University Doctoral (PhD) Dissertation Abstract

The protection of personality rights in family law

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1. Background and objectives of the dissertation

Both the protection of personality rights and family law are *eternal* areas of law, which are *constantly changing* due to social influences. This dissertation seeks to explore and illustrate the direct links between these two areas of law. The reason for the choice of the topic lies in the *niche* nature of the subject of the research: although the subject of the protection of personality rights has been dealt with from many aspects in academic life, a comprehensive, complex examination of the protection of personality rights in family law relationships has not been carried out yet.

We have been talking about personality law as a category of legal philosophy for less than two centuries, based on the social philosophy of the Enlightenment, and the private law approach to the subject is even younger.[1] The question of how the protection of personality rights in family law relationships can be integrated into this system, which has a history of several centuries and which is constantly changing and expanding in the light of social, economic and technological trends, is still not the subject of consensus. Moreover, it is fair to say that the *unanswered questions* outweigh the *indisputable findings* as far as the protection of personality rights in family law is concerned.

We may rightly ask whether there is a place for the protection of personality rights in the system of family relations, i.e. whether the protection of personality rights can have a raison d'être in family law relationships. The background to the question is that the legal tradition has experienced a fundamental contradiction between the family and the individual, and has viewed the family as a unit rather than as an autonomous community of separate individuals.[2] From the nineteenth century onwards, and at an even faster pace in the twentieth century, we have witnessed an even faster acceleration of the questioning of the earlier traditional conception,[3] and in the last fifty years, the most fundamental change in family law and family relations has been the recognition and protection of individual rights – as *Sanford Katz* sees it.[4]

In view of all this – as the initial hypothesis of the research – we can assume that the protection of personality rights needs to be enforced in family law relationships as well. However, the

[1] Tímea BARZÓ: *Személyiségvédelem. A személyiségvédelem általános kérdései*. (Third part, First chapter) In: Tímea BARZÓ –Tekla PAPP (eds.): *Civilisztika I. Általános tanok, Személyek joga, Szellemi alkotások joga.* Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2018, 173.
[2] Elizabeth FOX-GENOVESE: *The legal status of families as institutions*. Cornell Law Review, 1992/5, 992.
[3] FOX-GENOVESE: 994.
[4] Sanford KATZ: *Individual Rights and Family Relationships*. In: Sanford N. KATZ – John EEKELAAR – Mavis MACLEAN: *Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and England*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 621.

differences between this and the traditional rules of the protection of personality rights require further investigation. It is undisputed that family law can and should be treated as an integral part of civil law; however, the rules of family law have relative autonomy within the body of private law. In *Tamás Lábady'*s view, this separation derives specifically from the unique approach to personality rights.[5]

Family is a construct and a value that existed before the law, and man is by nature a family being. According to *Lábady*: family is the *„fundamental cell of society."* Family is the source and founding event of human society, which has the character of natural law and has an internal constitution and principles that are at the interface of law and morality. These specifically legal characteristics animate, in the natural order of persons, the substantive factors that are fundamental to society as a whole. Although the marriage and the family are inseparably linked to legality, the normative legal provisions of external power are preceded by the internal, natural laws and regulative principles of the family and the marriage.[6]

In the light of all this, we may rightly ask how the classical rules of the protection of personality rights can be interpreted in the complex system of family ties, which are based primarily on moral and ethical principles. How can the rules of the protection of personality rights be enforced in the specific atmosphere of family relations? On the one hand, the research seeks to answer – along the lines of the questions posed – how the rights of the classical catalogue of personality rights in the Hungarian Civil Code are realised *in* family law, i.e. – in the words of *András Kőrös* – in the dimension of the *„most intimate"*[7] private law.

