5, 1928. For more on this see also “Protest Welcome to 525 Hungarians. Foes Here of Horthy Ask Mayor to Oppose City Fete for Delegates to Kossuth Celebration,” *The New York Times*, March 13, 1928; “Kossuth Statue Here Protested. Anti-Horthy League Sees Hidden Motives in the Coming of 500 Pilgrims,” *The New York Herald Tribune*, March 5, 1928; “Four Hungarians Seized As Pickets,” *The Washington Star*, March 19, 1928. A truly provocative contribution to this protest was Oszkár Jászi’s article in *The Nation*, “Dishonoring Kossuth. A Speech Not Delivered at the Unveiling of the Kossuth Monument at New York March 15, 1928,” March 28, 1928.

³⁹⁵ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 82-85; Bíró, *Amerika*, 42-65. “The Nations Unveil Statue of Kossuth,” *The New York Times* March 16, 1928. See also Endre Lieber, *A főváros küldöttségének amerikai útja. Naplószerű följegyzések* (Budapest: Székesfővárosi Házinyomda, 1928) and Andor Lázár, *Az amerikai Kossuth-zarándoklás* (Budapest: Révai Irodalmi Intézet Nyomdája, 1928).

³⁹⁶ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 60-140. See also the detailed memorandum on the program and activities of the Kossuth pilgrims in the US in György Ghika to Lajos Walkó, April 18, 1928. Fond 80 K63, MOL.

had been condemned to take the wrong side in the war and was punished by the most unjust treaty, a treaty by which the nation had been cursed and sentenced to death. And he pointed out that in her quest for justice Hungary expected the US to act.³⁹⁷ Although its political nature had been denied,³⁹⁸ the Kossuth pilgrimage had an obvious political purpose, and was a propaganda tour against the Treaty of Trianon and for US assistance in its revision.³⁹⁹ The Hungarian government ostensibly remained aloof from the Kossuth pilgrimage, as was the case with Lord Rothermere's press campaign. At the same time, it gave its tacit approval. Hungarian Minister László Széchenyi's memorandum to Foreign Minister Lajos Walkó clearly reflected the general attitude of the Hungarian government to revisionist propaganda abroad. Discussing the significance of the Rothermere Action, and at the same time drawing a parallel between Rothermere's campaign and the Kossuth pilgrimage, Széchenyi shared his opinion with Walkó according to which these projects should never hurt the national interests; still they had to be dealt with very carefully.⁴⁰⁰

The members of the "Kossuth excursion" took every possibility to "impress the people of New York that the reduction of Hungary's population was still resented"⁴⁰¹ and to ask for help in the US "to correct and seek cure for the injustice [...]."⁴⁰² In an interview granted to *The New York Herald Tribune* Baron Perényi said that although Hungary was too weak to think of war, "it knows that there can be no lasting peace in Europe until there is a just re-division of its original territory."⁴⁰³ The same opinion was reflected by Jenő Sipőcz, the lord mayor of Budapest, when he said: "Hungary's claims will not only be put before the League

³⁹⁷ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 46-47. Also see Vásáry, *A New York-i Kossuth-zarándoklatról*, 4, 17.

³⁹⁸ See Perényi's Pittsburgh speech quoted in "Kossuth-napok Pittsburghben," *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, March 23, 1928.

³⁹⁹ The State Department also expressed "the fear that advantage may be taken of this trip to engage in further propaganda on behalf of Hungary." Wright to Secretary of State, December 20, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG84, NARA.

⁴⁰⁰ László Széchenyi to Lajos Walkó April 4, 1928. Fond 80 K63, Hungarian National Archives.

⁴⁰¹ "600 Hungarians at Paris On Way to New York Ceremony," *The New York Herald Tribune*, March 7, 1928.

⁴⁰² Vásáry, *A New York-i Kossuth-zarándoklatról*, 31. See also, for example, Arthur P. Vakár's article "European Injustice Seen from the American Perspective," *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, March 29, 1928.

⁴⁰³ "600 Hungarians at Paris On Way to New York Ceremony," *The New York Herald Tribune*, March 7, 1928.

of Nations, but various notables in the delegation would make a strong bid for Hungarian sympathy in the United States.”⁴⁰⁴ At the unveiling ceremony Count Albert Apponyi’s message was read out by Mór Zukor. It was an appeal to America: “Today,” he said,

the oppressors of the Hungarian nation are different than at the times of Kossuth. Today Hungary is suffering under the yoke of the unjust peace treaty. Those who put her in this yoke find themselves in opposition to whatever Kossuth represented. In Hungary’s struggle for justice she asks for the sympathy and the understanding, and above all the help of the sophisticated nations.⁴⁰⁵

Baron Perényi’s speech on the same occasion more explicitly expressed his belief that the cure for the problems of Hungary could and would only be offered by the United States.⁴⁰⁶

Former Minister of Science Lóránt Hegedüs’ statement made at the lunch in his honor at the American Hungarian Chamber of Commerce echoed the comments quoted above:

Europe does not need American money, but American principles. [...] The United States in the forthcoming 2000 years will be the leader of the world. [...] With the dismemberment of Hungary not only Hungary became wretched, but the population of the detached territories as well. In our position it is only the United States who can be of real help for us, all the more so that the United States was the only power that did not guarantee Trianon.⁴⁰⁷

These utterances were only some of the many that showed that the members of the Kossuth pilgrimage considered the question of treaty revision a priority on their agenda, and the unveiling of the Kossuth statue created an excellent pretext to speak out for that. Some booklength publications, as was *Magyarország tükre*, were also prepared and distributed in advance in the US in order to inform Hungarian–American and American audiences about Hungary’s situation, and, thus, win support for Hungary’s claims.⁴⁰⁸ Clearly, the tour was a well-prepared and systematic propaganda campaign with thinly-veiled government support.

The Kossuth pilgrimage was also linked to the activities of the Hungarian Revisionist League, a significant non-government ‘propaganda agency’ established on July 27, 1927 as an immediate outcome of Lord Rothermere’s campaign. The League, in order to gain the widest

⁴⁰⁴ “600 Hungarians to Seek U.S. in League Fight,” *The Evening Post*, March 8, 1928.

⁴⁰⁵ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 87.

⁴⁰⁶ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 88.

⁴⁰⁷ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 91.

⁴⁰⁸ Perényi, et al, *Magyarország tükre*.

possible publicity for Hungary's problem, set up branches abroad. The US capital gave home to the American branch, and Imre Jósika-Herczeg was appointed its head.⁴⁰⁹ Both Jósika-Herczeg, the chairman of the pilgrims' reception committee, and Ferenc Herczeg, the president of the League in Budapest, were ardent promoters of the pilgrimage, and took their fair share in its preparation and organization, and, thus, the propaganda work for revision in the US.

The organizers of the Kossuth pilgrimage tried to elicit official American participation in the unveiling of the monument. The Hungarian committee in charge of the arrangements for the dedication approached the American minister to Hungary, Joshua Butler Wright, and offered to invite him to "accompany the Hungarian delegation to the United States, as their guest, in order that they might claim the pleasure of being presented to the President by the American representative to Hungary." Wright cordially refused to accept the invitation saying that the pilgrimage was purely a Hungarian affair and that his participation therein would be decidedly intrusive.⁴¹⁰

The invitation was an effort to magnify the significance of the pilgrimage and legitimize its indirect cause. "[T]he enemies of Hungary-as well as many other people who were interested in the welfare of Hungary but sharply critical of the methods employed by her," argued Wright, "would interpret any such action as propaganda of the most transparent nature which, irrespective of the effect it might have [...] could not fail to militate against the interests of Hungary and the relations between our two countries."⁴¹¹ As Wright's memorandum about this invitation as well as his further correspondence with the State Department regarding the Kossuth pilgrimage clearly demonstrate, American officials sought to keep the pilgrimage at arm's length. The State Department was informed that the groups of

⁴⁰⁹ For more see Miklós Zeidler, "A Magyar Revíziós Liga," *Századok* (1997/2): 303-351; Zeidler, *A revíziós gondolat*, 88-124.

⁴¹⁰ Wright's Memorandum to Secretary of State. December 1, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG84, NARA.

⁴¹¹ Wright's Memorandum to Secretary of State. December 1, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG84, NARA.

the pilgrims “will have, to a certain extent, a representative character, as they are being sent to the United States on a special mission of a distinctly public nature and that, although not sent by the Hungarian Government, the project or ‘pilgrimage’ has the direct support of the Government [...]”⁴¹² This consideration matched by “[t]he fear that advantage may be taken of this trip to engage in further propaganda on behalf of Hungary, and in repeated allusions to her present political and economic situation”⁴¹³ explained why official America decided to distance herself from it.

Much effort was made by the organizers of the pilgrimage to secure an official hearing and visit with President Coolidge. In the eyes of Hungarians an official meeting with the US president, the leader of the most powerful nation, let alone his expected expression of sympathies with Hungary’s problems, might have been interpreted as the expression of some kind of commitment to the Hungarian cause. Coolidge agreed to receive Hungarian Minister László Széchenyi and with him a small delegation on Monday, March 19, 1928, at 12:15 p.m. in the White House.⁴¹⁴ The meeting did not yield the desired results. Because the State Department wished to avoid any connection even to the slightest form of propaganda, assurances were “obtained in advance from the Royal Hungarian Legation in Washington that the members of the party will refer to no *such* subjects (that is allusions to Hungary’s present political and economic situation) in their conversations with the President.”⁴¹⁵ On the other hand, the president agreed to meet (only) a small delegation of 22 people, including members of the two houses of the Hungarian parliament and the mayor of Budapest in the Executive Office, and he did so briefly leaving time only for some polite gestures of introduction. Coolidge met the rest of the pilgrims in the garden of the White House, where all assembled

⁴¹² Wright to William H. Gale. December 22, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG 84, NARA.

⁴¹³ Wright to Secretary of State. December 20, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG84, NARA.

⁴¹⁴ Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs in the State Department/Assistant Secretary of State William R. Castle to Secretary to the President Everett Sanders. February 20, 1928. Series 1. Reel 91. *Calvin Coolidge Papers*, Microfilm Division, LOC. Hereafter cited as *Calvin Coolidge Papers*. Everett Sanders to William R. Castle. February 20, 1928. Series 1. Reel 91. *Calvin Coolidge Papers*.

⁴¹⁵ Wright to Secretary of State. December 20, 1927. Vol. 10, 1927, RG84, NARA.

for a photograph with the president.⁴¹⁶ Although Faragó evaluated the visit as a success in generating publicity for Hungary's cause,⁴¹⁷ there was considerable disappointment because the high expectations were not actually met.⁴¹⁸ The pilgrims were received in both houses of the US Congress, and met, among others, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Borah, and William R. Castle, Jr. from the State Department.⁴¹⁹

Although Hungarians hoped for some palpable aid from official American circles, only repeated demonstrations of sympathy were offered. The Kossuth pilgrimage did not bring real political dividends as no official measures followed to support the Hungarian revisionist claims. The outcome of the pilgrimage resembled that of the visit of their great example, Kossuth. "It is interesting to observe," commented *The Sun*, "that the attitude of America towards foreign political entanglement in 1850 was practically the same as it is today, and that quarrels over alien problems do not cause Americans to withhold their recognition of men whose services to humanity are worthy of applause."⁴²⁰ The pilgrimage, and subsequently Hungary's political and economic problems under the Treaty of Trianon, however, received extensive media coverage and publicity. And the Hungarian-American communities also profited from it. The erection of the Kossuth statue united the Hungarian-Americans and strengthened their Hungarian national consciousness, thereby boosting Hungarian-American relations with new energies for years to come between the wars. Some immediate effects of the pilgrimage in this respect were the Hungarian National Congress of Buffalo in May 1929; the Hungarian World Conferences in August 1929 and August 1938. The members of the pilgrimage, as an expression of their gratitude for the warm welcome they received in the States, invited several American officials, e.g. the mayors of New York,

⁴¹⁶ William R. Castle to Everett Sanders. March 13, 1928. Series 1. Reel 91. *Calvin Coolidge Papers*. Also see Bíró, *Amerika*, 160-162.

⁴¹⁷ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 97.

⁴¹⁸ Bíró, *Amerika*, 160-162.

⁴¹⁹ Faragó, *Kossuth-zarándokok*, 97.

⁴²⁰ *The Sun*, March 13, 1928.

Pittsburgh, Cleveland, etc. to Hungary. Accordingly, in July 1928 500-600 prominent Hungarian-Americans and Americans sailed for Budapest to take part in the Saint Stephen's Day ceremonies.⁴²¹

A better-known anti-Trianon campaign was the famous trans-Atlantic flight, popularly known as the "Justice for Hungary" movement in 1931. After Charles Lindbergh's achievement in 1927, a prosperous era of aviation came and dozens of adventurous pilots of all nationalities tried to repeat Lindbergh's feat. Hungarians were no exception to this rule. In the summer of 1931 György Endresz and Sándor Magyar made history by becoming the first Hungarians to fly across the Atlantic non-stop. Money was raised both by Hungarians (the insignificant amount of \$45) and the Hungarian-American community (\$5,000) to help the fulfillment of the ocean flight. Imre Emil Szalay, a well-off Hungarian-American entrepreneur, offered a generous contribution of \$25,000 which was indispensable in securing the firm financial background for the project.⁴²² Finally, the Lockheed could depart from Harbor Grace, New York on July 15, 1931. Endresz and Magyar managed to cover the distance of 5770 kilometers almost in 26 hours, thereby setting a number of records.⁴²³ Although they had to make a forced landing in Bicske some 30 kilometers from their planned destination in Budapest partly due to unexpected technical problems and shortage of fuel, the pilots received the hail due to the heroes of the nation.⁴²⁴ While their flight was momentous *per se*, its significance was increased by the fact that the flight served propaganda purposes.

