fellebbezés elintézése a harmadfokú büntetőeljárásban
| dc.contributor.author | Törő, Blanka | |
| dc.contributor.author | Háger, Tamás | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-28T11:50:25Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-06-28T11:50:25Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-07-30 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The questions of remedy are in close relations with the legal force. The legal force of the clinching decisions represents the final, irreversible decision about the demand of penal law, which decision is a guideline and undeniably binding for all, and cannot be attacked with an ordinary appeal. The legal force of other decisions with the capacity to have legal force defines a decision which is final, irreversible, a guideline for all, obligatory (independent of executability) and cannot be attacked with an appeal. Furthermore, there are the decisions with formal legal force, the legal force of which stands only for not being appealable. A valid decision can only be made about the factual and legal basis of criminal responsibility by the court that is entitled and obligated to do it, that is, only the court has a right during criminal procedure to decide whether there was a crime or not, and if yes, who committed it. In relation to this, the question of material legal force can only regard the constituted charge and the act in consideration, when the court makes a permanent decision about the demand of penal law, in the framework of the substantive judging of the act that became the object of prosecution. Lodging an appeal on legal grounds shall be governed by the provisions set forth in Chapter XV of the Criminal procedure Act. The judgement of the court of second instance may be appealed at the court of appeal. The appeal against the judgement of the court of second instance may involve any of the dispositions therein or exclusively the justification thereof. An appeal may be lodged for legal or factual reasons. An appeal suspends the part of the judgement to become final which is to be reviewed by the court of appeal owing to the appeal. The third remedy is allowed only in cases where the first and second instance decision is absolutely different in the question of guilty. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | The questions of remedy are in close relations with the legal force. The legal force of the clinching decisions represents the final, irreversible decision about the demand of penal law, which decision is a guideline and undeniably binding for all, and cannot be attacked with an ordinary appeal. The legal force of other decisions with the capacity to have legal force defines a decision which is final, irreversible, a guideline for all, obligatory (independent of executability) and cannot be attacked with an appeal. Furthermore, there are the decisions with formal legal force, the legal force of which stands only for not being appealable. A valid decision can only be made about the factual and legal basis of criminal responsibility by the court that is entitled and obligated to do it, that is, only the court has a right during criminal procedure to decide whether there was a crime or not, and if yes, who committed it. In relation to this, the question of material legal force can only regard the constituted charge and the act in consideration, when the court makes a permanent decision about the demand of penal law, in the framework of the substantive judging of the act that became the object of prosecution. Lodging an appeal on legal grounds shall be governed by the provisions set forth in Chapter XV of the Criminal procedure Act. The judgement of the court of second instance may be appealed at the court of appeal. The appeal against the judgement of the court of second instance may involve any of the dispositions therein or exclusively the justification thereof. An appeal may be lodged for legal or factual reasons. An appeal suspends the part of the judgement to become final which is to be reviewed by the court of appeal owing to the appeal. The third remedy is allowed only in cases where the first and second instance decision is absolutely different in the question of guilty. | hu |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Debreceni Jogi Műhely, Évf. 10 szám 3 (2013) , 120-137 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.24169/DJM/2013/3/8 | |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1786-5158 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1787-775X | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 3 | |
| dc.identifier.jatitle | DJM | |
| dc.identifier.jtitle | Debreceni Jogi Műhely | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2437/318186 | en |
| dc.identifier.volume | 10 | |
| dc.language | hu | |
| dc.relation | https://ojs.lib.unideb.hu/DJM/article/view/5979 | |
| dc.rights.access | Open Access | |
| dc.rights.owner | Debreceni Jogi Műhely | |
| dc.title | fellebbezés elintézése a harmadfokú büntetőeljárásban | hu |
| dc.type | folyóiratcikk | hu |
| dc.type | article | en |
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