In addition to the exploration of the specific nature of the protection of the personality between the members of the family, the research attempts to examine the *additional elements* of the protection of personality rights in family law compared to the so-called classical protection of personality rights. It can be declared beyond any doubt that family law is one of the most rapidly changing areas of law with regard to its subject matter.[8] The interaction of social, economic and cultural processes is calling into question the traditional concept of the family, sometimes undermining the dominance of the nuclear family ideal. Legalised civil partnerships, single

[5] Tamás LÁBADY: *A magyar magánjog (polgári jog) általános része.* Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2000, 36.
[6] Tamás LÁBADY: *A házasság és a család jogi környezete*. In: Tamás LÁBADY: *Megtartott szó: válogatott jogi tanulmányok.* Wolters Kluwer, Budapest, 2018, 95-96.
[7] https://ptk2013.hu/interjuk/az-uj-ptk-csaladjogi-konyve-interju-koros-andras-kuriai-biroval/1669 (2021. 04. 02.)
[8] Marshall W. WALLER – Ryan C. WALLER: *California Family Law.* Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, New York, 2021, 2.

parents, childless couples or even mosaic families are all becoming more widely accepted and prevalent.[9]

Alongside the transformation of the traditional family model, another significant change is the focus on *children's rights*, as children are being treated as autonomous individuals with legally autonomous and separate interests.[10] Besides all these changes, we should further mention the rapid technological revolution taking place today, which is fundamentally reshaping our theory of the origins of life – just think of the increasing number of reproductive technologies being used – and which is also making it necessary to redefine the concept of privacy. As a result of this complex development, nowadays, family law is confronted with a number of questions – which a few decades ago seemed unthinkable – that, in the dimension of the protection of personality rights, are open to interpretation and often urgently need to be answered.

What privacy concerns does the practice of „sharenting" raise for the child? How can the child's right to know his/her genetic origins be interpreted in the light of new human reproductive technologies? How can the right to contact in the relationship between the child and the separate parent be safeguarded in pandemic circumstances? The dissertation seeks to answer, inter alia, these questions, which have arisen recently – a few decades ago, and in some cases only a few years ago – and which have a fundamental bearing on the subject of the protection of the personality rights in the dimension of family law.

2. Structure of the dissertation and research methods applied

The dissertation consists of two main units: the first, general part focuses on the *theoretical foundation* of the research topic, within the framework of which the dogmatic and historical development of the protection of personality rights is presented from the aspect of family law – with a special emphasis on the category of relative personality rights –, followed by an analysis of the specificities of the protection of personality rights in family law.

The second main unit of the dissertation aims the examination of the *practical application* of the statements of the general part by analysing certain personality rights typically applicable in the relationships of family law. Given the limitations of the dissertation, the analysis will focus exclusively on personality rights in family relationships, while rights vis-à-vis third parties and rights asserted by third parties will not be examined.

[9] Meg LUXTON: *Changing Families, New Understandings.* Contemporary Family Trends, 2011/6, 4.
[10] Victoria MI MATHER: *Evolution and Revolution in Family Law.* St. Mary's Law Journal, 1993/25, 406.

With regard to personality rights between spouses, the primary aim of the study is to demonstrate how the classical personality rights found in the Hungarian Civil Code are enforced between spouses under *special conditions and guiding principles.* The preliminary hypothesis of the research is that violation of these personality rights – in view of the long-lasting relationship of trust between the members of the family – are exercised in a particular way, in a manner different from infringements against third parties. While analysing the violations of personality rights in the parent-child relationship, the research will mainly focus on the hypothesis that family law has additional elements in the area of the protection of personality rights. In line with this hypothesis, an overview is given of the personality rights that have been developed as a result of judicial legislation and legal developments.

The research is based primarily on a *qualitative* review of the literature. In addition to domestic and foreign legislation, it further seeks to process and analyse Hungarian and foreign-language literature and judicial practice – predominantly English and French, and to a lesser extent German and Italian – as fully as possible.

The research attempts to explore the topic in full depth through *historical, theoretical and empirical* analysis. The method applied is library research, international comparative analysis of legislative materials, and the study of Hungarian legislative materials in an international context. Due to the specificity of the topic, the processing and synthesizing analysis of judicial and constitutional court case law is an indispensable method of research. In my view, the nature and content of personality rights, their relationship with other personality rights, and the limitation of these rights can be understood through the study and processing of case law.

The dogmatic method is used to present the legal philosophical concepts of personality rights, while the *historical method* is mainly used to review the history of the development of the protection of personality rights. The *comparative method* is mainly applied in the second part of the dissertation, in the analysis of rights, examining the foreign and domestic regulations on the specific personality right, highlighting their similarities and differences. The dissertation adopts an *interdisciplinary approach*, which means taking into account perspectives from outside private law – primarily constitutional law – as well as from social science outside law.