⁴²¹ "Magyars To Visit Native Capital," *The World*, July 23, 1928.

⁴²² Sándor Magyar, *Álmodni mertünk* (Budapest: Aero & Rádió Kft., 1991), 93-95. Vászárhelyi, *A lord és a korona*, 34.

⁴²³ Endresz and Magyar covered the distance of almost 6,000 kilometers almost in 26 hours, hereby they flew at 250 km per hour in general, that is at the highest speed ever until that time in the history of flying. The "Justice for Hungary" flight also marked the first time that an airplane crossing the ocean had radio contact both with the starting and the landing aerodromes. For more on this see Zsolt Mészlay, "Az első magyar óceánrepülés," *História* (July 2002), 29-30. Hereafter cited as Mészlay, "Az első magyar óceánrepülés."

⁴²⁴ Mészlay, "Az első magyar óceánrepülés," 30. In order to raise money for the ocean flyers the American Hungarian Transatlantic Committee in Detroit issued special Justice for Hungary postcards which cost one dollar each.

Upon Lord Rothermere's advice, who offered 10,000 dollars for the Hungarian pilot who would manage to fly across the Atlantic, the plane was named *Justice for Hungary*.⁴²⁵ So, the flight besides the triumph of man and technology was a project to call attention to Hungary's seriously troubled political and economic status under the Treaty of Trianon.⁴²⁶ Since the Justice for Hungary flight received fairly extensive media coverage, Hungarian revisionism got some international attention again.⁴²⁷ This was, however, quite short-lived. The Hungarian ocean flight, only temporarily and by mere coincidence, diverted attention from other issues of more serious nature, as was the economic and banking crisis which hit Hungary in July 1931.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵ For more on Rothermere's relations to the pilots see Vásárhelyi, *A lord és a korona*, 62-65.

⁴²⁶ Nándor Dreisziger, "The 'Justice for Hungary' Ocean Flight: The Trianon Syndrome in Immigrant Hungarian Society," in Steven Béla Várdy and Ágnes Huszár Várdy, eds., *Triumph in Adversity. Studies in Hungarian Civilization in Honor of Professor Ferenc Somogyi on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday* (New York: East European Monographs, 1988), 573-589; Kornél Nagy, "Igazságot Magyarországnak! A magyar óceánrepülés," *Magyar Szárnyak* Vol. 10 (1981), 63-75.

⁴²⁷ As compared to the Hungarian newspapers, which hailed the oceanflight with enthusiasm and admiration and devoted long articles to it, the foreign papers dealt with the issue only in the short news section.

⁴²⁸ Vásárhelyi, *A lord és a korona*, 40, 46.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Official America and Hungarian Revisionism

The previous chapters presented various forms of Hungarian revisionist appeals aimed at the United States. Previously, it has been repeatedly pointed out that such Hungarian revisionist aspirations toward the United States were unfounded, and the general image of the US as *arbiter mundi* relative to the most important priority of interwar Hungary, the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, was based on wishful thinking. Although some expressions of individual American sympathies with Hungary's cause furnished some hope, Washington did not intend to support the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. The official American standpoint in relation to Hungary in general and treaty revision in particular can only be fully understood against a backdrop of the general trends of American foreign policy in the interwar period and, within this framework, American policy toward Hungary. Such an analysis combined with the demonstration of the attitude of the respective American governmental bodies (including the State Department and the representatives of the US in Hungary in the American Legation in Budapest) regarding Hungarian revisionism, conclusively demonstrates the lack of official interest in the Hungarian cause.

The fundamental guiding principle of American foreign policy toward Europe following the World War I was the Monroe doctrine, the century-old American policy of political isolation. By the Senate's rejection of the Paris peace treaties and the reluctance to join the League of Nations the United States refused to undertake the political and military commitment to, and the responsibility for enforcing the peace. American unwillingness to endorse international causes, as manifested, for example, by the debate about the World Court, the Locarno treaty or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, indicated that she decidedly pursued the policy of non-entanglement, primarily with European issues. While the US refused to accept

international commitments and obligations, political isolationism from Europe was loosened up in accordance with ever-increasing American interests in the European economy. What tied American economic interests to Europe were mainly the interrelated questions of debts, wartime and peacetime loans and the claims, reparations, occupation costs as well as other economic privileges arising from the separate peace treaties the US signed with European countries. On the other hand, the opportunity for US investments and prospective trade relations with that part of the world also underlined US economic interests.⁴²⁹ The key to European economic recovery and prosperity, thus to the success of American business, as the Dawes and Young Plans demonstrate, was, of course, Germany. Therefore, the US devoted special attention to her. At the same time, other central European countries, among them Hungary, also became a possible target for American investors. American economic interest largely defined the relative significance of Hungary in terms of American foreign policy in the region.

Although Hungarians liked to believe otherwise, the Kingdom of Hungary was not among the most important American spheres of interest. What is more, Budapest and Hungary had also been labeled as places (relatively) “unimportant”⁴³⁰ by the State Department. Still, as part of central Europe, and more importantly as a politically and economically instable state, Hungary continuously held the attention of the Division of Western European Affairs of the State Department. The Western European Desk was

⁴²⁹ For more on international relations after the war see Selig Adler, *The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941. American Foreign Policy Between the Wars* (New York: MacMillan, 1995), 70-92; Peter H. Buckingham, *International Normalcy. The Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-1929* (Willmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1983), 1-34; 124-153; Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion. American Political, Cultural, and Economic Relations with Europe, 1919-1933* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also Melvin Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy. The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994* (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) and Armin Rappaport, ed., *Essays in American Diplomacy* (New York: MacMillan, 1967). Hereafter respectively cited as Adler, *The Uncertain Giant*; Buckingham, *International Normalcy*; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion* and Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy*.

⁴³⁰ William R. Castle, Jr. to George A. Gordon. October 20, 1926. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Hereafter cited as *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*. Access to the Castle Papers was made possible for me by Dr. Tibor Glant. With regard to important consular transfers Castle informs Gordon, secretary in the American Legation in Budapest, about the transfer of a high ranking consular officer, Mr. Gale to Budapest, who, as Castle suspects, will “make a terrible fuss about being sent to a place as unimportant as Budapest.”

concerned about Hungarian affairs, and explicitly stated its desire to receive continuous information regarding Hungarian politics, government, economic life, military and social issues.⁴³¹

After the armistice in November 1918 the state of belligerency had to be terminated and peace had to be signed between the US and Hungary. Consequently, the general terms and conditions upon which the diplomatic, political and economic relations of the two countries were to rest during the interwar period were defined by the separate peace treaty between Hungary and the United States, signed on August 29, 1921. As was explained in chapter four, one of the unfounded tenets of Hungarian expectations toward America relative to the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was that the separate treaty did not mention Trianon because the US was reluctant to become a party to an unjust peace.

Senate Joint Resolution 16, prepared by Senator Philander C. Knox, proposed to repeal the declarations of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. While reserving “all the rights, powers, claims, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages to which it and its nationals have been entitled [...]” under the Treaty of Versailles, it suggested the total avoidance of the responsibilities emerging from the wartime alliance, the armistice and the Paris treaty system.⁴³² The separate peace resolution, as modified by Steven G. Porter, thus known as the Knox-Porter resolution, was passed by Congress, and the state of belligerency was officially declared to have ended.⁴³³ To secure the advantages the US had to sign bilateral treaties to secure the “benefits of the victors.”⁴³⁴ Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes

⁴³¹ William R. Castle, Jr. to Charles B. Curtis, December 6, 1923. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴³² Buckingham, *International Normalcy*, 17-18. See the debates on the Knox-[Porter] Resolution in the *Congressional Record*, 1st Session, 67th US Congress, April 1921.

⁴³³ “Joint resolution terminating the state of war between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America and between the Imperial Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the United States of America. That the state of war declared to exist [...] is hereby declared at an end.” In Secretary of State to the US Commissioner in Berlin (Dresel) July 5, 1921 in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States of America. 1921*. Vol. 2 (US Government Printing Office, 1936), 3-4. Hereafter cited as *FRUS. 1921. Vol.2*.

⁴³⁴ Buckingham, *International Normalcy*, 21-22.

began the peace negotiations with Hungary on July 9, 1921,⁴³⁵ and, as spelled out in the Knox-Porter resolution, explicitly asked for the recognition and the guarantee of all rights and privileges the US was entitled to under the Treaty of Trianon. As the correspondence between Hughes and American Commissioner to Budapest Ulysses Grant-Smith illustrates, the Knox-Porter resolution was not negotiable for Hungary. That notwithstanding, Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Miklós Bánffy and the Hungarian government repeatedly tried to enforce some reservations in the text of the resolution. Although they accepted and were ready to guarantee American rights under the Treaty of Trianon, at the same time they proposed that the specific mention of the Treaty of Trianon should be avoided, and/or reservations be designed to recognize Hungarian rights (with special respect to Hungarian frontiers and their possible future rectification under Article 19).⁴³⁶

Another piece of correspondence between the US secretary of state and Grant-Smith discussing Hungarian reservations sheds light on why it was imperative for Hungary to elaborate on the phraseology of the text and why the US refused to comply.

The Hungarians will aim to have it so phrased that the US will recognize herself subject to the same limitations and bound by the same obligations in regard to rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, advantages, as those signatories who have ratified the Trianon Treaty. Hoping to profit by our mollifying influence they desire evidently to draw us into full participation in obligations including mechanism of enforcement.⁴³⁷

In the separate peace with Hungary, which was to be based on the Knox-Porter resolution, the US insisted on keeping the economic privileges and rights under the Treaty of Trianon. So, in connection with them the Treaty of Trianon was specifically mentioned. At the same time the US explicitly renounced all the responsibilities contained therein regarding the Hungarian treaty (mainly responsibilities accruing from Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant

⁴³⁵ Buckingham, *International Normalcy*, 31.

⁴³⁶ Secretary of State to Grant-Smith July 9, 1921 in *FRUS. 1921. Vol.2*, 250.

Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, July 18, 1921 in *FRUS. 1921. Vol. 2*, 251-252. Secretary of State to Grant-Smith, July 28, 1921 in *FRUS. 1921. Vol. 2*, 252-253. For more see *FRUS 1921. Vol. 2*, 249-259 and Buckingham, *International Normalcy*, 31. For the respective clauses of the Treaty of Trianon (XXXIII/1921) see Miklós Zeidler, *Trianon. Nemzet és emlékezet* (Budapest: Osiris, 2003), 166-296.

⁴³⁷ Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, August 1, 1921 in *FRUS. 1921. Vol. 2*, 253.

holding out the prospect of frontier adjustment). Consequently, even the slightest reference to diplomatic, military and political commitments regarding the Treaty of Trianon in general, and the frontiers of Hungary in particular was left out of the text, as it was regarded “inadvisable.”⁴³⁸ Ultimately, the Hungarian National Assembly accepted “in full and without reservation the contents of the peace resolution,”⁴³⁹ and on August 29 it ratified the separate peace treaty. The tone of the negotiations clearly demonstrated that Hungary was in a “take-it-or-leave-it”⁴⁴⁰ position. The specific stipulations of the treaty, setting the framework for the relations of Hungary and the United States, reflect the uneven nature of the relationship between the two countries, with the US dictating the conditions.⁴⁴¹

While Hungary had to guarantee all the rights, privileges and advantages to the US to which she was entitled under the Treaty of Trianon, the US explicitly renounced all the responsibilities and obligations possibly arising from it, especially in relation to stipulations specified in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Articles I and II demonstrate this clearly.

Article I

Hungary undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages specified in the [...] Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Trianon which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States. [...]

Article II

With view to defining more particularly the obligation of Hungary under the foregoing Article with respect to certain provision in the Treaty of Trianon, it is understood and agreed between the High Contracting Parties:

(1) That the rights and advantages stipulated in that Treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and XIV.

(2) That the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part I of that Treaty, nor by any provisions of that Treaty including those mentioned in paragraph (1) of this Article, which relate to the

⁴³⁸ Secretary of State to Grant-Smith August 17, 1921 in *FRUS. 1921*. Vol. 2, 254.

⁴³⁹ Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, August 12, 1921 in *FRUS. 1921*. Vol. 2, 253.

⁴⁴⁰ William R. Castle, chief of the Western European Division in the State Department, when meeting with Count Pál Teleki at the Harvard Club said that the peace treaty was a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and that Hungary should accept it without reservation. Castle to Hughes, August 9, 1921. Quoted in Buckingham, *International Normalcy*, 32.

⁴⁴¹ See Charles Evans Hughes to Ulysses Grant-Smith, July 9, 1921: “[...] the peace resolution is a clear expression of the Congress that more rights, advantages, and interests must be secured to the USA, and that our Government will not conclude any treaty that does not secure those rights, etc.” *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1921. Vol. 2* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), 250.

Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council, or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent to such action.

(3) That the United States assumes no obligations under or with respect to the provisions of Part II, Part III, Part IV and Part XIII of that Treaty.⁴⁴²

Within this larger framework, following the treaty of peace and, of course, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, other treaties previously made by the US with Hungary had to be renegotiated, with special emphasis on those which guaranteed US trade and business interests. Besides such instruments as the copyright and extradition treaties, “there remained still the following: commerce and navigation, property and consular jurisdiction, agreement concerning tobacco, consular convention, naturalization, trade marks and arbitration, etc.”⁴⁴³ The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Hungary, signed on June 24, 1925, for example, was one result of such considerations and negotiations.⁴⁴⁴

The three chief points of interest to the government of the US in connection with Hungary, as was confidentially stated by George A. Gordon, a secretary of the American Legation in Budapest, were (1) legitimism and the King question, (2) the fiscal policy of the Hungarian government and the economic consolidation in Hungary, and (3) Trianon and Hungarian revisionism.⁴⁴⁵ While the legitimist threat was ruled out after King Charles’ second unsuccessful attempt to return to the throne in October 1921, economic questions and Hungarian revisionism remained the major focuses of attention for Washington. The consolidation of the Hungarian economy, a budget standing on firm grounds and the solvency of Hungarian banks became the prerequisite of the sympathies of American business circles

⁴⁴² Treaty between the United States of America and Hungary, Signed at Budapest, August 29, 1921. Quoted in Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy*, 257. See the discussion on the terms of the Trianon Peace Treaty in chapter two.

⁴⁴³ Horace Dorsey Newson to William R. Castle, Jr., November, 29, 1922. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁴⁴ For more detail see the 69th Congress 1st Session (March 17-April 5, 1926) *Record of the Senate Vol. LXVII. Part 6. 1926*. RG46 NARA.

⁴⁴⁵ George A. Gordon to Secretary of State, June 3, 1927. Roll#7 M708 RG59, NARA.

and the American government.⁴⁴⁶ The international loan to Hungary for reconstruction, known as the League of Nations loan, to which the US government also consented in 1924, served the very aim to help Hungary get back on her feet.⁴⁴⁷ It indirectly secured American economic interests (including the payment of debts and claims) and rendered prospective investments (for example in shipping, agriculture, forestry and railways) safer. A memorandum sent to the State Department by Ulysses Grant-Smith, the US commissioner to Hungary from 1919 to 1922, summarized the situation as follows: until serious post-war problems of central Europe and Hungary were

solved to some appreciable degree the commerce of the West must suffer the delet[e]rious effects of one portion of the body being deceased and in a stage of high fever. [...] It is evident, therefore, that the United States has a vital interest in desiring an early solution of these great problems and the consequent pacification of so large and populous an area of the earth's surface.⁴⁴⁸

That American economic interest defined American action in Hungary is also demonstrated by the following incident. In the winter of 1926 the Tripartite Claims Commission dealing with claims arising under Article 231 of the Treaty of Trianon set the prewar rate of exchange concerning the payment of debts according to the average rate during the month preceding the outbreak of the war. In case of the US, as of November 1917, this rate amounted to 9.4 cents per crown, which Hungary found too high. The Hungarian government, via the Hungarian Legation in Washington and the American Legation in Budapest, tried to bargain for a reduction or, as George A. Gordon of the American Legation in Budapest remarked somewhat furiously that Budapest “solicit[ed] an out and out gift.” This Hungarian demand, of course, did not find favorable reception in the State Department. Other favors such as the postponement of the payment of other unpaid claims (for example

⁴⁴⁶ See the conversation between Regent Miklós Horthy and William R. Castle, July 23, 1920 and Castle's account on his conversation with Hungarian Finance Minister on November 2, 1922. *William R. Castle, Jr. Diaries*. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. This source was made available to me by Dr. Tibor Glant of Debrecen University.

⁴⁴⁷ The American Jeremiah Smith, commissioner of the League of Nations was sent to Hungary to provide assistance and help in the consolidation of Hungarian economy.

⁴⁴⁸ Ulysses Grant-Smith to the State Department, December 13, 1920. Roll#1 M708 RG59, NARA.

reparations for prisoners of war) due to the US had already been granted to Hungary previously. Therefore, there seemed to be no legitimate reason for the Hungarian Government “to plead the necessity of poverty” and economic instability or try to classify legitimate American claims as “treaty charges,” a State Department memorandum argued.⁴⁴⁹ Such bargaining on the part of the Hungarian government was labeled as “evasive haggling,” and the argument put forth by the Hungarian government as to why such a favor for them was necessary was designated as “preposterous.” The memorandum continued to pass a devastating judgment concerning the Hungarian attitude:

[The Hungarian] Government in general seems to be somewhat in the habit of regarding the United States as the purveyor of all good things, including an unceasing flow of foreign loans, and the quality of its gratitude is certainly not devoid of a lively sense of favors to come; it therefore behooves it not to confine its responsiveness to lip service.⁴⁵⁰

Gordon’s opinion may stand out as rather extreme, but a general conclusion may be drawn that while the US was willing to cooperate with and assist Hungary for the sake of Hungary’s economic consolidation, it was not altruism or America’s sense of responsibility that made the US do so. Her down-to earth and well-calculated interest explained her economic policy toward Hungary as is demonstrated by the surprisingly harsh language used.

The third major issue of interest for the US government was Hungarian revisionism. The questions of economic stability and the revision of the Treaty of Trianon were interestingly linked, inasmuch as the harsh peace terms and the subsequent political, economic and social burdens which Trianon imposed on Hungary were argued to have created a considerable threat to the economic viability of the country, and also to the economic stability of the whole of central Europe.⁴⁵¹ On the grounds of economic, political and moral considerations American politicians from official circles often gave voice to their

⁴⁴⁹ George A. Gordon to William R. Castle, Jr., November 27, 1926. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁵⁰ George A. Gordon to William R. Castle, Jr., November 27, 1926. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁵¹ See for example Apponyi’s and Teleki’s lectures delivered in the US discussed in chapter five and the opinion of John Maynard Keynes in his *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* mentioned in chapter two.

belief that the treaty was a mistaken one, and that its economic, financial and political stipulations were too harsh. Such views, however, never affected the official position of the United States on the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Official US retained its uncompromisingly consistent policy of non-entanglement in this question.

William R. Castle, Jr., chief of the Division of Western European Affairs at the Department of State, was in charge of Hungarian matters. Since he was actively involved in dealing with Hungarian issues, his papers and official correspondence offer reliable grounds for reviewing official American views about treaty revision. Several of his comments in his diary suggest that he deeply understood the “bitterness” of Hungarians over the peace treaty.⁴⁵² When discussing the difficulties of the Hungarian economy, the crop failures, and Hungary’s difficulties in 1921 and 1922 in stabilizing its currency, he did not view the large payments the Reparation Commission tried to force on Hungary as timely. He warned of the possibility of an immediate and disastrous economic and financial crash in Hungary.⁴⁵³

Castle was aware that the peace treaties “created impossible nations with impossible boundaries and the ruling groups in these new nations are playing havoc with their own states as well as bringing on an international crisis.”⁴⁵⁴ Still, in his official capacity as Undersecretary of State of the Western European Desk he never promoted changes in the postwar European system. He consistently warned his colleagues in the American Legation in Budapest to avoid any connection with Hungarian revisionist propaganda, popular, unofficial, or semi-official.

At the time, as the immediate effect of the Kossuth Pilgrimage, Hungarian patriotic organizations in the US were preparing to carry out pro-Hungarian propaganda, “[t]his, of

⁴⁵² See for example the July 27, 1921 entry in *William R. Castle, Jr. Diaries*.

⁴⁵³ “Personally, I have no sympathy whatever for reparation demands on Hungary. The people who want the money are the Czechs, Yugoslavs and Roumanians who should be satisfied with the vast Hungarian territories they have acquired. I think there can be no doubt in this case that what they all three want is the utter ruin of Hungary, to absorb the country altogether, which would mean trouble for generations to come.” November 22, 1922. *William R. Castle, Jr. Diaries*.

⁴⁵⁴ July 27, 1921. *William R. Castle, Jr. Diaries*.

course, include[ing] propaganda for the revision of the treaty.” They were also preparing to organize a Hungarian congress in Buffalo. These initiatives were not welcomed by the State Department. The Department assumed that the Buffalo congress expected its proceedings and speeches to be “widely reported in all the papers [...] and thereby” it hoped to “influence the American government and [...] demand the revision of the treaty.”⁴⁵⁵ The issue was even more delicate since some representatives of the Hungarian government were also expected to attend the congress. Therefore, Castle sent the following instructions to the American minister in Budapest:

[Y]ou could well find the opportunity to say to some of your friends in the Hungarian Government that the American Government is not at all keen about this kind of business. When foreigners become naturalized, we feel that their efforts should be devoted to improving things in the country of their adoption. This does not at all mean that we expect them to lose interest in the problems of the country from which they come, but merely that they should not publicly devote themselves to propaganda, which in this case is not only pro-Hungarian, but anti-Czech, Roumanian and Yugoslav and is, therefore, directly against governments with which we are on friendly terms. [...] [I]t would create a storm of abuse [...] not favorable to Hungary and that besides making trouble in this country, it would undoubtedly do serious harm to the Hungarian cause. Anything that Hungary does to spread pro-Hungarian ideas, such as sending over exchange students and exchange professors to the universities or people who will talk or write in a reasonable way, we naturally have no objection to whatever, but I can only reiterate that these patriotic organizations can and do make a lot of trouble.⁴⁵⁶

It follows from the above that even the least possible association with revisionist propaganda was viewed by official America as most unacceptable and dangerous.⁴⁵⁷

Similarly, the State Department and the American Legation in Budapest handled the dedication of the statue to General Harry Hill Bandholtz in August 1936 with caution. As was discussed in chapter one, Bandholtz was the American member of the Inter-Allied Military

⁴⁵⁵ William R. Castle, Jr. to Joshua Butler Wright, March 8, 1929. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁵⁶ William R. Castle, Jr. to Joshua Butler Wright, March 8, 1929. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁵⁷ Even the indirect danger of revisionist “junketing” prompted the immediate action of the State Department, as was the case when Countess Bethlen wished to deliver a lecture in the US under the title “The Habsburgs, Mussolini and other European public characters.” “If Countess Bethlen should come over and give some rather scandalous lectures about European personalities, I have no doubt that she would draw an audience of sorts, but it would be distinctly disagreeable for us and disagreeable for Hungary. Personally,” Castle observed, “I don’t like to see the wife of the Prime Minister come to this country for a more or less junketing expedition and if I were a really rich man, I should offer to pay her to stay away. That would also be because of my liking for Hungary.” William R. Castle, Jr. to Nicholas Roosevelt, June 20, 1931. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

Mission to Budapest in 1919. He enjoyed great popularity and the respect of the Hungarians, because he prevented the Romanian army from looting the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest during the Romanian occupation of Budapest in the fall of 1919. To commemorate the activities of the general, the American Hungarian community raised funds for the statue. Hungarians viewed the Bandholtz statue as a living proof of the Romanian aggression as well as symbol of the devastation of Trianon and American sympathy for the Hungarian cause.⁴⁵⁸

John F. Montgomery, then American minister to Budapest, was not only invited to be present at the unveiling, but was asked to speak as well. Reference to Trianon and covert revisionist appeals to the American nation were expected at the ceremony, which took place on the Fourth of July.⁴⁵⁹ Therefore, the State Department took immediate steps to instruct the US representatives in the American Legation “to be careful not to take an active part in the ceremony and under no circumstances should [any of them] make any remarks.”⁴⁶⁰ Minister Montgomery shared the concerns of the State Department and chose to refrain from participation at the unveiling. He could only excuse himself from being present by way of an official leave of absence signed by the secretary of state which instructed him to be in Washington before June 15, well before the ceremony.⁴⁶¹ The unveiling of the Bandholtz statue in Budapest, as was foreseen, set Hungarian anti-Trianon propaganda into motion, when after the erection of the statue the American Hungarian daily, *Szabadság*, launched a

⁴⁵⁸ For more detail on the political significance of the statue see János Pótó, *Az emlékeztetés helyei. Emlékművek és politika* (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2003), 90-99. Also see Zsuzsa, L. Nagy, “Bonyodalom egy budapesti szobor körül,” *História* (1989/6). <http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/historia-1989-06/historia-1989-06-081013-6>.

⁴⁵⁹ See Chapter Two on the symbolism and political-cultural significance of the July 4th ceremonies in Hungary in the interwar period. The unveiling of the Bandholtz statue finally took place on August 23, 1919.

⁴⁶⁰ Secretary of State Cordell Hull to John F. Montgomery, March 23, 1936. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1936. Vol. 2* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), 335. Hereafter cited as *FRUS. 1936*.