3. New scientific results of the dissertation

3. 1. Conclusions of the general part, de *lege ferenda* proposals

On the basis of the *doctrinal analysis,* it can be concluded that the protection of personality rights in family law relationships deserves attention. Despite it is not mentioned as an independent category, several representatives of the legal literature – for example *Artur Meszlény, Alajos Bozóky, Károly Törő*; and among the representatives of contemporary legal theory *Tamás Lábady, László Székely and Márta Görög* – emphasize the specificity of the protection of personality rights realized in family law. Due to the long-term, trust-based relationship, the parties – in addition to claims derive from the classic protection of personality rights – may have additional moral and ethical expectations of each other, which shall be assessed, at least at the level of jurisprudence.

As a result of this realization, the recognition of the autonomy of these personality rights, which are partly relevant to family law, was most prominent in legal literature and jurisprudence, resulting in the emergence of the *relative personality rights* in the nineteenth century. The main characteristic of this category of personality rights is that it is directed against certain persons, against the exercise of certain conduct, as opposed to the norm of absolute personality rights, which is generally binding on everyone. These rights can be interpreted as applying to specific members of society, and their subjects are both entitled and obliged, such as spouses and children and parents in their relations with each other.

In my opinion, the category of relative personality rights should not be mentioned occasionally, but it is absolutely necessary to legitimise and establish it in the legal community, especially in view of the fact that it is present in legal practice in many cases and produces conflicts that need to be resolved, and not only in family law: a typical case of a relative personality right relationship between an attorney and his client or a doctor and his patient. The scope is therefore much broader than can be covered in this research.

From my perspective, the protection of personality relevant in family law relationships is relatively distinct within the scope of relative personality rights. It is self-evident that in a lasting family law relationship, which is essentially imbued with moral norms, the above rules apply in a different way than in a doctor-patient or employer-employee relationship, which is based solely on the principle of *„pacta sunt servanda”*.

It should be emphasized that personal rights arising from the family law relationship – as highlighted by *Bozóky* and *Szászy* – cannot be identified with relative personality rights. A further criterion shall be fulfilled in order to establish the personality right, namely that the *value to be protected derives directly from the personality of the individual.* In my view, obligations of a moral nature arising from marriage, such as marital fidelity, the obligation of mutual cooperation and support, and the right of joint decision-making, do not meet this requirement and therefore, I do not consider it justified to include them in the scope of personality rights.

Based on the historical analysis, it can be stated that the protection of personality rights in family law relationships has not been significantly differentiated either at the level of legislation or in judicial practice, despite the fact that the courts have already adjudicated numerous claims and injuries of non-material damage with family law relevance since the beginning of statehood. However, it should be pointed out that the precursors of certain relative personality rights relevant to family law had already appeared in the nineteenth century, such as the right to *trace one's mother and father in the* case of the right to know one's genetic origins, while in the field of children's rights, *the right to contact.*

It is important to highlight the significant stage of development for this dissertation: the merging of the general right to personality with human dignity and its definition as a mother right. According to *Elemér Balás P.*, the general clause of the protection of personality is a *golden bridge*, which, in the form of a specific rule, provides the possibility of a freer functioning instead of a rigid attachment to positive law.[11] The general clause, which was drawn up by the Constitutional Court of Hungary and enacted in the current Hungarian Civil Code, serves as a legitimate basis for expanding the unwritten catalogue of personality rights, provided that there is a sufficiently close link between the value to be protected and the personality. It is in the spirit of this practice that typical personality rights in family law relationships have been recognised, such as the right to know one's genetic origins, the right to bring up one's children.

I believe that, from both a historical and a doctrinal point of view, as well as from an overview of the specific features of the legal relationship, it has been established that the protection of personality rights in family law cannot be reduced to claims arising from the infringement of absolute personality rights. In my opinion, the enforcement of the classical rules of personality

[11] Elemér BALÁS P.: *Személyiségi jog.* In: Károly SZLADITS (ed.): *Magyar magánjog. Első kötet, Általános rész, Személyi jog.* Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, Budapest, 1941, 641.

protection is absolutely necessary in family law relationships, but it is by no means sufficient. There are a number of rights and obligations arising from family relationships which, in addition to the general protection of personality, require *additional legal protection.* If the value to be protected derives directly from the personality of the individual, I consider it appropriate to apply the instruments of the protection of personality rights. As far as I am concerned, the recognition of rights established by judicial practice is necessary at the level of the application of the law, but I do not consider it necessary to enshrine them in the specific body of law, as this would make the written law extremely chaotic. Moreover, if it was permitted, other areas of law could also make a similar claim.