⁴⁶¹ Montgomery to Hull, March 27, 1936; Hull to Montgomery, March 31, 1936. *FRUS. 1936*, 336. Hungarians were utterly disappointed by the absence of the American minister. To avoid offending Hungarian sensibilities and bad impressions about the American Legation, one of the charges represented the American Legation at the unveiling ceremony. For further detail also see Tibor Frank, ed., *Roosevelt követe Budapesten. John F. Montgomery bizalmas politikai beszélgetései, 1934-1941* (Budapest: Corvina, 2002), 50-53. Hereafter cited as Frank, ed., *Roosevelt követe Budapesten*. See also its English edition, Tibor Frank, *Discussing Hitler. Advisers of U.S. Diplomacy in Central Europe, 1934-1941* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003).

campaign to collect signatures in support of the revision of the treaty. Official US stayed out of that project as well.

Diplomatic representatives of the US to Hungary during the interwar period displayed the same attitude toward revision. Of course, the American ministers to Hungary had to comply with the official American approach. At the same time the questions should also be addressed whether there was a personal side to all this, whether any of them, even tacitly, supported Hungarian revisionism, and if their personal relations to the country and its leaders influenced their official views. The record shows a range of reactions.

During the interwar period five American diplomats served as senior American representatives in Budapest: Ulysses Grant-Smith (1919-1922), Theodore Brentano (1922-1927), Joshua Butler Wright (1927-1931), Nicholas Roosevelt (1931-1933) and John Flournoy Montgomery (1933-1941). Ulysses Grant-Smith was the unofficial diplomatic representative of the US in Hungary from December 1919 to January 1922, and served as chargé d'affaires pro tempore until May 1922.⁴⁶² He was sent to the region to safeguard American interests, and had the responsibility to establish the foundations of the official contacts between the two countries.⁴⁶³ The difficulties of his task defined not only his official, but also his reserved and often negatively biased personal relations to the country and her people. The “habitual, unconscious exaggeration practiced by all the people” and their tendency “to speak in figurative phrases, and [...] consequently [mis]understand and discount one another’s statements”⁴⁶⁴ made him a stern critic of postwar Hungary. During most of his

⁴⁶² *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Current Volume F. 1939-1942* (New York: James T. White & Co., 1942), 403.

⁴⁶³ “While exercising the utmost caution not to commit yourself and this government to preference for one or the other of the many political groups which seeks to control the government of Hungary, you will be expected tactfully to encourage such constructive movements among the Hungarians as would appear to lead toward the firmer establishment of a representative government.” Secretary of State to the Ulysses Grant-Smith, December 10, 1919. *FRUS. 1919. Vol. 1 and 2* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), 410-411. Hereafter cited as *FRUS. 1919. Vol. 1 and 2*.

⁴⁶⁴ Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, May 17, 1920. Roll#1 M708, RG59, NARA.

stay in Hungary, until August 29, 1921, no official diplomatic relations existed between the US and Hungary. This set the framework for his actions and explained why his activities were guided by extraordinary caution with respect to any kind of political utterance relative to Hungarian problems after the war, among them the Treaty of Trianon.⁴⁶⁵ His opinion and the instructions he received from the State Department, for example, in connection with the Conference of Allied Diplomatic Representatives in Budapest, shows how undesirable he considered even the least direct connection with issues relating, in any way, to Hungarian politics. Grant-Smith was of the opinion “that any participation of the American representative in Hungary in the conference should be in response to a request from the British, French and Italian Governments and that it should be strictly informal.”⁴⁶⁶ “It appears to me,” says Grant-Smith,

that the best American policy would be to avoid becoming implicated in any demarche which may be taken in this regard. [...] The longer I follow the development of affairs in Central and Eastern Europe the more do I become convinced of the wisdom of a policy of detachment and a minimum interference on our part in the regulation of the numberless complicated questions which continue to arise as a result of the war. The tendency would ever become more marked, on the part of all concerned, to shift the responsibility for failures to our shoulders, as well as the expense.⁴⁶⁷

Grant-Smith knew that although Hungary accepted the loss of her territories temporarily, she would not submit forever to the conditions brought about by the peace treaty.⁴⁶⁸ He had strong opinions about Hungary’s new frontiers:

The Magyars, just as the Serbs, Roumanians, and Czechs, if victorious, would have laid claim to vast territories as due them. It is their nature, it is their habit of mind to make exaggerated claims. [...] Consequently, had the new boundaries of Hungary been made to include all the contiguous Magyar populations which lie at present in Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia, the Hungarians would have immediately claimed something beyond. As it is presented, however, the League of Nations might very well and, in justice, ought to hand back those populations to Hungary. This might keep

⁴⁶⁵ Secretary of State to the Ulysses Grant-Smith, December 10, 1919. *FRUS. 1919. Vol.1 and 2*, 410-411. Ulysses-Grant Smith served during the term of three secretaries of state, namely Robert Lansing, Bainbridge Colby and Charles Evans Hughes.

⁴⁶⁶ Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, September 29, 1920. Roll#1 M708, RG59, NARA.

⁴⁶⁷ Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, December 24, 1920. Roll#1, M708, RG59, NARA.

⁴⁶⁸ Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, May 31, 1920. Roll#1, M708, RG 59, NARA.

them quiet for a time and would afford them no legitimate grounds to carry on a propaganda for regaining lost territories.⁴⁶⁹

After the separate peace was signed between the US and Hungary official diplomatic relations between the two countries were established for the first time. The first official representative of the US to Hungary after the war was Theodore Brentano.

Brentano was a retired judge when he entered the diplomatic service and was appointed minister to Hungary in 1921. He served in Budapest between 1922 and 1927.⁴⁷⁰ His diplomatic activities in Budapest were met with some criticism in the State Department, since Castle was not fully satisfied with his work.⁴⁷¹ Unfortunately, only a small number of State Department documents are available regarding Theodore Brentano's stand on the revision of the Trianon peace treaty. His monthly reports to the secretary of state on revisionist propaganda in Hungary and abroad, however, contained but one personal comment. Brentano's highly critical comment in his memoranda to the State Department on "a certain part of the Hungarian population belonging to a class whose everlasting drone 'why doesn't America do something?' exasperates the practical man of European politics"⁴⁷² sheds some light on his opinion. In the absence of further personal remarks, however, his opinion is impossible to analyze. His successor, Joshua Butler Wright was the exact opposite.

Having served at various important diplomatic posts both in Europe (Brussels, London, The Hague) and in Latin America (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Santiago, Chile), Wright was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Hungary in

⁴⁶⁹ Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, May 17, 1920. Roll#1, M708, RG59, NARA.

⁴⁷⁰ *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Current Volume C* (New York: James T. White & Co., 1930), 487-488.

⁴⁷¹ Rumors were spread that Brentano was drunk more often than sober. "There has been a good deal of agitation in the Department to replace Judge Brentano by a Service Minister. There are innumerable stories that he is drunk most of the time and if these stories are true he is, of course, a peculiarly unfit representative of this dry country. There have also been rumors of personal misbehavior with some Jewish dancer from the opera, but in these stories I take no stock whatever." Castle to Charles B. Curtis, May 6, 1925. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁷² Theodore Brentano to Secretary of State, June 12, 1923. Roll#1, M708, RG59, NARA.

1927.⁴⁷³ His diaries contain some objective comments regarding Hungarian questions and treaty revision, including the one according to which the League of Nations was not paying enough attention to the local questions in this [central Europe] part of the world.⁴⁷⁴ His official correspondence with the State Department on the other hand is more indicative of his critical stand on Hungarian issues. The fact that Wright kept a shrewd eye on Hungarian affairs, especially on revisionist propaganda, is best demonstrated by his comment regarding the Hungarian exaggeration and overestimation of the successes of the Rothermere campaign in the US. Considering the extent to which the Hungarians believed that their difficulties interested the rest of the world, “[o]ne gains the impression,” Wright said,

that these people are convinced that Hungary is an important factor in the general European policy of England and other great Powers; this is bred from their intense national spirit and love of country, which, I believe, is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. It is therefore to be regretted that they appear to be blind to the ill-effects of this untimely agitation.⁴⁷⁵

Wright’s comment went to the heart of the matter: Hungarian expectations of official American support were delusional.

Nicholas Roosevelt’s personal papers and correspondence with the State Department reveal a similar approach. Roosevelt, diplomat and journalist, served at diplomatic posts in Paris and Madrid, and was a captain in the military in France after the US entered World War I. After the armistice President Wilson appointed him his aide in Paris, then member to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Later he was commissioned to Vienna in 1919–1920 as member of the American field mission.⁴⁷⁶ Therefore, when in 1930 he received an appointment as minister to Hungary, he arrived in a region which was familiar to him. While

⁴⁷³ *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Volume XXX* (New York: James T. White & Co., 1943), 196-197.

⁴⁷⁴ Joshua Butler Wright on October 9, 1927. Box 3. Series IV. Diaries. *Joshua Butler Wright Papers*. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

⁴⁷⁵ Wright to Secretary of State, September 30, 1927. Roll#7, M708 RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁷⁶ Roosevelt was in Budapest in March 1919 when the Hungarian Soviet Republic (Tanácsköztársaság) was declared.

in office Roosevelt concentrated mostly on the economic and financial life of both Hungary and central Europe.⁴⁷⁷ He never really liked the place. His rather detached attitude toward “semi-feudal” Hungary, the behavior of Hungarians and their conduct in life are duly illustrated by his memoirs, *A Front Row Seat*.⁴⁷⁸ As Roosevelt was regarded “the best-informed American in Central Europe,”⁴⁷⁹ a former journalist and a diplomat who had widespread contacts with the American business and political circles, Hungarians expected much from him: “Mr. Roosevelt is not only a diplomat but also a journalist who writes striking articles for the best American reviews and dailies. His sympathy therefore not only means that he communicates the favorable impressions gained in Hungary in an official quality but he gives even greater publicity to the same.”⁴⁸⁰ In an interview Roosevelt was asked what Hungary could expect from the United States. He gave a very diplomatic answer. While avoiding the disappointing answer of a straightforward “not much,” he cordially explained that until America got more familiar with Hungary, she could not expect much from the US. Therefore, she needed bigger and wider publicity in the US to make ties and spiritual relations between the two countries stronger. For this, he said in several interviews, as a journalist, he would willingly work both as a journalist and a diplomat and promised to use the “the publicity of the American papers in the interest of Hungary.”⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁷ *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Current Volume F. 1939-1942* (New York: James T. White & Co., 1942), 324-325.

⁴⁷⁸ For further details see Nicholas Roosevelt, *A Front Row Seat. A Sparklingly Personal Narrative of the History-Making Events in Which Mr. Roosevelt Has Participated, and the Notable Figures He Has Known, Especially the Roosevelt Family* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 186-205. His retrospective recollections may have become somewhat more critical of contemporary Hungary than they actually were in 1930-1933. On the other hand his critical approach to Hungarian issues and cautious policy are also underlined by his correspondence with the State Department.

⁴⁷⁹ *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography. Current Volume F. 1939-1942* (New York: James T. White & Co., 1942), 324.

⁴⁸⁰ *8 órai újság*, September 28, 1933 in Box 5, Series I. Correspondence, *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*, Syracuse University Library, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY. Hereafter cited as *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*.

⁴⁸¹ *8 órai újság*, September 28, 1933. Box 5, Series I. Correspondence, *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*. See also “Mit remélhet Magyarország Amerikától?” [What may Hungary expect from America?] *Pesti Hírlap*, October 12, 1930 in Box 3, Series VII. Correspondence, *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*. See also “Október [...] az új amerikai követ. Beszélgetés a New York Times szerkesztőségében Nicholas Roosevelttel” [October [...] the new American minister. A conversation with Nicholas Roosevelt in the headquarters of The New York Times], *Az Est*, October 12, 1930 in Box 3, Series VII, *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*.; Imre Déri, “Roosevelt követ beszél

Like his predecessors, Roosevelt viewed Hungarian attempts at the revision of the Treaty of Trianon critically and with caution. Roosevelt was concerned about the Hungarian military, despite the fact that the Treaty of Trianon introduced strict limits on its size. He was very much aware that Hungary had not accepted the peace treaties “except through force.” He knew that Hungarians looked forward to regaining their lost territories; therefore, he wrote, the suspected “development of Hungary’s military establishment could materially affect the peace of Europe.”⁴⁸² The essence of his opinion concerning revisionism was briefly but explicitly summed up in the introduction which Roosevelt wrote to Horthy’s memoirs in 1956. The program, he says, “to try to restore to Hungary the boundaries it had had before the Habsburg [E]mpire broke up” was “a policy” which “however commendable to Magyars, ran counter to the nationalist aspirations and fears of non-Magyars, and was doomed to failure.”⁴⁸³ His successor, John Flounoy Montgomery, also had a strong opinion about Hungarian revisionism.

Unlike Roosevelt, Montgomery became a true admirer of Hungary during his mission in Budapest. This affection, however, did not lead him to support revisionism. Montgomery, a manufacturer and businessman with extensive interests in the milk condensing and food industry in the US, served as minister to Budapest between 1933 and 1941.⁴⁸⁴ His personal papers and correspondence reveal how much he got to like Horthy’s Hungary. Indulging in the pompous and often ceremonious life of Hungary, he kept close relations with the members of the aristocracy, representatives of other foreign posts in Budapest and, of course, with prominent members of Hungarian political life. His views sometimes reflected the rather

terveiről s Magyarországról” [Roosevelt on his plans and Hungary], *Amerikai Magyar Népszava*, September 27, 1930 in Box 3, Series VII, *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*; Emil Lengyel, “Old Budapest Goes American,” *New York Herald Tribune*, March 31, 1931, 15 in Box 3, Series VII, *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*.

⁴⁸² Nicholas Roosevelt to Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, January 14, 1931. *The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers*.

⁴⁸³ The draft of Roosevelt’s introduction to the book attached to Nicholas Roosevelt to Robert Speller, the publisher of Horthy’s memoirs, April 25, 1956. In Box 4, Series I. *Nicholas Roosevelt Papers*. See also Miklós Horthy, *Memoirs* (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957).

⁴⁸⁴ *The National Cyclopedic of American Biography. Current Volume D* (New York: James T. White & Co., 1934), 410-411.

limited scope of his Hungarian social and political acquaintances. That notwithstanding, Montgomery sensed how powerful and dangerous a force Trianon was, and how it united all the layers of Hungarian society irrespective of class and social standing.⁴⁸⁵ As mentioned, Montgomery did not want to participate in the unveiling ceremony of the Bandholtz statue.⁴⁸⁶ Despite his favorable attitude toward Horthy's Hungary, and his sometime more favorable judgment of things Hungarian, he developed a fairly critical opinion of the Hungarian attitude toward revisionism and the policies devised to achieve this goal. Although Montgomery did not consider the Habsburg Empire a "political monstrosity"⁴⁸⁷ and understood the grief of the Hungarians over its dismemberment, he did not allow himself to be misled by Hungarian revisionist aspirations. He grew even more critical of Hungarian revisionism when Hungary sought to restore her former boundaries by force within the framework of the ever-strengthening German alliance.⁴⁸⁸ And while in his *Hungary, The Unwilling Satellite* Montgomery readily tried to save Hungary's reputation and depict her ultimate accession to the Axis powers as one of force and "unwilling" expediency, at the same time he passed rather ominous comments concerning revisionism. The American minister to Budapest designated Hungarian revisionism a "curious myth rather than a clear program," and called attention to its menace:

As time went on and I gained the confidence of my Magyar friends, I discovered that many responsible Magyars were by no means in favor of a revisionist policy. On the contrary, they considered it a serious handicap, because it had become a national obsession. [...] They also knew that revisionism

⁴⁸⁵ Frank, ed., *Roosevelt követe Budapesten*, 11-65. See also Montgomery's comments on golf, traveling, cuisine, viticulture, social life in Hungary in Box 1, Budapest Diplomatic Corps Exchanges, 1933-1937, *The John F. Montgomery Papers*. MS 353. Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University. Hereafter cited as *The John F. Montgomery Papers*.

⁴⁸⁶ On the Bandholtz statue also see Box 4, Vol. VII. Personal Correspondence, 1933-37, Part I, *The John F. Montgomery Papers*.

⁴⁸⁷ Montgomery to Robert D. Coe, December 4, 1939. Box 3, Foreign Service Personnel Exchanges, 1938-1939, Part 1, Vol. 5. *The John F. Montgomery Papers*: "Personally I am not of the opinion that the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was a political monstrosity. Everything I have learnt since I have been here convinces me to the contrary."

⁴⁸⁸ Messerschmidt to Montgomery, November 20, 1934 and March 5, 1936, Box 2, Foreign Service Personnel Exchange, 1933-37, Part 1, Vol. 3, *The John F. Montgomery Papers*. See also Montgomery's correspondence with the State Department. Roll#1 M1206 RG 59, NARA.

was a dangerous toy and that Hungary was utterly unprepared for war. [...] To the politicians, revisionism was a godsend, but more responsible men thought it dangerous.⁴⁸⁹

Throughout the interwar period the US strictly adhered to the policy of (political) non-entanglement. Providing support for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was never a viable option despite Hungary's hope. Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the US were built on false hopes and illusions. America's relations to Hungary in general and treaty revision in particular were defined by the official American policy of political isolation toward Europe. The Western European Desk of the Department of State, and its head, William R. Castle, Jr., as well as the official American representatives of the US to Hungary consistently represented such a policy. Official America did not fall in line with Hungarian revisionist expectations. One curious exception, however, seems to be Senator William Edgar Borah of Idaho, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 1924 and 1933, who repeatedly gave voice to his belief that the post-war treaties, and among them the Treaty of Trianon, should be revised.

Borah's position on the question of revision made him, in the opinion of his biographer, one of "the most widely read and quoted Americans" in Europe.⁴⁹⁰ As one of the prominent members of the senatorial isolationist stronghold, the Irreconcilables, Borah did not approve of the Paris peace treaties. Furthermore, in Senate debates, essays, articles, newspaper interviews and personal correspondence with people in the United States and abroad Senator Borah gave voice to his strong opinion and firm conviction that the treaties signed at the end of World War I were morally, politically and economically wrong and should be subjects to serious changes. He despised the creators of the treaties. In his eyes,

⁴⁸⁹ John Flournoy Montgomery, *Hungary. The Unwilling Satellite* (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1947), 52-55. See also Frank, ed., *Roosevelt követe Budapesten*, 48-49.

⁴⁹⁰ Claudius O. Johnson, *Borah of Idaho* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936), 317. Hereafter cited as Johnson, *Borah*. Borah thought that the Polish Corridor should go back to the Germans. He also advocated the recognition of the Soviet Union.

they were only guided by revenge,⁴⁹¹ and he held them responsible for the postwar political and economic problems in Europe.

Borah's opinion was seized upon by the nations concerned, among them Hungary. His statements nourished the hope and fuelled the belief that Senator Borah supported the revision of the postwar settlement. The Laval incident in 1931 also seemed to reinforce the Hungarian conviction about Borah's commitment to the revision of the Hungarian treaty.

In October 1931 French Premier Pierre Laval paid a visit to Washington on the invitation of President Herbert Hoover to discuss the gold standard and the question of intergovernmental debts, two very urgent economic issues of the day. Hoover also planned to discuss the Polish Corridor question. On the president's request Senator Borah, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, also took part in the meeting. While the President and Laval were conferring, Borah gave a press conference to French newspapermen in his office, and with this he created a minor diplomatic storm. Borah stated that the Polish Corridor should be returned to Germany and the former boundaries of Hungary should be restored. He stated that the revision of the Versailles Treaty was a prerequisite of disarmament and debt adjustment. While the Germans and the Hungarians welcomed his opinion, the Polish and the French objected.⁴⁹²

In 1931 a group of American-Hungarians visited Borah in Washington "to express their gratitude and appreciation of the Hungarian nation for the stand he had taken in the matter of the Trianon Treaty." The speech Borah gave on this occasion again directed attention to senator's opinion on the Hungarian treaty, and in the eyes of Hungarians strengthened Borah's image as the "friend of the Hungarians." "One thing I can promise,"

⁴⁹¹ Borah's speech on the political and economic effects of the Versailles Treaty, *Record of the US Senate*, 67th Congress, 1st Session, April 30, 1921, 853-854. See also Borah's speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Versailles Treaty, September 26, 1921 in Horace Green, ed., *William E. Borah. American Problems. A Selection of Speeches and Prophecies by William E. Borah* (New York: Duffield & Co., 1924), 133, 136-137. Hereafter cited as Green, ed., *Borah. American Problems*.

⁴⁹² Johnson, *Borah*, 445-449.

Borah said, “both individually and collectively: to do everything within our means to alter the opinion of America and the world regarding the treaty of Trianon.”⁴⁹³ His promises that he would see what he can do and when are also demonstrated by Borah’s letter to Alexis de Boer, agent of Hungary before the Tripartite Claims Commission: “As I said [...] I sympathize deeply with Hungary. The only question with me is how and under what circumstances I can be of any service to your country. I hope the time will sometime come when I can be of some service. If that time does come, I will try not to disappoint you and your country.”⁴⁹⁴ These were vague, almost meaningless statements offering no specific commitments. Still, Hungarians were blind to evaluate them objectively.

As was presented in chapter two, characteristic of the nature of Hungarian revisionism was the fact that every expression of foreign opinion in favor of changes affecting the post-World War I settlement were more than welcome. With such utterances saying actually what Hungarians wanted to hear, Senator Borah appealed to the most fundamental Hungarian national sentiments after the war. Consequently, the senator’s consistent stand against the postwar treaties made him the champion of the Hungarian revisionist cause. Borah’s statements were overestimated and misrepresented by the Hungarians and gave ground to the false idea that the senator could somehow influence American policy concerning treaty revision.

Obviously, Borah became very popular with the Hungarians, to which fact the senator’s correspondence files testify. Hungarians were very responsive to him. On all occasions when Borah spoke about the treaties and their revision he received dozens of letters from all walks of life in Hungary as well as from the members of the Hungarian–American community in the US. Many Hungarians and Hungarian–Americans wrote to Borah to thank

⁴⁹³ “Senator Borah’s Speech before the Hungarian Delegation: ‘Future Accomplishments Will Speak of Our Work in Behalf of the Revision of the Treaty of Trianon,’” Box 381, *Borah Papers*. The American-Hungarians visited Borah “to express their gratitude and appreciation of the Hungarian nation for the stand he had taken in the matter of the Trianon Treaty.”

⁴⁹⁴ Alexis de Boer to Borah, July 13, 1929, Box 270, *Borah Papers*.

him for furthering the Hungarian cause, and encouraged him in “the performance of [his] great mission.”⁴⁹⁵

For example, the Archduke Francis Joseph compiled a great bulk of material on the troubles and suffering of Hungary and sent it to Borah. Professor Francis Deák of Columbia University also corresponded with the senator from Idaho,⁴⁹⁶ as did some prominent members of Hungarian public life, including the noted author Ferenc Herczeg of the Hungarian Frontier Adjustment League, and Nándor Fodor, an editor of the *Az Est*.⁴⁹⁷ Lajos Kossuth Birinyi, the Hungarian–American historian, was in extensive correspondence with Borah, too.⁴⁹⁸ Among other things, they exchanged ideas about Birinyi’s book, *Why the Treaty of Trianon is Void?* (1938). Borah also helped insert Birinyi’s essay, “The Resurrection of Hungary,” in the *Record of the Senate of the United States*.⁴⁹⁹ Political and civic organizations such as the Magyar Városok Országos Kongresszusa (National Congress of Hungarian Municipalities), the Women’s World League for Hungary, the United Magyar Civic Association in Western Pennsylvania, or the Hungarian–American Chamber of Commerce also sought out the senator for advice and asked him to further the revision of Trianon.⁵⁰⁰

Among the messages to Borah one can find truly exceptional ones, as was the letter written on behalf of the fourth-graders at the Hódmezővásárhely Elementary School. In it Julianna Kruzsliczki asks the “Kedves Szenátor Bácsi!” (Dear Uncle Senator) not to let Hungary down and liberate her.⁵⁰¹ The expectations toward Senator Borah relative to helping Hungary revise the terms of the treaty sometimes became manifested in fairly exaggerated forms, as is demonstrated by one of the oddest letters ever sent to Borah. It was written by a

⁴⁹⁵ Lajos Kossuth Birinyi to Borah, November 28, 1931, Box 313, *Borah Papers*.

⁴⁹⁶ Boxes 381, 796 and 843, *Borah Papers*.

⁴⁹⁷ Boxes 226 and 234, *Borah Papers*.

⁴⁹⁸ Boxes 179, 338 and 490, *Borah Papers*.

⁴⁹⁹ Borah asked the Congress to have Birinyi’s article printed in the *Record*. *Record of the Senate of the United States*, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, April 14, 1938, 1512. The article was originally published in a Bridgeport newspaper.

⁵⁰⁰ These three letters are in Box 490, *Borah Papers*.

⁵⁰¹ Julianna Kruzsliczki to Borah, December 12, 1931, Box 337, *Borah Papers*.

certain Bóra Jenőné (Mrs. Eugene Bóra) addressing the “Igen Tisztelt Ösmeretlen Rokon!” (To the Respected Unknown Relative). On the basis of the resemblance in the spelling and pronunciation of their family names, Mrs. Bóra claimed family relations with the senator. (Borah’s family tree proves that he had no Hungarian relatives whatsoever.)⁵⁰² The lady sought help for Hungary, as well as for herself. A truly memorable twist in her letter is the fact that she asked the “distant rich American relative” for financial assistance as well.⁵⁰³

The press, both the Hungarian and the Hungarian–American, extensively covered Borah’s political activities and opinion. Numerous newspapers, for example, *Az Est*, *Budapesti Hírlap*, and *The Pester Lloyd* published articles on Borah’s views. These were all written in the deepest tribute to the “savior of Hungary.” In the files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry at the Hungarian National Archives there is no indication if the government of Hungary ever capitalized on Borah’s popularity or approached the senator on the topic of revision.⁵⁰⁴ Still, the press as well as other civic forums and organizations did their best to strengthen the belief and keep the hope alive that the ills of Trianon would soon be diminished and treaty revision will be assisted by an influential American politician, Senator Borah. “[E]very Hungarian knows and feels,” as Ferenc Herczeg put it, “that when [Borah] is speaking, then America is speaking: the voice of the real American spirit, and the will of the American people [...]”⁵⁰⁵

Borah was one of the most prominent influential politicians in the US that time. As one of the most respected members of the Senate, a famous Irreconcilable, his word was thought to have really counted. He was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

⁵⁰² Robert James Maddox, *William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), xiv. Hereafter cited as Maddox, *Borah*. Borah’s greatgrandfather, Jacob Borah immigrated to America from Germany to Lancaster County, PA around 1760. Borah was the seventh child to William Nathan and Elizabelth Borah and was raised in a strictly religious Presbyterian family.