Knowledge of the relevant practice of the *Constitutional Court* is essential for a deeper understanding of the subject: although I consider it inappropriate to „conflate" the categories of fundamental rights and personality rights, I believe that these two categories cannot be interpreted and applied in a closed way. As a result of the work of the Constitutional Court in the development of the law, the content of a number of fundamental rights has been expanded and extended, which can also significantly facilitate the interpretation of the related personality right, for example, the right to know one's genetic origins or the right to contact. In view of this, I believe that the relevant case law of the Constitutional Court should serve as a guide for civil courts during the interpretation of the law – or, in the event of a possible legal vacuum, as a point of reference for legislation.

3. 2. Conclusions of the second part, *de lege ferenda* proposals

Rights in the relationship between spouses

The most relevant rights in the relationship between spouses are those contained in the *classical catalogue of personality rights* of the Hungarian Civil Code. The focus of my analysis has been on certain aspects of privacy, such as rights to a person's home, honour and reputation, privacy and communication, and rights to facial likeness and recorded voice. The analysis revealed that the terms 'privacy', 'private life' and 'private sphere' are synonymous concepts in the public mind, even though they are far from being identical. Consequently, I propose a clear distinction, definition and consistent use of these concepts in legal literature and practice.

Following the investigation, it was confirmed that the above rights also exist in the relationship between spouses: the right to privacy is a legitimate value to be protected in the intimate and confidential relationship between the members of the family. However, it can be concluded that these rights to privacy are exercised in a special way in family law relationships, supporting the

hypothesis of the dissertation that the *classical rules of the protection of personality rights* are exercised in family law in an *exceptional way*. The lasting bond of trust between spouses and the obligation of loyalty towards each other generate specific situations for the judiciary.

Consequently, given the typically long-term and durable relationship between the parties, the fact of infringement itself is also *fragile*. The consent of the infringing party, long-standing rights and obligations between the parties, family traditions and established norms of communication may also call into question the fact of infringement. To give an example, the judgement of a defamatory behaviour depends on the communication patterns of the family and the limit of tolerance of the parties. It may be the case that a behaviour which is considered to be an infringement in one family does not go beyond the limits of ordinary communication in the other family, and therefore does not give rise to a claim for protection of personality rights.

As a general trend, including the infringements of privacy in family law relationships, the unprecedented development of the digital era, the rise of the social media and the proliferation of online platforms have led to an increasing number of infringements committed in virtual spaces. The number of such infringements is high in the context of family members, as the shared household and shared objects – such as shared laptops, family houses with cameras, GPS trackers in family cars – contribute to the blurring of the boundaries of individual privacy.

The Hungarian legislator responded to this threat by creating the *Act LIII of 2018 on the protection of privacy*. This Act, which in its preamble highlights the impact of modern tools of infocommunication on everyday interactions, emphasizes that privacy protection also covers cyber harassment. In my view, the legislator, by enacting this law, has provided effective and enhanced protection of privacy to a necessary and sufficient extent. However, it is not excluded that new rights and new situations brought about by technological developments will require amendments to this law. In my view, however, the effective enforcement of the right and the swiftest possible response to the challenges posed by the new communication and information recording devices are primarily the responsibility of the judiciary, not the legislature. It goes without saying that the rapid digital developments that are nowadays taking place will only increase the number of questions need to be answered.

The analysis of the case law shows that the violation of the right to privacy in family law disputes is typically committed through the use of infringing evidence. The cases examined sufficiently demonstrate that the invocation of the *protection of the best interests of the child*, in close connection with the public interest in finding the truth, may sufficiently justify the

admissibility in court of evidence produced or obtained through infringement. On the contrary, the mere invocation of a legitimate private interest does not necessarily legitimise the use of unlawful evidence.

To summarize, in my opinion, the Hungarian legal regulation regarding the protection of the spouses' personality rights can be considered *satisfactory*, and the enforcement of the specificities and differences arising from the spousal relationship is necessarily implemented by the courts.