⁵⁰³ Szemerjai Bóra Jenőné to Borah, February 15, 1928, Box 337, *Borah Papers*.

⁵⁰⁴ The Kossuth pilgrims met Senator Borah.

⁵⁰⁵ Ferenc Herczeg to Borah, May 31, 1933, Box 381, *Borah Papers*. In an article Herczeg wrote the following: [a]mong the leading representative men of cultured humanity whose conscience has been stirred by the Hungarian tragedy, an eminent place is due to Senator Borah. He has never been in our country, and has probably not had very much to do at all with Hungarians; nevertheless, the injustice meted out to us has linked him so closely to our country that today he is called by millions ‘the friend of the Hungarian people.’ Ferenc Herczeg, “Senator Borah’s Message to Hungary,” Box 381, *Borah Papers*.

between 1924 and 1933. Moreover, President Hoover wished to appoint him secretary of state, a position which was considered to be the next most important to that of the US president.⁵⁰⁶ These facts made Hungarians assume that Borah was a very powerful voice in American politics. What is more, Hungarians believed that Borah had the power to channel the direction of US foreign policy in the way he wanted. Hungarian hopes and expectations toward Senator Borah, as well as toward the US, were, however, unfounded for a variety of reasons.

Borah was a “Great Individualist” in the Senate, a true “free lancer.”⁵⁰⁷ He never obeyed majority opinion, nor did he act according to party exigencies all the time. In an interview he characterized himself as a man who is “too old to change. Whoever the next president is he will get my support when I think he is right,” he said. “And when I think he isn’t, he will get something else.”⁵⁰⁸ The following popular anecdote also tells a lot about his character: “having encountered Borah horseback riding one day, then President Coolidge expressed surprise at seeing the Senator and the horse traveling in the same direction.”⁵⁰⁹ A study of his political career demonstrates that he always represented his own opinion, which did not necessarily fall in line with the policy of his government (or party), and which Borah, even if he served high-ranking positions, could not, and did not influence.⁵¹⁰ It can also be stated that Borah’s views on treaty revision represented neither the general opinion of the Republican Party, nor that of the Senate or its Committee on Foreign Relations.⁵¹¹

Hungarians attached much significance to Senator Borah’s serving as head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and hoped that, in this capacity, the senator would

⁵⁰⁶ J. B. Wright to Secretary of State, December 6, 1928, Roll#10, M708 RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁰⁷ Johnson, *Borah*, 258.

⁵⁰⁸ Borah’s Scrapbook, Vol.7, Series 2, *Borah Papers*.

⁵⁰⁹ James E. Watson, *As I Knew Them; The Memoirs of James E. Watson* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936), 237. Maddox, *Borah*, 150.

⁵¹⁰ The best example to illustrate that Borah was an independent thinker was how he related to the question of the outlawry of war. For more on this see J. Chalmers Vinson, *William E. Borah and the Outlawry of War* (Athens, GA.: Yale University Press, 1957). Hereafter cited as Vinson, *Outlawry of War*.

⁵¹¹ See the debates of the 67th Congress.

persuade his government about the necessity of treaty revision. The fact that Borah was a fierce Irreconcilable and the belief that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had a powerful role in making foreign policy decisions just like it had during 1919-1920 in the defeat of the peace treaties and the League of Nations only strengthened Hungarian expectations; however, without much basis. Although the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had authority over the approval of foreign treaties and bills proposed by the executive within the system of checks-and-balances, primarily it functions as an advisory body of the government, and, as such, has little to do with the actual formation of American foreign policy directly. Hungarians knew that President Hoover planned to appoint Senator Borah his secretary of state, which obviously made Borah even more important in their eyes, and made the senator seem even more influential for the revision of Trianon. But Borah refused to accept the post. His explanation as to why he did so supports the fact that he was an independent voice in contemporary American politics. He said “if as a secretary of state he found it impossible to agree with the administration on some matter of foreign policy, he would be forced either to surrender or get out. Neither of which he would want to do, but the latter he would do if necessary.”⁵¹²

Thus, contrary to Hungarian beliefs, Senator Borah had but limited power over the conduct of US foreign affairs, and his opinion clearly did not coincide with the opinion of his government. Borah himself made it quite clear in an interview to *Az Est* that what he said in relation to treaty revision was “purely an expression of his personal opinion and conviction and that he was not speaking as the representative of any party or in any official capacity.”⁵¹³

Before exploring Borah’s reasons for supporting revision, two important issues should be raised. A close scrutiny of his speeches and addresses shows that the Hungarian treaty was but of minor importance for Borah compared to the German treaty, which was primarily in the

⁵¹² Transcript of the Senator Borah’s White House conferences prepared by his secretary Mrs. Cora Rubin Lane. Quoted in Johnson, *Borah*, 260.

⁵¹³ Joshua Butler Wright to the Secretary of State, December 6, 1928. Roll#10 M 708 RG 59, NARA.

focus of his attention. Secondly, a thorough review of his utterances demonstrates that, contrary to appearances, Borah never considered active political commitment to revision an option. Borah always voiced his opinion that morally he sided with the Hungarian cause,⁵¹⁴ but he always spoke in vague terms as to when, how, in what capacity he could help. Borah's cautious abstinence from real political commitment is, for example, articulated in an interview he gave to the December 6, 1928 issue of *Az Est*. In it the senator was quoted to have said that

he was pleased that the United States did not ratify the Treaty of Trianon because of the stipulations contained therein. [...] He said that his position was unaltered, that he still believes that the Treaty of Trianon cannot continue to exist in its present form, and that would have to be altered sooner or later. It is not clear to him how exactly this can be accomplished and he was unable to say by what means the best result would be attained. [...] In reply to the question as to what Hungary might expect from America in connection with the treaty he said that he could not be expected to make a reply at a moment, just before the election, when it might be misconstrued.⁵¹⁵

Although Borah advocated the necessity of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, he never offered concrete solutions to the wherewithal of active political participation of the US in it.

Vital economic concerns about the future of the European, and, primarily, the American economy underlined Borah's opinion on the revision of the postwar settlement, the Treaty of Trianon included. Borah's worries about the German treaty and his insistence on political non-entanglement were the key factors in Borah's support of the revision of the postwar treaties in general, and the Treaty of Trianon in particular.

Although he himself refused the isolationist label saying that "there was no such thing as an isolationist,"⁵¹⁶ Borah had a strong commitment to the isolationist credo. And, interestingly, Borah's firm isolationist stand explained why he was so concerned with the treaties. As is well-known, the US Senate refused to approve the League of Nations plan which Borah welcomed as the "most fundamental and satisfactory decision reached on

⁵¹⁴ See for example Borah to Lajos Kossuth Birinyi, July 13, 1932, Box 338, *Borah Papers*.

⁵¹⁵ Joshua Butler Wright to the Secretary of State, December 6, 1928, Roll#10 M 708 RG 59, NARA.

⁵¹⁶ Vinson, *Outlawry of War*, 1.

foreign affairs by this Government since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.”⁵¹⁷ Borah’s firm anti-League stand stemmed from his conviction that such an organization was a scheme to place the United States in the storm center of European politics, which would result in the loss of America’s independent action and a certain degree of her national sovereignty. As a shrewd-minded lawyer he anticipated the League as a “cloak of respectability,”⁵¹⁸ which, sanctioned by Article X of its Covenant, would only be used to protect the *status quo*. Borah dismissed the idea of the League as irreconcilable with American interests and as completely unacceptable.⁵¹⁹ Participation in the League would have limited American freedom of action by legal, military and political commitments, and Senator Borah was unwilling to accept this. The fact that Borah did not consent to the ratification of the postwar treaties can be explained by the same concerns.

That notwithstanding, he studied closely the postwar treaties in general, and the Versailles Treaty in particular. Borah found the treaties, and primarily the treaty with Germany, not only unacceptable, but even repugnant. Their terms shocked him. Senator Borah’s private correspondence and his speeches in the Senate in 1921 indicate that the more he dealt with the treaties, the more inequitable and unjust he found them. Borah argued that the economic prosperity of the US and that of the world depended on Europe.⁵²⁰ He recognized that European economic stability and the reconstruction of Europe hinged on German economic recovery; which he saw as unfeasible and problematic due to the impossibly harsh and huge indemnities that the Versailles Treaty imposed on Germany. This

⁵¹⁷ Borah quoted in Johnson, *Borah*, 223. Borah’s ardent opposition to the League is powerfully expressed in one of the interviews the senator gave to *The New York Times* on February 1, 1919. He said: “I would have opposed the League had the Savior of Mankind revisited the earth to campaign for its adoption,” 53-54.

⁵¹⁸ Maddox, *Borah*, 61.

⁵¹⁹ It is to be noted that Hungarians interpreted Borah’s objection to the League and its Covenant as the expression of his commitment to revising the *status quo*.

⁵²⁰ “European problems were American problems.” Borah quoted in Maddox, *Borah*, 134.

explains why Borah argued for the revision of the terms of the Paris treaties, and those of the Versailles Treaty primarily.⁵²¹

He recognized quickly the wrongs of the Paris Peace settlement very early and formulated the idea that such a system should be subject to changes for the economic and political good of Europe, as well as for that of the United States. In Borah's views the "economic reconstruction of Europe which [was so] necessary to the very life of her civilization and the recovery of [American] commerce and industry"⁵²² became closely related with the question of war debts and reparations which he considered to be the key to the solution. In January 1933, in a Senate debate on postwar economic problems, Borah clearly stated his program: entailing responsibilities and participation in any council, he called for an international economic conference. His plan was to use the Allied debts as the bargaining tool. In return for American cancellation of debts he expected the Allies to cancel further reparations demands from Germany, reduce armaments, revise the Treaty of Versailles and, above all, open their markets for American goods. "To tell the truth," he said, "I care very little about these debts in comparison with the restoration of the markets of the American farmer, with the restoration of commerce and trade, and with the restoration of a sound monetary system in the world."⁵²³ But economic help did not equal political commitments in Borah's views.⁵²⁴ As a committed isolationist he would have never entangled America in European politics, and he freely gave voice to this opinion.

In conclusion, it is beyond doubt that Borah's grave assumptions about the postwar settlement and, consequently, his fears from its possible outcome made him repeatedly

⁵²¹ Borah's speech on the Versailles Treaty, *Record of the US Senate*, 67th Congress, 1st Session, April 30, 1921, 853; Borah's speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Versailles Treaty, September 26, 1921. In Green, ed., *Borah. American Problems*, 136-137.

⁵²² Borah's speech on the Versailles Treaty, *Record of the US Senate*, 67th Congress, 1st Session, April 30, 1921, 855.

⁵²³ *Record of the Senate of the Congress of the United States*, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 4, 1933, 1284-1293. See also Maddox, *Borah*, 124-135 and Johnson, *Borah*, 274-278.

⁵²⁴ "Helpfulness does not mean entanglement, and participation in economic adjustments does not mean sponsorship for treaty commitments [...]. Borah's speech in *Record of the Senate of the United States*, 67th Congress, 1st Session, April 30, 1921, 850.

express his conviction that it was imperative to undo the “most successful conspiracy against the recovery of Europe,”⁵²⁵ but he never wished to entangle the US with Europe and sacrifice American freedom of action and sovereignty to do so. His policy, despite appearances, had always been characterized by his strong and consistent adherence to the isolationist credo. Commitments of purely economic and moral nature were acceptable, but he rejected political commitments and entanglement completely. This explains Borah’s views concerning the Treaty of Trianon and illuminates the dual nature of his opinion on the Hungarian treaty. It follows from the above that Hungarian expectations toward Senator Borah were unfounded.

The case study on Borah’s political views on the question of Hungarian revision demonstrates how exuberantly emotional and irrational Hungarian revisionism was, at the same time it also illuminates the nature of official American views on Hungarian revisionism, and conclusively supports the thesis of the present work: that Hungarian revisionist hopes for American support to dismantle the Trianon Peace Treaty amounted to wishful thinking. Treaty revision eventually happened with German help, but its analysis would go beyond the scope of the present study.

⁵²⁵ Borah to E. D. Morel, Member of the English Parliament on January 17, 1923, Box 132, *Borah Papers*.

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

Trianon was an overarching national issue in Hungary between the wars. Revisionism was a platform that united the whole nation giving ground to exaggerated and, often, even irrational expectations. Contrary to political realities, the United States assumed a very important role in the eyes of the Hungarians with respect to the reestablishment of Hungary's pre-Trianon frontiers during the interwar period. Both as a cause as well as an effect, popular as well as serious academic interest in the USA arose. The geography and political life of the US became part of the university curriculum and travel literature about the USA continued to be popular with Hungarians. At the same time, Hungarians began to observe American holidays, most importantly the Fourth of July. This was also part of the Hungarian efforts to reinforce the favorable view of the USA as land of freedom, justice and fair play. Lajos Kossuth's image in the USA and George Washington's image in Hungary acquired a great significance. Their cultural and political legacy was believed to be a bond between the two nations and came to serve as an important ideological foundation of Hungarian revisionist endeavors aimed at the United States.

The expectation that the United States should play a key role in the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was also based on major ideological, historical and political tenets relative to American war and peace policies with regard to Hungary. As explained in chapter four above, Jenő Horváth, the 'official historian' of the period, contributed to the creation of this myth. Still, a critical study of Horváth's Trianon works revealed that Horváth's interpretation relative to the role the United States may, and should, play in treaty revision, consequently the myth of the US as the promoter of the Hungarian cause, rested on misinterpretation, manipulation and distortion of facts. For example, the analysis of Horváth's presentation of the Inquiry's recommendations in connection with Point Ten demonstrated that he

deliberately manipulated historical sources, ignored some historical facts and overemphasized others. Likewise, the study of Horváth's interpretation of the diplomatic correspondence between Washington and Vienna in October 1918 points to the Hungarian historian's tendency to adapt history to theory in order to reinforce America's positive image as a potential ally in treaty revision.

As was discussed in chapter five, the Treaty of Trianon and Hungary's delicate situation in Europe between the world wars made open governmental revisionism unfeasible, at least until the second half of the 1930s. Therefore, revisionist efforts found new, semi-official channels. As a result, focus shifted to the importance of well-conducted international campaigns and that of civic and political education. Addressing the "learned American public" and academic circles and informing them about Hungary's situation and thereby winning their understanding and support turned out to be a significant means for conducting covert revisionist propaganda in the United States. Counts Pál Teleki and Albert Apponyi's visits to America in 1921 and 1923 respectively served these ends.

Both Teleki and Apponyi enjoyed a good reputation in the United States, their statesmanship and expertise were greatly acknowledged. During their visits both of them met influential American political and economic leaders, and the American press also kept a close eye on their activities. That notwithstanding, apart from the publicity their lectures and talks gained for the Hungarian cause, their visits failed to influence American political decision making and did not yield any practical results.

Within the context of the international effort to inform the learned audience abroad about the Hungarian question, foreign language periodicals such as *Külügyi Szemle*, *The Hungarian Nation* and *The Hungarian Quarterly* also did their share. The topics they addressed and the agenda they followed shows that the United States was, indeed, one of their focuses of attention.

Individual, semi-official campaigns and journals in English served an important role in the policy of the Hungarian government. Although Budapest distanced itself from open revisionism, it tacitly approved of such activities. Within such limitations, available primary sources indicate that Hungarian diplomatic representatives in the United States (Counts László Széchenyi and János Pelényi) found it difficult to further the Hungarian cause in America in their official capacity.

Besides the semi-official ones, there are many examples of popular or private contributions to revisionist propaganda in America. A study of archival sources has brought to light a variety of revisionist efforts ranging from private letters through propaganda pamphlets and brochures to book-length accounts and even a PhD dissertation. Among them, for example, Jenő Pivány's "Statement" addressed to the US Senate in September 1919, Louis Kossuth Birinyi's anti-Trianon works, Stephen Borsodi's and Béla Krécsy's pamphlets are presented in greater detail in chapter six.

Generally, these popular or private efforts illustrate the Hungarian desperation to win any and all support from the USA. Many of them entertained popular myths, were overly emotional, often lacked the clear judgment of the contemporary historical-political situation and their significance was often overestimated, as was the case with Jenő Pivány's appeal.

In addition, there were some systematic popular contributions to the anti-Trianon effort in the United States. Lord Rothermere's visit to the United States in the winter of 1927 and 1928 and his American activities gave Hungarian revisionism a boost. He put the Hungarian question into the limelight, and won over many Americans and Hungarian-Americans for the Hungarian cause. Rothermere became the hero of the day. Nevertheless, US State Department documents clearly demonstrate that, despite the popular belief, Washington considered Rothermere's activities unfortunate and dangerous. Hungarians grossly overestimated the effects of Rothermere's American campaign regarding America's support for the revision of

the Trianon frontiers. Joshua Butler Wright's memoranda to the State Department prove that such beliefs were largely unfounded.

Lord Rothermere's American campaign triggered two anti-Trianon endeavors: the Kossuth Pilgrimage in 1928 and the Justice for Hungary movement in 1931. Inquiry into archival sources in Hungary and the United States and the study of contemporary newspapers, personal accounts and memoirs shed light on important features of the Kossuth Pilgrimage: i.e. its ideological, political nature, its actual program and proceedings, its aims as well as its political and cultural effects. Although it was denied by the organizers and the participants, the Kossuth Pilgrimage was a covert revisionist propaganda campaign (with the tacit approval of the Hungarian government) in America with the aim to win America's support. Kossuth represented democratic and liberal values which the Americans considered important and sacred. Like before the war, Kossuth's political and moral legacy came to be viewed as an ideological bond between Hungary and America, and in the context of Trianon it gained great significance. Still, contrary to expectations, the pilgrimage again did not bring the expected results, inasmuch as no official measures followed. Clearly, Washington wished to distance herself from Hungarian revisionism; this was clearly demonstrated, for example, by the exchanges between the State Department and the Royal Hungarian Legation in Washington, D.C. relative to the visit the pilgrims wished to pay to President Calvin Coolidge.

Hungary was not among the most important partners for the United States during the interwar period. Nonetheless, a review of American foreign policy and American policy toward Hungary in chapter seven has shown that the Western European Desk in the State Department kept a close eye on Hungarian affairs, especially on revisionist efforts. With Hungarians holding high revisionist expectations towards America, the question was whether Washington would endorse the Hungarian cause. State Department documents and the memoirs and personal papers of the American diplomats in charge of Hungarian affairs

between the wars (William R. Castle, Jr., and others) also demonstrate that such expectations toward America were not well grounded. The position of official America on Hungarian issues and the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was defined by a policy of political non-entanglement in European affairs.

The case study on Senator William Edgar Borah's views on treaty revision offers the same conclusion. Borah held strong views about the Paris peace treaties and often criticized the Treaty of Trianon in particular. He believed that the treaties were morally, economically and politically wrong, so, consequently, they should be revised. Such public statements made Borah the champion of the Hungarian revisionist cause. His statements fed high expectations and created the false image that the senator could exert his influence on the official policy of the United States. A thorough review of his utterances demonstrates that he never considered political commitment to treaty revision in general, and the revision of the Treaty of Trianon in particular, a feasible option. Apart from moral and economic commitments, Borah never wished to entangle America with non-hemispheric, let alone Hungarian, affairs. Hungarian expectations toward Senator Borah, as toward the USA, therefore, were unfounded.

The policy of the total or partial restoration of historic Hungary was a major driving force between the wars. Revision by peaceful and strictly diplomatic means was considered to be the only solution by the Hungarian government until after the middle of 1930s. In this context, it can be generally concluded that, despite the popular beliefs according to which the USA would endorse the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, official America did not support Hungarian revisionism.

In the second half of the 1930s, pro-Nazi sentiments strengthened in Hungary. The rise of Hitler's Germany, and, consequently, its territorial expansion, encouraged militant revisionism. For the first time since the end of World War I, the rectification of Hungary's frontiers seemed possible. Orchestrated by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the Vienna

Awards in 1938 and in 1940 realized some of Hungary's territorial aspirations. In the long run, however, Hungary's Nazi orientation rendered any Western alliance impossible and made Hungary vulnerable to her own policies. In 1939 with the German attack on Poland World War II started, and almost within a year in November 1940 Hungary joined the Axis powers.

Disregarding reality, even after Hungary's accession to the Axis powers, there were Hungarian attempts at winning the goodwill and political support of America. Anglophile Hungarian politicians, among them Prime Minister Pál Teleki and Foreign Minister István Csáky, knew that it was imperative to secure a status for Hungary in which her post-war position would be much better than it had been after World War I. To counter Hitler's influence and strengthen the connections with the West, for example, Teleki sent member of the National Assembly and leader of the Smallholders' Party Tibor Eckhardt to the US in 1940 to lead a Hungarian mission and to join the Free Hungary movement, a political group of Hungarian émigrés in America to create an effective Hungarian lobby and, if necessary, enhance the establishment of a government-in-exile.⁵²⁶

In view of the growing German influence in Hungary and, consequently, Hungary's unstable international standing, Hungarian Minister to the US János Pelényi also sought to secure the goodwill of America. With the approval of the Foreign Office⁵²⁷ Pelényi made a tour of the major American universities. His aim was to get acquainted and exchange ideas

⁵²⁶ Nándor F. Dreisziger, "The Atlantic Democracies and the Movements for a 'Free Hungary' during World War II," in Ignác Romsics, ed. *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1995), 185-205. Hereafter cited as Dreisziger, "Movements for a 'Free Hungary.'" Also see "The Long Shadow of Trianon: Hungarian Alliance Policies during World War II," *Hungarian Studies* (Budapest), 17, 1 (2003): 33-5; Katalin Kádár Lynn, *Tibor Eckhardt: His American Years, 1941-1972* (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs, 2007) and Paul Nadányi, *The "Free Hungary" Movement* (New York: The Amerikai Magyar Népszava, 1942).

⁵²⁷ János Pelényi to Ira S. Lillich, December 29, 1939, Fond 8 K106, *Pelényi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives.

See also the letters written by Ferenc Deák to Pelényi on January 24, 1940 and January 29, 1940, both advising him on which universities he should visit and whom he should get in contact with; in Fond 8 K106, *Pelényi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives.

with the finest scholars and intellectual leaders of universities, people “who really count,” concerning international affairs and Hungary’s position in the war and in the future.⁵²⁸

As early as April 17, 1939, in a memorandum to his government, Pelényi proposed that the constitutional Hungarian government go into exile and establish in the West a government, which would provide no legitimacy and legality for the changes that a possible Nazi German invasion may affect in Hungary.⁵²⁹ In view of experiences during and after World War I, Pelényi believed that Hungary had to “prepare for [various] imaginable contingencies [...] to preclude another Trianon or an even worse fate at the end of the war.”⁵³⁰ Reflecting the political aims of the Free Hungary movement, Pelényi’s initiative matched the intentions of his government, which, led by Pál Teleki and Foreign Minister Csáky, was eager to secure the good will of the Western powers. Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Teleki asked Pelényi to carry this secret plan out. It failed, mainly due to Hungary’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Hungary’s participation in the attack on Yugoslavia, and its consequences in terms of Hungary’s international reputation, rendered any Western alliance improbable. The fact that even after the winter of 1940 some attempts were made by anti-Nazi Hungarian circles to win the West is well illustrated by Pelényi’s activities in the USA after his resignation on November 26, 1940.

Due to the ever-growing German influence in Hungary, Pelényi decided to resign chiefly, according to his own account, to save his personal connections and privately remain in service of his country, which without his resignation would have been impossible.⁵³¹ Following his

⁵²⁸ János Pelényi to Ira S. Lillich, December 29, 1939, Fond 8 K106, *Pelényi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives and János Pelényi to Ira S. Lillich, February 19, 1940, Fond 8 K106, *Pelényi Papers*, Hungarian National Archives.

⁵²⁹ John Pelényi, “The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West at the Outbreak of World War II,” *The Journal of Modern History* 36 (1964): 170. See also *Memorandum Sent by the Hungarian Minister in Washington to His Government on April 17, 1939* published therein. Hereafter cited as Pelényi, “The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West.”

⁵³⁰ *Memorandum Sent by the Hungarian Minister in Washington to His Government on April 17, 1939* published in Pelényi, “The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West,” 173.

⁵³¹ János Pelényi to then Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki explaining the reasons for his resignation the post of minister plenipotentiary to Washington, November 28, 1940. See also József Balogh to János Pelényi,

resignation it was through secret, semi-official channels that Pelényi continued to provide diplomatic services to the Hungarian government to further Hungary's case.⁵³²

Then as professor of Dartmouth College, Pelényi drafted a detailed note addressed to István Bethlen and to the anti-Nazi circles in Hungary. In it he advised the pro-Western political groups on what Hungary should do to “come to a general understanding with the United States” to save herself⁵³³ and avoid the post-war vortex, which, according to key American decision makers, carried in itself peace terms harsher than those of Versailles:

It must not happen that a false sense of honor or desperation hold us on the German side till the end when no one and nothing will be able to help Hungary. It would not change the situation if we would break with Germany until such time when the principal United Nations would no longer welcome our assistance [...]. In spite of the severe judgment which our active participation in the war on the side of the Germans has provoked in America, Hungary's cause can still be served if she takes the proper decisions. [W]e have ascertained that [...] the most competent factors here would prefer a solution in the Danube Valley which corresponds also to Hungarian interests provided that the future attitudes of Hungary offers a possibility for it. We must emphasize in particular that no objection would here be raised against the reincorporation of the whole of Transylvania into Hungary. [...] We have ascertained further that within the camp of the United Nations Hungary can count on an objective judgment primarily on the part of the U.S.⁵³⁴

This plan was never put into motion. According to Pelényi's note, the memorandum was supposed to be transmitted to Hungarian Ambassador to the Holy See Gábor Apor by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, which he never did.

The wartime American plan to create an economically viable and politically stable confederation in Eastern Europe, and thereby revise the Trianon frontiers to some extent, was abandoned even before the end of World War II. In 1943 at the Teheran conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt accepted the “three policemen” idea, and agreed that Hungary should become part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Thus, the fate of Hungary was decided for long

December 31, 1940; and “A Link with Hungary,” *New York Tribune*, November 30, 1940. In *János Pelényi Papers*, Hoover Institution on War and Peace, Stanford University. Hereafter cited as *Pelényi Papers*, Hoover Institution on War and Peace, Stanford University.