Rights in the parent-child relationship

Among the personality rights on the side of the child, the main focus of the research was on the newly emerging personality rights as a result of the *development of judicial law*. In their case, it was generally agreed that the results of foreign case law are forward-looking and set a precedent for domestic law: for example, the right to know one's genetic origins, which was declared to exist two years earlier in German law than in domestic law. In addition, the problems and responses to them brought about by the technological revolution are emerging sooner in an international context. An example of this phenomenon is *the right to be forgotten*, the foundations of which can be traced back to the legal development work of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the so-called Google Spain case. In my view, foreign law is ahead of domestic law not only in terms of the legitimisation of certain newly created rights, but also in terms of the development of their content. An example of this is the right to know one's genetic origins, the content of which is still undergoing significant changes as a result of the genetic-biotechnological revolution. The new questions that arise in this context – which are not yet in the focus of jurisprudence in Hungary – have already been answered in a number of Western European countries.

Taking into account the fact that the trends of legal development of foreign states and the legal solutions given to certain problems – especially with regard to the law of continental states – significantly determine the directions of domestic legal development, I believe that it is justified to monitor them closely, both from the side of the legislator and the judiciary.

In general, it can be stated that there is *uncertainty* among the courts as to the nature – the status of personality right – of certain newly-emerging rights on the part of the child, in particular the right to contact and, to some extent, the right to know one’s genetic origins. Some courts have consistently interpreted these rights as personality rights, while others have mechanically denied the claim for protection of personality right on the grounds that this dispute falls

exclusively within the field of family law and that, in accordance with the prohibition of duplication of the legal system, a dispute concerning the protection of personality rights cannot be used to resolve a dispute in another field of law. In my view, the need to resolve the contradictions arising from this conflicting judicial practice and, accordingly, the need to establish a consistent and uniform body of case-law is quite urgent, if only to avoid legal uncertainty.

I believe that the protection of these rights by the instruments of family law is inevitably necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in itself. I agree with the courts' position that family law disputes are primarily to be resolved by the institutions of family law, though, I also consider it necessary to recognise that in certain cases family law cannot respond effectively to the infringing behaviour. In cases where the litigant has exhausted the remedies of family law but the prejudice has not been remedied, it may be justified to bring an action for the protection of personality rights if the value to be protected derives directly from the personality of the individual. In my opininon, the pure fact that a conflict is of a strongly family law nature cannot automatically preclude the application of the means of protection of personality rights: this would lead to the full prevalence of a rigorous approach which advocates a sharp separation between family law and civil law, thereby preventing the full protection of personality, which necessarily cuts across the various areas and branches of law.

On this basis, I propose that the right to contact should be treated as a personality right, where the aggrieved party has exhausted all possible procedures and remedies offered by family law, but the infringing conduct continues to occur regularly and in a trend. I consider it justified to elevate the right to contact to the status of a right of personality, deriving from *the right to private and family life*. I also propose recognising the right to know one's genetic origins, derived from *the right to self-determination*. In my opinion, the knowledge of one's genetic origins is an indispensable condition of self-identity, the „core of identity." A prerequisite for the assertion of the above claims is that judicial practice consistently and uniformly treats these rights as personality rights.

Another typical problem with children's personal rights is the *limited possibilities to enforce them*. In my opinion, this is most evident in the context of certain aspects of private life, where the parent who, as a rule, legally represents the child is most often the party who infringes the law. Accordingly, the protection of the child's private life can be seen as a formal declaration of values, since, in view of the traditionally closed concept of parent-child relations and the hierarchical and authoritarian model of parenting. It is quite rare of for a child – even a child of

limited capacity aged 14 or over, who can bring an action for the protection of personality rights – to take legal action against his or her own parents.

A similar issue arises in relation to the enforcement of the child's right to self-determination in health care. In my view, this is due to the strongly paternalistic approach in our country, as is the case with the protection of privacy. I believe that the practice of the Anglo-Saxon countries can also serve as a guideline for our country, as the case of these countries demonstrates that, subject to a strict set of criteria, a minor can assert his or her opinion and convictions even in connection with procedures of such high priority as decision-making in connection with his/her health. Accordingly, I propose that the concept of the *mature minor,* as we have seen in the American practice, should be introduced into domestic health legislation, ensuring significantly more rights at least for minors with limited capacity. This solution would allow minors with sufficient maturity and discernment to exercise their right to self-determination with regard to specific health care services, subject to a strict set of criteria.