⁵³² Dreisziger, “Movements for a 'Free Hungary,’” 185-205.

⁵³³ This typed letter is a general reply to all ‘feelers’ which had reached America from Hungary in relation to the political perspectives if Hungary would break with Germany. No date, *Pelényi Papers*, Hoover Institution on War and Peace, Stanford University.

⁵³⁴ Hand-written draft of the letter from János Pelényi to István Bethlen via Baron Gábor Apor. N.d., 1942, *Pelényi Papers*, Hoover Institution on War and Peace, Stanford University.

years to come.⁵³⁵ Consequently, favorable American plans for Hungary's frontiers were no longer on the agenda. The 1947 Paris Peace Conference annulled the Vienna Awards and enforced boundaries for Hungary even more disadvantageous than those set by the Treaty of Trianon. The Hungarian nation again suffered a major national tragedy. To add insult to injury, the communist regime considered the problem to be non-existent, and the question of Trianon became a political taboo, leaving many essential political, economic, social, and ideological questions unanswered. It was only after 1989 when it became a topical issue again in public, academic as well as political discourse offering an important field for insight for the historian.

⁵³⁵ For more on this see Ignác Romsics, *Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary and the Paris Peace Conference, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 157-169; and Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harner and Brothers, 1944).

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Zeidler, Miklós. *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920–1945*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2007.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Andrássy, Count Gyula (1860–1929): Hungarian politician, the last foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy between October 24 and 30, 1918.

Apponyi, Count Albert (1846–1933): Hungarian aristocrat and politician, leader of the Hungarian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to receive the terms of the Trianon Peace Treaty in January 1920, and Hungary's delegate to the League of Nations.

Armand, Abel Count (?–?): French diplomat, intelligence officer of the French General Staff, carried out secret peace negotiations with Count Nicholas Revertera.

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish (1893–1973): American diplomat and journalist, editor of *Foreign Affairs* between 1928 and 1972.

Bainville, Jacques (1879–1938): French historian and journalist, leading member of Action Française.

Baker, Ray Stannard (1870–1946): American journalist, a Muckraker, a war correspondent in Europe during World War I and President Wilson's press secretary at Versailles.

Balogh, József (1893–1944): classical philologist, editor of *The Hungarian Quarterly*.

Bandholtz, Harry Hill (1864–1925): Major General of the US Army, American representative of the Allied Military Mission in Hungary in 1919.

Bánffy, Count Miklós (1873–1950): Hungarian politician, writer, between 1921 and 1922 minister of foreign affairs in the Bethlen government.

Bárdossy, László (1890–1946): Hungarian diplomat and politician, prime minister of Hungary between 1941 and 1942.

Berkó, Géza D. (1871–1927): owner and editor of *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* during World War I.

Bethlen, Count István (1874–1946): Hungarian statesman, prime minister of Hungary between 1921 and 1931.

Birinyi, Louis Kossuth (1886–1941): Hungarian-American historian and professor of law.

Borah, William Edgar (1865–1940): American attorney, politician, one of the Irreconcilables and Republican senator from Idaho.

Brentano, Theodore (1854–1940): American attorney and judge, the first American minister to Hungary between 1922 and 1927.

Brown, Philip Marshall (1875–?): American diplomat and professor of international law at Princeton University.

Burián, Count István (1851–1922): Hungarian diplomat and statesman, twice foreign minister of Austria-Hungary during World War I.

Butler, Nicholas Murray (1862–1947): American diplomat and educator, president of Columbia University and president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1925 and 1945.

Castle, William Richard, Jr. (1878–1963): American diplomat, chief of the Western European Desk of the State Department from 1921 to 1927, assistant secretary of state in Calvin Coolidge's cabinet.

Charles I (IV) (1887–1922): the last emperor of Austria-Hungary.

Clemenceau, Georges Benjamin (1841–1929): French statesman, and prime minister of France from 1906 to 1909, and from 1917 to 1920. One of the Big Three at the Paris Peace Conference.

Clerk, Sir George Russell (1874–1951): British diplomat, leader of the Clerk Mission in Hungary in October 1919.

Cobb, Frank Irving (1869–1923): American journalist, editor of the *New York World*, co-author of the Lippmann-Cobb Commentary on the Fourteen Points.

Coolidge, Archibald Cary (1866–1928): American educator, professor of history at Harvard University, one of the key members of the Inquiry, member of the American Delegation to Negotiate Peace and leader of the American political mission to Hungary in 1919.

Coolidge, Calvin (1872–1933): American politician, Republican president of the United States between 1923 and 1929.

Czernin, Count Ottokar (1872–1932): Austria-Hungary's foreign minister during World War I.

Csáky, Count István (1894–1941): Hungarian aristocrat, foreign minister of Hungary between 1938 and 1941.

d'Esperey, Franchet Louis (1856–1941): French general during World War I.

Dawes, Charles Gates (1865–1951): American banker and politician, father of the Dawes Plan, vice president of Calvin Coolidge.

Deák, Francis (–): Hungarian–American law professor at Columbia University, author of *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*.

Eckhardt, Tibor (1888– 1972): Hungarian politician, lawyer, member of the Hungarian National Assembly, Hungary's chief delegate to the League of Nations in 1934 and 1935.

Endresz, György (1893–1932): Hungarian aviator, co-pilot of the first Hungarian trans-Atlantic ocean flight in 1931 on board of the *Justice for Hungary*.

Faragó, László (?–?): Hungarian journalist, writer, member of the Kossuth Pilgrimage to New York in 1928.

George, David Lloyd (1893–1945): British liberal politician and statesman, prime minister of Great Britain and leader of the wartime coalition government between 1916 and 1922.

Gömbös, Gyula (1886–1936): Hungarian politician, prime minister of Hungary between 1932 and 1936.

Grant-Smith, Ulysses (1870–1959): American diplomat, US commissioner to Hungary in 1919, and the chargé d'affaires of the American Legation in Budapest from 1919 to 1922.

Harding, Warren Gamaliel (1865–1923): American politician, Republican president of the US between 1921 and 1923.

Hegedüs, Lóránt (1872–1943): Hungarian economist, politician, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Minister of Finances in the Bethlen government.

Herczeg, Ferenc (1863–1954): Hungarian author and playwright.

Herron, George David (1862–1925): American clergyman and writer, one of the major advocates of the Social Gospel movement, a self-appointed diplomat, prepared intelligence reports to the American and British governments during World War I.

Hoover, Herbert (1874–1964): American statesman, Republican president of the US between 1929 and 1933.

Horthy, Miklós (1868–1957): Hungarian aristocrat, statesman, admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary during the interwar period between 1920 and 1944.

Horváth, Jenő (1881–1950): Hungarian professor of history and international law, one of the major historians of the interwar period.

House, Edward Mandell (1858–1938): American diplomat, politician, chief foreign policy advisor to President Woodrow Wilson.

Hughes, Charles Evans (1862–1948): American lawyer, statesman, Republican politician, secretary of state between 1921 and 1925.

Huszár, Károly (1882–1941): Hungarian politician, prime minister of Hungary between November 1919 and March 1920.

Jászi, Oszkár (1875–1957): Hungarian sociologist, writer, editor of *Husztadik Század*, liberal politician, minister without portfolio in the Károlyi government, lived in exile in Oberlin, USA.

Jósika-Herczeg, Imre (?–?): officer in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I, military attaché in Berlin, immigrated to the USA, leader of the American-Hungarian communities in New York.

Kállay, Miklós (1887–1967): Hungarian politician, prime minister of Hungary between 1942 and 1944.

Karácsonyi, János (1858–1929): Hungarian historian, professor of theology, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Károlyi, Count Mihály (1875–1955): Hungarian statesman, politician, leader of the democratic ‘frost flower’ revolution in October 1918, prime minister, then president of the Hungarian Democratic Republic.

Keynes, John Maynard (1883–1946): British economist, theoretician of modern macroeconomics, author of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*.

Knox, Philander Chase (1853–1921): American politician, Republican senator from Pennsylvania.

Kovács, Alajos (1877–1963): Hungarian statistician, demographer, director and president of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Kun, Béla (1886–1938?): communist politician, leader of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

Lammasch, Heinrich (1853–1920): Austrian jurist, professor of criminal and international law, played key role in the secret peace negotiations with the Allies in 1918.

Lansing, Robert (1864–1928): American politician, legal advisor to the State Department, US secretary of state in President Wilson’s cabinet between 1915 and 1920.

Laval, Pierre (1883–1945): French politician, prime minister of France.

Lindbergh, Charles (1902–1974): American aviator, author, made his fame with his first non-stop solo trans-Atlantic flight in his plane, the *Spirit of St. Louis* in 1927.

Lippmann, Walter (1889–1974): American writer, political commentator, co-author of the Lippmann-Cobb commentary.

Magyar, Sándor (1898–1981): Hungarian aviator, navigator, co-pilot of the first Hungarian trans-Atlantic ocean flight in 1931 on board of the *Justice for Hungary*.

Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue (1850–1937): Czechoslovak politician, founder and the first president of Czechoslovakia.

Mensdorff-Pouilly, Count Albert (1861–1945): Austro-Hungarian diplomat, ambassador to London at the outbreak of World War I.

Miller, David Hunter (1875–1945): American lawyer, legal expert, State Department official, member of the American Delegation to Negotiate Peace in Paris.

Millerand, Alexandre (1859–1943): French politician, premier of France between 1920 and 1924.

Montgomery, John Flournoy (1878–1954): American businessmen and diplomat, US minister to Hungary between 1933 and 1941.

Nicholson, Harold (1886–1968): English diplomat and politician.

Nitti, Francesco Saverio (1868–1953): Italian politician, prime minister of Italy between 1919 and 1920.

Peidl, Gyula (1873–1943): Hungarian trade union activist and socialist politician, prime minister of Hungary for less than a week in August 1919.

Perényi, Baron Zsigmond (1870–1946): Hungarian aristocrat, politician, minister of the interior in 1919.

Revertera, Nicholas Count (?–?): Austrian nobleman and diplomat.

Pivány, Jenő (1873–1946): Hungarian-American author, self-appointed historian, an ardent researcher of Hungarian-American historical connections.

Poincaré, Raymond (1860–1934): French statesman, conservative politician, president of France from 1913 to 1920.

Porter, Steven Geyer (1869–1930): American politician, Republican representative in the US Congress.

Pozzi, Henri (1879–1946): French politician, author.

Roosevelt, Nicholas (1893–1982): American diplomat and journalist, US minister to Hungary from 1931 to 1933.

Rothermere, Viscount/Harold Sydney Harmsworth (1868–1940): British newspaper proprietor and owner, launched a press campaign in the *Daily Mail* in favor of the revision the Trianon Peace Treaty.

Scott, James Brown (1866–1943): American legal expert, professor of law, secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International peace.

Seton-Watson, Robert William (1879–1951): British historian, member of the New Europe group.

Seymour, Charles (1885–1963): American academic, head of the Austro-Hungarian Division of the Inquiry, member of the American Delegation to Negotiate Peace in Paris, later president of Yale University.

Smuts, Jan Christian (1870–1950): South African and British Commonwealth statesman, prime minister of the South African Union from 1919 to 1924.

Szalay, Imre Emil (?–?): Hungarian-American entrepreneur offered 25,000 dollars to the ‘Justice for Hungary’ ocean flight in 1931.

Széchenyi, László Count (1879–1938): Hungarian aristocrat, diplomat, and minister to the US from 1922 to 1933.

Taft, William Howard (1857–1930): American politician, Republican president from 1909 to 1913, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Teleki, Pál Count (1879–1941): Hungarian geographer, professor, aristocrat and statesman, prime minister of Hungary between 1920 and 1921 and 1939 and 1941.

Temperley, Harold W. V. (1879–1939): British historian, professor of modern diplomatic history, attended the Paris Peace Conference, and wrote its official history: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 6. vols., 1920-24.

Vix, Fernand (1876–1941): French soldier, head of the Allied Military Mission to Hungary between 1918 and 1919.

Walkó, Lajos (1880–1954): Hungarian politician, minister of foreign affairs in the Bethlen government between 1925 and 1930.

Wekerle, Sándor (1848–1921): Hungarian politician, three times prime minister of Hungary.


Wilson, Thomas Woodrow (1856–1924): American politician, professor of political science, a Progressivist, Democratic president of the US between 1913 and 1921, father of the League of Nations.

Wlassich, Baron Gyula (1852–1937): Hungarian aristocrat, lawyer, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, minister of religion and education in the first Wekerle government.

Wright, Joshua Butler (1877–1939): American diplomat, assistant secretary of state in Calvin Coolidge’s cabinet, minister to Hungary between 1927 and 1931.


MAPS

1. Historic Hungary⁵³⁶



⁵³⁶ The map is from Miklós Zeidler, *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920–1945* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2007), 414.

2. American Boundary Recommendations of 1919 and the Trianon Borders of Hungary.⁵³⁷



⁵³⁷ The map is from Ignác, Romsics, ed., *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1995), 355.