The impact of the unprecedented development of digital technology on everyday life should also be mentioned in the context of children's rights to privacy: this is most relevant to the phenomenon of *„sharenting",* which is linked to the right to privacy and *„digital footprints".* Today, '*posting*' and '*tagging*' have become commonplace and, in the absence of sufficient online awareness, the sharing of ultrasound images and semi-nude baby photos in social media has become one of the most natural things in the world. As this generation grows up, I believe that the number of legal disputes in connection with invasive and unwarranted interference with privacy will increase significantly, posing new challenges to legislators and courts. The right to be forgotten, which is still in its infancy, may come to the foreground, and a redefinition of the right to privacy is not excluded. One thing is certain: parental *„over-exposure"* and as a result, the blurring of the boundaries between privacy and publicity also present a number of situations to be resolved. In my opinion, the solution to the problems arising from the practice of sharenting requires a change in the law: by narrowing the right of consent of the parent – legal representative – to data processing as laid down in the GDPR, possibly by defining an exception.

The importance of an *interdisciplinary approach* and the need to use extra-legal instruments can be seen specifically in the context of the examination of children's rights. Concerns about the right to contact between the separated parent and his or her child, the child's right to self-determination in health care and the child's right to respect for his or her privacy demonstrate that the mere prospect of legal restraint without a marked change in the parent's parenting

attitude and approach is not sufficient to resolve the conflict in a reassuring way between the rights of the child and the rights and obligations arising from parental custody. In my opinion, a complex scientific – pedagogical and psychological – approach is needed in this case, in addition to the legal perspective.

For all the rights on the child's side, it can be concluded that their *effective enforcement* requires more *legislative and judiciary activity.* While the recognition and protection of children's rights has been explicitly recognised in the legal literature and legislation, there are a number of obstacles to the practical implementation of them, as detailed above. In my view, the regulation of the personality rights of children cannot be considered satisfactory. I believe that it is the right to privacy of the child that is most at risk, and that its protection should therefore be strengthened by guarantee rules, with appropriate sanctions for infringing parental behaviour. In my opinion, no sophisticated solution has been developed in foreign countries that would completely solve the practical problems surrounding the child's ability to assert his or her rights. At present, in the absence of such a regulatory model, the solution could be the invocation of the protection of best interests of the child, even in disputes of personality rights.

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List of publications related to the dissertation

Articles, studies (5)

1. **Szendrői, A.**: Meddig ér el a szülői kéz?: A kiskorút megillető egészségügyi önrendelkezési jog problematikája - I. rész.
   Med. et Jur. közlésre elfogadva, 1-10, 2022. ISSN: 2061-6619.

2. **Szendrői, A.**: A vér nem válik vízzé, avagy a vérségi származás megismeréséhez fűződő jog problematikája.
   Magyar Jog. 67 (6), 321-331, 2020. ISSN: 0025-0147.

   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

3. **Szendrői, A.**: Egy szúrás az egész?! Az életkorhoz kötött kötelező védőoltásokat övező személyiségi jogi kollíziók.
   Miskolci Jogi Szemle. 15 (2), 186-199, 2020. ISSN: 1788-0386.

   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

4. **Szendrői, A.**: A jogsértő bizonyítási eszközök felhasználhatósága a családjogi perben.
   Miskolci Jogi Szemle. 14 (2), 154-174, 2019. ISSN: 1788-0386.

   Level of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: A

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   Pro Futuro. 9 (2), 82-99, 2019. ISSN: 2063-1987.
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List of other publications

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6. **Szendrői, A.**: Alapjogi kollíziók a munkaviszonyban a személyiségi jog területén. *Miskolci Jogi Szemle. 12* (1), 127-142, 2017. ISSN: 1788-0386.

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Conference presentations (2)

7. **Szendrői, A.**: A munkavállalók személyiségi jogainak védelme a munkaügyi perben. *Profectus in Litteris. 9*, 283-288, 2018. ISSN: 2062-1469.

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By the directives of HAS Committee on Legal and Political Sciences: Publications in periodicals level „A": 5, related to the dissertation: 4.

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